HAOL, Núm. 10 (Primavera, 2006), 17-36 ISSN 1696-2060

LIKE FATHER, LIKE SON? A COMPARISON OF THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF GEORGE H. W. AND GEORGE W. BUSH

Marc J. O’Reilly1 ; Wesley B. Renfro2 1 Heilderber Collage, United States. E-mail: [email protected] 2 University of Connecticut, United States. E-mail: [email protected]

Recibido: 3 Diciembre 2005 / Revisado: 23 Enero 2006 / Aceptado: 10 Febrero 2006 / Publicación Online: 15 Junio 2006

Abstract: This article applies cognitive (i.e., In 1992, the year Bill Clinton defeated H.W. leadership) and poliheuristic approaches to Bush in the November presidential election, the foreign-policy decision making to explain incumbent struck many Americans as a variances in the policies of George H.W. Bush bumbling New England Yankee whose mangled and George W. Bush. Juxtaposing these related syntax and unfamiliarity with checkout counter approaches highlights the how and why of scanners invited derision. As Clinton and Ross presidential decision making, providing a Perot attracted disaffected and other voters with synthetic, though more cogent, understanding of their folksy style, Bush, whose popularity foreign-policy analysis -- especially as it following Operation Desert Storm seemed to pertains to presidencies. The initial section of guarantee him a second term, stumbled badly as the article discusses the two theories. The the campaign climaxed. His defeat seemingly following section examines important decisions assured him a spot in the pantheon of utterly via case studies – one for each administration. forgettable presidents, the successor to the The final section analyzes the decisions in the popular but in no way his heir. context of the theories. While this article emphasizes the individual level of analysis, Bush’s qualities, often ridiculed while he served structural as well as domestic factors will also in the , found favor within a be discussed. decade, however, as Clinton and George W. Keywords: decision making, foreign policy, Bush exhibited traits often associated with their George H. W. Bush, George W. Bush, “Baby Boom” generation: arrogance, self- leadership, poliheuristic approach. servitude, and indulgence. As Americans ______watched Clinton and W. Bush eschew responsibility for their political and personal n February 12, 2006, Garry Trudeau’s misdeeds, many yearned for the propriety and Doonesbury cartoon juxtaposed the integrity of George H.W. Bush. Such nostalgia, O presidency of George Herbert Walker typical of much presidential history, overlooked Bush (1989-1993) with that of his son, George genuine failings, both his administration’s and Walker Bush (2001-present). Trudeau’s narrator his own, but this re-examination of his praised the elder Bush as “moderate, informed, presidency prompted an obvious question: Why prudent, responsible, forgiving, and modest” was George W. Bush not more like his father? while vilifying the younger Bush as immoral Furthermore, given George H.W. Bush’s and reckless, traits that have yielded disastrous acknowledged foreign-policy expertise, why did policies, both foreign and domestic. Trudeau his son’s diplomacy differ so starkly from his presented this installment of his cartoon as a own? mea culpa. During H.W. Bush’s tenure in the White House, Trudeau had maligned him The answers to these questions presume obvious consistently as “ineffectual and out of touch, a differences in policy and style, yet important caretaker president with no vision for the similarities exist and are important in explaining country” -- criticisms Democrats and many the foreign policies of both men. For example, Republicans repeated loudly and often1. George H.W. Bush authorized a U.S. invasion of

© Historia Actual Online 2006 17 Like Father, Like Son? Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro Panama in December 1989 and, like his son, George H.W. took the presidential oath of office defied international law and acted without the in January 1989 having served as Chief U.S. support of allies or the U.N. Although the Liaison to the People’s Republic of China, younger Bush receives much criticism for his Ambassador to the United Nations, Director of unwillingness to work with important allies, he the Central Intelligence Agency, and Vice has placed a premium on cooperating with President of the United States. Like his father, France and Germany, two countries that George W. worked in the Texas oil industry. vociferously opposed his policy, on the After a stint as co-owner of the Texas Rangers matter of Iranian nuclear proliferation. baseball club, he became Governor of Texas. Contrasting father and son may therefore not be Unlike “41,” he did not fight in a war (his father as easy as one thinks. Critics of George W. Bush was the youngest Navy pilot in World War II), may now tout his father’s foreign policy as although he served in the Texas Air National cautious, righteous, and sagacious, but this kind Guard. Importantly, George W. embraced of ex post facto analysis belies many Christianity following years of self-described contemporary assessments of George H.W. “hard drinking”. Bush’s diplomacy and military policy and, more seriously, points to a possible selectivity bias. With the above in mind, this article applies Given how journalists, policy analysts, and cognitive (i.e., leadership) and poliheuristic scholars scrutinize U.S. foreign policy, rarely approaches to foreign-policy decision making to does a serving president receive plaudits for his explain variances in the policies of George H.W. decisions. Presidents earn kudos only when their Bush and George W. Bush. Juxtaposing these policies can be understood and appreciated in related approaches highlights the how and why proper context – some of Harry Truman’s, of presidential decision making, providing a Dwight Eisenhower’s, and Reagan’s more synthetic, though more cogent, understanding of controversial policies come to mind. foreign-policy analysis -- especially as it pertains to presidencies. The initial section of Still, despite this caveat, a comparison between the article discusses the two theories. The the foreign policies of George H.W. Bush and following section examines important decisions George W. Bush is apropos for several reasons. via case studies – one for each administration. First, their familial ties (they are the first pater The final section analyzes the decisions in the et filius to achieve the presidency since John context of the theories. While this article Adams and in the late 18th emphasizes the individual level of analysis, and early 19th century) draw attention to structural as well as domestic factors will also psychological and sociological issues such as be discussed. the father-son dynamic, core beliefs, and generational effects. Second, George H.W. 1. COGNITIVE THEORY & LEADERSHIP Bush’s close relationship with his son afforded STYLES him and continues to afford him every opportunity to counsel his son -- unlike John Following the works of Thucydides, Titus Adams, who died in his offspring’s second year Livius, and many others, scholars have noted in office. Likewise, George W. Bush could and how individuals, no matter the background, can ask for his father’s advice. As well, George aptitude, and skill, help shape or determine W. no doubt learned much working for the man outcomes – political, economic, diplomatic, he affectionately calls “41” (as in forty-first military, or otherwise. Although systemic and president) while the latter occupied the White domestic variables can explain many events, House. Third, the Bushes represent different analysts must examine individuals as well, so factions of the Republican Party, both that national policies can be properly and fully ideological and geographical. While George understood2. The individual level of analysis H.W. is a Rockefeller Republican, George W. is spotlights issues such as previous experiences, a neo-Reaganite. Although they both graduated personality, beliefs, character, intellectual from Yale University, the elder Bush oozes East capabilities, thought processes, capacity for Coast establishment (he grew up in Connecticut, “learning”, leadership qualities, and negotiation the son of a U.S. senator, and owns a styles3. All these idiosyncratic factors combine Kennedyesque compound in Kennebunkport, to produce individual and group decisions. Maine), while the younger Bush epitomizes Texas cocksureness. Finally, each president Leadership often separates wise decisions from came to the job with a very different résumé. foolhardy ones. Effective leaders achieve

18 © Historia Actual Online 2006 Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro Like Father, Like Son? success, however defined, both for themselves others around one’s message”. For directive and their countries. Conversely, ineffective leaders, “[f]ocus of attention is on maintaining leaders, no matter their preparation and ability, one’s own and the government’s status and prove incapable of effecting desired results. That acceptance by others by engaging in actions on leadership matters in most cases, then, should be the world stage that enhance the state’s self-evident. As Margaret Hermann and Joe reputation”. For influential leaders, “[f]ocus of Hagan assert, “[l]eaders define states’ attention is on building cooperative relationships international and domestic constraints. Based on with other governments and states in order to their perceptions and interpretations, they build play a leadership role; by working with others, expectations, plan strategies, and urge actions on one can gain more than is possible on one’s their governments that conform with their own”. For collegial leaders, “[f]ocus of attention judgments about what is possible and likely to is on reconciling differences and building maintain them in their positions”4. Leaders consensus – on gaining prestige and status typically seek to impose their preferences upon through empowering others and sharing others (e.g., decision-makers, bureaucracies, and accountability”. publics) in hope that their foreign-policy views will prevail. How leaders tend to proceed Leadership style pairs respond differently to constitutes leadership style. their political environment. Expansionistic and evangelistic leaders (Pair I) “challenge Margaret Hermann states that this term “means constraints” but are “closed to information”. the ways in which leaders relate to those around Actively independent and directive leaders (Pair them – whether constituents, advisers, or other II) also challenge constraints, but remain “open leaders – and how they structure interactions and to information”. Incremental and influential the norms, rules, and principles they use to leaders (Pair III) “respect constraints”, but are guide such interactions”5. Hermann’s aggregate “closed to information”. Finally, opportunistic analysis measures how 122 leaders (from both and collegial leaders (Pair IV) “respect democratic and autocratic countries) responded constraints” but remain “open to information”8. to “political constraints” and dealt with “incoming information.” Her study also assesses Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany, and what motivated those leaders to seek office6. Timothy Shaw divide the four pairs into “crusaders” (Pair I), “strategists” (Pair II), Hermann’s leadership style matrix highlights “pragmatists” (Pair III), and “opportunists” (Pair eight possibilities7. When it comes to “problem IV). According to Hermann et al., Pair I leaders focus,” four styles manifest themselves: “are…usually crusading for or advocating a “expansionistic”, “actively independent”, position and being proactive. If the political “incremental” and “opportunistic”. With respect context facilitates what such leaders want to do, to “relationship focus,” leaders can be they can be effective in mobilizing others to “evangelistic”, “directive”, “influential” or action”. Hermann et al. add that, “[b]y being “collegial”. In the case of expansionistic leaders, convinced that available information supports “[f]ocus of attention is on expanding [a] their position, [crusaders] often create a very leader’s, government’s, and state’s span of persuasive rationale for what they are doing that control”. For actively independent leaders, gives their actions credibility and legitimacy. “[f]ocus of attention is on maintaining one’s Thus, in the decision making process, such own and the government’s maneuverability and leaders’ positions are likely to prevail as they independence in a world that is perceived to take charge and work to control what happens”. continually try to limit both”. For incremental Unlike crusaders, strategists seek information, leaders, “[f]ocus of attention is on improving which “is sought concerning what the most [the] state’s economy and/or security in feasible means are currently to reach [their] incremental steps while avoiding the obstacles goal”. For pragmatists, “the dilemma is to that will inevitably arise along the way”. For ensure that some progress is made toward a goal opportunistic leaders, “[f]ocus of attention is on without stepping outside the bounds of one’s assessing what is possible in the current position. If the time is right to push their own situation and context given what one wants to positions, they can do so; but such leaders can achieve and considering what important also accommodate to pressure if the time is not constituencies will allow”. For evangelistic quite right”. For opportunists, “knowledge about leaders, “[f]ocus of attention is on persuading the political context is crucial; they are the most others to join in one’s mission, in mobilizing sensitive to contextual information. Such leaders

