REGULAT INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM (R IDS)
AOCE SION NBR:8205180348 DOC.DATE: 82/05/07 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50 387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Stations Unit 1< Pennsylva 05. BYNAME50~388 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station< Unit 2i Pennsylva AUTH AUTHOR AFFILIATION CURTIS NOTES: RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL In CODE/NAi E LTTR ENCL LIC BR 02 BC 12 1 0 PERCHsRe/ 01 1 1 INTERNAL: ELD/HOSE 12 1 GC g~ 13 1 1 IE F ILE 09 1 1 NRR CALVOgJ 1 1 NRR/DE/EQB 07 2 .2 NRR/OL D IR 1 a 1 1 NR ~GRAB 06 1 1 NRR/DS I/hEB 1 1 c5 00 1 1 RGN1 1 1 EXTERNAL: ACRS 15 10 10 LPDR 03 '2 2 NRC PDR 02 1 1 NSIC 05 1 NTZS 31 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 28 ENCL 27 Pennsylvania Power 8 Light Company Two North Ninth Street ~ Allentown, PA 18101 ~ 215 i 7705151 Norman W. Curtis Vice President-Engineering & Construction-Nuclear 21 5 / 770-5381 May 7, 1982 Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION ER 100450 FILE 843 Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-1084 50-388 Dear Mr. Schwencer: Attached is the Environmental Qualification Justification for Interim Operation for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. This report demonstrates that interim operation of Unit 1 of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station is justified until completion of the environmental qualification program. The justification for interim operation was provided to auditors during the audit of the Susquehanna Environmental Qualification Program conducted this past week. ~ Shoultt you have any questions or need further clarification concerning this subject, please contact Mr. G. S. Wetzel (215-770-6534). Very truly yours, N. W. Curtis Vice President-Engineering & Construction-Nuclear WWW/mks Attachment cc: R. Perch 5 ENVIRONMEWZAL QUALIFICATION JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION SUSQUFHAI'Kh, STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 JOB 8856 DOCKET NO. 50-387 PREPARED BY: BHCHTEL POWER CORPORATION AND TORREY PINES TECHNOLGGY PENNSYLVANIA PCNER AND LIGHT COMPANY APRIL, 1982 PF27/8-1 ~~<7/(~2 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION —JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION I. Introduction A. Intent B. Groundrules C. Methodology D. Organization of Report II. Cold Shutdown (CSD) Path Selection A. Design Basis Events (DBEs) Causing a Harsh Environment B. Safety Actions and Systems Responding to DBEs C. CSD Path Options D. CSD Path Selection 1. Minimum Core Cooling Response 2. Support System Identification 3. Reguired CSD Components >ax. nent Justifications for Interim ration A. Criteria for Justifications B. Detailed Justifications IV. Conclusion aB A. Protective Loaic Diagrams B. System Environmental Data Sheets C. Justification for Interim Operation Forms D. PAID Markups m8/27 INTRODUCTION A. Intent The intent of this report is to demonstrate that interim" operation of Unit 1 of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) is justified pending completion of the environmental qualification program. The purpose of the study is to show that one path of achieving and maintaining a cold shutdown condition is available using only Class 1E equipment which is environmentally qualified.or for which an acceptable justification for interim operation has been identified. Each Class 1E component which is not yet qualified is evaluated to determine whether an appropriate justification for interim operation can be ascertained for that component, regardless of whether it is reauired for the single path to cold shutdown. B. Groundrules A single path to cold shutdown must be determined for each design basis event identified in the SSES FSAR Appendix 15A which can produce a harsh environment. Random single failures of environmentally qualified equipnent are not assumed. The only failures of Class 1E equipnent considered are those which may result from the initiating event. The single cold shutdown (CSD) path includes the minimum systems and equipnent essential to erne'rgency reactor 'shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, containment and reactor heat removal, and prevention of significant release of radioactive material to the environment. All components located in a potentially harsh environment and required to function in the CSD path must either be environmentally qualified or "justified". A Class 1E component is environmentally qualified if it meets the required cateqory of NUREX 0588. (Environmentally qualified Class 1E equipment is not evaluated further in this study). A component is considered "justified" if it has been analyzed in'detail to ensure that the plant can be safely operated pending completion of the component's environmental. qualification. The criteria for interim justification have been derived from the proposed rule 10 CFR 50.49(j) (47 F.R. 2876 through 2879). These justification criteria are detailed in part III of this report. PF27/8-2 Cold Shutdown Path Eval. Pace 2 Class 1E equipnent in a mild environment is considered generically justified due to the SQRT program, accessibility following an accident, and lack of significant or unusual stress on the equipnent followinq the DBE. In addition, plant technical specification testinq and maintenance and surveillance demonstrates qualification, as called for in NRC Generic Letter No. 82-09, dated April 20, 1982. C. Methodology lhe study proceeded in,the following manner: First, each of the design basis events (DBE's) identified in FSAR Appendix 15A were reviewed to determine which events produce a harsh environment. Next, those safety actions necessary to achieve cold shutdown from each DBE were established and the primary and auxiliary systems required to perform,those safety functions were identified. This enabled identification of potential paths to cold shutdown. From there, a preferred CSD path was selected for further review, snd the s~cxKc ccmpcnents within the preferred. path which will be subjected to a harsh environment as a result of the postulated DBEs were identified. Those Class 1E components in a harsh environment which will not be environmentally qualified (per NUREG-0588) by fuel load were analyzed in detail with respect to their safety functions. All not yet qualified components, both those in the preferred CSD path as well as those not essential to achieve success of the path, were evaluated to determine whether interim operation is justified. This evaluation is presented in part III. Qualified components are not evaluated further. Where a given component is not required for the preferred cold shutdown path, this fact is considered to be a justification for interim operation; however, the impact of failure of such a component upon the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown was considered. Once all the Class 1E components were evaluated, a comparison was made to the list of required components on the preferred CSD path. The path is considered successful if it is demonstrated that all required components are either qualified or justified and that failure of unqualified, unjustified components not in the preferred CSD path will not affect the plant's ability to achieve and maintain a safe cold shutdown condition. PF27/8-3 L Page 3 D. Organization of Re rt Part II presents the selection process for determining the preferred CSD path as discussed above in Section I.C. Part III is devoted to the component justification for interim operation, including a discussion of criteria employed in the evaluations. In Part IV, Conclusion, the preferred CSD path is reviewed to determine whether all reauired components in the path are qualified or justified. If this goal is attained, then it can be concluded that the SSES Unit 1 can be operated safely pendina completion of the environment qualification program. PF27/8-4 II. COLD SHVZDCNN'CSD) PATH SELECTIOH A systeqfplant analysis was accomplished to establish that (at time of fuel load) a CSD path is available with the use of only components which have been justified for interim operation with regard to the harsh environment. This analysis (a) reviewed the Design Basis Events (DBE's) to identify those producing harsh environments, (b) established required safety actions and systems providing these actions, (c) identified the auxiliary systems which support these systems, (d) reviewed potential CSD paths and selected a "preferred" CSD path, (e) documented the systems which provide this path, and (f) identified explicitly the required electrical/ mechanical components in each system. Electrical and control components are included implicitly by being associated/supportive of the listed components. If an electrical or control component was not fully qualified, its system function was reviewed and analyzed to determine whether an adequate basis for interim justification exists (see Section III). The failure of a safety-related component to appear on the System Environmental Data Sheets (either explicitly or implicitly) provides one of the justifications used in this study i.e. it is not needed for the preferred CSD path nor will it adversely affect the preferred CSD path. A. Harsh Environment DBE's The DBE's which are identified in FSAR Section 15, Appendix 15A were reviewed with respect to their 'effect on the environment to determine which ones produce a harsh environment. %he results of this review are displayed in Figure II.A-1. Five DBE's (Events N40, 42, 43, 44 and 45) were identified as producing a harsh environment. One of these events (the Control Rod Drop Accident) produces a harsh environment which is the result of radioactive reactor water that is maintained within the reactor coolant pressure boundary and associated cooling systems pressure boundary. B. Safety Actions Required for Response to DBE's For each DBE the plant must respond in such a manner so as to assure that specific Safety Actions occur. Table II.B-1 summarizes the Safety Actions as identified by FSAR Appendix 15A. H15/15-1 D Pa ection Paqe 2 C. CSD Path Options It can be seen by reviewing the FSAR figures in Appendix 15 that the only Safety Action (Table II.B-1) which has a wide selection of alternate paths is Initial Core Cooling. The other Safety Actions are generally accomplished by redundant sets of the same components and do not provide much relief in this harsh environment study. Appendix A is a set of Protective Logic Diagrams (from FSAR Appendix 15A) for Initial Core Cooling and Extended Core Cooling, which demonstrates the options available. The great variety of systems, sequences and timing is evident. %he effect of removing a system can qualitatively be evaluated as was done by the "X"ing out of HPCI, RCIC and CS systems. D. CSD Path Selection 1. Minimum Core Cooling Response From Appendix A for Extended Core Cooling, it is seen that RHR/ADS is required, while for Initial Core Cooling ADS/RP/CS is shown as adequate. Based upon the premise that no failure beyond the DBE and its consequences occurs, it was decided to exclude the CS from the minimum CSD path. Historically, >~8 have been designed such that the RHR system could provide the minimum cooling water required post DBE for both short and long term cooling. This was 'confirmed in the GE presentation made by C. H. Stoll to PP&L's Blue Ribbon, KKI committee. The RHR system as provided for Susquehanna was reported by GE to provide a 140% reauired cooling water flow rate with four RHR pumps running (i.e., no Core Spray). The proposed path, Figure II.D-1, was then compared to the SSES FSAR. A search of the SSES FSAR did not find any contradiction with the suggested path. The relevant sections are discussed below: Section 6.3.1.1.2 identifies the ECCS available after a single failure, but not the minimum required. Section 6.3.3.7.4 states that failure of the LPCI is rmre severe than failure of the CS. Table 6.3-5 identifies the ECCS available after a single failure, but not the minimum required. Figure 7.3-1 identifies the acceptable and unacceptable number of RHR pump with one or tm CS trains, but does not address 4 RHR pumps alone or if CS is not available. Section 'l5, Appendix 15A describes the need for LPCI/CS but does not quantify this need. Based upon the above, the described Shutdown Path is adequate. H15/5-2 CSD Path Selection Paqe 3 2. Support System Identification Combininq the preceeding data, Table II.D-1 was .developed which provides a listing of responses to a specific event. For each response, the respondinq systems are identified and the support or auxiliary systems are shown. This provides a system level identification of the minimum CSD path. Table II.D-2 provides further identification of the Auxiliary Systems and their prime function(s) with respect to the systems which they support. 3. Required CSD Components The System Environmental Data Sheets, Appendix B, were developed to provide a detailed identification of each system with respect to the major components required for the minimum shutdown path under a harsh environment. It also identifies the events for which the system is required, the Safety Actions the system is providing/ supporting, and provides'a best estimate of the time required for the components to operate. The electrical and control corqnnents necessary to support listed eguignent are not listed specifically but rather are implicitly included with their associated mechanical/ electrical components. For example, MCC, switchgear, panels, time delay relays, cable, transformers, etc., have not been specifically identified. H15/5-3 FIGURE II 'A-1 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION DESIGN BASES EVENF ENVIRORKNTAL EFFECTS The DBFs discussed in the FSAR Appendix 15A, were evaluated with respect to their effect upon the environment. Five of these DBEs (Events 40, 42, 43, 44 and 45) were identified as producing a harsh environment. H15/6-7 Figure II.A-1 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION DESIGN BASES EVENT (CHAPTER 15A) HARSH ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS HARSH ENV. EVENT TITZE PRODUCED Per FSAR 15.4.9, RCPB not breached 40. Control Rod Dro Accident but high activit in water 41. Fuel Handling Accident X Not a qualification roblem Loss of Coolant Accident Resulting from SpeCtrum of 42. Postulated Piping Breaks Within RPCB Inside.'rimary Containment 43. Steam System Piping Break . Outside Prima Containment 44. Instrument Line Break Inside Seconda Containment ~ Feedwater Zine Break Outside~ Prim~ Containment 46. Gaseous Radwaste System X No safety related items in area Leak or Failure 47. Ambient Charcoal OffWas X No safety related items in area Treatment S stem Failure 48. Licruid Radwaste System X No safety related items in area Leak or Failure 49. Ziauid Radwaste System No safety related items in area Storage Tank Failure / 50. S nt Fuel Cask Dro Reactor Shutdown from Not a design bases 51. Anticipated Transient— Without SCRAM (A'IWS) 52. Reactor Shutdown —from Outside Main Control Rocm 53. Reactor Shutdown —Without Control Rods I I WP8/23 TABLE II.B-1 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION SAFETY ACTIONS Table II.B-1 summarizes the Safety Actions required to respond to the Harsh Environment Design Bases events identified in Figure II.A-1. For more detail as to the systems which normally provide these Safety Actions refer to the figures in FSAR Appendix 15A. H15/6-8 SUSQUEHANNA DESIGN BASES EVENTS SAFETY ACTIONS (FSAR Chapter '15A) EVENT 40 Event 42 Event 43, 44,45 Scram Scram Scram Reactor Vessel Isolation Reactor Vessel Isolation N Establish Containment Establish Primary Cont. Establish Secondary Cont. Initial Core Cooling Initial Core Cooling Initial Core Cooling Extended Core Cooling Extended Core Cooling Extended Core Cooling Pr essure Relief Pressure Relief Pressure Relief Control Room Env. Control Room Env.~ Control Room Env. Control Contr ol Control Limit~ Reactivity~ ~ Insertion~ Stop Rod Ejection Restrict loss of Rate Reactor Coolant Suppression Pool Cooling FIGURE'I.D-1 SUSQUEHANNA SHULM ELECTRIC STATION DESIGN BASES EVEPZ MINIMUMCORE COOLING REPONSE This figure provides a core cooling cold shutdown path based upon the premise that no failure beyond the DBE occurs and upon minimizing the quantity of components needed. 'Ihe LPCI/ADS mode with RHR HX will exceed the coolie requirements for the core in the extended cooling . period. At that time, the suppression pool could be cooled at the operator's option. Note that for Event 40, it is possible to use ADS/RHR in lieu of the HPCI/RCIC response shown in Appendix A and FSAR Appendix 15A. H15/6-6 Figure II.-D-1 SUSQUEHANNA SES DESIGN BASES EYENT " "MINIMUM CORE COOLING RESPONSE IDC Incident Detection Initial Cooling Depressurizaticn Injecting Water LPCI Extended LPCI/ADS LPCI Cooling M RHR HX Supp. Pool Cooling (if required) Assume: no single failure TABLE II.D-1 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION SUPPORT SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION This table provides a listing of responses to a specific DBE. For each response, the responding systems are identified and the support or auxiliary systems are shown. This provides a system level identification of the minimum CSD path. Acronyms used in this table are as follows: IDC Incident Detection Circuitry Control Rod Drive Reactor Protection System Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System Reactor Building Isolation Control System Main Steam Isolation Valve Residual Heat Removal LPCI Zaw Pressure Coolant Injection Mode of RHR Heat Exchanger Automatic Depressurization System H15/6-2 ge 1 TABLE II.D-1 SUPPORT SYSTEN IDEÃZIFICATIC8 SYSTEMÃ SYSTEMÃ FUFF RFSPCNSE RESHM)ING AUXILIARY 'UB-AUXILIARY SUB-SUB AUXILIARY 8YSTEN SYSTEM 42 Pipe Break Inside I Containment I I I I Large Rreak I Scram I CRD I I RPS I I I Fatablish Primary I PCmrrcs DC Power Aux. AC or Batteriesl I Gmtainment I I Aux. AC Power Standby AC Power DC Power I Diesel Oil Transfer I Emergency Service Hater I Diesel Generator Bldg. I Vent I Diesel Generator Can- I I bustion Air I I I ESSW Pumphouse Vent I I I I I I MS Isolation I I I I Valve I I I I I I I I I I I Instrument Gas I I I I I Accumulator I I I I I I I I I I Aux. AC Power I Standby AC Power I See Above I I I I I I I Containment I Hydrogen Recanb- I Aux. AC Power I See Above (Standby AC) I I Atmos. Cont. I iners I I I I I I I I I ~ll HVAC I Aux. AC Bower I Standby AC Power I See Above I I (H2 Mix.) I I I I I I I I. I2/12-1 Page 2 SUPPORP SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION EVRN1.'ESPONSE AUXILIARY SUB-AUXILIARY SUB-SUB AUXILIARY SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM 42 Larae Break Establish Secondary l PCRVICS ( See Above Inside I Containment Containment I (Cont'd) RBICS I. I. I I MSIV-Leakage I MS branch line I Control ( isolation I I I I I Standby Gas ( DC Power I Treatment I I I I I I ( Control Structure ( I I HVAC I I I I Aux. AC Power Standby AC Power I See Above I Fnvironmental Control Room I Aux. AC Power I Standby AC Power I See Above Control of Control HVAC I I I Room I Control Structurel Emergency Service I I Chilled Water Water I I Initial Core Incident Detect- ( DC Power Aux. AC Power or I Cooling ion I Batteries .I Circuitry'PCI I I Auxiliary AC Standby AC Power I DC Power I Power I Diesel Oil Transfer I I Emergency Service Water I I I Diesel Generator Bldg. I I Vent I I I Diesel Generator Can- I I I bustion Air I I I ESSW Pumphouse Vent P12/12-2 Page 3 SUPPORT SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION RF8PCNSE RFSPONDING AUXILIARY SUB-AUXILIARY SUB-SUB AUXILIARY SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM I 42 Large Break Initial Core I DC Power I Inside Coolinq (Cont'd) I Containment I Emergency Service I (Cont'd) I Water I I I I Equipment Area I Cooling I I — Extended Core RHR LPCI via I Coolinq (includinq RHR HX I Suppression Pool Auxiliary AC I Standby AC Power See Above Coolinq) Power I I I I I Emergency Service I I I Water I I I I RHR Service I I Water I I I I Equipnent Area I I Coolinq I I I I I Instrument Gas I I Accumulator I I I I "Suppression PoolI Aux. AC Power Standby AC Power I See Above Temp. I I I I I *Not required for large Recirculation Line Break. PF12/1 2-3 0 Page 4 SUPPORT SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION EVER RESPCNSE RESPONDING AUXILIARY SUB-AUXILIARY SUB-SUB AUXILIARY SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM 42 Larae Break Detect Rad Zeakaae I Plant Process Aux. AC Power See Above Inside I Rad Monitoring I Containment I I (Cont d) I I I I I I Intermediate/ Same as above I Small Break except ADS reauired I I Inside Contain-I for initial cooling I I ment I I I I I 40 Control Rod I I Neutron Monitor- Auxiliary AC Power I Drop -I I ing or Batteries I I I I I I CRD I I I I I I RPS I I I I I I Reactor Vessel I Main Steam Line I I I Isolation and I Radiation I 'I I Fstablish Contain- I Monitoring I I ment I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I' I- I I I PF.12/12-4 Page 5 SUPPORP SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FVENZ AUXILIARY SUB-AUXILIARY SUB-SUB AUXILIARY SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM 40 Control Rod Reactor Vessel Aux. AC Power I Standby AC Power DC Power Drop (Cont'd)I Isolation and I. Diesel Oil Transfer I Fatablish Contain- I I Emergency Service Water a I ment I I Diesel Generator Bldg. t I Vent I I I Diesel Generator Ccm- I I bustion Air I I I ESSH Pumphouse Vent I I I I DC Power I Aux. AC or Batteries) I I I Main Steam Iso- DC Power I lation Valve I Instrument Gas I Accumulator t I Aux. AC Power Standby AC Power See Above I Fnvironmental I Control Room Auxiliary AC Standby AC Power See Above Control of Control HVAC I'Power Room I Eilergency Service) i Water l I I I ?F12/12-5 Page 6 SUPPORT SYSTEM IDEÃZIFICATI(N FUFF RESPCNSE AUXILIARY SUB-AUXILIARY SUB-SUB AUXILIARY SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM 40 Control Rod I Control Structure( Drop (Cont'd)l I Chilled water I Initial Core Incident Detect- DC Power I Auxiliary AC Power Coolinq ion Circuitry I or Batteries I DC Power I I Instrument Gas Accumulator I LPCI DC Power I I Aux. AC Power Standby AC Power See Above I I I I Emergency Service l I I Water I I I I I I Equipnent Area I I I I Cooling I I I I I I I — I Fxtended Core I RHR LPCI via I DC Power I I I Coolim (including RHR HX I I I I Suppression Pool I I Aux. AC Power I Standby AC Power I See Above I Coolina) I I I I I I I Emerqency Servicel I I I I Water I I I I I I I- I I RHR Service Waterl I I I I I 'I I I Fauipnent Area I I I I I Cooling I I ?F12/1 2-6 e 7 SUPPORr SYSTEM IDENTIFICATICN RFSPONSH RES PCNDING AUXILIARY SUB-AUXILIARY SUB-SUB AUXILIARY SYSTEM SYSTEM SYS'IBM SYSTEM 40 Control Rod I Extended Core I Suppression Pool Aux. AC Power Drop (Cont'd) I Coolina (Cont'd) I Temp. I DC Power Instrument Gas Accumulator I Rad Detect Leakage Plant Process I Rad Monitoring I I I I 44, 45 I I I I I I I I Pipe Break I I Outside I I I I I I Containment I I I I I I I I I I RHR Shutdown I Scram I CRD I I Cooling Break I I I I I- I I I I I I I I RPS I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I RV I Establish I PCRVICS DC Power I Aux. AC Power or I I Isolation I I I Batteries I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ Page & SUPPORT SYSTEM IDENTIFICATICN RESTS E AUXILIARY SUB-AUXILIARY SUB-SUB AUXILIARY SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM 43, 44, 45 (Cont'd) I I I Pipe Break l Auxiliary AC I Standby. AC Power DC Power Outside I Diesel Oil Transfer Containment I Emergency Service Water (Cont.'d) I Diesel Generator Bldg. I Vent I Diesel Generator Can- - I bustion Air I ESSN Pumphouse Vent I I Main Steam Iso- I DC Power Aux. AC Power or lation Valves I Batteries I I Instrument Gas I Accumulator I I Auxiliary AC Standby AC Power I See Above P I l Power I I I I I Environmental I Control Room HVACt Aux. AC Power t Standby AC Power I See Above I Control of Control t I I I Room t Control Structurel Emergency Service I I ) Chilled Water Water I l I I I I Initial Core IDC i DC Power I I I Coolie I I I I t t I I I I I I I I PF12/12-8 Page 9 SUPPORT SYSTEM IDENTIFICATICN EVFNZ RES%ME AUXILIARY SUB-AUXILIARY SUB-SUB AUXILIARY SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM 43, 44, 45 RHR Shutdown Initial Core f LPCI Aux. AC Power Standby AC Power f See Above Coolinq Break Coolinq (Cont'd) I I I Outside I DC Power I I Containment I I I (Cont'd) Emergency Service f I f Water l I I I I f I I Equipnent Area I I I l Cooling I I I I I I — Fxtended Core l RHR LPCI via f DC Power I l Coolinq (includinq f RHR HX .I I l Suppression Pool I f Aux. AC Power f Standby AC Power l See Above l Coolie) I I I I f Fmergency Service f I l Water I f I I l l RHR Service Water f I I I I l Equipnent Area l Emergency Service I f Cooling l Water I I I I I f AD@ f DC Power I I I I I I I f Instrument Gas l .I I f Accumulator f I I l l f Supp. Pool Temp. f Aux. AC Power I I l I I 'F12/1 2-9 0 e 10 SUPPOKZ SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION RES POSE RES PCNDING AUXILIARY SUB-AUXILIARY SUB-SUB AUXILIARY SYSTEM ~ SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM 4, 44, 45 I I I I Break (other I Scram I See Above I than RHR Shut- I I I down Cooling) I Establish RV I See Above I Outside I Isolation I I Containment I I I I Environmental I See Above I I Control of Control I I I Room I I I I I I Initial Core I IDC I Dc vower I Cooling I I I I I I I ADS I DC Power I I I I I Instrument Gas I I I Accumulator I I I I I LPCI I Aux. AC Power Standby AC Power DC Power I I I Diesel Oil Transfer I I I Emergency Service Water I I I Diesel Generator Bldg. I I I Vent I I I Diesel Generator Can- I I I bustion Air I I I ESSW Pumphouse Vent I I I I I I DC Power I I I t 2/12-10 Page 11 SUPPORT SYSTEM IDENI'IFICATION RESPONDING AUXILIARY SUB-AUXIIIARY SUB-SUB AUXILIARY SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEN 43, 44, 4S I I I I Break (other I Initial Core' I Emergency Service I than RHR Shut- Cooling (Cont'd) I Water down Coolinq) I I Outside I F~ipnent Area Containment I I Coolinq (Cont'd) I I — I Fxtended Core RHR LPCI via I DC Power I Coolinq (includinq RHR Hx Suppression Pool Aux. AC Power Standby AC Power See Above Coolinq) I Emergency Service I Water I RHR Service Water I Equipnent Area I Cooling I I I Instrument Gas I Accumulator I I I Suppression PoolI Aux. AC Power I I I LPCI See Above I I I Break Detection I Plant Leak Aux. AC Power Standby AC Power I See Above I Detection I PF12/12-11 ge 12 SUPPORT SYSTEM IDENZIFICATI(N RFSP(NSE RFSFCN3ING AUXILIARY SUB-AUXILIARY SUB-SUB AUXILIARY SYSTEM S~ SYSTEM SYSTEM ' 43, 44, 45 I I I I Break (other I Extended Core I I Emergency Service I RHR than Shut- I Coolinq (Cont'd) I I Water I down Coolinq) I I I Outside I I RHR Service WaterI Containment I I I (Cont'd) I I Equipnent Area I I Cooling I I I I ADS DC Power I I I I I I Instrument Gas I Accumulator I I I I Suppression Pool Aux. AC Power I I Temp. I I I I LKI See Above I I I Break Detection I Plant Leak Aux. AC Power I Standby AC Power I See Above I Detection I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I — I I I I l2/1 2-12 TABLE II.D-2 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION AUXILIARYSAFETY SYSTEMS t 'Ibis table identifies the auxiliary, systems directly required by the safety-related systems. In addition, the primary support functions of the auxiliary systems are provided. This table includes all safety systems> not merely those on the preferred Cold Shutdown path; 815/6-3 Table ll.D-2 AUXKLIARYSAFETY'YSTEMS SYSTEM AUXILIARY SYSTEM COMMENTS RCI C DC Power System Control Circuit . Valve Power Lube Oil Pump Equipment Area Cool Area of Cooling System RCICS Turbine Pump SUppression Mater Supply Pool Storage for RCICS Pumps (Passive) Nuclear Boiler Turbine Motivation Steam HPCI DC Power System Control Circuit Valve Power, Lube Oil Pump " Equipment Area Cool Area of Cooling System HPCI Turbine Pump Suppression Mater Supply for Pool Storage HPCI Pump (Passive) Nuclear Boiler Steam Tur bine Motivation ~ RHRS Suppression Auxiliary AC Valve and Pump ~ Pool Cooling Power System Power (RHRS-Containment Spray Cooling) DC Power System Pump Breaker Control Emergency Service RHRS Mater System Pump Cooler RHRS RHRS Heat Service'ater System Exchangers Equi pment Area Cool Area Cooling System of RHR Equipment RHRS LPCI Auxi 1 iary C ower a ve an System Pump Power DC Power System Pump Breaker Control and Control Logic Page 2 AUXILIARYSA~ SYSTENS AUXILIARYSYSTEN t Emergency Service RHRS Pump Mater System Cooler Equipment Area Cool Area of Cooling Sy'tem RHRS Equi.p- ment Suppression Pool Mater Supply to Storage (Passive) LPCI Pumps RHRS Shutdown Auxi1 iary Valve and Cooling Mode AC Power System Pump Power DC Power Valve Power, System Pump Breaker Control and Control Logic Emergency Service RHRS Pump Mater System Cooler Equipment Area Cool Area of Cooling System RHRS Equipment RHRS Service RHRS Mater System Heat Exchangers ADS and Manual Suppression Pool Steam Conden- Relief Valve Storage (Passive) sation Operation DC Power System Rel'ief Valve Controls Sensors Logic and Solenoids Instrument Gas Accommulator System CSCS Auxiliary AC Valve and Power System Pump Power DC Power System Breaker Control Control Logic Equipment Ar ea Cool Area of Cooling System Spray Equipment Suppression Pool Mater Supply Storage (Passive) to Pumps Standby Liquid Auxiliary AC Power Pump Power Control System System Tank Heaters Valve Firing Circuits AUXILIARYSA~ SYSTEMS Page 3 A~TXILTARY SYSTEN Code Pressure Relief Suppression Pool Steam System Stor age (Passive) Condensation Neutron Monitoring DC Power System System Page 4 SUS UEHANNA SES AUXILIARY SAFETY SYSTEM SYSTEM AUXILIARYSYSTEMS COMMENTS Control Structure Auxiliary AC Power Chiller and Chilled Water System Pump Power System DC Power System Control Power t Emergency Service Cool Chiller Mater System Primary Containment DC Power System Valve and and Reactor Vessel Control Power Isolation Control System Auxiliary AC Power Valve Power System Incident Detection DC Power System Power Control Circuitry Circuitry Containment Suppression Pool Pr es sure (Passive) Storage (Passive) Suppression Containment Reactor Building/ Vacuum Relief Containment System Differental Pressure Control Drywell Vacuum Drywell/Suppression Relief System Pool Differential Pressure Control Offsite AC Power DC Power System Breaker Control System Standby AC Power DG Power System Diesel and Breaker System Control Emergency Service Diesel Cooling Mater System Diesel Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System Combustion Air Supply to Diesel Room SUSQUEHANNA SF o Page 5 AUXlLIARYSA~ SYSTEMS AUXILIARYSYSTEMS 'COMMENTS Equipment Area D/G 5 Switch Cooling Gear Areas Cooling Control Room Heating Auxiliary AC Power Power to Ventilating and System Air Conditioning Air Conditioning Equipment System Control Structure Air Coolers Chilled Mater System Emergency Service DC Power System Pump Breaker Water System Control Power Auxiliary AC Power Valve and Pump System Power Equipment Areas Cool Areas Cooling System of ESW Pump Standby Gas DC Power System Control Power Treatment Auxiliary AC Power Deliver Power System to Blowers and Heaters Equipment Area Emergency Service Cool Area Cooling System Water System Coolers Auxiliary AC Power Power to System Blowers RHRS Service Auxiliary AC Power Valve and Mater System System Pump Power DC Power System Pump Breaker Control Power Equipment Area Cool Areas Cooling System of RHRS Service Mater Pump Hydrogen Control DC Power System Control Power System Auxiliary AC Power Recombiner System Fan Power MSLIV DC Power System Control Power Auxiliary AC Power Control Power System SUSQUEHANNA SFB Page 6 AUXILlARYSAFETY SYSTEMS 'SYSII'EM AUXILIARY'SYSTEMS COMMENTS Instrument Gas Accumulator System Diesel Oil Storage DC Power System Control and Pump and Transfer System Power Auxiliary AC Power Standby AC Power System System or Offsite At', Power System DC Power System Breaker Control Component usta. xcatxons Page 1 III. C0566NEÃZ. