DOCSLIB.ORG

Boethius, the Consolation of Philosophy, Book 5 (Or, Reconciling Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Boethius, the Consolation of Philosophy, Book 5 (Or, Reconciling Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge) Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, book 5 (or, reconciling human freedom and divine foreknowledge) More than a century after Augustine, Boethius offers a different solution to the problem of human freedom versus divine foreknowledge, which appeals to the nature of time and God’s eternity. He reaches this conclusion by way of an imaginary conversation with “Lady Philosophy” as he waits in his prison cell before his execution (in 524 AD). 1. No Chance, No Freedom? Boethius begins by asking if it is possible for an event to occur by mere chance—i.e., an event that is purely random (indeterministic). The answer is no. For, a truly random event would have to be one that has no cause at all. But, this is just to say that a random event comes from nothing. As the famous adage goes, nothing comes from nothing, however. So, a truly random event is impossible. Clarification: Sure, we often CALL events “random” or “chance” events. But, we’re speaking improperly when we do so. For instance, imagine a farmer who, by “chance”, finds some gold buried in his field. This event is not truly random. For, there IS a causal explanation (e.g., some thief was on the run and buried it there long ago, but was captured before he could retrieve it, etc.). In short, what we really mean when we say that this was a “random” event is that it was unexpected, or unforeseen, or unintended. [Imagine a pair of dice. Though the result of throwing them may SEEM random, strictly speaking, if we knew the angle and momentum of your throw, every detail about the table and the dice, the air current, and so on, we would be able to accurately calculate how the dice would land. When we say that the result is “random” we really mean “unforeseen”. Or consider the way that a computer generates a “random” number. It uses an algorithm that is SO complicated that we cannot predict the number generated. So, it SEEMS random to us—the generated number is always unexpected. Nevertheless, one could calculate that number with certainty if they knew the mechanism (algorithm) that determined it.] But, then, if there is no such thing as true chance, and everything is really subject to the stream of causation, are we really free? For, the gold in the field, the pair of dice, a stone that inevitably falls to the ground—indeed, all physical objects—seem to just be entirely caught up in an “inescapable interweaving of causes”? (Pr. 1) (governed by physical laws) So then, are we, like the rock that falls, ALSO caught up in this chain of causes? Boethius asks, “Is there any freedom of our independent judgment? Or does the chain of fate tie together the very motions of human minds as well?” (Prose 3) 1 Yes, We Are Free: Lady Philosophy assures Boethius that humans do have free will. Unlike rocks that simply fall with no choice in the matter, we humans by nature have the ability to reason; i.e., the ability to discriminate or distinguish between things. We can JUDGE things, and come to the conclusion that some things are better, or worse, than others. Then, we can SEEK the better things and AVOID the worse things.1 [Still, today, we might worry that the laws of physics dictate even our judgements and desires! When we compare things and weigh them up, one against the other, is it INEVITABLE that we come to the conclusion that we do about which one is better? For instance, imagine that you were trying to decide between W&M and UVA. If it is inevitable that you decided that W&M is better, then perhaps you did not make your choice freely. If it is NOT inevitable that you came to the conclusion that you did, then think for a moment about what that means: Given EXACTLY the same reasons and EXACTLY the same deliberation, you could have instead come to the conclusion that UVA was better, and then decided to go there. Was that outcome REALLY possible though?] 2. Freedom vs. Foreknowledge: Given that we do have free will, the question of how human freedom is compatible with divine foreknowledge arises once again (Pr. 3, 3-6). Recall that the idea is that there is no free will, since (because God knows everything we will do before we do it, and is never wrong) everything we do is necessary. Now Augustine said there is no problem, since the DIRECTION of the necessity is such that it does not jeopardize free will. The two possible directions of necessitation are: (1) God’s knowledge Human choice (2) Human Choice God’s Knowledge The FIRST option is the one that removes free will. Think of them like this: (1) If God knows that I will do X tomorrow, this knowledge causes me to do X. (2) If I will do X tomorrow, then this action causes God to know that I will do X. The solution is that (2) is true, but (1) is false. Boethius rejects this “solution”, writing: 1 [Lady Philosophy also goes on to say that freedom comes in degrees. The MOST free are those who align their desires with God; they are less free when moved toward Earthly things; and least free when “enslaved” by vices, or destructive passions. Yet, even these slaves are free in some sense, since they are “captives of their own liberty”. The implication seems to be that they are enslaved because they FREELY CHOSE to be (like addicts, who voluntarily begin taking a drug, but then cannot voluntarily quit).] 