Chadbourne Gilpatric and Ludwig Wittgenstein: a Fateful Meeting
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Rethinking Fideism Through the Lens of Wittgenstein's Engineering Outlook
University of Dayton eCommons Religious Studies Faculty Publications Department of Religious Studies 2012 Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook Brad Kallenberg University of Dayton, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/rel_fac_pub Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, Christianity Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Other Religion Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons eCommons Citation Kallenberg, Brad, "Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook" (2012). Religious Studies Faculty Publications. 82. https://ecommons.udayton.edu/rel_fac_pub/82 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Religious Studies at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Religious Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Note: This is the accepted manuscript for the following article: Kallenberg, Brad J. “Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71, no. 1 (2012): 55-73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-011-9327-0 Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook Brad J. Kallenberg University of Dayton, 2011 In an otherwise superbly edited compilation of student notes from Wittgenstein’s 1939 Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cora Diamond makes an false step that reveals to us our own tendencies to misread Wittgenstein. The student notes she collated attributed the following remark to a student named Watson: “The point is that these [data] tables do not by themselves determine that one builds the bridge in this way: only the tables together with certain scientific theory determine that.”1 But Diamond thinks this a mistake, presuming instead to change the manuscript and put these words into the mouth of Wittgenstein. -
Stellar 08 Cover Page
Stellar Undergraduate Research Journal Oklahoma City University Volume 2, 2008 Stellar Oklahoma City University’s Undergraduate Research Journal Inside are 2007-08 research papers spanning the disciplines at OCU, including criminology, English, economics, music, philosophy, political science, and psychology, representing the exceptional undergraduate research happening at Oklahoma City University. Editor-in-Chief: Gina Jennings Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Terry Phelps Stellar is published annually by Oklahoma City University. Opinions and beliefs herein do not necessarily reflect those of the university. Submissions are accepted from undergraduate students. Address all correspondence to: Stellar c/o The Learning Enhancement Center, 2501 N. Blackwelder Ave., Oklahoma City, OK 73106. All submissions are subject to editing. 2 Contents Because I Do Not Hope to Turn Again:T.S. Eliot as the First Confessional Poet Kristin May……………………………………………………………3 Who Goes First Does Matter Unless No One Goes First: Personal Dyadic Space and Order Amy D. Simpson and Stacie Abla………….………………………...11 The Relationship Between Black Farmers and the United States Department of Agriculture Zachary L. Newland…..........................................................................19 Don’t Be Afraid of the Ball! Wittgenstein on Knowledge of Other Minds Jacob Coleman......................................................................................28 The Effects of Culture, Gender, and Recipient of Money on Moral Comfort Dashala Cubit, Lacey Novinska, and Danny Gering…………………39 -
Rush Rhees on Philosophy and Religious Discourse
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Asbury Theological Seminary Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 18 Issue 4 Article 3 10-1-2001 Rush Rhees on Philosophy and Religious Discourse Lars Hertzberg Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Hertzberg, Lars (2001) "Rush Rhees on Philosophy and Religious Discourse," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 18 : Iss. 4 , Article 3. Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol18/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. RUSH RHEES ON PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE Lars Hertzberg Rush Rhees is primarily known as an expOlmder ofWittgenstein's philosophy. However, his depth and originality as a thinker is increasingly recognized, largely due to the posthumous publication of his Nachlass. In this essay, char acteristic features of Rhees's philosophical style and method are conveyed through comparing and contrasting them with those of Wittgenstein. Rhees, it is found, is more of a dialogical thinker than Wittgenstein. His most distinctive contributions to philosophy were concerned with language and religion. Rhees's views on the unity of language are compared with those of Wittgenstein, and in conclusion Rhees's thinking about religion is presented through a close reading of one of his essays on that topic. -
I Am in Training: Wittgenstein on Language Acquisition Megan J
150 Wittgenstein on Language Acquisition I Am in Training: Wittgenstein on Language Acquisition Megan J. Laverty Teachers College, Columbia University Norm Friesen’s analysis of Wittgenstein as a tragic philosopher of education draws upon an understanding of Wittgenstein’s German influences: Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Karl Kraus, Alfred Loos, Otto Wininger, and Oswald Spengler. According to Friesen, these influences share “a dark view of the world and our place within it,” which inspired Wittgenstein’s deeply pessimistic philosophy of education. Friesen argues that Wittgenstein deliberately brings the experience of learning a language into relation with the way “we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things” in order to highlight that the process of becom- ing a cultured or “conventionalized” being — otherwise known as humanization — necessarily entails “renunciation and brutality.” Friesen may be right that En- glish-speaking philosophers of education have failed to appreciate the full force of Wittgenstein on Abrichtung — the breaking in of an animal by means of obedience training or dressage — but he does not go all the way to establishing that Abrichtung is characteristically brutal and harsh. Wittgenstein uses the word Abrichtung to describe language learning and ed- ucation. As Wolfgang Huemer explains, in German the term is “exclusively used for animals, for training dogs to sit down on the command ‘sit,’ or horses to gallop when the rider performs a certain bodily movement.”1 Thus, to German speakers, Wittgenstein’s suggestion that “we have to abrichten our children” seems quite drastic; it implies that children are animals. According to Friesen, English-speaking philos- ophers of education are inclined to explain away Wittgenstein’s reliance upon the term, and so make his philosophy of education appear far more progressive than it is. -