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ZÃZERIM OPFRATION All Class 1E components which will not be environmentally qualified by Unit 1 fuel load (forecast for July 1,'982) and which will be located in a harsh environment following a design basis event have been evaluated to ascertain whether the SSES plant can be safely operated pending completion of the environmental qualification program. A. Criteria for Justifications In evaluating individual components for interim justifications, the considerations given" in proposed rule'0 CFR 50.49(j), as follows, were applied: "1) Accomplishing the safety function by some designated alternative equipnent that has been adequately qualified and satisfies the single-failure criterion if the principal equipnent has not been demonstrated to be fully qualified. 2) The validity of partial test data in support of the original qualification. 3) Limited use of administrative controls over equipment that has not been demonstrated to be fully qualified. 4) Completion of the safety function prior to exposure . to the ensuing accident environment and the subsequent failure of the equipment does not degrade any safety function or mislead the operator. 5) No significant degradation of any safety function or misleading of the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment". (49 F.R. 2879, January 20, 1982). Mesc considerations were further defined and expanded to cover other situations; this activity resulted in the developnent of a set of General Guidelines, listed in Table III.A-1, which were followed in determining the detailed component justifications (see Section III.B). For the purposes of this study, two other significant criteria were factored into the general guidelines: ( 1) a component not yet qualified which is not required for the preferred cold shutdown path is considered to be justified so long as failure of such a component will not prevent achieving and maintaining cold shutdown, and (2) Class 1E equipment in a mild environment is generically justified (see Introduction). PF27/8-5 ~nent Justifications Page 2 \ In addition, the results of a recent recalculation of total inteqrated doses (TIDs) have been factored into this report. &is recalculation was conducted in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-0588 and demonstrated a reduction in the calculated post-accident doses in certain areas of the plant from those previously calculated. The results of the TID recalculation will be made available for the NRC at the May, 1982 Environmental Qualification audit; however, because the study is so recent, the revised doses may not appear in the FSAR or be reflected in the SSES Environmental Qualification Files at the time of the audit. Low Risk Operation durin Zaw Power Testing In addition to the above, the risk of public health ard safety is substantially less during the low power testing phase than after the plant has gone into mmmrcial operation. This fact has been recognized specifically by the Nuclear Requlatory Commission. As stated in the introduction to the notice of proposed rulemaking for 10 CFR 50.47 (regarding emergency planning and preparedness): "%he Commission's position is that several factors contribute to a substantial reduction in risk and potential accident consequences for low power testing as compared to the highez risks in continuous full power operation. First, the fission product inventory generated during low power testing is much less than during full power operation due to the lower level of reactor activity and short period of operation. Second, at low power, there is a reduction in the required capacity of systems designated to mitigate the consequences of an abnormal occurrence under full power operation. %bird, the time scale for taking actions to identify accident causes and mitigate accident consequences is much longer than at full power. This means the operators should have sufficient time to prevent a release from occurring." (46 F.R. 61133, December 15, 1981) 'lhe rationale propounded above is directly applicable to the justification for interim operation until ascension to full power for Class 1E components which are not yet environmentally qualified. PF27/8-6 Component Justifications Page 3 The following discussion shows how the considerations given in proposed rule 10 CFR 50.49 (j) on Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants relate to the above rationale: 10 CFR 50.49 (j)(1): "Accomplishing the safety function by some designated alternative equipnent that has been adequately qualified and satisfies the single-failure criterion if the principal equipment has not been demonstrated to be fully qualified". A licabilit : During the low-power testing phase, the energy available in the core is much less than during full power operation; therefore the operators have a longer time period to identify an accident and to take appropriate mitigating actions. This would allow the operators to use systems not normally called upon to mitigate accidents. Also, since the plant is not connected to the power grid during the low power testing phase, an accident would not cause a transient on the grid such that a loss of offsite power simultaneous with a DBA is much less likely; therefore, Class 1E offsite power supplies would most likely be available. 10 CFR 50.49 (j)(2): "The validity of partial test data in support of the original qualification". Partial test data for a given ~nent may be adequate to indicate that the component is able to withstand the less severe environment resulting from the postulated accident. This consideration may also apply where the manufacturer has stated and documented that its equipnent will work in the accident environment but not all supporting data is available. PF27/8-7 Component Justifications Pa e 4 lo C~ g0.49 (j)(4): Completion of the safety function prior to exposure to the ensuing accident environment and the subsequent failure of the equipnent does not degrade any safety function or mislead the operator". Applicability: lhe fission product inventory during the low power testing period will be much lower than during full power operation; consequently, the total integrated dose from a postulated accident would be much lower. At low power the required capacity of systems designed to mitigate accident consequences is much less than at full power; therefore, fewer responding systems should be required to operate. Lack of equignent aging data can be justified because the low power test program has a short duration. Jhe temperature profile for harsh environments during low power operation will be less severe. Although the temperature peak would be about the same as for full power operation (because the temperature and pressure of the reactor coolant inventory is the same), the total energy available frcm the reactor core is less, so that the core cooling systems will overcome decay heat faster which means that equipnent space temperatures would be reduced earlier. Finally, and perhaps most important, the probability of a design basis accident occurring during the low power testing phase is much lower than later in the plant life. 'Ihis is because the equipment and piping is new, such that there will have been insufficient time for flaws to develop or propagate after'he initial NDE and hydrotest. Also, there has been limited thermal cycling of the equipment and piping, and long- term phenanena such as Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking would not have had time to pose a problem. PF27/8-8 Component Justifications Paqe 5 B. Detailed'Justifications The detailed component justifications appear on the forms found in Appendix C of this report. 'lhese forms give basic information on each component which is not yet q'ualified and is located in a harsh environment. In many cases, for convenience, several components were grouped together for evaluation —especially where such components. have a common safety function and environment. For BOP equipnent, the design basis accident(s) for which a component must be qualified are listed acmrding to the number codes described in Section II.A. Also, the justifications are coded according to the applicable general guidelines of Table III.A-1. A brief explanation is included where necessary to clarify how each general guideline applies to the specific component being reviewed. For most'of the components under review, several justifications for interim operation have been advanced. Thus, it can be seen that the determination of whether the plant can be safely operated in the interim rests upon the„ccmbination of justifications, rather than upon a In some cases the JIO form indicates that a future activity (for example, testing) is planned to complete the environmental qualification for a given component type. The activities mentioned are those intended at the time this report was prepared; i:f there is a change in plans, the NRC will be informed. PF27/8-9 TABLE III.A-1 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERIM OPERATION (JIOs) —GENERAL GUIDELINES Component is not in the preferred Cold Shutdown (CSD) path. Failure of this component will not affect the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. %his component is electrically and physically separate from equipnent on the Cold Shutdown path. 2. Desiqnated alternate component is available to accomplish safety function; this alternate component is qualified or is located in a mild environment. 3. 'Ihe component is desiqned in a redundant pair; each redundant component is separated from the other, with only one redundant component subjected to a harsh environment (e.g., containment isolation valves inside and outside containment). 4 ~ The component completes its safety function in a period of time after an accident such that the component does not experience adverse effects from the accident environmental conditions in this time period. 'lhe most likely mode of failure for the component is "fail safe". Similar items have been qualified for the required environmental conditions; differences between the qualified items and the component under review are not expected to affect the component's ability to perform its safety function. 7 ~ Operator action (administrative controls) can be taken in the case of component failure. 8. Failure of the component will not have any adverse impact on the effectiveness of the system to perform its safety-related function (e.q., failure of a minimum flow valve). 9. The component provides safety-related information only. Failure of the component would not affect safety equipment operation. Other instruments are available to provide the same information. Instrument failure should not mislead the operator. 10. Partial test data is available for postulated environmental conditions. No credit for the component has been taken in the safety analysis. PF27/9-1 e .— on 12. There is confidence that the component is qualified for its service conditions because of conservative design practices and materials of fabrication and that the level of stress experienced by the component will not adversely affect the component's ability to perform its safety-related function. 13. The component (e.q., solenoid valve, a motor-operated containment isolation valve, etc.) is normally in the position required for accident mitigation. 14. Environmental parameters previously given were conservatively calculated and have been reduced by a more realistic analysis while still retainina sufficient safety margin. Khese reduced environmental conditions can be met by the component. 15. Justification that the component is qualified for its service conditions can be deduced from the successful operating history of similar components at operatinq plants. %hen viewing accident scenario mechanistically, it is apparent that it is physically impossible for the component to be exposed to a harsh environment before the component attains its safe position or state. 17. The unqualified component will be replaced by a qualified component after fuel load but before ascension to full power. PF27/9-2 CONCLUSION Justification for interim operation of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 pending completion of environmental qualification has been demonstrated on three levels. First, a comprehensive, high- quality program has been underway for several years to environmentally qualify Class 1E electric equipment to the appropriate category of NUBEG-0588. Second, this study has shown that a single, clear path to cold shutdown can be achieved employing either environmentally qualified or justified Class lE components. Failure of unqualified eauipment will not affect the plant's ability to achieve and maintain a safe, cold shutdown. Finally, as discussed in Section III.A.l, there is a low risk of operating the plant during the interim period. As can be demonstrated by SSES'nvironmental Qualification Files, most Class lE equipment is presently qualified, and resolution of all outstanding qualification concerns related to justification for interim operation is anticipated before ascension to full power operation. PF27/8-10 0 APPENDIX A SUSQUEHANNA, STEAM ELECTRIC STATION PROTECTIVE LOGIC DIAGRAMS This appendix is a set of Protective Zoqic Diagrams (from FSAR Appendix 15A) for Initial Core Cooling and Extended Core Cooling, which demonstrates the options available. The great variety of systems, sequences and timing is evident. The effect of removing a system can qualitatively be evaluated as was done by the "X"ing out of HPCI, RCIC and CS systems. "X"ing out HPCI and RCIC completely eliminated Initial Core Coolinq Protective Zagic I applicable to Event 40. However, it is possible to use ADS/LPCI in lieu of HPCI/RCIC as shown in Initial Core Cooling Zoic V. The "Plant States" listed on pages 5 and 6 of this appendix are those defined in the SSES FSAR Table 15A.3-1, namely: A = Shutdown with reactor vessel head off B = Not shutdown with reactor vessel head off C = Shutdown with reactor vessel head on D = Not shutdown with reactor vessel head on. H15/6-5 ~ ~ PP \ ~ 'Ot ~ ~ ~ fP ~ prd ~ P 1 I 4 a. ~ ~ ~ ~s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I) No CREDIT pbR, ffI.,CI WD R 1DC (AI) 5 F ~ ~ C e L?CI (Cl) C HFCC (< IC I TZCI (Cl) ~ ~ N ~ P, I ~, ~ ~ ~ i A 1rotoctlvs Lotle Iy ~ " 0 O~ ?rotocttvs Lotle 5 g yroteetfrs Lotlc VI I 1DC IDC (A4) IDC Q4) 5 F 5 IF ~ ~ ( Dl) QP (Dl) DPZ g ) AD5 (Dl) 't I L(Cl) 5 F j LFC1 ( Cl) (cl) 1?CI (Cl) ' I ga(aty tobe t(abf Oatay IIaat Ranoval I la(aty fatltt Intended Coco Coo'fgg I 1a ~ ' ~ ' ~ I Prst ~ ctirc logio Dfcgrana ~ I . jest 4 , yrotactfai Loafe IY .I ~ h ysstoctfra Logic I Protective Logic II Protactfra Logic ILI Protective Logic Y RIIR ~ Suppression Pool Cooling RIIR Suppression Pool Cooling (:Cb) RIIR cun F L (DJ) lNR LPCI ( Cl LPCI (Cl) p p I RHR TrI U (Il) RV Ops hDI (Dl) n,) p . RV Oper n ADS (Dl) I Protective Logic YI Protcctfrs Logic YII RIIR 5 UI pgggA Protective Logic VIII PeeL Cooling RRR ~ Supprcooioa RIIR i Suppressio P Pool Pool Loolinb p Cooling ~ ADS Actuated ADS Actuated 4&~scucosd IUIR Suppression Pool Cooliag Protcctfve Logfc ~ ( DS) L (DS) RRR Suppression Pool Cooling RV RV Operation Operation ( Dl) RV Opc on + ADS ( Dl) ~ LPCI ( Cl) F ( Cl) LPCI (Cl) LPCI (Cl) F p P p 0 ~. (t RV on ADS Opc f (Dt) PJoq 65;. g BIO CIFZpIT'e~. gt/+ SHU73>e&h) CeO<1~$ H>DBc PSE @II'~ LPCI /4IO+g '7//go~/1 h'EA7 EX''QAI5EV. 8/F: Single Failure Proof. Operator Action Required. L 3o Indicates that one or more of the key process parameters must be limited to satisfy nuclear safety operational criteria. 4. : Mfferent Plant Conditions. 5. : Initial Condition 6-: Arriving the Initial Core Cooling State Arriving the Extended Core Cooling State 0 ~ ~ I. bootes: X. (AX): Detect Reactor Protective Parameters, and Initiate Safety Systems, vhere: Al ~ Detect Lou Water Level. Initiate HPCI and RCIS Systems. A2 ~ Detect Lov. Water Level or High Drywell Pressure. Initiate HPCI, CS, and LPCI Systems on Respective Trip Setting. A3 ~ Detect Lo~ Water Level~, e Initiate.~LPQ'. and CS Systems on Respective Trip Setting RCc h4 ~ Detect Lo~ Water Level. Initiate HPCI, ADS, CS and LPCI Systems on Respective Trip Setting. 2. (EX): Reactor Pressure Conditions, 'Where: Sl ~ When Reactor Pressure ( gg psig Start the System Cooling process, | here: Cl ~ Restore'T"ater Level and MaixCain Core Cooling by Plqoding. C2 ~ Restore Pater Level and Haintain Core Cooling by Spraying.. C3 ~ Remove Decay Heat from Suppression Pool. 4 (DX): Depressurization, Where: Dl ~ 7 or Less Valves Required to Depressurize Reactor. D2 ~ De'pressurize Reactor. D3 ~ 2 or Less Valves Required to Haintain Depressurization. D4 ~ 2 or X.ess Valves Required to Control Depressurization. D5 ~ Suppression Pool Temperature Limit, Start Depressurization. Function: Decay Heat Removal Task: Initial Core Cooling Plant Event Events States Conditions otect ve g c. y 8 h,B l2 C,D 13 D 2 Pumps Trip l4 C,D 20 C,D Reactor Pres re > g$ psig 22 ,D -23 C, C,D Secon ressure Regulator Failure 25 'D 26 C,D 27 D eactor Pover > 302 Rated 28 C,D Reactor Pressure >g psig 29 C,D actor Pressure > $ 8 psig 30 D Rea tor Pover > 304 Rated 31 9 React Pover > 30K Rated 3B D D ~ ~ S,CsD Reactor Isolat from Naia Condenser Reactor Pressure $ 5 Qsig 52 C,D Reactor Isolated fray Hain Condenser Reactor Pressure > 98 psig B,D Reactor Isolated from k n Condenser Reactor Pressure > QQ, ps Protective Logic Type II 42 C,D Large Breaks Protective Logic Type III '43 C,D RHR Shutdown Cooling Break 44 CQD RHR Shutdown Cooling Break 45 C0D RHR Shutdown Cooling Break Protective Logic Type EV 42 C,D Sma11 or Intermediate Break Vhich Incapacitate- HPCI ~ ~ o w yr ~ ~ w ~ e po p~,~ ~ ~ pose [trot tl ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 'P tpr ~ «orooe; ggr gap ~ ~'IIJgtV7+ J V + a O~e S,A,o TV'.IP I >~iisa< Conc Cgcrltsog . Plant Event Even s States Conditions Protective Xagic Type VI ~ 42 ~ C,D Small or Intermediate Break which Doesn' Incapacitate HPCI 43 C,D Not RHR Shutdown Cooking Break 44 C,D Ãot RHR Shutdown Cooling Break 45 C,D Not RHR Shutdown Cooling Break ~ ~ ~ $ ~ PC@ Qc. 7 Function: Decay Heat Removal 0 Task: .tended Core Cooling Plant Event Events States Conditions Prote,ctive Logic Type I C,D Reactor Isolated from Main C er Reactor Pressure < g - 51 52 C,D Reacto o ated from Main Condenser Pressure c psig $2 " $3 Reactor Isolated fro . Condenser Reactor Pressure < $ 8 psig Protective Logic Type XI C,D Reactor Isolated from Main Con Reactor Pressu ps g C,D solated from Main Condenser Reactor r psig D Reactor Isolated from 'ndenser Reactor.pressure > gg psig Protective Logic Type III Isolation of ne Protective Logic Type ZV 43 C,D RHRS Shutdown Cooling, Break 44 C,D RHRS Shutdo~ Cooling Break 45 CED RHRS Shutdo~ Cooling Break Protective Logic 'Type V Tao'?51:Lan of Shot8o~~o(5I ng uc on ne Protective Xegic ~e VI CSD SEER@„StEE @cd SllFFlClE.PJT Fa< OBCAQ HBA7 REMOVE C,D Rot RHRS Shutdovn Cooling Break C,D Not RHRS Shutdown Cooling Break CsD Sot RHRS Shutdown Cooling Break I te t 'ls 85 4 +J, COte Ce o li g Plont Events Kre:"ts States Cond itions Protective"Logic Type VXI 42 C,D SMAKSlZE Su&lClEAQ FOP ~~y ZZh7 PEHOVAl. Protective Logic Type VIII 20 C,D Reactor Pressure > $8 psfg 22 S 24 C,D Second Pressu gulator Failure 26 D 27 D 28 C,D Reactor Pressure > 29 > S Reactor Pressure $8 psig 38 D 40 RPC(RCV~TlOQ MME APPFNDIX B SYSTEM ENVIRONMENTAL DATA SHEEIS ELECTRICAL/MECHANICALCOMPONENTS (HARSH ENVIRONMERZ) The System Environmental Data Sheets provide a detailed identification of each system with respect to the major components required for the minimum shutdown path under a harsh environment. It also identifies the events for which the system is reauired, lists the safety actions which the system are providing/supporting and provides a best estimate of the time reauired for the cm~nents to operate. The electrical and control components necessary to support the listed eauipment are not listed specifically but are rather implicitly included with their associated mechanical/electrical components. For example, MCC, switchaear, panels, time delay relays, cable, transformer, etc., have not been specifically identified. H15/6-4 ppen zx vxsxon. By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: v s 4 c e. Ilor ll0 JVo~i, P &ID - IOV Rev, Safety Related Operation: I o Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action 840 Control Rod Drop Accident II42 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) 843,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past Establish Prim. Containmen qualification time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment Suppression Pool Cooling (3) Unrelated to normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control Term Equipment/Instrument/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required cn pmfertadcsP, Revision'- ' 2- Date: + - 23. - 8 2 By: L t". 5'~ Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: P&ID M - (OV Rev. f 7 e Safety Related Operation: P d JJt Es Hr e. lcfO'&& / Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action 840 Control Rod Drop Accident v (J) f/42 PiPe Break Inside Containment f3 Notes (where referenced It43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen ~ (y) (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram a qualification Establish Prim. Containmen a ~t$) b time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling v normal system Initial Core Cooling c C e function Extended Core Cooling v L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control V V V' Term (s) ee. ). V.ss.l ~"/~ )(d~ o~ Ip Actions Being Time Equipment/Ins trument/Valve Implemented Required 48 (N D (2 gy ~gq qpg 6- p- (s„,~. gtve Po HV - I II+3 8 $ Press'o ce J5od'll Jt) ) fk V- per for $ 1 ir Ev e ) QCV J-4 J VLJ Date: - 92 By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: 5a~uice, ct tt'~ PaID br' t l 9 Rev. (0 Safety Related Operation: 2 o few Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action /140 Control Rod Drop Accident (z). fp) />42 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) f/43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (3) (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: CS) Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past , Scram qualification Establish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c (3)'nrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal'system Initial Core Cooling e function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term (~) ~~',~$ Actions Being Time Equipment/Instrument/Valve Implemented Required ~ l4 +~ p 8 4fc 8rtwe/lp Jt ght~ygrJ mc r+ i~~i ~ sn- evxs on. -s By Che eke: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) gh..~ I eJv. System: E mew e~e fs awe P &ID JIA Rev.~s4, Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action u40 Control Rod Drop Accident /V 2 Break Containment Pipe Inside Notes (where referenced) 843,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past Establish Prim. Containmen qualification time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment Suppression Pool (3)'nrelated to Cooling'nitial normal system Core Cooling e functiqn Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control-Room Env. Control g ~ Term ($) geygQ~ Pg J'fg( +Solo APL 8h/P Equipment/Instrument/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required Cf II ~mP~ C,Re ff CF~C'> 'll4fX - LCD Sk H '8 P)i'O'RR~aeR 4 ~z s/„p b-9 y- sl I +0 A 4 8 CMs-'g Fc)- See 5 I fe~ ptcffc ~+ H C Y 4e( )) SV-le~9 g >,f P, i'$ ZD a soy Revision- Date: — — z. By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: Ekf P &ID 17 Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action r)4O Control Rod Drop Accident 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past Establish Prim. Containmen qualification time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment Pool (3)'nrelated to Suppression Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control Term 4 i~~e Ji~4e 44~<'oui/ ($) f+ opere ly > cuba~~ Aom L.T. +o la ~(~, Equipment/Instrument/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required HV I»isA 5 H y'l~to AW8; -48 L ~ door Syr)Cm FT- llVoagp ga tVln> o L.7; Opt I'g )4yh ~Y~ P c'<~. )rialto +Canal~ oIPP g'F o)ll PCS how- hoI rl e,o,~o» ~e~ p, evxs on. Date: By: Checke : System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: P &ID Rev. l8 Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action Control Rod Drop Accident 842 Break Containment (~) Pipe Inside ~ Notes (where referenced) 843,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer- to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past qualification Es tablish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c Suppression Pool Cooling (3) 'nrelated to normal system Initial Core Cooling e functipn Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term Equipment/Ins trumen t/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required 4 (o~)„ (a) 4' A r g., gy- ii3+ pu-s]~IY yy ((7+5 ow Jf p(8 Revision- 0 Date- By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: Dte r e P&ID —I'20 Rev, 8 Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Riich Require Some System Action 840 Control Rod Drop Accident 842 Break Containment Pipe Inside Notes (where referenced) 843,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer- to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past Establish Prim. Containmen qualification time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c Pool Cooling (3) Unrelated to Suppression normal system Initial Core Cooling e functiyn , Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Term , Control Room Env. Control g Equipment/Ins trumen t/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required ~p r'ftm 8 heal pm ae Revision: Date: -22- & 2- By: Checked: r System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: re cer 5 PAID Sa fety Related Operation: JPVI c, Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action II4O Control Rod Drop Accident Pipe Break, Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) 843,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 0 42 43-45 To be fail- Scram safe past Establish Prim. Containmen qualification time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term Equipment/Instrument/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required For +>e ~garrett c E D ~«ytl, pri~»)y C««'f«t««e«k is fii««iJ«J by He ««lory ok die c«» g«i'w««,. j. Ne)) tL« gsl>«r (g lubJ) j PD mw NC. C;C. yol 'ei'«s«ising. ev s on- Date: 9 - I - 82 By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: e g P&ID ~ pi< Safety Related Operation:~~< err' G ~co r X~ g'Ni~ l E~en Jpd +~ < II40 Control Rod Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment V Notes (where referenced) 843,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event nowhere refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past Establish Prim. Containmen qualification time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3)'nrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling functiqn Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control Term Equipment/Instrument/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required gy- iotas)Ac& Ca,o Cv.o. - ) 2 C':5, l0 G ++ > x C +g r c 5 Y > > L.T- p~~tQ(+g 0 l>cq3 (p .g„...