America Vs Itself at Antietam: How Northern Newspapers Empowered Lincoln’S Greatest Political Feat

America vs Itself at Antietam: How Northern Newspapers Empowered Lincoln’s Greatest Political Feat Dylan Siwicki History 319 Professor Cara Shelly November, 22 2016 Abstract The Battle of Antietam was the major turning point of the American Civil War. The Confederacy had so much to gain from a successive invasion into the North, such as possibly turning Maryland over to the Confederacy and possibly gaining foreign recognition by very powerful European nations, namely Great Britain and France, who were getting desperate for cotton to feed their textile industry. Their recognition would have put the European powers head- to-head with the Union blockade along the US eastern and southern coastline, in attempt to supply the Confederacy. Any Union interference would have certainly brought widen the war, and force peace negotiations. In addition, a Confederate victory at Antietam would have put other major Union held cities, such as Washington, DC and Philadelphia in danger. This serious threat could have possibly turned the Northern public against the war and further enhance peace negotiations. While the battle was tactically won by the Union, many Northern newspapers went on to publish articles glorifying McClellan as the general who won the greatest battle ever fought in the western hemisphere. However, the battle was more of a struggle between two armies and the Union’s superiority in men and ammunition that ultimately led to Lee’s retreat. Nevertheless, the politicization of northern newspapers enabled President Lincoln to shift the war toward slavery with the announcement of the Emancipation of Proclamation. That announcement forever barred any foreign recognition of the Confederacy and any hope they had in breaking the Union blockade. America vs Itself at Antietam: How Northern Newspapers Empowered Lincoln’s Greatest Political Feat September 17, 1862, remains the single bloodiest day in American history. On that day, Union General George B. McClellan’s Union Army of 64,000 men met Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army of 40,000 men near a small town of Sharpsburg, Maryland, and that saw some of the most savage fighting of the American Civil War resulting in more than 22,000 casualties.1 The fighting began in the early morning north of Sharpsburg in wooded areas around a cornfield where powerful Union attacks led by Major General Joseph Hooker were met with equally strong counterattacks by Confederate forces led by Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson. Despite the Union’s numerical superiority, the two sides swept back and forth across the battlefield until Jackson’s forces ultimately prevailed in holding a line near Hooker’s main objective, the Dunker Church. As the fighting died down north of Sharpsburg, the center of the battlefield directly east of Sharpsburg saw the fighting intensify very rapidly, especially around a sunken road where Union soldiers pierced the Confederate center but were unable to capitalize on the gained success. Later in the day, Ambrose Burnside led a march across Antietam creek south of Sharpsburg, but was soon met by A.P Hill’s Division who had just marched up from Harpers Ferry. Generally, the Battle of Antietam was really just three separate bloody battles fought on the outskirts of Sharpsburg. Although their wasn’t a clear and decisive winner on the battlefield, Lee’s retreat back into northern Virginia was a significant turning point of the war and many of the newspapers in the North described the battle as a glorious victory and the definite blow to the rebel army. 1 Shelby Foote, The Civil War, a Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville. (New York: First vintage books edition, 1986), 685, 702. 1 Following the Confederate victory at the Battle of the Second Manassas, Lee decided that it was time to take the war to the North. With the simultaneous Confederate advance in Kentucky, Union forces were now weakened and on their heels in the East, and the time was now to put an end to the war. The first call for the northern advance into Maryland was to influence Northern voters for the upcoming off-year elections to elect a new House of Representatives to recognize independence of the Confederacy. “The proposal of peace would enable the people of the United States to determine at their coming elections whether they will support those who favor a prolongation of war, or those who wish to bring it to a termination.”2 The House at the time was controlled by the Republicans, the party of Abraham Lincoln and the ones in favor of the war. In the opposition, the ones who were more likely to call for peace were the so called Peace Democrats. The Peace Democrats maintained the ideal that “Northern Armies could never conquer the South and that the