DOCSLIB.ORG

Confessions of a Political Hit

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Confessions of a Political Hit ANALYSIS COMMENTARY 8 Monday 30th June, 2008 EDITORIAL Confessions of a political hit man plits in the JVP have a long tion and its final outcome, the Wijeweera had, according to vent the grassroots level SLFPers branded a CIA agent contracted to history. On the very day it breakaway of the Weerawansa Weerawansa, been careful not to who had been temporarily attract- drive the Sri Lanka youth to their Swas founded, some of its group. The book may lack depth allow the JVP's Marxist agenda to ed to the JVP from being pulled graves and in the late 1970s, he was prominent members voted with and a serious academic discus- take precedence over its focus on back to the SLFP. His assessment accused of being a pliable tool in their feet. Since then it has experi- sion. (The author himself admits the 'national liberation struggle' in is fairly accurate. the hands of President J. R. enced a number of debilitating he did a hurried job and apologies a bid to forge a broader alliance of The JVP's refusal to join the Jayewardene. The JVP came to be desertions prior to the abortive for any shortcomings.) It is more forces including even those in the government, as evident from the derisively dubbed 'Jayewardene 1971 insurrection, in its after- an attack by way of self-defence periphery of the capitalist camp outcome of the last LG polls, alien- Vijeweera Peramuna'. Even Lenin, math, following JVP leader than a serious political work but it the way Castro had done during ated the SLFPers who had voted says Weerawansa, once faced a Rohana Wijeweera's humiliating is a must read for students of Sri the Cuban revolution by camou- overwhelmingly for JVP candi- sinister propaganda campaign defeat at the 1982 Presidential Lankan politics as it is an insight- flaging his socialist agenda to dates at the 2004 election, enabling which resulted in his supporters Election and the 1989 crackdown. ful critique of the evolution of the muster the support of even non 39 of them to be returned. And the leaving the party in large numbers All those crises in the JVP were JVP's crisis and its present state of communist activists for his cause, UNP rebels moved in to fill the at the beginning. consequent upon its inability to affairs. to gain a turbo boost for his strug- vacuum that the JVP pull out had The neththa venuvata aththa handle its failures which natural- The neththa venuvata aththa, gle and, most of all, to prevent a created in the government. Thus, remains silent on why there ly led to the disillusionment of which contains 307 pages includ- possible US intervention to abort the JVP was denied an opportuni- emerged a bitter personality clash some of its leaders and cadres and ing a long index, has five main the- the revolution. ty to carry forward its popular between Wimal Weerawansa and attendant challenges to leader- matic strands: Factors that led to Weerawansa attributes the pres- programmes like the tank rehabil- JVP Leader Somawansa ship. the JVP crisis––missed opportuni- ent situation of the JVP to certain itation project and prepare for the Amarasinghe to the point of the But, the crisis that has gripped ties, UNP moles, mindless next general election. As a latter personally undertaking to the JVP today is different from the shibboleths etc.––the crisis result, the JVP, which had a oust the former, though both of previous ones in that it has sprung and its mismanagement, the The Island meteoric rise in mainstream them were on the same wave- not from the party's inability to wrong strategy and the politics––one seat in 1994, 10 length, where how the party Published by Upali Newspapers Ltd. handle any failure but from its attendant misdirection, the seats in 2000, 16 seats in 2001 should relate to the SLFP under 223, Bloemendhal Road, Colombo 13. failure to 'manage' its success. It disintegration of the party and 39 seats in 2004––has a President Mahinda Rajapaksa was Tel: 2497574, Fax:2448185 - 2497543 may be likened to the predicament and the way forward. The bleak future staring it in the concerned. E-mail: [email protected] of a poor family that wins a sweep book contains the edited ver- face, as it failed to manage its That clash, insiders believe, Branch Advertising Office: ticket but fails to improve its lot sions of several vital docu- No. 6, Sir Chittampalam electoral gains. could be traced to an election that for want of proper management of ments meant for only the A. Gardiner Mawatha It was a UNP mole in the the JVP Central Committee (CC) its windfall. eyes of the JVP leaders. Colombo 1 JVP who had, according to had in June 2005 to nominate a Today, the JVP has been infil- They make very interesting Monday 30th June, 2008 Weerawansa, put paid to a presidential candidate, should the trated by the SLFP and the UNP as reading as they are candid coming together of the two need arise for that. The names of never before even at the decision appraisals of the party's parties again. That person Somawansa and Weerawansa were making level, if the recent conflict strategy and turning points in its strategic blunders on the part of will, Weerawansa says, destroy the proposed and the CC overwhelm- that led to a disastrous breakaway affairs. the JVP leadership such as the JVP the same way an infiltrator ingly supported Weerawansa! Of is anything to go by. Some of the Weerawansa attributes the JVP party's rejection of an offer to join rendered the communist party of the 28 CC members who voted, 23 JVP decision