South China Sea Tensions Reflect Danger of Defense Budget Cuts
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ISSUE BRIEF No. 3688 | August 2, 2012 Storm Warnings: South China Sea Tensions Reflect Danger of Defense Cuts Dean Cheng n recent months, tensions have they had a bargain to de-escalate the Meanwhile, Beijing also exerted Irisen in the South China Sea as the conflict, the Philippines pulled out heavy pressure on the Association of ongoing territorial disputes between its ships. Although the Chinese did Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) various Southeast Asian states and not deploy naval ships to the waters, at its annual meeting to reject any the People’s Republic of China have Chinese fishing boats and civilian statement regarding the South China begun to boil. An April speech by law enforcement vessels remained, Sea. Efforts to characterize discus- Chinese Defense Minister Liang despite an announced Chinese fish- sion of the conflict between China Guanglie stating that the South Sea ing ban on the area. and the Philippines led to “unprec- Fleet would be the vanguard of major At the same time, the Chinese edented discord” within ASEAN. new missions makes recent develop- ratcheted up the pressure on “The row illustrated how Southeast ments even more ominous. This situ- Manila by discouraging tourism Asian nations have been polarised ation raises real stakes for the United and imposing additional “inspec- by China’s rapidly expanding influ- States, especially in the context of tions” on imports of Philippine ence in the region.”1 Consequently, ongoing and potentially accelerating bananas. Chinese foreign ministry for the first time in ASEAN’s 45-year cuts to the defense budget. spokespeople regularly mentioned history, no joint communiqué was Increasing Chinese Pressure. the Scarborough Shoal in order to issued, raising real concerns that the China has been steadily increas- remind Manila that the Chinese saw regional organization was in disarray ing pressure on its neighbors in the this as a high-profile issue. due to Chinese pressure. ongoing South China Sea dispute, Then, in June, the China This was then followed by the employing a variety of means. In National Offshore Oil Company announcement that the Nansha March, Chinese and Philippine fish- announced that it was opening nine (Spratlys), Xisha (Paracels), and ing vessels converged on the disputed new blocks in the South China Sea Zhongsha (Macclesfield Bank) ter- Scarborough Shoal, reinforcing each to bids for exploration and develop- ritories would all be administered side’s claim to the area. Thinking ment. All of these blocks are in dis- by a new, prefectural-level political puted waters directly off Vietnam’s entity called Sansha City (Sansha is coast, in some cases within 100 literally “three sands,” referring to This paper, in its entirety, can be found at nautical miles of Vietnam’s shores. the three “sha” of the disputed ter- http://report.heritage.org/ib3688 A few days later, the Chinese min- ritories). This new political entity is Produced by the Asian Studies Center istry of defense announced that it higher than the previous city-level The Heritage Foundation was preparing to start regular naval entity that had informally adminis- 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 patrols in the waters around the tered these territories. Even more (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Spratly Islands, which are claimed worrisome, the new Sansha prefec- Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily by not only China but Brunei, ture has a military garrison headed reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, by a senior colonel (brigadier general before Congress. and Vietnam. equivalent).2 Coupled with an earlier ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3688 August 2, 2012 announcement that the PLA would fighter fleet, for example, is believed American Responses. It is in now be mounting regular combat- to be assigned to the Guangzhou MR the American interest to help keep ready patrols of the Spratlys, it would Air Force. The Guangzhou MR has the peace in this area, especially as appear that Beijing is prepared to also seen a steady growth in infra- the economic lifelines of such key militarize its claims within the so- structure, including submarine allies as Japan, South Korea, and called “nine-dash line.”3 tunnels on Hainan Island, as well as Taiwan all transit the waters. The Growing Regional Chinese an array of airbases. (Indeed, in the loud statements of a U.S. “pivot” to Military Capabilities. For Beijing, 2001 EP-3 incident, the U.S. aircraft Asia would seem to have provided an the two decades of nearly unbroken made an emergency landing at one opportune moment for underscor- double-digit increases in the People’s such base.) Other reports suggest ing U.S. ability to maintain regional Liberation Army (PLA) defense bud- that new rocket artillery