Rush Rhees: Main Publications
Rush Rhees: Main Publications Books Without Answers, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1%9. Discussions of Wittgenstein, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. Contributions to Books Introduction to George Boole, Studies in Logic and Probability, London, 1952. ' "Ontology" and Identity in the Tractatus', in Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, ed. Peter Winch, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969. 'Postscript', in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981. 'Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual', in Wittgenstein and His Times, ed. Brian McGuiness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982. Introduction to Jakob Friedrich Fries, Dialogues on Morality and Religion, trans. David Walford, ed. D. Z. Phillips, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982. Editorial work etc. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953. Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, ed. with an Introduction by R. Rhees, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'A Lecture on Ethics', ed. R. Rhees, Philosophical Review, Vol. 74, 1965. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. C. Barrett, from notes taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966. 'Wittgenstein's Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense Data"', ed. R. Rhees, Philosophical Review, Vol. 77, 1968. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Eine Philosophische Betrachtung, ed. R. Rhees, in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Schriften 5, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'Remarks on Frazer's "Golden Bough"', trans. A. C. Miles and R. Rhees, ed. R. Rhees, The Human World, No. 3, May 1971. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. J.P. -
Rush Rhees on Religious Belief Language
©til Philosophical Writings, No. 12, Autumn 1999 BELIEF OR 'BELIEF': RUSH RHEES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF LANGUAGE Todd R. Long-University ofRochester he recent book Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy contains a Tstimulating collection of writin~s by Rush Rhees on a variety of topics in the philosophy of religion. Comprising accounts of personal, religious and moral struggles, these essays provide a refreshing change from the often dry, overly technical approach to philosophy writing. Despite spanning more than thirty years, Rhees' s essays disclose a fairly consistent philosophy .of religion with a clear emphasis. Since he was Wittgenstein's student and long-time friend as well as a literary executor ofWittgenstein's writings, it is not surprising that Rhees's comments on the philosophy of religion reveal a distinctly Wittgensteinian approach, both in content and style. Moreover, Rhees's particular way of doing philosophy of religion seems, in retrospect, to have set the course that subsequent philosophy of religion of the Wittgensteinian type would take. Two themes, or methods, inform nearly the whole book: a concentrated focus on the "grammar" of religious statements and a selective reliance on verificationism. Although the latter may sound provocative since Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion can rightly be seen as a polemic against logical positivism, I will argue that Rhees's reliance on verificationism is important for his project. In this essay, I want to consider Rhees' s treatment of the sense of religious language, for it both exemplifies his approach to nearly all aspects of his philosophy of religion, and it discloses what I will argue is his chief failing: the distortion of Christian concepts on the basis of what he thinks ought to be deep about religion. -
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
SAUL A. KRIPKE Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language An Elementary Exposition Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts Contents Copyright © 1982 by Saul A. Kripke All rights reserved Preface Vll EIGHTH PRINTING, 1995 1 Introductory 1 Printed in the United States of America 2 The Wittgensteinian Paradox 7 3 The Solution and the 'Private Language' Argument 55 Postscript Wittgenstein and Other Minds Library ofCongress Cataloging in Publication Data 114 Index Kripke, Saul A., 1940- 147 Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Includes bibliographical references and index. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. I. Title B3376.W564K74 192 81-20070 AACR2 ISBN 0-674-95401-7 (paper) - To my parents Preface The main part ofthis work has been delivered at various places as lectures, series oflectures, or seminars. It constitutes, as I say, 'an elementary exposition' ofwhat I take to be the central thread of Wittgenstein's later work on the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mathematics, including my interpretation of the 'private language argument', which on my view is principally to be explicated in terms ofthe problem of 'following a rule'. A postscript presents another problem Wittgenstein saw in the conception ofprivate language, which leads to a discussion of some aspects of his views on the problem ofother minds. Since I stress the strong connection in Wittgenstein's later philosophy between the philosophy of psychology and the philosophy of mathematics, I had hoped to add a second postscript on the philosophy ofmathematics. Time has not permitted this, so for the moment the basic remarks on philosophy ofmathematics in the main text must suffice. -
Approaches to Philosophy of Religion: Contemplating the World Or Trying to Find Our Way Home?
