The Case Against Carnivore: Preventing Law Enforcement from Devouring Privacy
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USA V. Pen Register
Case 4:06-mj-00356 Document 13-1 Filed in TXSD on 07/19/06 Page 1 of 35 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE § UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR AN ORDER § AUTHORIZING (1) INSTALLATION AND USE OF A § PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE §MAGISTRATE NO. H-06-356M OR PROCESS, (2) ACCESS TO CUSTOMER § RECORDS, AND (3) CELL PHONE TRACKING § OPINION This opinion addresses two significant issues concerning law enforcement access to certain dialing and signaling information in the hands of telephone companies under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”). The first is whether the Government may obtain “post- cut-through dialed digits” containing communication contents under the authority of the Pen/Trap Statute.1 The second is whether limited cell site information may be obtained prospectively under the dual or hybrid authority of the Pen/Trap Statute and the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).2 These questions arise from a recent governmental application for a court order authorizing installation and use of a pen register and trap/trace device, access to customer records, and cell phone tracking. The court initially granted this order in part, denying access to the dialed digits as well as the limited cell site authority. In response to the Government’s informal request, the court agreed to reconsider the dialed digits ruling and invited full briefing by the Government as well as interested parties. The Electronic Frontier Foundation and Center for Democracy and Technology have filed 1 18 U.S.C. -
An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Updated October 9, 2012 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R41733 Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Summary This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). It also appends citations to state law in the area and the text of ECPA. It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given his prior consent. It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than five years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); civil liability for damages, attorneys’ fees and possibly punitive damages; disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate, but comparable, protective schemes for electronic communications (e.g., email) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices. Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given narrowly confined authority to engage in electronic surveillance, conduct physical searches, and install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices for law enforcement purposes under ECPA and for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. -
A Philosophy of Technology for Computational Law
© Mireille Hildebrandt, draft chapter for OUP’s The Philosophical Foundations of Information Technology Law, eds. David Mangan, Catherine Easton, Daithí Mac Síthigh A philosophy of technology for computational law Abstract: This chapter confronts the foundational challenges posed to legal theory and legal philosophy by the surge of computational law. Two types of computational law are at stake. On the one hand we have artificial intelligence in the legal realm that will be addressed as data-driven law, and on the other hand we have the coding of self-executing contracts and regulation in the blockchain, as well as other types of automated decision making (ADM), addressed as code-driven law. Data-driven law raises problems due to its autonomic operations and the ensuing opacity of its reasoning. Code-driven law presents us with a conflation of regulation, execution and adjudication. Though such implications are very different, both types of computational law share assumptions based on the calculability and computability of legal practice and legal research. Facing the assumptions and implications of data- and code-driven law the chapter will first investigate the affordances of current, text-driven law, and relate some of the core tenets of the Rule of Law to those affordances. This will lead to an enquiry into what computational law affords in terms of legal protection, assuming that one of the core functions of the law and the Rule of Law is to protect what is not computable. Keywords: positive law, rule of law, legal certainty, justice, -
The Future Is Bright Complicated: AI, Apps & Access to Justice