© Historia Actual Online 2006 19 Like Father, Like Son? Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro are expedient, defining the problem and taking a influence of advisors, and conflict resolution -- position based on what important others seem to all salient themes in a comparison of the foreign be pushing.” Hermann et al. stress that policies of George H.W. Bush and George W. “[b]argaining lies at the heart of the political Bush14. game; unless some kind of consensus can be built, inaction is preferable to an action that has During the first stage of PH, leaders, especially the potential of losing support and building in crisis situations, are typically confronted with opposition”9. a bewildering number of plausible courses of action. Leaders use a dimensional and Each of the leadership styles represents an ideal noncompensatory decision making construct in type. Nevertheless, this typology should be an attempt to reduce this array to a more useful in explicating the foreign policies of manageable subset. Each possible policy is George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush. measured against a number of pertinent Another way to understand their foreign policies dimensions -- political, military, economic, etc. is to rely on poliheuristic theory. Unlike the compensatory or additive paradigm proposed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and 2. POLIHEURISTIC THEORY David Lalman, PH posits that options with favorable values in some dimensions cannot Although cognitive approaches to foreign policy compensate for unfavorable values on (a) analysis have contributed much to International critical dimension(s)15. Relations’ knowledge of why leaders make decisions, explanations of foreign policy Applied research confirms that PH is a outcomes rooted in the cognitive/psychological surprisingly flexible model of foreign policy tradition often fail to understand how key analysis and also suggests that the critical decisions, including the use of force, are dimension(s) may change over time, space, and reached10. Moreover, this approach faces serious context, and generally leaders do not pursue challenges from rationalist perspectives, largely policies that may endanger their own political inspired by the scholarship of Bruce Bueno de fortunes16. Mintz contends that “[p]olicy makers Mesquita11. Though both traditions have are political actors whose self-interest in powerful explanatory and predictive functions, political survival is paramount. Consequently, individually they appear to be incapable of policy makers are likely to reject outright any resolving many contentious and nuanced puzzles alternative that poses potentially very high plaguing the discipline. In the words of Patrick political costs, even if that same alternative also James and Enyu Zhang, “[i]t becomes yields potentially high benefits on other increasingly clear that neither approach alone dimensions”17. can provide a complete explanation of how and why foreign policy decisions are made, which This first, cognitive, stage of the PH model is creates the need for a unified model of decision especially fruitful to scholars because humans, processes and outcomes”12. even presidents and prime ministers used to balancing numerous demands and grueling Poliheuristic Theory (PH) is a sophisticated schedules, have a finite capacity to sort, order, approach to understanding both the why and and rank information18. This limitation how of foreign policy and answers James and combined with “[i]ndividual values, beliefs and Zhang’s call for a more unified model. Alex preferences, along with the near-impossibility of Mintz, originator of PH, writes, “Poliheuristic obtaining complete information, inhibit rational (PH) choice theory postulates a two-stage choice at the initial stage”19. Issues of timing in decision process in which the menu for choice is crisis situations are especially relevant as they narrowed initially by a noncompensatory “force decision makers to strive for short-cuts in analysis that eliminates options by the use of order to simplify decision matrices”20. one or more heuristics (cognitive shortcuts). Remaining alternatives are then evaluated in an As Mintz notes, however, the dimensional and attempt to minimize risks and maximize noncompensatory decision making construct is benefits”13. Since 1993, PH has been widely unlikely to narrow the array of options to a applied in social science research covering single optimal outcome21. Though reduced, diverse topics including use of force, initial numerous policies may pass the crisis reaction, war termination, coalition noncompensatory dimensional threshold. formation, level of force used in a crisis, Leaders will then choose from remaining

20 © Historia Actual Online 2006 Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro Like Father, Like Son? options in an attempt to maximize utility and perspective, “simple cost-benefit” or minimize costs by employing a rational lexicographic, yielded executive decisions. (expected utility) calculation or an optimization Although the cognitive approach may illuminate along the critical dimension (lexicographic some aspects of why George H.W. Bush and choice or LEX)22. As James and Zhang explain, George W. Bush prized some policies above others, this project applies the more “The former aims to calculate and balance the sophisticated PH model to understand both the costs and benefits for each alternative, while the why and how of these decisions. We believe that latter requires that the final decision achieve the this approach will not only help explain utility-maximizing goal along the dimension variances between the Bush foreign policies but regarded as most vital for decision makers. In also contribute to the rapidly growing body of other words, the dimensions in the lexicographic research supporting the usefulness of PH as a scenario are not equally weighted -- the most mode of foreign policy analysis. vital dimension will be evaluated carefully for each option and the final choice needs to be best 3. CASE STUDY: THE PRESIDENCY OF in this way but does not have to be optimal in an GEORGE H.W. BUSH overall sense”23. “I come before you and assume the Presidency Research into American presidential decision at a moment rich with promise. We live in a making confirms that chief executives employ peaceful, prosperous time, but we can make it the noncompensatory device24. Moreover, recent better. For a new breeze is blowing, and a world scholarship also suggests that presidential refreshed by freedom seems reborn. For in man's decision making is not only noncompensatory heart, if not in fact, the day of the dictator is but also lexicographic25. A noncompensatory over” (George H.W. Bush. Inaugural Address, lexicographic model of decision making 1989)28. emphasizes “[t]he options that have the highest utility on the dimension regarded as most vital In January 1989, George H.W. Bush, after by decision makers”, instead of a “simple cost- decades of service in Washington, assumed the benefit analysis”26. Although this second stage presidency at a most uncertain time in American of the PH model is largely informed by rational history. After decades of ideological, political, perspectives, cognitive factors and personality economic, and military rivalry, America’s arch traits are not entirely divorced from the selection foe, the Soviet Union, inched ever closer to between “cost-benefit” and lexicographic collapse. Though many Reaganite cold warriors alternatives. James and Zhang, drawing on undoubtedly welcomed Moscow’s retreat from earlier studies, note that “[t]he actual selection global prominence, others feared the instability of either strategy [cost-benefit or lexicographic], generated by a contracting USSR. Dramatic to a large extent, depends on the varying international change, on a scale not seen since conditions of the problem and on the cognitive the days immediately following World War II, and personal characteristics of the decision was not limited to the Soviet Union. By the end maker(s)” (emphasis added)27. of 1989, hitherto Communist Eastern Europe was in full revolt, Germany seemed destined for Application of a noncompensatory lexicographic reunification, and Japanese economic might PH model to the foreign policy decisions of threatened American primacy, a development George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, that convinced many analysts that the United especially the 1991 and 2003 military actions States was entering a period of slow decline29. vis-à-vis Iraq, may yield theoretical and policy relevant insights into both the how and why of George H.W. Bush, however, seemed presidential decision making. In the following particularly well-suited for the difficult job of section, this paper mines the historical record, guiding America through these challenging through comparative case studies, in an attempt geopolitical and economic times. A permanent to identify salient cognitive themes that fixture in Washington politics since winning a influenced both elder and younger Bush. House of Representatives seat in 1966, Bush Relevant cognitive factors will then be coupled brought more foreign policy experience into the with the PH model in an attempt to understand White House than any president in generations. how each leader framed foreign policy After losing his second Senate race in 1970, problems, identified critical dimensions President Nixon rescued Bush’s political career. (political or otherwise), and which rationalist Throughout the 1970s, Bush became one of the

© Historia Actual Online 2006 21 Like Father, Like Son? Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro best known and well-respected presidential banking scandal and economic slowdown appointees, serving as Ambassador to the United increasingly occupied Bush’s attention. Nations (1971-73), Chief U.S. Liaison to China (1974-75), and Director of the Central With domestic pressures rising and foreign Intelligence Agency (1976-77)30. policy aimed squarely at ensuring a peaceful devolution of the Soviet system, the H.W. Bush Despite Bush’s expertise, the more charismatic team was not expecting Iraq to instigate a major Ronald Reagan easily won the 1980 Republican international crisis. Although the Persian Gulf nomination for President. Reagan, in a move remained a key strategic theater for the United reminiscent of Nixon’s 1970s appointments, States, the conclusion of the -Iraq War in selected Bush as his running mate. During his 1988 greatly lowered the prospects for regional two terms as Vice President, Bush remained in conflagration. Moreover, since the 1978-79 the background, yet managed to enhance his Iranian Revolution Washington and Baghdad’s reputation as a leader with keen interest in relations had steadily warmed, despite some foreign affairs. Once again seeking the Congressional protests over Saddam Hussein’s presidency, he ran a skilled primary and general human rights abuses33. Bush signed National campaign and handily defeated Democrat Security Directive 26, aimed at normalizing all Michael Dukakis in 1988. Bush’s behavior aspects of American-Iraqi relations in October during the primary election foreshadowed a 1989, less than ten months before Saddam salient theme in his presidency: he did not want Hussein’s irredentist invasion of Kuwait to be considered a “wimp”. As Gary Hess notes, presented Bush with the most vexing foreign policy issue of his presidency34. “During his long pursuit of the presidency, Bush had suffered from a reputation for being Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, deferential and indecisive, and political emerged from a punishing eight-year war with opponents, pundits, and cartoonists portrayed Iran heavily indebted and in dire need of hard him as a “wimp.” During the 1988 presidential currency to repair damaged infrastructure as campaign, Bush took the offensive in a well as rebuild its military. Iraq’s petro-wealth calculated and ultimately successful effort to was insufficient to cover the billions owed to change that perception. In a masterful Persian Gulf creditors, including Kuwait, as well acceptance speech at the Republican National as creditors in the United States, Japan, and Convention, Bush presented himself to the elsewhere. Hussein’s preferred strategy to cover American electorate as a forceful leader”31. Iraq’s debt payments was to raise the price of oil35. Baghdad’s efforts were complicated by Armed with a landslide victory over Dukakis, falling oil prices and OPEC members, including extensive experience in Washington, and having Kuwait, producing more than their allotted lost, at least temporarily, the unwanted (and quota. After months of demands, negotiations, perhaps unwarranted) “wimp” label, Bush and saber rattling, Hussein finally opted for a assumed the presidency confident and optimistic military solution. His army invaded the small, about the future. vulnerable Kuwaiti emirate on August 2, 1990.

