FORGING a NEW PATH: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK's Response to Conflict

FORGING A NEW PATH: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK's Response to Conflict

Liam Walpole Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen This report was written by staff at the Oxford Research Group’s Remote War- fare Programme. We were set up in 2014 to examine changes in military engagement, with a focus on remote warfare. This is the trend in which countries like the United Kingdom choose to support local and regional forces on the front lines rather than deploying large numbers of their own troops.

Liam Walpole (Policy Manager) and Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen (Research and Policy Officer).

With expert contributions from Abigail Watson (Research Manager) and Alasdair McKay (Senior Editor).

We would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to the many people who gave up their time and shared their knowledge with us for this report. Some of them, often still in official positions, have preferred to remain anonymous and are not named here. None of them bear responsibility for any of the opinions (or errors) in this report, which are the authors’ own.

Andrew Yaw Tchie, Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, Beatrice Godefroy, Catherine Roe, Chris Swallow, Elea- nor Beevor, Emily Knowles, Ewan Lawson, Feargal Cochrane, Frank Ledwidge, George Woodhams, Georgina Wright, Hijab Shah, James Clark, Melissa Dalton, Mike Wilmot, Patrick Hamilton, Robert Page, Sam Goodman, Sam Johnston Hawke, Sean Moore, Thomas Wheeler, and Tracey German.

Published by the Remote Warfare Programme, July 2020.

Remote Warfare Programme Oxford Research Group The Green House 244-254 Cambridge Heath Road London E2 9DA

Charity no. 299436 Company no. 2260840 [email protected] http://oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk

Cover Image: REUTERS / THOMAS MUKOYA - stock.adobe.com

The text of this report is made available under a Creative Commons license. Photographs remain the copy- right of original holders. All citations must be credited to the Remote Warfare Programme and the Oxford Research Group. This report was written by staff at the Oxford Research Group’s Remote War- fare Programme. We were set up in 2014 to examine changes in military engagement, with a focus on remote warfare. This is the trend in which countries like the United Kingdom choose to support local and regional forces on the front lines rather than deploying large numbers of their own troops.

Liam Walpole (Policy Manager) and Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen (Research and Policy Officer).

With expert contributions from Abigail Watson (Research Manager) and Alasdair McKay (Senior Editor).

Published by the Remote Warfare Programme, July 2020.

Remote Warfare Programme Oxford Research Group The Green House 244-254 Cambridge Heath Road London E2 9DA

Charity no. 299436 Company no. 2260840 [email protected] http://oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk

Cover Image: REUTERS / THOMAS MUKOYA - stock.adobe.com

Executive summary ...... 1 Introduction ...... 3 Section 1 ...... 5 The UK’s Role in the World ...... 5 Section 2 ...... 12 POC and UK strategy ...... 12 Section 3 ...... 17 Overseas Security and Justice Assessments ...... 17 Security Force Assistance: Risk Mitigation in Practice ...... 17 Section 4……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….30 Addressing the Accountability Gap Over UK Special Forces ...... 30 Conclusion ...... 36 List of abbreviations

• Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) • Armed Non-State Actors (ANSA) • Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) • Conflict Sensitivity Marker (CSM) • Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) • Counter Terrorism Associated Prosecurial Reforms Initiative (CAPRI) • Department for International Development (DFID) • Department of Defence (DOD) • European Union (EU) • Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) • Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) • Intelligence and Security Committee • Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) • Internal Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST) • International Humanitarian Law (IHL) • International Human Rights Law (IHRL) • International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) • Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT) • Islamic State (IS) • Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) • Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) • Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT) • Joint Services Publication 1325: Human Security in Military Operations (JSP 1325) • Ministry of Defence • National Security Advisor (NSA) • Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) • Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) • Overseas Security and Justice Assessment (OSJA) • Oxford Research Group (ORG) • Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) • People’s Protection Units (YPG) • Protection of Civilians (POC) • Royal Air Force (RAF) • Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) • Somali National Army (SNA) • Special Air Service (SAS) • Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) • United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) • United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) • United States Special Operation Forces (US SOF) Executive Summary

The United Kingdom (UK) currently faces military and political officials and members a rare opportunity to forge a new path for of the civil service, this report lays out the its foreign policy. Among other things, it is challenges of the UK’s current policies and preparing to leave the European Union the steps required to improve the UK’s (EU) and finds itself responding to one of safeguarding mechanisms. It argues the most significant global health crises in that for the UK’s safeguarding mechanisms living memory. At the same time, the Gov- to be effective, the following changes must ernment is embarking on the “largest re- be made: view of the UK’s foreign, defence, security and development policy” since the end of The Protection of Civilians (POC) Strat- the Cold War. For this review to improve egy must be updated. the way the country engages overseas, it While it is positive that the UK has a na- must incorporate lessons from the last dec- tional policy focused on protecting civilians ade on the impact of remote warfare on ci- in conflict, the 2010 POC Strategy is now a vilian populations. decade old and must be updated to reflect contemporary conflicts. Such an update Remote warfare has characterised the was promised in early 2019, yet it remains UK’s response to conflict over the last dec- unclear when the renewed Strategy will be ade and sees states like the UK deploying published and how it will take into account fewer numbers of their own troops. Instead, the challenges of remote warfare. To be ef- they provide support to local and regional fective, an updated POC Strategy must fo- partners who do the bulk of the frontline cus on: fighting. Western policy-makers often perceive this approach to be both low-cost and • Moving beyond a focus on civilian low-risk, compared with previous major harm caused by others to also ad- conventional deployments in Iraq and Af- dress harm to civilians from the ghanistan. However, this is not the case for UK’s own actions, and the actions those civilians who live in the theatres of of partners who have received UK these military operations. Our research has support; shown that remote warfare presents distinct risks to civilians. Accounting for the • Committing to communicating people on the ground, and building effec- clearly on POC, including by active tools to safeguard against their harm, counting more accurately for civilian is vital not just for legal and moral reasons. harm and deaths. It must also be done to ensure that the UK’s At the same time, it is important to go be- international engagements contribute to yond a narrow focus on the POC Strategy forging peace and stability abroad. It is also to ensure that gaps in other relevant strat- in the UK's strategic interests to ensure that egy documents are also addressed. Im- its international engagements contribute to portant among these is the Joint Services forging peace and stability and abroad. Publication 1325, which was published in January 2019 to cover the military’s ap- However, as it stands, the UK’s safeguard- proach to human security. Both the POC ing mechanisms are inadequate. Based Strategy and the JSP 1325 must focus on on roundtables and expert interviews with the following elements to improve the UK's

Remote Warfare Programme 1 approach to protecting civilians in remote • Expanding the remit of Parlia- warfare: ment in overseeing the OSJA process; • Bridging differences in the ap- • Incorporating specific guidance on proach taken by departments who the particular risks when provid- share responsibility for implementing support to non-state ac- ing the Government’s commitments tors as part of its OSJA Guidance; to protect civilians – including differences in the use of language; • Introducing a database for collating information on OSJA to im- • Routinely engaging with civil soci- prove cross-government working, in ety actors including civil society Whitehall and in-country. groups in the countries where the UK operates. Addressing the Accountability Gap over UK Special Forces The Overseas Security and Justice Assis- tance (OSJA) Guidance must be re- The blanket opacity afforded to the UK’s formed. Special Forces (UKSF) makes it impossible Beyond strategy documents, there are to assess the effectiveness of their ap- mechanisms in place to prevent civilian proach to civilian harm mitigation. It is harm from UK actions during international therefore essential that the Government: programmes and projects – key among these is the Government’s OSJA Guid- • Ensures allegations of wrongdoing ance. However, the OSJA lacks transpar- follow the same due process as the ency and is too narrowly focused on ad- rest of the British Armed Forces; dressing the legal risks of providing security assistance abroad. It fails to account for • Supports the introduction of a pro- the broader drivers of conflict that need to cess of external accountability of be considered to improve the UK’s contri- UKSF in Parliament; bution to long-term peace and stability. To • Releases details of the accounta- tackle these problems, the Government bility mechanisms in place to ad- must focus on: dress both instances where UKSF soldiers, and foreign units they • Setting out a mechanism to account have trained, commit abuses for the underlying causes of con- against civilians. flict in the places it engages overseas; At the same time, the UKSF must: • Prioritise the protection of civilians • Introducing a clear policy on sus- both as part of its own opera- pending and withdrawing sup- tions, but also where it is de- port to partners, including a pro- ployed to train foreign military cess of remediation when instances units. of abuse occur;

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 2 Introduction

The United Kingdom’s (UK) foreign policy foreign and domestic policy for years to stands at a crossroads. In the context of the come. UK’s formal withdrawal from the European Union (EU), the country is undergoing one Remote warfare is no exception. Over the of the most dramatic reviews of its ap- last six years, the Remote Warfare Pro- proach to foreign policy in decades. Prime gramme at Oxford Research Group (ORG) Minister Boris Johnson’s Government in- has examined this form of engagement tends to use this as an opportunity for the which has emerged since the post-9/11 UK to re-define its role on the international wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. stage as “Global Britain”1, launching what is being described as the “largest review of Facing shrinking military budgets and per- the UK’s foreign, defence, security and de- ceived resistance from electorates, coun- velopment policy” since the end of the Cold tries like the UK have become increasingly War.2 reluctant to deploy large numbers of their own troops, and focus instead on support- This has gained the title ‘The Integrated ing local and regional forces, who do the Security, Defence, Development and For- bulk of frontline fighting. The UK’s support eign Policy Review’ – or the ‘Integrated Re- can range from intelligence sharing, arms view’ for short. Such an extensive and exports and military training, to special timely assessment of the UK’s foreign pol- forces deployments and air support – both icy offers an opportunity to take stock of combat and non-combat. Remote warfare what has worked in the UK’s international has been key to the UK’s military engage- approach over the last two decades and ments across the Middle East, the Sahel what has not. Doing so objectively is vital and the Horn of Africa in the last decade. as the results of the review are likely to For risk-averse policymakers, fearful of the have implications for many aspects of UK political and public backlash from military

Remote Warfare Programme 3 deployments, this approach has been, and only vital for moral and legal reasons; it is continues to be, considered lower risk and also essential to ensure that the UK’s inter- lower cost compared to conventional de- national engagements contribute to the ployments. Yet our research over the last UK’s strategic interests. six years has found that this interpretation fails to account for the effects on civilians in This report lays out how the UK’s safe- conflict-affected countries, where ‘remote’ guarding mechanisms to protect civilians in warfare is not at all remote but rather part conflict can be improved as part of its con- of the everyday reality. This shift towards tribution to resolving conflict abroad. It does remote warfare poses distinct risks to civil- so in four sections. ians. To better understand these particular risks to civilians and the opportunities of- Section 1 explores the Integrated Review fered by the Integrated Review, the Re- and the UK’s role in the world – and how mote Warfare Programme conducted a se- this is likely to change over the next few ries of five roundtables between June 2019 years. and June 2020, covering both protection of ci-vilians (POC), and the Integrated Review Section 2 examines the opportunities and it-self. We supplemented this with challenges of the UK’s strategic POC doc- interviews with members of the military, uments, including the POC Strategy itself, academia, government, civil servants, and as well as the Ministry of Defence’s civil soci-ety. (MoD’s) Joint Services publication 1325: Human Security in Military Operations. Our research has found that while recent campaigns, including the counter-Islamic Section 3 goes on to examine gaps in cur- State (IS) wars in Iraq and Syria, have pro- rent mechanism to safeguarding against vided plenty of tangible lessons on protect- harm to civilians from UK projects abroad, ing civilians in remote warfare, these les- with a focus on the Government’s Over- sons have not been effectively incorpo- seas Security and Justice Assistance rated into British policy. This gap is particu- (OSJA) Guidance. larly disconcerting given that remote warfare is likely to remain the predominant Section 4 examines how the blanket opac- means by which the UK engages militarily ity over the UK’s Special Forces makes it in the decade ahead. While the COVID-19 impossible to assess the effectiveness of outbreak has led to the temporary suspen- their POC efforts. sion of many of the UK’s training programmes, the pandemic is likely to exacerbate the temptation to rely on remote warfare in the long run.3

