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United States Military Advisory Assistance Groups During The View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Texas A&M Repository UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY ASSISTANCE GROUPS DURING THE COLD WAR, 1945-1965 A Dissertation by NATHANIEL R WEBER Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Chair of Committee, Brian Linn Committee Members, Terry Anderson Adam Seipp Brian Rouleau Jason Parker Head of Department, David Vaught May 2016 Major Subject: History Copyright 2016 Nathaniel R Weber ABSTRACT Military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) played an important part in United States strategy during the first two decades of the Cold War. From 1947 to 1963, the US provided billions of dollars in military weapons, equipment, and supplies to its allies, in an attempt to strengthen them against real and perceived communist threats. The advisors managed the delivery of this materiel and trained combat and support troops in dozens of nations. In some cases, the advisors provided direct guidance to allies at war The armed forces committed thousands of officers to the advisory effort. The advisory groups, for a variety of reasons, achieved only mixed success. The advisors received very limited advisory training, served short tours of duty, and could rarely speak the native language of the host military. There were strict financial and time limitations of military assistance. Lastly, the advisors themselves emphasized training that reflected resource-intense American warfare, inappropriate for many of its allies. Though assistance and advising strengthened several allies and helped others defeat communist enemies, no recipient of aid was able to provide for its own defense without US support, and the advisory mission to South Vietnam ended in disaster. This work uses previously unpublished primary documents from several archives to show how the advisors worked with and trained foreign militaries around the world. It also examines the training and lives of the advisors themselves, as they lived in cultures much different than their own and reflected on their experiences. ii DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to my family: Joe, my grandfather, who served his country in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere, and loved me like a son; Josie, my grandmother, also a veteran, who accompanied my grandfather around the world, raised five children, and loved me like a son as well; Kevin, my uncle, an army officer who imparted to me a love of military history; and Karen, my mother, an army sergeant who marched into Kuwait when I was fortunately too young to appreciate the danger, and did everything in her power to ensure I had a happy and prosperous childhood. Together they raised me. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation would have been impossible without the hard work and support of many people. Dr. Brian Linn, my advisor, read what must have been a nauseating number of drafts, always with quick turn around, and I thank him for my growth as a historian and a writer. Drs. Brian Rouleau and Bradley Coleman were great sources of encouragement and advice. The rest of my committee, Drs. Terry Anderson, Adam Seipp, and Jason Parker provided excellent feedback and commentary on my work. Grants provided to me by the US Army Heritage and Education Center, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the John A. Adams ’71 Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis at Virginia Military Institute were vital in the completion of this project. I am immensely grateful to these institutions. Thank you to my contacts with each of these institutions, Dr. Richard J. Sommer, Dale Stewart, and Dr. Bradley Coleman, for your help and support. I received excellent help from the archivists at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland; the United States Air Force Historical Research Agency in Montgomery, Alabama; the United States Army Heritage and Education Center in Carlisle, Pennsylvania; and the George C. Marshall Library at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia. I would have been lost without their help. iv My time in the Texas A&M History Department went as well as it did in large part because of the department’s excellent staff and graduate advisors. Thank you so much to Mary Johnson, Rita Walker, Barbara Dawson, and Kelly Cook, who always answered my many bureaucratic questions, managed travel accounts, and gave me a hand when I inevitably forgot to file, sign, or fill out vital materials, and for making the front office a friendly, welcoming place. You fight for the graduate students. Thanks as well to Dr. David Hudson, the perpetual champion for the graduate students, whose knowledge of Texas A&M’s workings is apparently infinite. Thanks again to Dr. Adam Seipp, who has worked form his position as graduate advisor to do so much for the history department. Thanks to my friends Aaron Linderman, Dan Johnson, David Villar, and Blake Whitaker, for being good friends and colleagues. Finally, thanks to my wife, Rainlilly Elizondo, whose editing greatly strengthened my work and whose love and support are all that I really need to carry on. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………... ii DEDICATION……………………………………………………………………... iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………... iv TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………... vi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………... 1 Military Advisors in Three Vignettes…………………………………….... 1 Military Assistance Advisory Groups in the Cold War……………………. 3 CHAPTER II MILITARY ASSISTANCE, ADVISORY GROUPS, AND TRAINING………………………………………………………………………… 13 The Cold War, the Armed Forces, and Military Assistance……………..... 14 A Typical MAAG: Organization and Duties……………………………… 23 Ad Hoc Advisors…………………………………………………………... 26 Formal Training of Advisors: The Military Assistance Institute………….. 29 Soldier Diplomats………………………………………………………….. 35 The Language Problem…………………………………………………….. 38 Longer Tours, or a New Career Path?........................................................... 42 Anti-Communism………………………………………………………….. 44 Conclusion: Worthy Men on a Worthy Mission?.......................................... 47 CHAPTER III MAAGS IN EUROPE….…………………………………………. 50 Assistance Begins in Europe: Greece……………………………………… 51 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Military Aid to Western Europe…………………………………………………………………….... 63 Denmark……………………………………………………………………. 69 The Netherlands……………………………………………………………. 74 Support of Spain and Germany…………………………………………….. 81 Spain………………………………………………………………………... 83 A Decade of MAAGs in Europe……………………………………………. 92 vi CHAPTER IV THIRD WORLD ADVISORY MISSIONS………………………. 95 The Middle East……………………………………………………………. 96 Turkey……………………………………………………………………… 99 Iran…………………………………………………………………………. 112 Libya and Ethiopia………………………………………………………..... 120 Ethiopia…………………………………………………………………...... 123 East Asia…………………………………………………………………..... 128 Taiwan…………………………………………………………………….... 130 Japan………………………………………………………………………... 137 South Korea………………………………………………………………… 144 Southeast Asia……………………………………………………………… 149 Thailand…………………………………………………………………….. 150 Conclusions: Slow Development, Little American Armies, and Political Officers……………………………………………………………………... 154 CHAPTER V ADVISORS IN VIETNAM………………………………………… 161 French Indochina…………………………………………………………… 163 Republic of Vietnam……………………………………………………….. 183 MAAG-Vietnam……………………………………………………………. 188 The Partial Shift to Counterinsurgency…………………………………….. 200 Conclusion: The Failure of Advising in Vietnam………………………….. 206 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION…………………………………………………… 211 Successes and Failures…………………………………………………….. 211 REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………. 216 vii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION MILITARY ADVISORS IN THREE VIGNETTES Brigadier General Frank Cam and his Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) had a number of objectives in Portugal. A 1951 agreement granted the Iberian country American military aid, including hardware and training, so that the nation could better meet its defense obligations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Cam, whose advisors administered the aid and conducted training, intended to convert the Portuguese Air Force (PAF) from propeller-driven aircraft to jets. However, the general found serious problems with the PAF, reporting in 1952 that it was “a most negligent organization with reference to ground safety.” Pilots damaged wingtips while taxiing and injured themselves when they recklessly jumped out of their cockpits before the plane came to a complete stop on the tarmac. Maintenance crews smoked in the hangars, and started fires when they dropped cigarette butts onto gasoline-stained floors. They had no specialized training to put those fires out. Before any flight training or operational planning could begin, MAAG Portugal would have to teach the PAF to not damage itself by accident.1 1 “Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, with Annexes, between the United States of America and Portugal,” 5 Jan 1951, Military Assistance Bilaterals, http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll11/id/1099/rec/20 (hereafter Military Assistance Bilaterals) and 114.Brigadier General Frank Cam, “Monthly Activities Report #18, July 1952,” 7 Aug 1952, Folder (hereafter F) 319.1 Monthly Activity Reports, Jul-Dec 1952, MAAG 1 In 1954, air force Lieutenant Colonel James Muri served in the advisory group for Belgium. Assistance to Belgium, which included aid to Luxembourg, had begun in 1950 as a part of the American commitment
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