Dramatic international events in 1989, including Within hours, H.W. Bush learned of the the Tiananmen Square upheaval in June, the fall invasion and issued a statement calling the of the Berlin Wall in November, and a unilateral action “naked aggression” and demanded “the American invasion of Panama in December, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all tested the new president’s much lauded foreign- Iraqi forces”36. Turning quickly to the policy acumen. Bush and his team of key international community, Bush displayed his advisors, the so-called big eight (National preference for multilateral action. Within the Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of day, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Defense Richard Cheney, Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering called for an emergency , Vice President , meeting of the Security Council. The body Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General quickly adopted Resolution 660 condemning the , Deputy National Security Advisor invasion and demanding a complete Iraqi , and White House Chief of Staff withdrawal. Not content to work solely through John Sununu)32, managed to handle these the United Nations, the United States consulted incidents with aplomb, even as domestic issues with allies, and the European Community including the mounting Savings and Loan

22 © Historia Actual Online 2006 Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro Like Father, Like Son? adopted a position consistent with earlier Two squadrons of F-15 fighters and the 82nd American and U.N. statements. Airborne Division were hastily deployed to Saudi Arabia at the request of a very nervous Throughout the duration of the crisis, which Riyadh. Though Washington had not yet culminated with the U.S.-led, U.N.-sanctioned committed to military force as means of invasion of Kuwait in January 1991, George restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty, Bush and his H.W. Bush, recalling the policies of both advisors agreed that the United States must Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, have, at minimum the capability to deter further placed a premium on multilateral cooperation. Iraqi advances in the region. By the end of This crisis also provided Bush with an August, approximately 100,000 U.S. forces, opportunity to develop his previously inchoate known as Desert Shield, were in place ready to concept of a “new world order”37. Eric Miller defend Saudi Arabia and the House of Saud43. and Steve Yetiv, writing on the subject, claim that “[t]he Gulf crisis contributed fundamentally As American military forces arrived in the to the development of the concept of a new region and it became increasingly clear that world order. The end of the cold war created Saudi Arabia was secure in the short term, Bush conditions that made a new world order possible began developing a more comprehensive in theory”38. strategy for evicting Hussein from Kuwait. Alex Mintz, in his application of the PH model to the The confluence of the changing structure of the Persian , writes that “[t]o achieve the international system, from bipolarity to policy of forcing Saddam Hussein out of unipolarity, and Bush’s personal worldview Kuwait, three alternatives were identified: (1) about the role of expansionist powers, drawn use of force; (2) containment, that is, continue largely from his experience in the Second World the sanctions and keep the diplomatic pressure War, greatly helped define the parameters of the on Iraq; and (3) withdrawal”44. Unwilling to American response. The analogy between events allow Hussein to gain access to vast Kuwaiti oil in the Persian Gulf and the Munich Crisis of the reserves and not wanting to appear weak before 1930s affected Bush’s thinking of how to craft a regional dictator, Bush and key advisors America’s response to Kuwait’s invasion39. rejected the withdrawal option.

George H.W. Bush experienced firsthand the As the crisis continued throughout the autumn of horrors generated by unchecked aggression and 1990, Bush increasingly favored a military the failure of diplomacy at Munich. A senior in solution. Going to war over Kuwait, however, prep school in December 1941, Bush graduated hinged on the Bush team’s ability to marshal and immediately enlisted in the Navy, serving as domestic, especially Congressional support -- a decorated pilot in the Pacific40. Steve Yetiv, not an easy task given early Democratic (and commenting on the role of analogy in the some Republican) opposition as well as a George H.W. Bush presidency, writes, “The general, post-Vietnam reluctance of Americans [Munich] analogy made Bush more likely to to support and sustain large-scale military personalize the conflict with Saddam, to operations45. Congressional leaders from both undermine others’ efforts at compromise with parties, mindful of upcoming elections, Saddam, and to prefer war to the continued use expressed a number of reservations about of economic sanctions”41. On August 8, 1990, rushing to war without exhausting diplomatic, while addressing the nation, Bush claimed, including economic, options. “This new era can be full of promise, an age of freedom, a time of peace for all people. But if In response to Congressional misgivings over history teaches us anything, it is that we must direct military action, Bush and his advisors resist aggression or it will destroy our drafted a new strategy aimed at culling public freedoms” (emphasis added)42. and Congressional support for their policies. The White House wanted to gain as much Having secured at least the rhetorical support of international support as possible from traditional key allies and the United Nations, Bush moved allies and Arab states in the Middle East, U.N. to prevent Hussein from attacking Saudi Arabia. approval, and compliance from a divided and Although the United States lacked substantial weak, though not impotent, Soviet Union. military assets in the Persian Gulf, as a result of During these months, Secretary of State James Washington’s “over the horizon” policy, Bush Baker became one of the most well-traveled ordered ships from Diego Garcia to the Gulf. American diplomats in history, making the

© Historia Actual Online 2006 23 Like Father, Like Son? Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro rounds to dozens of foreign capitals46. Bush, for reports predicting that sanctions would have his part, took an active role in convincing little effect over the short to medium term. foreign leaders that Hussein was a regional, if Moreover, these reports suggested that sanctions not global, menace that must be stopped, with would most likely harm Iraqi civilians rather military force if necessary. The United than Baghdad’s military51. Having garnered Kingdom, under Prime Minister Margaret multilateral support, including substantial Thatcher, was a strong supporter of a hard-line financial pledges meant to bankroll military policy against Iraq; however, other European operations, Soviet support, a U.N. resolution, states, notably France, were less willing to and increased domestic support, the White entertain such a policy without U.S. or U.N. House put the issue before Congress on January cajoling47. Bush and Baker’s deft diplomacy 12, 1991. Although opposition remained, both ultimately worked, though Hussein’s the House of Representatives and Senate cast increasingly boastful public statements and news affirmative votes authorizing the president to coverage of Baghdad’s cruel treatment of use military force to restore Kuwaiti Kuwaiti and foreign citizens likely helped sovereignty52. Washington’s case. After a flurry of last minute diplomacy failed to With key European and Arab allies slowly lining resolve the crisis, the American lead coalition up behind the U.S. position, American launched an offensive campaign, Operation diplomats, for both domestic and international Desert Storm, on January 17, 1991. A massive reasons, sought legitimization from the United aerial bombing blitz preceded the ground Nations. Bush and key advisors were well aware campaign. Operation Desert Storm quickly that a U.N. Security Council Resolution displayed American military superiority against authorizing the use of military force would go Hussein’s much vaunted military. Within weeks, far in muting Congressional opposition as well Iraq’s army had largely collapsed and on as further enhancing the still inchoate concept of February 27, 1991, Bush declared victory53. a “new world order”. The White House knew Contrary to dire pre-war predictions, Operation that such a resolution hinged on securing Soviet Desert Storm produced only minimal American support. Though the Kremlin’s foreign-policy casualties54. From a military standpoint, the staffers were evenly divided on how best to campaign had been an unqualified success and resolve the Kuwait situation, Moscow’s need for did much to restore prestige to an American American economic aid silenced the calls of military still haunted by the legacy of Vietnam. those opposing a military solution48. Secretary of State Baker later recalled a conversation with The latter still figured prominently, however, in Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in which the minds of key policymakers and likely had Gorbachev said: “We need help. We’re in the much to do with Washington’s decision not to middle of the transition right now. As we move advance further into Iraq and depose the Hussein toward implementing these reforms, there’s regime. This decision, moreover, as Bush was going to be great dissatisfaction. It’s very fond of noting, also kept U.S. action within the difficult for us right now. The domestic situation letter of U.N. Resolution 678 and satisfied is getting much worse”49. With Moscow’s coalition partners, including those leery of an support in place, the United States secured expansionist America as Soviet power waned, as passage of U.N. Resolution 678, demanding Iraq well as Congress and the American public. make a complete withdrawal from Kuwait by Bush’s handing of the war, as well as his January 15, 1991, and authorizing member restraint in not enlarging the operation to include states to use all necessary means to restore the occupation of Iraq, gained him much Kuwaiti sovereignty50. currency as a wise statesman and for a time boosted his domestic approval ratings to Domestic and Congressional support slowly but previously unthinkable levels -- nearly 90%55. steadily increased during the fall of 1990 as it looked as if the White House and its allies were During the buildup to the conflict and in the attempting diplomatic and economic solutions months following, it was increasingly clear that before entering into a conflict. Though this crisis had provided the catalyst for the multilateral sanctions were in place, Hussein development of what Bush hoped would be his showed little signs up budging under economic legacy, the idea of a “new world order.” pressures. During this time, the Central Entailing a rejection of aggression and emphasis Intelligence Agency authored a number of on multilateralism, this idea matured from clever

