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“Libertarian” “Econom Ic -R Ig AUTISTIC SCREECHING MEME (COMMUNIST) A1 A11 WOLF (POLITICAL COMPASS MEME) FORMER SOVIET UNION NATIONAL & POLITICAL SYMBOL A2 A12 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) FLAG OF NORTH KOREA A3 A13 PEPE THE FROG / NAZI PEPE NORTH KOREAN CHEERLEADERS A4 A14 BOSTON DYNAMICS DOG 50 CENT ARMY, CHINA A6 “AUTHORITARIAN” A15 DISCORD EMOTE (EMOJI) 50 CENT ARMY, CHINA A7 A16 14/88 (CODE FOR « FOURTEEN WORDS / HEIL HITLER ») « I DON’T WANT 60 CENTS, 50 IS ENOUGH! » A8 A17 JARED TAYLOR INTERNET WATER ARMY, CHINA A9 A19 GÉNÉRATION IDENTITAIRE GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 A10 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 A20 AUTISTIC SCREECHING MEME (WHITE SUPREMACIST) RED FLAG (EMOJI) B1 B11 WHITE POLO SHIRT NUCLEAR WEAPON, NORTH KOREA B2 B12 ADER JANOS KIM JONG-UN B4 B17 RODRIGO DUTERTE BEE (EMOJI) B5 B18 BREITBART NEWS NETWORK « UNHEALTHY INTERNET » COMIC STRIPS, CHINA B6 A A B18 RED PILL « I AM A FIFTY CENTER, AND PROUD OF IT! » B7 FLAG OF NORTH KOREA NORTH KOREAN 50 CENT ARMY, CHINA 50 CENT ARMY, CHINA GÉNÉRATION IDENTITAIRE B19 RICHARD SPENCER CHEERLEADERS FLAG OF CHINA B9 « I DON’T WANT 60 CENTS, NATIONAL SECURITY CODE FOR « FOURTEEN JARED TAYLOR B20 FLAG OF CHILE GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 WOLF AUTISTIC SCREECHING 50 IS ENOUGH! » AGENCY (NSA) WORDS / HEIL HITLER » AUTISTIC SCREECHING BOSTON DYNAMICS DOG DONALD TRUMP WITH KIM JONG-UN B10 MEME (COMMUNIST) MEME (WHITE C11 JAROSŁAW KACZYŃSKI PEPE THE FROG / RODRIGO DUTERTE SUPREMACIST) JOSEPH STALIN (MEME) C1 NAZI PEPE C14 PEPE THE FROG / ANGRY PEPE INTERNET WATER ARMY, INTERNET CULTURE BUSINESS LICENSE C5 CHINA DISCORD EMOTE C15 FOX NEWS CHANNEL SINA WEIBO C7 C16 THE DAILY STORMER (WEBSITE) WECHAT APP C8 B B C17 FREE SPEECH CONCEPT WEAPONIZED BY ALT-RIGHT EXPRESSVPN C9 C18 STEVE BANNON WHITE POLO SHIRT THE GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA C10 BREITBART NEWS FLAG OF CHILE C19 THE REBEL MEDIA (WEBSITE) BEE NETWORK VLADIMIR PUTIN AS PEPE THE FROG C10 « I AM A FIFTY CENTER, C20 MIKE PENCE AND PROUD OF IT! » DONALD TRUMP WITH HUGO CHÁVEZ D1 NUCLEAR WEAPON, D12 ARMY OF JESUS (COMMUNITY) KIM JONG-UN NORTH KOREA THE GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA D3 « UNHEALTHY INTERNET » D13 INTERNET TROLL COMIC STRIPS THE DAILY STORMER RICHARD SPENCER RED STAR OS D4 (WEBSITE) D14 NECKBEARDS FLAG OF CHINA XI JINPING D5 ADER JANOS FOX NEWS CHANNEL D15 HARAMBE MEME INTERNET CULTURE WINNIE-THE-POOH D6 C C D16 PEPE THE FROG / DONALD TRUMP KIM JONG-UN BUSINESS LICENSE PEPE THE FROG / BAIDU, INC. D7 ANGRY PEPE D17 4CHAN FREE SPEECH CONCEPT