Engaging with a “Clash of Civilisations”

GAVIN D’COSTA

ENGAGING WITH A “CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS”

Liberal Views of Religion in the Public Domain and Catholic Approaches

Introduction Samuel Huntington’s deeply insightful (if flawed) thesis helps situate our interreligious situation on a complex global map. After the drawing open of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Berlin wall, Huntington argues that future global conflict will operate on a cultural, not ideological axis—with religion play- ing a decisive role. Blood, language, religion, way of life, were what the Greeks had in common and what distinguished them from the Persians and other non-Greeks. Of all the objective elements that define civilizations, however, the most important usually is religion, as the Athenian emphasized. To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world’s great religions and people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other, as happened in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, and the [Indian] Subcontinent. (Huntingdon 1996: 42) The three cultural-religious clusters are the Asian (China, Japan, and East Asia), the Western Christian (North America and Western Europe) and the Is- lamic (the Middle East, Africa, parts of East Asia). In Europe all three clusters meet, and indeed clash, and a fourth element also enters the picture: modernity. How might I as a Christian reflect on this situation: tense, dangerous, and yet full of new opportunities and blessings. In what follows, I shall give the European Christian-Islamic dimension special attention as otherwise the canvas becomes entirely unmanageable.

In the first part of this paper, I will briefly isolate two particular currents of thought that have shaped modern Western Europe (and Western societies more widely), that together can be named “secular modernity.” 1 I will indicate how modernity has positioned Christianity—and indeed, other religions in the pub-

1 The debate on secularisation is very alive. See, for example, Bruce 1992.

31 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 17 (2007) 1 lic arena. I will argue that modernity has tried to make “religion” a private matter in the alleged interests of the common good, even though precisely the opposite is true. In Europe, in practice, we have very different variations of this template, such that religions are sometimes granted more space in the public square, but the situation is always precarious as we saw recently in England in the case of Catholic adoption agencies and their operation in the public square. What I am keen to do is isolate basic operative paradigms and subject them to questions. In the second part, I will briefly isolate two stages within Roman Catholicism in response to these currents. I choose Roman Catholicism as any attempt to speak of “Christianity” ends in abstraction and lack of historicity— and it is the tradition out of which I work. I will argue that the Roman Catholic Church, after its own teething problems with modernity, provides an alterna- tive between theocracy and the social privatisation of religion desired by modernity in its fear of theocracy. It, like other Christian churches and ecclesial communities, has the resources to offer religiously pluralist Europe an alterna- tive to the predicted “clash of civilizations.” Only in this mode is intercultural and interreligious engagement possible. Elsewhere, I have argued against the secular study of religion and instead, for a theological “religious studies” (D’Costa 2005).

Modernity’s Conversion of Europe Western Europe is an amalgam of five cultural layers: Greek, Judeo-Christian, Islamic, the Latin West, and modernity.2 Modernity has nearly succeeded in erasing the previous four layers except in legal and political terms. This ex- plains the Vatican’s strenuous efforts to have the new EU charter acknowledge the Christian heritage of Europe. The refusal of this acknowledgement (which is now poised to change with Germany’s chairing of the EU) is just one exem- plification of my point. Admittedly, modernity has also brought many good things in its wake: the most important is the emancipation of women. I am not interested in modernity-bashing but rather the phenomenon of secularism that shaped the emerging nation states. The philosophical names behind this current run through Descartes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, and Comte: establishing the domain of the secular, a political space that is autonomous from religion and present for the service of man (and eventually women).3 The actual word

2 There is considerable debate as to whether Islam should be counted as a fifth here. Peter Antes outlines the complexity here in Antes 1995. Ratzinger (1988) defends these four and excludes Islam, which also accounts for his resistance to Turkey’s inclusion into “Europe” prior to his becoming Pope. In what I say I assume that Judaism is inherent in the Christian tradition as well as a separate cultural-religious force.