As the military, political and economic con- straints which led to the dominance of remote warfare at the beginning of the last decade worsen, in part as a consequence of the financial pressures brought on by the pandemic, working through partners is likely to remain the preferred option with policymakers.4 Improving the protection of civilians in remote warfare is therefore not

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 4 Section 1 The UK’s Role in the World

It is welcome that the Government has announced what appears to be one of the most expansive reviews of UK foreign policy in decades. However, recent events have provided strong evidence that the Johnson Government may use the Inte- grated Review as an opportunity to drive forward a UK foreign policy focussed on The decision to partially predetermine the value for money and narrow national inter- outcome of the Integrated Review, there- ests, rather than a thorough analysis of the fore, seems peculiar, especially in light of worst effects of remote warfare and how concerns from a large number of civil soci- these undermine the UK’s ambition to act ety groups, DFID and FCO providers, not as a “force for good in the world.”5 to mention a former Conservative prime minister – concerns that we share.11 This The starkest example of this focus has also undermines the sincerity of Govern- been Johnson’s decision to merge the De- ment commitments to undertake broad partment for International Development consultation with external experts. Never- (DFID) and the Foreign and Common- theless, despite the lack of clarity on the ex- wealth Office (FCO) into a new department, tent to which the Johnson Government will the Foreign, Commonwealth and Develop- take the findings of the Review into ac- ment Office (FCDO).6 This is a move that count, there may still be an opportunity to the Prime Minister has said would “unite drive forward positive change in the UK’s our aid with our diplomacy and bring them foreign policy, one that places the protec- together in our international effort.”7 In- tion of civilians at the heart of its approach deed, Johnson emphasised that the goal is to international engagements. to “achieve the maximum value with every pound we spend.”8 However, we recognise that this will not be without its challenges. There are already However, as Crispin Blunt said in response signs that the Government may rely on its to the announcement in the House of Com- favourable parliamentary majority to insti- mons, the success of this decision will de- tute major changes in Whitehall without pend largely on the values that underpin consultation. For instance, influential fig- UK foreign policy going forward.9 This mer- ures within Downing Street are already ger of the FCO and DFID – preceding the pushing for a stronger focus on value for findings of the Integrated Review – may in- money in the UK’s foreign policy, beyond dicate a Government that has already set the merger of FCO and DFID. Dominic its priorities and is unwilling to wait for ex- Cummings, the Prime Minister’s influential ternal input. Chief Adviser, appears to have his sights on the MoD budget itself.12 While it is a bat- Tobias Ellwood, Chair of the House of tle that has not yet come to fruition, Cum- Commons Defence Committee, echoed Mr mings’ contempt for MoD procurement Blunt’s concerns, arguing:10 costs is well documented. For example, he has indicated a desire to use technology to

Remote Warfare Programme 5 find “innovative ways” to increase the effec- This renders pre- and post-strike intelli- tiveness of UK decision-making around gence assessments less effective at track- procurement, as well as reducing the costs ing civilian populations on the ground and associated with them.13 increases the likelihood that Western strikes result in higher civilian casualties. This context is likely to lead to a greater These weaknesses have been unaided by push for remote warfare; as one roundtable a notable lack of political will by the UK participant said, this cost-saving focus Government to either acknowledge the dis- means “partnered operations could be- tinct risks to civilians in these recent military come more attractive.”14 The risk being that campaigns or to adapt its approach to this could lead to a narrower focus on UK tracking civilian harm.18 security partnerships as a way to pursue perceived UK national security objectives. This challenge has been exemplified by the Not only would this undermine the Govern- UK’s recent contributions to the anti-IS co- ment’s attempt to be a “force for good in the alition in Iraq and Syria. While the UK world”, but it would also ignore the strategic dropped more than 3,700 bombs and mis- benefits of pursuing UK interests in a prin- siles between 2014-2018, which the Royal cipled way – an approach that would not Air Force (RAF) claimed killed over 4,000 necessarily require more funds, but one IS fighters by January 2019, the British which would deliver the desired out- Government has maintained its position comes.15 The Integrated Review offers an that there is only enough evidence to show opportunity for the Government to address that one civilian was killed as a result of UK these misconceptions about the impact of military action.19 This position was summed remote warfare to ensure the UK’s foreign up by former Armed Forces Minister, Mark policy is better placed to address “the Lancaster, who said in April 2019: “[I]t is not causes of instability, fragility, and conflict our position that there has been only a sin- upstream”, something it has repeatedly gle civilian casualty as a result of our mili- identified as a core objective.16 tary action. What we are saying is that we have evidence of only a single, or what we The Challenges of Remote Warfare believe to have been a single, civilian casualty.”20 The increasing reliance on remote warfare presents two distinct risks to civilians. The This stands in stark contrast to reports by first comes from the fact that this approach organisations such as Amnesty Interna- leads to the UK relying more heavily on tional, which estimates that 1,600 civilians providing air support to local and regional were killed in the battle for Raqqa alone, as forces on the ground. Despite advances in well as Airwars, an independent organisa- technology, relying solely on air-based in- tion tracking civilian casualties, which esti- telligence has not counteracted the gaps mates that anywhere between 8,259– that have emerged as a result of “fewer 13,135 civilians were killed in the five years eyes and ears on the ground.” The limits of of the campaign.21 air-based ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnais- If the UK is unwilling to act on the data col- sance) are exacerbated by the fact that lection of international NGOs, it may prefer countries like the UK often come to rely on to take inspiration from its American ally. partners with weaker intelligence capabili- After a strong campaign by US civil society ties compared to those of Western militar- groups and Congress, the US has now ies.17 acknowledged 1,370 civilian casualties as

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 6 populations and its relationship with other ethnic/social groups in-country. In recent years, there have been several cases in which the UK’s local partners have gone on to commit abuses against civilians.27 For instance, the Somali National Army (SNA) has received significant support from the UK to combat al-Shabaab.

However, our research has found that rather than combatting this terrorist group, the abuses by the SNA have actually had the opposite effect and have instead be- A depiction of the devastation in Mosul after the Battle for Mosul. (Image Credit: H. Mourdock/Public Domain). come a significant recruitment tool for al- Shabaab among civilians who perceive the a result of its air campaign in Iraq and SNA to be “just another militia.”28 Syria.22 Even if a local partner shows a strong com- While it is important to caveat this point with mitment to protecting civilians, they may the fact that the US has reportedly carried lack the capacity to do so in practice. Mosul out 34,502 airstrikes, 30,000 more than the provides an unfortunate example of the cat- UK, it has nonetheless been more proac- astrophic consequences this can have on tive in addressing concerns about the im- the ground. The low risk-appetite on the pact of remote warfare on civilian popula- part of Western forces meant that Iraq se- 23 tions. Indeed, the US military claims it has curity forces were forced to do the vast ma- evidence that British airstrikes have caused jority of the frontline fighting. more casualties than the one confirmed by 24 the MoD. This reinforces the need for the Yet inexperienced in clearing and holding UK to improve its mechanisms for as- densely populated urban terrain, and expe- sessing whether civilians have been killed riencing high casualties among their own as a result of British airstrikes. forces, Iraqi troops were often reluctant to advance in the city without heavy levels of The second major risk to civilians emerges international air support – presenting signif- when the UK empowers local partners who icant risks to civilians on the ground.29 In may not have the capacity or sufficient in- the aftermath of the battle in the city, during terest in implementing strong POC mecha- which the anti-IS Coalition conducted 1,250 25 nisms. This is a particular risk in remote strikes with nearly 30,000 munitions, 80% warfare, which tends to be focused on of the Old Town lay in ruins.30 Three-quar- short-term tactical objectives (such as mili- ters of Mosul’s roads, all of its bridges, and tarily countering terrorist organisations or most of the electrical network were also de- furthering regional influence and interna- stroyed.31 tional reputation).26 Independent organisations estimate that as Consequently, the nature of security part- many as 9,000 civilians were killed.32 It was nerships is often dictated by these short- a battle that led one British general to say: term objectives, rather than a longer-term “I don’t think any military in living memory consideration of local partners’ propensity has encountered a battle of this nature. I for committing violence against civilian have said regularly – I stand ready to

Remote Warfare Programme 7 challenge – that I cannot think of a more is commonplace in US defence and secu- significant urban battle since the Second rity policy approaches. It would not be sur- World War.”33 As such, while the risk to Brit- prising if this becomes a key part of a UK ish soldiers is comparatively lower in this strategy which increasingly prioritises influ- form of warfare than in conventional war, it ence and value for money.35 is wrong to say that remote warfare is low- risk; the risks are merely transferred to oth- As the Government resumes the Integrated ers. These lessons must not be ignored in Review process, which was paused as a the Integrated Review, at a time when there result of COVID-19 pandemic, it should is a growing tendency among policymakers recognise the importance of using this Re- to consider the use of remote warfare as view to add real substance to its aspirations low-risk and low-cost. for a new Global Britain, while ensuring that the risks and challenges of remote warfare This is particularly important on account of are clearly articulated and addressed. That growing pressure for the Government to requires a critical re-assessment of the im- sign up to new trade deals, which may see pact that the UK’s security partnerships UK military engagements abroad handed have on civilian populations. Nowhere is out as a quid pro quo for more favourable this clearer than in Britain’s relationship trading arrangements post-Brexit, including with Saudi Arabia. to states who may not have favourable human rights records, such as Saudi Arabia.34 This is a reality that Rachel Kleinfeld says

Figure 1 Graphic of Global Britain's three pillars.

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 8 The UK: A Force for Good in the World? the Government believes that suspending military support – including the transfer of At a UN General Assembly meeting mark- arms – to the regime would put the UK’s ing the 20th anniversary of the UN Security national interests at risk. On a visit to the Council taking up the protection of civilians region in June 2020, for example, Foreign on its agenda, UK Ambassador to the UN, Secretary Dominic Raab said that Saudi Johnathan Allen, gave an impassioned de- Arabia represented one of the UK’s “clos- fence of the importance of prioritising an est trade partners [who] plays an important honest approach to POC: role in keeping Britain safe."38 However, the failings of this relationship have repeatedly demonstrated that the difference between rhetoric and reality can severely undermine the sincerity of the UK’s commitments on POC.