Oklahoma Law Review Volume 72 | Number 1 Symposium: Lawyering in the Age of Artificial Intelligence 2019 The Future Is B̶ r̶ i̶ g̶ h̶ t̶ ̶ Complicated: AI, Apps & Access to Justice Emily S. Taylor Poppe Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons Recommended Citation Emily S. Taylor Poppe, The Future Is Br̶ i̶ g̶ h̶ t̶ ̶ Complicated: AI, Apps & Access to Justice, 72 Oᴋʟᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 185 (2019). This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE FUTURE IS BRIGHT COMPLICATED: AI, APPS & ACCESS TO JUSTICE EMILY S. TAYLOR POPPE* Introduction Women’s garments typically have buttons on the left side with openings on the right, opposite the orientation of men’s garments. The practice is clearly a historical relic, with the best explanation being the following: when clothing designs became standardized, the wealthy women who could afford buttons did not dress themselves.1 The servants who dressed them were more likely to be right-handed, so the buttons were positioned on the woman’s left to make it easier for servants to manipulate the fasteners.2 This “button differential” reflects the fact that at one point in time, for the wealthy female portion of the population, dressing was not a task one did for oneself.3 Today, the placement of buttons is all that remains of this history. -
Blocked-Chain: the Application of the Unauthorized Practice of Law to Smart Contracts
Blocked-Chain: The Application of the Unauthorized Practice of Law to Smart Contracts SARAH TEMPLIN* INTRODUCTION In the decade since the release of the Bitcoin white paper by Satoshi Nakamoto,1 computer scientists and crypto-experts are on the cutting edge of using the blockchain for a wide array of uses, including currency and contracts. These uses of the blockchain have been slowly encroaching into regulated areas, including areas that may be ethically left to professional lawyers as practices of law. Regulators are taking notice of smart contracts and the blockchain. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commissioner Brian Quintenz expressed his perso- nal opinion that code developers of smart contracts using the blockchain could be under the regulatory purview of the CFTC. 2 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission brought an enforcement action against a crypto token trading plat- form that used a smart contract to execute trades.3 With regulators taking notice of the use of smart contracts in the marketplace, it seems almost inevitable that the regulators of the legal profession, including the state bar associations and state courts, will take notice of the ethical implications of the use of smart contracts on the legal profession. This note will explore the application of the unauthorized practice of law doc- trine to smart contracts and the implications for the legal profession of this appli- cation. In Part I, this note will summarize the mechanics of the technology of smart contracts and the blockchain, which forms the basis for today's smart con- tracts. In Part II, this note will explore the development and divergence of state doctrines of the unauthorized practice of law. -
2016 February Montana Lawyer
Montana State Bar of Montana LawyerFebruary 2016 | Vol. 41, No. 4 42% of Montana legal professionals who responded to survey say they have been targets of work-related threats or violence Also in this edition: > ABA TECHSHOW 2016 — State > Former longtime Lake, Silver Bow Bar of Montana members eligible for county attorneys pass away — page 27 heavily discounted registration — > Matt Thiel reflects on Magna Carta’s See page 20 for details 800th anniversary — page 3 > Montana Supreme Court orders committee to study decline in bar > Supreme Court set oral arguments exam passage rates — page 11 in Bozeman and Missoula — page 12 Montana Lawyer 1 The official magazine of the State Bar of Montana published every month except January and July by the State Bar of Montana, 7 W. Sixth Ave., Suite 2B, P.O. Box 577, Helena MT 59624. 406-442-7660; Fax 406-442-7763. INDEX E-mail: [email protected] State Bar Officers February 2016 President Matthew Thiel, Missoula President-Elect Bruce M. Spencer, Helena Feature Stories Secretary-Treasurer Survey: Threats, violence against attorneys common ................. 14 Jason Holden, Great Falls Immediate Past President Supreme Court Summaries ................................................................... 18 Mark D. Parker, Billings ABA TECHSHOW 2016 ............................................................................. 20 Chair of the Board Leslie Halligan, Missoula Essential Data Backup Practices for Your Office ............................. 21 Board of Trustees Optimize Your iOS Devices for the Enterprise ................................ 23 Elizabeth Brennan, Missoula Marybeth Sampsel, Kalispell Liesel Shoquist, Missoula Ellen Donohue, Anaconda Shari Gianarelli, Conrad Regular Features Paul Haffeman, Great Falls Kent Sipe, Roundup Member News ...............................................................................................4 Luke Berger, Helena Kate Ellis, Helena State Bar News ...............................................................................................7 J. -
Problems with Extending EINSTEIN 3 to Critical Infrastructure1