2 “Ha! As if the contention were which is the cause of which—whether foreknowledge of future things is the cause of the necessity, or whether the necessity of future things is the cause of the foreseeing.” (Pr. 3, 7-14) First, Boethius seems to think it somewhat blasphemous to think that we can somehow CAUSE God—an eternal, unchanging being—to know things: “How utterly backwards it is to say that the outcome of temporal events is the cause of eternal knowledge!” (ibid.) More importantly, Boethius thinks that the direction of causation is irrelevant, for EITHER WAY there is a necessitation that threatens free will. He writes, “even though the cause of truth proceeds from only one side, there is present all the same a common necessity on both sides.” (Pr. 3, 7-14) This is because, even if foreknowledge doesn’t GENERATE or CAUSE the necessity of future events, it “is nevertheless a sign that such things are necessarily going to occur.” (Pr. 4, 9-14) In short, even if my knowledge of what will happen does not CAUSE it to happen, nevertheless, it will NECESSARILY happen—otherwise, I wouldn’t have knowledge. The belief seems to be that I can only KNOW that something is going to happen if it is 100% CERTAIN to happen. He writes, “when I know that something will be, it is necessarily the case that that same thing will be. And so it happens that the outcome of a foreseen event cannot be avoided.” (Pr. 3, 15-18) For, “there can in no way be foreknowledge if necessity is absent; … nothing can be grasped by knowledge unless it is a definite thing. For if things that are characterized by indefinite outcomes are foreseen as if they were definite, that would be the darkness of opinion and not the truth of knowledge.” (Pr. 4, 21-15) In other words, if we are free, then there are multiple ways that the future could turn out; i.e., the future is indefinite. But, knowledge is by nature definite; it is SURE; it is CERTAIN. So, one simply cannot KNOW that something will happen unless it will DEFINITELY happen. In short, with respect to seeing the future, there are two options: (1) God knows the future (which entails that the future is definite; i.e., no free will). (2) The future is NOT definite (which entails God CANNOT have knowledge of it, since one cannot be certain of things that are themselves uncertain!). Or, in other words: How can one have knowledge (which is definite) of a future free choice (which, if it is truly free, is NOT definite)? 3 The hopeless result: There is no free will. In turn, punishments and rewards are always unjust (since no one is truly blameworthy or praiseworthy). The ideas of “virtues” and “vices” are meaningless. And it would be pointless to hope, or pray, for anything, since “hopes and prayers … have no force”. 3. Boethius’s Solution: Lady Philosophy disagrees. Boethius seems to think that: If X knows that P will occur, then P is “necessarily going to occur” (Pr. 4, 9-14). Knowledge of the Present: But, surely something similar does not apply when we see PRESENT things occurring. For instance, consider a case where you KNOW that a charioteer is presently driving a chariot. Isn’t that something you can know? There is no problem of having definite knowledge of something indefinite, since (a) you know that the driver is driving the chariot, and (b) he IS DEFINITELY driving it. Nevertheless, the fact that he is DEFINITELY, presently driving the chariot does not entail that he did not choose to do so freely.2 When you see present things, you are able to distinguish between “necessary” events (e.g., the Sun’s rising) and “voluntary” ones (e.g., human choices). Both are “necessary” or “certain” in that they are both DEFINITELY happening—however, there was only necessity in the event itself for ONE of those two events (namely, the Sun’s rising).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • RELG 399 Fall2019