~ gfjj g~ go~~cl ]gdt. Ai~ cr lo/) $ y- la CGS o> Hlr-tiNO> g (3) 4 lo~. g 0) Rev sion: Date: 0 -I- 2 By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System'PIC C.t P&ID Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action ft40 Control Rod Drop Accident lV 2 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) 843,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 0 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past Establish Prim. Containmen qualification time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3) Unrelated Pool to'ormal Suppression Cooling d system Initial Core Cooling e function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control Term Equipment/Ins trumen t/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required yz|C~ Il Iw P Wcr>- $ o<<$ e ~u>WOa~c~ ~ Revision: 0 Date '- 4 — -'. By: Checked. System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: Le Cob Wf f r P&ID ss Safety Related Operat on: P ~ 4A Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action II40 Control.Rod Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) I)543,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram qualification Establish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling . (4) L.T. means Long Term Control Room Env. Control Actions Being Time Equipment/Instrument/Valve Implemented Required pT-tNoSC L. T. P7.- Hv- tFoo8'V - tFc 0~ Hlr -tC ao< . Hv- tC 007 l K - gosA o~g Revisi.on: Date: By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: P&ID hrt - I VI Rev.~ Safety Related Operation: 2 S'olpA Reo 4r Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action 84O Control god Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) /I43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 0 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram qualification Establish Prim. Containmen b time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling e function Extended Core Cooling . (4) L.T.. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term Actions Being Time Equipment/Ins trument/Valve Implemented Required 4/Gei~C Fl v - t w P 0 > A 8 c Q < o <~M'J s. v, oe > > > Hv -<~»+>8c D x 'v. l 9 ply H y - ~ f A) oqlFo(t: — 4 Idem pl5 l A ooC A > oo7 A %8 6op Age hogg< I TE -tiyoi+A,,C, g gC lO~&~ Ihrolc h ~ 8,C,O leo rd4,8, C, ~ Revision: Date- H z / By: Checked: W p~3 System Environmental Data Sheet sl-a Electrical Components {Harsh Environment) System: Si ~ L/r P&ID - I 'A Rev. Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System 'Action 114O Control Rod Drop Accident f/42 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) f/43,44, 45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to PSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram qualification Establish Prim. Containmen b time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling e function Extended Core Cooling, {4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term Actions Being Time Equipment/Ins trumen t/Valve Implemented Required ~2 H 9 - lFooi py J/=oo2- CN'.c,} b 0 Revision: Date: By: Checked: 54ecF 3 O,C g System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System'. Abc /trav P &ID Rev.~l'afety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action II40 Control.Rod Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) I/43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to CESAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram qualification Es tablish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3) Unrelated to Cooling Suppression Pool normal, system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Term Control Room Env. Control (5) Foe <~3e~~rJi44 ~ l~+~t o~ I Actions Being Time Equipment/Instrument/Valve Implemented Required PSV- fF<<9 6, lc, l nh~N L.7. 5Y- fR-lI P c I) G 2 e,$ T 1 ) J> /C I ) It.'i g.l g,a ~l) Pll ~-Pg Revision: .: +~n-'y: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) — th System.'Pu'vf Ir Pic.H t P &ID ( 2 Rev.~ Safety Related Operation: IHE)Nlkt Y R P~ f P 4~~4fo~ S 2»elf, s 4/, Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action II40 Control Rod Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) /I43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event nowhere refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: 'ection 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram qualification Establish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling e function Extended Core Cooling . '(4) L.T. means Long Term Control Room Env. Control Actions Being Time Equipment/Ins trument/Valve Implemented Required fVo 0 l p C p 5 I g e P5',- tH02.2. A Mu s P~s - lh/o~~u,p pT /jv o 59A C. I 5 - I IVY'2't A ) 8 a.tS - lbo~~A A I N ci 3/ ~ C gi 0 L ITS'~os 4'A~ 8 Revision: 0 Date: Bye Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: fP P&ID M I 8 3 Rev. II'o~lo. Safety Related Operation: 'I (' r 4 I J. C I Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action fI40 Control Rod Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) /J43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) ,.To be fail- safe past Scram qualification Establish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling e function . Extended Core Cooling . (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term Actions Being Time Equipment/Instrument/Valve Implemented Required 0 e,+ C'/<~ix 5 V-ryglf oy S~- ~+'3>C (PC) FC) Revision: Date'- (- 9< By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: 5 NfCt" P&ID IN - l ++ Rev. l7 Safety Related Operation: rrul C '/ rr~ C C. I lE'/ k Jseelo I rr Events Resulting in Abnormal Env ornment Mhich Require Some System Action 840 Control Rod Drop Accident (s) iI42 Break Containmen (y) Pipe Inside v Notes (wbere referenoed) 843,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen ~ ('j) (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram a safe past Establish Prim. Containmen qualification b time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment Suppression Pool Cooling (3) Unrelated to normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term cs) S) p .4-cJ + cour/e4 ICr b4 ~ ~ AQ( Equipment/Ins trument/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required ( H V- tF'ool o~ ] F do+ 4lo „ f4flber d pit'4l)l)HC ~ pj foe Jp jf/$ p If cx) P C. /Cd'e / )edm I Omtw g 'tC f ((j f )y )ryder /( g QC f psH — ( Nofp A g ry) Cs) Revision: -*2 s By e Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: C P g) -') 9- 2 Eev. II Safety Related Operation: I Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action f/40 Control Rod Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) It43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram qualification Es tablish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normaL system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling . (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control Term Actions Being Time Equipment/Instrument/Ualve Implemented Required u~'t CE AO( t 2, 3 9 Hy JkeuliC CO1 fr g I6~ (a k 5 ) + v Etc) 'Q 5''s for o porches >ufo o~l) 5$ If 00$ 4,Og4OEX IFteC4W System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: & < L~, Coi fbi/ P&ID /H- /+ Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action 840 Control Rod Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) $/43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past qualification Establish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling e functidn Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term Equipment/Ins trumen t/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required fVd~ ow grege,l'red, Cdllf 548 JPlv'~ p e 8g Revision 3 Date: -,'- 9 -P 2 By e Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) iver Is System: -] 4 Rev. 10 Safety Related Operation: 2'~ f~ Je ss to rr t Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action 840 Control Rod Drop Accident w 6) II42 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenoed) (t43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen ().) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- s'afe past Scram qualification Establish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. 'Containment (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal. system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling . (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control Term (5') yePz~Pt fclc A'f03 Pgiv/c C f. R (IP/f ggyfe) Actions Being Time (Equipment/Ins tr umen t/Valve Implemented Required ~O/~~~0+ bt $ 4I 5 + fa 7 (s) (~) (g f ~ HN IF OO I ow ftb IF 0O8 glo Hhv HII IF tI3 I (EI.C, ) ~)(r o ~'> . ~ Pcf c. k i~i b~f r genic.+ c>) (5) gL lOF,I') gPZ3 I EIO VI (3l k HY lfoO I g gC lb+;w '< (3) CS i03,> gE-t V o iih g >E.1'at A TE- th) Oath 7-F- ihlogpp - '7 E I hl 0 o s R 3 C wE - IN o>(hi c E- iV o>ZW, Revision: 2 Date: )+- dt.2- P 2 By: Checked: (~ye i uk< System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) ly( ri I I q - System: )5 l QERev. tf Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action //40 Control'Rod Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) %3,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (t.) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram a qualification Establish Prim. Containmen b time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling e function Extended Core Cooling . v v (4) L.T. means Long Term Control Room Env. Control g Actions Being Time Equipment/Ins trumen t/Valve Implemented Required c, 0 0 (p>o>A> 5, d, e,5 -(Vo)g A]g ) C 4D I'9 Ps-(IV p g,(," TE —t tdb$ 0, A fc- H>- I Fog S A,g ) Fo )yh,8 l F sap A,g Hv - lFcri+Aig P7- t t(t oty't)) (s)0% J gP Cj P 5H /Q ~~ o ioA) (6 —I ht 009 y~ —f NOR.g d4 c.. Revision- Date: By: der Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Pr)C Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) 8-I ~l ski System: IP ff 8 C.ea K ~a Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action /uo Control .Rod Drop Accident q<~C iI42 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) //43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram qualification Establish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling . (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term a Actions Being Time Equipment/Ins trumen t/Valve Implemented Required HY- IP or+ 4,g, C, 9 (A.o.) ,Hv -IF 0+7 h,g CKo.) i o (hr. o.) ~ v - F o y 4, 8 > ctg SY-l5ISL Ap >F 5 p ts l s'/Apppj ~ flgelgp' >~~>)6~ Hy- >F op< A8 Cec) ] 6 0 l7 AI9 (ll/0) H V - i F IfO4,8 f'iield.) (~) HQ lF -okla 8 ]F g]g p 8 0 Revision: . 2 Date: 4f- 'X- Q2 Bye Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: P &ID Safety Related Operation: t Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action 1!4O Control Rod Drop Accident f142 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) !/43,44, 45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) 'o be fail- safe past Scram qualification Containmen 3 Establish Prim. V b time (i.e. Long Tenn) Establish Sec. Containment c (3) Unrelated to . Suppression Pool Cooling tern normal. sys Initial Core Cooling e function Extended Core Cooling . (4) L.T. means Long Term ~ Control Room Env. Control g Actions Being Time Equipment /Ins trumen t/Valve Implemented Required /5dLh P/de Qo& pent& Pfghp7 b's (gg (>2 ftl/-/'bc o/ A g HV- l&o/5 ( 4,0.) P~~o ~g~ By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: F P&ID M- I 5 Rev, )J Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action lt4O Control Rod Drop Accident f142 Containmen Pipe Break Inside Notes (where referenced) 843,44, 45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: (5) Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past Prim. Containmen qualification Establish time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3)'nrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control Term g) p~( Peg f EAg~pc~cy Cooley Actions Being Time Equipment/Instrument/Valve Implemented Required P~ ly m~>~~( p~] w~ 4~'~ P Revision: 3 By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) )5C l2. I'3 System: H PC2 P &ID f 5 S Rev. Safety Related Operation: Z» f.c.L ra P'ff ok/ 7 Events Resulting n Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action IV0 Control Rod Drop Accident t42 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) It43,44, 45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram a qualification Establish Prim. Containmen b time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal. system Initial Core Cooling e function Extended Core Cooling . (4) L.T.- means Long Control Room Env. Control Term EgCfsp~ Feb H I'CL (g) grail'<) u.4,.C< urer,)„~„. g. pa~,~;) Actions Being Time Equipment/Ins trument/Valve Implemented Required XJ'O ~e ~ie> COntO>'h see„4 V-oos 4P NIN ~ H v- t Foot. on H +RR) 'e p ( ) (s) tc) Dek~k gWCr g('„, hie~i g PDzS I Hot+ g V iFoox System: Co I ~ m~ J f.33 z kr (31 P&ID Ah-f5'7 I/ I Rev. Safety Related Operation: 4 At tet,o ) <~. dyL Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action ll40 Control Rod Drop Accident Pipe Break Inside Containment v Notes (wbere referenced) %3,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: " Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram qualification Establish Prim. Containmen b time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system unction Initial Core Cooling e f Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term Actions Being Time Equipment/Instrument/Valve Implemented Required leuc I cia ear lE'+0 4I 8, C, P, L. T. > ' go~ /~3'~~~„0 System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) - 7- System: Com Rn P&ID " /b 5'ev.~ Safety Related Operation: <) Og ltU /V PC Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Wh9.ch Require Some System Action e40 Control Rod Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referented) It43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram a qualification Establish Prim. Containmen b time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal, system Initial Core Cooling e function Extended Core Cooling . (4) L.T. means Long Term Control Room Env. Control g Actions Being Time Equipment/Instrument/Valve Implemented Required sll-I57soA nR. sv-]s7szA 5N - (57o3 og (Sv-IS'7o+ j Ev-Ifg5) 5V - ]57%4,4 oR. Sv - ]C739h ~ 0 - iv~Cc ~w HV -If7CQ taiga: g> ga,conhapER pssuNI'0 75 AkoP Fil/L,ZPM~&RF Aim PuRQF. Hnl oH HiwIHug egg) PATq Revision: By: Checked: " System Environmental Data Sheet )ssfe g ok 'lectrical Components f (Harsh Environment) System: C~~4p f PRZD~J4- ~~2 Rev . 7(P Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action 840 Control Rod Drop Accident f142 Break Inside Containment Pipe Notes (where referenced) f/43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer. to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past Establish Prim. Containmen qualification time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment Suppression Pool Cooling (3) Unrelated to normal system Initial Core Cooling functibn Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control Term Juror Equipment/Ins trumen t/Ualve Actions Being Time Implemented Required ge~ gi ~ri( Po~r~ f~pplrir P C Z (>- bc.~ g, C,g) L..7: V>6 Hz «c~f" 4~hr~r «t rs'c m~ J 4c) OSSA )EeC +IefsI ~ IC ~Crt'PRO J ~OPe, ~d)d,gf,, +4 c~~+ yc p~ y, qtc ae> ob He wdafmuER g'ku4(rfe s k Revision Date~ By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Pu~cfuf + Electrical Components (Harsh Environment)J 'ystem. Co 4i~~ u Safety Related Operation: a) 2nfc~ lockr ~ FL ro (fr r Ark W c *ir Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action II4O Control Rod Drop Accident (I42 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) 843, 44, 45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 '(2) To be fail- Scram safe past Establish Prim. Containmen qualification time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c Suppression Pool Cooling (3) Unrelated to normal system Initial Core Cooling e function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term Equipment/Instrument/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required 5 QO au Are Ory~CIP ($ 7Y 2 (f1p3>(J7 C J Tg (y 7 >$ > (>7$ l> L.T: Sop prrsPa pa. ts 7C( )$'7C + > c le~ brr, (5 F7 C 1 Cg) ($ 775 ~ ~~p /f55" 5110 Q p' "lloyd f ly'g'0 f4gg ( ($ CJ g E — (s v2o h !S /III 4hu cr houu puuui +Ac 'otic~ 4m~ J~'5'FoYnay]io~ ~ ) u~~ I + ~~ ~'~ a V po r+ ecol c/t1 Qa pw p<>+> Revision- Date- + - 2. By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) /ref l System: Zo Ju.~.k Glleclrow P&ID M- l C I Rev, J g Safety Related Operation: m 4 I'NM Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Mhich Require Some System Action 840 Control Rod Drop Accident Pipe Break Inside Containment M //42'3,44, Notes (where referenced) 45 Pipe Bre'ak Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past qualification Establish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c Pool (3) Unrelated to Suppression Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling e function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term Equipment/Instrument/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required (2. ~;e, 4 /0„;„ 5 y- (C]o P A I p O'O'-IC '~8~2- 5'> yy-roti @ 8 l zp. l/(/ZA2 Revision: By: Checked: Sc..f l o 7 System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) I6 I'IJ System: HVAR ~clr 814 P&ID V< fbi Rev. / 5'8 Safety Related Operation: 5 dr~ 4 7 cl r Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action 840 Control Rod Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) I/43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen Event numbers '1) refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram a qualification Establish Prim. Containmen b time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling e function Extended Core Cooling . (4) L.T. means Long Term Control Room Env. Control g Actions Being Time Equipment/Ins trument/Valve 'Implemented Required Qp 20/A or 8 (kectrC ~ ) L T'V HDY a7$ Q.SA or 8 ov5+'3 Aoy f ( N.E .; P c.; 1=. a. ) Jo AN. 0+5p + ]O~Jia H- Q.E; >e; Zc.) F'.c 5V l7 J'1g + ow 8 (yE~ u.c'., ) A'c. SP IP>c+ A- oy (~pi b.o ) 5 v I-lx9'c k e~ CprZi A.a.] ~c. ) Revision: l Date- + - 82 By: Checked: s'lac System Environmental Data Sheet k Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System. 1/ A C- cr~i p&ID VC-/7) 8 2.Rev.~ Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action /uo Control Rod Drop Accident Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) (/43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past Prim. Containmen qualification Establish time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control Term Actions Being Time Equipment/Instrument/Valve Implemented Required gy ~~~<>~ op- S Y-is~ c Vg (HF.; ZC) gy - l~y]+k ov 8 5 I/ -f75>+ 0- ow 8 Ck'~j <~"1 0 Revision: Date: 8 By: Checke : System Environmental Data Sheet flite,& 3 ~ ( 3 Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) sk„43 System: y/eg-k der 7rss P&ID Y 4 -I 5 Rev. ld Safety Related Operation: ' )oi'm /J C C rc Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action Control Rod Drop Accident Containment 842 Pipe Break Inside Notes (where referenced) 8'43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past Establish Prim. Containmen qualification time (i.e. Long Term) Establish'Sec. Containment (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term Equtpment/Instrument/valve +L'/''/') Actions Being Time (/s/sr mssscrs~J Implemented Required Fa s V- /of A (F /pM» o 7$ 5/P () fDOQ -ov ss+A p DiN-oeS 5I 8*2. og -(ajar OE «(Q+A oE - (0+AD g ~S>S A or 6 uC/ZC C plea-r557h 'loJaa s L s HO% ~7yS~A yo/pg s v-ov s$ 8 A pc(rc, Date: 'f -I By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) Vd- l7 4 System.'H ~k~ e Lw 8/4 24 Safety Related Operation: op /&pl k cat c~ >I F.~~ r Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action /Vo Control Rod Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) /t43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to PSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 0 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram qualification Establish Prim. Containmen time (i.e, Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cool'ing normal system Initial Core Cooling functibn Extended Core Cooling . (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control Term go~ 5'Irsm lP @) g f g~ f ~~+ly 4 ~ brcak. Actions Being Time Equipment/Instrument/Valve Implemented Required Coellet De i f ( P ee>P 0'&S P I& 2 & jCeee&~ )e I Q 2 22 A f lS 'I II Dg 7& SPA ) bled. FSL.-I7C3ah ('8; 7 sH-l7C3]pgg s HPg <7t''7 8 or 5 L.W [ggG2 I4 or 8 (qgGt P c P7 O'C7A 5'Y $ 7(0 V.A or B > t~CO)k o& B o„g yegg P PIC PI& 1>5'e 8 Pb~~ 9|'TC7+A or (7C 7P h or 8 > G5 g 8 > hen4 Su - «C~l k ~r 8 ~ <~C7O 0 or6'7lO C A~,g fCC Sc eelele Na' ev. yC,- let A~ evzones 0 Aso/+ h LIJ~ A/D AppeCIATEP DIFFERPIIylAL pRRSSIII&S Se System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) —t System: ~i wf;I< I w Flo P&ID M 7 1 Rev. 8 Safety Related Operation: hh'< CL ht df C Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action <>40 Control Rod Drop Accident 842 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) f/43,44,45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numhers refer to PSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram a qualification Establish Prim. Containmen b time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment c (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling e functibn Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term Actions Being Time Equipment/Ins trumen t/Valve Implemented Required o~ 8 L. 7". 0 Revision '- Date: + l2-P< By Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components sl. (Harsh Environment) yt'-]~ 8 t v'C -l~ 8 rA 2. g System: Cd~hot eC. e H P&ID )Vl ) 1 8'ev.~M td''afety Related Operation: J ~ c. c Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action 84O Control Rod Drop Accident 042 Pipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) f!43, 44, 45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numhers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram qualification Establish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3) 'nrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control Term Actions Being Time ERufpment/Instrument/vaIva ()slcrt rp/'/'rsr«isaJ c «+ op Imp1emantad Required HD~ -o78 ~+A L.> 5 Q «0 7803 p~H -o78I>A. gg - 1 +3 A ov iota gee - e~~j~4 -gzgo~A ~y )( p A ov 8 j FE - pyulpp~p L. T. H'I) lN Ov8+l 4+ gkfh ~ g, cx) -rn O) 0 0 1 Revision: 0 Date: Che cked: System Environmenta 1 Data Shee t Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) System: w F4 lrcr~ P&ID Safety Related Op erat ion: Cr Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action IV 0 Contro 1 Rod Drop Accident 842 P ipe Break Inside Containment Notes (where referenced) I!43, 44, 45 P ipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to FSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fai1- safe past Scram qualification Es tab 1 ish 'rim. Conta inmen time (i. e . Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Term Control Room Env. Control v Actions Being Time Equ ipmen t/Ins trumen t/Va1ve Implemented Required 'r(ojp Q.pig (ee llarl'E Ceu(ssww ee> Revision: Q Date: - g- By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components Environment) I'Harsh System: C ~ > fgpc c. >c. CAill~ A( 6 PAID g- l E Rev.~~ Safety Related Operation: iJ~ llk O Ceo Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- safe past Scram qualification Establish Prim. Containmen time (i.e. Long Term) Establish Sec. Containment (3) Unrelated to Suppression Pool Cooling normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling . (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control Term Actions Being Time Equipment/Instrument/Valve Implemented Required p'- ~> ~ Y-a84'Ol h gg g V-op) G ) Agg Date- Q- l— 2 By: Checked: System Environmental Data Sheet Electrical Components (Harsh Environment) pic.&a System: P&ED M - I 7 Rev.~ s Safety Related Operation: Events Resulting in Abnormal Enviornment Which Require Some System Action II40 Control Rod Drop Accident f/42 Break Containment Pipe Inside v (0 Notes (where referenced) $I43, 44, 45 Pipe Break Outside Containmen (1) Event numbers refer to PSAR Action Being Implemented: Section 15 40 42 43-45 (2) To be fail- Scram safe past Establish Prim. Containmen qualification time (i.e. Long Term). Establish Sec. Containment c Suppression Pool Cooling (3) 'nrelated to normal system Initial Core Cooling function Extended Core Cooling (4) L.T. means Long Control Room Env. Control g Term Equipment/Instrument/Valve Actions Being Time Implemented Required Q)()sv> p) ~ace ~) gW (SVEXgl e~(SP)fiAI (sm q~) APPENDIX C DETAIIED COMPONEÃZ JUSTIFICATION FOR INT1WIM OPERATION Refer to Section III and Table III.A-lof this report for an explanation of how these forms are used to demonstrate compo- nent justifications. PF27/8-10 age ENVIRQNMENlALQUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATI(M FOR IPZEZGM OPERATION Ocatponent Ident. No(s) .: Agastat 7000 Series 8 lay Ckelponent Name: Time Delay Relays System: Standby AC Power Purchase Order: E-109D l. Qmponent(s) Safety Function: Cbntrol switching, interlocks, etc. in the 4.16 KV switchgear system. 2. Accident(s) for which Qmponent(s) must be Qualified: 40'2i 43, 44, 45 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 17. 9he unqualified canponent will be replaced by a qualified component (Rx3el E-7000 after fuel load but before ascension to full power (before initial criticality). ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. Interim Operation is l~l Justifi~ ( Not Justified TN1/2/3 Page 2 ENVlRCNMENZAL QUALIFICATICN—JUSTIFICATION H)R INTERIM OH%ATION Potter and Brunfield type MDR-5062 Gm~nent Ident. No(s) .: Auxiliary Relays Cbmponent Name: Isolation Relays System: Standby AC Power Purchase Order: E-109D l. Qxngonent(s) Safety Function: (control switching a isolation in the 4.16 KV switchgear system. ~ ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: 40'2'3'4'5 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: 17. +uipnent is qualified, except that the pigtail attached to the relay is teflon coated wire which is not qualified for the specified Beta dose. A suitable sleeving material (Raychem Splicing Kit) will be used to cover each pigtail to protect the teflon pigtails from Beta radiation. Field implementation will be made before initial criticality. 4. Interim Operation is Justified ( Not Justified TM1/2/2 4 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATICN- JUSTIFICATICN FOR INTERIM OPERATION Qm~nent Ident. No(s).: GE Pushbutton Type CR-2940 axponent Name: Pushbutton Switch S stem, Standby AC Power purchase Order:~~~~ 1. Ckxagonent(s) Safety Function: None. ('lhese pushbuttons are used for resetting trip alarm relays only.) ~ ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Gzttponent(s) must be Qualified: None 3'. Justification for Interim Operation: l,ll. these pushbuttons are used only to reset alarm trip relays and have no impact on attainment of safe, cold shutdown. Potential impact on operator should devices fail is expected to be minor annoyance due to alarms not being reset. 10< 17. Devices are qualified for seismic a hydrodynamic loads. Rxlifi- cation kit to replace materials which lack docunent traceability can be installed after fuel load, but before .initial criticality. ~ ~ ~ 4.~ Interim Operation is x i Justified i i Not Justified Not Required TM1/2/3 page 4 —JUSTIFICATION FOR AH~M OPERATION ENVIRONMEHZAL QUALIFICATIOH Qaaponent Ident. No(s) .: Anphenol Connector (Xeponent Name: penetration Ashembl System: ¹utron Nonitoring (SRM, IRM, LPRM APRM purchase Order:~ l. Qomponent(s) Safety Function: a. SRM, IRM: None b. LPRM, APRM: ¹utron Flux Scram Accident(s) for which Cement(s) must be Qualified: 40 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: a.) 1,9,ll. Jhe connectors for the SRM, IRM monitors are not required to achieve cold shutdown. Verification that the reactor has scraaned can be obtained fran the rod bottcm indicators and scram valve position indicators. b.) 10,12. Jhe connector for the LPRM, APRM monitors has been qualified for the TID due to gamma; however, the qualification does not cover thermal aging, seismic a hydrodynamic loads, beta radiation and temperature ramp after the LGCA. Nese connectors were previously tested by Westinghouse to a less severe set of environmental parameters. 'Ihe connector will be retested to Category I requirements for SSES environmental parameters; based on the previous test results, there is confidence that these connectors will prove to be fully qualified. 'Ihe testing is currently scheduled to be ccmpleted by fuel load; however, should the schedule slip/ there would be no safety concern so long as the testing is completed by initial criticality. ' Not Justified 4. Interim Operation is ) Justified ) ) 4. Since these monitors are needed only to initiate a neutron flux scram, their functionality, is required only for a few seconds after the accident occurs. Subsequent failure would have no safety significance. TM1/2/5 Page 5 See attached ~anent IdeElt No(s) ~ list pomponent Name: Baile GontrolS'n Panel OC-883 PSB System: Standby Gas Treatment Purchase Order:~<~ Canponent(s) Safety Function: Controls and indication for the SOS Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: 40'2 with TID=l.gxl03 Rads, taking credit for the recent recalculation of TIDs 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: 10< 12. All controls and instrunentation purchased originally through P.O. J-03B have been replaced by Bailey controls procured under J-03C. 