Can It Really Work? Problems with Extending EINSTEIN 3 to Critical Infrastructure1 Steven M. Bellovin2, Scott O. Bradner3, Whitfield Diffie4, Susan Landau5, Jennifer Rexford6 1 Introduction Effectiveness should be the measure of any deployed technology. Does the solution actually solve the problem? Does it do so in a cost-efficient manner? If the solution creates new problems, are these easier and less problematic to handle than the original issue? In short, is the solution effective? In the rush to protect the U.S. after the 9/11 attacks, effectiveness was not always the primary driver in determining the value of the systems being proposed. In this context we consider the potential extension to the private sector of EINSTEIN 3, a federal program to detect and prevent cyber intrusions. Providing services to the public is a fundamental role for U.S. federal civilian agencies, and beginning in the mid 1990s, many agencies turned to the Internet. This shift was not without problems. While confidentiality, integrity, and authentication dominated early federal thinking about computer and Internet security, the threats agencies faced included phishing, IP spoofing, botnets, denials of service (DoS), distributed denials of service, and man-in-the-middle attacks. Some exploits were done purely for the publicity, but others had serious purpose behind them. By the early 2000s, the growing number of attacks on U.S. civilian agency systems could not be ignored, and in 2004 the U.S. began an active effort to protect federal civilian agencies against cyber intrusions7. This 1 The authors would like to thank Matt Blaze and John Treichler for various insights and suggestions in the writing of this paper, and we would also like to acknowledge multiple useful conversations with Sandy Bacik, Tahir El Gamal, and Vern Paxson. -
Electronic Communications Surveillance
Electronic Communications Surveillance LAUREN REGAN “I think you’re misunderstanding the perceived problem here, Mr. President. No one is saying you broke any laws. We’re just saying it’s a little bit weird that you didn’t have to.”—John Oliver on The Daily Show1 The government is collecting information on millions of citizens. Phone, Internet, and email habits, credit card and bank records—vir- tually all information that is communicated electronically is subject to the watchful eye of the state. The government is even building a nifty, 1.5 million square foot facility in Utah to house all of this data.2 With the recent exposure of the NSA’s PRISM program by whistleblower Edward Snowden, many people—especially activists—are wondering: How much privacy do we actually have? Well, as far as electronic pri- vacy, the short answer is: None. None at all. There are a few ways to protect yourself, but ultimately, nothing in electronic communications is absolutely protected. In the United States, surveillance of electronic communications is governed primarily by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), which is an extension of the 1968 Federal Wiretap act (also called “Title III”) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Other legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), sup- plement both the ECPA and FISA. The ECPA is divided into three broad areas: wiretaps and “electronic eavesdropping,” stored messages, and pen registers and trap-and-trace devices. Each degree of surveillance requires a particular burden that the government must meet in order to engage in the surveillance. -
United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
All redacted information exempt under b(1) and/or b(3) except where TOP SECRETIIHCSIfCOMIPITIINOFORN otherwise noted. !'ILEO KAREN E. SUTTON, CLERK UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT U.S. Foreign lntelllgsnce Surveillance Court WASHINGTON, D.C. Docket Number: PRITT MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND FACT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES TOP !lECRETlIHCSJICOl\:UNTHNOFORN Derived from Application of the United States to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in the above-captioned matt~ filed Dealassify ealy tl1'6ft the detetnhnatioll of the Pxesident. 1871 (c) (2) PRODUCT I ON JULY 2009 2405 'fell SECR£THHCS/fCOP,H~ITmIOFORN : . ! INTRODUCTION (U) One of the greatest challenges the United States faces in the ongoing conflict with_ "is finding operatives of the enemy. As the Court is aware' ,that task is complicated by terrorists' exploitation of Interne! e-mail as a favored means of communication. -- , .' TOP 8ECRET/fHC8NCOMIl'ffi'A'IOFORN 1871 (c) (2) PRODUCT I ON JULY 2009 2406 TOP SECR:ETffHCSHCOMINT/fNOFORN LI. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, USAF, Director, NSA 'If 6 I(Attaclunent A to the Application) (hereinafter "DIRNSA Dec!. "). Unless the United States finds a way to sort through that data to identify terrorists' cornmuniical:iotls, . be losing vital intelligence that could prevent another deadly terrorist attack. (TSNSlitNF) The attached Application for pen registers and trap and trace devices works within the traditional authorities provided by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to capitalize upon the unique opportunities the United States has for identifying communications 0_' The collection sought here will make possible one of the most powerful tools that the Government can bring to bear to discover enemy ,communications: meta data analYSIS. -
Online Legal Services: the Future of the Legal Profession