3 See this history narrated in Milbank 1990 and MacIntyre 1990.

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“secularism” emerged in 1846, with the Birmingham-born agnostic George Jacob Holyoake (1817-1906), who is not anti-religion, but pro-natural reason and humanity. He writes: Secularism is that which seeks the development of the physical, moral, and intellectual nature of man to the highest possible point, as the immediate duty of life—which inculcates the practical sufficiency of natural morality apart from Atheism, Theism, or the Bible—which selects as its methods of procedure the promotion of human improvement by material means, and proposes these positive agreements as the common bond of union, to all who would regulate life by reason and ennoble it by service. (Holyoake 1860: 17) I would suggest, based on various empirical surveys regarding organised religion in Europe, that this basic philosophy underpins most civilised Europeans who seek material prosperity within the new European Union (recall Holyoake finding this aspect, “the promotion of human improvement by material means” the “common bond” of people). This does not preclude care for the poor and downtrodden, through what Holyoake calls “service.” And apart from the material improvement, the only other “common bond,” at least procedurally, is the use of “natural morality” and “reason,” but only when it avoids theism and the bible (and more recently the Quran).

Holyoake’s inclusion of atheism along with theism and the Bible is interesting, for it indicates his concern to avoid all “ideologies,” to promote thus a free society. This can be done only through the promotion of his own agnosticism that he believed to be neutral. I think I’ve already shown why it was not. In fact, in another publication, Holyoake explicitly says that “Secularism is a code of duty pertaining to this life, founded on considerations purely human, and intend- ed mainly for those who find theology indefinite or inadequate, unreliable or unbelievable” (Holyoake 1896: 35). Admittedly, many of my theology students at Bristol might also think this of the discipline. Holyoake campaigned vigor- ously for the secularisation of education in all public schools—a key he thought, to producing a new culture of religious and non-religious plurality. There are elements of this tradition running through most European countries and also the United States, and also non-Western countries like India, and each instantiation brings out very variable dynamics, so no easy generalisations are possible.4 We can distinguish three strategies.

4 Indonesia, interestingly, opted for a secular, although theistic, state system while maintaining a clear separation between religion and state in Suharto’s Pancasila – to try and bring harmony to its radically pluralist society.

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Sidestepping Pluralism through “Neutrality” Hence, one conclusion is that there is an agnostic strand of modernity that is not explicitly hostile to religion but simply asks that the public space be neutral to accommodate the religious and non-religious pluralism of modern societies. Without this mediating neutrality, it tends to look back at history and see the wars of religions (Christianity and Islam, and intra-Christian clashes) and therefore promotes this route to peaceful co-existence. This philosophically developed is the early position of John Rawls (Rawls 1973). Socio-politically, it is the position of the French Republic with its clear demarcation between the secular and the religious. I would argue that in this position we find simply the promotion of one ideology as the only acceptable public face of dealing with religious and non-religious pluralism, thereby sidestepping the real issue of pluralism rather than tackling it. For religions it spells the end of intercultural or interreligious dialogue as the public square is contracted to exclude the religious, which is doomed to an impossible a-culturality. Atheist Secularism In 1870, Holyoake publicly debated with Charles Bradlaugh (1883-1891), a re- nowned atheist who succeeded Holyoake as president of the London Secular Society in 1858. Bradlaugh nicely indicates the telos of secular agnosticism in his argument against Holyoake: Although at present it may be perfectly true that all men who are Secularists are not Atheists, I put it that in my opinion the logical consequences of the acceptance of Secu- larism must be that man gets to Atheism if he has brains enough to comprehend .... You cannot have a scheme of morality without Atheism. The Utilitarian scheme is a defiance of the doctrine of Providence and a protest against God. It is interesting that John Paul II agreed with Bradlaugh’s claim regarding Util- itarianism; that it is finally incompatible with Christian ethics, even if the Pope actually turns on its head Bradlaugh’s initial premise, arguing that atheism cannot sustain ethics as it is both reductionist regarding the dimensions of the human person as well as not being able to ontologically ground the “good” (see John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor), Bradlaugh was adamant that Secularism could be established only with the disproof of religion. This is the second current of modernity: atheism. 5