24 © Historia Actual Online 2006 Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro Like Father, Like Son? phraseology into the core of the administration’s sought to overhaul the American military force policy vis-à-vis Iraq. As Under Secretary of structure and evolve a strategic doctrine more in State Lawrence Eagleburger later recalled, “[w]e sync with the post-Cold War world. But, unlike thought it [failure to check Iraqi aggression] his dad, he made a national missile defense could set all the wrong standards for the post- system an urgent priority despite the exorbitant Cold War world by suggesting to regional cost and daunting technological challenges dictators that naked aggression pays and by associated with such a venture. To pursue this hurting U.S. credibility at a time when its dream of shielding the United States from leadership was being tested, if it did not take enemy missile attacks, and to husband U.S. strong action”56. This sentiment was echoed by financial and other resources he would need to James Baker who called the Iraq crisis “a critical provide Americans with significant tax cuts, his juncture in history”57. most important campaign promise, he and his administration thought it imperative for the Bush maintained that he would have used country to avoid Clintonesque “social work” unilateral military force against Iraq. Miller and abroad, “nation building” especially59. Yetiv write, “[t]o be sure, Bush was determined to reverse Iraq’s invasion even without support Early Bush foreign policy irritated America’s from the United Nations or even the U.S. friends and enemies alike, as the White House Congress”58. However, counterfactual eschewed the Clinton preference for speculation about the veracity of these claims multilateralism in favor of a series of unilateral does not reveal what would have happened had measures that won the United States scant Washington been unable to secure multilateral international admiration. In a cavalier manner and U.N. support for its preferred policy. reminiscent of the Reagan years, Bush rejected Although Bush had acted alone in Panama the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which sought to curb against another dictator, Manuel Noriega, it is alarming rates of greenhouse gas emissions unknown if he would have replicated unilateral harmful to Planet Earth’s ecology; withdrew action on a larger scale against Iraq. from (or “unsigned”) the 1998 Rome Treaty that created the International Criminal Court (ICC), George H.W. Bush’s presidency was filled with an institution that could try individuals, such as a number of demanding and contentious foreign- ex-Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, policy challenges (ethnic conflict in the Balkans accused of hideous crimes (i.e., so-called crimes and famine in Somalia would draw his attention against humanity); imposed onerous steel tariffs following Operation Desert Storm, yet none was in violation of World Trade Organization as significant as the Persian Gulf War. That stipulations forbidding such protectionism; and crisis, because of its length and the depth of supported a Congressional farm bill that Bush’s personal involvement, in many ways appealed shamelessly to agribusiness interests typified his approach to foreign policy. A and Farm Belt politicians hungry for votes. The shrewd and restrained leader, he felt a keen Texan with the Harvard MBA justified his sense of moral responsibility. He recognized the controversial decisions by invoking American importance of multilateral support for his self-interest. In his mind, the United States had policies, however, especially in light of his to seek self-sufficiency rather than global well- desire to advance a post-Cold War foreign- being, which required cooperation and policy agenda centered around his concept of a compromise with other countries. Similarly, “new world order”. His oldest son, George W. Bush maligned international norms, such as Bush, would have the opportunity to build upon environmental stewardship, human rights, and that order eight years after his father left office. fair trade, while promoting unchecked U.S. economic growth and exempting American 4. CASE STUDY: THE PRESIDENCY OF soldiers and citizens from ever standing trial at GEORGE W. BUSH The Hague should they commit atrocities on foreign soil and not be prosecuted in America -- George W. Bush’s tenure as president promised the only circumstances under which Americans a “humble” America internationally, while could have appeared before the ICC60. returning the country to the kind of traditional foreign-policy concerns (U.S.-Russian and U.S.- Conservatives may have applauded Bush’s Chinese relations, for example) which had assertiveness, but his administration’s realism -- preoccupied George H.W. Bush and his jingoism, said critics -- clashed with administration. Like his father, George W. Bush increasingly assertive allies opposed to U.S.

© Historia Actual Online 2006 25 Like Father, Like Son? Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro policy. Europeans, especially, expressed Freedom achieved its objective within a few profound dismay when Washington substituted months. Eager to claim a victory in its “War on diktat for consultation, a reversal of Clinton Terror,” President Bush spotlighted the end of policy. They preferred the forty-second the Taliban’s tyrannical rule and the routing of president’s dictum of “multilateralism when we al-Qaeda forces. Most importantly, he continued can, unilateralism when we must” to the forty- to portray his policy as just and consistent with third’s “unilateralism when we can, both American and global values. The U.S. multilateralism when we must”. Bush may have public wholeheartedly concurred with its reassured Americans that he would not sacrifice president, as any criticism of the Bush their best interests to the whims of the European administration struck most Americans, who Union and U.N. diplomats, but White House clamored “United We Stand”, as unpatriotic. selfishness promised much global acrimony at a time when U.S. plenty, the result of half-a-dozen With dissent frowned upon following the 9/11- or so years of spectacular economic expansion, induced erosion of U.S. civil liberties, Bush contrasted dramatically with an international sought to polarize the world further by alerting scene often racked by inequality, injustice, Americans and a worldwide audience, in his poverty, disease, strife, anger, and despair – a January 2002 State of the Union Address, to the “world on fire,” in Amy Chua’s words. existence of an “Axis of Evil” reminiscent of Ironically, in many cases only the United States World War II’s Axis Powers. The president (with the assistance of various non- substituted Iraq, Iran, and North Korea for Nazi governmental organizations) could provide Germany, Japan, and Italy. While consistent assistance, relief, and salvation – which it often with the Texan’s Evangelical Christianity, did, though not to everyone’s satisfaction61. Bush’s dichotomy between “Good and Evil” satisfied many Americans fearful of renewed This charitable impulse served Americans well attacks against the U.S. homeland. The White on September 11, 2001, as they unexpectedly House’s de facto emphasis on civilizational experienced an agony unlike any other in the conflict (rhetorically, though, Bush praised country’s history. As City Mayor Islam) alarmed many Europeans and Asians, tried to console a grief-striken who greeted a twenty-first century crusade with nation, President Bush overcame his initial utmost trepidation. With imams in the Middle bewilderment to rally his countrymen and East calling for jihad, Washington forged ahead women. He vowed justice for those wantonly with its plan to defend so-called Western murdered and committed the country to a unique civilization from enemies who either sought to campaign -- the defeat of international terrorism. undermine or destroy it63. He promised no quick victories, but spoke confidently of eventual victory in this In a June 1, 2002, speech at West Point, Manichean contest. While some U.S. and other President Bush previewed a transformation in commentators reexamined America’s supposed American foreign policy. He spoke of his innocence abroad, Bush dismissed any country’s right to eliminate threats before they American culpability for the apocalyptic events manifested themselves. A doctrine of prevention of 9/11. Armed with the world’s sympathy, the would call for an offensive rather than defensive White House carefully and deliberately crafted a military policy, in contravention of international nuanced response that sought to punish culprits, law. Although the White House already mainly members of Osama bin Laden’s al- considered the United States at war -- the 9/11 Qaeda Islamic organization, while reassuring attacks certainly allowed Washington to invoke Muslims (in the United States and elsewhere) Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which authorized that Washington would not wage a civilizational national self-defense -- the discarding of the war on the umma (i.e., the community of Cold War strategy of “containment” for a policy believers), the followers of Prophet of selected aggression promised to set a dubious Muhammad62. precedent and draw howls of disapproval from some foreign leaders. Owing to its unrivaled Although fifteen of the nineteen September 11th military superiority, America could behave hijackers hailed from Saudi Arabia, in the fall of capriciously, or so the international community 2001 the Bush administration targeted the feared. Bush dismissed such concerns, however, Taliban, Afghanistan’s medieval rulers, and and reported to Congress in the fall that their al-Qaeda terrorist guests for removal. henceforth the United States would reserve the Following a shaky start, Operation Enduring right to dispose of threats before they

26 © Historia Actual Online 2006 Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro Like Father, Like Son? materialized. His national security strategy preventive war, formally announced in struck another blow for American primacy when September 2002, President Bush invoked it stated that the United States would oppose any Baghdad’s WMD threat as a sufficient reason country that tried to compete with it for for America to attack Iraq. Secretary of State political-military supremacy64. Colin Powell insisted, however, that the United States seek international approval for its policy. The Bush Doctrine’s imperial features Members of the president’s inner circle – Vice forecasted an America indefinitely trying to President , Rumsfeld, and Deputy counter potential harm to U.S. national interests. Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz -- As the administration proceeded with its missile disparaged such a tactic, asserting that the defense project and continued to hunt down United Nations would only impede the United Osama bin Laden, it fixated upon its favorite States as it sought to achieve its foreign-policy bête noire, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. North objectives. Powell considered such thinking Korea’s fall 2002 confession to an illicit shortsighted and potentially very harmful to resumption of its nuclear programme annoyed U.S. relations with its allies. Better to build up the White House, but President Bush and his American credibility, the retired general argued, advisors preferred diplomacy to a military than waste it needlessly via some unpopular, campaign with Northeast Asia’s impoverished, unilateral U.S. venture66. Stalinist member of the “Axis of Evil”. Pyongyang’s conventional and possible nuclear President Bush sided with Powell, who favored arsenal, as well as its ability to strike key renewed inspections rather than a hasty American allies, including South Korea and invasion. In fall 2002 at the U.N. General Japan, dictated a cautious policy. To avoid a Assembly, Bush urged member states to tackle similar scenario in Iraq, whereby a nuclear- the Iraq issue to ensure that the world’s premier armed Baghdad could deter the United States, international organization carried out its early in 2003 Bush officials kept their eyes obligation to uphold global peace. Following the trained on Hussein and his purported weapons of president’s speech, Security Council members mass destruction (WMD). The president and his worked feverishly to craft a resolution that advisors thought their country could transform allowed the United Nations Monitoring, the fossilized Arab world -- with its Inspection, and Verification Commission anachronistic authoritarians, sclerotic (UNMOVIC), still barred by Hussein from economies, and apparent abundance of suicidal- entering Iraq, to inspect Iraqi facilities suspected homicidal terrorists ready to murder scores of of WMD activity. On November 8, the Security Israeli Jews and Americans in return for Islamic Council voted unanimously to approve salvation -- into a progressive, thriving, and, Resolution 1441, which promised “serious most importantly, more U.S.- and Israeli- consequences” should Iraq not fully comply. friendly area, by toppling the man who President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony incarnated the worst political, economic, and Blair, whose solidarity with the U.S. position military trends in the Middle East -- Saddam ingratiated him to the White House and thus Hussein65. earned him input into American policy, wanted explicit authorization to wage war on Iraq, The White House’s opportunity to dislodge should Hussein thwart U.N. will. France, Russia, Hussein arose once al-Qaeda terrorists utilized and the People’s Republic of China strenuously three hijacked planes to fell ’s objected, however. As a result, the permanent, twin towers and tear into the Pentagon. Within a veto-wielding members of the Security Council week of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush ordered bickered over whether a second resolution that something be done about the Hussein would be necessary to sanction a military Government. Secretary of Defense Donald campaign to disarm Iraq. Washington and Rumsfeld obliged the commander in chief by London said no; Paris, Moscow, and Beijing instructing General Tommy Franks, head of U.S. took a contrary view. Previous to the approval of Central Command, to devise an invasion plan Resolution 1441, members of the U.S. Congress for Iraq. Although the interdiction of much expressed confidence in the president’s policy illegal Iraqi commerce by the U.S. and by authorizing him to use whatever means he Australian navies restricted Hussein’s ability to considered appropriate to enforce Iraq’s import military items, the White House pressed compliance with U.N. resolutions. The timing of on with its agenda to remove the Iraqi autocrat. the vote, just before the Congressional election, Consistent with his nascent doctrine of hamstrung many Democrats, who risked

© Historia Actual Online 2006 27 Like Father, Like Son? Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro alienating constituents if they opposed the the billions necessary to fashion a successful measure67. liberal economy70.