In its support for the Saudi-led coalition’s war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen, the UK has been complicit in the ongoing war, where two-thirds of civilian casualties have been caused by Saudi-led airstrikes.39 While 2019 saw a decrease in incidents by 6% compared to 2018, this re- duction was largely a result of the various The speech set the right tone for a nation ceasefire agreements reached between currently trying to reinforce its commitment belligerents.40 Despite sporadic cessations to the international rules-based system, a in hostilities throughout 2019, the Civilian standpoint that permeates the UK’s public Impact Monitoring Project recorded 2,213 statements and Government policy docu- incidents of civilian harm as a consequence ments, in which the UK repeatedly ex- of coalition airstrikes, many of which the presses its aim to act as a force for good in Yemen Data Project have classified as war the world.36 However, to truly deliver on this crimes41 The civilian cost of the Saudi-led ambition, the UK needs to practice what it war in the country has contributed to what preaches and ensure that its own actions the UN regards as the worst humanitarian encapsulate this same call for change. crisis in the world today.42

While remote warfare operations do not While the UK has made efforts to reduce necessarily place UK soldiers on the front- the civilian casualties caused by its partner, line, the country’s reputation as an up- they have been woefully inadequate. The holder of the rules-based order is still at UK and other Western allies have engaged stake. This is exemplified by the UK’s se- with the Saudis to establish a civilian casu- curity partnership with a country like Saudi alty tracking cell, the Joint Incidents As- Arabia, which is regarded as a “Human sessment Team (JIAT). The UK has been Rights Priority Country” by the FCO.37 The keen to emphasise the positive impact this UK arms exports to this country have re- has had. For instance, after the 2018 Au- ceived significant media attention since the gust airstrike on a school bus (which killed beginning of the Saudi-led war in Yemen. at least forty school children), the UK Gov- Yet the relationship also involves other ernment argued that the post-strike review forms of support. Despite public outrage, process had been “almost unparalleled in

Remote Warfare Programme 9 Boris Johnson and Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir at the international Syria meeting in London, 16 October 2016. (Image Credit: Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Wikimedia Commons). terms of admitting error” and demonstrated Numerous experts have argued that the UK the “hand of the United Kingdom.”43 did nowhere near enough to stop abuses or to press for real improvements to the JIAT Had such an airstrike been committed by a once its failing became clear.45 This is de- non-partner state, such as Iran, this would spite the UK Government’s claims that its surely have been heavily (and rightly) con- security relationship with Saudi Arabia demned by the British Government, not gives it unprecedented leverage over the lauded as an opportunity for self-congratu- country. Instead of raising the possibility of lations for the UK’s positive influence over suspending support, former Prime Minister Saudi Arabia. Above all, this also fails to Theresa May claimed in 2017 that the best recognise that the JIAT is inherently biased way forward would be to create “an even as assessments of strikes are conducted deeper partnership …[which] will increase by the Saudis themselves. As Andrew our ability to address the issues that con- Mitchell, a senior Conservative MP argued, cern us.”46 this is equivalent to the Saudi’s “marking their own homework.”44 However, a report written by the Policy In- stitute at King’s College London1 in 2018 Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest found that “there is little evidence, based on that the JIAT or British engagements have publicly available information, that the UK led to a significant institutional shift within exerts either influence or leverage over Saudi targeting policy or a measurable re- Saudi Arabia.”47 This chimed with research duction in the number of civilian casualties. conducted by Dr Larry Lewis, a former

1 This report was commissioned by the Oxford Re- search Group.

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 10 State Department advisor for civilian pro- relations with autocratic regimes. Instead, it tection, who urged the Saudis to set up the needs to change its approach to security JIAT. He argued, in a report for the CNA, relationships. In the words of Sir Nicholas that using relationships as leverage with Soames, former Conservative MP of thirty- Saudi Arabia didn’t always have the in- five years and former Minister for the tended, positive impact.48 Instead, he con- Armed Forces:54 cluded, the most effective way to alter behaviour was by “training and mentoring [that] was data-driven”49 to address specific patterns of harm to reduce the civilian casualties committed by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.50

In assessing the success of JIAT, Lewis said: “the JIAT failed on its own terms because it was simply ignored by the Saudi defence ministry.”51 As one expert pointed out in conversations with us, this raises questions on whether the UK is focused primarily on preventing “PR disasters”52 or meaningfully pushing for structural improvements to the Saudi’s POC mechanisms.

As the UN Security Council penholder2 for both Yemen and the POC agenda, the UK’s blindness to the criticism of its complicity in Saudi war crimes undermines its efforts to be regarded as a force for good in the world.53 Contrasting Ambassador Al- len’s speech with the UK’s support for Saudi Arabia illustrates how the UK is keen to talk up the importance of issues like POC but is not doing enough in practice to demonstrate it is serious about embedding the protection into its foreign policy approach in a practical way.

If the UK Government is to balance its interests with its values, it should do much more to counter accusations of hypocrisy by adopting a more proactive and princi- pled approach to its interests. To do this, the UK should not necessarily sever

2Penholders are countries on the UN Security Council who hold responsibility for a thematic area.

Remote Warfare Programme 11 ‘human security’ term is used simply as a Section 2 synonym for gender challenges leaves POC and UK strategy many other aspects of human security un- addressed. In 2010, the UK released its Strategy for the Regardless, the Government’s commit- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict ment to updating its approach to protecting (‘POC Strategy’) which lays out the UK’s civilians was reiterated further in February moral and legal obligations to protect civil- 2019, when it announced that it would be ians in conflict across the world.55 When it launching a review into its 2010 POC strat- released this document, the UK became egy.57 Just two months later, then Defence one of the first countries to publish a strat- Secretary Gavin Williamson demonstrated egy specifically on POC, something the UN the apparent MoD buy-in by announcing advises all countries to do. the launch of a new UK Centre of Excel- lence for Human Security.58 Analysts at the However, the 2010 POC Strategy is a prod- time saw this as a sign that the MoD was uct of its time, reflective of the UK’s role in broadening its approach to POC, bringing it more in line with the terminology used by the world as it looked a decade ago. Since both the FCO and DFID.59 Williamson em- its release, circumstances have changed phasised: “In modern warfare, there is no with a growing apathy about the Responsi- ‘front line’ and the sad reality is that inno- bility to Protect, which formed the back- cent bystanders are in harm’s way in con- bone of the 2010 Strategy, as well as the flicts around the world. Protecting civilians emergence of remote warfare and the UK’s from human rights violations is as much a changing role in the world in the context of military task as defeating the enemy.”60 A Brexit. As such, while the 2010 strategy member of staff at the NATO Headquarters raises important points, it fails to capture emphasised, during an interview, that the the challenges posed by the changing organisation was encouraged by the UK character of conflict and therefore risks be- taking on such an initiative.61 ing ignored in discussions around how to plan for future deployments overseas. However, since these announcements were made, the commitments to a renewed In early 2019, after immense pressure from focus on POC appear to have fallen by the civil society groups including ORG, the wayside. Brexit discussions, the December Government made it clear that it was willing 2019 General Election, and, of course, the to prioritise updating its approach to POC. UK’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, In January, the MoD released the Joint Ser- have dominated headlines and policy vices Publication 1325: Human Security in bandwidth. This issue has been exacer- Military Operations (JSP 1325).56 The JSP bated by ministerial postings changing at a 1325 is, in effect, a tool to implement the rapid pace – with three different Secretar- Women, Peace, and Security agenda an- ies of State for Defence in 2019 alone. In chored in UN Resolution 1325. Introducing the meantime, the Centre of Excellence such a policy document, that specifically has since been deemed unfeasible in an in- addresses the gendered impact of conflict ternal MoD study, and its creation cur- on civilians is hugely valuable, especially 62 when it is accompanied by a practical focus tailed. The review of the POC Strategy on how to integrate these elements into op- appears to have been deprioritised and it erations and training. However, the termi- remains unclear when it will be completed. nology of the JSP 1325 raises a challenge. While it is good that a WPS strategy docu- Such a de-prioritisation of POC is a mis- ment exists in the UK, the fact that the take. Brexit and COVID-19 do not make

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 12 this less so. In fact, both events heighten presents its own unique challenges.65 the need for a strong approach to POC. As These are yet to be addressed directly in the UK redefines its role in the world follow- British policy documents. ing Brexit, an updated, relevant POC Strat- egy would reconfirm its commitment to a This clearly shows that the UK’s POC foreign policy that balances the pursuit of mechanisms have not managed to keep interests and values. So too would a stance pace with the emergence of remote warfare against partners who use COVID-19 as an and the predominance of partnered military opportunity to repress civilian populations operations. To ensure the UK POC strat- by implementing restrictive curfews, cen- egy keeps pace, it should incorporate the soring journalists, and imprisoning political four following elements: opponents.63 1. Committing to incorporating POC Getting the POC Strategy Right lessons from recent campaigns; 2. Ensuring better dialogue with civil If the updated POC Strategy is to have a society, local populations and local tangible impact on the way the UK engages authorities; in conflicts, it must reflect the shift towards 3. Committing to better communica- remote warfare. While such contemporary tion when civilian harm or deaths do engagements have not resulted in numbers occur; of civilian casualties comparable to those of 4. Developing a more coherent UK re- the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, it would be sponse to POC. a mistake to assume that civilian deaths do not occur at all, or that the lower numbers When looking at the first three of these, the require less attention. UK can draw inspiration from the POC strategies of other countries and allies. It is problematic, therefore, that 2010 POC NATO’s 2016 Strategy, in particular, offers Strategy focuses overwhelmingly on British valuable aspects which should be echoed contributions as an external peacekeeping in the UK’s national POC Strategy. force rather than as a belligerent to the conflict. It makes sense for the UK’s role as a Learning Lessons from Recent Cam- peacekeeper to be included in the Strategy. paigns Yet the document is meant to “draw together the different strands needed for co- The first element that must find its way into herent and consistent action, along diplo- the POC Strategy is the prioritisation of matic, legal, human rights, humanitarian, learning lessons from previous military development and military tracks.”64 As campaigns.66 In particular, as the NATO such, it seems right that an updated Strat- policy emphasises, lessons must be taken egy should include a focus on civilian harm from Afghanistan, where the NATO-led In- which may be inadvertently caused by Brit- ternational Security Assistance Force ish forces, and the forces the UK trains and (ISAF) found that, as a direct result of its supports overseas. weak monitoring mechanisms, the overall objective to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of This is particularly important as the charac- the Afghan population was being under- ter of warfare, and the UK’s participation in mined. Instead, Afghans felt that they had conflict overseas, changes. Remote war- become the target. In response, ISAF fare is not just conventional warfare ‘lite’; it adopted policies to reduce civilian harm, in is its own form of engagement, which addition to introducing a civilian tracking