'lhese new instrunents are qualified for seismic and hydrodynamic loads; however, environmental qualification is in progress. We qualification of these-models is scheduled to be ccmpleted by June, 1982. Since those only environmental parameter which creates a harsh environment for these instrunents is radiation with a relatively low TID (1.6x 103 Bads), it is expected that these instrunents will be qualified by fuel load. Should the above schedule slip, there would be no safety concern so long as qualification is achieved before initial criticality. ~ ~ ~ 4.~ Interim Operation is ) x ( Justified } ] Not Justified Page Sa, ATTACHMENT K) JIO FOR BAILEY CONTROLS ON OC-883 A & B Instnxn ent Taa No. Satan PDSL 07554A1 Standby Gas Treatment System PDSL 07554A2 Standby Gas Treatment System PDSL '75S4A3 Standby Gas Treatment System PDSL 07554B1 Standby Gas Weatment System PDSL 07554B2 Standby Gas Treatment System PDSL 07554B3 Standby Gas treatment System PDSL 07550A SGTS Inlet Header Belay PDY 07550A Standby Gas treatment System PDSL 07550B SGTS Inlet Header System PDY 07550B Standby Gas Treatment System FSL 07551A Standby Gas Treatment System FY 07551A SGTS Discharge Treatment System FSL 07551B Standby Gas Treatment System FY 07551B SGTS Discharge Systenm B TDSL 07552A Standby Gas Weatment System TIC 07552A SGTS El Heater OE101A System TDIC 07552A Standby Gas Treatment System TDY 07552A Standby Gas Treatment System TY 07552Al Standby Gas Treatment System TT 07552A2 Standby Gas Weatment System TDIC 07552B Standby Gas Treatment Systen TDSL 07552B Standby Gas Treatment System TIC 07552B SGTS El Heater OE101B System 075S2B Standby Gas Treatment System i 07552B1 Standby Gas Treatment System 07553A SGTS H aters PDSHL 07553A SGXS Filter Train PD System PDSL 07553B SGIS Heaters PDSHL 07553B SGXS Filter Train PD System FY. 07555 SGTS O.A. Make-Up page 6 Q3ALIFICATICN —JUSTIFICATICN FOR IHHQGM OPERATION Oomponent Ident. No(s) .: TI-07552A1/Blg TT-07552A1 Bl TY-07552 — component Name- Temperature In'strunents Baile Gont -883 AaB, System: Standby Gas Treatment purchase Order: 1. Qmmmnent(s) Safety Function: Measurement of temperature upstream and downstream of the SGTS filter train heater for indication and to generate a high/low differential temperature signal for alarm and SGIS fan trip. Accident(s) for which Oonponent(s) must be Qualified: 40, 42 with TID = 1.6 x 103 rads, taking credit for the recent recalculation of TIDs 3. Justification for Interim Cperation: 1, 8, 9, 'Ihe temperature indications provided by TI-07552A1/Bl are not ll used by the operator to perform any safety-related function. Eow differential temperature indicates failure of the filter train heater, which controls the hunidity of the air reaching the filter. For purposes of this study, random failures of environmentally qualified equignent are not postulated. 'lhe heater is environmentally qualified. &us, these instrunents are not required for, and have no effect on, the attainment of safe cold shutdown. 10. All controls and instrunentation purchased originally through P.O. J-03B have been replaced by Bailey controls procured under J-03C. 'Ihese new 'instrunents are qualified for seismic and hydrodynamic loads. ~ ~ Not 4.~ Interim Operation is )~) Justified ) ] Justified TM1/2/8 Page 7 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATICN FOR INTERIM OPKQTION Cm~nent Ident.~ No(s) .:~ See attached list Component Name: Baile Controls on Panel OC-876 A&B Control Structure Hnergenc Outside Air Su 1 Purchase Order.- ys em EOASS l. Ocaqmnent(s) Safety Function: Controls and indication for the CSEOASS. 2. Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: 40, 42, 43, 44, 45 with TID=1.6x103 rads, taking credit for the recent recalculation of TIDs 3. Justification for Interim Cperation: 10, 12. All controls and instrumentation purchased originally through P.O. J-03B have been replaced by Bailey controls procured under J-03C. Mesc new instrunents are qualified for seismic and hydrodynamic loads; however, environmental qualification is in progress. 'The qualification of these models is scheduled to be completed by June, 1982. Since the only environmental parameter which creates a harsh environment for these instrunents is radiation with a relatively low TzD (1.6x 103 Rads), it is expected that these instrunents will be qualified by fuel load. Should the above schedule slip, there would be no safety concern so long as qualification is achieved before initial criticality. ~ ~ 4.~ Interim Operation is ( Justified. ) Not Justified TM1/2/10 AITACHMEÃZTO JIO for BAILEY CONTfKZS ON OC-876 Instrunent Tag. No. ~stem FSL 07813A Cbntrol Structure 0/A OV101 TDSHL 07811A Cbntrol Structure Hnergency 0/A Sup ~ 'SL 07811B Cbntrol Structure Emergency 0/A OV101 TDSHL 07813B Cbntrol Structure Hnergency 0/A Sup TSY . 07811B Bnergency Outside Air Supply PDSH, 07814A Bnergency O.A Supp 1 St HEPA PDSH 07814B Bnergency O.A Supp 1 St HEPA FY 0781 6A1 Hnergency Outside Air Supply FY 07816B1 Bnergency Outside Air Supply TDY 07811A Bnergency Outside Air Supply Page 8 ENVIBONMENIALQUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATICN FOR IRK~M OPERATION Component Ident. No(s).: TI-07811A/B and TI-07814 B lemperature Indicator —Bailey Cbntrols on Panel Oomponent Name: OC-876 ASB Control Structure Emergenc Outside Purchase Order: r upp y ys em CSEOASS) 1. Oamponent(s) Safety Function: None. (Temperature indication of CSEAOSS filter train inlet and outlet) Accident(s) for which Qorqnnent(s) must be Qualified: None 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: 1, 9, ll. These temperature indicators are not used by the operator to perform any safety-related function. 10. All controls and instrumentation purchased originally through P.O. J-03B have been replaced by Bailey controls procured under J-03C. Mesc new instrunents are qualified for seismic and hydrodynamic loads. ~ ~ ~ 4.~ Interim Operation is )~i Justified t ) Not Justified Not Bequired TMl/2/11 g3ALIFICATION —JUSTIFICATICN FOR INTERIM OPERATION Cm~nent Ident. No(s) .: T2-07811A/B and TZ-07814 B Temperature Transmitter — Bailey Controls on Cbmponent Name: Panel OC-876 System: Control Structure Eme en Outside Purchase Order:~(13~ r upp y System (CSEOASS) gx~nent(s) Safety Function: Temperature trananitter provides signal of CSEOASS filter train inlet & outlet temperature for indication and to generate a high/low differential temperature signal for alarm and CSEOASS fan trip. Accident(s) for which Exponent(s) must be Qualified: 40, 42, 43, 44, 45 with TID = l. 5x 103 rads, taking credit for the recent recalculation of TIDs h 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: 1, 8, 9, Indication function is not required. See JIO form for TI-07811 A/B ll and -07814~. Alarm function is not safety-related. Zow differential temperature indicates failure of the filter train heater, which controls the hunidity of the air reaching the filter. Ebr purposes of this study, random failures of environmentally qualified equignent are not postulated. 'Ihe heater is environmentally qualified. Thus, these instrunents are not required for, and have no effect on, the attainment of safe, cold shutdown. 10. All controls and instrunentation purchased originally through P.O. J-03B have been replaced by Bailey controls procured under J-03C. 'these new instrunents are qualified for seismic and hydrodynamic loads. Not Justified 4. Interim Operation is ]~) Justified ) TM1/2/12 Page ENVIEKNMENZALQUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION Oceponent Ident. No(s).: See attached list Gxponent Name: Instrunents on 'Remote Shu System: Remote Shutdown Purchase Order: 1. Gxponent(s) Safety Function: None (Uarious indicators on Remote Shutdown Panel) ?Rne: Bracuation of Main Cbntrol Rem is not postulated simultaneous with a DBA. 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: ( ( 1, ll. Emote shutdown panel indications are not required post-accident. 'Ihese instrunents are isolated fran their corresponding instrunents in the Main Control Rocm by transfer switches. ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. Interim Operation is ) X [ Justified ) ( Not Justified Not Required TMl/2/13 II ge XUa ATTACHMENT TO JIO FOR BAILEY CCMPROLS ON REMOTE SD PANEL Instrument Tata. No. ~SstBIII FY 11207B2 RHR Heat Exchanger B SW Inlet TI .15751 Suppression Pool Temperature TI 15752 Suppression Pool Temperature TR 15790A1 Gontainment Atmos Temp TR 15790B1 Gontainment Atmos Temp FSL 11207A RHR Heat Exchanger A SW Input FY 11207Al RHR Heat Exchanger A SW Input FSL 11207B RHR Heat Exchanger B SW Input FI 11207B RHR Heat Exchanger B SW Discharge FY 11207Bl RHR Heat Exchanger B SW Inlet FY 15105 RHR Loop B FI 15105 RHR Loop B FIC 14903 RCIC Turbine Pump Discharge FY 14903 RCIC Turbine Pump Discharge 'I 14903 RCIC Pump Injection ES 14903 RCIC Turbine Pump Discharge FY 14903A RCIC Turbine Pump Discharge SI 15001B RCIC Turbine Speed List SY '15001B RCIC Turbine Speed TI 15725B Suppression Pool Air Purge Line TT 15725B Suppression, Pool Air Purge Line LI 15776B2 Suppression Pool Level 15728B Primary Containment Drywell Pressure 15790B2 Gontainment Atmospheric ~rature 15790B2 Containment Atmospheric Temperature 14262 Reactor Vessel LI 14262 Reactor Vessel TMl/3/2 Page ll ENVIRONMEVZALQUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION Component Ident. No(s) .: PDIC-07550A/B Dif erentz.al Pressure Indicating (antro er: Component Name: Baile Controls on Panel OC-883A/B System: Standb Gas Treatment System Purchase Order: J-03C 1. Cbmponent(s) Safety Function: Measures dP of outside:air to reactor bldg. supply header to regulate SGTS fan damper. Accident(s) for which Gmponent(s) must be Qualified: 40, 42 with TID = 1.6 x 103 rads, taking credit for the recent recalculation of TIDs 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 8. This controller regulates the SGIS intake damper position. &is function is not crucial to the safe operation of the SGTS because the intake damper is preset to always maintain a minimum flowrate of 40% rated; thus removal of radioactivity from the secondary containment will not be prevented by failure of this instrunent. 10. All controls and instrunentation purchased originally through PO J-03B has been replaced by Bailey Controls procured under J-03C. 'Ihese new instrunents are qualified for seismic and hydrodynamic loads. ~ ~ ~ Interim Operation is ) X ( Justified ) Not Justified TMl/2/62 Page 12 ENVXRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION— JUSTIFICATION FOR INTi~M OPERATION Component Ident. No(s).: HIC-075553/8 Indxcatxng Contro er Gomponent Name: Baile Controls on Panel OC-883k/B System: Standby Gas Treatment S stem Purchase Ckder: J-03C 1. Component(s) Safety Function: None 2. Accident(s) for which Oomponent(s) must be Qualified: 3. Justification for Interim Operation: lg 11. &is controller is used to regulate a bypass damper for charcoal cooling when the SGTS is not operating. It is not required post- accident, because the SGTS fan causes airflow through the charcoal for cooling. 10. All controls and instrunentation purchased originally through PO J-03B has been replaced by Bailey Controls procured under J-03C. Jhese new instrunents are qualified for seismic and hydrodynamic loads. Interim Operation is ) X ) Justified ( Not Justified rm/Z/63 ENVXRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION— JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION Component Ident. No(s) .: PDY-07554k/B Differential Pressure Relay Component Name: Baile Controls on Panel OC-883k/B System: Standb Gas Treatment Purchase Order: J-03C 1. Cbmponent(s) Safety Function: Measures dP of Reactor Bldg. header to outside air to the reactor bldg. recirculation system supply dampers positions. 2. Accident(s) for which Cbmponent(s) must be Qualified: 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: 4, 5, 16. 'Ihis instrunent will be used during the first few minutes following an accident to regulate the position of dampers 'PDD-07554 A5B. After the initial pressure spike in the reactor bldg., the SClS should stabilize. Since the dampers fail as-is, subsequent failure of these PDYs will not prevent removal of radioactivity frcm the secondary containment. All controls and instrunentation purchased originally through PO J-03B has been replaced by Bailey Controls procured under J-03C. 'Ihese new instrunents are qualified for seismic and hydrodynamic ,loads. ~ ~ Interim Operation is x( Justified [ Not Justified Page !4 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLYLEFT BLANK Page 15 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLYLEFT BLANK ENVIRONMEPZAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR INK~M OPERATION Component Ident. No(s) .: 1C-226 A B Qxponent Name: Containment H Anal zer Sam le System: Containment Atmos eric Control Purchase Order: 1. Oomponent(s) Safety Function: Indication and alarm of containment H2 and 02 concentrations 2. Accident(s) for which Oorrponent(s) must be Qualified: 42 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 9. H2O2 analyzer provides indication and alarm only of containment Hg 6 O2 concentrations. With inerted containment plus hydrogen recombxners, there is a low risk of explosive concentrations, developing, particularly since the accident must be one in which fuel damage occurs before hydrogen generation becomes a problem. Current meter on hydrogen recanbiner control panel indicates that recombination is taking place. (Hydrogen recanbiner and controls are environmentally qualified.) 7. FSAR (figure 6.2-50) shows that, for worst case, there would be ample time (l-l/2 days) after a LOCA before H2 concentration would be expected to exceed the lower combustible limit of 4 v/o. 'Jherefore, pending environmental qualification of this ccmponent, the operators will be instructed to turn on the hydrogen recombiners early in the post-LOCA recovery phase, placing more reliance on the H2 reccmbiner current meter than the ~H/02 analyzer. ~ ~ ~ Interim Operation is ) x ( Justified ) ) Not Justified 'le/2/24 Page 17 ENVIRQNMEHIALg3ALIFICATION —JUSTIFICATICN FOR INTERIM OH%ATION Qm~nent Ident. No(s).: TE-15751 through -15770 Cbmponent Name: Suppression Pal RTDs System- SPOBKS Purchase Order:~~ Oomponent(s) Safety Function: Suppression pool water temperature indication and alarm. Indication used by operator to determine when to manually initiate pool cooling mode of RHR system. 2. Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: 40'2'3@ 44@ 45 3. Justification for Interim Cperation: 6, 12. Ehvironmental qualification testing is scheduled to be canpleted by tune, 1982. RTDs of similar material and construction have already been qualified; thus, there is high confidence that these detectors will be qualified. Should the above schedule slip, there would be. no safety concern so long as qualification is achieved before initial criticality. ~ ~ ~ 4. Interim Operation is )~[ Justified I I Not Justified TMl/2/15 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION— JUSTIFICATION FOR INT1~M OPERATION PT-15702, PT-15728A, PT-15728B, PT-15709A, PT-15709B, PT 15710Ag PT 15710Bg ZV 15775Ag LT 1577SBg LT 5776Ai . Canponent Ident. No(s).: LT-15776B, PT-12643, PT-12648, PT-18612A, FT-08623A Qmponent hhme: Pressure 6 Differential Pressure Transmitters (Barton) System: Containment Atmos. Qontrol, Gontainment Inst. Purchase Order: J-56A-. Gas, Cbntro Struc. Chi ed Water l. (component(s) Safety Function: Wnitor drywell and suppression chamber Maintain Control Rxm temperatures -(Zow pressure isolation for Cbntainment Instrunent Gas bottles) ~ ~ Accident(s) for which Opponent(s) must be Qualified: 40 g 42g43 ~ 44 f45 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 6,12. &sting program underway; to be completed by end of June, 1982. Identical model has been qualified for environments in other nuclear power plants. Interim Ceration is ( x ( Justified ( Not Justified 1%i/2/16 Page 19 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLYLEFT BLANK Page 20 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATICN FOR IÃIKRIMOPERATION VE-14180 Al thru AS and Bl thru BS Gm~nent Ident. No(s) .: VT-14180 Al thru AS and Bl Gxponent Name: MSS/RV position Indication: accele er System: Nuclear Boiler Purchase Order:~~ l. Oomponent(s) Safety Function: Indication of Safety Relief Valve position (acoustic 'monitor) 2. Accident(s) for which Gomponent(s) must be Qualified: 40,42 (small a intermediate size breaks only), 43,44,4S 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: 1,9,11: 'Ihe addition of acoustic monitors for determining SRV position is a post-KMI backfit (NUREG-0737, II.D.3). Mesc monitors are not in the preferred CSD path; their failure would not affect. the ability to achieve safe, cold shutdown. We position of the SRVs can be verified indirectly by the operator by observing reactor vessel pressure and suppression pool tempera- ture. 10. IDCA test must be reperformed and Beta radiation must be addressed. Sensors are qualified for seismic a Hydrodynamic loads. &sting is scheduled to be ccxnpleted by June 1, 1982, (i.e. before fuel load). However, should this schedule slip, there is no safety concern based upon the above justification. ~ ~ ~ X Justified Not Justified 4. Interim Operation is J ( TMl/2/18 page 21 ENVIRONMEÃZAL QUALIFICATION- JUSTIFICATICN FOR AH~M OPERATION pcxl0pDnent Ident No(s) . V-11274 AP B Cbmgonent Name: Solenoid Pilot Valve RHR Service Water Purchase Onler:~J-699 J-69 Replacement valves purchased under P.O. J-69B) 1. 'amponent(s) Safety Function: None ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Gmgonent(s) must be Qualified: None 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 1,S,S,ll Valves are RHRSW bypass to LRW and are not needed for CSD path. They are "valved-out" from rest of RHRSW system by keylocked closed valves. Thus, failure of these valves cannot affect safe cold shutdown. These valves will be replaced with qualified SVs before startup following the first refueling outage. 12. Ehvironmental qualification tests (for-replacement valves) are scheduled to be completed May 20, 1982; there is high confidence of successful testing, because environment is not extremely severe so that these SVs are not expected to be overstressed. ~ ~ ~ Not Justified 4.~ Interim Operation is )~( Justified 1 I Not Required TN1/2/19 Page ENVIRCINMENIALQUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR IHH:RIM OPERATION Oattponent Ident. No(s).: SV-07833 A, B Oomponent Name: Solenoid Pilot Valve Control Structure HVAC purchase Order:~~ l. Qamponent(s) Safety Function: Isolates Control Rxm Relief Air Fan (OV-119) from rest of CS-HVAC system by venting air from damper air operator. Valves also receive a high-chlorine-at-CS-outside-air-intake trip signal. ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Qmponent(s) must be Qualified: None 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: 1,5,8,11 Valves serve no safety function during postulated accidents. Chlorine release is not postulated to occur simultaneously with a DBA. 12. (See page 21) ~ ~ ~ ~ Justified ) Not Justified 4. Interim Operation is L z ( Not Required TMl/2/20 Page 23 ENVIRQN%&ZALQUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATICN FOR INHKIMOPERATION Qxponent Ident. No{s).: SV-07813 A, B 'Cbmponent Name: Solenoid Pilot. valve System: Cbntrol Structure Bnergency Outside Air purchase Order:~~ gmgonent(s) Safety Function: A3mit air to operator of deluge valve to initiate tare suppression oi CSEOASS filters. Accident{s) for which Cement(s) must be Qualified: ,40'2/ 43'4J 45 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 4,5,8,11,13. Solenoid valve is normally-deenergized, and axr-operated valve is normallyclosed, fail-cJosed. 'Ihere xs no credible failure mode which could cause the sv to move safe to the non-raz.l- position. Safety function or vm.ve aurxng DM zs to be closed, since a fire in CSEOASS is not postulated smulraneoussy with a DBA. 12. (See page 21) ~ ~ ~ 4. Interim Operation is )~( Justified ) Not Justified ~Q21 1 ENVIRCNMENlALQUALIFICATICN—JUSTIFICATICN FOR INZE2GM OPERATION Cm~nent Ident. No(s).: SV-07543 A a B'ilot Gxponent Name: Solenoid 'Valve I@actor Bldg Zone III HVAC purchase Order: 1. Oamponent(s) Safety Function: Admit air to operator of dampers in Reactor Bldg HVAC Recirculation System to recirculate secondary containment atmosphere; supply to SGTS. 2. Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: 40, 42 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: 4, 5. SV is normally-energized, fails to admit air to air operator of normally-closed, fail open damper. Campers are redundant and arranged in parallel; should one SV fail in a non-safe direction, the other damper would probably remain open. If both SV's fail in a non-safe direction, the Reactor Building HVAC Recirculation system would be inoperable, and the SGTS would not be able to remove radioactivity frcm the secondary containment atmosphere. 'thus, reactor building radioactivity would build up to unacceptable levels and unmonitored leakage could occur. 16. however, inasmuch as the only concern for these .valves is mechanical operability (i.e. SV moves to its "fail" position upon deenergization), the sole failure mode of concern is valve janming due to degradation of organic seals fram radiation exposure. &is failure should not happen during the time the valve is required to be operable, since the valves reposition during the first few minutes following the LOCA. Airborne dose in reactor building is insignificant during this period. 12. (See page 21) 4. Interim Operation is i~i Justified i Not Justified TM1/2/22 Page ENVIRONMENZAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION Caqmnent Ident. No(s).: SV-17508 A a B Component Name: Pilot Solenoid Valve System: Standby Gas Treatment Purchase Order: 1. Gxponent(s) Safety Function: Mne. (For DBAs 40 and 42, function of valves is to isolate containment purge from SGTS to protect the filters and to preclude a release fran containment.) ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Oomponent(s) must be Qualified: None 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: 1, 2, ll. 'Ihe dampers controlled by these SVs are downstream of the containment purge isolation valves which isolate automatically on a LOCA signal. 'Ihus, these dampers are merely a backup means of isolating the containment purge lines, and are not needed for the attainment of a safe cold shutdown. 4, 5, 13. SV is normally&eenergized; air-operated damper is normally- closed, fail-closed. Ihere is no credible failure mode which could cause the SV to move to its non-fail-safe position. 16. D spite the above, it should be noted that these solenoid valves also receive a LOCA signal and de-energize to cause, the associated dampers to close long before they will be exposed to the harsh environment. 12. (See page 21) ~ ~ 4 ~ Interim Operation is X ) Justified I I Not Justified ) Not Required TMl/2/23 Page 26 ENVIRQNMEPZAL g3ALIFICATICN- JUSTIFICATICN FOR AH~M OPERATION Component Ident. No(s).: SV-10943 A S( B and SV-11024 A & B Qx~nent Name: Solenoid Pilot Valve System: Service Water/Bnergency Service Water Purchase Order:~~ 1. Qmponent(s) Safety Function: Isolate Emergency Service Water fran TBCCW and RBCCW heat exchangers by venting air off air operators of isolation valves. ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: 40i 42'3'4'5 3. Justification for Interim +@ration: 1,4,5,8,11,13. Solenoid valve is normally-c3eenergized and air-operated valves are normally-closed, fail-closed. lhere is no credible , failure mode which could cause the SV to move to its non-'ail-safe-position. It is an off-normal situation for ESW to be cross-tied with the TBCCW or RBCCW heat exchangers; 'Ihese valves are opened only after a loss of office power. 7 ~ Operating procedures specify that these valves should be remote-manually closed immediately after an accident. 12. (See page 21) 4. ~ ~ Interim Operation is )~( Justified ) Not Justified TM1/2/24 Page 27 ENVIRONMEHZAL QUALIFICATION —JUFHFICATION H)R INTERIM OH%ATION SV 17502 A/Bg 17514 A/Bg 17564 A/Bg 17524 A/B Gxlttponent Ident'o(s) ~ . SV-'17586 B, -17534 A thru Cbatponent Name: Pilot Solenoid Valve System: Reactor Bld Zone III HVAC Purchase Order: 1. Qmponent(s) Safety Function: Isolate reactor bldg HVAC systems from &circulation System and SGTS to establish secondary containment by bleeding air off operators of isolation dampers. Also isolates air locks for same reason (i.e. establish secondary containment) . ~ ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Oomponent(s) must be Qualified: 40i 42 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 4, 5, these SVs are normally-energized and supply air to normally open, fail- closed isolation dampers. Except for dampers for the air-locks, each flow path is isolated by two series dampers. 'Ihe SVs receive isolation signals upon initiation of a LOCA. If thd SVs fail to the vent position, the isolation dampers will close, as they should. If, however, the SVs fail to reposition, secondary containment would not be achieved. 16. however, inasmuch as the only concern for these valves is mechanical operability (i.e. SV moves to its "fail" position upon deenergization), the sole failure mode of concern is valve jamming due to degradation of organic seals fran radiation exposure. 'this failure should not happen during the time the valve is required to be operable, since the valves reposition during the first few minutes following the LOCA. Airborne dose in reactor building is insignificant during this period. 12. (See page 21) 4. Interim Operation is X) Justifiu ) ) Not Justified TMl/2/25 age 28 QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION — — SV-15151A/B, 15152A/B, 15153A/B g 15188A/B g Cbmponent Ident. No(s) ~ : -15189A/B, -1519~B, -15170A/B Component Name: Pilot Solenoid Valve System: RHR (Steam Condensi Node) Purchase Order: J-69B l. Gbmponent(s) Safety Function: Isolate RHR system fran HPCI, RCIC< and LHÃ Steam Gondensing Rxfe cross-ties by bleeding air off air-operated isolation valves fu prevent diversion of RHR water or HPCI steam. 2. Accident(s) for which Gomponent(s) must be Qualified: 40g42g43~44,45 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 4,5,13. Except for SV-151708+8, all these solenoid valves are normally- deenergized, and the associated air-operated valves are normally- closed, fail-closed. Were is no credible failure mode which could cause these SVs to move to their non-fail-safe position. SV-15170A/B are no~lly-energized, and their associated air-operated valves are normally-open, fail-closed. 1 2g (see page 21) 1g2. SV-15153A/B are not on CSD path, since isolation of steam condensing mode isolation return line is provided by HV-lH)26A/B. 1 gll. SV-15188A/B has no safety function; only used as steam trap bypass. SV-15170A/B not on CSD path, because they will be valved out from RHR system by SV-15151A/B and SV-15152A/B. 4. Interim Operation is x Not ) [ Justified ( Justified TM1/2/26 page 29 ENVIRGKMDKALQUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR INTf~M OPERATION Component Ident. No(s).: SV-15004, -15005, -15625 and -15626 Component Name: Pilot Solenoid Valves System: RCIC ard HPCI purchase Order: J-69B 1. Cbnqnnent(s) Safety Function: RCIC/HPCI condensate line drain valve isolation. ~ 2.~ Mcident(s) for which Qomponent(s) must be Qualified: 40g42g43g44g45 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: 1,4,5,11. HPCI and RCIC are .not on preferred Cold Shutdown path. Mrbine startup signal initiates air-operated valve closure. these valves are used only to drain the barcmetric condenser vacuun tank on high level when the system is in standby, and are not needed when the system is in operation. 13. 'Ihe drain line in each system contains two valves in series. Upstream valves are normally-closed, fail-closed. 'Jhere is no credible failure mode which could cause the upstream SVs to move to their non-fail-safe position. 12. (See page 21) 4. Interim Operation is )x ) Justified ( Not Justified m/2/27 Page 30 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION— JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION Component Ident. No(s) .: SV-14320 Cbmponent Name: Pilot Solenoid Valve System: Reactor Recirculation Purchase Order: J-69B 1. Qmgonent(s) Safety Functions Reactor Recirc Loop B sample line isolation and containment isolation. 2. Accident(s) for which Qmponent(s) must be Qualified: 40g42 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 3~4g5gl3. SV is nomally&eenergized; air-operated isolation valve is normally-closed, fail-closed. Mere is no credible failure mode which could cause these SVs to move to their non-fail-safe position. Air-operated valve is an outboard containment isolation valve; inboard valve will ensure isolation for harsh environments in reactor building. 12. (See page 21) 4. Interim Operation is ( x ( Justified ) [ Not Justified ml/2/28 Page 31 QUALIFICATION— JUSTIFICATION FOR Ill~OPERATION SV 15703 g 15704 g 15705 ~ 15711 ~ 15713 g 15714 ~ Qmponent Ident. No(s).: -15721, -15722, -15723, -15724, -15725 Qomponent Name: Pilot Solenoid Valve System: Contairxnent Atmosphere Control Purchase Gn3er: J-69B/P-31A (Replacement valves were purchased under J-69B) 1. Qmponent(s) Safety Function: Isolates containment purge & vent lines by bleeding air off operators of isolation valves. ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: 40'2 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 4,5,13,16. Solenoid valves are normally&eenergized; air-operated isolation valves are normally-closed, fail-closed. 'Ihere is no credible failure mode which could cause these SVs to move to their non-fail-safe position. Containment purging/ inerting is performed on an infrequent basis. All valves are outside containment, and thus will not be exposed to a harsh environment during the time they are required to function. Isolation valves are in series pairs. 