Valuing Spectrum Allocations Thomas W
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Recent Developments in Cybersecurity Melanie J
American University Business Law Review Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 1 2013 Fiddling on the Roof: Recent Developments in Cybersecurity Melanie J. Teplinsky Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aublr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Teplinsky, Melanie J. "Fiddling on the Roof: Recent Developments in Cybersecurity." American University Business Law Review 2, no. 2 (2013): 225-322. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Business Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLES FIDDLING ON THE ROOF: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CYBERSECURITY MELANIE J. TEPLINSKY* TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction .......................................... ..... 227 I. The Promise and Peril of Cyberspace .............. ........ 227 II. Self-Regulation and the Challenge of Critical Infrastructure ......... 232 III. The Changing Face of Cybersecurity: Technology Trends ............ 233 A. Mobile Technology ......................... 233 B. Cloud Computing ........................... ...... 237 C. Social Networking ................................. 241 IV. The Changing Face of Cybersecurity: Cyberthreat Trends ............ 244 A. Cybercrime ................................. ..... 249 1. Costs of Cybercrime -
The Cio's Guide to Quantum Computing
THE CIO’S GUIDE TO QUANTUM COMPUTING November 2020 COPYRIGHT ©2020 CBS INTERACTIVE INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THE CIO’S GUIDE TO QUANTUM COMPUTING TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 Introduction 3 Quantum computers are coming. Get ready for them to change everything 10 Research: Quantum computing will impact the enterprise, despite being misunderstood 12 What is quantum computing? Understanding the how, why and when of quantum computers 23 Quantum computing has arrived, but we still don’t really know what to do with it 26 CIO Jury: How quantum computing will affect the enterprise 28 Quantum computing: Five ways you can get involved 31 Quantum computers could soon reveal all of our secrets. The race is on to stop that happening 36 8 companies leading in quantum computing endeavors in 2020 41 What classic software developers need to know about quantum computing 50 Quantum computing meets cloud computing: D-Wave says its 5,000-qubit system is ready for business 2 COPYRIGHT ©2020 CBS INTERACTIVE INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THE CIO’S GUIDE TO QUANTUM COMPUTING INTRODUCTION Quantum computers offer great promise for cryptography and optimization problems, and companies like IBM, Google, and D-Wave are racing to make them practical for business use. This special feature from TechRepublic and ZDNet explores what quantum computers will and won’t be able to do and the challenges we still face. QUANTUM COMPUTERS ARE COMING. GET READY FOR THEM TO CHANGE EVERYTHING Quantum computers are not yet creating business value, but CIOs should nonetheless lose no time in getting involved. BY DAPHNE LEPRINCE-RINGUET/ZDNET Supermarket aisles filled with fresh produce are probably not where you would expect to discover some of the first benefits of quantum computing. -
Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: an Experimental
CommonValue Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz‐Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking* 21 May 2009 Abstract We experimentally test alternative auction designs suitable for pricing and removing troubled assets from banks’ balance sheets as part of the financial rescue. Many individual securities or pools of securities are auctioned simultaneously. Securities that are widely held are purchased in auctions for individual securities. Securities with concentrated ownership are purchased as pools of related securities. Each bank has private information about its liquidity need and the true common value of each security. We study bidding behavior and performance of sealed‐ bid uniform‐price auctions and dynamic clock auctions. The clock and sealed‐bid auctions resulted in similar prices. However, the clock auctions resulted in substantially higher bank payoffs, since the dynamic auction enabled the banks to better manage their liquidity needs. The clock auctions also reduced bidder error. The experiments demonstrated the feasibility of quickly implementing simple and effective auction designs to help resolve the crisis. (JEL D44, C92, G01, G21. Keywords: financial crisis, uniform‐price auction, clock auction, market design, experiments, troubled assets, TARP.) 1 Introduction On 3 October 2008, the US Congress passed and the President signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Public Law 110‐343). The Act established the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). It authorized the US Treasury to purchase troubled assets in order to restore liquidity to financial markets, favoring. the use of market mechanisms such as reverse auctions for asset purchases. -
The Evolution of U.S. Spectrum Values Over Time