makers, as we have crisis to the party's radical depar- the Rajapaksa government in 2005 Malaysia hollow. The unnamed backed Weerawansa, while argued in these columns, have ture from the course its founder after its exit in 2005 (over mole is also accused of having Somawansa polled only five votes! gravitated towards the UNP and leader Wijeweera charted. The President Chandrika striven to prevent the JVP from Perhaps, as the clash between the the SLFP with the old guard strug- founder, he says, wanted the JVP Kumaratunga's decision to set up throwing in its lot with the SLFP JVP and the JNP escalates––yes- gling to keep the party on its revo- to be a Marxist party with a com- a joint mechanism to share tsuna- at the last presidential election. terday evening they were engaged lutionary course. mitment to the so-called national mi aid with the LTTE) and contin- Weerawansa claims that the in a bitter poster war with the The present crisis of the JVP liberation struggle as its interface. ue the party’s unfinished mission UNP mole and others of his ilk Somawansa faction obliterating stems from a clash between the That way, Weerawansa argues, so as to be able to go it alone at a have swayed the JVP's agenda in posters put up by the Weerawansa pro-SLFP and pro-UNP factions, Wijeweera wanted the JVP to be general election in or before 2010. such a manner that it has become faction to announce a JNP rally with the latter enjoying the back- different from the LSSP and other Providing documentary proof, he a carbon copy of the UNP's, as slated for today at Nugegoda––and ing of the old guard for the time traditional leftist outfits which argues that even JVP leader could be seen from the shifting of Rathu Sahodarayas take to wash- being because of its anti-govern- presented themselves to the people Somawansa Amarasinghe was ini- JVP's focus from the 'national lib- ing dirty linen in public in a big- ment posturing. However, now as dyed-in-the-wool Marxist par- tially well disposed towards coa- eration struggle' to issues such as ger way, much more interesting that the pro-government faction ties with no other agenda. lescing with the Rajapaksa gov- human rights, cost of living and information hitherto kept under has broken away, a clash between At present, Weerawansa says, ernment and even lamented in a media freedom. These issues, wraps is likely to be leaked out. the pro-UNP group and the revolu- due to the influence of certain written submission to the party Weerawansa says, should be Weerawansa's conclusion in his tionary core of the party is only a JVP leaders like General politburo a collective decision addressed but the party's focus book is that the JVP has gone matter of time. That is very likely Secretary Tilvin Silva, the party against such a move, which he must remain on the conflict and astray and is flirting with to happen during the realignment has become an absolute Marxist considered a missed opportunity. ways and means of defeating sepa- Gotterdammerung. of political forces prior to the next entity with little emphasis on the A perusal of the JVP leader's ratism. In other words, he is playing general election. 'national liberation struggle' and submission to the politburo helps The last part of the book is a messiah to the JVP's rank and file. Former JVP Propaganda as such it has failed to be different one see the hidden agenda that the lament. Weerawansa tries to justi- How they will respond to his call Secretary and leader of the from the old left and is doomed to JVP sought to achieve by helping fy his exit from the party to form remains to be seen but it is patent- Janatha Nidahas Peramuna (JNP) go the same way as the Nava Sama Mahinda Rajapaksa win the presi- the JNP.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Mainstreaming Radical Politics in Sri Lanka: the Case of JVP Post-1977
    Mainstreaming Radical Politics in Sri Lanka: The case of JVP post-1977 Nirmal Ranjith Dewasiri Abstract This article provides a critical understanding of dynamics behind the roles of the People’s Liberation Front (JVP) in post-1977 Sri Lankan politics. Having suffered a severe setback in the early 1970s, the JVP transformed itself into a significant force in electoral politics that eventually brought the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) to power. This article explains the transformation by examining the radical political setting and mapping out the actors and various movements which allowed the JVP to emerge as a dominant player within the hegemonic political mainstream in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, it also highlights the structural changes in JVP politics and its challenges for future consolidation. Introduction The 1977 general election marked a major turning point in the history of post-colonial Sri Lanka. While the landslide victory of the United National Party (UNP) was the most important highlight of the election results, the shocking defeat for the old leftist parties was equally important. Both the victory of the UNP and the defeat of the left were symbolic. The left’s electoral defeat was soon followed by the introduction of new macro-economic policy framework under the UNP’s rule, which replaced protective economic policy framework that was endorsed by the Left.1 Ironically enough, as if to dig its own grave, the same UNP government helped People’s Liberation Front (JVP), which became a formidable threat to the smooth implementation of the new economic policies, to re-enter into the political mainstream by way of freeing its leadership from the prison.