    McGill University School of Religious Studies RELG 399 TEXTS OF CHRISTIAN SPIRITUALITY (Late Antiquity) In the Fall Term of 2019 this seminar course will focus on Christian spirituality in Late Antiquity with close study and interpretation of Aurelius Augustine’s spiritual odyssey the Confessiones, his account of creation in De genesi ad litteram, and his handbook of hermeneutics De doctrina Christiana. We will also read Ancius Manlius Severinus Boethius’s treatment of theodicy in De consolatione philosophiae, his De Trinitate, and selections from De Musica. Professor: Torrance Kirby Office Hours: Birks 206, Tuesdays/Thursdays, 10:00–11:00 am Email: [email protected] Birks Building, Room 004A Tuesdays/Thursdays 4:05–5:25 pm COURSE SYLLABUS—FALL TERM 2019 Date Reading 3 September INTRODUCTION 5 September Aurelius Augustine, Confessiones Book I, Early Years 10 September Book II, Theft of Pears 12 September Book III, Adolescence and Student Life 17 September Book IV, Manichee and Astrologer 19 September Book V, Carthage, Rome, and Milan *Confirm Mid-Term Essay Topics (1500-2000 words) (NB Consult the Style Sheet, essay-writing guidelines and evaluation rubric in the appendix to the syllabus.) 24 September Book VI, Secular Ambitions and Conflicts 26 September Book VII, Neoplatonic Quest for the Good 1 October Book VIII, Tolle, lege; tolle, lege 3 October Book IX, Vision at Ostia 8 October Book X, 1-26 Memory *Mid-term Essays due at beginning of class. Essay Conferences to be scheduled for week of 21 October 10 October Book X, 27-43 “Late have I loved you” 15 October Book XI, Time and Eternity 17 October Book XII, Creation Essay Conferences begin this week, Birks 206.
    [Show full text]
  • Intellectual Elitism and the Need for Faith in Maimonides and Aquinas
    INTELLECTUAL ELITISM AND THE NEED FOR FAITH Intellectual elitism and the need for faith in Maimonides and Aquinas Elitismo intelectual y la necesidad de la fe según Maimónides y Tomás de Aquino FRANCISCO ROMERO CARRASQUILLO Departamento de Humanidades Universidad Panamericana 45010 Zapopan, Jalisco (México) [email protected] Abstract: In his Commentary on Boethius’ De Resumen: En su Comentario al De Trinitate de Trinitate 3.1, Aquinas cites Maimonides as Boecio 3.1, Tomás de Aquino cita a Maimóni- giving fi ve reasons for the need for faith. Yet des, de quien afi rma que presenta cinco ra- interpreters tend to see Aquinas as “stand- zones a favor de la necesidad de la fe. Los in- ing Maimonides on his head”. In this paper, térpretes suelen ver a Tomás de Aquino como the author places Maimonides’ text (on the si “hubiera puesto a Maimónides de cabeza”. five reasons for concealing metaphysics) En el presente artículo se retoma el texto de within the context of his rational mysticism Maimónides (acerca de las cinco razones por and compares it to Aquinas’ own Christian las que la metafísica debe reservarse a los mystical thought in an attempt to show that doctos y ocultarse a las masas), y se sitúa en el in his own mind Aquinas is not misquoting, contexto de su misticismo racional. Compa- reversing, or doing violence to Maimonides’ rándolo con el pensamiento místico cristiano text; rather, Aquinas is completing Maimon- de Tomás de Aquino, se muestra cómo éste ides’ natural, rational mysticism with what he no está citando erróneamente, ni invirtiendo understands to be the supernatural perfec- ni violentando el texto de Maimónides; más tion of the theological virtue of faith.
    [Show full text]
  • Bonaventure's Threefold Way to God
    BONAVENTURE’S THREE-FOLD WAY TO GOD R. E. Houser Though he became Minister General of the Franciscan Order in 1257, Bonaventure’s heart never left the University of Paris, and during his generalate he delivered three sets of “collations” or university sermons at Paris. On 10 December 1270 Itienne Tempier, bishop of Paris, had condemned certain erroneous propositions. Bonaventure ruminated over these matters, and in the Spring of 1273 delivered his magisterial Collations on the Hexameron.1 Left 1 For Bonaventure’s dates see J.G. Bougerol, Introduction a l’étude de saint Bonaventure 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1988); J. Quinn, “Bonaventure” Dict. of the M.A. 2: 313-9. On the circumstances of the Collations, one friar noted: “But oh, no, no, no! Since the reverend Lord and Master who gave out this work has been elevated to a sublime position, and is leaving his way of life [as a friar], those attending his sermons have not received what was to follow [the missing last three collations]. This work was read and composed at Paris, in the year of our Lord 1273, from Easter to Pentecost, there being present Masters and Bachelors of Theology and other brothers, in the number of 160.” Bonaventure, Opera Omnia (ed. Quaracchi) 5: 450 n. 10; Coll. in Hex. ed. F. Delorme (Quaracchi: 1934) 275. 92 unfinished owing to his elevation to the cardinalate, in them he read the first chapter of Genesis spiritually, distinguishing seven levels of “vision” corresponding to the seven days of creation. The first level is “understanding naturally given” or philosophy, divided into logic, physics, and ethics.