Remote Warfare Programme 13 cell. These steps had a dramatic impact on Improving Dialogue In-Theatre civilian harm from the international air campaign, reducing civilian deaths from one The UK’s POC Strategy would do well to every 5.71 strikes in 2009 to one every further reflect on NATO Policy which em- 15.67 strikes by 2012.67 These improve- phasises: “Promoting long-term, self-sus- ments and a desire to further lower the tained peace, security and stability [which] numbers of civilian casualties served as the is best achieved in cooperation with the lo- impetus for the NATO Alliance to formulate cal authorities, population and civil soci- its own Policy for the Protection of Civilians ety.”70 in 2016. This was later operationalised in 2018 in the NATO Military Concept on Pro- While working with local civil society groups tection of Civilians.68 should be a part of all international engagements, it is especially important in remote The 2010 POC Strategy does refer to the warfare where engaging on a light footprint importance of learning lessons, but it does can make it difficult to have sustained en- so only in passing, referring to the im- gagement with civil society in-country.71 portance of learning from the international Without such engagement, it can be even community. Yet this needs to be given more difficult to mitigate against the very greater priority as a large part of the effec- risks that remote warfare often exacer- tiveness of the UK’s international engage- bates, such as lending support to local and ments in the coming decade will depend on regional forces who worsen insecurity in how well the UK can learn lessons from the long term. Engaging with civil society previous decades. groups and with local communities is essential for gauging the true drivers of con- We were told by a member of the UK mili- flict; which actors are upholding the rule of tary, during one of our roundtables, that the law; and which actors make civilians feel problem is not a lack of the British army safe. The importance of this was corrobo- identifying lessons, but rather, “part of the rated by the Organisation for Economic Co- problem is that we don’t talk about it or pub- operation and Development (OECD) which licise it. [The military] is not very good at concluded that “[g]iven the weakness of publishing what it is doing. Everything has state capacity in many countries,’’ civil so- been re-written since we were in Afghani- ciety groups are essential in helping to not stan.”69 just denounce bad policies but also to “make practical suggestions that will help to However, sharing such lessons with exter- sustain the reform process.”72 nal actors, including both civil society and Parliament, allows these institutions to act The UK has committed to prioritising such as an important check on whether the right engagement with civil society on many oc- lessons are identified and incorporated into casions. For instance, it emphasises in future operational planning. It is impossible ‘The UK Government’s Approach to Stabi- to perform this role if lessons are not lisation’, that UK programmes should have shared. an emphasis “on regular two-way dialogue and engagement with a wide range of The POC Strategy offers an ideal oppor- stakeholders, formal and informal power- tunity to commit to identifying the right les- holders but also as far as possible civil so- sons from recent engagements, including ciety.”73 Nevertheless, while the UK has by engaging more with civil society and recognised the importance of owning the Parliament. narrative in theory, this has not been

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 14 sufficiently reflected in practice. As ORG its credibility.”75 This is as true for the UK’s documented extensively in our report on unilateral engagements in conflicts as it is the Fusion Doctrine, ‘Five Steps to Fusion: for its operations that it may conduct along- Lessons Learned from Remote Warfare in side its NATO allies. Shaping and project- Africa’, we heard complaints from both civil ing narratives have always been important servants and members of civil society or- in conflicts. However, in an age of rapidly ganisations that engagement between growing global internet access, the battle to these two groups has decreased in recent control the narrative has picked up speed years and that civil society is rarely in- and become more intense as adversaries cluded in strategic decision making.74 The use the internet to compete for ownership POC Strategy would be an ideal place to of the narrative.76 commit to reverse this trend and ensure that civil society engagement on the ground The UK, and many of its allies, have occurs systematically as an integral com- acknowledged this challenge, and the im- ponent of the UK’s engagements overseas. portance of adequately addressing it, on As one interviewee suggested to us, there several occasions. The 2010 Strategic De- could also be a further consideration on fence and Security Review (SDSR), for in- how to build the capacity of partners to en- stance, made this point very clear, speak- gage with local civil society, a topic which ing of the need to “win the battle for infor- is beyond the scope of this report. mation, as well as the battle on the ground”77 and acknowledging that “a more Despite the commitments to include civil transparent society” aided by “the speed society, the processes of updating both the and range of modern global communica- UK’s POC Strategy and the JSP 1325 ap- tions”78 would submit British operations to pear to have included little engagement intense scrutiny. In 2019, the Modernising with groups and organisations in countries Defence Programme reiterated this point, where the UK operates. Even with British adding that: “More generally, we will focus civil society organisations, the Govern- on gaining ‘Information Advantage’ as the ment’s engagement has been largely character of warfare changes.”79 driven by such organisations pushing to engage on the issue of POC, rather than an Such a need to proactively take ownership active attempt by Government to consult of the narrative is particularly acute when it with external experts. And even then, it re- comes to countering terrorist groups that mains unclear to what extent the feedback thrive on discontented civilian populations. from civil society will be incorporated – if at This remains true whether the UK deploys all. its own forces to engage in countering such groups overseas or chooses instead to Communications Around Civilian Harm work through local security forces.

The NATO Policy emphasises the im- In both cases, the UK is likely to be per- portance of communicating clearly about ceived as complicit by those on the ground civilian harm when it occurs. It states: “Es- if they do not account for civilian harm. As tablishing a clear communications and pub- one member of the British military empha- lic information strategy to address POC is sised at one of our roundtables: “if the local critical for the credibility of an operation or population perceive that you are doing ille- mission...By being first with the facts, gitimate acts or supporting illegitimate acts NATO can counter false information, or actors, those who would oppose British demonstrate transparency and strengthen engagement increase.”80

Remote Warfare Programme 15 By its very nature, remote warfare is a more fusion among its departments, there is no discreet means of engaging overseas, both clarification on why these departments owing to the capabilities employed as well have aligned themselves to different con- as less public and media attention. Factors cepts – especially as the departments must which have been part of the appeal to UK work together to deliver these operation- policymakers. Nevertheless, the UK and its ally. We heard from several experts in our allies must communicate more openly and roundtables, including staff from the FCO transparently about why they are present in and DFID, a concern that there does not these theatres and how they are safe- appear to be a plan in place to ensure that guarding against harm to civilian popula- these agendas interlink.82 With no clarifica- tions. This should extend to communicating tion on the different terms used, it also be- more clearly with Parliament and the wider comes difficult to understand how the MoD British public as well, to make clear the will meaningfully contribute to – and later risks of remote warfare. implement – the new POC Strategy if this is still to be introduced. As the Royal United A Whole-of-Government Approach to Services Institute (RUSI) and Save the POC Children emphasised in a recent joint report calling on the Government to update A final consideration is how the govern- its current POC Strategy: “Practically real- ment develops a whole-of-government ap- ising civilian protection objectives strongly proach to POC. As we noted in our report, depends on being able to secure collective Five Steps to Fusion, this is no easy feat understanding of what POC is and what its and there are already indications of a frag- implementation entails.”83 mented UK approach to protecting civilians in conflicts. Take the JSP 1325’s use of lan- As it stands, the POC Strategy is a well-in- guage, which is centred around ‘human se- tentioned, but outdated document. If it is to curity’. The JSP outlines that: 81 be improved, it must take into consideration how warfare has changed – and how this presents new and different risks to civilians in conflict. The four suggestions above would each contribute strongly to ensuring that civilians are protected as much as possible where the UK engages in future operations.

This indicates that the MoD’s focus over- laps with the focuses of both DFID and FCO on their uses of the concept of ‘protection of civilians’. However, in spite of the departments pursuing common goals, and a Government commitment to ensuring

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 16 This inhibits its effectiveness at ensuring Section 3 UK security assistance prioritises the pro- Overseas Security and Justice tection of civilians as part of a broader ap- Assessments proach to conflict overseas.

The OSJA Guidance was first published in Security Force Assistance: Risk Mitiga- March 2011 by then-foreign secretary Wil- tion in Practice liam Hague (see Box 1 below). It emerged in recognition of the need to balance be- Beyond strategy documents like the POC tween the UK’s pursuit of national security Strategy, successive UK governments objectives while maintaining its obligations have attempted to put in place mechanisms to international law as it increased its focus to prevent civilian harm from UK security on working with a range of partners across assistance – key among these is Overseas the world to tackle terrorism at source.85 As Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Hague emphasised at the time, such an ap- 84 Guidance. The OSJA was established as proach would sometimes mean “working a tool to address civilian harm by identifying with countries, institutions or units where risks of abuses and laying out mitigation we have concerns about their adherence to measures. However, as a compliance tool, and respect of human rights and democ- the focus is centred disproportionately on racy” but that “these countries or institu- the legal risks associated with providing se- tions are where security and justice assis- curity assistance abroad. tance is most needed.”86

Textbox 1 What is the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance?87

The UK’s training and support of partner militaries abroad does not take place without an assessment of the risks involved. While the UK has not passed domestic legislation to en- shrine due diligence obligations to verify the human rights situation on the ground – as states like the US have done through the Foreign Assistance Act and Leahy Laws – the UK Gov- ernment has produced what it refers to as the OSJA Guidance.

The OSJA Guidance sets out what International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) risks must be considered before approving the provision of UK assistance overseas. This is done through a two-stage process. In the first stage, there is an assessment on the likelihood that a breach may occur as a result of assistance being provided, while the second stage considers the political and reputational risks that the UK Government may face if a breach were to occur.

To complete the OSJA, policymakers are asked to consider a wide range of sources. This includes the FCO’s Annual Human Rights Report, US State Department human rights reports, UN reports, “credible”88 NGO reports (though what is regarded as credible is not specified), cross-governmental Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability assessments (JACS),89 and DFID Country Governance Analyses.90

Remote Warfare Programme 17 Depending on the risks identified – and the extent to which such risks can be mitigated – officials designate the proposed activity in one of the following three categories: low-risk, medium-risk and high-risk (see diagram below). The mitigation steps must cover both IHL and IHRL risks and the political/reputational risks. It is important to note that while the broader political and reputational risks are considered as part of the OSJA, the focus here was to identify the specific political and reputational risks that would emerge if legal breaches were to occur. This has been an area of confusion among some researchers. With many often interpreting the OSJA Guidance’s inclusion of a separate assessment of the political and reputational impact looking at the broader consequences of the assistance being given, rather than a narrow assessment of the political and reputational risks of a legal breach taking place. However, several civil servants we interviewed for this research confirmed that the OSJA does not consider broader political and reputational risks. Rather, these are considered through other processes, such as “ministerial submissions, governance board meetings etc.”

Based on the risk level identified, the assessor will determine the grade/seniority of the civil servant required to provide approval. The high-risk designation is used when officials are not satisfied that the risks of providing assistance could be mitigated effectively. Pro- grammes that have received this designation can still go ahead but require ministerial approval. It should be noted, however, that the Guidance does ask civil servants to consider whether a minister would want to be informed about the assessment if it is considered low- or medium risk. The decision to inform ministers, therefore, appears to be left to individuals rather than a set process or circumstance.

In theory, it would seem logical to target address underlying causes of civil- those states and institutions most in need ian harm; of reform, where human rights abuses are 3. The Guidance fails to set out a clear most common and commitments on POC policy on stopping and/or suspend- limited. However, OSJA risks leading poli- ing support when abuses are re- cymakers into a false sense of security, es- ported or proven to have taken pecially as it can lead to the assumption place; that mitigating the legal risks of providing 4. There is a lack of transparency and security assistance will lead to the mitiga- accountability surrounding the tion of wider risks. There are three major OSJA process. This has, in part, led flaws with OSJA that prevent this from be- to poor cross-departmental coordi- ing the case: nation on assessments.