    [Show full text]
  • The Maoist Movement in Sri Lanka
    ISA S Insights No. 103 – 02 June 2010 469A Bukit Timah Road #07-01, Tower Block, Singapore 259770 Tel: 6516 6179 / 6516 4239 Fax: 6776 7505 / 6314 5447 Email: [email protected] Website: www.isas.nus.edu.sg The Maoist Movement in Sri Lanka Dayan Jayatilleka1 ‘More than Maoism: Rural Dislocation in South Asia’ is an ISAS research theme focusing on socio- economic, political and security dimensions of “Maoist movements” in South Asia. The institute conducted a closed-door workshop on the research theme and the presentations are being put together as a series of ISAS Insights and ISAS Working Papers. This is the fourth paper in this series. Abstract This paper examines the rise and decline of the Maoist movement in Sri Lanka. It provides a background to the history of Sri Lankan Maoism and looks at the split between the Pro-Moscow and Pro-China groups in 1964. The high point of Maoism in Sri Lanka was the close relationship Nagalingam Sanmugathasan of the Ceylon Trade Union Federation (CTUF) developed with Chairman Mao Tse-Tung and other leaders of the Communist Party of China during the Cultural Revolution. Though some conditions were favourable for Left mobilisation, the movement fizzled out in Sri Lanka. The paper also provides possible explanations for the failure of the movement. These include a disconnect between Maoist doctrine and socio-political realities, the ‘right’ turn in China’s foreign policy, the Sino-Vietnam and Sino-Albanian schisms, and the Tamil ethnicity of Sanmugathasan and his age, which precluded him from participating in armed struggle.
    [Show full text]
  • Sanmugathasan, the Left and the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka , Published by the Social Scientists’ Association, Colombo
    Introduction by Prof. N. Shanmugaratnam to Ravi Vaitheespara’s Theorizing the National Crisis: Sanmugathasan, the Left and the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka , published by the Social Scientists’ Association, Colombo. Introduction Interrogating an Obscured Legacy N. Shanmugaratnam 1 ‘The volatility of the national question’, writes Nimni, ‘disconcerted two of the most formidable ideological protagonists of the twentieth century – liberal democracy and Marxism’ (Nimni, 1991: 2). In post-colonial Sri Lanka, the national question posed a formidable political challenge to the liberal democratic and Marxist (Left) parties in a Westminster type parliamentary system implanted by the British colonialists. Communalism had already become a dominant factor in the politics of representation in colonial Ceylon. The ethnic contours of the national question were clearly marked indeed. The left movement, which arrived in the 1930s when communalism had already begun to raise its ugly head in the trade union movement, stood for the unity of the working class and other sections of the people across ethnic divides against colonialism. 2 The so called liberal democrats chose an ideology of ethno- majoritarianism to win elections and form governments. The Left movement, represented by the Lanka Samasamaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP), remained a staunch defender of the rights of the minorities and stood against the powerful resurgence of Sinhala Buddhist majoritarianism until the end of the 1950s. The 1960s saw major splits in the LSSP and CP due to domestic as well as international causes. In the early 1960s, both parties decided to adopt a conciliatory approach towards Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and join a united front with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).