THE GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA D8 WEAPONIZED BY ALT-RIGHT D18 /POL/ POLITICALLY INCORRECT BOARD (4CHAN) PEPPA PIG (CARTOON) E3 E11 VLADISLAV SURKOV JOSEPH STALIN (MEME) WECHAT APP JAROSŁAW KACZYŃSKI STEVE BANNON BIAOQING MEME E4 SINA WEIBO THE REBEL MEDIA E12 ABC NEWS (FAKE NEWS WEBSITE) (WEBSITE) BIAOQING MEME E5 E13 DONALD TUSK EXPRESSVPN MIKE PENCE WINNIE-THE-POOH MEME E6 E14 PEPE THE FROG / SMUG PEPE TENCENT QQ E7 RED STAR OS E15 TOPKEK (CAKE) D HARAMBE MEME /POL/ POLITICALLY D INCORRECT BOARD BIG YELLOW DUCK MEME E8 E16 POLICE OFFICER (4CHAN) THE GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA E8 ARMY OF JESUS NECKBEARDS E16 SILDENAFIL (VIAGRA) 4 CHAN WINNIE-THE-POOH VLADIMIR PUTIN AS PEPE (COMMUNITY) PEPE THE FROG / /POL/ POLITICS AS THEATRE E9 THE FROG DONALD TRUMP E17 GAB (SOCIAL NETWORK) BAIDU, INC. INTERNET TROLL INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY (RUSSIAN TROLL FARM) E10 XI JINPING E18 JAIR BOLSONARO NICOLÁS MADURO F1 E20 DONALD TRUMP PEPPA PIG LEFTYPOL MEME (8CHAN) F2 HUGO CHÁVEZ F11 SPUTNIK (NEWS AGENCY) TENCENT QQ THE GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA F4 SOCKPUPPET (INTERNET) F14 CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA LTD (CA) E DONALD TUSK E THE GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA F6 ABC NEWS (FAKE PEPE THE FROG / TOPKEK (CAKE) POLICE OFFICER SILDENAFIL (VIAGRA) F15 BARBIE (DOLL) BIAOQING MEME BIG YELLOW DUCK MEME NEWS WEBSITE) SMUG FROG GAB (SOCIAL NETWORK) THE GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA F7 BIAOQING MEME F17 HOLY BIBLE VLADISLAV SURKOV EXTINCTION REBELLION MOVEMENT F8 WINNIE-THE-POOH MEME F18 JEB BUSH INTERNET RESEARCH JAIR BOLSONARO WEB BRIGADES F9 AGENCY DONALD TRUMP F19 MITT ROMNEY K. MARX AND F. ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO G1 G13 THERESA MAY SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK (MEME) G2 G14 FNN (FAKE NEWS NETWORK) YELLOW VESTS MOVEMENT G5 G16 SHOTGUNS F RUSSIAN WEB BRIGADES F GUERRILLA GIRLS G7 G17 CHRISTIAN FAMILY (RUSSIA’S TROLL ARMY) GRETA THUNBERG G9 G17 COWBOYS JACK MA G10 G18 PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST LEFTYPOL SOVIET SKELLINGTON H1 G19 INARTICULATE YELLING NICOLÁS MADURO MITT ROMNEY ANONYMOUS (GROUP) H2 HOLY BIBLE JEB BUSH G20 KING KONG LEFTYPOL MEME (8CHAN) “ SMART WOJAK H3 H11 BEYONCÉ SPUTNIK (NEWS AGENCY) ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ H4 EXTINCTION REBELLION H12 BARACK OBAMA SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX H6 G G H13 RUSSIAN TROLLS ON REDDIT SHOTGUNS ECONOMIC-RIGHT” GREENPEACE H7 H14 SPURDO SPÄRDE SLUTWALK I9 PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, H15 