1. There is currently no specific advice Armed Non-State Actors for policymakers on providing support to non-state actors, despite OSJA needs to better reflect the risks of support for such actors presenting providing support to Armed Non-State Ac- specific challenges to civilians; tors (ANSA).91 Working with ANSAs has 2. As a compliance-based tool, there been a dominant feature of recent military is insufficient recognition of the campaigns, as we explored in our report need for a broader peacebuilding ‘No Such Thing As a Quick Fix’.92 For in- approach to risk mitigation and UK stance, Western support to groups like the security assistance as a means to Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria played a

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 18 key role in the territorial defeat of IS. How- non-state violent groups – a common tactic ever, as our research has shown on many in these so-called weak, but actually com- occasions, these same campaigns also re- plicit, countries.”95 vealed the unique challenges and risks of providing military support to ANSAs. Un- While some ANSAs, such as the People’s less the UK accounts for these, it is likely to Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, have im- lead to more violent conflict in the long pressive hierarchies and systems of ac- term.93 countability, this is often not the case.96 In some instances, providing support to AN- The Government claims that the OSJA SAs would not only mean trusting weak Guidance can be applied whether the re- and rudimentary accountability mecha- cipient is a state or an ANSA. In response nisms but it would also mean taking a leap to a parliamentary question on this point, of faith in providing support to a group former FCO Minister, Mark Field, said: where such mechanisms are almost non- existent.

In this context, it is questionable how the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach of OSJA can be counted on to effectively apply the appropriate checks to avoid civilians being harmed when working with a wide array of partners. Or in instances where civilians are harmed, ensuring that appropriate action is taken to address abuses. Beyond immediate civilian harm caused, Western security assistance creates broader, longer-term risks to civilian populations. In particular, sowing the seeds of social dis- However, as the risks presented by part- cord among different social, cultural and nering with ANSAs are significantly differ- ethnic divides that could exacerbate con- ent from those presented by partnering with flict and lead to civilian harm. As ORG ar- states, it should follow that different mitiga- gued in a report published in July 2018:97 tion measures will also be necessary. Sen- ator Leahy (the US lawmaker behind the Leahy Laws) noted the challenges of providing support when no institutions exist for justice to be applied: “Every situation is different, and it can be challenging to apply the law consistently under the conditions that exist [which can make] it harder to do the vetting of recipients of our aid, harder to identify those responsible for crimes, and harder to bring people to justice”.94 Rachel Kleinfeld, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, offers a more critical assessment of its limits: “The Leahy Law…[cannot] address governments that choose to give up the monopoly of force to

Remote Warfare Programme 19 Figure 2 Graphic of OSJA's risk categories.

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 20 On that basis, the Government should con- world, with state forces responsible for sider reflecting these unique challenges so more than a quarter of all violence targeting that officials can more effectively mitigate civilians in 2019 – the largest proportion of the risks associated with providing assis- any actor type.”101 As such, OSJA’s focus tance to ANSAs. on mitigating the legal risks over a broader assessment of the long-term drivers of con- Security Assistance in Fragile States flict will undermine the UK’s contribution to tackling the causes of state violence Our interviews with British Army personnel against civilians. Among the long-term driv- shows that IHL training remains the most ers which should be considered are local common means of mitigating civilian harm; conflict dynamics, underlying political ten- however, our research has also shown time sions, corruption, institutionalised discrimi- and again the limits of such an approach in nation and/or weak institutions in the host tackling the underlying drivers of civilian country.102 While legal compliance is an im- harm.98 Despite some impressive efforts portant factor, it is ill-suited to form the en- from soldiers to develop innovative training tire basis of a risk assessment. which reflects local cultures and religion, such training will have little impact if it is not There were signs from the Government’s accompanied by long-term efforts aimed at 2018/19 Conflict Stability and Security the root causes of abuse such as ineffec- Fund (CSSF) annual report that this was tive accountability mechanisms for ad- being considered. Indeed, the Government dressing abuses committed.99 announced that it was piloting a ‘conflict sensitivity marker’ (CSM) as part of its As Emily Knowles, Research Fellow at the CSSF programming in its 2017/18 annual Oxford Research Group, and Jahara Ma- report. It was explained in that report that tisek, a US Air Force officer, argued in an the CSM would set “standards for all pro- article for the RUSI Journal in December grammes to ensure that they are suitably 2019:100 informed by context analysis and that they identify, monitor and adapt to specific conflict sensitivity risks.”103

Despite a further roll-out across CSSF programmes in 2018/19, it is unclear what the CSM looks like in practice or how it (if at all) aligns with a tool like OSJA.104 There would be considerable merit in combining the CSM with the OSJA to provide a broader assessment of the risks associated with the UK’s security assistance programmes abroad.

As Saferworld argued in a submission of written evidence to the Joint Committee on This argument was reinforced in the Armed the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) in Conflict Location & Event Data Project’s 2012: “The human rights guidance (ACLED) 2019 annual report, which ar- should...be incorporated into a practical set gued: “Governments continue to pose the of operational guidelines for ensuring that greatest threat to civilians around the not only does such assistance do no harm,

Remote Warfare Programme 21 but it helps to build sustainable peace and Moreover, it remains unclear to us what security.”105 This could be done by aligning process is in place to ensure that these two tools more effectively. OSJAs are routinely reviewed if and when circumstances on the ground As the UK looks set to continue its focus on change. One expert emphasised that it security partnerships as part of its National would be beneficial to set up “clear triggers Security Strategy going forward, these for reassessments…and a sequence and issues must be addressed by committing to course of action that could lead to suspen- an improved system of risk mitigation which sion being discussed.”109 takes into account the broader drivers of conflict.106 This should be based primarily The Dangers of Suspending Support? on the impact of UK military assistance on contributing positively to peace and stability As part of our research for this report, we for the local population, and with it UK spoke to many who argued that the UK national security. There will, however, be should not risk applying strict conditions on situations where abuses will require the UK support because the competition for influ- Government to withdraw support; tempo- ence in places where the UK is engaged rarily or indefinitely, depending on whether overseas is so intense that doing so would issues can be resolved. undermine UK national security interests. In particular, some emphasised that by re- A Formal Process for Suspending Sup- moving themselves from supporting states port who commit abuses, the UK would be allowing countries who place less emphasis on human rights (such as China and Rus- sia) to take the UK’s place; undermining UK influence and its broader national security interests. However, not only is it problematic to frame the UK’s role overseas as having a ‘civilising effect’, by promoting West- ern values, it is also an oversimplification in several ways.

First, many experts we interviewed pushed back on the idea that places in Africa and The UK Government must consider sus- the Middle East are “vacuums” to be filled pending or withdrawing its military support by other states if the UK is not present.110 to local partners as a separate policy tool in In many cases, this is not true. Not least its own right. The OSJA Guidance stipu- because – as one roundtable participant lates that officials should consider circum- said – countries like Russia and China are stances where there is “an opportunity for not waiting to “fill the vacuum. They're al- regular or periodic review/ assessment [of ready there.”111 The challenge, then, is not the project] in order to identify and/or con- to rely on mere presence – which seems to sider HRs/ IHL risks…[and] consider be the strategy behind the UK military’s whether the programme or project provides emphasis on ‘persistent engagement’ – but an opportunity to withdraw”107 but there is to ensure that the UK contribution is desir- no formal process for doing this as is the able for foreign governments and their populations by delivering the intended impact. case in other countries, like the US.108

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 22 As argued in a briefing published by the over other states may be based in truth, Center for Strategic and International Stud- there needs to be greater clarity on whether ies (CSIS):112 the ‘British brand’ is sufficiently ‘marketa- ble’ to the extent that partners will accept greater conditionality. Moreover, applying a rigorous approach to abuses from partner forces will likely strengthen Britain’s international reputation because it will show that the UK leads by example when it comes to keeping civilians safe and respecting international law. Furthermore, it will lend valid- ity when British trainers on the ground train their local counterparts in protecting civilians.

That is not to say that it will always be practical to stop or suspend support if a partner The UK Government itself was clear in its force commits abuses. This is especially 2015 National Security Strategy and Stra- the case when training is focused on ad- tegic Defence and Security Review that the dressing patterns of human rights abuses desired outcome, in “Everything we do” is from security forces by training them in the driven by our determination to protect our legal, operational, and strategic impera- 113 people and our values…”. This appears tives to protect civilians. However, unlike significantly more difficult if the UK is not the US the UK is not bound by national leg- willing to push for its values. As one of our islation to suspend support when abuses roundtable participants emphasised, “…if occur at the hands of a local partner in re- we come in and reinforce approaches that ceipt of direct support. In the US case, this do not respect our values, [China and Rus- is laid down in the Leahy provisions of the sia] still win. If our identity is defending US Foreign Assistance Act, commonly re- 114 these rights, we are losing.” In this ferred to as the ‘Leahy Laws.’117 sense, they argued, “formulating our values is not just a thing we should do to be nice, As a direct consequence of Leahy, there it’s strategic.”115 have been plenty of examples where the US has effectively suspended support as a It is also noteworthy that many of the same temporary response to abuse(s) committed experts who expressed concerns about ap- by a partner force, only for this to be rein- plying conditions to UK assistance over- stated once the perpetrators have been seas, at the risk of losing local partners to held to account (see Textbox 2). Going be- competing international actors, were also yond risks of future liability, the importance adamant that UK support is particularly of a robust response by the UK Govern- sought after in regions such as the Sahel ment to abuses by partners is essential to and the Middle East. One member of the retaining the moral high ground. If civilians British military – representing a view that have been harmed, the UK may still incur we have heard from many others – empha- significant reputational damage even if sised: “There is a British brand of training. there has not been a breach of international They will choose us as a nation to come law. This is because it could still hinder the train them as their first choice.”116 While the strategic success of the UK’s efforts over appeal of receiving British military training the long term. In essence, the point at

Remote Warfare Programme 23 which the UK will be perceived as complicit programmes in Sudan and DR Congo were in transgressions, which may weaken first monitored and later terminated in 2013 chances of mission success and damage and 2014 respectively.”119 However, there relationships (posing political and reputa- appears to be little formal guidance on how tional risks) can come before the point of and when this should be done. The current legal complicity.118 Local and domestic au- OSJA Guidance refers to the need to rou- diences tend to apportion a general sense tinely review assessments which fall within of British responsibility for the conduct of the remit of OSJA Project Leads.120 How- conflicts to which the UK is contributing ever, the Guidance does not set out a clear troops or other forms of assistance – even policy on when and how the UK holds its when standards of legal responsibility are partners accountable when abuses oc- unlikely to be met. There are examples cur.121 There is also a risk of inconsisten- where assistance has been withdrawn by cies across government as the process ap- the UK Government. Research by pears to be largely determined by OSJA the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), leads.122 Embedding a process of remedia- for example, has found that DFID “Training tion could provide various opportunities for

Textbox 2 Contrasting Responses to Human Rights Abuses

The contrast between the British and American approaches to holding perpetrators among partner forces to account were illustrated by an example given to us by a British military trainer during an interview.