The Evolution of U.S. Spectrum Values Over Time Michelle Connolly, Department of Economics, Duke University Nelson Sa, Department of Economics, Brandeis University Azeem Zaman, Department of Statistics, Harvard University Chris Roark, Department of Economics, University of Chicago Akshaya Trivedi, Trinity College, Duke University, Class of 2018 Working Paper Series 2018 | 121 Evolution of spectrum values 1 The Evolution of U.S. Spectrum Values Over Time Michelle Connolly1, Nelson Sá2, Azeem Zaman3, Chris Roark4, and Akshaya Trivedi5 February 13, 2018 Abstract We consider 1997 to 2015 data from FCC spectrum auctions related to cellular services to attempt to identify intrinsic spectrum values. Relative to previous literature, we control for license specific auction rules, and introduce measures to separate out technological progress that effectively reduces spectrum scarcity from progress that increases demand. Results confirm that technological changes have led to increases in the relative value of higher frequencies. Surprisingly, 47 percent of these licenses have been won by “small” bidders, representing 27 percent of the real value of these licenses. The use of bidding credits further appears to consistently reduce auction competition. Keywords: Spectrum, Spectrum Scarcity, Auctions, FCC, Auction Rules, Mobile Applications, Spectral Efficiency, Broadband Speeds, Closed Auctions, Small Bidders, “The Google Effect” JEL Codes: L5, O3, K2 1 Corresponding author: Michelle Connolly, [email protected], 213 Social Sciences, Box 90097, Department of Economics, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708. 2 Department of Economics, Brandeis University. 3 Department of Statistics, Harvard University. 4 Department of Economics, University of Chicago. 5 Trinity College, Duke University Class of 2018. We gratefully acknowledge the support of NSF grant 1314468. -
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Putting Auction Theory to Work Paul Milgrom With a Foreword by Evan Kwerel © 2003 “In Paul Milgrom's hands, auction theory has become the great culmination of game theory and economics of information. Here elegant mathematics meets practical applications and yields deep insights into the general theory of markets. Milgrom's book will be the definitive reference in auction theory for decades to come.” —Roger Myerson, W.C.Norby Professor of Economics, University of Chicago “Market design is one of the most exciting developments in contemporary economics and game theory, and who can resist a master class from one of the giants of the field?” —Alvin Roth, George Gund Professor of Economics and Business, Harvard University “Paul Milgrom has had an enormous influence on the most important recent application of auction theory for the same reason you will want to read this book – clarity of thought and expression.” —Evan Kwerel, Federal Communications Commission, from the Foreword For Robert Wilson Foreword to Putting Auction Theory to Work Paul Milgrom has had an enormous influence on the most important recent application of auction theory for the same reason you will want to read this book – clarity of thought and expression. In August 1993, President Clinton signed legislation granting the Federal Communications Commission the authority to auction spectrum licenses and requiring it to begin the first auction within a year. With no prior auction experience and a tight deadline, the normal bureaucratic behavior would have been to adopt a “tried and true” auction design. But in 1993 there was no tried and true method appropriate for the circumstances – multiple licenses with potentially highly interdependent values. -
Collusion and Equilibrium Selection in Auctions∗
Collusion and equilibrium selection in auctions∗ By Anthony M. Kwasnica† and Katerina Sherstyuk‡ Abstract We study bidder collusion and test the power of payoff dominance as an equi- librium selection principle in experimental multi-object ascending auctions. In these institutions low-price collusive equilibria exist along with competitive payoff-inferior equilibria. Achieving payoff-superior collusive outcomes requires complex strategies that, depending on the environment, may involve signaling, market splitting, and bid rotation. We provide the first systematic evidence of successful bidder collusion in such complex environments without communication. The results demonstrate that in repeated settings bidders are often able to coordinate on payoff superior outcomes, with the choice of collusive strategies varying systematically with the environment. Key words: multi-object auctions; experiments; multiple equilibria; coordination; tacit collusion 1 Introduction Auctions for timber, automobiles, oil drilling rights, and spectrum bandwidth are just a few examples of markets where multiple heterogeneous lots are offered for sale simultane- ously. In multi-object ascending auctions, the applied issue of collusion and the theoretical issue of equilibrium selection are closely linked. In these auctions, bidders can profit by splitting the markets. By acting as local monopsonists for a disjoint subset of the objects, the bidders lower the price they must pay. As opposed to the sealed bid auction, the ascending auction format provides bidders with the -