Most civilised Europeans are not intellectually rigorous enough (in Brad- laugh’s terms) to be classified as hard atheists. I say this with the exception of Marxism—which constitutes a very important part of recent European history, especially of the fifth layer, although now struggling to breathe in the debris of the Berlin wall. Nevertheless, secular agnostic and atheist Europeans are united

5 Arguably, both derive from currents within Christianity: see Buckley 1987.

34 ENGAGING WITH A “CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS” with both Bradlaugh and Holyoake in affirming that modern society can fully and properly operate only with the public space being defined in “secular” terms. Toothless Pluralism There is of course a more nuanced third position which is to be found in peri- ods of many European histories, and is nicely exemplified in Jeffrey Stout’s recent book, Tradition and Democracy (2004). Stout moves one step forward from John Rawls in arguing that the public square is constituted by different religious voices and, in silencing them, Rawls draws a public square that will eventually destroy democracy as it is not concerned with the voices of all its citizens. Stout makes three decisive moves in his argument: first, that all groups engaged in conversation must believe in the importance of open conversation that democracy and civil society promote; second, that all groups will have a confidence that it is in such conversations that resolutions can be ar- rived at related to apparently intractable problems and clashes of civilization, values and outlook; third, Stout’s own position is dependent on a form of He- gelian pragmatism.

To evaluate Stout’s complex thesis properly is beyond my brief, but I want to note three points to show its problematic nature. First, it makes democracy the sacred cow at centre stage, a sacred cow that is not necessarily valued per se by different religious communities. This does not mean that some religious communities have not developed complex theologies to engage with and support democracy. They have. But it does mean that once again a Trojan Horse is slipped into Stout’s mediating role, such that there is a requirement to accept some element of secular modernity’s trajectory before participation at the public table is allowed. Second, such a forum of conversation cannot be a guaran- tee of truth, and this secular faith in democratic pragmatism is thereby again quite problematic. Third, Stout’s rhetorical asides against fundamentalisms and biblicists, and his major assault on Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre indicates his deep animosity towards non-liberal formations of religion and his propensity to shape the public square with like-minded folk. Democratic pragmatism is perhaps the least hostile of the three forms of secular democracy that I have outlined, but I still want to make the point that even this benign version eventually and ultimately fails to take seriously non-liberal forms of religious formation; and precisely because liberalism is the sacred value being propa- gated. Postmodern Escapism A brief aside at this point is appropriate. Out of these three currents post- modernity emerges, refusing the universality of reason (and thereby under- cutting the entire modernist project), claiming all discourse is a will to power (thereby transforming the ontological into the political), and promoting non-

35 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 17 (2007) 1 foundationalism as a basic methodology for all disciplines. Unsurprisingly, the postmodern celebration of difference, even religious difference, cannot be finally rationally determined or argued for. It unsurprisingly collapses into pragmatism as Richard Rorty’s work indicates, or Utilitarianism, to use Brad- laugh’s term i.e., it is commended because it works. But my point is that it works for itself, not for genuine interreligious plurality in society.

What are we to make of the three currents of modernity mentioned above that have until recently positioned the religious, initially the Christian, and now all religions, in the domain of the private as opposed to the public, even if with quite varying degrees of generosity? Let me offer three comments.

First, modernity is based on natural reason, which eventually collapses into contractualism, the only binding force when people do not share the same values or estimation of reason and its operation. Hence a form of human rights based on contractualism dominates American discourse, and increasingly also European tradition (cf. Glendon 1991). It is this “human rights” trajectory within modernity, a curious kind of Trojan horse in the system, that has actually allowed religions to climb back into the public arena. For example, under EU legislation, all chaplaincies in hospitals and colleges must now be interfaith chaplaincies, not just Christian, as they once were. But even here, religion is allocated its particular areas of public space.

