Definition: What Is a Trojan Horse and What Are It's Capabilities?

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Definition: What Is a Trojan Horse and What Are It's Capabilities? Definition: What is a trojan horse and what are it’s capabilities? A Trojan Horse is a program, which appears to be a useful tool but is able to do various things hidden in the background without the computer owner knowing. Trojan Horses have been named after the “Trojan Horse” in Greek Mythology; a wooden horse was left behind by Troy’s besiegers. Not knowing that the Greek had been hiding inside the horse. The people of Troy moved the horse to the inside of the town to celebrate their victory. Once within Trojan walls, the enemies left their hiding place to conquer the city. Nowadays, virtual Trojan Horse attacks work in a similar way. Trojan Horses are often incorrectly treated like viruses. This is only true to a certain extend;as opposed to viruses, their main purpose is not to destroy any kind of information stored on a computer, but to transmit this data to the initiator of the attack for abusing purposes or to get control over infected computers. Since the amount of data transmitted to the initiator is often too unfathomable, many Trojan Horses offer much more intelligent options. These so called Backdoor Trojans enable attackers to take control of foreign computers to do whatever they desire. It’s just like as if the attacker would be sitting in front of the infected computer. Well known Trojan Horses like Sub7, Netbus or Back Orifice consist of three parts: 1. Serverfile This is the file which has to be installed on the computer, the attacker wants to control. Using this file, the attacker is able to take control of the computer. In most cases, this file is sent as an attachment via email. The attachment is an executable file appearing to be an useful program. Once started, the Trojan Horse installs itself automatically. An error message pops up to distract the user of the computer, telling them that the installation of the program was not successful. The disappointed user often deletes the program file and forgets about it. Unfortunately, they are not aware of the fact that a Trojan Horse has been installed which automatically starts on a system reboot. Everytime, the computer is turned on, the Trojan Horse loads itself into the main memory, waiting for a client to get in touch with it. 2. Configuration tool fort he serverfile This is the program used to set up certain options for the serverfile. It is possible to adjust which way the server is supposed to start itself after successful infection, or which ports to use to gain access to a computer. Usually the serverfile is being created using this kind of configuration tool, where it is possible to select which options the Trojan Horse should offer after taking over control of a computer. 3. Client After successful infection of a computer, the client tries to build up a connection to the infected computer. If everything worked out fine, it is now possible to use the client program to gain access to the serverfile on a computer. There are many different types of Trojan Seite 1 von 9 Horses using different routines. Trojans, only sneaking around in foreign systems are as likely as Trojans, gathering important or valuable information to send it to a certain address via email. Oftentimes, these Trojans are able to do their destructive work for months without being recognized. Some of them only start, when an internet connection is being built up – a fact, which makes finding Trojans on the own system a very difficult task. What is a port and why do Trojan Horses use them? Although most of the computers only have one IP-address, it is possible to run many different services. This is possible because every single service uses a specific number (port) for the exchange of information. Let’s suppose a server machine, running the services www (world wide web) and ftp (file transfer protocol); when trying to exchange information without port numbers, none of the running services is able to recognize if certain incoming data is designated to them. Ports serve the purpose of channelling certain data into an application or service. Using these port numbers every single service knows, who the recipient of the information is. Ports with the numbers 1 to 1024 are reserved for standard-programs (www, ftp,..). The maximum numeric value of a port would be 65.535. Thus, the complete port range begins with 1 and ends with 65.535. Ports are used by Trojan Horses to sneak their way into a computer system. Since most of the computer owners have no idea of which ports are ‘open’ on their system, it is easy for a Trojan to invade a system over a certain open port. Unfortunately, Trojan Horses are able to use different ports. That allows a Trojan to be able to switch onto another port, in case the used one is closed. What are Trojan Horses able to do? This depends on what the attacker wants to do. If the intention is to gather information, infliction of damage to the system can be excluded. But if the attacker intends to cause trouble, he is going to use a Trojan Horse, which offers options to take control of the infected computer. This starts with remotely opening the CD-Rom-tray to even deleting files or the entire hard-disk. This shows that a Trojan Horse can be a powerful tool, which, in the wrong hands, can cause serious damage. How can someone take control of my computer? If an attacker manages to get his server-file on a foreign computer-system, the only thing left he needs is the computer’s IP address. An IP address is a combination of numbers, which identify a computer on the internet. Computers get their IP addresses from their providers, when dialing into the internet. When using an advanced type of Trojan Horse, the server-file can be sent via email. Once installed on the foreign PC, the server sends the IP address of the infected computer to the initiator of the attack. Many Austrian internet providers (Chello, A-Online,..) offer so called static IP addresses to their customers. Static IP addresses never change when dialing into the internet, since the dialing routine itself never takes place. The advantage of a static IP address is, that it is Seite 2 von 9 much more easier to install and use an own internet-server. But on the same time it makes causing damage on a computer a whole lot easier for potential attackers. Identification: How to discover trojan horses Trojan Horses can inflict serious damage to a computer system. But how is it possible to detect an infection? There are different methods of finding out whether a Trojan Horse managed to infect a computer or not. One thing’s for sure: if your computer begins to do funny things, without you even touching the mouse, the chances of being infected are nearly 100 percent. Harmless pranks like opening and closing the CD-ROM-tray or swapping the mouse-axis might sound funny, but unfortunately serious issues like hiding or even deleting important system-files are also possible. Therefore it is very important to always have an eye on what’s going on on or off the screen. If something unordinary happens, closing the internet-connection and checking the whole system might be a good idea. Revealing Trojan Horses is an easy task, as long certain security rules were maintained. If this is not the case, tracking down Trojan Horses might be a little bit more difficult. Most of the revealing-methods use the so called „object comparison principal.” Objects would be files or folders. The objects are being compared with themselves on a sooner or later point of time. Let’s take a backup tape or a burned CD-Rom, for instance. Some of the files on the backup-media are being compared to the actual files on the computer. If those two files differ and the file on the computer has not been modified or replaced in any way, then there’s a possible infection. Since we didn’t modify it in any way, the file on the system should have the exact same file-size like the one on the backup-tape. This technique should be used on every system-file, since attackers like using them to get their Trojan Horses inside a running system. Object-comparison is an easy method to check the file-integrity, which is based on the discovery of state-modifications of files. Alternative methods variegate from simple to very difficult. The integrity of a file can be verified by checking the date of the last modification, the creation date of the file and the file-size. Unfortunately all three methods are insufficient, since the values can be easily manipulated in one way or the other. Each time a file is modified its values change. For example, if you open a file, change it and save it, a new date for the last modification is given. This date- stamp can easily be changed, by adjusting the computer’s system time, and saving the file again. Therefore using the date-stamp on files is the most unreliable method to compare objects. Another way to verify file-integrity is to check the file-size. This method too is unreliable, since this value as well can be manipulated. It’s quite easy to start with a file which has approximately 1000KB, modify it and save the same file with the exact file-size from the start.
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