With only minimal dissent from Democrats and When confronted with such derision, the White rousing support from fellow Republicans (who House conjured up the specter of a WMD attack in November 2002 took back the Senate and upon the United States in an attempt to quell increased their advantage in the House of criticism of its policy. This appeal to fear of a Representatives), President Bush used his possible, rather than probable, calamity likely January 2003 State of the Union Address to convinced many Americans, a majority of whom deliver an ultimatum: either the Security consented to a war whether or not the Security Council honored its commitment to disarm Iraq Council approved one. As long as some U.S. or the world’s most exclusive political club allies endorsed American policy, nearly 60% risked forfeiting its relevance. The commander favored intervention, according to a Washington in chief also informed ordinary Iraqis that the Post-ABC News poll. Americans only expressed United States intended to emancipate them from lukewarm support (44%), however, for a lengthy Saddam Hussein’s slavery. That day’s initial and costly U.S. occupation71. U.N. inspectors’ report confirmed Bush’s impatience with the Iraqi Government68. With scarce knowledge of what could transpire in postwar Iraq, Defense and State Department Buoyed by this news, Bush promised that officials hardly reassured U.S. senators when Secretary of State Powell would unveil damning they testified before the Foreign Relations evidence at the Security Council to convince Committee. Under Secretary of Defense for skeptics, especially France and Germany, of Policy Douglas Feith conceded that American Baghdad’s duplicitous ways and connect forces would occupy Iraq for two years at a cost Hussein to al-Qaeda, an administration of at least $15 billion per year. This minimum contention that most terrorism, intelligence, and sum contrasted with those analysts who believed Middle East experts doubted or disbelieved. that a war and its aftermath would tally in the Powell’s presentation swayed many Americans, hundreds of billions. In an era of spiraling yet Paris and Berlin still opposed the proposed budget deficits, due to Bush tax cuts and American remedy to Iraqi deceit69. exorbitant expenses for homeland as well as national security, additional fiscal burdens Despite UNMOVIC’s apparent validation of the courtesy of an invasion and occupation White House’s assertions, the Bush potentially promised bruising economic times72. administration struggled to present a coherent rationale for intervention in Iraq -- it would Oblivious to, or unconcerned with, such costs, a invoke twenty-three justifications for war, determined President Bush seemed convinced of according to one researcher. Oddly, Bush his policy’s correctness and sure of his own officials refused publicly to invoke the righteousness, a trait he and his father shared. precedents of Bosnia and Kosovo to justify their As George W. Bush aimed to do what he call for Saddam Hussein’s removal. Perhaps thought “right”, he likely kept in mind the these Republicans considered “humanitarian following: his dad’s overwhelmingly popular intervention”, Bill Clinton’s justification for victory in Operation Desert Storm (a war U.S. sending U.S. forces overseas, impolitic. To allies paid for), Iraq’s deleterious behavior vis-à- avoid any comparisons to their detested vis the United States since 1991, Saddam predecessor, the president and his Reaganite Hussein’s efforts to assassinate George H.W. advisors emulated their political hero when they Bush in 1993, and, of course, the lessons of announced that the United States would seek to 9/11, which the Bush Doctrine incarnated. Such democratize Iraq, whose example hopefully analogies enabled George W. Bush and his would spur neighbors to imitate it. Cynics blew advisors to dismiss the claims, which they raspberries at this idea of occupation à la considered spurious, of critics who suspected a Germany and Japan circa 1945, which they U.S.-ExxonMobil conspiracy to seize Iraq’s oil considered preposterous given the near absence resources. With Baghdad apparently intending of any democratic tradition in the Arab world. to torch Iraqi oil fields should an invasion occur, Furthermore, they doubted Washington would the White House denial seemed credible, want to spend years inculcating Iraqi society especially when coupled with administration with democratic theory and habits and to invest assurances that it would instruct American occupation officials to use Iraqi crude to pay for

28 © Historia Actual Online 2006 Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro Like Father, Like Son? the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure -- accused Saddam Hussein of ruthless and already shattered after years of war, unpardonable crimes, and of harboring weapons international sanctions, and misrule. Such of mass destruction with the intent to strike U.S. promises underwhelmed many opponents of targets or arm anti-American terrorists, the self- Bush’s policy, who could recite numerous assured Texan could not back down without occasions when the U.S. Government reneged forfeiting his own as well as his country’s on its word or plain lied73. credibility and disappointing the 71% of Americans, according to an ABC As the White House struggled to persuade non- News/Washington Post poll, who approved of permanent Security Council members (such as war in Iraq. Bush thus issued an ultimatum on Guinea, Cameroon, and Angola) and other March 17. If Hussein did not disarm to U.S. governments whose populations vociferously satisfaction within forty-eight hours, then opposed war in the Middle East, irate U.S. Washington would attack Iraq and depose officials issued ultimata in a concerted effort to Hussein76. dragoon states reluctant to endorse American policy despite the promise of significant Predictably, Hussein, who apparently thought financial rewards. U.S. heavy-handedness and war improbable or, if unleashed, confined to an arrogance on the part of some American air campaign his regime could survive, rejected decision-makers -- to wit, Rumsfeld’s caustic Bush’s demand. On March 19, 2003, when reference to France and Germany as “Old seemingly reliable intelligence -- courtesy of the Europe” -- corroded America’s ties with its U.S. DB/ROCKSTARS spy network in Iraq -- traditional partners and friends, some of which, persuaded the president to authorize a notably the French and Germans, sought to rein “decapitation strike” aimed at Hussein and his in or even corral U.S. power. Still, the White sons, American missiles and heavy bombs House seemed either not to care or simply crashed into an Iraqi government facility, expected the Europeans, Australians, Japanese, thereby initiating Operation Iraqi Freedom. On and Canadians, whose compromise U.N. April 9, following weeks of steady U.S. resolution proved futile, to follow the American advances and with no one to defend Saddam lead or risk irrelevance74. Hussein’s regime, the Americans assisted jubilant Iraqis as they tore down statues of Although U.S. intransigence only frustrated Hussein and other despised symbols of their America’s friends and embittered its enemies, oppressor’s decades of tyrannical rule. When the Bush administration relentlessly pressed its President Bush announced the cessation of case for intervention. At the Security Council, major combat operations on May 1, his Washington continued to clash with the French, controversial foreign policy seemed Germans, Russians, Chinese, and Secretary- vindicated77. General Kofi Annan, who opposed any U.N. document approving the use of force in Iraq. In the months and years that followed, however, Despite this opposition, the United States, events in Iraq, especially, and elsewhere United Kingdom, and Spain submitted a underscored the shortcomings of Washington’s resolution asking for exactly that. American obnoxious unilateralism. Despite occasional diplomats lobbied the other Security Council successes, such as the apprehension of Saddam countries intensely in a Sisyphean effort to Hussein in December 2003 and various elections recruit them to the U.S.-U.K.-Spanish position. in 2005, life in post-Hussein Iraq proved brutish The Bush administration hoped to persuade nine as insurgency and ethno-sectarian conflict members; even if a permanent member vetoed threatened to ruin the White House’s plan for the proposal, support from a Council majority Iraqi democratization. President Bush spoke of would have satisfied the White House. With an Iraq as a beacon of liberty, but reality in that unsuccessful vote likely to embarrass country presaged civil war, not harmonious Washington and London, the pro-invasion federalism. As America found itself mired in the threesome withdrew its proposal in mid- heartland of the Middle East, inhabitants of that March75. region and other Muslim lands shouted their dissatisfaction with U.S. policy. Such anti- Although British Prime Minister Blair’s Labour Americanism no doubt emboldened Iran, which, Party clamored for a U.N. mandate, President starting in the summer of 2005, brazenly defied Bush ignored -- albeit unwillfully -- his partner’s the United States and its European allies on the political needs to satisfy his own. Having all-important matter of nuclear proliferation.