This is a repository copy of Approaches to philosophy of religion: Contemplating the world or trying to find our way home?. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/85283/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Burley, M (2015) Approaches to philosophy of religion: Contemplating the world or trying to find our way home? Religious Studies, 51 (2). 221 - 239. ISSN 0034-4125 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412514000377 Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Approaches to philosophy of religion: contemplating the world or trying to find our way home? MIKEL BURLEY School of Philosophy, Religion and the History of Science, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK e-mail: [email protected] Abstract: What is the point of philosophy of religion? Is it to help us find the right path in life, with the philosopher as guide and mentor? Or is it, as D. -
Wittgenstein's Concept of Language Games
47 Al-Hikmat Volume 26 (2006), pp. 47-62 WITTGENSTEIN’S CONCEPT OF LANGUAGE GAMES ROSHAN ARA* Abstract. By the time Wittgenstein wrote The Philosophical Investigations he rejected the three assumptions of his early period namely that language is used for one purpose the presenting of facts, that sentence acquires meaning in one way that is through picturing and that language essentially has a clear and firm structure of the formulae in a logical calculus. In the later development of his thought Wittgenstein seems to repudiate the earlier notion of the uniformity of language, which would restrict the word to a rigid and demarcated use, a use which would suit all cases. He came to think that language is flexible, subtle and multiform. Wittgenstein’s remarks on “Games and Definitions” could be applied to aesthetics. The nature of art is like that of the nature of games. If we look carefully and see what it is that we called 'art' we will find no common properties but discern strands of similarities. Knowing what art is not discovering some manifest or latent essence but being able to recognize, describe and explain those things we call art by virtue of these similarities. The basic resemblance between these concepts is their open texture. In elucidating them certain (paradigm) cases can be given to which we conveniently apply the word 'art' or game but no exhaustive set of cases can be given. It is so because one can always envisage new cases, which can be added to it. In the Philosophical Investigations, published in 1953, Wittgenstein expressed the view: “Our language can be seen as an *Dr. -
Norman Malcolm, Edited with a Response by Peter Winch, WITTGENSTEIN: a RELIGIOUS POINT of VIEW?