12. (See page 21; applies to replacement valves) 17. 'Ihe replacement valves will be installed after fuel load but before ascension to full power. 4. Interim Operation is [ x ) Justified ) Not Justified me/2/29 Page 32 ENVIRGNMEN'PAL QUALIFICATION— JUSTIFICATION FOR IÃZERIM OPERATION Gomponent Ident. No(s).: SV-14924, -15521, -15122A/B, -15203A/B Cbmponent Name: Pilot Solenoid Valves System: RCIC, HPCI, RHR, Gore Spra Purchase Order: J-69C/J-69B (emplacement valves were purchased under PO J-69C) 1. Qmponent(s) Safety Function: Containment isolation: these are all 1" solenoid operated bypass valves which are used to equalize pressure across the main isolation valves. ~ ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: 40'2 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 4g5gl3. these solenoid valves function as pressure-equalizing valves around containment isolation valves. 'Ihey are normally- deenergized, normallymlosed, fail-closed. Ihere is no credible failure mode which could cause these SVs to move to their non-fail-safe position. 3 ~ 'Ihese valves are inboard containment isolation valves; for each, a redundant outboard valve exists. 12,.; Cnly deficiency in EQ for the replacement valves is ccmpletion of seismic/hydrodynamic load qualification, in progress, forecast for the end of June, 1982. 'Ihe replacement valves will be installed before startup following the first refueling outage. Not Justified 4. Interim Ceration is ( x ( Justified ] TM1/2/30 page 33 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION Component Ident. No(s) .: SV-14319 Cbmgonent Name: pilot Solenoid Valve System: Reactor Recirc. Purchase Order: J-69C/J-69B (She replacement valve was purchased under PO J-69C) 1. Opponent(s) Safety Function: Containment isolation — inboard valve 2. Pacident(s) for which Qmgonent(s) must be Qualified: 40g42 3. Justification for Interim ~ration: 4,5,13. SV is normally de-energized; air-ogerated isolation valve is normally-closed, fail-closed. Ihere is no credible failure. mode which could cause these RS to move tp their non-fail-safe position. 3. Air-operated valve is an inboard containment isolation valve; outboard valve will ensure isolation for harsh environments inside containment. 12. Chly deficiency in EQ for the replacement valves is seismic/hydro- dynamic load qualification, in progress, forecast for the end of June, 1982. 17. Dhe replacement valve will be installed after fuel load but before 'ascension to full gower. Not Justified 4. Interim Operation is ) x ) Justified ( TM1/2/31 Page 34 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR INTl~M OPERATION Gomponent Ident. No(s) .: SV-18792Al/A2/Bl/B2, -18782A1/A2/Bl/B2 Qmponent Nme: Pilot Solenoid Valve System: Reactor Bldg. Chilled Water Purchase Order: J-69C/J-69 (She replacement valves were purchased under PO J-69C) l. Opponent(s) Safety Function: Containment isolation — inboard valves (actuator for air-operated CIVs) 2. Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: 40'2 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 3g4i5: Solenoid valves are normally-energized. Air-operated valves are normally open, fail closed. Redundant CIVs outside containment will ensure containment isolation for the system in the event of harsh environment inside containment, even if the subject SV does not move to its fail-safe position. 12: Cnly deficiency in EQ for the replacement valves is seimsic/hydrodynamic load qualification, in progress, forecast for the end of June, 1982. 17. 'Ihe replacement valves will be installed after fuel load but before ascension to fullpower. 4. Interim Operation is ) x ( Justified ) Not Justified TK/2/32 Page 35 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR IÃH~M OPERATION Gomgonent Ident. No(s) .: SV-15150A/B, -15206A/B Cbmgonent Rane: Pilot Solenoid Valve System: RHR, Cbre Spra Purchase Order: J-69C/J-69B (I@placement valves were purchased under PO J-69C) 1. Cbmgonent(s) Safety Function: None 2. Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 1,4,5,11,13: 'Ihese valves are actuators for air-operators on check valves used for containment isolation. Jhe SVs are used for testing only; in the event containment isolation of these lines is required (break in line outside containment), check valve will close, because the air operator is not strong enough to over-, power the check valve when reverse dp is applied. 'Iheregore, failure of the solenoid valve has no effect on attainment of cold shutdown. Likewise, SV failure cannot cause loss of RHR/Qore Spray system. 12: Chly deficiency in EQ for the replacement valves is seismic/ hydrodynamic load qualification, in progress, forecast for the end of June, 1982. 17. 'Ihe replacement valves will be installed after fuel load but before ascension to full gower. 4. Interim Qeration is ) x ) Justified ) Not Justified muf2/33 Page 36 QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR IÃZERIM OPERATION Gomponent Ident. No(s).: SV-14925, -14926, -15528, -15529 Gmponent Rune: Pilot Solenoid Valve System: RCIC, HPCI Purchase Order: J-69C/J-69 (emplacement vaIves were purchased under PO J-69C) 1. Cbmponent(s) Safety Function: Isolate RCIC/HPCI steam supply line drain trap on a RCIC/HPCI initiation signal. 2. Pccident(s) for which Gomponent(s) must be Qualified: 40 g42 g43 i44 g45 3. Justification~ ~ ~ for Interim Operation: ' 1.~ RCIC 6 HPCI are not in preferred CSD path. 4g 5i8. 'Ihese SVs are normally-energized; air-operated valves are normally- open, fail-closed. Should the SW not move to their fail-safe position, a percentage of the steam being supplied to the RCIC and HPCI turbines will be bypassed through the drain line to the main condenser. &is may prevent the HPCI/RCIC systems fran supplying adequate flow to the RPV; should this occur, the ADS system would function to depressurize the vessel, and LCPI (and Gore Spray) would provide core cooling. 16. ¹vertheless, inasmuch as the only concern for these valves is mechanical operability (i.e., SV moves to "fail" position upon depressurization), the sole failure mode of concern is valve jamming due to degradation of organic seals from radiation exposure. Ibis failure should not happen during the time the valve is required to be operable, since the valves reposition during the first few minutes following a LOCA. Airborne dose in the reactor building is insignificant during this period. 12. (hly deficiency in EQ for the replacement valves is seismic/hydro- dynamic load qualification, in progress, forecast for the end of June, 1982. 17. Ihe replacement valves will be installed after fuel load but before ascension to full power. Not Justified 4. Interim Operation is ) x ) Justified [ TMl/2/34 Page 37 ENVIRGNMEÃZALQUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR INTi~M OPERATION Gomponent Ident. No(s) .: OK-112A/B Cbmponent Rane: Centrifugal Water Chiller System: Control Structure HVAC Purchase Order: M-310/M-411 l. Cbmponent(s) Safety Function: Provide cooling to the Control Structure ~ 2.~ Pacident(s) for which Cbmponent(s) must be Qualified: ~ ~ 40, 42, 43, 44, 45 (TID = 1.0~ x 103, taking credit for recent reanalysis~ of TIDs) 3. Justification for Interim Cperation: 10, 12. 'Ihe major class lE canponents (i.e. motor, solid state module, etc.) of the chiller are qualified to NUREG-0588 Category II. However, scme of the control panel components and machine- mounted instronents were not included by the vendor in the generic requalification of the chiller. 'Ihe entire control panel and the machine-mounted components will be replaced by 12/30/83 during the upgrading of chiller capacity for Wit 2 operation. ~ 4.~ Interim Operation is ) X ) Justified ) Not Justified Page 38 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION K)R INTERIM OPERATION Oomponent Ident. No(s) .: PDT-07814 A/B Qmponent Name: Tavis 2-wire Pressure Differential Transmitter System: Control Structure — HVAC Purchase Order: M-320 1. Ctmponent(s) Safety Function: None. (High differential pressure alarm for filter OF-124 VB) 2. Accident(s) for which Cbmponent(s) must be Qualified: None 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 1, ll. Alarm function is not safety-related 8,9. If filter dp beccmes high, fan will trip on low flow, thus starting standby train. In any case, filters have been sized so that they should not beccme overloaded during the accident recovery period, assuning regular maintenance has been performed. This unit is scheduled to be replaced with a qualified, 3-wire Tavis PDT at first refueling outage. ~ ~ 4. Interim Operation is ) X ( Justified/ ) ) Not Justified Not Required TMl/2/43 Page 39 ENVIRONMEPZAL QMIFICATION— JUSTIFICATION FOR IÃZ1~M OPERATION Component Ident. No(s) .: POP-$ 7554 Al/A3/Bl/B3 Component Name: ~ Tavis 2-wire Pressure Differential Transmitter System: Reactor Bldg. — SGTS Purchase Order: M-320 1. Component(s) Safety Function: Al/Bl: Honitors and controls reactor bldg. Ul pressure at -0.25" w.g. (Zone I) A3/B3: Monitors and controls reactor bldg Ul pressure at -0.25" w.g. (Zone III) 2. Accident(s) for which Ckxnponent(s) must be Qualified: 40'2 (TID = 4.9 x 104 rads at its location) 3. Justification for Interim Ceration: 8, 13. The most likely failure mode for the dampers controlled by these PVZ's is fail in last position. Campers serve to modulate air flow to regulate Reactor Bldg. negative pressure; so long as fans continue to operate, reactor bldg. pressure should remain negative, thus preventing an uncontrolled release. 17. Jhese POI"s are scheduled to be replaced with qualified (to 1.4 x 106 rads) 3-wire Tavis units after fuel load but before ascension to full power. Interim Operation is ( X ( Justified ( Not Justified TM1/2/53 0 Page 40 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION Gomponent Ident. No(s).:J FT-07555; FT-07557 Cbmponent 1%me: Tavis 2-wire Flow Transmitter System: Reactor Bldg — SGTS Purchase Order: M-320 1. Oomponent(s) Safety Function: None (PT-07555: Make up air CEN indication) ' ' 0 5: 8 g) 2. Accident(s) for which Oomponent(s) must be Qualified: None 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 8. Scheduled to be replaced by qualified Tavis 3-wire model during next refueling outage. Failure of this unit will not impair functioning of SGTS system. 1, ll. 'lhese transmitters serve no safety-related function; their associated indicators are not Q-listed nor Class lE. ~ ~ Justified 4. Interim Operation is ) x ) Justified ] Not Not Inquired TM1/2/45 Page 41 ENVIEKNNENTALQUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR IÃZERIM OPERATION Gomponent Ident. No(s) .: FT-07816 A/B Gmponent Rane: Tavis 2-wire Flow Transmitter System: Control Structure HVAC (CSEOASS) Purchase Order: H-320 1. Qmponent(s) Safety Function: Trips running CSEOASS fan OV-101 A or B on low flow to start standby unit. ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Gomponent(s) must be Qualified: 40i 42i 43i 44i 45 = (TID l.~ 6 x 105 rads, taking credit for,recent recalculation of TIDs) 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 17. Purchase order for replacements with qualified 3-wire Tavis PVZ's will be placed by 4/30/82 with installation by September, 1982. 'Ihese replacement units are presently qualified for TID of 1.4 x 10< rads. 4. Interim Operation is ) X ( Justified I I Not Justified TM1/2/46 Page 42 QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR IÃZERIM OPERATION Ccmponent Ident. No(s) .: POP-07553 A/B Component Name: Tavis 2-wire Pressure Differential Trananitter System: Standb Gas Treatment tern Purchase Order: M-320 1. Gmponent(s) Safety Function: 'Ibis ccmponent measures dP of HEPA filter OF-170 A/B; this signal in conjunction with dT signal controls heating element OE-101 A/B. Failure of heater will trip SOS exhaust fan OV-109 and initiate startup of standby unit. ~ Pr:cident(s)~ for which~ Component(s) must be Qualified: ~ 40, 42.~ (TID = 1.2xl07~ rads, direct contact dose on SGIS filter housingi taking~ credit~ for recent recalculation of TIEs) 3. JUstification for Interim Cperation: 17. Purchase order for replacements with 3-wire Tavis PIG'S's will be placed by 4/30/82 with'nstallation by September 1982.. lhe replacement units are qualified for TID of 1.4 x 10< rads. Further reduction of the Total Integrated Dose (factor of approximately 9) which these devices must survive will be accomplished by relocating the transmitter further away from the SGTS filter. This modification will be done in the same time frame as replacement of the transmitter. Hodification and replacement will both be completed before ascension to full power. ~ ~ ~ Interim Cperation is )~) Justified ) sot Justified TM1/2/47 Page 43 ENVIRQNMEPIAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION B3R INTERIM OPERATION Obmponent Ident. No(s) .: POP-07550 A/B Cbmponent Rune: Tavis 2-wire Pressure Differential Transmitter System: Standb Gas Treatment S tern Purchase Order: M-320 1. Cbmponent(s) Safety Function: Controls flowrate of SGTS exhaust fan GV-109A/B and makeup air by measuring dP of SGTS supply header fran the reactor bldg. compared to outside air intake. ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Gmponent(s) must be Qualified: 42 with TID = 2.4~ x 103 Bads at its location, taking credit for recent recalculation~ of TIDs 3. Justification for Interim ~ration: 17. Purchase order for replacements with qualified 3-wire avis POZs will be placed by 4/30/82 with installation before September, 1982. Mesc replacement units are qualified for TID of 1.4 x 106 rads. 8. this PDZ regulates ratio of outside air makeup to reactor bldg. air being supplied to the SGTS exhaust fan by controlling the position of the outside air. supply dampers and the position of the damper on the SCIS exhaust fan intake. Ibis function is not crucial to the safe operation of the SGTS for two reasons: (1) failure of this PDT will not prevent or inhibit removal of radioactivity from the secondary containment, and (2) the SGTS exhaust fan inlet damper is preset to always maintain'a minimum flowrate of 40% of rated. 4. Interim Operation is ( X ) Justified ) ) Not Justified TM1/2/48 Page 44 ENVIRONMEPZAL QUALIFICATION— JUSTIFICATION FOR I1VZERIM OPERATION Qmponent Ident. No(s) .: FT-07551 A/B Qmponent Rune: Tavis 2-wire Flow Transmitter System: Reactor Bldg. SGTS Purchase Order: M-320 1. Qmponent(s) Safety Function: Cbntrols flowrate of SGTS exhaust fan OV-109 A/B and trips fan on low flow to start standby unit. 2. Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qua1ified: 40, 42 (TID = 2.4' 103 rads, taking credit for recent recalculation of TIDs) 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 17. Purchase order for replacements with qualified 3-wire 'avis FP's will be placed by 4/30/82 with installation by September, 1982. Nese replacement units are qualified for TID of 1.4 x 106 rads. ~ 4.~ Interim ~ration is X ) ( Justified ( Not Justified TMl/2/49 Page 45 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION— JUSTIFICATION FOR INTl&IMOPERATION Gomponent Ident. No(s) .: OC-888A/B Qmponent Rune: Alison Temperature Detection Unit System: Standb Gas Treatment S tern Purchase Order: M-320 1. Oomponent(s) Safety Function: Monitors temperature of charcoal filter OF-169A/B within SGTS filter housing. Will also alarm and initiate water deluge system if filter overheats, and will trip running SGZS fan, thereby initiating startup of standby fan. ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Gmponent(s) must be Qualified: 40 g 42 (TID = 2. 4 x 105 rads, taking credit for recent recalculation of TIDs) 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 14. This equipnent is qualified to IEEE 323-1974. Integrated circuit (I/C) P/N LM124A, is qualified to 2.5 x 105 rads, which exceeds the required TID given above. %is equignent is fully qualified for all other environmental parameters of concern. ( 4. Interim Operation is ) x ) Justified ] Not Justified THl/2/52 Page 46 ENVIRCNMEWZAL QUALIFICATION- JUSTIFICATION FOR INT1~M OPERATION Qomponent Ident. No(s) .: 1V-208A/B, 1V-209A/Bi 1V-211A/B/C/D Gomponent Rune: ECCS Unit Cooler Fan Motors for HPCI, RCIC and CSS Roans System: Reactor Bldg. (Zone I) HVAC Purchase Order: M-315 (Emplacement to be purchased under P.O. M-399) 1. Cbmponent(s) Safety Function: Maintain ECCS pump rocm temperature < 130'F following a DBA. Support system to ECCS. 2. Accident(s) for which Qomponent(s) must be Qualified: 40/ 42'3i 44'5 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 1. HPCI, RCIC and Core Spray systems are not on the preferred CSD path. Ihus, cooling of their equignent roans is not required. Ihese HVAC systems are electrically and physically independent of the unit coolers required for CSD; thus, failure of these fan motors will not affect safe, cold shutdown. 10, 12. 'Ihese 8 motors (with type "F" insulation) can be operated for a limited time (3 years maxim') until replacements are installed. Mtors will be replaced with qualified motors (with type "H" insulation) prior to startup following the first refueling outage. Interim Operation is [ X [ Justified [ Not Justified TK./2/59 page 47 ENVIRONMEFZAL QUALIFICATION—'JUSTIFICATION FOR INTi~M OPERATION Oomponent Ident. No(s) .: 1V-210A/8/C/D Qmponent Name: RHR Panp Rocms Unit Cooler Fan Motor System: Reactor Bldg. (Zone I) HVAC Purchase Order: M-315/ N-399 for re~pacement motors 1. Qmponent(s) Safety Function: Maintain RHR pump rocm temperature < 130'F following a DBA. Support systems to LPCI and suppression pool cooling modes of RHR. ~ ~ 2.~ Accident(s) for which Oomponent(s) must be Qualified: 40g 42'3'4'5 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 17. She 4 existing motors (with type "F" insulation) will be replaced with qualified motors (with type "H" insulation) after scheduled fuel load but before full power ascension. emplacement is forecast for October 5g 1982. ~ ~ 4.~ Interim Operation is i X i Justified i Not Justified 1%1/2/50 Page 48 ENVIRGNNENZAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR INTI~M OPERATION Cbmponent Ident. No(s) .: OC-883A/8 (component Rane: Zacal HVAC Panel System: Standb Gas Treatment S stem Purchase Order: M-334/M-412 (M-412 for qualifxcatxon acti- vity only) 1. Cbmgonent(s) Safety Function: Zocal Control Panel for SGTS and its associated controls. 2. Accident(s) for which component(s) must be Qualified: 40< 42 (TID = 1. 6 x 103 Mds, taking credit for recent recalculation of TIDs) 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 10,12 use panels are being qualified by analysis; the vendor has submitted an EQ report, but it is not considered canplete. 'Ihe qualification of these panels is currently scheduled to be cxxnpleted after fuel load (July 30, 1982). Since these panels will be subjected to only 103 Bads after the accident with no change in temperature, pressure or hunidity, there is confidence that they will prove to be qualified. Interim Operation is ( X,[ Justified Not I 1 Justified ~/2/60a =-Page 49 ENVIRONMEPZAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR IÃZERIM OPERATION Component Ident. No(s) .: OC-876A/B Cbmponent Rane: Zocal HVAC Panel System: Control Structure Bnergenc Purchase Order: M-334/M-412 Outside Ai.r Supp y System CSEQASS) 4»f 'E vity only) 1. Cbmponent(s) Safety Function: Local Control Panel for CSEOASS and its associated controls. 2. Pccident(s) for which Qmponent(s) must be Qualified: 40/ 42 (TID = 1.6 x 103 Rads, taking credit for recent recalculation of TIDs) 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 10,12. 'Ihese panels are being qualified by analysis; the vendor has submitted an EQ report, but it is not considered canplete. Ihe qualification of these panels is currently scheduled to be ccmpleted after fuel load (July 30, 1982). Since these panels will be subjected to only 103 Bads after the accident with no change in temperature, pressure or hunidity, there is confidence that they will prove to be qualified. ~ ~ ~ ~ Interim Operation is X ) Justified ( ( Not Justified TMl/2/60b Page 50 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR IÃZERIM OPERATION Gomponent Ident. No(s).: HEN-07553 A&B, HEN-07555 AEB Component Name: Damper Actuators (h ranotor) System: Standb Gas Treatment S stem Purchase Order: M-336A 1. Cbmponent(s) Safety Function: a) HEN-07553A/B: inlet dampers to SGZS train A/B; must reposition on train switchover. b) HIM-0755~B: outside air bypass damper for charcoal cooling; used only in event of extreme overheating of charcoal bed. 2. Accident(s) for which Qomponent(s) must be Qualified: 40i 42 (TID = 1.2 x 106'ads, taking credit for recent recalculation of TIDs) 3. .Justification for Interim Operation: 14. Jhese damper actuators are qualified for a total integrated dose of 2.3 x 107 Rads while the capacitor in the actuator is qualified for 5.5 x 106 Rads. 'Ihese values exceed the required TID given above. These actuators are fully qualified for all other environmental parameters of concern. Interim~ geration~ ~ is [ X [ Justified [ Not Justified 'IKl/2/60c Page 51 ENVIRCNMENTAL QUALIFICATION— JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION Component Ident. No(s) .: GV-109A/8 (component Name: SG1S Exhaust Fan Motor System: Standb Gas Treatment Purchase Order: M-362 (&placement P.O. M-399) 1. Cbmgonent(s) Safety Function: a) Maintain -0.25 in. wg. negative pressure in the secondary containment post-accident. b) Exhaust filtered air from the secondary containment to limit the offsite dosee ' c) Filter and exhaust discharge frcm MSIVLCS. 2.~ Pacident(s) for which Cbmponent(s) must be Qualified: = 5.. 40'2 (TID 1.5~ x 10 - Rads), taking credit for recent recalculation of TIDs. 3. Justification for Interim Cperation: 10, 12. <„Motor vendor has test docunentation showing that motors have been '-tested for 2 x 106 Bads. Based on the existing test docunents, the vendor has stated that the presently ins~led motors can be used for up to 3 years; therefore these motors will b'e replaced prior to startup following the first refueling outage with qualified motors having type "H" insulation. 4. Interim Cgeration is ) X ( Justified ( Not Justified TMl/2/61 Page ENVIBONMEPZAL QUALIFICATION—JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION ZS-10943A2g ZS-10943B2g ZS-10924Alg ZS-11024A2i Cbmponent Ident. No(s).: ZS-11024Bl, ZS-11024B2, ZS-11143A, ZS-11143B Qomponent Name: Valve Position Limit Switches System: Bne en Service Water Purchase Ceder: P-16A l. Gomponent(s) Safety Function: Valve position indication for air-operated valves which isolate emergency service water from the service water connections to the TBCCW and RBCCW heat exchangers. 2. Accident(s) for which Oomponent(s) must be Qualified: 40'2'3'4'5 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 4, 13,, -, 'Ihe valves for which these limit switches provide position indication are normally closed. 5hese valves are opened remote-manually only in the event of a loss-of-offsite power without a.LOCA. In the unlikely event that a DBE occurs during this situation, the operator will reclose the valves; lack of position indication should not confuse the operator. Ne limit switches will be replaced with qualified switches before startup following the first refueling outage. 4. Interim Operation is ) X ) Justified ( Wt Justified Page 53 Q3ALIFICATICN —JUSTIFICATICN FOR I17ZEZGM OPERATION Oanponent Ident. No(s) .: Component Name: System: RGIc Purchase Order: l. Component(s) Safety Function: Position indication for RCIC vacuum tank condensate pump discharge line drain valves HV-E51-1F004 & -1F005. 'Pacident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: None 3. Justif ication for Interim iteration: 1, 11. RCIC System is not on the preferred CSD path. RCIC System is not taken credit for in accident analysis. Failure or these limit switches will not affect ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. Barometric condenser is not needed for operation of RCIC System. 4. These valves get a closure signal when the RCIC turbine steam supply valve opens. 13. The upstream valve is normally-closed, fail-closed. 16, 9. The only environmental parameter for which these limit switches are not yet qualified is temperature due to a RCIC steam line break; since this event will cause automatic isolation of the steam supply line, the operators would not be concerned about the position of the drain valves. 4. Interim Ceration is ) x ) Justified ) Not Justified TMl/2/3 Page 54 QMIFICATICN —JUSTIFICATICS PQR INIKRIMOPERATION Qx~nent Ident. No(s) .: Cbn|ponent Name: System: .HpCI Purchase Order:~ 1. Qxxenent(s) Safety Function: Position indication for HPCI vacuum tank condensate pump discharge line drain valves HV-E41-1F025 & -1F026. Accident(s) for which Cor~nent(s) m st be Qualified: 40, 42, 43, 44, 45 3. Justification for Interim Operation: 1, 11. HPCI System is not on the preferred CSD path. Failure of these limit switches will not affect ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. Barometric condenser is not needed for operation of HPCI'ystem. 4, -These valves get a closure signal when the HPCI turbine steam supply valve opens 13. The upstream valve is normally-closed, fail-closed. 16, 9. The only environmental parameter for which these limit switches are not yet qualified is temperature due'o a HPCI steam line break; since this event will cause automatic isolation of the steam supply line, the operators would not abc concerned about the position of the drain valves. Not Justified 4. 'nterim Ceration is x ( Justified ) TMl/2/3 Page Q1ALIFICATION —JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION Qxaponent Ident. No(s) .: ZS-15528 ZS-15529 Qsrttgonent Name: Valve position Limit Switch System: HPCI Purchase Order: J-65 1. Component(s) Safety Function: Position indication for HPCI steam supply line drain valves HV-E41-1F028 & -1F029. Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: 40, 42, 43, 44, 45 3. Justification for Interim Cperation: 1. HPCI system is not in the preferred CSD path. Failure of these limit switches will not affect ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. 4. These valves are closed automatically on a LOCA signal. 16, 9. The only environmental parameter for which these limit switches are not yet qualified is temperature due to an HPCI steam line break; since this event will cause automatic isolation of the steam supply line, the operators would not be concerned about the position of the drain valves. 4. Interim Operation is z ) Justified ) Not Justified TMl/2/3 Page s6 QM IFICATICN —JUSTIFICATICN FOR INIKRIM OPERATION Ocgponent Ident. No(s) .: Component Name: System: RC Purchase Order:~ 1. Gmponent(s) Safety Function: Position indication for RCIC steam supply line drain valves HV-E51-1F025 6 -1F026. Accident(s) for which Qzzmnent(s) m st be Qualifi'ed: None 3. Justification for Interim Cperation: 1, ll RCIC system is not in the preferred CSD path. RCIC system is not taken credit for in accident analysis. Failure of these limit switches will not affect ability „to achieve and mainta'in cold shutdown. 4. These valves are closed automatically on a LOCA signal. 16, 9 The only environmental parameter for which these limit switches are not yet qualified is temperature due to an RCIC steam line break; since this event will cause automatic isolation of the steam supply lines the operators would not be concerned about the position of the drain valves. 4. Interim Operation is I~1 Justified i Not Justified TNl/2/3 CUALIFICATZ(K- JUSTIFICATECN FOR ZHZERIM OPERATXON Canponent Ident. No(s) ~ zs-11274 A B Exponent Name: System: RHR Service Water Purchase Order: 1. Ccaxenent(s) Safety Function: None (Position indication for telltale drain valve for RHRSW/RHR crosstie correction) cident(s)t for which Qz~nent(s) mus" be Qualified: None 3. Justification for Interim Operation:- 1, 11, 9. This valve is not in the preferred CSD path. It is valved out from the RHR and RHRSW systems by normally — keylocked closed crosstie isolation valves. The need to crosstie RHR to RHRSW requires multiple component failures and need not be assumed for purposes of this study. Failure of this valve limit switch will not affect the ability to attain or maintain safe, cold shut- down condition, and the operator does not rely on position indication of this valve to perform any safety action. 4. Interim ~ration is ) Not Justified Page 58 This page is intentionally left blank Page 59 QIALIFICATICN- JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION Canponent Ident. No(s) .: Cbmgonent Name: System R R Purchase Order:~ 1. Ccxngonent(s) Safety Function: Position indication for RHR Steam Condensing Mode isolation valves HV-Ell-1F051 A, B, 1F052 A, B, and -1F053 A, B. Accident(s) for which Component(s) must be Qualified: 40, 42, 43, 44, 45 3. Justification for Interim Cperation: HV-Ell-1F052 A, B and 1F053 A, B are not on the preferred path to cold shutdown. 9. Limit switches provides valve position indication only. 13. Valves are normally-closed; steam condensing mode of RHR is seldom, if ever, used. 4,16. Valves x'eceive automatic LOCA isolation signal; limit switches should not be exposed to harsh environment during early post-accident period. Subsequent failure of limit switches should not confuse operator. Justified Not Justified 4. Interim Operation is '~) ] TNl/2/3 Appendix C, cont'd. NSSS EQUIPMENT The NSSS equipment is arranged by EQEL number. Each EQEL may have multiple sheets to accommodate various system reqirements for Justification for Interim Operation. Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 1 of 2 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 IF F T FO Technical Document No: 2400:NAV-025 E.Q.E.L. Item No. Prepared by 'tt Item Name e 'tch T 'tte Revised by E Reviewed by System: c ar Tag No: -N D T N D at': x Justified Not Justified 2. ust'cat'o or te rat'o . The safety functions of the switch and transmitter are also provided by qualified components (LITS-1N026AGB) on the cold shutdown path. Switch failure could cause inadvertent NSIV closure which is analyzed as a DBE. Transmitter failure causing erroneous indication in the control room can be determined by comparison with the qual'ified component indication (LITS-1N026 A&B) . Any failure of these components will not preclude any qualified component from performing its safety function or the plant achieving and maintaining cold shutdown. 3. s et ct'witch: Initiates MSIV closure on low reactor vessel water level. Transmitter: Provides reactor vessel water level (above fuel zone) signal to recorders and indicators in the control room. 4 ~ cc'd t s r hic st a or e a 'o ~ None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 2 of 2 Facility:~ ~ Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 NMEÃ7 IF T N— F T Technical Document No: MAV 5 E.Q.E.L. Item No. D Prepared by M tte Item Name itch Tran itter Revised by E o Reviewed by System: Nuc ear er Tag No: -N T N A B 1. nte 'atio ~ Justified Not Justified 2. usti icat'o for nter'at'o ~ The switch has no safety function and has no failure consequences since it is disconnected. The transmitter function (fuel zone water level) is adequately provided by LITS-1N026A,B (above fuel zone water level) which are on the cold shutdown path.~ Except for a few seconds following a LOCA, the justified~ systems on the cold shutdown path maintain~ the water level within the range of the above qualified components. ~ Transmitter failure causing erroneous indication~ in the control room can be determined by comparison with the above qualified component indication. Any failure of this component will not prevent any qualified component from performing its safety function or achieving and maintaining cold shutdown. 3. Co e t s Sa t Funct Switch: None. Switch disconnected. Transmitter: Provides reactor vessel water level (fuel zone) signal to indicator in the control room. 4. ccid t s or ich o e t s be a 'ed o ter'one Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 1 of 6 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Nl) Project No. 2400 F 0 Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-031 E.Q.E.L. Item No. Prepared by G'tt Item Name P essu e 'tch Revised by 'tte Reviewed by System: ore ra Tag No: —N E -N N 1. nter'a 'o 's: ~ Justified Not Justified 2. ust'ca 'o for te at'o ~ The safety function, core cooling, of the core spray system is also provided by environmentally justified system (ADS + LPCI mode of RHR system) on the cold shutdown path. Switch failure will not actuate the ADS or prevent actuation since a permissive is also provided by the RHR pump discharge pressure switches (PS-lN016, PS-1N010) on the cold shutdown path. Any failure ~ of these switches will not prevent the above justified systems from achieving and maintaining a cold shutdown. 3 ~ e t cti Provide permissive signal to the ADS when the core spray system pump discharge pressure is ~30 psig. 'ch 4 ~ ccid s for st a 'd o at'ts ter'one Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 2 of 6 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES 01) Project No. 2400 FI T FO M PERAT Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-031 E.Q.E.L. Item No. Prepared by itterman Item Name Pressure itch Revised by M 'tte Reviewed by System: i ressure oo t 'ect'o Tag No: E B D B D l. nter 'm ratio ~ Justified Not Justified 2. ust'cat'o f r te 'at'he safety function, core cooling, of the HPCI system is also provided by environmentally justified systems (ADS + LPCI mode of RHR system) on the cold shutdown path.~ Switch failure could prevent HPCI startup or lead to turbine/pump maloperation and/or the loss of the HPCI system. Any failure of these switches will not prevent the above justified systems from achieving and maintaining a cold shutdown.~ . 3 ~ e t s et ct'o Isolate HPCI turbine steam supply and pump discharge lines on low steam supply pressure. 4. Accid t s for hic Co e t s st b a 'ed o t ra 'o . None Owner: Pennsylvania Power 6 Light Page 3 of 6 Facility : Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES 01) Project No. 2400 IF T 0 — ST T OP TO Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-031 E.Q.E.L. Item No. Prepared by 'tte Item Name ressure 'tch Revised by 'tte Reviewed by System. Hi Pressure t n'ect'o Tag No: H-' 1. te rat'o i ~ Justified Not Justified ' 2. ust'f'cat'o for te at'o ~ The safety function, core cooling, of the HPCI system is also provided by environmentally justified systems (ADS + LPCI mode of RHR system) on the cold ~ shutdown path.~ Switch failure will not cause opening of the valve but could ~ prevent opening of the valve which could lead to HPCI pump damage and loss of ~ ~ the HPCI system.~ Any failure of this switch will not prevent the above ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ justified systems from achieving and maintaining cold shutdown.~ 3. o n t t ct'o ~ Provides permissive signal to open the HPCI pump low flow bypass valve when pump discharge pressure is ~25 psig. ' 4 ~ c'de t s or 'ch nent s b a rat'o- t t None Owner: Pennsylvania Power 6 Light Page 4 of 6 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-031 E.Q.E.L. Item t'e 4 Re 's'o Prepared by E P Item Name: Pressure itch Re ised E P on Reviewed by System: eact o e at'o oo n Tag No: P —N A 1. ter'at'o 's: ~ Justified Not Justified 2. u t'f'cat'o f r ter't'o ~ The safety function, core cooling, of the RCIC system is also provided by environmentally justified systems (ADS + LPCI mode of the RHR system) on the cold shutdown path. Switch failures could prevent RCIC startup or lead to RCIC turbine failure and/or the loss of the RCIC system. Any failure of these switches will not prevent the above justified systems from achieving and maintaining a cold shutdown. 3. Co ne t et Funct'rovides trip signals to the RCIC turbine controls on high turbine exhaust pressure. 4. cc'd nt s or h'ch o e t s st e a 'f r te ra 'on: None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 5 of 6 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 F CAT N- MO T Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-031 E.Q.E.L. Item Date Rev's'o Prepared by E o Item Name Pressure 'tc Revised b E on Reviewed by System: Reactor o e so at'o 'n Tag No: -N B D P B D l. Int r't'o 's: ~ Justified Not Justified 2. ust'f'cat'o o te 'at'he safety function, core cooling, provided by the RCIC system is also provided by environmentally justified systems (ADS + LPCI mode of the RHR system) on the cold shutdown path. Switch failure could prevent RCIC startup or lead to RCIC turbine failure and/or the loss of the RCIC systems. Any failure of these switches will not prevent the above justified systems from achieving and maintaining cold shutdown. 3. o ets et ct'o ~ The pressure switches provide an RCIC system isolation signal to close the steam supply isolation valves and trip the RCIC turbine when the pressure downstream of the first rupture disk in the turbine exhaust header exceeds 10 PSIG. 4. cc'de t s for 'ch r t tbSL None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 6 of 6 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-031 E.Q.E.L. Item No. Prepared by 'tt Name P essu e itch Revised by 'tte at'tem Reviewed by System: eactor re s 'n Tag No: 1. te rat'o 's: ~ Justified Not Justified 2. ust'cat'o fo te at'he safety function, core cooling, of the RCIC system is also provided by environmentally justified systems (ADS + LPCI mode of RHR system) on the cold shutdown path. Switch failure will not cause opening of the valve but could prevent opening the valve which could lead to RCIC pump damage and loss of the RCIC system. Any failure of this switch will not prevent the above justified system from achieving and maintaining a cold shutdown. 3. o e t s et ct'o ~ Provides permissive signal to open the RCIC pump low flow bypass valve when pump discharge pressure is ~25 psig. 4 ~ ccident s or h'ch stbe a ra 's 'er'one Owner: Pennsylvania Power 6 Light Page l of l Facility: Susquehanna Unit l (SSES el) Project No. 2400 F T MOP T Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-036 E.Q.E.L. Item 'o t R Prepared by 's'tem Revised by E Reviewed by System: Tag No: -N006 B F ' P FE-lN006 B F K P. Inboard stem ~ Justified Not Justified Provided that the operator is instructed to not initiate the inboard MSIV-LCS subsystem. 2. ust'cat'r ter't'on. The inboard system is not part of the cold shutdown path and should not be used in response to a IDCA until it is fully qualified. The system must be manually actuated, and the subject components only function to inhibit system operation. Should these components fail in the permissive mode, the system would still not start automatically. Therefore, failure of these components is tolerable and has no effect on the ability of other systems to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown. 3 ~ t et c'o supply flow signals to flow transmitters, FT-N053 B, F, K 6 P, to isolate inboard MSIV-LCS on high leakage flow through the inboard MSIV's. 4. ci o 'ch o st a 'ed o t None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power 6 Light Page 1 of 1 -Facility : Susquehanna Unit. 1 (SSES 81) Project No. 2400 I T N- FI T Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-037 E.Q.E.L. Item o t s Prepared by M t arne Detect r Po e e 's Reviewed by u r Tag No: 1-Dl 3 —Power Ran e Mon't s at'o ~ Justified Not Justified For Control Rod Drop Accident Only. 2. u t'cat' t at'o ~ PRM's provide no safety function in LOCA or HELB accidents since reactor scram signal is provided by Qualified Instruments, reactor vessel low water level and/or high containment pressure (GXA) or MSlV closure (HELB). In a rod drop accident, the high flux scram signal is generated in less than one second (FSAR Table 15.4-8) at 120% power. Over this time frame, ambient conditions to which the PRM's are exposed do not change significantly and thus for the rod drop accident the PRM's can be considered exposed only to a benign environment. Should the PRM's fail to provide a scram signal, the initial power excursion is terminated by the Doppler coefficient and a backup scram signal is generated by closure of the MSIV's on detection of high radioactivity in the main steam lines. Therefore, failure of these components will not preclude the ability to accomplish or maintain cold shutdown. 3. t ct'o . Generate scram signal at 120% power. 4. ccid t s or h'ch o nt Rod drop accident. Owner: Pennsylvania Power a Light Page 1 of 1 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project.No. 2400 T 0 — STXF T 0 T Technical Document No: 2400:NAV-038 E.Q.E.L. Item o Date — — Re by E 's'repared o Item N r 'tte Revised by E on Reviewed by System: aka o tro MSIV- S Tag No: -N F P FT-N5 B F po d 1 ~ t at'on is: X Justified Not Justified Provided that the operator is instructed to not initiate the inboard MSIV-LCS subsystem. 2. st'f'cat'or te at'o . The inboard system is not part of the cold shutdown path and should not be used in response to a IlX'A until it is fully qualified. The system must be manually actuated, and the subject components only function to inhibit system operation. Should these components fail in the permissive mode, the system would still not start automatically. Therefore, failure of these components is tolerable and has no effect on the ability of other systems to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown. 3. o n t s et ct'o ~ Flow elements, FE-1N006 B, F, K 6 P supplies signals to the flow trans- mitters Fl lN053 B, F, K, a P which isolates the inboard MSIV-LCS on high leakage flow through the inboard MSIV's. 4. cc'd t s r wh'ch o e t s st e a te . 'at'o None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power 6 Light Page 1 of 9 Facility : Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 R M PERAT Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-048 E.Q.E.L. Item No. """" Prepared by 'tt c- Item Name: r ssu e T ansmitte Revised b 'tt Reviewed by System: Nuc ea Bo' Tag No: -N PT- N B 1. t r't'o 's: ~ Justified Not Justified 2. usti icat'on o t 't'. The safety function provided by this transmitter is also provided by an environmentally qualified transmitter (PT-1N055A) on the cold shutdown path. Transmitter failure causing erroneous indication in the control room can be determined by comparison with the above qualified component indication. Failure of this component will not prevent the qualified component from performing its safety function or achieving and maintaining cold shutdown. 3 ~ ne t s et a pressure signalct'upplies to the reactor vessel wide range. recorder in the control room in the same manner that PT-lN055A supplies PR-1R623A 4. ccide t s o wh'ch o e t st e a'one. Owner: Pennsylvania Power 6 Light Page 2 of 9 acility: Susquehanna Unit l (SSES Sl) Project No. 2400 IF T Technical Document No: 2400:NAV-048 E.9.E.L. Item No Prepared by Wis Item Tran itt Revised b Reviewed by System: Tag No: ' 1 ~ t at'on Justified Not Justified 2. ust'cat' t 't'he safety function, provided by the core spray system, which is not on the cold shutdown path, is also provided by environmentally justified systems on the cold shutdown path (ADS + LPCI mode of RHR system) . Failure of these components could give the operator erroneous information concerning the system. However, mis-operation or total loss of the system would be of no consequence because the system is not on the cold shutdown path. Therefore, failure of the component will not preclude the accomplishment of the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. 3. flow signals toct'rovides indicators in the control room for each loop of the core spray system which provides core cooling when the reactor vessel is depressurized. 4. ccid t or 'c o e t st QhLtJUI None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power E Light Page 3 of 9 Facility : Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 T Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-048 E.Q.E.L. Item R). Revision B Prepared by 'tt Item Name Revised by 's Reviewed by System: Tag No: po p Fv- at'on 's: ~ Justified Not Justified Provided that the operator is instructed 'to not initiate the inboard MSIV LCS subsystem. 2. u 'cat'o or te i at'o: The inboard system is not part of the cold shutdown path and should not be ~ used in response to a LOCA until it is fully qualified.~ The system must be manually actuated, and the subject components only function to inhibit system ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ initiation.~ Should these components fail in the permissive mode, the system- would still not start automatically. Therefore, failure of these components is tolerable and has no effect on the ability of other systems to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown. 3. n t t Funct'o: PT-N051 B,F,K,P —To provide signals, based on pressure upstream of outboard MSIV. These signals feed a switch and timer which close the inlet bleed and depressurization valves, when pressure is above 5 psig, 1 minute after system initiation. Pl N061 B,F,K,P —To provide signals to a switch which prevents opening of the bleed valves when pressure upstream of outboard MSIV is above 35 psig. PT-N050 6 60 —To provide signals which prevent blower initiation when reactor pressure is above 35 psig. Either instrument reading less than 35 psig will allow blower initiation. FT-N054 — To provide a flow signal based on the differential pressure across a flow element in the dilution air intake line. This signal prevents opening of the bleed valves when flow is below the setpoint and closes the valves if flow decreases to an inadecgmte level during operation. cc' 4.~ t s o wh'ch o ts st or nt ~ None Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 4 of 9 Facility : Susquehanna Unit l (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 T N- M T Technical Document No: 2400:NAV-048 E.Q.E.L. Item No. ~4-- evis'o g~ga~d ~ 's o T Qeej~sg. b QQYLeMRcj Leaka e Control stem outboard subs st TccT. E32-N059 PP- at's- ~ ~ugttf~ ust'ca 'on or te i at'o ~ This flow transmitter is in a system which is part of the cold shutdown path.~ However, failure of the subject component is of no consequence since it has no control function. Failure of this component would be significant only if there is a blockage in the dilution~ air intake line; but, because no failures in the qualified equipnent of the cold shutdown path are assumed, there will be no failure for the subject component to detect.~ Therefore, failure of the subject component can not prevent achievement and maintenance of cold shutdown. o nt s t t'o ~ To provide a signal based on flow in the dilution air intake line. The signal is used as input to an alarm and indicator in the control room. ccide t o 'ch o nt Ibaatlaa ' None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 5 of 9 Facility : Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Sl) Project No. 2400 F T F T NFO Document No: 2400:MAV-048 E.Q.E.L.'echnicalItem 'o . Dat Prepared by s Item T smitt Revised b s Reviewed by System: 'h ss e t'on I Tag No: 1. nt at'on i ~ Justified Not Justified 2. ust'cat' or te o o The safety function, core cooling, provided by the HPCI system which is not in the cold shutdown path is also provided by environmentally justified systems on the cold shutdown path (ADS + LPCI mode of RHR). Failure of this component may cause erratic operation of a system for which no credit has been taken for the cold shutdown path. Therefore, failure of this component will not preclude the justified systems from achieving and maintaining cold shutdown. 'I 3. o nen s t ct'o ~ Supplies a flow signal to the HPCI turbine control so that the system flow can be changed to meet the requirements for core cooling during the times when reactor vessel pressure is too high to use the low pressure systems. 'c 4 ~ ccid t o o et stb a ati None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 6 of 9 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 T P T Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-048 E.Q.E.L. Item No. Prepared by E Item Name P e T itt Revised by Reviewed by System: su e Tag No: te ''o 's: ~ Justified Not Justified 2. u 'ca 'on f r nte i at'o . The safety functions, core cooling, of the HPCI system is also provided by environmentally justified systems (ADS + LPCI mode of RHR system) on the cold shutdown path. Transmitter failure could cause erroneous indication in the control room and lead to HPCI pump damage and/or loss of the HPCI system. Any failure of this transmitter will not prevent the above justified system from achieving~ and maintaining~ a cold shutdown. 3. t et Funct'rovides HPCI pump discharge pressure signal to indicator in control room. ' 4. c'ch st a o t None II Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 7 of 9 Facility: Susquehanna Unit l (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 I T Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-048 E.Q.E.L. Item Dat is'on Prepared by Item o T ansmitte Revised b Reviewed by 'ystem: a or re so at'o oo Tag No: 03 er't'o i ~ Justified Not Justified 2 ~ 'cat' te at'on. The safety function, core cooling, provided by the RCIC system which is not on the cold shutdown path, is also provided by environmentally justified systems on the cold shutdown path (ADS + LPCI mode of RHR) . Failure of this component may cause erratic operation in the system for which no credit is taken for the cold shutdown path. Therefore, failure of this component will not preclude the accomplishment of the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. . 3 ~ t t ct'o Provides a flow signal input to the RCIC turbine controls so that the system flow can be changed to meet the requirements for core cooling during the times when reactor vessel pressure is too high to use the low pressure systems. 4. cc'd t s o i o ne t s QalaJR None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 8 of 9 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 F T — SI' Technical Document No: 2400:MAV:048 E.Q.E.L. Item No. 4 Prepared by E Item Name ss T Revised by Reviewed by System: act r o at'o Tag No: -N PT- 1. t rat'o ~ Justified Not Justified 2. ust'ca 'o or nt at'he safety function, core cooling, of the RCIC system is also provided by environmentally justified systems (ADS + LPCI mode of RHR system) on the cold shutdown path. Transmitter failure could cause erroneous indication in the ~ control room and lead to RCIC pump failure and/or loss of the RCIC system.~ Any failure of this transmitter will not prevent the above justified systems from ~ achieving and maintaining a cold shutdown.~ 3. t t RCIC pump discharget'rovides pressure signal to indicator in the control roomi 4 ~ CC s c s t a" rat'o ~ None Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 9 of 9 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 F T — ST F T Technical Document No: 2400: 048 E.Q.E.L. Item No. Prepared by ~. 'tt Item Name smitt Revised by Reviewed by System: ac a Tag No: a 'o ~ Justified'ot Justified 'o 2 ~ st'c or nt 't'ailure of these components is of no consequence because their function can be performed by other qualified equipnent. In addition, this system is automatically isolated in response to a LOCA or HEU3. These items are not part f a system which is required for the cold shutdown path. Therefore, these omponents will not affect the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.. 3 ~ To detect small leaks by comparing system inlet and outlet flows and supply a signal to isolate the system. PBSH-N044A supplies a similar leak detection function by detecting high flow in the RNCU system. In addition, small leaks can be detected by the temperature portion of the isolation logic. TE-lN016A/F supplies isolation signals when they detect high ambient temperature in the RNCU equipnent area, and TE-1N022A/F in conjunction with TE-1N023A/F supplies isolation signal when they detect high differential temperature between the inlet and outlet of the equipnent area ventillation ducts. The temperature measurement is also part of the leak detection and isolation instrumentation. PDSH-N044A and all of the listed temperature elements are qualified. 4. acct'"cc'de t o h'ch o None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power 6 Light Page 1 of 5 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 I 0 Technical Document No: 2400: 054 E.Q.E.L. Item No. Prepared by Item Name ressure 'tch Revised by E o Reviewed by System: c ea er Tag No: D B D 1. te 't's: ~ Justified Not Justified 2. us 'a 'o o t 't'o . These components have no safety function when the reactor mode switch is in the 'run'osition. With the mode switch in other positions (e.g. 'startup'), pressure switch failure~ could prevent the scram on MSIV closure. However, the attendent pressure increase and subsequent coolant flow through the safety/relief~ valves will~ result in a scram on low reactor vessel water level (LIS-1N024 A,B) . Both the valves and level switches are environmentally qualified~ ~ components on the cold shutdown path. Any failure of these pressure switches will not prevent any qualified component fran performing its safety function or achieving and maintaining a cold shutdown. 3 ~ n t s et a signal to restorect'rovides the MSIV closure scram function when reactor pressure is above 600 psig ~d the reactor mode switch is ugt in 'run'osition. 4 ~ CC d s r 'ch o e s t a None. Owner Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 1A of 5 Facility : Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES 81) Project No. 2400 ENVIRONMENTAL.QUALIFICATION — JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION C e E.Q.E.L. ITEM No. 054 Technical Document No: 2400:MAV:048 Date 5-13-'82 Revision A Prepared by J Rakowski Item Name Pressure Switch Revised by ~~ Reviewed;by System; Nuclear Boiler ~ B21-'N021A C Tag No q (PS 1N021A ~ C) l. Interim 0 eration is: X Justified Not Justified Justification for Interim 0 eration: These switches shall be replaced (per letter TPLP-158) prior to a power level where they would experience a damaging radiation level in the event of . an accident. 3. Com onent(s Safet Function: Monitors reactor 'vessel pressure. 4. Accident s) which Com onent s) must be uglified for Interim 0 eration: 40,42,43,44 6 45 Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 2 of 5 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES 01) Project No. 2400 NMEPF IFICAT 0 — ST F CAT Technical Document No: 2400:054 E.Q.E.L. Item No. ~4- Prepared by E o Item Name Pressure 'tch Revised by on Reviewed by System: cea ie Tag No: -N D E M R DEFG K M P 1. nter'at'o ~ Justified Not Justified 2. usti 'cat'r te 't'o . The safety function provided by these switches is also provided by the environmentally justified safety mode (spring actuated) of the safety/relief valves. Failures which actuate the relief mode of the valves produce a LOCA which is within the spectrum of depressurization events analyzed. Any failure will not prevent any valve safety mode from performing its safety function or achieving~ ~ and maintaining~ a cold shutdown. 3. n t s et t'hese components provide a pressure signal to actuate the pressure relief mode of the safety/relief valves at a selected pressure lower than the valve safety mode (spring) actuation for events requiring control of reactor vessel pressure increases. 4. cc' s o ic o e t st e a 'ed o rat'o ~ , ter'one. Gxnponents are not required to operate during a LOCA or HELB accident. Owner: Pennsylvania Power 6 Light Page 3 of 5 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Cl) Project No. 2400 F ON- OP Technical Document No: 2400: 054 E.Q.E.L. Item No. ~4- Prepared by E o Item Name Pressure 'h Revised by 'R 'se Reviewed by System: c ea Tag No: B D 1. te 't'o 's: ~ Justified Not Justified 2. ust'ficat'o fo nter't'hese switches do not have a safety function in response to a IDCA because a LOCA results in decreasing reactor pressure. For the main steam line outside of containment, the environmentally qualified inboard MSIV limit switches will cause a reactor trip when the MSIV is closed. Failure of the subject switches could cause either a spurrious reactor trip (an unwanted but not serious transient) or could prevent the generation of the high pressure trip. The latter failure will not prevent the achievement of safe shutdown because there are several other qualified trip signals that will scram the reactor (and shall scram the reactor before the high pressure trip is reached. FSAR 15.2). Examples are: MSIV limit switches, low water level, high reactor power, turbine stop valve and control valve closure signals. These switches are not part of the cold shutdown path and their failure has no effect on the cold shutdown path. Therefore, failure of these pressure switches will not affect the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. 3. t s et pressure signalsct'rovides to trip reactor on high reactor vessel pressure for events wherein the reactor is not tripped by other means (e.g. MSIV Limit Switches). 'c 4 ~ cc'de t s r o e t s s te at'o ~ None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power 6 Light Page 4 of 5 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES $1) Project No. 2400 AL IF T Technical Document No: 2400: 054 E.Q.E.L. Item No. 5 Prepared by E o Item Name Pressure itch Revised by R 'se Reviewed by System- s dua eat va Tag No: N 1. t ri rat'o s: ~ Justified Not Justified 2. us 'cat'o fo te 't'o ~ The safety function provided by this switch is also provided by the environmentally qualified flow indicator (FI-1R603A) which will adequately indicate the existence of a flow restriction in the RHR system. Failure of these switches~ to indicate~ ~ a high pressure condition~ would be of no consequence because the system flow is monitored by the qualified FI-1R603A. A failure such that a spurious alarm is received~ would lead the operator to check that the system is operating properly by verifying~ system flow using the qualified flow'ndicator FI-1R603A. Therefore, the failure of the subject pressure switches will not affect the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. 3. ct Provides a pressure signal to the RHR system high pressure alarm in the control room for all operating modes, except steam-condensing, as an indication of possible flow restriction in the RHR line subsequent to a IDCA or an HELB. ' 4. cc't' r c 0 st e a o te None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power, S Light Page 5 of 5 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES 01) Project No. 2400 U T F T Technical Document No: 2400:054 E.Q.E.L. Item No. Prepared by ~. 's Item Name P essure 'tch Revised by E Reviewed by System: Nuc ea e Tag No: 1. t rat'o ~ Justified Not Justified 2. ust'cat'o for te i at'o ~ The safety function provided by these switches are also provided by environmentally qualified switches (PS-N021 B,D) which are on the cold shutdown path. Failure of the subject switches such that an erroneous low pressure signal is generated will not cause any automatic action because a diesel generator running signal is also needed. Failure of these switches so that a low pressure is not detected will not cause any difficulties because the above qualified components will provide the needed signals. Any failure of the subject switches does not affect the qualified components and does not affect the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. 