    [Show full text]
  • Open Wounds and Mounting Dangers
    HUMAN OPEN WOUNDS AND RIGHTS MOUNTING DANGERS WATCH Blocking Accountability for Grave Abuses in Sri Lanka Open Wounds and Mounting Dangers Blocking Accountability for Grave Abuses in Sri Lanka Copyright © 2021 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-887-5 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org FEBRUARY 2021 ISBN: 978-1-62313-887-5 Open Wounds and Mounting Dangers Blocking Accountability for Grave Abuses in Sri Lanka Summary ......................................................................................................................... 1 Silencing Victim’s Families and Critics ......................................................................................4 Conflict-Era Violations and Failure of Accountability ................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Ceylon-Sri Lanka
    CEYLON-SRI LANKA COUNTRY READER TABLE OF CONTENTS Max Waldo Bishop 1944-1945 Consul, Colombo Howard Imbrey 1951-1952 Labor Reporting Officer, Colombo Robert Anderson 1956-1959 Near Eastern Affairs, Ceylon Desk, Washington DC Robert A. Lincoln 1958-1961 Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Colombo C. William Kontos 1959-1961 Deputy Director, USAID, Colombo James G. Lowenstein 1959-1961 Political Officer, Colombo Harold G. Josif 1959-1962 Political Officer, Colombo Walter A. Lundy 1961-1963 Consular/Political Officer, Colombo Harry I. Odell 1961-1964 Economic Officer, Colombo John L. DeOrnellas 1962-1965 Political Officer, Colombo George G. B. Griffin 1962-1965 Second Secretary and Vice Consul, Colombo LaRue R. Lutkins 1962-1965 Deputy Chief of Mission, Colombo Cecil B. Lyon 1964-1967 Ambassador, Ceylon Dorothy A. Eardley 1965-1968 Secretary to the Ambassador, Colombo Franklin J. Crawford 1967-1968 Political/Economic Officer, Colombo George G. B. Griffin 1967-1969 Near East/South Asia Bureau, Southeast Asian Affairs, Ceylon and Maldives Desk Officer, Washington DC Lange Schermerhorn 1967-1969 Rotation Officer, Colombo Victor Skiles 1967-1969 USAID Representative, Colombo Betty Crites Dillon 1967-1971 Peace Corps Director, Colombo Victor L. Stier 1968-1971 Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Colombo Terrell E. Arnold 1969-1970 Deputy Chief of Mission, Colombo Albert A. Thibault, Jr. 1972-1975 Political/Labor Officer, Colombo Christopher Van Hollen 1972-1976 Ambassador, Sri Lanka Edward Brynn 1973-1975 Economic Officer, Colombo Richard Fenton Ross 1973-1977 Cultural Attaché, USIS, Colombo William P. Kiehl 1975-1977 Press Attaché, USIS, Colombo Albert A. Thibault, Jr. 1975-1978 India, Sri Lanka and Maldives Desk Officer, Washington DC Frank D.
    [Show full text]
  • 2019 Sri Lankan Presidential Election ELECTION OBSERVATION REPORT
    2019 Sri Lankan Presidential Election ELECTION OBSERVATION REPORT 1 CMEV was formed in 1997 by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), the Free Media Movement (FMM) and the Coalition Against Political Violence as an independent and non-partisan organisation to monitor the incidence of election related violence and violations. Currently, CMEV is made up of CPA, FMM and the INFORM Human Rights Documentation Centre. 2019 Sri Lankan Presidential Election: Election Observation Report Copyright © CMEV, 2020 All rights reserved. Written and edited by: Manjula Gajanayake, Thusitha Siriwardana, Hirantha Isuranga and Pasan Jayasinghe Photographs by: Kavindu Gayan Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, Colombo, Sri Lanka Phone: +94 11 2826381/+94 11 2826387 | Email: [email protected] www.cmev.org 2 Contents Foreword ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Acknowledgements.................................................................................................................................................................. 6 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................................. 8 Election Overview ................................................................................................................................................................... 9
    [Show full text]
  • Sectarian Socialism: the Politics of Sri Lanka's Janatha Vimukthi
    Modern Asian Studies 44, 3 (2010) pp. 567–602. C Cambridge University Press 2009 doi:10.1017/S0026749X09004028 First published online 27 July 2009 Sectarian Socialism: The Politics of Sri Lanka’s Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna ( JVP) RAJESH VENUGOPAL University of Oxford, Oxford, UK Email: [email protected] Abstract This paper explores the politics of Sri Lanka’s Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in the post-1994 period, when it re-created itself as a mainstream parliamentary political party and came to play a critical role in the collapse of the 2001–2004 peace process. The fundamental analytical enigma of the JVP lies in explaining its hybrid Marxist/Sinhala nationalist persona, which enabled it to craft a highly effective campaign of opposition to the Ranil Wickremasinghe government’s two- track agenda of peace with market reforms. This paper examines how the JVP’s Marxism relates to its Sinhala nationalism, and how it fits within the Sri Lanka’s Marxist tradition as a whole. It argues that the JVP’s increasing emphasis on Sinhala nationalism post-1999 has occurred in the context of de-radicalisation and parliamentary habilitation, and discusses the relevance of its ideological orientation to the material basis of Sinhala nationalism and its relationship with the social democratic state. Introduction The Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) is perhaps the most resilient, dynamic and deeply-rooted political force in contemporary Sri Lanka. It occupies a unique position in Sri Lankan political hagiography as an icon of ‘anti-systemic’ rage and youth radicalism.1 Formed during 1966–1967 as a small splinter group that emerged out of the Communist Party (Peking), the JVP had by 1971 recruited and trained thousands of young militants to launch the island’s first anti-state 1 The use of the term ‘anti-systemic’ here follows Jagath Senaratne’s definition, which characterizes the JVP as anti-government, anti-state, anti-ruling class, and anti-‘alternative left-wing power centres’.