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 13 Issue 1 Article 12 1-1-1996 Norman Malcolm, edited with a response by Peter Winch, WITTGENSTEIN: A RELIGIOUS POINT OF VIEW? Ronald E. Hustwit Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Hustwit, Ronald E. (1996) "Norman Malcolm, edited with a response by Peter Winch, WITTGENSTEIN: A RELIGIOUS POINT OF VIEW?," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 13 : Iss. 1 , Article 12. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil199613123 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol13/iss1/12 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 146 Faith and Philosophy University Press, 1963); for criticisms of Almond and Verba, see Alasdair MacIntyre "The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts" Ethics 84 (1973) 1-9; Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships" American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 635-52. 8. Murray, op. cit., p. 103. 9. George Will "Conservatism and Character" in his The Morning After (New York: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 365-68, p. 365. 10. See Murray, op. cit., pp. 103ff. In these passages, Murray relies upon Adolph A. Berle, Jr. Power Without Property (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1959), pp. 98-116, where the issue of legitimacy is more explicitly addressed than in his own discussion. -
The Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy: Program History
The Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy: Program History 1960 FIRST COLLOQUIUM Wilfrid Sellars, "On Looking at Something and Seeing it" Ronald Hepburn, "God and Ambiguity" Comments: Dennis O'Brien Kurt Baier, "Itching and Scratching" Comments: David Falk/Bruce Aune Annette Baier, "Motives" Comments: Jerome Schneewind 1961 SECOND COLLOQUIUM W.D. Falk, "Hegel, Hare and the Existential Malady" Richard Cartwright, "Propositions" Comments: Ruth Barcan Marcus D.A.T. Casking, "Avowals" Comments: Martin Lean Zeno Vendler, "Consequences, Effects and Results" Comments: William Dray/Sylvan Bromberger PUBLISHED: Analytical Philosophy, First Series, R.J. Butler (ed.), Oxford, Blackwell's, 1962. 1962 THIRD COLLOQUIUM C.J. Warnock, "Truth" Arthur Prior, "Some Exercises in Epistemic Logic" Newton Garver, "Criteria" Comments: Carl Ginet/Paul Ziff Hector-Neri Castenada, "The Private Language Argument" Comments: Vere Chappell/James Thomson John Searle, "Meaning and Speech Acts" Comments: Paul Benacerraf/Zeno Vendler PUBLISHED: Knowledge and Experience, C.D. Rollins (ed.), University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964. 1963 FOURTH COLLOQUIUM Michael Scriven, "Insanity" Frederick Will, "The Preferability of Probable Beliefs" Norman Malcolm, "Criteria" Comments: Peter Geach/George Pitcher Terrence Penelhum, "Pleasure and Falsity" Comments: William Kennick/Arnold Isenberg 1964 FIFTH COLLOQUIUM Stephen Korner, "Some Remarks on Deductivism" J.J.C. Smart, "Nonsense" Joel Feinberg, "Causing Voluntary Actions" Comments: Keith Donnellan/Keith Lehrer Nicholas Rescher, "Evaluative Metaphysics" Comments: Lewis W. Beck/Thomas E. Patton Herbert Hochberg, "Qualities" Comments: Richard Severens/J.M. Shorter PUBLISHED: Metaphysics and Explanation, W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill (eds.), University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966. 1965 SIXTH COLLOQUIUM Patrick Nowell-Smith, "Acts and Locutions" George Nakhnikian, "St. Anselm's Four Ontological Arguments" Hilary Putnam, "Psychological Predicates" Comments: Bruce Aune/U.T. -
The You-Turn in Philosophy of Mind: on the Significance of Experiences That Aren’T Mine
THE YOU-TURN IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EXPERIENCES THAT AREN’T MINE A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI‘I AT MĀNOA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY AUGUST 2018 By Joshua Stoll Dissertation Committee: Arindam Chakrabarti, Chairperson Vrinda Dalmiya Ronald Bontekoe Joseph Tanke Jesse Knutson Ashley Maynard Acknowledgements I could not have written this dissertation without the help and support of others, including my family, my friends, and my professors at the UH Mānoa Department of Philosophy. My parents Luci and Howie Stoll have always been there to unwaveringly support my endeavors. They have been a great source of love, inspiration, and guidance. I owe them everything I have become. My brother Adam and his wife Lisa and their kids have also been a great source of love, inspiration, and guidance. And I’m thankful that my nieces and nephew really got me moving on this project by playfully asking me every Thanksgiving (perhaps with some prodding from my parents) if I have finished it yet. In addition, I’d like to thank my fellow graduate student colleague-friends in the department, in particular: Matt Izor, Elyse Byrnes, Ben Zenk, Brandon Underwood, Jane Allred, and Joel Label. More particularly, out of this group, I’d like to thank Sydney Morrow for being a close friend and great officemate, as well as Ian Nicolay, for being a close friend and great roommate. Our camaraderie and support of each other, the community we formed, truly made me feel at home here in Hawai‘i.