    [Show full text]
  • John M. Hill Chaucer's Neoplatonism
    John M. Hill Chaucer’s Neoplatonism: Varieties of Love, Friendship, and Community Jonathan Fruoco To cite this version: Jonathan Fruoco. John M. Hill Chaucer’s Neoplatonism: Varieties of Love, Friendship, and Commu- nity. 2019. hal-01995227 HAL Id: hal-01995227 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01995227 Submitted on 26 Jan 2019 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. JOHN M. HILL. Chaucer’s Neoplatonism: Varieties of Love, Friendship, and Community. Lanham-Boulder-New York-London, Lexington Books, 2018. Pp. 201. $95.00. It would certainly be difficult to count the number of monographs studying the Boethian nature of Geoffrey Chaucer’s poetry. Readers and literary critics from the past centuries have long recognised that connexion and studied how Chaucer went through The Consolation of Philosophy for his own understanding of Love’s binding principle, or for notions such as providence, fate, and free will. John M. Hill’s detailed analysis in Chaucer’s Neoplatonism: Varieties of Love, Friendship, and Community follows that critical tradition but accomplishes, however, a rare feat: indeed, for a study underlying the importance of old books in the production of new science, to paraphrase Chaucer, Hill brilliantly manages to absorb past criticism and to offer something new on the subject.
    [Show full text]
  • Divine Omnipotence in Descartes' Philosophy
    City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 6-2014 Divine Omnipotence In Descartes' Philosophy Alfredo Rodriguez Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/274 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE IN DESCARTES’ PHILOSOPHY BY ALFREDO RODRIGUEZ A master's thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York 2014 © 2014 Alfredo Rodriguez All Rights Reserved ii This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in satisfaction of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts. Professor Douglas Lackey Date Thesis Adviser Professor Matthew K. Gold Date Executive Officer THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii Abstract Divine Omnipotence in Descartes’ Philosophy by Alfredo Rodriguez Adviser: Professor Douglas Lackey The present thesis explores various aspects of Rene Descartes’ doctrine of divine omnipotence within the context of his overall philosophy and with reference to his medieval heritage. This thesis shows that, contrary to his multiple and explicit statements that God’s power cannot be limited in any way, Descartes took a more nuanced position on divine omnipotence that incorporated aspects of the widely accepted medieval position that God’s goodness is a constraint on his power.
    [Show full text]
  • “Anselm of Canterbury,” Pp. 138-151 in Jorge JE Gracia and Timothy B
    Jasper Hopkins, “Anselm of Canterbury,” pp. 138-151 in Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone, editors, A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2003. Reprinted here by permission of the pub- lisher (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, England). The short bibliography on pp. 150-151 is here excluded. Anselm of Canterbury JASPER HOPKINS Anselm (b. 1033; d. 1109) flourished during the period of the Norman Conquest of England (1066), the call by Pope Urban II to the First Crusade (1095), and the strident Investiture Controversy. This latter dispute pitted Popes Gregory VII, Urban II, and Paschal II against the monarchs of Europe in regard to just who had the right—whether kings or bishops—to invest bishops and archbishops with their ecclesiastical offices. It is not surprising that R. W. Southern, Anselm’s present-day biographer, speaks of Anselm’s life as covering “one of the most momentous periods of change in European history, comparable to the centuries of the Reformation or the Industrial Revolution” (1990, p. 4). Yet it is ironic that Anselm, who began as a simple monk shunning all desire for fame, should nonetheless today have become one of the most famous intellectual figures of the Middle Ages. And it is even more ironic that this judgment holds true in spite of the fact that he wrote only eleven treatises or dia- logues (not to mention his three meditations, nineteen prayers, and 374 letters). Anselm was born in Aosta, today a part of Italy but in Anselm’s time a part of the Kingdom of Burgundy.