    [Show full text]
  • Presidential Election – 20.10.1982
    Presidential Election – 20.10.1982 1. Date of order issued by the Commissioner of Elections under Section 2 of the Presidential Elections Act. 30.08.1982 2. Nomination Period – 8.00 a.m. to 11.00 a.m. on September 17th , 1982. 3. At the close of nominations the valid nominations had been received from the following six (6) candidates. Name of Candid Political Parties/ Ind. Groups Symbol Mr. J.R. Jayawardene United National Party (Elephant) Mr. H.S.R.B. Kobbekaduwa Sri Lanka Freedom Party (Hand) Mr. Rohana Wijeweera Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Bell) Mr. G.G. Ponnambalam Akila Illankai Thamil Congress (Bicycle) Dr. Colvin R. De Silva Lanka Samasamaja Party (Key) Mr. Vasudeva Nanayakakra Nawa Sama Samaja Party (Umbrella) 4. Notice of Poll under Section 21 was published in the Gazette Extraordinary No.211/2 dated September 20th , 1982. 5. Date of Poll :- 20.10.1982. 6. Results of the Presidential Election. Mr. J.R. Jayawardene 34,50,811 Mr. H.S.R.B. Kobbekaduwa 25,48,438 Mr. Rohana Wijeweera 2,73,428 Mr. G.G. Ponnambalam 1,73,934 Dr. Colvin R. De Silva 58,531 Mr. Vasudeva Nanayakakra 17,005 Number of Valid Votes 65,22,147 Number of Votes equal to one half 32,61,073 Candidates who polled more than one-half of this Number of Valid Votes- Mr. J.R. Jayawardene:- Number of Valid Votes received by that Candidate over the above such one-half of the Valid Votes:- 1,89,738 Percentage of the Valid Votes Polled by that Candidate: 52.91% 7.
    [Show full text]
  • PPWG Assessment – Sri Lanka Conflict Prepared for the United States Atrocity Early Warning Task Force
    PPWG Assessment – Sri Lanka Conflict Prepared for the United States Atrocity Early Warning Task Force Conflict Background Sri Lanka is a mosaic of languages and religions. The country is peopled mainly by three ethnic groups – Sinhalese (74.9%), Tamils (15.3%) and Sri Lankan Moors (Muslim) (9.3%). Of them, Sinhalese and Tamils use language as the main marker of identity – Sinhala and Tamil. Muslims on the other hand, use religion as the main marker of their ethnic identity. While language might be the dominant element that makes up Sinhala and Tamil identity, 70.1% of the population – almost totally Sinhalese – are Buddhist, while 12.6% Tamils are Hindu, and Muslims are 9.7%. Christians who claim adherents from both the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic groups are around 7.6% of Sri Lanka’s population. Fighting between the Sri Lankan State and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebels began in 1977. The conflict centered around the Tamils demand for secession after Sinhala Buddhists leveraged State power to discriminate against Tamils and thwart for 28 years Tamils’ non-violent demands for power sharing. Fighting came to bloody end with the government military crushing the LTTE. The UN estimates more than 40,000, mostly Tamil civilians were killed in the last three months of the conflict. The UN found that there were credible allegations of war crimes committed by both sides and recommended a hybrid court be set up for accountability. There was no formal peace accord or agreement between Tamils’ political representatives and the Sri Lankan State, hence root causes of the conflict remain.