Second, in the variable degrees of hostility to religion generated by the modern project, Islam has often become public enemy number one for many varieties of Islam resist the dichotomy between public and private that modernity un- derwrites. These Muslims thankfully refuse to separate the public and private, for religion affects every dimension of life: schools, colleges, legal and civic institutions. For example, in England where Christian schools are sometimes funded by the state, some Muslims rightly argue that Islamic schools should also be state-funded, for only thus will the rhetoric about equal rights and religious rights be properly instantiated. Those secularists who argue against Mus- lim schools in the name of avoiding sectarianism and ghettoism, simply privi- lege one form of ideology (secularism). Admittedly, the British government is caught between the liberal logic of the argument and a public purse and public opinion that do not yet support such moves. Or, to take another example, when the French government (yet again) ban the wearing of the hijjab (the head dress worn by some Muslim women and seen as a religious duty) at state schools, it is not only so-called Muslim extremists who should protest, for is this not a clear example of state repression of religious rights, and specifically

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French Islamaphobia?6 This situation is now occurring in England and other parts of Europe.

Third, a counter-response to political modernity both within Western and non- Western societies is the renewal of theocracy.7 This is best seen in Saudi Ara- bia and Sudan, and recent moments in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan—to name a few instances. The Muslims I mention above in the School’s debate in England do not take this further step to urge Islamic theocracy in England. These two arguments should not be conflated. There is also a Christian equiva- lence to Islamic theocracy with the re-emergence of Constantianism, clearly seen in the recent American elections, where God and flag are raised together. In European terms, at least, I would argue this move draws back from one of Christian Europe’s greatest achievements, the division between the domains of state and church, without the intention of secularising the first domain as has subsequently happened in modernity.

Finally, and linking my first to my second section, Christians should have good theological reasons to resist these particular currents of modernity that privatise religion, for, in accepting this positioning, the gospel is compromised, the salt loses its flavour, and the light is hidden under the European charter. In a curious way, Christianity, Judaism and Islam all have something in common, or should have, their resistance to certain elements of modernity. In reality, in all three traditions, the assimilation to modernity within some sections is so thorough that the problem is not even perceived. In this sense Christians might learn from Islam that their own God is not a private inner event, but a social transformation of society, such that both church and the wider pluralist society always require evangelisation and fuller humanisation.

Roman Catholicism, Modernity, and Religious Plurality To simplify greatly, it is arguable that the Roman Catholic Church went through and is, perhaps, still going through two stages in its relationship to modernity, and likewise, in its relationship to religious pluralism. Again, I am concentrating on Roman Catholicism as I write as a Catholic theologian and the canvas would be unbearably wide otherwise.

The first stage at the turn of the nineteenth century was marked by a deep sus- picion of modernity and also the attendant “religious indifferentism” that was

6 See Antes 1995: 51-57, on Europe’s failure of memory.

7 See Watt 1988 and, from a Muslim perspective, the interesting analysis by Abu- Rabbi’ 1996.

37 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 17 (2007) 1 seen as its corollary. Technically, “indifferentism” is the position that all religions are (more or less) equal paths to the one God. The link between this position and that of the secular state was seen as a logical rather than contingent one. In so much as the secular state granted equal civic status and rights to all religions it offended against the rule that error has no rights. In granting all religions rights, the state thereby promoted indifferentism. Later, the link would be seen as contingent, and thereby a shift occurred both in terms of the Church’s attitude to other religions as well as the secular state in this respect. This first stage is historically exemplified in the papal encyclical Quanta Cura (1864) to which the “Syllabus of Condemned Errors” was attached, where error 16 reads: “Men can find the way of eternal salvation and attain eternal salvation by the practice of any religion whatever.” Error 79 reads: It is false to assert that civil freedom of cult and the full right granted to all to express openly and publicly any opinions and views leads to an easier corruption of morality and of the minds of people and helps to propagate the pest of indifferentism.’ 8 Vatican II, a hundred years later, exemplifies the second stage. The Roman Catholic Church now actually welcomed many aspects of modernity but rein- terprets and develops them within an ecclesial and Christological approach. Four documents are particularly important. First, Dignitatis Humanae (Declar- ation on Religious Liberty, 1965, 2) affirms that the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that in matters religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs. Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accord- ance with his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in associa- tion, within due limits. If this seems like a “U turn,”9 the following sentence indicates that this is not really the case, for the affirmation rests on very different considerations to that of secularism: the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person, as this dignity is known through the revealed Word of God and by reason itself. This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitu- tional law whereby society is governed. Thus it is to become a civil right.