While training local security forces in Afghanistan, the trainer had been approached by the troops they were training, who informed them that they would be going on a “blue only” mission – that is, without British accompaniment. In spite of objections from the British trainer, the troops went to a local village where they arbitrarily executed three men accused of rape. According to the trainer, who reported the incident to their commander, UK training resumed the next day. The only repercussion was seemingly a “strongly worded letter” from the FCO. When asked if they thought a more robust response would have been appropriate, the trainer responded that upon discussing the matter with their superiors they were told to “respect the local ways of doing things”, and that “if we don’t train them someone else will.” (Interview 01/11/19)

This stands in contrast to examples from the US, where such instances trigger a suspension of support as described in the Leahy Laws. In fact, there have been several examples very similar to the one given to us by the British trainer. For instance, August 2014 saw an “extrajudicial killing of a civilian by a group of Afghan soldiers in Logar Province. Following this incident, the Afghan General Staff and Ministry of Defense carried out an investigation, arresting and ultimately sentencing the soldiers involved…DoD determined that the Afghan government had taken ‘all necessary corrective steps’ to hold the perpetrators who had committed the gross violations of human rights accountable and therefore resumed U.S. security assistance to the previously sanctioned units” ( Dalton et al., “Shift- ing the Burden Responsibly,” 11.).

While these must be recognised as singular examples of abuse, in which we of course do not have all the details of internal conversations between British officials and their Afghan counter-parts, the case studies illustrate the inadequacy of the argument that the UK must maintain support simply to ensure that others don’t.

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 24 the UK Government. Firstly, it could allow This is concerning because it provides no the UK to actively respond and demon- accountability of decisions to go ahead with strates its commitment to the rules-based programmes that have been deemed high system, thereby increasing the credibility of risk. The lack of accountability and its im- its rhetoric on the protection of civilians. pact on the ground is not merely theoretical Secondly, it could serve as a corrective but has presented real challenges on sev- measure that would prevent future inci- eral occasions. dences of abuse and the potential reputational or political harm such incidents would The UK’s assistance to Pakistan’s justice inflict on the UK. Finally, it would allow the system, for example, has led to accusa- UK to directly influence the institutional tions of UK complicity in the use of torture drivers of civilian harm by state security and the death penalty, practices which are forces and contribute directly to long-term illegal in UK domestic law. According to Re- stability. It is important, therefore, that the prieve, a human rights NGO, this has re- Government sets out a clear approach to sulted in UK funding being used in “prose- withdrawing and suspending support when cutions in anti-terrorism courts in Pakistan abuses occur. that have handed down more than 350 death sentences” between 2014 and Getting Answers: OSJA Risk Assess- 2019.123 This project was part of “The ments Counter Terrorism Associated Prosecuto- rial Reforms Initiative (CAPRI)”, part of the The Government remains reticent to share Pakistan Rule of Law Programme funded information about OSJA with Parliament. by the CSSF. This not only undermines the aim of successive governments to increase the trans- In 2018-19 alone, the Programme was al- parency and accountability of the UK’s na- located £9.32 million.124 Dan Jarvis MP, a tional security policy overseas, but also member of the JCNSS, pushed the Gov- serves as a barrier to effective reform of the ernment on this point in an oral evidence current policy. When attempts have been session when he asked, David Lidington, made by Parliamentarians to glean infor- the minister responsible for the Govern- mation about OSJA assessments – in par- ment’s CSSF fund at the time, to give as- ticular, high-risk cases signed off by minis- surances that “taxpayers’ money is not be- ters at the MoD and Foreign Office – offi- ing used to fund activities that might lead to cials often respond by saying that such in- the death of people in other countries, ei- formation can only be found at a dispropor- ther through torture or human rights tionate cost to the UK taxpayer: abuses”.125

In reply, Lidington said that “ambassadors and high commissioners on the ground are intimately involved in judgments about which programmes will work or not work in the particular political and governance context of that nation.”126 However, James Gray MP, a former member of the JCNSS said of the Rule of Law Programme:127

Remote Warfare Programme 25 taken lightly, or that they will necessarily be the wrong decisions. Indeed, one of our in- terviewees emphasised that ministers remain highly risk averse. But the lack of accountability raises suspicions about the va- lidity of UK assistance programmes overseas and whether the current approach strikes the right balance between national security and UK commitments on human rights. Effective accountability is not simply about ensuring taxpayers’ money is spent responsibly, but as researchers at CSIS Demonstrating the weaknesses of the Gov- have noted with regards to US security ernment’s process of risk mitigation. force assistance, it’s about being “in a position to better direct, track, and calibrate” The provision of military assistance to for- assistance to partners so that it remains eign actors – as opposed to justice assis- consistent with a state’s national objec- tance in the example above – comes with a tives.130 Parliament must play a lead role in different set of risks that need to be consid- holding the Government to account on ered. Nevertheless, the above example is OSJA and its broader military partnerships indicative of the lack of external scrutiny abroad. that surrounds OSJA: both of the original assessment produced by officials and the Growing Political Interest in OSJA decision-making process undertaken by ministers on programmes of activity that Since the release of the updated OSJA have been designated as high-risk (the risk Guidance in January 2017, the third ver- categories for the OSJA process are shown sion since 2011, there have been over sev- above). It seems inappropriate that a min- enty-five written parliamentary questions ister can sign off on a programme even if on the issue.131 This shows growing politi- there is a high probability that the proposed cal interest from parliamentarians on the ef- activity could lead to severe breaches of ficacy of the Government’s application of UK obligations under domestic and interna- risk mitigation measures on assistance pro- tional law. While ministers take on the bur- grammes abroad. This was reinforced re- den of risk individually, it undermines UK cently when, following the appointment of law if it can be overruled for purposes of Sir Keir’s Shadow Foreign Office team, political expediency.128 some of the first written parliamentary questions put to Government ministers Officials we interviewed for this research concerned OSJA.132 Clearly, OSJAs are were keen to emphasise that they carry out not at the top of the political agenda, but the the OSJA assessment with significant cau- number of written parliamentary questions tion, ensuring that they receive the appro- about a compliance tool, likely to be un- priate sign-off on low-risk cases.129 But the known to the majority of the public, sug- fact remains that even if a programme of gests a strong interest across all political activity, such as training provided to a for- parties about the efficacy of this tool to mit- eign military unit, was designated high-risk igate human rights risks. as part of the assessment, the project could still go ahead pending ministerial approval. Regardless of the interest shown by Parlia- That is not to say that these decisions are mentarians, the Government has failed to

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 26 engage with Parliament properly. Even If the Government is keen to avoid public when the Cabinet Office announced an in- disclosure of sensitive information, mem- dependent audit of OSJAs across CSSF bers of the JCNSS could undergo the same programmes in 2019, ministers refused to security vetting that is required for the publish the details of its findings or recom- membership of the Intelligence and Secu- mendations.133 In response to a written par- rity Committee (ISC). We recognise the liamentary question by Dan Jarvis in July challenges that this committee has faced; 2019, David Lidington replied:134 most significant among them are its heavy workload and the delays to reconstituting the committee following three general elec- tions since 2015.136

Expanding the role of the JCNSS would, however, do two things. Firstly, it would provide the Government with assurances that the information it shares would be han- dled sensitively by committee members. Secondly, it would provide members (and committee staff) with the evidence they need to evaluate Government policy effec- There is no doubt that, owing to the nature tively. Given that the JCNSS is made-up of of these assessments, there will be sensi- Chairs from seven parliamentary select tive information pertaining to UK national committees – including the ISC – this would security interests and the national security address any concerns that this would risk interests of the recipient state/ actor/ insti- creating a two-tier system among select tution.135 However, the value of such an au- committees, as all committees with a stake dit seems questionable if there is no mech- in the UK’s national security are repre- anism for Parliament to hold the Govern- sented on the JCNSS.137 While it was pos- ment to account on the findings of this re- itive to see the previous Government com- view and if/how its recommendations will mit to sharing information on CSSF Annual be implemented. That is why the Govern- Reviews with the JCNSS in confidence, in- ment must commit to greater openness on creasing information-sharing would ensure this policy area. That could be done by for- this becomes systematic.138 malising the JCNSS’ role in holding the Government to account on OSJA. Improving Cross-Government Data Shar- ing The JCNSS has already shown that it has the capacity and expertise within its mem- The issue of information-sharing also ex- bership to review OSJAs. For example, the tends to the collection of OSJA assess- committee has held oral evidence sessions ments themselves. Ministers have stated in on the Government’s CSSF, including an response to parliamentary questions that ad hoc closed-door briefing by David Lid- records of OSJA risk assessments are not ington in response to concerns raised by held centrally. It seems logical for the Gov- JCNSS members about the UK’s Rule of ernment to consider introducing a database Law Programme in Pakistan. However, fur- system that can be accessed cross-depart- ther adaptations should be made to turn mentally, whereby information can be this informal, ad hoc arrangement, into a shared between departments and embas- formal process. sies in-country who may benefit from

Remote Warfare Programme 27 accessing previous assessments. When the cost of sharing information with Parlia- the former Shadow Secretary of State for ment about the UK’s security partnerships International Development put this pro- comes at too high a cost.143 posal to the former Foreign Office minister, Mark Field, he responded: There is, of course, the question of how this information would be shared between departments. One expert said that the system would have to reflect the fact that information is “Collated at embassies... at different levels [of seniority and many] don’t use the same technology”, adding that there would be a question of “how…you keep [information] classified.”144 However, another official working on OSJA explained that much of the information used to draft assessments was not classified. Rather, it was designated as “OFFSEN [which] is a However, the OSJA Guidance states that subset of the OFFICIAL classification, and OSJA Leads should determine their own as such is a relatively low-level classifica- approach to record-keeping, increasing the tion which is widely accessible across gov- likelihood of inconsistencies between de- ernment.”145 This demonstrates that this partments.139 This was demonstrated by challenge could be easily overcome. the fact that, in response to a series of parliamentary questions and FOI requests, Indeed, if a “multi-factor authentication” both the FCO and MoD refused to publish process can be introduced for Parliamen- details about the number of high-risk tarians to access their own IT, as was done cases, whereas DFID openly stated that following a cyber-attack in 2017, it’s not en- between 2015 and 2018 no OSJA assess- tirely implausible that the Government ment had required ministerial sign-off.140 could introduce a similar authentication process for cross-Government working on One of our roundtable participants from the OSJA.146 FCO, with experience of Government security policy (though not of OJSA directly), On this point, the Government may want to emphasised that, while they had good ex- take inspiration from US reforms to the In- periences of cross-departmental collabora- ternal Vetting and Security Tracking (IN- tion, “It’s very frustrating when you cannot VEST) system which is due to be rolled out access [the] same information as [the] as part of a process to increase infor- MoD.”141 Another emphasised that the cur- mation-sharing and the efficiency of Leahy rent approach of basing cross-governmen- vetting.147 One expert we spoke to with tal information-sharing “on personalities knowledge of the US system pointed out and relationships” was not necessarily the some issues around the functionality of the ideal approach. 142 Moreover, in the spirit system, particularly that, “some can see it, of current Government efforts to implement others can’t, [even though] everyone needs its Fusion Doctrine, it seems contradictory to work off the same sheet of music.”148 that the Government can suggest, on the one hand, that there are no certain benefits However, a new system was being trialled of a centralised system, while at the same and piloted, they explained, to address the time ministers can continue to argue that issues with the existing database.

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 28 Given that the UK’s capacity building activities often take place at the same time as other projects being led by different departments, having a central system could improve cross-government working. The creation of the Foreign, Development and Commonwealth Office (FDCO) could serve as the impetus to establish this data-sharing platform, especially as ambassadors are set to inherit a larger remit in coordinat- ing activities that were previously the responsibility of DFID. Indeed, there is evidence that influential figures within Number 10 Downing Street are already looking at ways “to improve data use and collection across Whitehall to help inform policy-making and implementation.”149

An issue that will be incredibly important in the context of the FDCO merger, given that it will likely entail data from projects that are currently DFID-led to be integrated into the new department. This could make it an opportune moment to invest time and resources into a new data-sharing capacity for OSJA across Whitehall.