PICKUP TRUCK COWBOYS THE DEATH OF THE WEST INARTICULATE YELLING #METOO MOVEMENT I9 H16 SOUTH PARK JACK MA CHRISTIAN FAMILY JUAN GUAIDÓ I10 K. MARX AND F. ENGELS, ALEXANDRIA H18 ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENTS THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO OCASIO-CORTEZ JACOBIN (MAGAZINE) J1 H18 TEA PARTY BEYONCÉ SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK KING KONG JEREMY CORBIN J3 GRETA THUNBERG H19 BODYBUILDING THERESA MAY YANIS VAROUFAKIS J4 GUERRILLA GIRLS H20 PARIS HILTON & NICOLE RICHIE H ANTI-ABORTION H MOVEMENTS DIEM25 (DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE MOVEMENT 2025) J5 BARACK OBAMA PICKUP TRUCK I11 SHEPARD FAIREY, HOPE BERNIE SANDERS J5 I11 ARAB SPRING ALYSSA MILANO (#METOO) J7 SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, I12 STARBUCKS CORPORATION THE SECOND SEX SMART WOJAK TARANA BURKE (#METOO) J8 PARIS HILTON I13 MICROSOFT CORPORATION (MS) SPURDO SPÄRDE SOUTH PARK & NICOLE RICHIE HOLLYWOOD J9 BODYBUILDING I14 ANGELA MERKEL ORDINARY PEOPLE (AKA. NORMIES) J10 SHEPARD FAIREY, HOPE RUSSIAN TROLLS I17 STOP TRUMP MOVEMENT ON REDDIT JUAN GUAIDÓ J12 CHAD I STARBUCKS CORPORATION STOP TRUMP I SLUTWALK MOVEMENT J13 STACY J14 AMAZON, INC. LEFTYPOL SOVIET J16 HILLARY CLINTON SKELLINGTON J17 MONSTER ENERGY (ENERGY DRINK) MICROSOFT CORPORATION (MS) J18 KIM KARDASHIAN ARAB SPRING ANGELA MERKEL J18 CLICKHOLE (WEBSITE) J19 JAMES BOND (LITERARY CHARACTER) KIM KARDASHIAN FIGHT CLUB JACOBIN (MAGAZINE) (TYLER DURDEN) J20 FIGHT CLUB (TYLER DURDEN) J ALYSSA MILANO J JEREMY CORBYN CHAD HILLARY CLINTON BERNIE SANDERS TARANA BURKE MONSTER ENERGY (ENERGY DRINK) JAMES BOND STACY CLICKHOLE (WEBSITE) (LITERARY CHARACTER) YANIS VAROUFAKIS K NIKE K NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO MAINSTREAM MEDIA (MSM) JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE GENDER UBER DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE PROTEST FREE BSD AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED ANTIFA MOVEMENT (ANTIFASCHISTISCHE AKTION) K1 ANTIFA GRITTY GRITTY MASCOT / MEME K2 EMMANUEL MACRON DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE PROTEST K4 L GAY CLOWN PUTIN CHOKER LAUREN SOUTHERN L MEME NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO K5 NEIL LYNDON, GENDER K6 MILO YIANNOPOULOS NO MORE SEX WAR CONTROVERSY OVER STUDENTS JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE K7 MOCKING NATIVE AMERICAN K11 MAINSTREAM MEDIA (MSM) NIKE (COLIN KAEPERNICK COMMERCIAL) K8 K12 FREE BSD CONSTRUCTION WORKER (EMOJI) K9 COLIBRI FAST FOOD K13 EMMANUEL MACRON HENRY MILLER, CABLE NEWS NETWORK (CNN) K9 TROPIC OF CANCER K15 ALEXANDRE BENALLA BUZZFEED (WEBSITE) BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION (BBC) K10 M GOOGLE LLC M K16 UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. AIRBNB , I N C . GONDOLA L2 K18 AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED APPLE, INC. PUSSY RIOT STUDENTS MOCKING NATIVE AMERICAN L4 RHODES MUST FALL K20 LAUREN SOUTHERN (#RHODESMUSTFALL) ALICIA GARZA, PATRISSE VICE (MAGAZINE) CULLORS, & OPAL TOMETI GAY CLOWN PUTIN MEME L5 L11 ALIBABA GROUP ECONOMIC-LEFT” THE GUARDIAN L6 L11 FAST FOOD LEFTIST POLITICALLY CHOKER L10 INCORRECT BOARD JEZEBEL (WEBSITE) L17 NEIL LYNDON, NO MORE SEX WAR (8CHAN) BUZZFEED (WEBSITE) M5 MARK ZUCKERBERG L19 MILO YIANNOPOULOS “ RHODES MUST FALL (#RHODESMUSTFALL) M6 N N M11 VICE (MAGAZINE) COLIBRI (POLITICAL COMPASS MEME) M7 GONDOLA M12 AIRBNB , I N C . AVOCADO (MILLENNIAL FOOD TREND) M7 PAUL GOODMAN, M13 APPLE, INC. GROWING UP ABSURD PORKY TUMBLR RAINBOW FLAG BLACK LIVES MATTER M8 ADAM CURTIS, M15 MARK ZUCKERBERG (MAN OF THE BOURGEOISIE) (LGBT MOVEMENT) HYPERNORMALISATION AMAZON ECHO « RED PILL » (MATRIX ALICIA GARZA, PATRISSE CULLORS, OPAL TOMETI M9 FEMEN SPIDER MOVIE) M20 HENRY MILLER, TROPIC OF CANCER CGI INFLUENCERS (ALEXA SPEAKER) GAY PRIDE PARADE WARREN FARRELL, PUSSY RIOT M10 (LIL MIQUELA) N11 INSTAGR AM INSTAGRAM THE MYTH OF MALE POWER PORKY (MAN OF THE BOURGEOISIE) N1 N12 CGI INFLUENCERS (LIL MIQUELA) LEFTIST POLITICALLY INCORRECT BOARD (8CHAN) N3 N13 AMAZON ECHO (ALEXA SPEAKER) SNOWFLAKE GENERATION FACEBOOK TUMBLR N5 O O N16 FACEBOOK, INC. COMPUTATIONAL THE FOUNDATION RAINBOW FLAG (LGBT MOVEMENT) N6 8CHAN N17 SPIDER (EMOJI) /LEFTYPOL/ PROPAGANDA RESEARCH FOR PEER TO PEER PROJECT ALTERNATIVES GAY PRIDE PARADE N7 NON PLAYABLE N18 WARREN FARRELL, THE MYTH OF MALE POWER WOJAK / FEELS GUY PEPE THE FROG / OCCUPY WALL STREET SPOONIES CHARACTER (NPC) RED PILL ADAM CURTIS, HYPERNORMALISATION N8 (MEME) BOY’S CLUB COMIC MARS (PLANET) REDDIT N19 « RED PILL » (MATRIX MOVIE) (OWS) FEMEN N10 N20 PAUL GOODMAN, GROWING UP ABSURD 8CHAN 8CHAN (/LEFTYPOL/) O1 O12 DORITOS (TORTILLA CHIP CRISP) NEIL STRAUSS, THE GAME OCCUPY WALL STREET O3 O14 MARS (PLANET) WOJAK / FEELS GUY (MEME) O4 YELLOW VESTS O16 8CHAN (IMAGEBOARD WEBSITE) P MOVEMENT P PEPE THE FROG / BOY’S CLUB COMIC O5 MULTIGENDER OTHERKIN O17 REDDIT (WEBSITE) LIVEJOURNAL (WEBSITE) GOLDSMITHS, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON O6 ANGELA NAGLE, O18 NON PLAYABLE CHARACTER (NPC) KILL ALL NORMIES SPOONIES (DISABILITY OR CHRONIC ILLNESS) O6 REDDIT O19 RED PILL STANFORD UNIVERSITY O7 O20 NEIL STRAUSS, THE GAME SNOWFLAKE GENERATION O7 P11 YELLOW VESTS MOVEMENT AMERICAN PSYCHO 4CHAN BLACK HOODIE COMPUTATIONAL
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