8 For a thorough presentation of the pre-Vatican position, see Murray, especially pp. 7-45.

9 This was the perception of some Catholics who created a schismatic movement after the Council who argued that the Council had renounced true Catholic teaching. See Davies 1992.

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This is a remarkable paragraph and well worth pondering. First, we see that rights language is grounded in Christian revelation and reason together, and therefore very different from contractual rights language. This also indicates an intrinsic link between natural law and God, so carefully developed in John Paul II’s pontificate, thus calling into question an ethics that is not finally grounded in God.10 Second, it affirms the civic basis of religious pluralism, making it clear that such pluralism does not in any way logically lead to indifferentism. Third, it shows that various ethical truths must be embedded in civic society if the “common good” is to be maintained, and this includes democracy. This im- plies that the Church has a right and duty to campaign for civic law on certain issues, without requiring a Christendom model to underpin this intervention. Hence, as a trans-national body the Church has a role in national and interna- tional politics. The old adage that religion and politics do not mix or that bi- shops and pastors should not stray into political territory is clearly nonsense in this precise and particular context.

The second important document for our purpose is Nostra Aetate (Declaration on the Relation of the Church to non-Christian Religions, 1965). The document focuses exclusively on what is held in common amongst religions and brings people together. It is a pastoral, not dogmatic document as the title (De- claration) indicates. It deals with Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and African tribal religions—in that order viz. their differing relations of closeness and commonness with the Christian faith. Read together with the Declaration on Religious Liberty, one can actually begin to see how the situation of religious plurality might be fruitful in promoting the “common good,” and need not be the cause of tension and strife—despite the significant differences between the religions. For example, viz. Islam, the Council fathers affirm that Muslims worship a transcendent creator God, strive to follow the “hidden decrees of God, just as Abraham submitted himself to God’s plan,” have a high regard for Jesus and for his virgin mother, and strive to live an upright life through prayer, alms-deeds and fasting (3). It significantly calls for a move out of the past rut where “many quarrels and dissensions” have marked the relationship, and calls for “mutual understanding; for the benefit of all men, let them together preserve and promote peace, liberty, social justice and moral values” (3). The key to this passage is not a dogmatic one, but a pastoral shift of sensibility to facilitate working together with other religions, in this case Islam, to promote the common good.

10 MacIntyre was to come to this conclusion through his trilogy, and, interestingly, Indonesia offers (in theory) just such a secular state with a religious backcloth in upholding theism.

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An exegesis of this passage might be seen in the Vatican’s close working together with Muslims at the United Nations Conference Population Summit in Cairo in 1998 to promote social justice and common moral values. Or again, earlier, at the wonderful Day of Prayer for Peace in Assisi in October 1986, where each religion witnessed to the other’s prayer for peace in a divided world. Here the prayer tradition of Islam was seen operating together with other religions for a common goal of peace. Or again, we may sadly recall Ribat es Salam (the Bond of Peace), a Muslim-Christian prayer group started by the Trappist monks of Tibhirine (Algeria) that was brutally destroyed with the murder of seven monks in 1996 by the G.I.A, a radical Islamic group. Or more recently, it can be seen in the Vatican’s fierce resistance to the invasion of Iraq and its repeated criticisms of Islamaphobia during that conflict. The simple point here is that there is a real attempt to overcome the mutual hostility of history and forge a working alliance based on what is held in common.