Remote Warfare Programme 29 have a propensity to commit violence Section 4 against civilian populations. Therefore, it is Addressing the Accountability essential that they prioritise POC as part of Gap Over UK Special Forces the training and advising missions they are tasked to undertake by Government ministers. To do this effectively, the Government In 2019 alone, media reports revealed UK also needs to consider how it holds these Special Forces (UKSF) had been deployed units accountable for allegations of abuses in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Syria committed by their own actions. and Yemen.150 However, despite evidence of the increased use of UKSF, there is no However, the shroud of secrecy that covers mechanism for the UK Parliament to hold UKSF operations means it is unclear how the Government to account over their use. consistently concerns about harm against In our report, “Britain’s Shadow Army: Pol- civilians, and its impact on long-term stabil- icy Options for External Oversight of UK ity, is factored into decision-making around Special Forces” we argued that increased their use. More importantly, whether inter- transparency and accountability of UKSF nal accountability mechanisms exist to re- could play an important role “in making spond to incidents of abuse against civil- sure that Government decisions are strate- ians. This must change if the UK hopes to gic as well as publicly defensible” in a post- boost the credibility of its commitment to be Chilcott era.151 However, the reality is that a force for good in the world and increase the Government’s current blanket opacity the impact of capacity building activities by policy also makes it impossible to assess UKSF. the effectiveness of UKSF at responding to concerns about its capacity for civilian This is especially important given that Gov- harm mitigation. As a force designed to ernment statements suggest that the have both a strategic and tactical effect, op- tempo of UKSF deployments are only set erations that do go wrong, and where civil- to continue.154 At the inaugural conference ians are harmed, could severely undermine of the cross-service strategic command, UK national security interests and its repu- Minister for Armed Forces, James Heap- tation for upholding international law. pey, outlined a growing role for UKSF.155 As the UK commits to being persistently The Risks of Blanket Opacity engaged “above and below the threshold of warfighting”156 to compete against Russian The ease with which prime ministers can and Chinese influence, UKSF are likely to deploy UKSF, without recourse to Parlia- be an essential component of the UK mili- ment, has increased the appeal of special tary’s response, he said. forces deployments over the past decade.152 This sees UKSF increasingly de- In this context, UKSF deployments must ployed, not just in support of conventional prioritise the protection of civilians to max- forces, but also as the only “instruments of imise the UK’s contribution to building sta- national power”153 in many parts of the bility overseas.157 In doing so, UKSF need world today. to look to how their operations can (1) address the long-term causes of conflict and In these places, they are often tasked with (2) improve their own transparency and ac- building the capacity of partner militaries. countability so they can help others do the This places UKSF units in fragile conflict same. environments, working with partners who

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 30 UKSF Building Partner Capacity Opera- Somalia as was intended.161 This involved tions Kenyan forces going “village to village rounding up nearly all of the male popula- UKSF must ensure that they prioritise POC tion” where they were later taken to military when working ‘by, with, and through’ part- camps to undergo “screening”.162 Human ners. Such partnerships are an integral part Rights Watch reported at the time that over of what they do, and previous experiences 4,000 civilians had been rounded up by have revealed that such relationships often Kenyan security forces, many of whom present significant risks when it comes to sustained severe injuries.163 safeguarding civilians.158 This point is demonstrated by UKSF’s experiences in The UK Government, in response, sus- Kenya in 2008. pended military training to 20 Para in July 2008; however, as Ben Rawlence noted at After 9/11, the Labour Government estab- the time, the fact the UK had to resort to lished Operation Monogram to support for- suspending support was evidence of inef- eign military units to counter terrorist fective training and programme design by threats in their regions to prevent “hotbeds the UK’s most elite unit.164 Moreover, rather of violent extremism that could threaten the than using the suspension as an oppor- UK.”159 It is an initiative that continues to tunity to push for the perpetrators being this day, but with a geographical focus on held to account, training was resumed after the Middle East and Asia.160 two months without clear evidence of the effect that the suspension had in changing Among those to receive support in the first behaviour – of both the partner and UKSF decade of the programme were members themselves.165 of Kenya’s elite forces. One expert we spoke to suggested that the In 2008, several media reports provided ev- opacity afforded to UKSF units is unneces- idence that Kenya’s 20 Para used the train- sary for such training operations, “since ing they had received from the UK’s Spe- good line units are more than capable of cial Air Service (SAS) to commit a series of carrying out this training without the risk ap- human rights abuses against civilians in the parently attached to SF attitudes to IHL”.166 Mount Elgon region on the border with As a result, “opacity is an added adverse Uganda, rather than fighting al-Shabaab in side-effect.”167

Figure 3 Map of UK Special Forces known activity in 2019.

Remote Warfare Programme 31 It should be noted that the case discussed US, where Congress and the military have above took place before the introduction of taken strong action. Indeed, accusations the UK Government’s POC Strategy and against US Special Operations Forces (US OSJA. Nevertheless, because there is no SOF) have been taken incredibly seriously information available to the public on UKSF by the US Congress who have responded training of partner forces, this remains one swiftly and publicly. Moreover, as part of of the few case studies available, and there the US National Defense Authorization Act is no proof that lessons have effectively in 2019, US lawmakers mandated the US been learned from this experience. In fact, Department of Defense (DOD) to under- it remains unclear how either the POC take a review into US Special Operations Strategy or OSJA influence UKSF prioriti- Command (USSOCOM) based on con- sation on issues like POC as part of their cerns over ethics within the force.170 training missions. Prioritising POC would improve the behaviour of UK military part- In March 2020, this review concluded that ners and directly contribute to the address- the “Army’s Green Berets [Army Special ing drivers of insecurity. Additionally, if Forces] and the Navy SEALs [including UKSF are to set an example to their part- SEAL Team 6], have developed a problem- ners, they must first address the record of atic culture that overemphasises combat ‘to harm to civilians from their own actions the detriment of leadership, discipline and over the last decade. accountability’”.171 President Donald Trump’s unprecedented intervention into UKSF’s Direct Actions in Remote Warfare an inquest into the conduct of Noel Gal- lagher – a Navy Seal who was accused of Setting an example for partner-forces is fatally stabbing a detainee in Iraq and cov- made difficult by a series of scandals and ering up the incident – demonstrates the accusations of abuse which have rocked damage of political attempts to cover up UKSF. Even in recent months, there have cases of wrongdoing as well as the limits of been several high-profile accusations the US system of oversight over US against UKSF in the British media, includ- SOF.172 Indeed, not only did it take a year ing accusations from within their own for Gallagher’s colleagues to “summon the ranks. courage to deal with” the accusations of murder but the fact that a sitting president In March 2019, a series of media outlets re- was in a position to grant Gallagher clem- ported, “up to 30 British troops based in ency, in effect overruling the decision of a Sa’dah [Yemen]”168 had been fighting US military court, places a question on the alongside Saudi-funded militia, who pur- efficacy of internal accountability mecha- portedly recruited child soldiers. Parliament nisms for US SOF units.173 had, at no point, been informed of the de- ployment of British troops to this conflict. In other ways, however, the US system of Senior Conservative MP, Andrew Mitchell, legislative oversight has been responsive the former Secretary of State for Interna- to accusations of misconduct by its elite tional Development, noted that “were it not forces. SOCOM leaders have openly for the all-consuming nature of Brexit, I sus- acknowledged that “USSOCOM’s ability to pect the House would want to explore this continue the proud legacy of the men and as a matter of urgency.”169 women who have made the ultimate sacri- fice is contingent on our ability to recognize This stands in stark contrast to how similar when and where organizational drift has accusations have been dealt with in the occurred, hold ourselves accountable, own

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 32 the problem, take corrective action, and im- owing to immense pressure from MPs to plement controls”.174 cease the inquiries into UK service personnel, former Defence Secretary, Sir Michael Similarly, the Australian SAS chief, Major- Fallon, decided to reduce the number of in- General Adam Findlay, has admitted that quiries that were being investigated “with his forces had committed war crimes in Af- over 100 RMP officers involved”.180 Staff ghanistan, which he blamed on the lack of working on cases were, therefore, pres- “moral leadership.”175 A report in Aus- sured to wrap up the investigations. With tralia’s, The Age, in June 2020 said:176 the MoD choosing not to dedicate any ad- ditional resources to speed up the process of reviewing claims, staff were forced to abandon many of the accusations they were previously pursuing.181

One investigator told BBC Panorama that “The Ministry of Defence had no intention of prosecuting any soldier of whatever rank he was unless it was absolutely necessary, and they couldn’t wriggle their way out of it.”182 Operation Northmoor was shut down in 2017, despite one senior officer suggest- Unfortunately, accusations against UKSF ing at the time that the situation was “am- have not led to the same level of debate ber, blinking red”.183 One expert told us that compared to its allies. Instead, it seems they interpreted this as mounting evidence that valid concerns have often been ig- that UKSF had committed war crimes.184 nored or even covered up by the MoD. In early January this year, SNP Defence The pressure to shut down investigations spokesperson, Stewart McDonald, spon- into UKSF came in the context of fervent sored a debate in the House of Commons campaigns to stop convictions of British on the topic of alleged abuses committed service personnel.185 For instance, pushing by UKSF during the height of the conflicts for the release of ‘Marine A’ (Sgt Alexander 177 in Iraq and Afghanistan. Blackman), a Royal Marine who was con- victed of battlefield murder after killing an These accusations were broadcast as part injured Taliban insurgent in Afghanistan in of a joint BBC Panorama and Sunday 2011.186 Times investigation in November 2019. In the documentary it was revealed that the In addition, there were attempts to close 178 MoD attempted to “cover up” alleged war down the Iraq Historical Allegations Team crimes committed by British troops – in- (IHAT), which was set up by the Labour cluding UKSF. These accusations were Government in 2010 “to draw a line under made by fellow British service personnel lingering allegations from an unpopular war who corroborated witness accounts of war and dispatch the idea that military miscon- crimes. duct was widespread.”187

In 2014, the UK Government set up Oper- This swell of public and political anguish ation Northmoor to investigate 52 allega- reached a peak in 2016 after it emerged tions of unlawful killings by UKSF in Af- that Phil Shiner, a solicitor who had brought 179 ghanistan between 2010 and 2013. Yet over 1,000 cases to IHAT, had paid an Iraqi

Remote Warfare Programme 33 middleman to find complainants.188 Follow- ing legal proceedings in 2017, Shiner was found guilty of “multiple professional misconduct charges” and banned from prac- tising law.189 Rather ironically, in cases like Marine A, British Armed Forces chiefs described publicly how the media’s campaign to release him was “misguided.”190