    [Show full text]
  • Supplementary Anselm-Bibliography 11
    SUPPLEMENTARY ANSELM-BIBLIOGRAPHY This bibliography is supplementary to the bibliographies contained in the following previous works of mine: J. Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972. _________. Anselm of Canterbury: Volume Four: Hermeneutical and Textual Problems in the Complete Treatises of St. Anselm. New York: Mellen Press, 1976. _________. A New, Interpretive Translation of St. Anselm’s Monologion and Proslogion. Minneapolis: Banning Press, 1986. Abulafia, Anna S. “St Anselm and Those Outside the Church,” pp. 11-37 in David Loades and Katherine Walsh, editors, Faith and Identity: Christian Political Experience. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. Adams, Marilyn M. “Saint Anselm’s Theory of Truth,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, I, 2 (1990), 353-372. _________. “Fides Quaerens Intellectum: St. Anselm’s Method in Philosophical Theology,” Faith and Philosophy, 9 (October, 1992), 409-435. _________. “Praying the Proslogion: Anselm’s Theological Method,” pp. 13-39 in Thomas D. Senor, editor, The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995. _________. “Satisfying Mercy: St. Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo Reconsidered,” The Modern Schoolman, 72 (January/March, 1995), 91-108. _________. “Elegant Necessity, Prayerful Disputation: Method in Cur Deus Homo,” pp. 367-396 in Paul Gilbert et al., editors, Cur Deus Homo. Rome: Prontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, 1999. _________. “Romancing the Good: God and the Self according to St. Anselm of Canterbury,” pp. 91-109 in Gareth B. Matthews, editor, The Augustinian Tradition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999. _________. “Re-reading De Grammatico or Anselm’s Introduction to Aristotle’s Categories,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, XI (2000), 83-112.
    [Show full text]
  • THE ROYAL FRAGMENT the Royal Fragment of Heraclitus May Be
    THE ROYAL FRAGMENT The Royal Fragment of Heraclitus may be carried over into English thus: Moderation is the greatest virtue and wisdom is to speak the truth and to act, according to nature, giving ear thereto.1 The Royal Fragment commands all that is most necessary in pursuing and attaining wisdom, but it is above our understanding in the brevity of its universal power.2 Hence, it is necessary to divide the universal thought of Heraclitus into less universal thoughts which are more proportioned to our minds. The chief part of the Royal Fragment is the second part which says that “wisdom is to speak the truth and to act, according to nature, giving ear thereto”. But before this main part, Heraclitus says that “moderation is the greatest virtue”. By itself, or as a statement in ethics, these words would be a paradox to the Greeks. Is not courage, for example, which defends one’s country a greater virtue? But Heraclitus is not making a statement in ethics here. His words are joined by the conjunction and to the second and main part of the fragment and they must be understood in reference to the second and main part. There are three reasons why Heraclitus begins with the words “Moderation is the greatest virtue”. The first reason is to help us understand better what is said in the second part and also avoid a misunderstanding of what is meant there. 1Dk 112 2Commenting on the words of the Epistle to the Romans , Chapter 9, v. 28, Thomas explains the connection of the two things said of the word: "...primo, ponit efficaciam evangelici verbi, dicens Verbum enim consummans et abbrevians in aequitate.
    [Show full text]
  • Chaucer and the Disconsolations of Philosophy: Boethius, Agency, and Literary
    Chaucer and the Disconsolations of Philosophy: Boethius, Agency, and Literary Form in Late Medieval Literature by Jack Harding Bell Department of English Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ David Aers, Supervisor ___________________________ Sarah Beckwith ___________________________ Thomas Pfau ___________________________ Nancy Armstrong Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of English in the Graduate School of Duke University 2016 ABSTRACT Chaucer and the Disconsolations of Philosophy: Boethius, Agency, and Literary Form in Late Medieval Literature by Jack Harding Bell Department of English Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ David Aers, Supervisor ___________________________ Sarah Beckwith ___________________________ Thomas Pfau ___________________________ Nancy Armstrong An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of English in the Graduate School of Duke University 2016 Copyright by Jack Harding Bell 2016 Abstract This study argues that Chaucer's poetry belongs to a far-reaching conversation about the forms of consolation (philosophical, theological, and poetic) that are available to human persons. Chaucer's entry point to this conversation was Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy , a sixth-century dialogue that tried to show how the Stoic ideals of autonomy and self-possession are not simply normative for human beings but remain within the grasp of every individual. Drawing on biblical commentary, consolation literature, and political theory, this study contends that Chaucer's interrogation of the moral and intellectual ideals of the Consolation took the form of philosophical disconsolations: scenes of profound poetic rupture in which a character, sometimes even Chaucer himself, turns to philosophy for solace and yet fails to be consoled.