3 ~ n ts t ct'upply a reactor vessel pressure (<310 psig) signals to close the recirc pump discharge and bypass valves. A diesel generator running signal is also needed to close these valves. ' 4. Accide t s or 'c e t s e a 'one Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 1 of 2 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES 01) Project No. 2400 NMEPP F T Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-059 E.Q.E.L. Item No. Prepared by Item Name Revised by E Reviewed by System: Tag No: D B D —N B D -N te at' Justified Not Justified For the non-refueling part of interim plant operation only. 2. ust'ficat'o o e 'at'o ~ These sensors/converters do not perform a safety function for a GX'A or HELB accident. There're no high energy lines in the area where these items are located. Switch failure can cause inadvertant Zone III isola- tion and SGTS startup which is an analyzed event (FSAR, App. 15A, Event 41 6 50) . The need to detect high activity is precluded by not handling spent fuel in the plant during the non-refueling part of interim plant operation. Any failure of these components will not prevent any qualified component from performing its safety function or achieving and maintaining a cold shutdown. 3. e t s e ct'o . These items isolate Zone III heating and ventilation of the reactor build- ing (refueling bay and railroad access tunnel) and start the Standby Gas Treatment System upon detection of high activity. 4 ~ c'de t s or ic s s e rat' 'one for the non-refueling part. For refueling, these components are required for spent fuel handling accidents and drop of spent fuel shipping cask but not required for LOCA or HELB. Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 2 of 2 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES 81) Project No. 2400 ENVIRONMENTAL UALIFICATION — JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-059 E.Q.E.L. Item No. 059 Date 5/2/82 Revision A Prepared by E. Ga non Item Name SENSOR & CONVERTER Revised by Reviewed by System: PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING Tag No: D12-N017 A&B 1. Interim 0 eration Is: X Justified Not Justified 2. Justification for Interim Operation: The radiation detectors are not part of the preferred cold shutdown path. The failure of these components will not impair operability of the Standby Gas Treatment System because the filter units have been" designed to handle the maximum credible postulated event. The failure of the monitor will result either a fail open or closed output. '. With train B operating and train A on Standby; fail"open,.continue„,to:operate which is designed to handle the event. Fail closed, isolate train B and start standby train A automatically. With train B operating and train A not on standby; fail open, continue to operate train B which is designed to handle the event. Fail closed,. isolate train B, the system tries to start standby train A but, train A is not available. The operator can then place train B on standby which automatically starts B. In addition, effluents can be monitored by using both the stack radiation monitor and periodic grab samples. Therefore, failure of these components will not affect the operability of the Standby Gas Treatment System or the ability to achieve and maintain cold shut- down The following actions are recommended: (1) Operate on SGTS filter unit "B" so there is no direct radiation shine path to the radiation detector. (2) By the end of the first refueling outage, move and/or shield the new detectors to ensure that the radiation levels will be sufficiently below background levels to achieve functional adaquacy without spurrious isolation/trip actions. 3. Com onent(s) Safet Function: The radiation detectors isolate the selected on-line SGTS filter unit on high radiation in the SGTS common filter exhaust duct. An alarm informs the operator of high radiation in the exhaust duct and isolation of the SGTS filter unit has occurred. Accident(s) for which Com onent(s) must be uglified for Interim 0 eration: None Owner: Pennsylvania Power 6 Light Page 1 of 1 Facility : Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Nl) Project No. 2400 F TON- TON R Technical Document No: 2400:MAV-069 E.Q.E.L. Item te 's'o B Prepared by Item Hang,: Va e uat Revised b Reviewed by System: c a Tag No: D E D E at' Justified Not Justxfxed s 2. 'cat't'he safety function provided by these actuators is also provided by the qualified ADS valve actuators (PSV-10F013 G, J, E, L. M, N) on the cold shutdown path. Failures which inadvertently actuate the relief mode of the valves produce a LOCA which is within the spectrum of depressurization events analyzed. Failure to actuate the relief mode is accommodated by the safety mode (spring actuated) and/or the qualified ADS valves. Any failure will not prevent the ADS valves or any valve safety mode from performing their safety function or achieving and maintaining a cold shut- down 3 ~ t s C Actuates pressure relief mode of the valves at a selected pressure lower than the valve safety mode (spring) actuation for events requiring control of reactor vessel pressure increases. 4. ccid t f wh'c nt must a 'f'o nt rat'o . None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power S Light Page 1 of 1 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Ol) Project No. 2400 T — STF T Document No: 2400: MAV-074 E.Q.E.L. Item No.: at'echnical 'se Prepared by ' Item Name: Revised by Reviewed by System: eactor o Tag No: 1. t r'a 'o 's: ~ Justified Not Justified 2. st'f'cat'o r te at'o ~ The safety function, core cooling, provided by the RCIC system which is not on the cold shutdown path is also provided by environmentally justi- fied systems on the cold shutdown path (ADS + LPCI mode of RHR system) . Failure of this component may cause inadequate performance of the system for which no credit is taken for the cold shutdown path. Therefore, failure of this component will not preclude accomplishment of the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. 3. t s et core cooling forct'rovides events in which reactor vessel pressure remains too high to use the low pressure systems. 'c 4 ~ cid t s f r st a e at's 'one. Owner: Pennsylvania Power a Light Page 1 of 2 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES «1) Project No. 2400 F CAT 0 — ST CAT 0 FO PERAT Technical Document No: 2400: 078 E.Q.E.L. Item No. Prepared by G'tte Item Name Revised by M. G>tteraell Reviewed by System. Tag No: D — F D B D 1. ter't'o is: ~ Justified Not Justified ust cat'o or I'. t i at o ~ Justification for Initial Plant Operation with Non-Qualified Actuators for the MSIV's (HV-1F022 A/B/C/b and HV-1F028 +'B/C/D.) MSIV's are required to close to prevent release of excessive radioactivity for LOCA, main steam line breaks, and rod drop accidents. For the rod drop accident, environmental conditions do not change and the total radiation dose to the valve actuators during~ the time~ the valves must close is~ not ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ significant.~ For main steam line breaks outside containment, the inboard MSIV's (HV-1F022 ~/C/D) are not subjected to any change in~ their normal environment (temperature, pressure, humidity,~ or radiation) and would thus be considered to be in a "mild" environment.~ For LOCA inside containment, the outboard MSIV's are protected from changes in ambient temperature, pressure, and humidity, but are subjected to increased gamma radiation. Justification for=initial plant operation, until these valve actuators have been tested, is presented below. It is anticipated that actuator testing will be completed by the end of 1983, some 18 months after scheduled plant startup. It is anticipated that during the initial 30-month operating period of the plant, no.more than 18-months of equivalent full power operation will be achieved considering the normal startup problems encountered by most nuclear plants. On this basis, the total radiation dose to the actuators due to normal operation would be about 6.57x104 rads. On this same basis, the estimated integrated radiation dose for two hours following the ZDCA would be about 1.94xl04 rads. This accident dose is conservative since the valves would have closed some 10 seconds after occurrence of the accident. Subsequent failure of the actuators is of no concern since such failure can not cause the valves to reopen (the valves are held shut by springs). The radiation dose due to normal operation thus represents 78% of the (normal + accident) dose expected at the end of the first 30 months of plant operation, and the total dose is almost an order of magnitude less than the Page 2 of 2 radiation damage threshold of the most susceptible material (Viton A) in the actuator package. Design of the valve actuators permits testing by partially stroking the valves during plant operation. Over the first 30 month period of plant operation, full stroke testing of all the valves prior to each startup, together with partial stroke testing of each valve once per week should provide adequate assurance of valve operability. On the basis of the relatively low radiation dose to which the valve actuators could be subjected plus the proposed periodic stroke testing of the valves, it is our judgement that there is adequate justification to permit plant operation for 30 months. 3 ~ t s et ct'o : Closes the MSlV's upon signal from several sources for events requiring isolation of the reactor vessel and primary containment. 4 ~ ccd 'ch o t s rat'o-ts None. Owner: Pennsylvania Power & Light Page 1 of 1 Facility: Susquehanna Unit 1 (SSES Cl) Project No. 2400 F T R Technical Document No: 2400:NAV-080 E.Q.E.L. Item Date s Prepared by 'se Item rb' Revised b s Reviewed by System: r oo t n'ect Tag No: E -C ' rat'on Justified Not Justified 2. us 'cat'o or te rat'o . The safety function, core cooling, provided by the HPCI system which is not on the cold shutdown path, is also provided by environmentally justi- fied systems on the cold shutdown path (ADS + LPCI mode of RHR system) . Failure of this component may cause inadequate performance of a system which no credit is taken on the cold shutdown path. Therefore, the failure of this component will not preclude the accomplishment of the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. 3 ~ 0 n s et ct'o ~ Controls HPCI turbine speed in order for the HPCI system to provide the required amount of core cooling when reactor vessel pressure is too high to use the low pressure systems. 4. cc'd t s 'c o ets t o t None. APPENDIX D SAFETY'EXATED P&ID MARK-UP Ne attached P&IEs have been marked-up to identify the electrical/ mechanical canponents which are both on the minima.CSD path and in a harsh environment. 'Ihe triangle identifies those components provided by Bechtel while the square identifies those canponents provided by GE. Jhese mark-ups provides the basis for Appendix B. 'Ihe P&IDs which are included in this appendix are: N-110 N-152 N-178 M-112 N-155 VC-178'ht. 1 N-113 N-156 VC-178'ht. 2 M-126 N-157, Sht. 1 N-186 N-139 N-157i Sht 2 N-187, Sht. 2 M-141 N-157'ht. 3 M-142 N-143 N-161'ht. 1 N-144 N-175 M-147 VC-175'ht. 1 N-149 VC-175'ht. 2 M-150 VC-175, Sht. 3 N-15li Sht. 1 N-176 N-15li Sht. 2 VC-176 N-177 H15/6-1 G +~i p'rect l ~ ~KIDDO ~ ~ ra 40 44- stt } I «ccj j;4 }sv V ~la«II I I T w I I l, ~ I F rw ~ ca EE It EEV IIV ~ ~ ~ ~ ~4 ~g III' ~~ M 50450 5 r— @II 4%& el MC ttlV«I SOI «IIO+~ RfI5 Rt «C} OrtCS r M(elllw I 4 ct'1 ~ . } ~I 01 tlrtcs'5 I .w ~I Elt I;ECVS 10, t ~ ~4 IILOOELJbLlllctt 4 Ist EOISSI OVI ~ ae 54 ~45 ttsca&RSE 4 t ~ ~ M 011 I cstitl I Jl I Ewvw wce t s ~ V Elt I'»OE I+ SEI I Ktlit ~\ Il I KOSIO Y r. ~I ~ ~ I I assr& ~ I H 500»+a ~0~ rar ~ ~'EW t@54 ~ scc 44 I I ~ ~ I -,PPesr 'I IW wise Qtl rc. 01 ~ w I w t ~ il art ~ r SSM r lc EK I Eaavr 00~ a«w Irj I IF O'J ts I rCB t IIV I=V 5 ours~ clD55ll coohvct 4 I rr'-.m j f I ~EE 45 I r~:nr, I I ~ 0 0 44444 't Q j I K 44 ere ~ ~ 44 0 4~$ 1 L't» Qfcl I Ir I0, et I e ~ 0 I«l «ar«ls too «reels -—-~rf- rt alE9 } «~~ 44 ro OII'M } 104 Rj~1I l 0SSZ&t 0 sct ~ I 0 EE Ett tca OIOIKI«41st ~Erceet 400 ~ ~ WK 4rell wes IKIIK«01te tert tele ~ EL I rca C VKII«IMMIIIEEII IVM«IO la ac 41410 r j O &CI CI ] I ~ejw"- ~ 4Nt »~ ~ CA I I 4y 8 Yi'g bd t l Es j 0 Ew I lMI SIILrt Ha IEE 4 & 0 ~ 4 ~ ~ f &EE' & Ign K Itce IQ „ cct ac I Ve ~ 8 II ~ I et OMMVMIO * C» j ~0 tr g EK 044 HOIV«1V\I & M IOEO ~~,.J ., MKIMi«ac Vtl H l 4 s CuCLAtitll~ f A i «FI, J 400~~ 11 I Kc~ 554 EVIVOOM cga /15 t a«4 J OE laroaecwrl ~ OV ~ 44 ' 44« M Ieo IIII) Ie rt ~eaa ~ ~5 ~ I ~ RILC&40«IL &910&00 ta lOISIILYJKlISWI}5 INSICSNI&tt ~ I ~ I ~ ~ co 4 4 rat 41 0'EWEI 14 Mt ~ I ~ ~ 400 At 51 MKIC~ P&10 UNIT I ~Etc «DO SERVICE WATER » 41 wwa w tt5& M IIO IO - *Ertri'0 4 I: Is ItiIITII4,eirrst'CV tel~ Il 0 Is E l062IS I ~ 'I ~ ' 18 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I 7 FI 5 I I I 4 ~ 1$ ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ I/ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I 0 ~ I ~ I I ~ ~ ~ I04 ~ I Z IIT'0%A I' ..'=:.:rs~".I 4 'Yfaw 'I 1 IL S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~aa I ~ a V ~ G ~ ~ .. C vyt alla... ~ I sfs ~ I Ptvb af ~ ~ -" u'I44 lb%at t . 5 CLQ @W C( 1st I ~: ~. P 4 ' ~ (m ills ~ ~ I 4 ~ J 5 ~ I al %IV I t ~ I%CO%at ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I .,: I ';,.J .t-8%= „'-;"1! .It. I I % tr . !!I-,,I, JI; I j-, %:hliticSP( ~ I ~ ~ KALI N.Ssjg~ I,: It . )4 I~ ~ ~ r%a ' ', .1st 14%4ts psl I 3 5I'. I lef.a os ~ Ie ~ I RV. I, ~as VVC IK I ICI V 44 44 I(TO th 8,, g TiLIP ~ ~ I I 4 ~ Ot ~ sf-vf ~ , ~%1 ~ l, ~ 1% OW .- agl 'n WVW I ~ V I ~ al m~Pr:t'a~be «% ~1~) i,„4 Q) 'C l C Ia t 4*(a -- - ~ =--" ~ =!'I.-,.'4 I::.' ~(CPI( ~ IfwV 4 ~ 'I -P.. ~ ~ y.. ~ .C .C..CP ( ~ ~ sloKC ~ w ~ ~ 4 J Pal PJV 4 ~ LA(~%%% I~ I ~ to Q» ~ ~ ~ I Veal te I 1(W P ~ ~ 44% KNo wIAtvva 4 Io IIAI N ~ ~ 4 ~ ILP )El ~ I Oas l L ~ ' ~ ~ 4'eaC ~ IIV al jQO .f %W 4 ~ ~Ie sw ,II el tp ~ .I» aat'Lc s'4 s '4 glaav s t I ~ I %%he») Vafl 4 Vl ~ P 7 ~ ~ I I l ~ I ~ ah vts %as(vt ~ I a , '.yg/K' lgsa jo TI CCCCP -N@ CI~ 1 1st 4 OKC41 l ~%V% fvvvf s ~ IJs %4% Ts Jog) C C ~ \ I%SKI Vhl t, I, Tt. «W 4 Aa ~ aawsc 4 L DIKwa I psl PNI4»vsas I C J w (vvl »wall Vhs ftlK p ~ alv w ItN (K(fosw~ ~ V ~ ~ (la p Jc fl K%%% ) rr-—a Jb +4 vlv Wh ~ vs at(a g» L I ~ a ISLV I'%4%%( %%4%4 IP 4 I%el aaKH ~Als P»a o PCI I0, ~«4% .44"...x, ~ 4 ~NlOW %%% Of ~pv %(VNS %%4 Nvfwvcvpp»h Kll II4 '%%4 %44%%%41 0 ~ VC ~ ~ LVC( ht »th( I 4 a, %%\ ~ % ~ K %%JV(%%4 V l OJ(a1(SVKL ~o VV~) af I VJ lht»44 SKV I Nl ffa %4 t %4 V'v 4 Va ~ 4 ' ~ %4 4 ~ ass ~ ~ a ILVVSS 1(N te CKO a SIWOI a(4%44 (% Cf ~ we%a%18% 4 ~4 vs ~ t oat%a% 4 t pa v%4% l v I %44114 - l '4 \ ~ tv I at wvca tv I 1 %1 ~ s ~ 4 J J ac ~ »%4ac I tKK %J Kt %%% V.l'\ C VII~ WIKKWAVVWKIK%%%NL V t ~ C K 'I tl. %1%% C JW ~ V tab st 465~% I WOONSOVVVO(lwsoaaow AVK aabt tJSCL(wv»papsc NfNK sl sot(la(at ~4 NN(O lf ~ I'I NSKCI 4 Nl(C'Ita 1%11Cfl t: ~ %%VS SPKKO lwtas 4.14%1 vlflvaKL4 who I', „L~ V 414(K %IN%%VLP»%»%Wall ~ tN I KCPKI SIPI gfv ~ ~ I IKKteKC 4%%V 1 I Olha ~OIV 4 ~ ~ I'-'45 ~ e(K Ca%I%ass C ISV44 tant I%Pete% w ~ ~ KJ(el%41(V 11 @~5. «~ 4 ~ OO W Lsll LCVVI Oslsalhh l I lav ~VJJ ~ 1% Oa f1. 4CI ~ ~ I '» eoc Io(Attv(vase %44K at pab Lac ' ~Sale' (y' ~- jl IS' I I I II K(fJA IOV(ate% ~ IJV ~tt V lola ~.W ~ ~ l IO Q6,,„, JK D (KWPI lf(o Co%owl 1 4 44 NL ~ ~ 4 4 %%No Nsl(lta I %K% %K K OK%V OJL ~ (~ ty at, PLCPS 44 tV .Alsl~ a ~ ft V Aa(PI, Iy~,'w ~ 4 ~ 4 KO %( v «a»%a»14 w vl N Ivpp 4( VJ I ls ~ ~ L vws I (44%JSJP law%% 1 s ~ has I) (1 V(%4 ~ %4 p h lvf4 I —4 t \ ~ I ~ f ICC "' t 4 %(l %4 ll I ~ N' I .'0 o I ~ ~ ~I ff l ~ 'PIVNlCwa %Vlf 4 I I N lists ~ CVKJ %Kit 1 ~ ~ %% Pf 141(L Slavtt %%4( ~ fl~ f PW Sall(( BO 4%( OVJJ 4 ~ %,1 ~ %% ~ ats (4»%%% .) p ~ 'I VJ ~ s os ~ K \ Uss sh IL( ~ I @ ~ ILC ~ 17 IC ~ ! I" i a 't-I ~ ~ N IC IN Pew% I )tag VIV %% I~III ~ ~ l ha(I ~ I ~ ~ f' ~ SW ta 1%% a (P pe(IN%et% teltt IV I ICII thV IIWV L t Kaf ~QC4 tttOCALYLRAIOWI14 UCCCI COAtCOY ~ lss ~ ISK 4 V»f % I As A P 610 tt ~ RRR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ws sa 4 ~ ~ Cv, ~ ~ ~I J ~ 454 M-112 IS I 44L»t tl bill)LaH Q Cw E - 106217 ~ IQ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ 7s I I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ G I ~ I ~ ~ ~ I I ~ ~ I a ~ ~ ' ~ ~ 5 II ~ I s ~ b I ~ ~ I I > ~ ~ ~ ~I ~ ~ 4 I I ~ ~ I I I EII-W- SS88 ~ « ts 0«0»vla~ sv«s r ~ G G C Oa lt I~~a } Eu-(sa ~\ ~ V ~ «v 000 f~l p Kt(t ~(00 l. «Sl ~ 0 ~ »I ( 0«v LIDKN Ns I I Sss(I (0(vsarua '»NtaNDICS)'E&3aosar ac« (sos oo v» (alht(o«vo «I ~ »alla «( ~ ital 41((li I I ) ~Iah la (Nsl rvt ~ SMI al N«t4 I (Dec.s»ca I (KN ot(ahs Na wa»c tl lt«ss stcu»co. 4 ~ ) I<»ac((asssau ! Na CL(LN Lr u I I!0. ~.i! , lE, 1 o Naa I ~ OONOO Y l Ol t a Pp.isit Iw»ca ~ 4, ~ j) } 0 l«sta ~soova «014 4100 v ta R 4 ( 0 KOII 4 ' r ~ ~ ~ ~ ctuiT(ou auuauss(as isso uo(oa oss coos(AS }- GBS ras' 4 ~IT«a Aa( c =Y Crt«00, ls M(00»slw(o t 0 A~ LOO Crl (oar»400 NSL(» 4.4 N t (04 Da V sh Ka g ,'C -g~„-i 4 4 ~ ~ Et N«14 ~ »0 40 »D I~ ~ ND as l ' CNOW ~ a ' ' tnTES ~ ~ Na«LLIC IM-0 ICKCSIO»0«O LONI«INVL ccwa sw os«t («Mesa»L w 0»sw co svo I c»4 (D«oatra;asc IIL vwaa«too«pa WCVSW4»N VWL s«»sls «co» v«L wsasa\ r«4 w 00040 - t ~ va w D vroos I Ns Isa OK «I Oaat tl~ T»N««l —,-i.e'1~~~. ~ 'ala ~Ko at( ws tlsaoNM IllMc ua«D«al i tl(OIMWII«0 W,aaaal I ION C 4 I w'.»Twa It.(sud shluaas sou« arcs(la 1 J (S I ss»K scaca 104(v 4 t ~ ~ Ds 04 sllsoNW 4440 w«4 KO Ml «so Nt« soaaso w»wwaa cata( I«Dao(LLL(vc sco«4»sv 4 0 asa Kcv a«0«co« Dao ~ I o ( Du'4 0 Soau( to«osttov /» I CNSTWW ~ 0 ~ ~tsoa S(&NWV»4 lvv 1 ~ aroaS 1 os s«w.q Isola tMtINK '4'Ire'o. 0( ~ 4 to'ct»a.' L. ~ Ilp'4 ."',0 as E - I062(8 4 ~ I ~ ~ ~ 4 ~ 5 I4 3 I 24 ~ 1 I a ~ ~ jl 7 92I W 9S88 4 ro«1 ~we ~ eeafUW G S«e 4( ~ I t Io 1) 4« K twva w«snw saafe«arts 1 « OC4 C ' ' f»1 CU w NO(i'( ~ «It I w(T r 1st eot t«L co ~ tla 'OL«I ~ ~. a« west( waa Rw e« c«aeww««etta« T Jv <«act««st« lj« ~ ~ «et r ~ 4 ~ 1 e elf ~ s ~ le ~ 0 V ~ 4+I'«we »» I «« «5(aw«as aaa ct««II« ~4 <414<«% 1 ~ ~ At I Wew ~ar PAID-UNIT I CONTAINMENT INSTRUMENT GAS I Is out M-I26 I5 I rrl clew Ovao«o closlD ccwa rea «asia CIICZI ICCI(ll'XI&I(%5)In')rt7tBEDT II Q Gwtt Es I0623 I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' 4 ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ' 6 7 I ~ I ~ ~ I ~ I I ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 6 5 4 4 O3 I ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ 1 ~ I i o ~ ~ I a II ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ape + ~ ~ 4T sf llo lhlpjjtfAflsl j f I f IT 4 rv ~ ) ~ Oil I ~ 11 <1 ~ ~I >If}Of'Kttti>f<4' , ~ 6fl so&as'fan I ~ I «If I II ~ I 'N«>,'I, ~ Is 4 ~s ~ 8@4., wv I I wwon >4 ta~ av ~ ~ «I ll~'s ' . s -S--g' >sa s HIDN r s) INN vh»414 IN VNI, ~ -l'. ) I} . „'. $ -log)q.l 4> Hv we i; llll I M erl ~ CI I «tt g ) rah OIIC ~ IOCC HI%ac) ~1 M lie« ~ 4+4 Uwseaw I s t I pt I5 ~s w i WSW G ' i U 4 ~ I ]i) s~a ww v)srw ~ v neo ~ fief» tr ss e ~ s~ ~ IIr)INN sf» »sere% sw eii I»SSI O ia As% 'I!'U ~ e» s la ~ev I'W 4 Crew % I ", CW 41 .=;$ i;."Qg I 'I'Hlv)I~ ~ @ s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~j ) Us~A!5h Ve S I a «' ere r UHE QH s I sw 'ee rr I I IF gj ~ ~ N ~ 4 ~WW fo»sita 0 ~ t Wt NWUW 'I Dt} UHI W t~t Wr»a fUI 8-e'::= H ] ~sre erst ~ as OH wp owl ~ ~ N ~ ~ ~ ta ~Icosa ! ilOUM O II D I ~ W Sia ~I c a»» ii0 ~ Pgal~ we eH Iio area % ow oaa I I I l lse 44 ae« I) CCW f Iw ol V cit hi ~ Q ~%) )C I s) I ~H — "'~ 1 N Citl Wof Ith OW I)I ;Q» ~I VSI~ ~ %»SHMVS ~ et ~ IC~ sr»w tN A~op%« I so IH I Ir Its% MIIM I IOVILNI4 vr lr I OWS HIw ,0 ~ tew or ~ WM ~ WUIW I I ~IIWitN I IUC N~ + ~ 'H I r ~ ee ~ ~ ~ Asr It, Mt« ~' ~ CI I ~ es ~ o ~ ~ E I EFO ~ ~ H 4 ~r rale ~ ]E w %%I ) ~ L I'ggo i 'I ~ ~ I Nl % ~ I (Vrifi 3. A.l er ~ ~ ~W e sw« g) pig ~e aa I 'Hao LOL)))HO Ql f MWire W ~ OH ~ t lt H Wfah Hv) I .- f,Q@~ ~ H rl ~ I )' I I a% t\ ta I)~ I Q I eros ~ flat4tar ~ WOOSH Iao I ~ ~ tt ~ r sr aaw I ~ M ~ Hlwi I t' IWW HlINlV I ~ 4 oai Hlwlsoofi \ aaef'I a»i ww t»svasoUs»orswa ) I '4 Me ~ solllwUW VfAi NN V%HW 1 W HH a Vila ~ t ~ ~ lfwahi~ sell ~ %% VW ~ isis'Wrawl« ~ W ~W rarw o ) I HatNitsSW ~&tao»i t 'W 4 IVi»WW NlWh ~ lfW 4 11% Ha r ~ ~ ~ ~ r.i- iNUItwslve 'wsf w fltr 'leaaco w V w ~ N I\ sa ,s -~--P--- ) I 11 ~ terse I .— QN W SW SO ~ WWHIMH L«lk l,'o I 4\ U) j L mB~~ a w ~ swee ~ wwaaswwa»svHN Ives» ~t I ~ ,] L NWMVe V is ~ ltWi I CV 0: ~ ~ 4%ca)flwial WOHDlfra 4CC C wwlfalrael»letioa }' F~t ~ ON ~ %4 ) 4 lar loll%Ireel HIIHH ~ ~ r I ~ 4 %4 lflwiewtvwatleNlsNO« Ssewa ~ 4 Cee4 cltsa ~ p» ~ Nl HWWO W»W ~pl ~ — t.w"aw~o } ns, ~ ~ W HNAHWISIWSNWICUN4tla 4 I ~wwsecTNH ~ IIMT Ni ~ P W w'fef~ ~ Ifwl Ioi)wso aewsseeMO N*V \ ~ ~ ie ~ IT ~ Uewe I%HI NWIWIWHOI I ae OH%I ' Nl HI~ ~ U4WW ~ ~ &e .I wwsovo 4>-5-S«s~ L Hsww Hs MIHO« N»MC f.oe ~ HifalrUHvo sorov IC )I!$ c ow M colo aww ti»r i%No %vie% e;.~~~.L; r.i ~ ~ Hl WIUAii Iaw)l)) IIN) ~I Si» Hlr ~ ~ i~ tow IVIItU IH pe re ao NNaa as 1 Nilal »o e ~ ) lease%i iL I ~ Pg: PJ,s ~ IN%ref' ww i)IW V WI aotl w s)vee) CHIL% IHUOC C ~ iii ~ file 41% ~ %4 ewwlwswo «cavo NHHW ~ Hare% WIN WV4 'Islet ial % ~ea «it f» el ~ i 1f)is NU+ wH.o4s«rh eros HVHIU)i) t gf ~H otfl ~ WS WA~ S'Ma.sa ~ 4) I l ..si ~ 4 ~ Herse) wl%4 ~ HN,IIwlall«I4s 4) ~t ~ H caercrco 11 ac Hw vor Hc U Il t 4 ~ ~ ~ I r I%ore Hcs wst a ae» tel wear foaaNHO)fsr)N 4 I lat'el aoeU Nl IOVU ial Il'ail I ~ slat let'YIW N ~ ~ Or Wl UVI W ~I ~ i ~ 4 ~ )%% N'IH ~ ~ H~ VWHW I%fret ~ flsil WS\ W «Ct, ~ IAIWN'W ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ NI eetl ~ e»HW ~ Htef VC I tr Il ] I 4 Cw t ~ caewlcr Nevi%etta ~ ~ ~ WIN H Qtftai leil4e ~ IWII~ 4%)w il.«aa L4 I eaa ~ a»tl 4tllINC I I 41 Q ~ I ~ '4HW(oWlslwe) %%%1UCOM1NM 1%4 j 'ri Nor I veoc ~ Ue) ~.C ~ D ~ ~\» % 'la Ha t e ~ «III et He»N rt4 %IVVNW Oooo'Usia ~ as% 4 tot wofosa oeolelilevc 1 HHIUMssaoice \ Nhtocirolop»c)NUA UI,WOUO (C4 e) swalys&lfsf ee ia-ta UIN lSCovtle NIO M.HD lf)cecfofio« vocosl Hacw ttl % e»eeet% I~ 8 ]S I li~,I tiff«'H ~ 'lllilHiHC ~ ~ » W ~MH sri'4 tW I ruat I Cute)) 4)N<) vo)tt coco)ND«svfssl 4)Ho%a)ocgossocN)co))so)H)ac ~ ], ~ F"'t' CO ~ ~ .A- Irfwro«w ee ~ Iel ~ ~ I 4 ~ ~ U ~ ~ 44) ~ I 4\olatla IOAILCteH I !'" Q':,:,"I ~tW we I ~ wfi I 's ' 4 I ~ tl ei -.. I 81) ")L L w ~sf If ~ U ~ I ~ W ~ ew) tir I a I ~ ~ ~ esrstae ) IWii ~Itw ~ ~ ~ ~ oa) 'o ~ ol 4 i 4~ ~ W IU ~ ~ ~ U WI CNIU ~ ~ ~ %» «' ~ ~ Oah 4 I ~Ipao Alsvwo Hl l Utiif ~ ~ ~ Ni W ealh ~I, ~ CHCt Noel) OIN ~ e refer U« ~ Iil i I~ ~ ~ ~ Ol ~ slee solve ~ otal f e' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ J~ CHIC IN~4 ~ f»i,l MIMI ~ ta ~ W»til fs»s Vli VSi U 4 ~ Ol »i UV fHt Nl') (g.itreu, ~I w Urwevs t t o sl ei ~ I el 44 fs4 1 4 4 )stH ~ ct eeirC Hcsfs44 ~ J /els l) U)fir'1 ie \ ~ I, Q Ao f«lwe ewa I l ~ ~ ~ eo 'ilwHfwe susaealal l ~I) row% e e af ~ Ilul te)f ~ ~ IofifiH NUCLEAR BOI.ER ~ I~ Mw st eel ~ Vv vw aeeso Nvs ~e ~ ~I ~ I V ~ \ ~ t N lt io ~ \ H SWWWDH»%% %Sac ~ e ~ M ~4 ~ ttso LS-14l lt E- loeme ji4o«rl ~ 4 evclteo ~ ~ Ilc ~ q ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 1 ~ ~ ) 4 ~ 1 s I ~ 4 t 4 IQ4 ~ IQ ~ ~ ~ 74 eo I ~ ~ 54 ~ ~ I ~ I 1' I 4 )3 s ~ )go 1 )l 2ji-15-98 88 N OI «I ~II~ ~ Iec ~ saawcl ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 of LION~ ~ NI I ~ G 4<«le W ~ ~ lll(llfCII4'TA(RUTIST r«HN ««alla(l ep ~ol(el 4«N «se»< « I ) ~ I( lw Ia Nls) }9(K o«~S(a IS ~ % IS I ~ $ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ 'I ~ 'I ~ ~ ~ 'I ~ ~ ~ I 4 ) ~ 8 74 ( I Go I l 5 I ~ ~ ~ 1 4 ~ 4 ) ~ ~ ~ 4 ~ 34 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 2t ~ ~ I ~ f I I l IP< 1 Nset4t 4»as»t Na»» w»» tsQINARY NTAINM Nt CCU<1 'Ill ~ leletaal oaaat41 ~ ao 4< ~ 4tease ~ oau »we N ~ r tECC ~ I 1 Ka ae eerett » e ~ al ~ f<<<< I h««s I'swoa G ,d ~ r» s»~A s e C ~ '1 »'rt as~a ~CKe ~~~~1 ~ « r~kS r Neap ~ 4» « r. Wr Nl htr ~ I F .J aff 5 I, e ' I aal «res I I ~A S E ra'(ri ~le(a<41 ltavwEI N 04 ~a NKEI ee(14; eek 4> sse Slc «N r ~ ~ <4 G TO arllava ta i« I~ To e rllakK (N(IN te Nl ~ ek ~ ei« ( es ~ hr ~ I~ ~ea (N»4 aaeN Keka ~ I \(4 ' ~ ~( ~ r hr AKP &4 ~ I E 4 r«t s ~ («4 vee «4 t ~ Lea ««4 4 Asti >4 ra«A hat) e.«TAP; lre &a~ l p as rt al fe> T T 44 4 ~ ~ I~ ~ CSZST ~ ~ a ~'I ~ ~ vlDla>tie (04110( 4 ac(os ~ 'I e ~ ~ ~ ~ 'I ~ ~ ~ le'I ' I 4 ~ 7 ~ I ~ le4 ~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~ 5 ~ I I ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ 4 ~ I I ~ ~ 4 13 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ I a ~ I ~ ~ 1 4 ~ 1> 1 I ~ ~ I ~ IPI ~ 6 III-III-9588 Ict ~ 4::('- cocks CON 4 vc Ct W ~ ~ ~ ~ < 1< ~ < NLN ' iitla» 1»1 11 1 ~ L ~ ~ k 14 »11 ~ 1 ~ I i ~ H~ ~ Ct ~ ~ 1» 1 ~lll4 ~ ~1<1\» N 1 HW 4 1 4 » WL»VLN ~ 4 k< ~ 41 ncs D tl~ C»PNI Nlt D. ~ I ~ » t OSIS%8 slggeST} C ss(IT} -6" TOCNO( SOI(CTsgOAT UNa( NUIIS ager(}o. ~ Isg ~ Ivc( (Atawcs ~4 1( aa eg II 6 LI I~to Dave IDI air~ G I»OKIUsta ~ sas( Cg st»ttjfi ~ ~ K sN 4 fihveeo ~ sr 1'I 'M'.t. Ct «slg Isla N J@4 ! era I 41040» 40»wl ev Ol t s Net.ltv I ~ «wss»tta «1st 4t sr es' I . ~ sic sL afi.gfsN ~ 0 I T. N 1 el rtf Iol ff ~ as»04 as 0 I».gea,qr»r».%s;Tata(.'aaw, s«s««ois tTo« t Nsv.~ 1 ~ s asst /f4 * ~ «sNes TT .DSL+1ev I ~ EJ. 401 ~ g Vlt«l I gee&« j} OINV00WQI4 ~cata»ec @I I NwNs ~ DJ ~gg a «Ia gyja ,I Iwatwf I 14 D 4»» »1 ) aa wtl~ 00 «4 »row T ~ 4 st hsv tFI 1st Sat( ~ '10 c wr tlg F I weath soaK ~ I I» ~ Io sl«sr lvlgwg lt((O L~P ~0 0014 ~ 0 st( N hs ~ 1 ra« ss« S V,LWl« l I D I Isaa» lets ~ tsf,l. 3T I I easNOKINO 0 ~ 4»asl ~ I 40«S gO 10 ~f«» ~ aa Ks,g fgs+fie I ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ I I ss» J I(tea ~a la I I I eg(s T ~ 'f 1 Qsl I ri, ~ war 40 NS wey clos \ llsl1 lsa aaac wrfawswr l(0 Cs lee« CDS I ~ src sa»as acta la orwc I I I 'S 0» I "tJ I sc 00 tltteKC«I«e' ltslwhs N ~ Nl tlttae 4'14041st«el t» Ill IJKeaf rc» 0 t»4 4 I»0 ~ ~ ~ a to twit ' g ~ ~ „.Di I ~"I I ~ D 's4 0 )II I'4 wl~ Na'la«0 ~ 4 w «4 00. ~ 1st C If4 ea» N ~ ~ ss ts I „a wr«aoava 0 ~ Iv- — Kawss»sg ~solo» aC01f ~ ~ ~ (STI a. ~ ~ ~ 1 waa TN c ~ 4I ~ ~ 0»» t E S»44 1 ~ 0 I n C ~ I I CONTROL STSTEU 'g(RBVeE ~ l ~r~iFa~a«s asRO~ C~L I ~ 04 ~0 l ~ ~ ~ a ~ ea ~ I ~ 3J I I ~ r so»4 I I»woaac(as at«»0»t w«sa 'I - sD 4401( o«a%0 ~0 to»f4 ~ ~ so asst 0 g ~ sltNe'ONIOII ~ .I yg ~ N 4 ~tfslaret» fell» I 0»ll ~ etN„ C J J Isle Q grr w a I I» ~ W OW ~ CN (eSea»wraa a I »h«0»e «WV ~ » H I 1 etoawra» I 1 t st*|J rtrsL v«0«a «4 wwo» 1 I ~ I Os»0«K S ~.I 0(fare«w 4 4 steato« ta»w I I vs 414 sve I ~ IK ~ ~ I ow«S ~ I I 40 aw I w s I 444 «rw 4 wswo ar 0«t o Ov I I ~ saw ae«0 ~ N«sa I ICV co ttvasca I ~S~ 4 I 0 ress«44 ww wIAll Of 4 twas ~IOS{saLtt} I I Wl WNS 1we ~ ~ IN I I 4 4 vwaat aew co«04 Nil ~ tow I tlag lees ~ 4 wc aor ~ wca sav»a wcs ~ oaas I ~wefaw I 0 I ~ ~ Ogl «404 Sa»l 04 N»4 I tat.1.!as s I«0» 04»»seat 04 wsa 40C ts»C ala ~ e ~ T L over sra »4 wa swears ~ ~ rwe ogl 4 ste wwwa oasww t Mllffw 4, ~ 044 %0»4 aw«t o«esos ~ l . 3 tas waa. ~ ~ a la 00 aowtsa« I Ww sac »tarot ~ ww«wa»4 varwt g <'J (T~„r I t }ra{KIIT ~ g I P 0 ~ lv('k,l Lws « tw,eel » U-Tv(at ~, I ~ »w '1 <4 sr No ~ s» sw I as J ~ 1 ~a I i; t g, N a( Kw ~ I Dha N4srw r» Kc Cgtlt I I J 't t Vl ~ ~ 1 lra ~gt I~~I I I I ~ 44 404 40 I D I~ w» ~ hw« I I Sl 10 Ta» .w hs I 1st t I «1»t «K W 4 w Oa ~ g I ~ lw oc c 4»o»fac ce«swrs(A ~Olg ) I ccacoea(a stew 0»». NO cc«N»aft I Katlg NNICs«WI alit ~ Wl ls» gaa«I 0 1»hc» owa ~ ao aa «o«4 tC IKIsl I aha ha«'N1 C,wr( Nl«NWVN ~ ILONNN(K OW IVII~ ll4 0N OCUL ss'r seeO») J. I awrglv toofwr»o t» at»c } ~ sea sfrw l44aa lc wc raacaa cr «4 a»a awrtow 4 ffa«cwwc w»tt 000414« aawra I I I s t As 1 0 ~ soaO 0 " ""i o I { i 4 I I ~ ~ w«tw 4 «Isa t ~ ~ t04 (D40 w«4' ~O PPT I 114 I Q e ~ if-0 I I r or j I g oew IK«r I « I C@O vga N@a Vga ~ 10 ~ Acsc daACNCIAIC CONS(NS(A 1 Cs gr ' sar I g 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ I I was ) 04 vlCNUK TAN( I I ~ I r OC 1014 I 4 I 100OKNO0 ICal W tlat W (Wa»KI g'r I 0»4401 tlssc trwt ~ a«et »ca cevala 4 wa 4(4«44 ~ ~ r 4 g 1 s Is l'jflllllllllllllllllllllllllljlllllllllllmlllll ljN I I I I I I I I I I I I II fl I I I l l1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I Irl I .PNI I I I I ' I I I I I I;P'Wj I I I I I I Ill.W9QB 1 4 ICar» 'h» ~1 ~ 4'll I REFERENCE lHcweIC4 14 ~ tl Vc\4 4 Ijra') F I -t ) ~ ~ ~ 11 ~ 4 a«hh~ Wos'1 ~a ~4 I }w.«aa) hta«4 mac 'll lah 14t ~ 1 ~ 1 aah» ~ 14 p \ 1'h ra ~ avaol. Nash la ~. 1st aa A Uac 4 ~ aap --Wig' 1-- }w aas l.ca»44« Nh al«or ~ ~ ao hah 1 f ~ ~ '1 ~ 1 lt aal ~ al 4'1 OV 11 ra rta ~ ~ I.»SN Ewart ~ 1 ac«s «hh ~ ~ lo l i.»l 1 o 1 ' ~ lc hwhc~ rr hara»hc aaraa«. hh'1 rhh 4 4th 1 ,S. I I}pa I ~ ralaaaalhracs ~ ~ h«S ar«S) I-lP,'P' ~ }aha 4ht ac»«lait acEa I ~ ~, 1 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ N lhrhha a«rar4 ~ 1 lo 11 ~ ~ «NN ~ rr 11 I,' ~ 4 «thresh caaaa4 wh} Nahh r«44»UW 41st 4 . c *4 ~ ~ srwh ahri t ~ lo 4 1st l~ flaaarrhcha a} 4C41$ 114 4 ~ 1 ~ 1 1st ' ccac » lira ls %P arr» Hr Y Ice ~ 1'1 a«h NINIWhcajs ~ Ta'ts Jro ,Y Sc»ac» aysaC»aCa rascal«» t III l 1 I 4«1 ar«l »I c«sam«4 test«'wa 4 1 ~ Io G I jt ~ ~ ~ f I r s.«4 ha c«a 4 a«W 4«h ~ ~ 141 I Qa O'll'111»1 4C r«a 4 I ~cr l >1 w ~ ~ < atl ~ „a«w t roe'R laro '«ha« V F«l' lh» ho»Q+444 tao ~ 41 P, I ~ fflfEL Ivan ovaa Q 'h WNM I 1 44 'g ~g l I) I hltcrh«« 4»l scarc 41 I I )Yf +4»4444 ~ I I 40I cac ctc I ~ ll 414 arras hlrth O ~f~ l Ol artist \ 47 O ~ a»oht cvrc Q~« 4 Natlrc oh» raract I»» aharra talc arhah csha 1 I I 'Wraha hhhatcth ~ ~N»V »41 ha- Athh «I) 4 U I Tacj Jlc}+5ANTF~ Whhl «4 11\4 N»sha ~ ~ 4 ~1444 1Wta »4 h«h 1 aaWH ~ I.. ', 1 4 l-'@ j rcjJ Ca ~ lao ( I 8'-.g'h 'A~a ',I II Q 41 ~«~ct I pl ~44 t TfsvaC 4 1 I 6: 1 @ha tI ,b; ~ }Ca ~ ~ ~ 1st\ ~ 11 «hhh NP 1- I la 4»144 4 ~ !QN ~~ ~ st,h o hta .Nai~ ! 'hwta aa' I ~ ~ ~ » U- ~ 1 A IN»a\ aha» haa ~ Ii 14 lv'I 4 ~I~ ~~ sa 4 1st aa1\1 ol p v 4»sold'll «.4444 +ac«cj at h 1'4' 4 N»h «1 ~~~~~Iit~I —cs 4'r~I}a >TT I~ ~ !~I ~ j" I ~ 1 1 ~ ~ aah aaa ~ ~I~~ ~ ~I~ A ~II~ ~ w ~I~I rXOR l r I l aft~ ~ iI ~t II ~ ~I ~ I 4 W ~~~I~ ~ ~I~ ~ ~ .-f) li: 1 I'6) ~ ~act N I ~~ ~ r rhIT~A~Y~aC Ta ~~~ ~ ii) «waa 4 ~ 2 'thai ~Ht si 1 ~ rashshaajhcharaa44»ET FFF o ~ h» w «4 ~ ~ ccstr «~ I Qs ~ , ~ 4} ~ that~@~ ~ ~shit ~ r H~ ~ . «»la 4 ~ ~ CPA ~ s ~ ~ ~ '1 hNr s ~a rroh)w 4 b%'.