This led to a bizarre situation where a hawkish and persuasive lobby group thought that, in defending Blackman, they were speaking on behalf of the majority of One former military officer with extensive British Armed Forces personnel, while in experience of Britain’s recent wars sug- fact, they were doing the opposite. gested to us that: “the importance of culture is either ignored or understandably It is right that British Armed Forces person- brushed under the carpet”.193 He added nel are not inappropriately pursued based that, “Internal culture in the SAS (UKSF) is on poor evidence. The case of Phil Shiner set largely by [non-commissioned officers], demonstrates the damaging effect this can not officers” but because “the culture is have on the lives of UK personnel. How- known only to those in it is not clear ever, the way in which investigations per- whether…[it] is characterised by one of ac- taining to Northmoor were politicised and countability for human rights abuses, rather bungled by inadequate resourcing has than one of deliberate opacity and the eva- made it more, not less, likely that the cloud sion of responsibility”.194 The toxic culture of suspicion continues to hang over UKSF of a particular unit, he said, could quickly which could inhibit the effectiveness of fu- and easily spread throughout the rest of the ture operations. British Armed Forces on account of the rev- erence afforded, to the SAS especially. This is especially true when accusations of Consequently, they said, this could also transgressions come from within UKSF spread “to trainees from foreign units.”195 ranks. If these individuals do not have the opportunity to clear their names through The spotlight placed on UKSF demon- due process, it may be that these accusa- strates the vital importance of oversight, tions resurface in the future. not only in ensuring all British Armed Forces personnel act in accordance with It is essential not to forget the families who UK values and domestic and international were affected by crimes committed by Brit- law, but also to ensure that the UK can se- ish service personnel and that these fami- cure its national security interests and lies are able to see justice is done. It is one maintain its reputation. In the words of the thing for ministers to claim that the UK has Minister for Defence, People and Veterans, "some of the most rigorous [prosecuting Johnny Mercer: "the UK's armed forces, [is] authorities] in the world",191 but another to an institution that prides itself on its ethos demonstrate this in practice. and values that set it apart from this nation's enemies."196 Without a forum for po- As Samira Shackle, who undertook an ex- litical consultation with senior UKSF com- tensive investigation of IHAT for The manders and political leaders in the UK Guardian newspaper in 2018, has said:192 Parliament, the UK risks falling behind its

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 34 allies, given that France, Denmark, Nor- way, and Australia all have oversight mechanisms in place over their special forces.197

As the UK continues to cast itself as a prin- cipled actor and champion of the rules- based international order, it is paramount that it ensures that UKSF apply an approach to training foreign militaries that builds the legitimacy of the Global Britain brand and contributes positively to the UK’s efforts towards peace and stability abroad.

Remote Warfare Programme 35 Second, the Government needs to reform Conclusion how it mitigates the risks of its security partnerships and the impact on civilians in the The UK faces a great opportunity to rede- countries where the UK engages. This fine its role in the international community must include expanding the process of risk and to reinforce its commitment to the pro- mitigation beyond a narrow assessment of tection of civilians in conflict. Several fac- the legal risks of security force assistance tors including the UK’s departure from the and ensuring there is a clear approach to EU, the Government’s integrated review suspending, withdrawing or remedying in- and the fallout from the COVID-19 pan- stances of abuse. demic provide an opportunity to forge a new path for the UK’s foreign policy priori- Additionally, the Government must commit ties for the next decade. Speaking at a se- to increasing the transparency and ac- lect committee hearing in October 2016, countability of its Overseas Security and then Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson Justice Assistance Guidance and improv- said: “You look around the world and you ing the capacity for information-sharing on see that this country is a massive force for OSJA across government. It should also good in an increasingly uncertain world, a consider allowing a committee like the world that has been deprived of leadership JCNSS to adopt a broader mandate so it 198 and values that we try to project.” How- can more effectively fulfil its role in holding ever, as this report has shown, remote war- the Government to account on its national fare undermines this ambition owing to the security strategy. distinct risks it creates for civilian populations and the long-term prospects for peace Third, as part of a commitment to act as a in the states and regions where the UK in- force for good in the world, the Government tervenes. These risks are insufficiently ad- must ensure that all branches of the British dressed in British policy. This continues to Armed Forces are held to the same scru- put civilians in harm’s way and undermines tiny. It must take immediate action in ensur- the UK’s self-image as a benign actor un- ing that UK Special Forces prioritise the der the banner of ‘Global Britain’. For the protection of civilians from their own ac- UK to address this, it must learn and imple- tions but also the actions of foreign military ment the lessons of the UK’s past military units they are deployed to train. engagements. The Integrated Review offers an opportune We believe there are three key areas that moment for the UK to think critically and the UK Government must act on to ensure honestly about the impact of its military en- that it can contribute to its position as a gagements abroad. The UK’s ability to act force for good in the world. as a positive influence on the world stage depends on its willingness to turn rhetoric First, the UK needs to update its strategic into reality when it comes to protecting ci- policy documents on protecting civilians in vilians in conflict. It is our hope that this re- conflict. These must take on board the les- port will contribute to the ongoing discus- sons of recent campaign to reflect the spe- sion about the UK’s future foreign policy cific challenges that remote warfare poses priorities and that it will serve as a driving to civilians who live in the places where ‘re- force for positive security policy change. mote’ warfare is the reality on the ground.

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 36 Recommendations

The UK’s Role in the World • The UK Government must implement the lessons from remote warfare on civilian populations. This should feature as a key component in the upcoming Integrated Review, which will set the UK’s foreign policy priorities, post-Brexit.

POC Strategy and JSP 1325 • The UK must follow through with its planned update of the 2010 POC Strategy. For the updated Strategy to be meaningful, it must take on the following elements. o Address harm to civilians that occur as a result of the UK’s own actions, and the actions of partners who have received UK support o Commit to communicating more clearly on its approach to POC. This must include a focus on how to account for civilian casualties and civilian harm more broadly. o In line with the roll out of Fusion Doctrine, the POC Strategy must create a more coherent approach to POC. This must involve bridging the language used by the MoD, FCO, and DFID when discussing how to protect civilians in conflict.

• Additionally, both the POC Strategy and the JSP 1325 must make a concerted effort to capitalise on civil society engagement. o Both documents must clearly communicate whether there will be further opportunities for engagement and who will be eligible to contribute. o Additionally, they must also commit to ensuring that civil society voices from countries where the UK operates will be able to meaningfully feed into the design and conduct of operations and activities overseas. OSJA • The Government must set out how the OSJA can more effectively address the underlying causes of conflict in the places it engages overseas. • The Government must introduce a clear policy on suspending and withdrawing security assistance, including a process of remediation when instances of abuse occur. This must include clear guidance on what would trigger the need for reviewing an OSJA. • Expand the remit of Parliament in overseeing the OSJA process. • The Government must consider including specific advice on risks to civilians when providing support to ANSAs as part of its OSJA Guidance • The Government should introduce a database for collating information on OSJA to improve cross-government working, including in Whitehall and in-country.

Addressing the Accountability Gap Over UK Special Forces • The Government must demonstrate that special forces are not above the law and that allegations of wrongdoing follow the same due process as the rest of the British Armed Forces. • UKSF must prioritise protection of civilians as part of its own missions and those where it is deployed to train foreign military units.

Remote Warfare Programme 37 • The Government should consider introducing a process of external accountability of its special forces so that Parliament can assess the efficacy of its mechanisms for prioritising POC as part of its deployments overseas. o The Government must release details of the accountability mechanisms in place to address both instances where UKSF soldiers, and foreign units they have trained, commit abuses against civilians.

Forging a New Path: Prioritising the Protection of Civilians in the UK’s Response to Conflict 38 Endnotes

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Remote Warfare Programme 49 118 For more information on the legal risks 103 Department for International Develop- associated with remote warfare, see: ment et al., ‘Conflict, Stability and Security Knowles and Watson, ‘Lawful But Awful?’ Fund: Annual Report 2017 to 2018’, 119 Nicholas Marsh, ‘Exporting Coercive GOV.UK, 18 July 2018, Power: Regulations and Best Practices for https://www.gov.uk/government/publica- Security Force Assistance’ (PRIO, 2020), tions/conflict-stability-and-security-fund- https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publica- annual-report-2017-to-2018. tion/?x=12389. 104 ‘Conflict Stability and Security Fund: 120 HM Government, ‘Overseas Security Annual Report 2018/19’ (London: Foreign and Justice Assistance (OSJA)’ (HM Gov- and Commonwealth Office, 2019), ernment, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/gov- https://assets.publishing.ser- ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attach- vice.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys- ment_data/file/583304/OSJA_Guid- tem/uploads/attach- ance_2017.pdf. ment_data/file/818585/CSSF-Annual-Re- 121 HM Government, ‘Overseas Security port-2018-to-2019.pdf. and Justice Assistance (OSJA)’. 105 ‘Publications’, accessed 22 June 2020, 122 ‘International Assistance’. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/re- 123 ‘UK Overseas Spending Linked to 350 sources/publications/667-overseas-secu- Death Sentences in Pakistan’, Reprieve rity-and-justice-assistance-an-assess- (blog), accessed 24 June 2020, https://re- ment-of-human-rights-guidance. prieve.org.uk/press/uk-overseas-spend- 106 ‘Mobilising, Modernising & Transform- ing-linked-to-350-death-sentences-in-paki- ing Defence: A Report on the Modernising stan/. Defence Programme’. 124 ‘UK Overseas Spending Linked to 350 107 HM Government, ‘Overseas Security Death Sentences in Pakistan’. and Justice Assistance (OSJA)’. 125 ‘Oral Evidence - Conflict, Stability and 108 ‘Shifting the Burden Responsibly: Over- Security Fund – Annual Report 2017-18 - sight and Accountability in U.S. Security 19 Nov 2018’, accessed 3 April 2020, Sector Assistance | Center for Strategic http://data.parliament.uk/written- and International Studies’, accessed 22 evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evi- June 2020, https://www.csis.org/analy- dencedocument/national-security-strategy- sis/shifting-burden-responsibly-oversight- committee/conflict-stability-and-security- and-accountability-us-security-sector-as- fund-annual-report- sistance. 201718/oral/92714.html. 109 Interview (17/07/20). 126 ‘Oral Evidence - Conflict, Stability and 110 Roundtable Participant (07/06/19). Security Fund – Annual Report 2017-18 - 111 Roundtable Participant (02/03/20). 19 Nov 2018’. 112 Melissa Dalton and Hijab Shah, ‘Part- 127 ‘UK Overseas Spending Linked to 350 ners, Not Proxies: Capacity Building in Hy- Death Sentences in Pakistan’, Reprieve brid Warfare’, 27 May 2020, (blog), accessed 24 June 2020, https://re- https://www.csis.org/analysis/partners-not- prieve.org.uk/press/uk-overseas-spend- proxies-capacity-building-hybrid-warfare. ing-linked-to-350-death-sentences-in-paki- 113 Great Britain et al., National Security stan/. Strategy and Strategic Defence and Secu- 128 Emily Knowles and Abigail Watson, rity Review 2015: A Secure and Prosper- ‘Lawful But Awful? Legal and Political ous United Kingdom., 2015. Challenges of Remote Warfare and Work- 114 Roundtable Participant (02/03/20). ing with Partners’ (Oxford Research 115 Roundtable Participant (02/03/20). Group, 31 May 2018), https://www.oxfor- 116 Event (19/02/20). dresearchgroup.org.uk/awful-but-lawful-le- 117 Serafino, ‘“Leahy Law” Human Rights gal-and-political-challenges-of-remote- Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue warfare-and-working-with-partners. Overview’.

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Remote Warfare Programme 53