    [Show full text]
  • The Guilt of Boethius
    The Guilt of Boethius Nathan Basik Copyright © 2000 by Nathan Basik. All rights reserved. This document may be copied and circu- lated freely, in printed or digital form, provided only that this notice of copyright is included on all pages copied. 2 Introduction In the nineteenth century, Benjamin Jowett spent over thirty years translat- ing Plato’s Republic. That is an extreme example of perfectionism, but it helps us appreciate the magnitude (and the hubris) of the goal Boethius set for himself in the Introduction to his translation of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: translating, analyzing, and reconciling the complete opera of Plato and Aristotle.1 As “incom- parably the greatest scholar and intellect of his day,”2 Boethius may have had the ability and the energy his ambition required. But we will never know how much Boethius would have achieved as a philosopher if he had not suffered a premature death. In 523, less than a year after being named Magister Officiorum3 by King Theodoric, Boethius was charged with treason, hastily and possibly illegally tried, and executed in 526.4 Since the contemporary sources of information about the affair are vague and fragmented, the passage of nearly 1500 years has brought no consensus in explaining Boethius’ tragic fall from a brilliant intellectual and political career. Though disagreement still shrouds the details of every aspect of the case, from indictment to execution, I will argue that Theodoric was fully justified in perceiving Boethius as a traitor. Claims that age or emotional passion or military pressures diminished the King’s judgment are, in this instance, unacceptable.
    [Show full text]
  • The Consolation of Philosophy Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
    The Consolation of Philosophy By Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius Translated from the Latin By W. V. Cooper Published by the Ex-classics Project, 2009 http://www.exclassics.com Public Domain -1- BOETHIUS -2- THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY -3- BOETHIUS CONTENTS EDITORIAL NOTE.......................................................................................................5 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE .......................................................................................6 BOOK I..........................................................................................................................8 BOOK II.......................................................................................................................17 BOOK III .....................................................................................................................28 BOOK IV.....................................................................................................................46 BOOK V ......................................................................................................................61 Publisher's Note ...........................................................................................................72 APPENDIX (See Book II, Prose III) ...........................................................................73 NOTES.........................................................................................................................74 -4- THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY EDITORIAL NOTE THE incompatibility
    [Show full text]
  • Four ST. THOMAS AQUINAS and THOMISM
    Four ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND THOMISM 1. Life of St. Thomas The introduction of Aristotle in the Latin world was not facile or peaceful. The topics on which the ancient and the new thinking had to confront them- selves were the conception of a nature autonomous in its own processes: a God, unmoved motor, wholly by itself (aseity) in its natural egoism; a reality of things, not of spirits; a divine action resembling the work of the human artificer; the surreptitious dualism between pure act and first matter; and a universal necessity controlled not by the free will but by chance. Human be- ings and their souls no longer are the center of reflection; Aristotelian natural- ism is. Averroism has already consolidated its polemic on the contrast be- tween reason and faith, a rational universal and a living individuality, eternity of the world and creation, death and the immortality of the soul, and between the necessary laws of things and providence. An orientation of Christian thought in a Platonic sense seemed highly justifiable. In the Sermones, Bonaventure had declared that Plato was essen- tially concerned with the things above, while Aristotle was mostly interested with the things below (Ille enim principaliter aspiciebat ad superiora, hic vero principaliter ad inferiora). Thomas of York declared that the Platonic position was totally consonant with the thought of Augustine (vide igitur posi- tionem Platonis per omnia consonam sententiae Augustini) and that Augustine had indicated the way to go. What dominated in Platonism were the desire for the divine and the need of escaping from this world.
    [Show full text]