    [Show full text]
  • A Lost Revolution: the JVP Insurrection 1971
    WWW Virtual Library: Tantirimale Page 1 of 14 WWW Virtual Library - Sri Lanka A Lost Revolution: The JVP Insurrection 1971 Rohana Wijeweera was born in July 1943 in Tangalle, and grew up in Kottegoda, a small village in the Matara district. He was admitted to the Goda Uda government Primary Boy's School in the middle of 1947, where he received primary education until 1953. In 1954 he joined the Goda Uda government Senior English School and passed his General Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level - equivalent to grade 10), public examination. His father was said to be an ardent supported of the Ceylon Communist Party. It was reported that his father was severely injured in 1952 when a fight erupted between the supporters of the ruling UNP and the Communist Party. In 1960, Wijeweera, it is said, worked for the Communist Party candidate, Aelian Nanayakara, in Devundara. Subsequently, in 1960, Wijeweera received a scholarship to study medicine in Russia. In 1962, during the Chinese-Russian split, he took the side of China. In 1964, Wijeweera returned to Ceylon on vacation, but the Russian Embassy in Colombo, on instructions from Moscow, refused to grant him visa to go back to Moscow to continue his education. Once it was confirmed that he could not continue his studies in Russia, due to his publicly known sympathy for China, he joined the newly formed Ceylon Communist Party led by N Shanmugathasan. By the end of 1964, he joined the party as a full-time functionary, receiving a monthly allowance of Rs150. While in the party, he slowly joined dissident groups within the party, who were dissatisfied with Shanmugathasan's leadership.
    [Show full text]
  • Mapping Sri Lanka's Political Parties
    VERITÉ RESEARCH Strategic Analysis for Asia Mapping Sri Lanka’s Political Parties: Politics & Politics Governance Actors and Evolutions November 2017 . Sri Lanka Political Party Mapping i VERITÉ RESEARCH Strategic Analysis for Asia Mapping Sri Lanka’s Political Parties: Actors and Evolutions The original version of this report was commissioned by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy to assist in its work in Sri Lanka with the Sri Lankan parliament and political parties. The opinions expressed and con- tents of this report are not necessarily those held by Westminster Foundation for Democracy. The report was prepared by the politics research practice at Verité Research with Charudaththa Ekanayake functioning as principal researcher under the overall editorial supervision of Janeen Fernando. Verité Research aims to be a leader in the provision of information and analysis for negotiations and policy making in Asia, while also promoting dialogue and education for social development in the region. The firm contributes actively to research and dialogue in the areas of economics, sociology, politics, law, and media, and provides services in data collection, information verification, strategy development, and decision analysis. ii Sri Lanka Political Party Mapping Contents Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 1. Major Parties ....................................................................................................... 2 1.1. United National Party
    [Show full text]
  • The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the 1970-72 Constitution- Making Process
    ! 26 Epistolary Interview Insurrection Amidst Constitutional Revolution: The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the 1970-72 Constitution- Making Process g Lionel Bopage1 1 Lionel Bopage was the General Secretary of the JVP during the 1980s. Asanga Welikala conducted this interview via email in June- July 2012. In some instances, Bopage has preferred to answer several questions in a cluster. ! ! 1. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) came into being in the late 1960s just as the political dynamics that led to the eventual establishment of the first Sri Lankan republic were crystallising. How would you locate the JVP, its ideology and programme in relation to this constitutional reform debate, which was at the time conducted primarily between the United Left Front and the UNP-led government? In order to clarify the JVP’s position, we need to understand the political and economic transition of Lanka from the colonial to the neo-colonial stage of capitalist development that occurred particularly during the 1940s. Neo–colonialism was much more sophisticated than colonialism, because neo-colonialism generated not only economic dependence, but also political, religious, ideological and cultural dependence. Responding to the growing anti-colonial militant struggles in the colonies, colonialists trained pro-colonial elements that followed the colonial image itself in everything they did. The ‘independence’ illusions created with the help of the pro- colonial elite were used to hoodwink people in the colonies. This political and economic strategy of the colonialists became known as neo–colonialism. This was not an exclusive view of the JVP, but the view of all progressive people at the time including the Third International, Fourth International and the traditional Left parties of Sri Lanka, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), the Communist Party (CP) and the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP).
    [Show full text]