The dogmatic exegesis of this passage on Islam (and of Nostra Aetate as a whole) makes it clear that this new pastoral attitude to Islam does not mean the adoption of indifferentism. Far from it, for in our third document, Lumen Gentium, (The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, 1964, 14) it is stated that “Basing itself on scripture and tradition, [this Council] teaches that the Church, a pilgrim now on earth, is necessary for salvation: the one Christ is the me- diator and the way of salvation.” It goes on to show that these claims, which fully accord with the traditional extra ecclesia nulla salus teaching, do not amount to the damnation of all non-Catholic humankind as is so often assumed and is perfectly in keeping with Nostra Aetate. Mahmoud Ayoub, a Muslim scholar in the US, thereby wrongly criticises John Paul II’s outlook as incon- sistent in promoting dialogue and cooperation with Islam while still promoting mission and Christ’s salvific uniqueness (1999).11 These two stances are not mutually incompatible. This nicely leads us to our final Vatican document to complete our inspection of the context of this shift in the Church’s attitude to modernity and other religions.

In Ad Gentes (Decree on the Church’s Missionary Activity, 1965, 9), we find the continuation of this theme: other religions and cultures have much that is good, true and beautiful, and in conversion to Christ, none of this is ever lost, but whatever goodness is found in the minds and hearts of men, or in the particular customs and cultures of peoples, far from being lost is purified, raised to a higher level and

11 Admittedly, Jews in the same volume make the same mistake. I have tried to defend the coherence of this position in D’Costa 2000.

40 ENGAGING WITH A “CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS” reaches its perfection, for the glory of God, the confusion of the demon, and the hap- piness of men. Now lest this sound like the Church only teaches others and brings them to their final goal, two balancing statements should be cited, so that the full or- ganic picture of the Council’s teachings emerge. First, the Church fully ac- knowledges how it learns from “the history and development of mankind,” “from the riches hidden in various cultures, through which greater light is thrown on the nature of man and new avenues to truth are opened up” (Gaudium et Spes, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, 44). This relates specifically to intercultural and interreligous theology. In this sense there is a real possibility of mutuality in the process of dialogue and mission between religions. Second, in Dignitatas Humanae 12, there is a clear ac- knowledgment that the Church’s own behaviour has at times been “hardly in keeping with the spirit of the Gospel and was even opposed to it.” So mission is in humble service to the Lord’s message, not a false confidence in the Church’s own life and history.

It is time to take stock, to look where Catholicism stands in this crucial junc- ture of history where it can be both the cause of deep strife and violence, a “clash of civilisations,” as well as bringing peace and charity between people, a “harmony of civilisations.” It may be helpful to conclude with some general theses slowly emerging from my discussion so far.

Some Interim “Conclusions” There are three major demographic forces that might shape modern Europe in the future: secular modernity in the lead, maybe Christianity, and just possibly Islam. The latter is not so deeply embedded in Western European culture to make a significant difference yet, but future migration and other socio-political factors mean this is an open question. How these three clusters relate to one another and to the plurality within themselves is vital in discerning the future of Europe, and especially the way Europe deals with religious plurality. I have limited my own brief to Christianity so I will try to confine my comments thus.

First, the Roman Catholic Church is still emerging through its encounter with modernity with some important themes developing within the recent tradition. In post-Christian pluralist Europe a “secular” form of government that is not inimical to religion and indeed helps and promotes religions is clearly the Catholic option in Vatican II. However, the problems raised against modernity in the writings of John Paul II and other Catholics such as Hans Urs von Bal- thasar and Joseph Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict, show that there still remains an ideological tension with this “solution,” for the resources of secular modernity are skin-deep in promoting and supporting real religious plurality. Ideo-

41 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 17 (2007) 1 logically, modernity and religion are deeply inimical to each other. Neverthe- less, there can be no return to Christendom, just as the Church has firmly re- sisted the encroachment of shari’a law upon Christian communities in Islamic theocracies and protested against the suppression of human rights in some of these countries. This of course takes us out of Europe, but shows the integral position being developed within Catholic social thinking. It is clear that the Church is concerned to protect religious freedoms for itself, as well as for all religions, “within limits,” in the new world order, but based on revelation and reason and not on contractual human rights-talk or other foundations. Again, this brings it into conflict with modernity on an ideological rather than practical level but interestingly brings it into deep harmony with Judaism and Is- lam, in so much as they too utilise “revelation” and “reason” to propound their cosmological-social vision. This commonality should not obscure some very real problems that can emerge between Islam, Judaism and Christianity were they to be in sustained dialogue.