systems stability. get provides them with additional have been deployed with some units Yet despite claims by Secretary military tools with which to under- in the Guangzhou MR.4 of Defense Leon Panetta that more score China’s claims to the region. More worrisome, senior PLA than half of the U.S. Navy would For most of the 1990s and 2000s, commanders have hinted that the be stationed in the western Pacific, the focus of the PLA was on Taiwan. Guangzhou MR will have additional the reality is far more thread-bare. Consequently, the best forces tended serious responsibilities and have Half the U.S. carrier fleet is cur- to be deployed to the Nanjing mili- praised its crisis-response capacities. rently centered on the Middle East,6 tary region (MR) opposite the island. In April, Chinese defense minis- Meanwhile, there is only one carrier As the resources available to the ter Liang Guanglie praised the MR currently assigned to the Seventh PLA have continued to flow, however, for its efforts at littoral defense and Fleet in the western Pacific. other parts of the PLA have benefited defense mobilization work. He then And this is before further budget as well. While many analysts have stated that the MR will play a lead- cuts hit. tended to focus on the acquisition ing role in future vital missions (zai Sequestration, with its imposi- of certain new capabilities such as zhongda renwu zhong dang jianbing, tion of another half-trillion dol- anti-ship ballistic missiles and the 在重大任务中当尖兵).5 lars in additional cuts atop those addition of a new aircraft carrier In some ways, the Guangzhou MR already programmed, will clearly (now undergoing sea trials) and have is the central repository of China’s hollow out American ability to raised concerns with them in asso- forced entry capabilities. Both of maintain substantial presence in ciation with a Taiwan contingency, China’s two marine brigades are the western Pacific. The budget the increased largesse has also been assigned to the South Sea Fleet, slashes, made without regard to reflected in modernization of other which is part of the Guangzhou strategy, will affect every part of portions of the PLA. MR. Similarly, the PLA Air Force’s the U.S. military, from training and This extends to the Guangzhou (PLAAF) three airborne divisions logistics to operations and main- MR, which is believed to have are all believed to be based in the tenance to acquisition and R&D. responsibility for the South China Guangzhou MR (but are controlled The PLA can only hope for such Sea region. A portion of China’s Su-27 by the PLAAF, not the MR). opportunities. 1. Olivia Rondonuwu, “ASEAN to Claim Common Ground on South China Sea, but No Communiqué,” Reuters, July 20, 2012, http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/20/asean-south-china-sea-idINDEE86J05120120720 (accessed July 31, 2012). 2. Associated Press, “China Names Military Heads of South China Sea City,” July 27, 2012. http://www.kfvs12.com/story/19127310/china-names-military-heads-of-south-china-sea-city (accessed July 31, 2012). 3. China Ministry of Defense, “Chinese Military Has Already Begun Routinized Combat-Ready Patrols,” June 28, 2012, http://news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2012-06/28/content_4381044.htm (accessed July 31, 2012). 4. Zhu Shuangshe, “New Equipment Has Arrived,” PLA Daily, July 5, 2012, http://mil.cnr.cn/zgjd/lj/201207/t20120705_510118898.html (accessed July 31, 2012). 5. Xinhuanet, “An Important Speech by Liang Guanglie: Guangzhou MR Will, in Future Vital Missions, Serve as the Vanguard,” April 17, 2012, http://mil.news.sohu.com/20120417/n340750133.shtml (accessed July 31, 2012). 6. Luis Martinez, “Pentagon Sends Carrier to the Middle East Early,” ABC News, July 16, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/07/pentagon-sends-carrier-to-the-middle-east-early/ (accessed July 31, 2012). 2 ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3688 August 2, 2012 What Should Be Done. missions. Yet under sequestration, the fleet is likely to shrink to 230 ■■ Preserve American presence. ships—its lowest in over a century. As the ASEAN meetings amply When one also takes into consid- demonstrated, China has the eration that a portion of that fleet ability to pressure its smaller is always in maintenance or rota- neighbors when there is no direct tion, the gap between reality and American countervailing pressure requirement becomes a yawning available. Unlike Europe, Asian chasm. diplomatic history is not one of balancing against hegemonic rise A Perilous Flashpoint. The but of acquiescence. Without a South China Sea is becoming an ever substantial American presence, more perilous flashpoint as China Asia is likely to fold its hand to increasingly asserts its control over China. But presence does not the region and develops the means come cheaply—although many to back it up. Consequently, the U.S. Asian allies provide substantial needs to make clear that regional defrayal of costs.