administration should seek an armistice and peace negotiations” immediately.3 Lee and Davis both knew that as long as the Republicans were in control of congress, they would continue to maintain their views of fighting to preserve the Union and freeman’s rights. Due to the numerical and resource superiority of the Union, the Confederates were in desperate need of help if they were going to achieve their goal of peace negotiations. The help the Confederates were looking for was in Europe. The South had the majority of the world’s cotton at the time, but with the Union blockade, foreign consumers couldn’t reach them. Ever 2 Lee to Jefferson Davis, Sept. 8, 1862, in Lee Family Digital Archive in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Vol.19, Part 2, p. 600. http:// leefamilyarchive.org/9-family-papers/720-robert-e-lee-to-jefferson-davis-1862-september-8 3 James M. McPherson, “The Battle of Antietam: A Turning Point in the Civil War,” The Gilder Lehrman: Institute of American History. https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/american-civil-war/essays/battle- antietam-turning-point-civil-war (accessed November 8, 2016). 2 since the war broke out, the Confederates believed it was only a matter of time before countries, such as Great Britain and France who needed cotton for their textile factories, would intervene on their behalf. Along with the recent Union defeats, a great victory on Union soil is what Lee had to split infinitive foreign recognition. On the day of the battle, Lord Russell replied to British Prime Minister Palmerston’s letter on September, 14th with “I agree with you that the time is come for offering mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the recognition of the Independence of the Confederates.”4 Jefferson Davis nor any member of the Confederate Congress was aware of this transaction between Lord Russell and Palmerston, but nevertheless, they believed Lee was right for the decision to try to force the issue. As Lee’s invasion of Maryland was put forth to put a solution to these various issues, McClellan caught a break in Lee’s invasion plans at Frederick, Maryland. “One of his soldiers found a copy of Robert E. Lee’s Special Orders No. 191 wrapped around three cigars, apparently lost by a careless Confederate courier.”5 McClellan’s first response was that it was a rebel trick because it’s too good to be true that Lee had divided his army. But nevertheless, a Union staff officer was able to recognize Lee’s handwriting, so McClellan took his word for it.6 Too late stop Lee’s attack on Harpers Ferry, McClellan ordered an evacuation of the fort and began to move very quickly towards the gaps in South Mountain. On September 14, the two armies commenced battle that saw the Union fight off the rebels, but Lee’s retreat allowed him to consolidate his army at a spot of his choosing. 4 Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 17, 1862, in The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and Robert E. Lee’s Maryland Campaigned, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004.) 397. 5 McPherson, “The Battle of Antietam.” 6 Foote, The Civil War, 670-671. 3 This is when Lee chose the city of Sharpsburg, near Antietam Creek, where the great battle was fought. Despite outnumbering Lee two-to-one, McClellan still only used about three- quarters of his army because he believed he was significantly outnumbered, when in fact Lee committed his entire force. “The greater part of four divisions-two under [Gen.] Franklin, two under [Gen.] Porter: no less than 20,000 men, a solid fourth of his effective force-had stood idle while the battle raged through climax after climax,” each giving McClellan a chance to decimate Lee, but McClellan firmly believed that “Lee was massing enormous reserves for a knockout blow.”7 As the battles commenced, McClellan’s reluctance to commit his forces to the battle allowed Lee to shift forces from threat to threat. Even in the late afternoon when the Union seemed poised for a breakthrough and potentially cut Lees’s retreat, McClellan still failed to commit. After A.P Hill’s counterattack to the Union left, the sun began to set and the conflict ended along all three fronts. By the next morning, the Confederates still stood in their place, but McClellan did not renew the attack, despite telling Henry Halleck, “The battle will probably be renewed today. Send all the troops you can by the most expeditious route.”8 Despite McClellan’s reinforcements, the battle was never renewed as the immediate aftermath saw both armies tend to their wounded, and Lee ordered a retreat that night. McClellan chose not to pursue Lee, a decision that would have later consequences, but also with the apparent statement on the battlefield, Lee’s retreat in failure gave the Union a chance to rejoice a victory.

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