Second, the Roman Catholic Church operates with a radically open attitude towards other religions on the pastoral and social level, but not at the dogmatic level. The new post-1965 openness encourages interreligious cooperation at every level (civic, monastic, and spiritual) for the attainment of the common good, for justice, peace, and equality, to the greater glory of God. In this sense the Catholic position is an important force for cohesion and harmony. Hunting- ton’s thesis is squarely called into question at this level. In relation to Islam, this is seen in many different ways—in part recounted above. However, the Catholic Church’s dogmatic position on Christology, trinity, and Church that hold to the exclusive salvific power of the trinitarian God, make known in Christ, mediated by his Church, is a stumbling block to some Muslims (as we have seen), various Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, atheists, other Christians—and admittedly, even to some Roman Catholic theologians. I have suggested that the dogmatic position is utterly consistent with the new shift in pastoral and social terms, and indeed supports it fully. Further, I have noted that this dogmatic position does not involve the damnation of all non-Christians, nor does it involve the rejection of the profound cultural and spiritual heritage of the great world religions, nor does it mean that the mystery of God is exhausted in Cath- olic Christianity. Hence, I consider it a matter of apologetics, not logic, to ex- plain how dialogue and mission are held together and promoted with equal vig- our, never to the exclusion of either.

Third, if it is argued that the Christian missionary imperative will lead to a clash of civilisations, especially regarding Islam, which also contains a universal missionary dynamic, two responses might be made. The manner in which each religion understands and practices its universal mission is a matter to be evaluated, but from the Catholic position, it is clear in theory that mission

42 ENGAGING WITH A “CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS” without regard to religious freedom, freedom of conscience, and freedom from all coercion, is a contradiction in terms. Hence, Catholicism is poised to keep mission central, without it being an ideological motor in a “clash of civilisations,” even if modernity is in the habit of rendering this missionary imperative in very negative terms. And this leads us to the nub of yet another unresolved tension. Whose “clash” and whose “civilisation’ are we referring to when we use these terms?

In modernity’s terms, the clash arises because religions do not conform to the private space granted them. Some European countries are moving beyond that position, but usually for pragmatic and political reasons rather than a real shift in ideology. But not all. France is not a good example to follow. Spain’s solution is rather more promising. In 1992 the Ministry of Justice published its treaty between the State and the Islamic community (Acuerdo de Cooperación del Estado Español con las “Comisión islámica de España”) establishing an Islamic Commission representing the two main Islamic organisations in the country, giving special protection to religious buildings, ceremonies, and practices, and opening large possibilities for religious education at all levels. Peter Antes concludes that “The treaty is the most comprehensive recognition of Muslim rights ever signed in Europe so far” (Antes 1995: 50).12 Whatever the practice, here is an instance where real religious diversity is taken seriously at the socio-political level. Tony Blair has also moved towards establishing a consultative religious body embedded within the political structure, although its workings and effect have yet to be properly evaluated.

Catholicism has moved beyond its traditional position that was deeply suspi- cious and even hostile to civic equality being granted to different religions and in that sense is having to think through the meaning of religious plurality in Europe and universally. The way each local church embodies this impulse will vary, but one can still discern a common direction and movement. Certain forms of Christianity, such as evangelical Christianity in the United States, oc- cupy a different position, often verging on Christendom and sometimes working with medieval caricatures of Islam. Catholics will equally have to critically engage with such intra-Christian positions. This is one reason why I have tried to be denomination-specific and to avoid simply outlining a situation without engaging in the critical debates taking place.