Online Legal Services: The Future of the Legal Profession By: Richard S. Granat, Esq. President, DirectLaw, Inc. | Granat Legal Services, P.C. http://www.directlaw.com | www.mdfamilylawyer.com Introduction This statement discusses the delivery of online legal services over the Internet, and how rules of professional responsibility can function as a deterrent to innovation in the delivery of legal services. Certain ethical rules have the effect, in my opinion, of making legal services higher in cost than they should be, uneven in quality, and unresponsive to what the average consumer really wants. The legal profession is highly stratified, with the largest number of practitioners, who are either solo practitioners or who work in small law firms, serving consumers and small business. Our largest law firms generally serve large corporations and their interests. My experience has been primarily with solos and small law firms serving consumers and small business. I am also a solo practitioner, operating a virtual law firm in Maryland, where I am a member of the bar, from my home in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. Thus my remarks should be understood from that perspective, although some of my analysis also applies to large law firm. ****** Background: Information Technology and the Legal Profession In general, the American Bar Association (ABA) has urged the legal community to get online. In 2000, ABA President William G. Paul established the "eLawyering Taskforce: Lawyers Serving Society through Technology" with the purpose of enabling lawyers to figure out how to deliver legal services online. At the time, President Paul observed that many industries were being transformed by the Internet and that consumers were conducting transactions online in such industries as the travel industry, the brokerage industry, the insurance industry, and the banking industry. -
FBI's Carnivore: How Federal Agents May Be Viewing Your Personal E-Mail and Why There Is Nothing You Can Do About It
The FBI's Carnivore: How Federal Agents May Be Viewing Your Personal E-Mail and Why There Is Nothing You Can Do About It PETER J. GEORGITON* Much controversy has arisen over the FBI's proposal to use an e-mail and Internet surveillanceprogram, named "Carnivore," to assist its law enforcement efforts on the Information Superhighway. In this note, the authorexamines how Carnivoreoperates and its implicationsfor individuals 'privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). The author concludes that the current state of constitutional and statutory law governing electronicsurveillance indicates that the FBI can utilize Carnivore to conduct a wide range of intrusive searches with little or no legal justification. Carnivore'sability to retrieve more than mere e-mail messages of suspects, the FBI's checkered past on privacy issues, and the lack ofjudicial oversight make the potentialfor abuse of Carnivoregreat. As a result, Congress must take a hard look at both the ECPA and Carnivore to prevent law enforcement agenciesfrom using Carnivore to peer into our personal e-mails and Internet usage. Whether he wrote DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER, or whether he refrainedfrom writing it, made no difference.... The Thought Police would get him just the same. He had committed-would still have committed, even ifhe had never set pen to paper-the essential crime that contained all others in itself Thoughtcrime, they called it. Thoughtcrime was not a thing that could be concealedforever. You might dodge successfully for a while, even for years, but sooner or laterthey were bound to get you. -
Independent Technical Review of the Carnivore System Final Report
Contract No. 00-C-0328 IITRI CR-030-216 Independent Technical Review of the Carnivore System Final Report 8 December 2000 Contract No. 00-C-0328 IITRI CR-030-216 Independent Review of the Carnivore System Final Report Prepared by: Stephen P. Smith J. Allen Crider Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Mengfen Shyong Harold Krent Larry L. Reynolds Stephen Mencik 8 December 2000 IIT Research Institute Suite 400 8100 Corporate Drive Lanham, Maryland 20785-2231 301-731-8894 FAX 301-731-0253 IITRI CR-030-216 CONTENTS Executive Summary.................................................................................................................. vii ES.1 Introduction................................................................................................................... vii ES.2 Scope............................................................................................................................. vii ES.3 Approach....................................................................................................................... viii ES.4 Observations ................................................................................................................. viii ES.5 Conclusions................................................................................................................... xii ES.6 Recommendations......................................................................................................... xiv Section 1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose.........................................................................................................................