© Historia Actual Online 2006 29 Like Father, Like Son? Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro Unlike in Bush’s first term, however, the In the months before Operation Iraqi Freedom, president could not order his overextended army George W. Bush hyped the Iraqi threat by to invade yet another country. Dissent at home spotlighting Saddam Hussein’s purported and abroad precluded policies that called for weapons of mass destruction. Ever the military intervention. No longer indifferent to “crusader,” he insistently told Americans that world opinion, George W. Bush touted, and unless the United States evicted Hussein from continues to promote, the sagacity of power, America would not be safe from terrorist multilateralism, a remarkable volte-face for a attack. By proselytizing in such a hyperbolic man so previously committed to splendid manner, Bush convinced a majority of American unilateralism78. Americans of the necessity of war with Iraq, even though many analysts considered such a 5. ANALYSIS conflict purely optional. His father demonized Saddam Hussein, often comparing him to Hitler, From a leadership style standpoint, George W. but seemingly more for instrumental purposes Bush and George H.W. Bush differ rather than out of heartfelt conviction. George W. Bush markedly. W. Bush epitomizes what Hermann et seemed to believe his own rhetoric, the hallmark al. call the “crusader.” He may not have of any true evangelist. possessed much in the way of foreign-policy knowledge upon entering the White House, but Unlike his son, George H.W. Bush seems the he certainly advocated an unequivocally archetypal “pragmatist”. His conservative ideological point of view. His emphasis on an political instincts, knowledge of the unbound America seemed effortless given his complexities of global politics, and diplomatic unabashed nationalism, which critics considered experience informed his every foreign-policy naïve and parochial. Like Ronald Reagan, decision. As his administration mid-wifed the George W. Bush seemed only inclined to birth of a new era, he struggled, as did his perceive his country’s good intentions and advisors, to adjust to an international reality so inexhaustible capacity for peerless achievement. different from the Cold War. A sometimes Unlike Bill Clinton, he refused to acknowledge dumbfounded Bush responded warily to the his nation’s shortcomings. momentous events unfolding in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, prompting critics to Ever the chief executive officer, George W. chide him for his seemingly anachronistic Bush left the details of foreign policy to his behavior. Although Bush occasionally proved capable advisors. But he continually proved the deaf and blind to, as it turned out, important most passionate salesman of his administration’s information and developments, he favored an policies, especially as they pertained to the War incremental policy carefully calibrated to the on Terror and Iraq. He relentlessly touted the political entropy whirling through the Soviet appropriateness and necessity of his foreign Empire and collaborated with his European policy while ignoring or disparaging criticisms. counterparts to usher in a reunited, peaceful As an “expansionistic” leader, he sought to continent. His influential diplomacy yielded a impose his views on others, whether members of rosy outcome that redounded to his country’s Congress, the American people, or foreign advantage. leaders and societies. In this task, his advisors proved invaluable. Vice President Cheney and Like his offspring, George H.W. Bush believed Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, veterans of the in America’s capacity for justice, but he realized Washington bureaucratic and political “wars,” its limitations in a way his progeny did not repeatedly displayed consummate skill at intuitively grasp. Whereas George W. Bush swaying important political constituencies that pursued a transformative, even revolutionary could facilitate the implementation of the Bush foreign policy, his father worked to insure that agenda. With their assistance, George W. Bush the post-Cold War world would not succumb to spent much of his first term in office rewriting international lawlessness. When threats to the rules of international politics. Unlike his George H.W. Bush’s “new world order” father and Bill Clinton, he overlooked or manifested themselves, he evolved into an disregarded the views of others if they clashed “opportunist”. His efforts to remove Manuel with his own preferences. As an “evangelistic” Noriega as Panama’s illegitimate autocratic leader, he sought to convert others to his leader following a democratic election in that opinions, which he relentlessly clung to even country proved felicitous even though the when evidence undermined his viewpoint. United States proceeded without U.N.

30 © Historia Actual Online 2006 Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro Like Father, Like Son? authorization and allied support. No state that necessity -- actions required to ensure future mattered internationally stood with Noriega, and peace, stability, and prosperity in a rapidly his status as a narcotics kingpin endeared him to changing international system. For H.W. Bush, no one. By limiting the scope of the mission to the transition from bipolarity to unipolarity was the mere seizure of Noriega, which took only a chance for Washington to reassert its primacy days, Bush won approval from Americans and on the global stage. The liberation of Kuwait Congress. Likewise, when Iraq invaded Kuwait was an opportunity to define the rules for his in August 1990, Bush hurriedly moved to undo “new world order.” Influenced by the events of this violation of state sovereignty in a region of the 1930s, he believed that if America did not critical strategic importance to America. He act decisively in checking regional aggression, sensed what could be achieved diplomatically this new era in international politics would be and militarily, consulted repeatedly with foreign marked by conflict rather than cooperation. Like and domestic leaders, forged an international his father, George W. Bush also opted for war consensus, and allowed other countries to take against Iraq against the backdrop of changes in credit for the coalition’s triumph even though the international system stemming from the the United States invested more human and events of 9/11. For him, a failure to prevent a technological resources into the endeavor. state such as Iraq from gaining WMD, especially nuclear weapons, was likely to result Assigning a leadership style to any American in catastrophic attacks on U.S. soil courtesy of president invites caveats and rebuttals. As the radical extremists. Both Bushes, grappling with above makes evident, George H.W. Bush’s style the moral burden of serving as steward of the should be considered a hybrid (i.e., pragmatic most powerful state in the world, believed that and opportunistic). Similarly, his son’s conflict with Iraq was required to ensure the “crusader” attitude and modus operandi should future security of the United States. not be considered monolithic. Already in his second term, W. Bush is exhibiting much more Although many individuals on the political Left conciliation vis-à-vis other countries and have accused George W. Bush of rushing into leaders. Reminiscent of Reagan after the 1985 war in a most cavalier manner, it seems clear Geneva Summit, Bush is softening his formerly that Bush, despite his sometimes bombastic abrasive and condescending tone. Dissimilar to rhetoric, did not take this decision lightly. The Reagan, though, Bush’s opting for a radically same is true with George H.W. Bush. In both different style has coincided with the cases, an application of PH theory suggests that misfortunes of his Iraq policy and his presidential decisions can be measured via commensurate loss of power domestically. dimensions -- political, economic, military, Currently, even Congressional Republicans, diplomatic, and ideological. What follows formerly administration stalwarts, doubt, if not examines how the decision to use military force oppose, Bush’s foreign policy. W’s new style, against Iraq likely measured on each dimension however, should not be considered his preferred as well as explains how each president made his or dominant one. Should he recover his lost final decision, in the rational or utility political strength, he may yet revert to his fully maximizing stage of PH. fledged “crusader” ways. Consistent with the PH framework, the actions Leadership style, as mentioned earlier, helps of both George H.W. and George W. Bush explain why George W. Bush and George H.W. suggest that the political dimension of decision Bush made certain foreign-policy decisions, making is most salient. Both leaders expended rather than others. Poliheuristic theory can vast amounts of political capital to secure explain how they made those decisions. Given domestic and Congressional support for their that each Bush presidency is defined by its Iraq policies. Although American presidents claim policy (i.e., its decision to wage interstate war), the right to deploy large numbers of troops PH provides a method for understanding both without explicit approval from Congress, policies, especially their divergent outcomes. embarking on wars of this scale and duration without Congressional blessing would constitute Both Bushes waged what many academics and political suicide. For H.W. Bush, this entailed pundits would call “wars of choice” against Iraq. convincing a somewhat skeptical domestic Cognitive analysis of both leaders suggests, audience that Iraq was a menace to global however, that the elder and younger Bush security and that diplomatic and economic viewed military action not as a choice but as a policies were insufficient to check Baghdad’s

© Historia Actual Online 2006 31 Like Father, Like Son? Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro irredentist ambitions. For the younger Bush, this would prove more costly than ignoring what he meant convincing a domestic audience, one considered a growing threat in the short term. recently sensitized to the horrors of terrorism, that Iraq was seeking, or already had, nuclear While both H.W. and W. Bush believed that and other WMD. Aware of the need to secure engaging in war against Iraq scored highly on political support for his preferred policy, W. the political (the critical dimension in the Bush cited alleged connections between Iraq and language of PH), economic, and ideological al-Qaeda frequently and loudly in a clear dimensions, their calculations on military and attempt to bolster domestic support for an diplomatic dimensions differ. During the Persian invasion of Iraq. The need for political support Gulf War, H.W. Bush, Congress, and the is noncompensatory -- no matter how high the American people braced themselves for a decision scored on other dimensions could not bruising campaign against a resolute and skilled compensate for a lack of domestic political Iraqi military. This overestimation likely support. stemmed from the legacy of Vietnam as well as reports and analysis that grossly inflated Domestic, especially Congressional support, Baghdad’s military capability. Despite a also directly relates to the economic dimension relatively low score on the military dimension, of the war decision. Both leaders believed they H.W. Bush believed the risks acceptable. This could successfully prosecute war in the Persian low score on a secondary (or non-critical) Gulf with minimal financial cost to the U.S. decision making dimension is also highly Treasury. H.W. Bush was far more successful in consistent with PH analysis. In the case of this respect, as he convinced the international George W. Bush, he and his advisors had little community to supply most of the billions it cost doubt that the military campaign against Iraq to wage Operation Desert Storm. George W. could be easily won. Drawing from the Persian Bush believed he could replicate his father’s feat Gulf War as well as recent American advances of war without economic cost by employing a in command and control and other high dual strategy of using Iraq’s petro-wealth as well technology military tactics, the Bush as international contributions to finance the cost administration seriously doubted Baghdad’s of war and reconstruction. The younger Bush, potential to fend off the world’s premier military however, did not count on a costly and power. In this respect, the preferred option of prolonged insurgency as well as a general invasion scored highly on a military dimension unwillingness of allies to open their coffers to for George W. Bush. Although a virulent contribute to the American led “nation-building” insurgency confirmed that stabilizing and enterprise. The ultimate success or failure of occupying Iraq would prove much costlier than these financial matters, however, is unimportant initially predicted, this development did not because at the time of planning the war, Bush manifest itself until after inter-state hostilities and many of his key advisors believed they had ceased. In an ironic historical twist, George would be able to depose Hussein and rehabilitate H.W. Bush prepared for a punishing military his country at little cost. In both cases, then, the campaign that never materialized. His son Bushes’ preferred solution, war, scored highly planned, however, for a short military campaign on the economic dimension. and easy occupation, which never materialized.