12 Editors’ note: cf. also the research on Spain as discussed in the review of Viggo Mortensen (ed.), Religion and Society in this issue.

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Islam has also started on this complex process of engagement with modernity, but since there is no one central organ representative of Islam, we must be very differentiated in discerning the variety of responses. One might recast Kissin- ger’s famous dictum: “If you want to contact Europe, whose number do you ring?” Likewise with Islam, “Islam” in Europe has no single definition and no single centre, no central phone number. The responses range from a Catholic parallel (Muhammad Iqbal from Pakistan might be cited or Mohammed Ar- koun who taught at the Sorbonne), an assimilation to modernity (perhaps the Indian Ameer Ali, follower of India’s Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, whose The Spirit of Islam [1873] is nicely described by William Montgomery Watt as in- corporating “all the values of Victorian liberalism” enabling “westernizing Muslims to feel that their religion was not inferior to Christianity” [Watt 1991: 103) and Islamic theocracy (in Pakistan’s Abu-l-A’la Maududi, founder of Ja- maat I-Islami, the largest religious party in Pakistan today, and his Egyptian follower, Sayyid Qutb, or the Iranians, Ali Shari’ati and Sayyid Muhamud Tal- equani). Some analysts argue that the latter grows in proportion to the aggres- sive capitalist exploitation of Muslim poor (along with the poor in general), although others contest this. Certainly, Islamic theocracy is always in danger of replacing modernity’s ideological secularism as a civic practice that cannot tol- erate religious diversity in the public square, rather like Catholicism pre-Vat- ican II. Taking pluralism seriously indicates that resolving such questions on commonly agreed terms is extremely difficult.

In conclusion, I have tried to show why secular modernity in three different forms cannot really accommodate the meeting of religions that is happening in Europe and worldwide. I have also tried to show that for one religion in modern Europe, Roman Catholicism, intercultural theology and interreligious engagement is a real possibility. I have also shown why its position is actually quite encouraging in that it offers a critique of secular modernity that is in danger of stifling real public religious plurality with its attendant debates and complex tensions. It also offers a position that religiously legitimates the pubic practice and discourse of multiple faiths. But I have also pointed to the remarkable element of novelty in this Catholic position, which prior to the 1960s had little articulation and practice, and this articulation and practice is very much in the process of still being worked out.

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Antes, Peter. (1995). “Islam in Europe.” In: Sean Gill et al. (eds). Religion in Europe: Contemporary Perspectives. Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1995. Pp. 46-67. Bruce, Stephen. (ed.). (1992). Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Buckley, Michael J. (1987). At the Origins of Modern Atheism. New Haven: Yale University Press. Davies, Michael. (1992). The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty. Minne- sota: Neumann Press, 1992. D’Costa, Gavin. (2000). The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity. Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark. (2005). Theology in the Public Square: Church, University and Nation. Oxford: Blackwell. Glendon, Mary Anne. (1991). Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse. New York: Free Press. Holyoake, George Jacob. (1860). The Principles of Secularism. London: Holyoake & Co. (1896). English Secularism: A Confession of Belief. Chicago: Open Court. Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York, Simon & Schuster. John Paul II. (1993). Veritatis Splendor. Vatican City : Libreria Editrice Vaticana. MacIntyre, Alasdair. (1990). Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. London: Duck- worth. Milbank, John. (1990). Theology and Social Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. Murray, John Courtney. (1965). The Problem of Religious Freedom. London: Newman Press. Ratzinger, Joseph. (1988). “Europe: A Heritage with Obligations for Christians.” In: Joseph Ratzinger. Church, Ecumenism and Politics: New Essays in Ecclesiology. Slough: St. Paul Publications. Pp. 221-36. Rawls, John. (1973). A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stout, Jeffrey (2004). Tradition and Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Watt, Montgomery. (1988). Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity. London: Rout- ledge. (1991). Muslim-Christian Encounters: Perceptions and Misperceptions. London: Routledge.