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University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 A Xerox Education Company GLASS, Ronald Johnson, 1941- LEIBNIZ AND PERCEPTION. Hie Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1972 Philosophy University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan © 1972 RONALD JOHNSON GLASS ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THTS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MTCROFTT,MED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. LEIBNIZ AND PERCEPTION DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Ronald Johnson Glass, Ph.D. * • • * • The Ohio State University 1972 Approved by Adviser Department of Philosophy ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Virgil Hinshaw, Jr., and Professor Marvin Pox who served on my dissertation committee for their support in this project and to my adviser, Professor Robert Turnbull, without whose help and efforts this dissertation would not have been possible. ii VITA December 31, 1941 . Born - St. Louis, Missouri 1963 ............. B.A., University of Missouri Columbia, Missouri 1964 ............. M.A., "Presentational Immediacy in Whitehead," University of Missouri Columbia, Missouri 1964-1968 ......... Teaching Assistant The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio 1968-1972 . • • • • Instructor, Department of Philosophy University of Wisconsin-La Crosse La Crosse, Wisconsin PUBLICATIONS "The Contradictions in Kant's Examples." Philosophical Studies, Volume XXII, 5-6, October-December, 1971, pp. 65-70. "Taylor's Argument from Design." The Personalist, forthcoming. TABLE OP CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................... ±± VITA ................................................... iii INTRODUCTION ...................... 1 Chapter I. THE CONTENTS OF A MONAD ...........................10 The Monad as Simple Yet Complex ................10 The Old Philosophy, the New Science, and the Internal Principle ........................ 20 Monadal Force and Perceptions .••••••• 35 "IT • GOD AND PERCEPTIONS............................... 54 Vertical Causation .......................... 54 God's Active I d e a s ............. • ............. 68 Perfections 81 C o n c e p t s ................... 93 III. PERCEPTION AND THE PERCEIVER ................... 110 Sensation as Intentional ............. 110 Knowledge of the S e l f ................. 124 Self, the Source of Perceptions ••••••• 140 The Molyneux Problem • •••••• ......... 151 IV. THE PERCEPTUAL SI T U A T I O N ........................ 159 Petites Perceptions .......................... 159 Clarity and Distinctness ..•••••••• 168 Real and Imaginary Phenomena .................179 Well-Founded Phenomena ...................... 185 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................... 212 iv INTRODUCTION The subject of Leibniz and perception divides rather easily into two major topics. The first is that of what Leibniz means when he uses the word "perception” in reference to perception in a monad. That is the basic theme of the first two chapters of this work. The second is that of what Leibniz takes to be involved in an ordi­ nary perceptual situation. The third and fourth chapters are basically concerned with that topic. The domain of the first topic provides the foundation for that of the second. I am sure that these two topics indicate what is vexing to anyone who has read the standard representative samples of Leibniz* text when he asks himself, "What does Leibniz have to say about perception?" The first topic presents itself because one quickly realizes in reading the standard Leibniz texts that the word "perception" is most often used in a tech­ nical sense and that apparently there are several tech­ nical meanings of the word as used by Leibniz. But the really important question which is to be faced is not what are the various meanings of "perception" when Leibniz uses it but rather what are the views that his 1 uses of the word help to formulate. The answer to that question is the only adequate way to come to an accurate view of what Leibniz means by "perception," Consequently the treatment of the first topic consists of spinning out in elaborate detail a presentation of the role of "per­ ception" in a great variety of topics. My method con­ sists of developing a conceptual fabric based upon quotations taken from a great number of Leibniz sources, Leibniz never wrote a work on the topic of perception, though there are several pieces on closely related topics, for example, ideas, which provide material on the topic. It is well known that even though Leibniz wrote two books, Theodicy and New Essays Con­ cerning Human Understanding, a large quantity of philo­ sophical material can be found in letters and essays written with certain readers in mind. Many of these, along with a selection of drafts and personal notes on philosophical topics, have been translated into English by Professor Leroy Loemker and published in book form. A similar book of selections which extensively overlaps the Loemker work appeared several years earlier, edited by Professor Philip Wiener. There are two obstacles to developing a detailed conceptual fabric which ties together what Leibniz means t by "perception." First, Leibniz wrote extensively in Latin and French and, to a lesser extent, in German. There are nuances which are lost to a person who is not intimately familiar with those languages in the time Leibniz wrote. Second, Leibniz' remarks on "perception" as he uses it are fragmentary. Generally one may cor­ rectly say that whenever Leibniz wrote, he wrote a little about a lot rather than a lot about a little. This is especially true of perception. Further, Leibniz writes with a certain audience in mind and shapes each piece, both in overall impression and in detail, for each occa­ sion. Generally he writes to persuade, emphasizing areas of agreement, glossing over details of things in a way that will not interfere with the points he wants to make but which leaves the way open for elaboration in another place. Unfortunately, elaborations follow elaborations to the point where one must master all of his views to have a fairly clear view of one of them. The effect of these obstacles is overcome by the fact that there are recurring details of themes. They appear explicitly in a variety of places and can be drawn out of remarks of others. The fact that detail in addi­ tion to theme appears quite constant in a variety of contexts and times indicates a conceptual fabric in which "perception" is embedded. In dealing with the first topic I will be drawing the details of the conceptual fabric out of the text. Generally my comments will be limited to this 4 task and I will not evaluate the views which emerge. Occasionally Liebniz’ views will be illuminated by con­ sideration of philosophical traditions and the views of other philosophers. Generally I will not give attention to the remarks of commentators concerning Leibniz on per­ ception for they are quite tentative and sketchy. To my knowledge the project of focusing on the topic of Leibniz and perception has never been undertaken. The result is that commentators have provided sketches of "perception11 which do not take one past his second cursory reading of the major selections, though the space devoted to the topic, even if scattered, is well spent. I believe the best sketches are to be found in Bertrand Russell*s Philosophy of Leibniz, G. H. R. Parkinson’s Logic and Reality in Leibniz’s Metaphysics, Nicholas Rescher's The Philosophy of Leibniz, and Ruth Saw’s Leibniz. An overview of the course of this work would probably be helpful in orienting the reader. The first major topic mentioned above may be conveniently desig­ nated as the
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