On the ideological dimension, both presidents The final dimension of our PH framework is held similar views that war with Iraq was good diplomatic. That dimension is where George for not only the United States, but for the global H.W. Bush and George W. Bush differ most community. Leery of a possible comparison significantly. Although H.W. Bush later claimed with Neville Chamberlain, George H.W. Bush he would have proceeded unilaterally if he had thought that the costs of not restoring Kuwaiti been unable to secure international backing for a sovereignty and checking Iraqi aggression were military solution to the Kuwait crisis, his intense much higher than pursuing an alternative, less diplomacy suggests that he very much valued effective strategy. The same logic applies to his multilateral support. For the elder Bush, the son, who, traumatized by 9/11, believed that his events in the Persian Gulf were inseparable from country could no absorb a first strike before the era and were thus intimately linked to his going to war. A first strike by a foe armed with plans for a “new world order”. For him, WMD, especially nuclear weapons, was simply diplomacy, while not as critical as the political unacceptable. Thus, like his father, George W. dimension, likely was nearly as important. Thus, Bush thought that not acting against Iraq in 2003 the effort to convince the Soviets, French, and

32 © Historia Actual Online 2006 Marc J. O’Reilly; Wesley B. Renfro Like Father, Like Son? others that a military solution was needed to policies, sociological and biological restore Kuwaiti sovereignty and “set the tone” commonalities ought to make presidents related for a post-Cold War security environment. to one another somewhat similar to each other -- Unlike his father, George W. Bush clearly did temperamentally, ideologically, or otherwise. not consider diplomacy a critical dimension. While George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush Though he did seek, in opposition to many of embrace the vigorous life (they both like his influential neo-conservative advisors, U.N. physical activity), they tend to avoid support for his military venture against Iraq, his introspection, preferring to assess situations via policy did not hinge on that blessing. From the feeling. Thus, they judge based on their own initial planning stages of the war, U.N. morality – e.g., they opposed Saddam Hussein legitimacy was not a necessary condition for since each thought it “right” to do so. invading and occupying Iraq. For the younger Notwithstanding such similarities, both Bush, his preferred policy solution scores quite President Bushes displayed contrasting styles, low on a diplomatic dimension. But this proves making foreign-policy decisions for entirely largely irrelevant given that diplomacy was the different reasons and in differing ways. For the least salient decision making dimension, in stark most part, then, the dictum “like father, like son” contrast with his more internationalist father. does not apply to George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush and their foreign policies. As previously noted, the second stage of a PH analysis is where a leader must choose among As for cognitive and poliheuristic theory, each the reduced number of policy options. In this spotlights different issues. Although PH process, a president is likely to employ either an incorporates cognitive theory, emphasis on expected utility calculation or an optimization leadership style provides worthwhile insight into along the critical dimension. In both Bush cases, why presidents behave as they do. Since PH however, military action was the only possible emphasizes how presidents make foreign-policy solution that passed the noncompensatory decisions, a study such as this one provides a threshold on the critical dimensions. In the case more nuanced analysis of U.S. foreign policy of George H.W. Bush, his desire to restore and the men who make it. Neither theory should Kuwaiti sovereignty and inculcate his concept of be thought of as normative, however, a a “new world order” meant that other available shortcoming Garry Trudeau would probably policies (sanctions, a negotiated diplomatic bemoan, but one George H.W. Bush might solution, or acquiescence in Hussein’s territorial consider “prudent” given family reunions. expansion) were rejected. For H.W. Bush, military intervention was the only policy that NOTES could achieve his preferred outcome while scoring well on critical, especially political and 1 The cartoon appeared in the Comics section of the diplomatic, dimensions. As well for George W. February 12, 2006, edition of The Blade (Toledo, OH). Bush, military action was the only policy 2 solution that could secure his preferred policy See Valerie Hudson’s excellent review of foreign- policy analysis literature. Hudson, Valerie M., outcome (i.e., removing Hussein from power “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and and obviating the risk of Iraqi-sponsored attacks the Ground of International Relations”. Foreign using WMD) and pass the key dimensional Policy Analysis, I-1 (march 2005), 1-30. thresholds. 3 See, for example, Isaacson, Walter, Kissinger: A Biography. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1992; CONCLUSION Etheredge, Lloyd, “Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy”. American Political Science Review, This article has compared the foreign policies of 72 (june 1978): 434-451; Hermann, Margaret G., two American presidents, a father and son. As “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the John Quincy Adams’ decisions differed from Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders”. International Studies Quarterly, 24 (march 1980), 7- those of his pater, George W. Bush’s policies 46; Shepard, Graham H., “Personality Effects on have not typically resembled those of his dad. American Foreign Policy, 1969-1984”. International Context, of course, explains many of the Studies Quarterly, 32 (march 1988), 91-123; Wayne, differences. No foreign policies of two Stephen J., “President Bush Goes to War: A presidents can be exactly alike given that events Psychological Interpretation from a Distance”, in do not repeat themselves. But, while family Stanley A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology relations and shared DNA cannot make for of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of presidential clones and identical foreign Conflict. Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh

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Press, 1993, 29-48; Glad, Betty, “Personality, 4 Hermann, Margaret G.; Hagan, Joe D., Political, and Group Variables in Foreign Policy “International Decision Making: Leadership Decision-Making: ’s Handling of the Matters”. Foreign Policy (Spring 1998), 124-35. Iranian Hostage Crisis”. International Political 5 Id., “Assessing Leadership Style…”, op. cit., 181. Science Review, 10 (Spring 1989), 35-61; Blum, 6 Ibid., 181-182. Douglas W., “The Soviet Foreign Policy System: 7 Ibid., 185. See also id. et al., “Who Leads Matters: Beliefs, Politics, and Foreign Policy Outcomes”. The Effects of Powerful Individuals,” International International Studies Quarterly, 37 (1993), 373-94; Studies Review, III-2 (Summer 2001), 86-95. Renshon, Stanley A., “Psychoanalytic Assessments 8 All these definitions can be found in Hermann, of Character and Performance in Presidents and Margaret G., “Assessing Leadership Style…”, op. Candidates: Some Observations on Theory and cit., 185. Method”, in Jerrold M. Post (ed.), The Psychological 9 All quotes can be found in id. et al., “Who Leads Assessment of Political Leaders. Ann Arbor, MI, The Matters…”, op. cit., 96-97. University of Michigan Press, 2003, 105-33; Post, 10 Sathasivam, Kanishkan, “No Other Choice: Jerold M., “Assessing Leaders at a Distance: The Pakistan’s Decision to Test the Bomb”, in Alex Political Personality Profile”, in ibid., 69-104; Mintz (ed.), Integrating Cognitive and Rational Graubard, Stephen R., Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind. Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making. New New York, Norton, 1974; George, Alexander L., York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 57. See also “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to Christensen, Eben J.; Redd, Steven B., “Bureaucrats the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making”. vs. the Ballot Box in Foreign Policy Decision International Studies Quarterly, 13 (june 1969), 190- Making: An Experimental Analysis of the 222; George, Alexander L., “The Causal Nexus Bureaucratic Politics Model and the Poliheuristic between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Model”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, XLVIII-1 Behavior: The ‘Operational Code’ Belief System”, in (2004), 69-90. Lawrence S. Falkowski (ed.), Psychological Models 11 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, The War Trap. New in International Politics. Boulder, CO, Westview Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1981. See also id., Press, 1979, 95-124; Holsti, Ole, “The ‘Operational “The War Trap Revisited”. American Political Code’ Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: Science Review, LXXIX-3 (1985), 747-765. ’ Philosophical and Instrumental 12 James, Patrick; Zhang, Enyu, “Chinese Choices: A Beliefs”. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3 Poliheuristic Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises, (1970), 123-57; Walker, Stephen G.; Schafer, Mark 1950-1996”. Foreign Policy Analysis, I-1 (march and Young, Michael D., “Operational Codes and 2005), 32. Role Identities: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy 13 Mintz, Alex, “How Do Leaders Make Decisions?”. Carter’s Operational Code”. Paper presented at the Journal of Conflict Resolution, XLVIII-1 (2004), 3. annual meeting of the International Studies See also id., “The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Association, San Diego, CA, 1996; Rosati, Jerel A., Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making”. “A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Journal of Conflict Resolution, XXXVII-4 (1993), Policy”, in Laura Neack; Jeanne A.K. Hey and 595-618; id., Integrating Cognitive and Rational Patrick J. Haney (eds.), Foreign Policy Analysis: Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making. New Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation. York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; and id.; Geva, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1995, 49-70; Nehemia, “The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Foong Khong, Yuen, Analogies at War: Korea, Policy Decision Making”, in id. (eds.), Decision Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive Rational of 1965. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, Debate. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1997, 81-102; 1992; Yetiv, Steve A., Explaining Foreign Policy: and James, Patrick; Zhang, Enyu, “Chinese U.S. Decision-Making & the Persian Gulf War. Choices…”, op. cit., 32. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 14 For an in-depth discussion of the types of decisions 2004; Henrikson, Alan K., “Mental Maps”, in studied by poliheuristic theory, see Mintz, Alex, Michael J. Hogan; Thomas G. Paterson (eds.), “How Do Leaders Make Decisions?...”, op. cit. and Explaining the History of American Foreign James, Patrick; Zhang, Enyu, “Chinese Choices…”, Relations. New York, Cambridge University Press, op. cit., 34. 1991, 177-192; Welch Larson, Deborah, “Learning in 15 See Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Lalman, David, U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Nixon-Kissinger War and Reason: Domestic and International Structure of Peace”. Paper presented at the annual Imperatives. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, meeting of the American Political Science 1994. Association, Washington, D.C., 1988; Sheffer, 16 Mintz, Alex, Integrating…, op. cit., 3. See also Gabriel (ed.), Innovative Leaders in International Nincic, Miroslav, “Loss Aversion and the Domestic Politics. Albany, NY, State University of New York Context of Military Intervention”. Political Research Press, 1993; MacGregor Burns, James, Leadership. Quarterly, L-1 (1997), 97-120; and Levy, Jack S., New York, Harper Torch Books, 1978 and Wills, “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Gary, “What Makes a Good Leader?”. The Atlantic Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems”. Monthly, 273 (april 1994), 63-80. Political Psychology, 13 (1992), 283-310.