« I g ~ ~ ~ 4}IP fha tl h h 4)'la'}act' hr taa 4 4 ~ 'i,f I raata 'atts A Nhta ~A»ah r»la 4th ~ A ta«t }aa}«AS' Vhh A»Ah cajt hr N«lola~a P]a 11 hh A'tent}t, Wh ~ l I. ~ 1 I l 1' 1 ahr L" to j Tc}isf ~ ha I 4 I 4QW I ~NvaavPa~s ~ I TQ .rj cj TICC I g t I'a tNI N 1 ~ I\N l- ~ ca» Irc~ 4 I aa» 4 Sa IE}sc ~ }octa r p, I I Vm w j g Esatta 'l - 1 ~ Ta hlhh 14. 1st ~ ~ t I ..X I C NN tr ~ f«N NN)t"'. 1 j I , isaac ',»gt l ~ ~ ' ls I ~ Varr \ ~ ~ ~ ~ N» 4 t Q) l j ~ »1 4 I 1 ~ ',sa ~ ~ 4 ah ~ w$ ~ 1 (y;. a 'taj 4 N ar ~ ~ ( +Ital '~1 4444Caac«che I g r)g I rw ~ I I rt I aaa 4 ~ .fN l-> al le cQ ~OJ t} ( p„-o WjFh4 rNrIFKS'y I v ~ ~ 4 ~ 41 c~ 14 ht Wl @0 a,r 1 Na ~ W»44. ~ ~ ~ 44 14 har 4 W ~ I 1 ~ ~-j» ~roROFIF ',, I * ";}'rN'a'}I ~1 I =„,~i(: ~\ gchF I ~> ca EN.I.'4'j EEEaE 64 j'- IOGP')G-2 ~ 14 Va» 4 sf 9 ~ I aal aawaal»a CE al ~ > ~ la> I G ~ «0 wwaww i'ha a a«a >w~4>v)>~t) )r& Iwaw>c CI ~ L.I >l\C>~ »hrc) '>~w>caro« VC,I»w >aaa& ~ oa VJ ~ hww t>o '4> > i I ». .»Ow wo ~ OO (1 aw>VS a( ~ ewt « IH> t. I c>4 Vw~ ~ y>T \(la> w ~ a(4 waa ««aye ~ E«44 '>44 a ~ ~ 4 (4 al ~ Ot»1 ~ >hh 14 I a(O «wa ~ 4> P ~«loca va( ' ~ I Iha ~ Il I' 4\ F ~ ~ ~ ~ I., I-Q ~ot>UI 4 I ~ a>a> 4 «444> I Oty V s f 401 OI ~ 1 CNO w Ow», ~ t la>w ~ ~ »4 0 Q> 1 j) 4P l La))() ~ a. I ~'CU 0 L c l(a >hell«NIL> «eo Lw>LN(ecue~ w» TN N>ONEEVO tua oaTI( a(a(ae(+0'ls ~ >w 44 )IC) ~ ~ ~ 4 e I 1, ta>04>w(a ~ ua(>«NEIUI 1>1>oaowatu I -'-I c>aa(ca(o To«N>(we(t ~ ~ 0 ~, 7 I 41> 61 «CW Crso L «O&w twit(a>a«oawtw«04«ENN "I/ ~ L J ~ ENO al.oluu(O j ~ts Ec( 4 / No) ~a. ~, t>t ao «4«4 N(4«4 4 >4 I>4404 oc(0«a>aca F4'-, «Oa 4(> 4 >Olla t>N«wb, haa 14 UME 4 Ta f rlw Nwalaa 114 «aNL, l ~ I ' ~ ap R >le>S l l-- L lal0( utah>4NLTNT«EL(ET(44L 11 f e ~ ~ ~ I I I ae !.I J rau ~ 0«waar ata>4 'v N 44>E0 La>N l .,I I IN tte(J N 14 teotaao«>fit Ia aa «ala «24 f ~ 4404 4 Tl>14( ~ JC ~ 4 JI(t. I s I I >(4 «ae I ~ >T 4 I ~ I Q ~ NNALYAXAFO))II0 UQCIC0IC)fs 0 ~ ate O @ I a ~ lal ~ aaaa (0>NOIUE I Al \140>44 '>wh 4 Jjst P Q IO CO0F SF))AC F))U) F)OFSIS CORE SPRAY FCF>MOCC> AAA)CUS ~ t 4>T~ 0 Cit osso 9 -l52 l5 wo E - l06257 ffYIBI WCoo LAO( Lo ~ ae) I: I q 7 5 ~ 0 ~ I 12 ~ ) 1 I 4 4 4 SSI Z5 SSSS Zlryb Kflllvalsaw«e ~ lavhlewi KO'fO W ~lw CC hs G v v r t~tw I ~ ~ ~ r ~ r ~ ia ~ e I I Ir r ~ 4 I 1 I a I i 1 I' ~ 1 a I I ~ 5 ~co«sa!AT I I I ~ I I 5 ~ I I I I ' 4 re ~ l I I ', I t 0 ~ I C to haO ~ ~ ~ r a ) s g!weiAa l ! al ~ ~ I a~ l 1 Ie ~ I ~ ~ I I ~ L M I 1 ~ rolANAYcofsaw P 4 T.sf Ollrfrsla ~ I ~ ~ I l ~ 5 ~ KIO I Z'wweY I I ~ ~ -- I l l LAI P~O~. q~il L 7 aha I »aa Zsj» ir ;~ g~O Ae» rrjlCR n N ~ NANwee ~ e je ~ ffalta»wv awafww N K ~ N feel at Alart a«» aana e»4 wet ttvlletlawa ~ elis 9', Ne«NO teel ~ Nrle ~ law 1 fl 1 ey 'I ~ f4apkwa I k t»a aw wee«»trews «wa K Nave ~ twa 1 lw Wle1 go ~krv tw ~ 1 ~ tease K r«f~ '»aftra vh «ewwefarw K IlkKet I ~ 1 O «4 a«t serif 41 ~ N wealw Maeak wvhv wtwhafe4 4 Ot Jw awol KC W«r les I ~ a a'e 'N vw aw e ~ 'lellf4 all'N I f I ~ «wall r .K w ~ . ~ ~ aeerw 1» NDAaeow»KM okf1 ~ I r---- 5- I ~NAA al Ao«arfo eo woe wwf oa fewp «W, LO w ~ OK»a» wtew 1 1 I rr aha«a lQ I LNS ~ «NOA ~ eeeeaf»waeewf«lr wf ol 1 1 kill~ w w 4 wsv««les 4 aorwwf Nav vcvfaaf» 14 Mlt ~ Ca L» Ce wka I ~ ~ ~terat wv atrial twa flvKNTvlc. ~~™ 1 Seetawte»4 TK g 4. I as fla lkSfeMKACO ~ swale«CT eall Csol la tws I»4 hl AWf «4 «ah \laf 1 AM«h Mal I P C or 4 O'-: Q' ~ ~ llveak 4r «allli41 litt Cl fit» skw ~ ea le =- 1@of ~~u -! aft lws lasaag 8':. ~ New Q» v N I ~ 41 AAIA«4 1wrtshaf «as Co' 5 wtl fra t ~ 5 ~ a wwwtwfvvathwafwvtvwavffsv .a...j W »V ~ el«wtr T M'e«vaakrafw MW»a) cwetvfla lo«l kafafwv etfak ve Tvaf IeNNN 4 »es cw«c wave Noa vecawaatD«T»a»4 I»4 I caw» I v«a»awoefwveefwaesf Kw«4 eave wraaa t ~ I 4, aalolew alto, , ~ tl Swl»l teat Kf«e ~ 111 leal ~ sJa. f L..J W «1 Q' l as«ra I a t ..:!. I ~ I ls patt I rage «ee ~ ice» t l I '. I", I I ~ I I I . l I I I j ~ la I. 5 p O«t I fr»aha l I ~ awJ I ' I'ataI ~ ~ «I Ckik ~ ~ ~ I I I I ~ t l "f"".~ 5 I 4 ~ I r Q vvaarfa ts ~ 71st ~IIAal N Nahakh lvttac ~ a Is Ivsfesa slit e l ~ ooa CAN -1+1.a.f )g 4 IfOAIOIIItt»IO as ve« g Eve li.;.5 I I l'! iLT&jl I I Oavaaotasaa»NN«af Kef. ~ »5~«M PI VAN wa ~ . e I hv4la eeh ANNAahl s «re»e LNINS I r»«wt 5rr f O+s I l l t Jv«raw rrltrl I el I ~ ~ I I I-i': I !l ifI a45O ' jh, ssziH ajjESQRE COOLANT NJECTON IijtiLlliI Zji [pl '4 kS 4454 . M 555 !4 - gfljlflg gCej!5 Oatea'.r, . -.: I!'.. I a..!ST Sl E lOGEGO 7 I 54 4 $ 4 I 9SI.II{9S88 I IOWO COVMIW ~ clc ~ csea paso We r~ I Tupowc 5 il~ Pa)Illa) ~a 'I N'I CQ N 4 o)I Cc I I ~ )f1 ~ \all I 'l ~ lilg ™ ~ ~ »4 vr j«U «rvvw«UC l \ *ao 4 v tract » ~ ra t ~ a l, »'a wave "+pl ~ 4« yI'~ vewrtv l Ital I ~$ IM 4 ~ ~)I) ~ »«4I ~«a)4 re 1 41 ra)) lvZV Ol'~ ~ala loa l ~ta a ~ ~ 1, a I) ~ 4 ~VI 4 a I I I I a ««I 5 f I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ eff vff» t«I ~ t,'o. r « r AM(": C 'lC) ~Nlr» cl wr I I r' 4 41 Q/a. V.vroo» Q)) I «J is vl,+i II ;I'II ~to4 4 ~ 4 I lot IcI t~ " @III'I Il »aWI»a »lel ~ t) lllli» or 4r « CO 4 aa) ~ ICC y QCl "IhII' ) s Il~ ) I trav I'ie) st t I ~ r ~ faov'Q»a ~ ~ »«4 l WO I la ~ l,a » V» e Il f ,Q-'u- -I I »w« t»tr II Cl4»«a)~ VI Ca atilt go ~ 4 are or', ~ I~ II .D L. ~ l r I ~ r»a 41 .+H. II& ~' t ( F T ti~ »4 ~ Co U 4 Cc ~ aeo 11 ~ Vrl » l a%'g ~ I w »1 tel 5 Iellvcea ~ I'q~ .It: ",II OFa)r'i )Bs I I«O 4 "ariaNl,+,'TL5«-„,e 4 I «» l )I»/« r „A~I l I vvtapht Owwa 14) f ~ «l ~ «fat ta loe go OI)t ~ 4 ~ »lea 0 ~ I » e).rr I I 4 'I ~ IIQQIII)aIQSIIQ Q I)ia)CI CQQ)SAT v 4» I I I I ~v» ~ t wa I As O 4)r P N IO UNIT 1 a.wl Cie»)) r CPNTAIM)5ENT ATMOS. CONTROL I ~ 4 I >FOC)f:5aeTL)5AAN~CI 8 f5LTXh "Ij"-" IQCC) ».Ii i~ QQ5Q M I57 'I II~ ~ OI ~ ~ ~ Q o C-I06262 SHI 18 ~ ~ I ~ I ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ I a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I 4 )4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ) ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ \ I ~ i ~ ~ ) ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ I ~ ) i ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 IPl ) ~ ~ ''rill 5 $ 5 6'9)-tt ~ ()('(89 (Sf'»$ IIIP ' ' o«a» 4 — ~ V~8-~ ~ 4 I ip,'@0-; 4 ~ I ~ ~4 Wh 4» , C0;)AYAt f l( Rfcoff)tkR CoNT ~ \\1 OCP a tt m /*I I „gI.~(-.',1: rallalfwr H Rl St(taf A C(t(YR(t ORYWfft. t I 1 ~ l ~ at« t I CKP alo ~Cl 11 I'tlaPC I 4 Jha C t la SCJ(t( 4 I I O ~ CHA((()ER 'c. c'Kl (t rP !l, 1 1 ~ ~ f '««atj Util 'I Caco.«4 I~'+a tA CK4 aot IR(o BIO i ~ t- ~ aol fTaZil 1 ~ I l C ra(c. Ar r ITLO toto eoccvcta ll etta It(i stets ~ (0 oe'coact tc t»c T ~ ~ ~ (' l C(a(S ail ~4 t~ acti I ~a (trot et'tat Oao I (aa Eat+I Ic l l !cap«Dc~ll yah l. IC22)A (D l fatotecc'tcocltl) (as Ptt( ~ I 1 4 I ~ C r.ci ta ~4» ~ h l L- a ala ' lo I Y I itLI\ra(I i l ~ KC ~ Se«toc ~ '1 4 ~ waw ~ hioal g f ---I--- t I .ga'g5-„ I Oe ~ I I Il(lt ~ ~ I- l -I ~ceo(Poco capet s«cs l ~ «w ac as» «a» ~aL tea a«I ( ~ eca watae4laa(ate«41\eh«aco C(era«4 ~at t& I I aaoe ~ s tllih.o«O ot(IOO tCaotaltoa ~ teethe(op. I 11 41 I » althoceai t It« ltD ICP( I ha css ac a» I '4 wa tt«ah Dt has(ct 2 ~ ac ~ 14LD 'I (Q I I I ' I:—'"~~~sc- K ~ 1 haec I ~ 'L 4 aal ~ Paa ~ 4 ttt th« tQolrr(Y(wa tow(t 4 UQ(r (oRtMY '"-I:3 I ~ 11 4awa %44 I cop«i \ T 'I p LLc ««Oooo "„-g5-g3, ~ aa ~ I 1 aOCaa mw ~ (ewt 41 I I KKIIP J I P 610 UNIT I loeraaaol fg«P I i. I ONTArNMENT ATMOS.CONTROL V«1 ~ u ~o((3--- .1 St«atoK ~ Sf(Q(tC IK)'rlttlfP(ra(K~ Ot(O M15t 10 K@MB ftftXtAX&T)26%liBiG55QT)8 E.)06264 St I ~ cg II IIII III I IIII I III III IIII III I I I I II III III III I II )ls I ~ '' lllll'I I''I ,)NCI I I I 1 1 I s Q IIIIIIIII'Illl ZE E Cg LSI Il $$ $$L T IM NIOI ~ QM» I ~ »so/I E.- T hl11 I-".I---'- ~. ~ I:f«ng--- 4 )„-:l h h$ $IO hf5III j,.~ ~ ~ f ~I ~ ~ 0 ~ l l I l ) SC « IOK f~l 0 ~ -„„---„- --- tolSII«C I el5'llI g G I @ 0 l ~ I ~ ~~ »SfIl I l«N ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ )- «) tl ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ \ Kf.00 s»p ~ ~ ~ ~SS s s ~ -JhJ. —. ~ ~ HH~~.Q.'~0,.... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~. V ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f~ ~ ~ ~ I I I KKPO ~s.u. IOC e«NI ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ IffffIos ~s«o ~ I I » ~ Ke s« .--.Q', I V 00 K~ h'SSIK ~ CIQ I ~SSCIQI ~ ~ K «K I ~ ~ I I 00!K0 s VKsg ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ I ~ ~ ~ Ks NI ~ ~ Q s~ I «I el l~ ~ I. ~ E-3 ~ - - ~NNI ...1I.. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ (M»IV I ~ O » d. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ N c) [~l ~ ~ elo ~ I NISI Nell ~ 4- ~ 0 R ~NKII ~ ~ ~ 0 I ~MIN 5 0 ~ ~ 000 "hF-6 S IO EV lettlC5$«N Csfeof ~ I KSM C ~ ~ I «TW~ 1' ~-$«s» $. C™MQ" I Oli Cess 0 ~ — ~ef NO fI,~Kf-e» ~l- OK, Cj ~PL" iSVA'~Ma ss-Tsf defi letll0 ef ~ I ro« Plugs s ~ I V ~ I fI Le fSK rsr~ v 1 I I V'KC ~ ~l L:4( I «I 0) j tJ„-",- I C ... '....a:-;[(;9j"~ Fee Ms! ~ ~ 9 «JCC«OSN 'e Nl' Ke L: gL( s ps« )Q ~TT ( ~ ~ ~ ~ Is«C ~ Kilo lo «C rtl le fle lflelloe r. ~- ~SS. ~ r--- e I ~ ~ Iusl ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I I ~ ~ ~ I Nllf ~ ~ Iule ~ ~ ~ ~SKS ta I»ON I c:> ~l«$ [i,'7-ry » Off5 ~00 Ks I00 soe IMKe [I 9] tIN Sells ISN Nfl« Cl~ I TCIII ~SO«K« Iel 0 Nl «l I TTCRITCTCÃ$ COCCI ~ O UCCCI II «KI CORTI'l«0 ICION P O IO WIT I COMTRIIOCTCCT IITCOSSPCCERT CQCCTRN. Nfso A ~ OTO TI-157 cr 131 a — c-Ioeaea 5„3 ~ ~ '0 s« \ Nl 1114 I 9I- -9%9 6 =- 1 ' 1 ~ . f ar~ ln~ ~ <«ewe a Q P ra«»1 14 ~ C ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' IQ 74 ~ 16 ~ C ~ I ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 15 4o I I ~ ~ 3 ~ ~ ~ I 1 I ~ I ~ ~ I 1 SI ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ O ~ G I 4a «» ~ I 14 IKL Ila4pt Patt PL«4 I tr 4I»CP« ~r»cpa ea»acp» » a» Car ~I«4 4 0 I lait O'La va -„~d Od ~at+I« tet ~Ia»ta Q( KKtra ha ha wr 4$ ~ Ja Nra ~ ai» I II»44«hheac t v"K( IOA»4« g-t )II '( -,I 4 ~ «OK fl RII I ~ » Ite s. (ted Q ~ v«a a» a« lrrsi I «I 4 I at ~ a "I Stra \a4 vtr «II «a ag» I dr-.-. a»lett 4 se< N»I ~ Ie ~ VIV ' t a 4 r aaa SK »KIC 4 t<0 t I @ a SKI»I ( CS C »0 (N ~a( ~a ~ ~ CO - --— L. (("— P4 I ~ ttarrl ov»a oat Paw<0 ta IR I ite&$ v v'Ltla4 ar HI ioa tlc»caaearv I »ae e» 4«t 'tt'aa(M'« oa(ti «4 «' aar «oi ~pa ~ p.....l.ca. l ~ I ev ~ ruuawa.~ C ( ~ t» ~ e ~ I In/-I < ~ ~ < ~ ~ AO tl 14 t«a ~ 4 PI ID ~»tat Her l RQSRIV RUrltRI 4 a K ~ * ' r ~~ s ~ f K,KXC'\,04 ~,I ~ ~ . ~ ~,',;' IJ'',,M'4,'.'',' s QI-QA-9%8 IN ','r,s fntelssa~l '' Nl ~ n IS ~ ~CIN G ~sSSVS IKs ~ IIII44 Ita ~ 'Nt I cslcscllsla ~ tsCC L.AR ~ss SKS N SKK R 04 r T ~ ~ I I I ~Nt INCKNS\ I 00 lvcsll 400 essa r I Cswlll scsca 0 ] ~I I I I N/CVlln 4 P gv Ile I I I I I gc," . ls I I'C I I ln SC I ] I @"-r I 4 I I I , ~G,,@gg I I I I S I a I I 4 J ~4 ~"I I ]6 I te ls K sss al ts assi Knl I l Knl ~ s > 4 l ISI It Clll @IN I- 0' SNI 4'4 lne Naassca ~en Is ~ I N asa ens sla I s I I ! I I, 044% I ~ 4~ I I :jt rleaa al J KS L-„""- ~ CONN @PE. ~s 00K 4 Ile ~t""; NNKC.W 04 lian st IN ']o SN 6SN sl IN IN I,' L=.---'=-:". '. l~': -CSCC414Ole I as ~N ts s sas assc 0 pgf ~ vv ~4 444 P ~ r------NVN g e 04 I Is4f 4 4s I I sg gs 40404444 sllh, I I 's l ~t s ~ ~ sse csa T. N C Na sas 4 I ~s ~ s I ar I Iael UNN Val CIMlsal Iaa I so III Nnassl slNllaa saaNC 440 I I I I salssetlet 00 tolnssl 4 ntNI I NKK~ ,.; C jC4 8 a tC tc ~ NcllllaK ~ ~ eelaavae ~ wale N'sll ~ C ec I evs al aasl I4.00 tea aealls sl ~ 4 ~ Na sl tacatss0 a 4 ~ 0 s tt vca ~ ~a CCKA / ~ saas c ] I Sst ~ Ca 'll ~ I cl sataa4 eltscl s ~ A IllttCNCL 'I ICS I sc I Vh ~I aa visa O'We ~ Kll I 0400 14 Sl Ill I sts s ~ ! ~Ca ' Nll ~ III 1 w~ ~ 'Iwe ~set CaalaKCI ~ 4 IN I ~ l41 cia NSI cia Is IN 4 ill Kl I ae C lla 4 I'l~ SSI 8 B Nsaa sll ssav at ~I ~ I CIN V I Sl +Cl& I s I 4 Klssl M CNISSKSaa < Csal ascscsn 4IKIN @? LESa\'ll 4I) +L lagLt K %T&tCJSS ILCtSCJJtls (2H A REPCl 'ED I I I : I sss4 'VC-l>S I I mm xuzmmnsxctxx ~tBLlsx B Q. E-K6680-I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ F ~ ~ I ~ ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0SI 'L. 6 6 ' ,, 44 $ ~ B I 4 ~ lie I Iol IIS ~ 'll.I I I'I I tt t SL! QA mw9 FA7 ~ ll ~ CCV ' ~ O't ~ t OV ~Pte ~ tee ~ Coe ~ ~4 II ttKK~ . ~ C»4 ~ etc C V Cl ai - Vt +VIVV T X ' K ~ ~ ~ le 1 ~tetH 4KB'I ~...~. Q,.~ ~ r ~ I et ~ ee ~ Kl 4 K 'ee I ~\ t;:. ~ ~tta I I ~ ~ ~ ~ t~;tt tert ~ K -'~j-- x'-~ El ~ ~ tee L ill~a ~ T T M ,tj ", P ~ I 1 I I Vi cte le ~ Ic» Vel lQ CICVI~ iI Kcea ot» I -I- ~Oe ~ ' ' .~ ~4 tee etc ~ i I I I I I I ~ ale I ~I Ct I --r--4---~ a ltl ~C& I ~ Ke~~» ~ =—I '. A.m~~ J ~4< I w I I 0 IK g Iteet ttot a I I' 4 ~oe ~ ~I I a 4 ~ ~ 14 Q ~i 1 ~ 4 a»Octet te tvt44 ~ ~I K ~ i ~I I taa ICKIN ~ Ctt ,I let 0 let Wete I @ale e I4 ~ ~ ~ ee te tat C tettet »tale teeae4»CI »eat I ~ ~eteeat ~ vft t v aee cve»K ~t I ttelt IICOK,tc elL ~ I 4 4wtttvCaavaaee oeas aaeeoa @Ie 4le '4 IK I tlail w ttt eevet te oe ve ~ lo4 eattt vekvv4ett lterece 4 F T T M ~ta Vf»I IIIaaaaaa IWSL voHO ol ~4 44 1 ~ Ml K ~ ~ 9 ~ 4 Kettle WL4 I I ~W\ I cle la pr 44 beetle I ~Ktvae» l le ~ I OK".-g» At ve ave I 4 ~ ~ L A%P ~ le I @4 la N «tt aa ,I eett tat 4 A ~ tate a ~tt I ~ I a e a l ~ K ~ f, K tLANaia A~~ggiri ~ ~ I ~ I I'a '. le ~ L I I OCVI'OI ate g T AA ~A 7 liu,;>Q 4 I 0 F.-t06680-R ~ I C--~ao G w>e >V> ee v> ve ev ~e» aeee a>\e»»e w» as o e>>war ae»>$ $>ver>tao v o>t ttv M> ~ eee> tee 'a> ~ ee>a >> e>we v»l at »a>>aSD we> wt s a>ees>>as>ee s tv>a ~%~ea e>ease>ee>p ~vew e>l >t»>t>MtO o>a woo ~ l ~ev c»% lr «0>> ~0 oars k. es } ",'I I I I I (feei ~ ee l I s I ' ~ — er ~ ~ I EW I ie>A' v ea o .. 0 ~ 0 I e~e e. a >w I ~ '4 I t -4 a o l l ~ t: I Es ala C~.@ ) l e t ~ 1 a~ oev Q $ t ~ I I I ~Q:~ I Qo Qtts vg~g" l : -= '--q n," ~CIv I'd ! I I -h Q-0>> I I I aa s.— r> l e +I Ileee's> osl >0>a a I I ~ea I I- -s--- I I I I J -J I 8-0 I I we I l I' I ~ a I t a ~ t>e ea I C s I I d I ~ee ~ tee> v>as>at>tv t I $ I ~ I I Q» 1 >» «e> t> C l ~ te> >e>ev>O I e «0> e I ~ ~ I '> I o I I I ~l I ~ I ~ea wee> wvr»tw I' ~>>as ~ o>t> I +>>>a e e I I I I:8I I te I >0 sj ~ ''. I >a ae I a ~ Ot I I I .s I s %00 YiLc I CE% 4(; OWG ~>'0 tav I ~W» ~ ~ ee> see\ va le>o v>~ ee > ~ I -I @IF' C ea >sssrossr'.~0$ ~ e I evv ~ >e Q I ~ >s >a>>stew span I >0 ~ ~ I--GisoII I e ~ I - Y ) K ee s ~ e a» ~ I--- -"---- wt B > v>a .* ~ r ------r----- II s F 0 ig -' ~ * ew ev S ~ l cll - - —I-- —— I A- 'I g >W Pt W g: II s a>0 ee ~ J I >;w' w >avet«eV W «et ~ I > II SZB-VC-ZZjia HQ >>V>I ~\ ~ s 0 ewel ~ ee oa>o v ~ I e>e OY 0 la I I I 0> ~ ee «w I II rvv toll - Jess I . INIIISSIIIOWS t IS>4I CMPAII I - g -I e - v ~ Iw~e tM ~ . I 0 ~ ~«»>e we ee >w ceo \ \> W. I ew see> ~ e w > >K As t HV PN A AM A it>PrsP " ~ w ws o -0 >Ear OII eev SIANDGY%5 PREAP NT 5 I M ~ ~ 4 R4I ( tllk14Blole1.4KATOSJLD 0 6-I0668p Bt3 ~ ~ ~ 0 F ' s o ~ 'lG ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ s o ~ s ~ ~ 7 l sg> s ~ r a ~ 4 sgo l s ~ ~ r ~ e e ~ ~ o s ~ ~ r a sl ~ s ~ a ~ ~ ~ 0 ope ~ ~ ftlhh I IOVVS ~wwf4 IIAWt w bQ' fww ltw I teshf nb~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ I 7 I I 11 OYI 00(KH 11110 ~ !lk--4- G or assai lB H fss aes ~or L ~ L-C w «4 10 00 ssft (I fssawfaf . be ~ 1st ~ bg tie ft-'t.„' I C ~ Iw»4 f40+ b I sww alwav Le l TET (4-I- ~ 44 Ve Df ~ ~ Stt Ita ~ ew ~ ~ lw Ha, ess» @cite aesasw hweavaw hh hc tots I I Mtwwfstao twawhC w ~ ~ HJJ4041 shwwaa et HIAWsIK 4 J Hs W C001IA Ittal COVIA AOOV Wst Isaswwa JV IW J ~ ww ~ I ~ I I ~ I "r'.>'-. 0 CD' sa4 ' I ~ wt I ~ m . ! I'l SC - ~P:O:.C."P. ro b~ i I ~ ~ AJW s LW I ~ or 41Aattf Lvasw ll Cwwash aala [s 0~ ~ tl ~ Tetd 0 ~ I ~ H SS ~ ltl~ IeCI ~ I 0 fE KITH ~ I( TAa1 ~L al ~ ~ Te I Jefh ~ 4 I ss 7(sD V.set ~ Jet 7 I 4 s ~ ~ aa Ill ~ ill4 Wltea O'4 CKL a s 0 ~ ll'IA a ~ aw sf ~ lslas SOLD I I eetsta ' ~ Cwle D I all; 4f 4 0 ~ 4 -.:,=:li~ 'Ii( 'D t b HIT, Aaf(WAaa Isae, fwla(OW tfha jtt, I JHI ~ w fef ~ ~, ~~! j~zi~J ~ -P j pe Il sf{. lp, ~ ~ 0 0 0 ~ ~ .l 400WL ssw 14 ~ twLIK HHLHAVKIwwewaeK LH(4 I Ilett aa Kaw aaaL K tsaawt 'aaa ~ Ossa» al I wwt~. a ew ~ l I Itw 1 wow 'wwsvaw IHI~ lea ewt L I I aw thea«a tIKTAK«wt00 Oealal I s>« ai ~ 'I~ hae faal W ISOSAL IWw 01 ~ est(sa ~ W tet 4 44 IKI hatful '; ~ 04MC taaaf ~ Se W ~ Caahaal KS4C ~ ~I ewe ~ W f4 twl ~l~ —.~~~,Q ~Q pg.".;I aflel ~g I', I Is~I ~ ((I 11 st' Wl IH I IH c,~", s04 I IHI DCI «t&0 CI ~ 1' Call g «00 Ita sa«44 VO P\ KK I AtwIawsa ) aw(ea Kt(0 'O «JW ~ f ~,-',f ' D I 1«es 7 0 f W (K al ~ cocfvoft oss lafl ~ IID I e.wI 's Il 4 KITIO CIC(tt al ~ I ~ 14 f 41 ~ ~ I wl ILDI ~ S ~ 4 ( 0{ oa Ataewawwtsww AO ~ ~ 'Z= P((TO COOT I D{A{IDRD(OCII(TIC A(k iCO» DCADDS» 70(ff 85 DDSD II-I76 I5 ~ 8 {sCI[s7{I(DslzkJsfIIA{IIIL'fiLICllID SI Q E-IP628 ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ lal 7 A 5 4 I I ~ I ~ ~ 31&j ~ ~ ~ I ~ I'I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ I ~ I ~ ~ ~ I ~ IPI I ~ 9Z I-DA-9888 0 G 0 ~ 0 r 'a I Oscsacaafas I ~WS aeeaCaal» ~14Tw Nesw lsoaa 0 I r- r-—— t' wfwart«e t«1 rl c Os F I II FI KIN ~ I cw esse I . ----..I--- T. WII T g VIV 1 aa 0 a QT ff QZTT I rI Ill Of la I I I ff I v 1 I r- -" ~ I so 0 ~ lease«saw ~Itaws 0«lists als«W tllarl I all sfa00 ~ wl I 'I aa Ic claw» l ~sas 4 ~1 0 jl . I «I gfi .-Clc t j W WI ~ ~tie a«wv «sl t; I ClfVcsa ttael tllalaeal 041 I Q jfI J Ma 4 1 PF. 0 r «tell I I r ———H I r------3 I„ +(VsC ~ NIT+ 1 I I ~ IDI\CT CT ISla 0441 I ~«AssklaaaaT asti«asst ~ C 1 I T Caalk c»la atc« 8 I TVV lsO. ~ «40 «4 twt WO 0 ' ~ t ~ Qs es» al 4 tssalla I Vf» d ~~ «CD 00 IC I SVI4« IO k < ~ 0 y ~ ~ ~ ~ nkf 0 0 ~el I ~ Cats a» s-Oil s ~ I so« C4«l a»«v al Q 0ttt ~ 0 I~ fawlfl~ fs« I0 4 Ill I VNISI ~ 4I aSC ~,sel awwl 0 ~ tss af»wee«walk I ssl waaal «0140weavso«f «ralal I Lrsravw ~ a4 tkssrse 0 lo taocaatf we«test I«also a«ceo owtls'I acs 4 gstw I Ol Oel ~ ~,sta a«kala MSOIIMMCO«klosa«swea « I s. tsa wfceases tawe a c«D 0 44 110«04 sak0 ) f C.oc saws»sc«vt I ~ « I ~ I441I1 D M I w 4weaswsartase00«saw«ae f I I cwsal s Dwlaswssrt00 rweaswvk « I 1 I I, la\are 4«Q slav tw CMIOtws 41 tolKcoos ~ t 4«ec«4 ot kvasa 8 I d s I I~ ~ VIO ~ I ee ~ I~ I ke» ~ I ~ 44 I I ~C 8I I 0 3P I I"- I I I-- b T«s«TRZI«kAW '«CRT. o. Isesca se ~,sll 00»e I C ~ \ Tl Mc V»T ~ ~ va st Z I sl I I NI tll01 C +«ok w«IIT~. west we~ I 4' I ~ st 8 [8 I tl I 0 ct 0 ~ tsc I asst w cwwraa I @CI% f4 I~ f«OV ~ ~ Iswe « «CTT«ID«I TIV««. 1 @cat k slee I ~ IW Sta 'llWa I 4«0 ~a«4l II VIOIV01 IS 01 e sflw tw eq f»ls ~ I «Cte f w«fe 1 sf ~ aoo«s 04 « Is }at~a I aw lllla Wl Daafl coc«04 s»ls 0 ~ Ve 4 0«saa tsa Ca«lfa&f» ls« ~s ~ "~ Se ~ Iwfe as cs ~ ~ 4 rs s ~ I ass«0 lssvlo foa elk as too ~ . il ~ asst bare w I ~ aces ~ 0 sl eat TOOTTTTTAT«lTOT«I««TNTT TORT««t« c»s I M I alee ~sc cca ~ I «sf ~ 0 s ata ~ta «0 I T«s« SI'4 AO ~ t« \H HVAC CONTROL OIAGRAII al I»s I» REACTOR Ia OVI ~ "sle BVILOING ZONE I a ~ os I 1 '8I f~f' ~ (8 O««4 VC-176 9 0 ~ E-I0668I ~ ~ ~ IQ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 I ~ ~ I ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ 5 le« I I 134 ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8 ~ I 1 I ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ IPa ~ FA~iud ~ILIA!!A~I 4»t I»ao a>4>) )!W-III F F ~ I ~Ca tlafl pi.A~~IVII «VI Ea»V I ~ ~«»t v>M gl «a oat« ~ ICICIOO CWIO 1 lo ~ I 8EKIiZLJBGSuBK ~ ~ ~ V I 0 I Ltw a>4 ~ ~ I. 1>v I V I>M ~ OI I Ill«lao«a««fall Ilao»III~ »lr ~ac«I 14 (aalv>1 ~ III I 8 5>a aool svaa ~Cato Itlatoaso) a 04I'ol ~ «» Iat 11 «I 0»I»M o»»a 14 a»» w»v I ~IV vow>el»»olll«a«vo»»ev Ivo I I ~II44»4 I I 1 o«>lwfaawo»voatcooa»ooa It~ 1«a «»41IO «CVOOE 14 I« lla!»4141 I iaals vt ac»no w aa>4olr »>as»ce »ato 5«aa «le~ v«a Is,ton C Cl ÃI'&ic~ v>aaa> I awl IMI Irs ta w ~ «I IIVVt>4 otal at r a~a 1 ao ~ 11 llsr«el ~ ««I»M ~ >v aaorp'a o«ale «>414 145>t ~IH ~ ~~t>44 r V ~ i) 0 I l~l >ovl «4 w»4»o wfc~ I I ~l«4I I Owe>4o «ca o»v oc oÃl1 (ao ~»I ~Et «4 as«» cll ~ IMMI~ o»v ol aoel ~ I~ ll4« ce«ect41 I $ re Na e I>VV» I'" EN EE Ofwa Isv LIA ~ 1 V» I(» 4I'I~ ~ ~ ~t'4 IVl VIM«IC«M I»ll tent! jlgo »w Ma wva»v» ~ ~ I a ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ I ~ 51 aft l 4« tat»» ~ I~ t I ~ Ivo ll ~ I ICXAi)«AIC))IIIl~MICA(IN waa 14«K» Al F I.IO IO)()oILL Al!I (LOC I)UI!(CA!I / ~ ~'> 4]] V« ~ol ~ p CI)4 M- l7'F 'I ! ' ~ I Cora nmrr~eaauI-Iia!IWXO II 0 0 E-ICC'82 'I ~ ~ 'I I ' I' ' ~ ~, 31 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 02 ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ 0 0 .101 ~ . Q«1 ~ . '...';."'j~~., '!:PP;q~I: I I, ~ ~ ~ ( 'I I (000 c SC ~ A» ~ ~ ~ » I- ~ lOCAI ' » V \ A ~ IOe) ~ atl cae« l ~ A IIceseces ~e ((ekc( ~ SC 11 we 41» ~als (4 ael I r, et ~ ~ «I l c ~ «e ls ( ~ ~ c«c 111 ~ «I « ~ eva e aa (e«lr Oaielr e 8+8 ( ~ «1 4 ~ ~ I~ MCV C«f tW Ml r p (Fleet ( »e Na»S tl«NM NN (ea ~ W » ~4 eo COOS H Cee 414 Iew IL ~el«M all OA I ~ I,IF( M oae4 44 N wl ~w((sscB l, z I ~ (1 ~ taca( laos ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ lee wtl ce lvs ~ T v ~TO Ccw ~'IJS ICZB l, Mt( kk I Ilvt ~ 4 ,'Clat C 114( «a ta» ceto«C ct ~ I Ctelwl Ia» Ptlwt a"(11 0»caw ~ ew«al pf(twce ~ ~ I ~ ta ~ «' l( I fettle I 6; (aeter( I IOOW ~NI'4 » ' ~ aaw 04«M ve » C 'Q all((H lw'I(la tla( I (LNI 4»» I law Ccw I» f(Seek«csf SOM )rw ciao Nll rtc«1 fI AQQ ~»eve«( 'I U ~ I I . ~Q ? 1 7 el'A'g+( fa ~SI I ( gee«1 0I ( p P Icf(L(oa'co ~ .. I 4 cte'w ''la OCAL .. I OE((NN(c- al V ~TAA — ~ el I~ ~ e(NS Aaelat As (erat Nlwl 2& w«r»vv Nslaec( «01 . I I 0 '"J . ~»ce ~ » ~ ett I e»» ~ Ply~ er htkfh ~ '-} }( 3„.' ?8} -} I . m} ~ OUI 4« 0 ccc(Nkl e*e e'lkl at»a ~ (lee Nor 'eat ceoU Ne(coal Naa ,I 4 ~ I'\ ~ Sg (1( 0(( DWS'I IIYeI 0 NCOCN M ~ N« DS I I 0)elo M'lk ea «»lie V «4 I I v 0 ~Oe OAU I ec Al Ua ~ «4 I1 t I ~ I wal Sr«A ~ e( I~ ~ «aae awa «1' le I 0 '}'" "." a( V. ~ 14 I '} ~ l ~ ~ ~ 414'W f I }[ ' I }SMSeSII ' capt sea lw 5}I 8} Ie Ca«awe(l ON WN ! «4rtll aal OOIC 04» «014 ~ t 1«l A Nwf 4 al« $ ~ Nwwa«toe« c»f Oaa«CW ~ T ~ )'I PUCA cia it» Nts Cr ~ ~ .4( 40 l( vCl ~OCA Il I~ (Nil IeNek» Ae«l ala( ~ caaglI AM »44 I 4 »tata»cc«tkwocw ~W(1 ~to fee c ~ I Na tl~ c»se «off U(ioosoo(a Ilel 4 ~cc 0 I ~ ~ ~lr Not(A(v«e(l «4( I Tee ~ I UNPglek« Iwe«tv el J. lie c ls l«e ~ I i 8} '/U( ]'4 I }};-'[i:"p ~} <-='- Pt 0~ 8 ( y ~ ~ IB CO»AS( ~ ~ m".%~ha .. BR ~lt 111 tla C»»a evtl «Aal fI «S,„l> r I I ~ I ~ e«vl 4 ~ Ma Cl ~W 'v I 0'( ' 'l Neet be ~ ~ o«N es c«efwcrae ~» C4 v t«8~ f v « N N» le N SAJ" '1l te(l « ~ lee lwec ~ t Ia« » ~ le ~ ~ 1; 1'> "I IOSLYIYANAIOWIIIILNICOLORANT lv> I:I';-'}!'q ~l-„'j~l 1 } '} I yl! jl e «e e «ell OM v« e« V»ltI Iallr [ckwa IA cw ~lla (((14 arl ~ cww aw A ~Nae at P Al ( Q« (IO I KB~INL es 1" K9 s( 0'V co((Y~ SY((oc?(c((E A(A FLOw OFef(AS( ~ I A(I J 'I Pffft I J }A e» - Ieeel (N~J ~ ~ 1 L Ltds ~ve I IIIO M-I?8 l2 ( I wa ~ c gp ~ N«V» 41((C ~ \ ~ Cl ~ I ~ e I ~ ~ ( I ~ ~ ~ IA ~ F:IOG283 'I ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ I 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ I 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ I I I I IOl ~ ~ 8 ~ r ~ I?a I I I j) 5 'l,l (3 I I I (1 I I 8ETDA %88 fstool es T sponn»» 1 ~«s & R t)e. «ol Q «'1 4»)n b „„-IIO~r G ,I La 0 s)aTT /~, ns I - C A«A pfsSC I CE$ 1D I Q T r ~ ~ gwI »+I I "RR ~ 1 I 1 I ~ IO ~ II ~ ~ ~ » n«oo 1 9/ ~ ~ ~ lt ~a .I u 11.»«Oa«f r=.) i)..../.: 1 Vsv ) 1 I,a ~ . )» ~ '»is )If~ )U(1 I,; lto) . -e~y lh 1'"- e - ~ f, ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ™ I 'UTs u. ls,al j(«s rema r-')"~4' :L" Ital)1 I f 4 ) ~ OV 1st ~ ~ ~ I Ue I ~" ja I . LV I )( I «,4 I /1) I I 1 ~ L Sl ~ g .JDl I l ~ O<411 '< t r. S -io»)1 t ~ I 1 ~ ~ ) I<4 1 c»e ok'4 40»awned clos. ~ 4VASVS ~a I\ 'U n»s $ Koteo I /C"') ~ ~ '( st v e«11 14 4«os Jc I k',.i!. I; Ua« ~I 1'1lo sa»» lv U,sots OC Un ~ 1 ~ 48 2 ~ « ~ A Al 14(o»a ' gc--4 HVAC CONTROL DIAGRAM ~ as~aC--- I sl(r t CONTROL STRUCTURE CCOICt)TER RL( flOOR CCCLIH/4 VC I )8 $1$1EI( CCO(TROL Rs« TCOO)C CO()LIU(s $1$ 1ELC ~ $ $ $ IO ILL/E ~ 1 '''( ~ ~ ~ 'Ias4'I 'as"'.ia's, E. I06683 - I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 'I ~ 1( I ~ 07 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I ~ ~ 4 ~ 'I ~ 1 ~ 6 S I I4 I t 13 ~ ~ 1 ~ I ~ t ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I I ~ I ~ 1 ) I I) 8E I- 4 40 I »Nai ~ iV rt1 4 a»4 LN ~ec ~I ,qq ~ ~ ~ r ~ ' cQ ~ V»es ~ ~ 'I OyrAO~INt '' ~ ~ ris ~ ";.4 I" 1 G.SFCON + '»I~ ~ ra a i ,Iri OO.IC I» »I»»W O 1st ~ IE ~ » «sr II Les. I NWI I'< I ~ ~ ~ I Tr ~ » IFO I ~ (W C 10 L F To + V«4 1 4rs40 ~ $ '100 ~ 0 ~ lc sk I 041 ~ ~ »l It '14 er», e Ii» I ~ 'I> (Cr ~ 'Ir I« ~ i»0J ~ ~ - ~ 0 ~ J I ~ I INN»t«40 Orirta N L-:. ':'" ~ 0 ~ l4 ts I ~ It 01 ~ steraL saic. fsa I ~ ~ LN... ~4 ~ I ~ WTI 4 e«IW 04 1— IW ~» W M ..~TI ~ J Tsc.s ne - ~ -0 I ~ ~ Seg . Jw»41»e ~ I I ~el«av I 1 ~ so Jt»ra sg I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~4 ~l»CO gl ~ ~ C»lrll L Si «,P OIAI I Mlle lt ~ .Ii t ~ 1 ii Sscs( n(rversa Sees(el (d ~ ' 5 . IA&RM >EAIOFs STSIEM »MC ~ '»tc NAO«VIII» »1 ~ I »ee sr «»is I Ij 1 r«t «r I Iiw'tvs »11O >0(Le t 4 QAIIERI RMS E>(H IEI. SCSIEM Pre h ~ Ta'N ~ C«NA 4 vr I» ~ 0 roA s««0 ; ~ ) C le ~ "'"' ~ «I Or ~ Ia ~ 1 e ~I NfVr~ ON«ON 0 Ss 1 TSL 'irl41 0 I «4 t»OW ONW SN W ICSit I W eros »011 ~ w tl»revv» I 4»t la S»01 I ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 III ~ ' I ION I 0»ew hvss - Q IN»ee Or«I I O 'raa 4 VIVAi»4S I, I c.e. Ie-r 4 «I»0 151II »t vra ~ 'ON 1@'»r TIE VMN Cr) ~ «C 0 I« IL sara ~ N SN CN B»S«s ~ ti«4 ) Ia ~ Sa ~ ~ ~ I TVC) Ir Airo ~ 4 '«is» AM\el''141 ~ O» TIN NN'I I ~ J « ~ 0 I C-.-»Igs- trs- L»n>T- ~ w sale 'ugitl 00N 00 (»Is 0 l, ",I I ~ ~ ~ r ter)TCI 1»«a 4» W in) ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ 4 NV4 wt ta I»A ACCESS C(>CICC)L C I AS AREA IJ>PPLT STSIEM ~ It N 1»4 ~ II~ Ia Cs»i»i t»0« ~iNII ~ N s«s I tells «least ose« 1 8 OOQROL RM < EO>OTIC)L RM. iACCESSCOTC ~ 1 ~0»N i TOILET,'(>IC>CEM I'AFsEA 1 IOAEI I «NNIN Kl 4.IOIOMI«a liar C >W IM ~ CO rl 1 ~ l»ls 4 1st TCO Oe iN». 0»r Ni le(8 E>(>IAMSI FA>t 515'lE Il I « I A~+ ~ ~ ~ 4 IIA, Irvo» Ic~ 4'tl s~ tata orl(I) l: ICCtio ~ ~ 41 4~ I v ~ ~ t«00 0 eMI ~sr 4 sss»c OTIAI a»A I I) 4 «tis N 1«NI «4 Os»0) ~ »r + INI» ~Nw I«I N ta 410 ~ orw 41 Owe»«w» ~ ~ ~ ~ ar»» I ~ I, I I Iilr cs rsai»IN sc(rc) t Ntr,«» 01st 1«r» »14 1CI tttr «1 tsar WW o«rv Ce,l 4« 4 I 1 'I ~ )'I Nr L C IN'AS lI Nrf I~ hair L Cn(t I~ " F(ACE ~tr MAAE(ATA>R <15(EM a$ E ~ r A 1 n>OUST e. W 0««» ~ 4 I ~ 4 Nr 10 «0 0M ~ 'INsre. ~ rc.a Ql ~I» 00« O»1 I »W ~il (») ~«l401 ~ 1st IC I IL14 I W ~C I C ~M 0'I ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 .I Ic 1 g » 1>aaa 00 A EAIS>sk.l Fcl(CIST5((M ir 'I s»sa I IAI l»i 0'»rr ~ I«4« ~ ~ oi»J 0 0»e»104 ~ 1 Iat alta i,l I ~ Ntt ~»ti»v,so«e.si ~ ~ ~Me 0 44 Ml I~ F(e 9'w',C( T'g'I-) " 'i' M«t « ~ ~ tr ON S [-,.I t 1 ~ ~ ~ N«rI I t f ~ os» 1st Nl» O»M ~ 40 .I 0!VSN ~ ~ ~ is C "':,'I-' ~r«ir I I I V» ols;NI, I«, trt IOOC(I MC>R CORILCI I I ggr(IT(TA>CA t rt, IC I I» ilrc NtilOi» i»S IS r TLS »»sj»ass\a A '1 I" I,. " J ~ 0 ~stirs sr 1 Nr« IN» 0»4 ~s ~ I" ~ ~ I 4 ON ss I I »IM .I M I I'> e«0 So ~ oa ~ n ~ M 0 A «1» 4 «se,sic I, ~ I sales( lt ~ I I h(AC CONTROL OIACRAM ~4 sr»r ««14 0 '1«C ~» ~ 4 0' 10 sr vr rs»PM bw t« oI ~Ie' 11 ~ 1 r«r t»rr I "I I siJ."'J Igt CONtROL STRUCTURE CCCCIAAC>CAIEO I REER (Tr(5 EA>L»5>LLC gl 1,0C TrsI78 E.I0668.'( —2 ~ '4 ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 I I 7 ~ I ~ ~ ~ I e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1st I t I r) ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ I I I ~ ~ ) I I ~ ~»rs ~ ~ ~ g+ JIa a-; ~ ns n l'. ~ Qrr ~ at raw w»s) LAL ~» ~s OKCI(t K CÃl«Was' h saww dv )BI-II4 9(o BB » '~ 4» ~ OS 44@4 Vt V ~ V ~ i ILS F II G 1 v» B Cv « «VIII ~ \ vl Fs ~ -ON 40.~)1 l.ooa ~ I Wa vo ~ I P I I L I I Jsol Q: .. ~ ~Oaf S. ~ D ' ~ 's L «11ssa NINNLNa 1101 Navls O41LL NID ' ~0«VS 10 VoaC Vlao Wva SNVSIS 44 I F)TFs s () ~«'1 CNSIL ~No 4 a. Iolvlsl s«waa C41i ~ vassal Ns IILLNV «a I «4N Y so ona ~ vo4 Y «wa I «ow~ so sa Y I «4 'I ~ t4«vs al cosalls «INL svlvlss Y ~ 'os« I ~ f«a«Is vasss« 'I ao Il«N«NNVII«o.sv «Taav «a 04«v«v I Ossaotaa D Wcesoe twif 10 elva«4 TT 4so«I Tv«Tao«0 «4 a «vows Ntavs IVII ) s I ~+ ~1 «otovota voav«va,vvvoTIND I ~ J- ~., 4 aa I ~ta fE I I I«v ~ TOADIat ~ v c. avttlv soocsvssv caoescviws 01 lavessa I I ~ 1" I ssvoo s~ N.~4'Svs 0 iv CllslllIlais ~ ~ aot sraf assi«la, I,~ ~ c ------+- l- ~ .---1- - - ID«DNN I wv t "~s J I ~ S. I ~ 141(OSCO Cats W Hail~ tsvl Wsoa ~N SW rill F N ~4 Vo N«O IIII«Isola C«f Nv IDDD 4 ~ Io(SN I)m I N 04 V 4 4 0«« toakWV laos44 ~ ~ ' ~ «S. 1(41 ss I~ ~ ~ N I ( I ~ Ioi ~ ll ~ ~ S«ON I ~4 svl ~ 'so«v»aos co OINNI ~SII (sails I I'« ct I~v ~ 4« I «I ~ 44 11 1 OOSN«t O«t«A s Omar NlI C t 'I 4 4 L vso-NW ""«C'» P» 1 ~4 DW4 ~ ta Dov ot aao 'Y1 «aJl ,v I 4 QP) ~ io I ~ . ~' 1,'.lp i ~ OQSN ~ ' vo ( «04 ='7'at IY I '4 ~ 4 s 444 ss C C f( 4 IIGII >- 44 J I I4 l~ IlV«as \o«S S I N sl I I O'I ) ICSI) ' I 1 I I Iloi t 4 ''ox ) ON CNSIL SOOSI «14 I V«1 p«INDI ~ o Isa IIK(oes I (40 «on Y «4 «4 Y Y ~ ~ i« B » at'«ll rise I I » SIO N~l I ' I 4'tal ~ n '', I I I tie N«sa 0« I I I ~ Tv 4 4 ~~,jP~, I ~ N«L W --..-- ~ C- ~ 4 Ill ------C----.-..-.—.)...--. I Ai I QN )IKf ~ Cs ~ i L.-;I Oaf Nl lI COVWK ~ Voloa 0 ) 'c «taa.s3 CNO N ~S«I ( (Tots ~ ~ f C D I I ) 'l ~4 «I HW ~Vt Kt(N««04 Aossa Vsso.a V'IID « CD(k«0 VVC~ Still« I'4«os 3 As Llsv IIIVI I ~ I Is ~ «Oval a Vaovoa N«N w s«w WI4 I4 8 IB v ~ casa vo sia «I ~ I l E« ~ ~ V V ~44 ~t OIOCOCOC ~ Oraa Os t'4 \w C SC LNI 1 I. 0(CDIIL«0. NI«a«ss Isl«sas I f cs ~ '«ISO 4 B ~ Nllol «love 40A WLass ON N Ssl ~ 'ASIA I ~I SN Seo ~ NO«I I 'Icosa I '«als h«4 vs ross «os « IL 0'vis ~ . Ns II1 ~ ( l rv sa ~ os ss« I ~ Slaa ICSCIIIaXl)Offtl IISV4CSSflÃf «So«l ~ f«IDN IC Iota l GEIAII. I l«a lllssCT 404l «4 ~ ~ 4« IAO ~'ISTO IWI4lo(T WIS VOLVO ClvvllNa INONON Wlf IC As NIIIL I. clsilsl 14 «v«va s«sv Iv IIIO P * ID REACTOR SLOG. CHIU.ED 17FATER ww« M IS) a.vss Icvc Q S E-IG6292. SII) 'I ' ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ S ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '1 'I B 174 IB ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ 5 I4 IQ ~ ~ ~ ~ \y ~ I ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ IPI ~ a ~ J i t 1 l I