A Former TMZ Employee Said She Was Fired After Complaining About a Sexist, Toxic Work Environment
A Former TMZ Employee Said She Was Fired After Complaining About A Sexist, Toxic Work Environment buzzfeednews.com/article/krystieyandoli/ex-tmz-employee-lawsuit A former TMZ employee filed a lawsuit against the celebrity gossip show’s parent companies Warner Bros. Entertainment and EHM Productions on Tuesday alleging gender discrimination and retaliation. Bernadette Zilio, 27, worked at TMZ and TooFab, another entertainment site owned by Warner Bros. and EHM Productions, from 2015 to 2020 and said she was fired after she complained to HR about a culture of toxicity and sexism. TMZ founder Harvey Levin, TooFab Managing Editor Shyam Dodge, and TooFab Senior Producer Ross McDonagh are also named in the lawsuit. In the complaint, which was filed Tuesday with the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing, Zilio said she went to Warner Bros. HR representatives in April 2019 about issues of “sexism, belittlement, preferential treatment and lies running rampant on [her] team.” She told HR that she felt there was a division of how men and women were treated on her team, and that when she spoke up about McDonagh writing articles she considered sexist and offensive, such as one that compared Rihanna getting sick with bronchitis and the “attack on her lungs” to her being attacked by Chris Brown, her concerns about making light of domestic violence were dismissed. The complaint also says that Zilio and her female colleagues described the work environment as “a boys’ club,” “100% a bro fest,” and a “freaking frat house.” “The first time I went to HR, they launched an investigation,” Zilio told BuzzFeed News. -
Faculty Senate Leadership Graduate School of Education Awards Law
UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA Tuesday, May 9, 2000 Volume 46 Number 32 www.upenn.edu/almanac/ Faculty Senate Leadership New Roles for Dean Lang The Faculty Senate President Judith Rodin announced last week leadership for 2000- that she had accepted with regret the decision of 2001, as of May 3: School of Nursing Phoebe Leboy is the Dean Norma Lang to newly elected past step down as dean, ef- chair; Larry Gross, fective this summer. center, continues as Dr. Lang, the Marga- chair; and David ret Bond Simon Dean Hackney is chair- of Nursing, is a world- elect. See SEC renowned nursing Actions on page 2. leader, educator and researcher. She has served as Dean since 1992 and will assume Phoebe Leboy Larry Gross David Hackney an endowed nursing professorship in the faculty. Norma Lang “The University is deeply grateful to Dean Graduate School of Education Awards Lang for the record of accomplishment the The Graduate School of Education has an- School has achieved under her leadership,” said nounced this year’s recipients of awards for fac- President Rodin. The School of Nursing is cur- ulty and students. Two awards were given to rently the top-funded private nursing school in faculty and three awards were given to students. federal research dollars from the NIH and con- Excellence in Teaching: Dr. Margaret Beale sistently ranked in the top two schools nation- Spencer, GSE Board of Overseers Professor of ally by the U.S. News & World Report survey of Education, director of CHANGES and director graduate schools. President Rodin continued, of DuBois Collective. -
2011 Kevin & Bean Clips Listed by Date
2011 Kevin & Bean clips listed by date January 03 Monday 01 Opening Segment-2011-01-03-No What It Do Nephew segment.mp3 02 Show Biz Beat-2011-01-03-6 am.mp3 03 Highlights Of Dick Clark and Ryan Seacrest-New Years Eve-2011-01-03.mp3 04 Harvey Levin-TMZ-2011-01-03.mp3 05 The Internet Round-up-2011-01-03.mp3 06 Show Biz Beat-2011-01-03-7 am.mp3 07 Thanks For That Info Bean-2011-01-03.mp3 08 Broken New Years Resolutions-2011-01-03.mp3 09 Show Biz Beat-2011-01-03-8 am.mp3 10 Eli Manning-2011-01-03-Turns 30 Today.mp3 11 Patton Oswalt-2011-01-03-New Book Out.mp3 12 Show Biz Beat-2011-01-03-9 am-Patton Oswalt Sits In.mp3 13 Dick Clark New Years Eve-More Highlights-2011-01-03-Patton Oswalt Sits In.mp3 14 Calling Arkansas About 2000 Dead Birds-2011-01-03-Patton Oswalt Sits In.mp3 15 Show Biz Beat-2011-01-03-10 am.mp3 January 04 Tuesday 01 Opening Segment-2011-01-04.mp3 02a Bean Did Not Realize It Was King Of Mexicos Birthday-2011-01-04.mp3 02b Show Biz Beat-2011-01-04-6 am.mp3 03 Calling Arkansas About 2000 Dead Birds-from Monday 2011-01-03-Patton Oswalt Sits In.mp3 04 and 14 Hotline To Heaven-2011-01-04-Michael Jackson.mp3 05 Oprah Rules In Kevins House-2011-01-04.mp3 06 Show Biz Beat-2011-01-04-7 am.mp3 07 Strange Addictions-2011-01-04-Listener Call-in.mp3 08 Paula Abdul-2011-01-04-On Her New TV Show.mp3 09 Show Biz Beat-2011-01-04-8 am.mp3 10 Bean Passed Out On Christmas Eve-2011-01-04-Wife Donna Explains.mp3 11 Psycho Body-2011-01-04.mp3 12 Show Biz Beat-2011-01-04-9 am.mp3 13 Afro Calls-2011-01-04.mp3 15 Show Biz Beat-2011-01-04-10 am.mp3 -
Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions
Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions Patrick Bajari and Jungwon Yeo October 19, 2008 Abstract The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has used auctions to award spectrum since 1994. During this time period, the FCC has experimented with a variety of auctions rules including click box bidding and anonymous bidding. These rule changes make the actions of bidders less visible during the auction and also limit the set of bids which can be submitted by a bidder during a particular round. Economic theory suggests that tacit collusion may be more di¢ cult as a result. We examine this proposition using data from 4 auctions: the PCS C Block, Auction 35, the Advanced Wireless Service auction and the 700 Mhz auction. We examine the frequency of jump bids, retaliatory bids and straightforward bids across these auctions. While this simple descriptive exercise has a number of limitations, the data suggests that these rule changes did limit …rms ability to tacitly collude. Bajari: Univeristy of Minnesota and NBER, Yeo: Univeristy of Minnesota. Bajari would like to thank the National Science Foundation for generous research support. 1 1 Introduction Starting in 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has used auctions to award spectrum. Prior to this time, the FCC used administrative hearings or lotteries to award licenses. Economic theory suggests that auctions should have a number of advantages over these earlier mechanisms. First, in many auction models, game theory predicts that the bidder which values the item most highly will win the auction. Therefore, the auction results in an e¢ cient allocation. -
Comments on the Above-Noted Consultation
Rogers Communications Inc. 333 Bloor Street East Toronto, Ontario M4W 1G9 Tel. (416) 935-7211 Fax (416) 935-7719 [email protected] Dawn Hunt Vice-President Regulatory July 15, 2009 Director, Spectrum Management Operations Radiocommunications and Broadcasting Regulatory Branch Industry Canada 300 Slater Street Ottawa ON K1A 0C8 Sent via email: [email protected] Re: Canada Gazette, Part I, April 11, 2009, Gazette Notice No. DGRB-001-09, Consultation on the Revisions to the Framework for Spectrum Auctions in Canada Rogers Communications Inc. (Rogers) appreciates the opportunity to provide reply comments on the above-noted consultation. The documents are being sent in Adobe Acrobat Professional Version 8.0. Operating System: Microsoft Windows XP. Yours very truly, Dawn Hunt Attach. WIRELESS DIGITAL CABLE INTERNET HOME PHONE VIDEO PUBLISHING BROADCASTING Reply Comments of Rogers Communications Inc. (Rogers) Canada Gazette Notice No. DGRB-001-09 Consultation on Revisions to the Framework for Spectrum Auctions in Canada Published in the Canada Gazette, Part I April 11, 2009 July 15, 2009 Rogers Communications Inc DGRB-001-09 July 15, 2009 Executive Summary Rogers Communications Inc. (“Rogers) provides the following reply to the submissions filed by other parties in response to Industry Canada’s Consultation on Revisions to the Framework for Spectrum Auctions in Canada (the “Consultation Paper”). In the Consultation Paper, the Department invited comments about spectrum management in Canada, including the use of auction types other than simultaneous multiple-round ascending (SMRA), the renewal of long-term licences, the research and development (R&D) condition of licence, and Tier areas for spectrum licensing. -
Spectrum Auctions from the Perspective of Matching
Spectrum Auctions from the Perspective of Matching Paul Milgrom and Andrew Vogt May 5, 2021 1 Introduction In July 1994, the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted the first economist-designed auction for radio spectrum licenses. In the years since, governments worldwide have come to rely on auction mecha- nisms to allocate { and reallocate { rights to use electromagnetic frequencies. Over the same period, novel uses for spectrum have dramatically increased both the demand for licenses and auction prices, drawing continued attention to the nuances of spectrum markets and driving the development of spectrum auction design. In August 2017, the FCC completed the Broadcast Incentive Auction, a two-sided repurposing of an endogenously-determined quantity of spectrum that ranks among the most complex feats of economic engineering ever under- taken. The next generations of mobile telecommunications are poised to extend this growth, and to demand further innovation in the markets and algorithms that are used to assign spectrum licenses. What does all of this have to do with matching theory? Spectrum auctions differ from canonical matching problems in meaningful ways. Market designers often emphasize that a key element of matching markets is the presence of preferences on both sides of the market. In a marriage, for example, it is not enough that you choose your spouse; your spouse must also choose you. This two-sided choice structure applies also to matches between students and schools and between firms and workers, but not to matches between telecommunications companies and radio spectrum licenses. It is a different matching element that is often critically important in ra- dio spectrum auctions.