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17 Mintz, Alex, “How Do Leaders Make 36 Woodward, Bob, The Commanders. New York, Decisions?...”, op. cit., 7. Simon & Schuster, 1991, 222-223. 18 James, Patrick; Zhang, Enyu, “Chinese 37 Miller, Eric A.; Yetiv, Steve, “The New World Choices…”, op. cit., 35. Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush 19 Ibid., 35. Administration’s Worldview in Transition”. 20 Ibid., 35. Presidential Studies Quarterly, XXXI-1 (2001), 56- 21 Mintz, Alex, “The Decision to Attack Iraq…”, op. 68. cit., 600. 38 Ibid., 57. 22 James, Patrick; Zhang, Enyu, “Chinese 39 Yetiv, Steve, Explaining Foreign Policy…, op. cit., Choices…”, op. cit., 33. See also Mintz, Alex; Geva, chapter 3. For more on the role of historical analogy, Nehemia, “The Poliheuristic Theory…”, op. cit. including Munich, see Foong Khong, Yuen, 23 James, Patrick; Zhang, Enyu, “Chinese Analogies at War…, op. cit., especially chapters 1, 7, Choices…”, op. cit., 33. and 8. 24 Ibid., 34; and Mintz, Alex, “The Decision to 40 Hess, Gary R., Presidential…, op. cit., 153. Attack Iraq…”, op. cit., 605-613. See also DeRouen, 41 Yetiv, Steve, Explaining Foreign Policy…, op. cit., Karl, Politics, Economics, and the Presidents Use of 61. Force Decision Making. Lewiston, NY, Edwin 42 George W. Bush, quoted in Miller, Eric A.; Yetiv, Mellen Press, 2001. Steve, “The New World Order…”, op. cit., 62. 25 DeRouen, Karl, “The Decision Not to Use Force at 43 Hahn, Peter L., Crisis…, op. cit., 108. Dien Bien Pu: A Poliheuristic Perspective”, in Alex 44 Mintz, Alex, “The Decision to Attack Iraq…”, op. Mintz (ed.), Integrating Cognitive and Rational cit., 606. Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making. New 45 Hess, Gary R., Presidential…, op. cit., 174, 177- York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 11-28; and 78, 179-180, 184. DeRouen, Karl; Sprecher, Christopher, “Initial Crises 46 Yetiv, Steve, Explaining Foreign Policy…, op. cit., Reaction and Poliheuristic Thoery”. Journal of 73-74; Hess, Gary R., Presidential…, op. cit., 178, Conflict Resolution, XLVIII-1 (2004), 56-68. 180-182. 26 James, Patrick; Zhang, Enyu, “Chinese 47 Graham, George, “Paris Squirms at Fall-Out From Choices…”, op. cit., 34. Iraq Links”. Financial Times, September 12 1990, 2; 27 Ibid., 35-36. and Yetiv, Steve, Explaining Foreign Policy…, op. 28 Bush, George H.W. January 20 1989. “Inaugural cit., 45-46. Address” [document online] Available from Internet 48 Miller, Eric A.; Yetiv, Steve, “The New World at: . Order…”, op. cit., 66. 29 Although this sentiment was expressed widely in 49 Baker III, James A. with Thomas D. DeFrank, The both popular and scholarly writings, none is more Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, well-known than Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall 1989-1992. New York, Putnam, 1995, 294. of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 50 Hahn, Peter L., Crisis…, op. cit., 108. Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York, Vintage, 51 Hess, Gary R., Presidential…, op. cit., 173. 1987. For an opposing, though less well-known, take 52 Hahn, Peter L., Crisis…, op. cit., 109. on America’s role in the international system, see 53 Hess, Gary R., Presidential…, op. cit., 211-215. Strange, Susan, “The Persistent Myth of Lost 54 Ibid., 214. Only 148 American soldiers died in the Hegemony”. International Organization, XLI-4 conflict, with another 458 wounded. (1987), 551-574. 55 Ibid., 214. 30 Hess, Gary R., Presidential Decisions for War. 56 Miller, Eric A.; Yetiv, Steve, “The New World Baltimore, John’s Hopkins University Press, 2001, Order…”, op. cit., 62. 154; and Rubenzer, Steven J.; Faschinbauer, Thomas 57 Ibid., 62. R., Personality, Character, and Leadership in the 58 Ibid., 63. White House: Psychologists Assess the Presidents. 59 See Daalder, Ivo H.; Lindsay, James M., America Washington, D.C., Brassey’s, 2004, 199. Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. 31 Hess, Gary R., Presidential…, op. cit., 154. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2003. 32 Ibid., 155. 60 See Prestowitz, Clyde, Rogue Nation: American 33 Ibid., 157. For an excellent account of American- Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions. Iraqi relations during the 1980s, see Jentleson, Bruce New York, Basic Books, 2003. W., With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and 61 Chua, Amy, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Saddam, 1982-1990. New York, W. W. Norton & Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Company, 1994, especially chapters 2 and 3. Instability. New York, Doubleday, 2003. 34 Hahn, Peter L., Crisis and Crossfire: The Untied 62 For information on the immediate aftermath of States and the Middle East Since 1945. Washington, 9/11, see the special report titled “God Bless D.C., Potomac Books, 2005, 106; and Jentleson, America”. Newsweek, September 24 2001. For Bruce W., With Friends…, op. cit., 94-138. assessments of the impact of 9/11 on U.S. foreign 35 Marr, Phebe, “Iraq’s Uncertain Future”. Current policy, see Friedman, Thomas L., Longitudes and History, 90 (1991), 4. Attitudes: The World in the Age of Terrorism. New York, Anchor Books, 2003; and Talbott, Strobe;

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Chanda, Nayan (eds.), The Age of Terror: America After a War”. . February 23 and the World After September 11. New York, Basic 2003. Books, 2001. 73 Stevenson, Richard W., “Antiwar Protests Fail to 63 Dyer, Gwynne, “Terrorism Deforms American Sway Bush on Plans for Iraq”. The New York Times, Foreign Policy”. The Blade, July 5 2002, A9. For an February 19 2003. examination of differing U.S. and European world 74 Zakaria, Fareed, “It’s Time to Talk To the World”. views, see Kagan, Robert, Of Paradise and Power: Newsweek, January 27 2003, 49. America and Europe in the New World Order. New 75 Woodward, Bob, Plan…, op. cit., 339-347; and York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003. Elliott, Michael, “Who’s with Him?”. Time, March 3 64 Daalder, Ivo H.; Lindsay, James M., America…, 2003, 28-32. On the Canadian draft resolution, see op. cit.; Zelikow, Philip, “The Transformation of O’Reilly, Marc J., “Canadian Foreign Policy in the National Security: Five Redefinitions”. The National Middle East: Reflexive Multilateralism in an Interest, 71 (Spring 2003), 17-28; Lewis Gaddis, Evolving World”, in Patrick James; Nelson Michaud John, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation”. and Marc J. O’Reilly (eds.), Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy, 133 (november-december 2002). Foreign Policy. Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, Bush, George W. September 2002. “The National 2006. Security Strategy of the United States of America” 76 Woodward, Bob, Plan…, op. cit., 357-372; [document online] Available from Internet at: Johnson, Boris, “Bush’s War, Blair’s Gamble”. The ; and Dao, New York Times, March 16 2003; Friedman, Thomas James, “One Nation Plays the Great Game Alone”. L., “Repairing the World”. The New York Times, The New York Times, July 6 2002. For foreign March 16 2003; Atkinson, Rick; Ricks, Thomas E., reaction to the Bush Doctrine, see Frankel, Glenn, “Audacious Mission, Awesome Risks”. The “New U.S. Doctrine Worries Europeans”. The Washington Post, March 16 2003; Herbert, Bob, Washington Post, September 30 2002 and Morley, ”With Ears and Eyes Closed”. The New York Times, Jefferson, “Bush Doctrine Leaves Allies Feeling Left March 17 2003; Morin, Richard; Deane, Claudia, Out”. The Washington Post, September 27 2002. By “71% of Americans Support War, Poll Shows”. The expanding its global commitments and intimidating Washington Post, March 19 2003; Broder, David S., allies and foes alike, the Bush administration “Step by Step to War”. The Washington Post, March contravened the advice scholar Stephen Walt 18 2003 and “Waiting to Exhale”. The Blade, March proffered -- a recipe for long-term foreign-policy 19 2003, A6. disaster, in Walt’s opinion. See Walt, Stephen M., 77 Woodward, Bob, Plan…, op. cit., 364-408; “Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy”. Shanker, Thom, “Regime Thought War Unlikely, International Security, XXVI-3 (Winter 2001/02), Iraqis Tell U.S.”. The New York Times, February 12 56-78. 2004; and Sanger, David E.; Shanker, Thom, “Bush 65 “Fractured Foreign Policy”. The Blade, January 5 Says Regime in Iraq Is No More; Victory ‘Certain’ ”. 2003, B4; Hirsh, Michael, “Kim Is the Key Danger”. The New York Times, April 16 2003. On the Newsweek, February 13 2003, 30; and Dickey, DB/ROCKSTARS network, see Woodward, Bob, Christopher, “...No, Saddam Is Worse”. Newsweek, Plan…, op. cit., 301-305. February 13 2003, 31. 78 Fukuyama, Francis, “After Neoconservatism”. The 66 Woodward, Bob, Plan of Attack. New York, Simon New York Times Magazine, February 19 2006; Nasr, & Schuster, 2004, 1-153. Vali, “Sects and Violence”. The New York Times, 67 Ibid., 154-227. February 23 2006 and Sanger, David E., “A Bush 68 Ibid., 228-295. Alarm: Urging U.S. to Shun Isolationism”. The New 69 Ibid., 296-315. York Times, March 13 2006. 70 Sanger, David E.; Dao, James, “U.S. Is Completing Plan to Promote a Democratic Iraq”. The New York Times, January 6 2003. Devon Largio wrote a University of undergraduate honors thesis examining the various rationales for war. See Raspberry, William, “Tracking Why We Went to War”. The Washington Post, May 31 2004. 71 Morin, Richard; Deane, Claudia, “Most Support Attack On Iraq, With Allies”. The Washington Post, February 11 2003. 72 Wright, Jonathan, “U.S. Plans for Two-Year Occupation of Iraq”. The Washington Post, February 11 2003. Ivins, Molly, “Paying the Price for Bush’s War”. The Blade, February 14 2003, A15; Adams, Gordon; Kosiak, Steve, “The Price We Pay”. The New York Times, February 15 2003 and Miller, Judith, “U.S. Officials Review Plan to Rebuild Iraq

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