Nigerian soldiers.809o Abu Keita testified that Bockarie communicated with Benjamin Yeaten and Joseph Tuah on the satellite phone, telling the witness that he was reporting to them on the status of the operation. Y" A number of witnesses agreed that this contact was frequent. Fornie testified that during the Kono operation, Bockarie would receive at least one message every three to four hours that the witness spent with Bockarie,8092 and that during the Freetown invasion, they spoke at least two or three times a day through the satellite phone. 8093 The evidence also suggests that such reports were promptly given as progress on the frontline developed. 8094

3556. Sometimes these communications concerned operational decisions. TF 1-516 stated that after conversing with the Accused, Bockarie would come to the radio station and draft instructions for the commanders, including Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) in Freetown, regarding military manoeuvres, the setting of ambushes and attacks on particular targets. 8095 Kabbah noted as an example that when Bockarie told Yeaten about the increasing difficulties Gullit's troops were facing in Freetown, Yeaten told Bockarie to send reinforcements to the city.8096 Fornie stated that sometimes Bockarie "would contact Benjamin to consult him on some decisions before he ever took them,,.8097

3557. Kabbah attested to a complicated relation ship between Yeaten and Bockarie during the conversations concerning the Kono and Freetown operations. He stated initially that Bockarie spoke to Yeaten as part of a "sisterly or brotherly operation", or a "joint operation", where each party sought to be kept updated on each other's successes and

8090 TF 1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12918. 809 1 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2020-2022. 8092 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21557. 8093 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21609-21610; see also TFI-516, Transcript 8 April 2008. p. 6937 (Bockarie was in "persistent" communication with Charles Taylor, call sign "020", and Benjamin Yeaten, call sign "Base I"). 8094 Mohamed Kabbah, Tran script 15 September 2008, pp. 16176-16178 (Kabbah testified that Bockarie informed the Accused that Gullit had entered Freetown and captured State House on the day that Bockarie himself received the news); Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008. pp. 2 1581-2 1582 (Less than an hour after Bockarie received the message concerning the release of the Pademba Road prisoners, he called Benjamin Yeaten on the satellite phone to inform him). 8095 TF 1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943. 8096 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173-16175; see also Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16143-16145, where the witness refers to the same incident ("at one time when in fact the 6 January invasion took place in Freetown when ECOMOG was pushing the men, at that time Mosquito spoke with Benjamin Yeaten and so he said, 'The situation is becoming bad at the front line. The enemies were pushing our men out of the town ", so Benjamin Yeaten told him why he was not trying to reinforce the men in the city. He said, ,You know the city is big. You need to reinforce them'"). 8097 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 2 1615.

Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18May2012 J1]Z?

failures .8098 Kabbah also observed that Bockarie spoke to Yeaten as if Bockarie was in the position of a subordinate receiving instruction from a superior.S099 However, Kabbah in cross-examination then affirmed a seemingly inconsistent prior statement in which he stated that Bockarie did not "take orders" from Yeaten because Bockarie would have seen Yeaten as "inferior" in rank.8lOOKabbah explained to the Trial Chamber that while Yeaten was officiall y ofa higher rank, Bockarie viewed Yeaten as inferior because Bockarie had a larger and more important role in Sierra Leone.slol Kabbah testified that Bockarie nonetheless followed instructions by Yeaten because he would have assumed such orders came from the Accused.8l02 Even if a message from Yeaten did not specifically refer to the Accused, it was understood in the RUF that Yeaten was the conduit for the Accused's instructions as he was the Accused's "right-hand man". 8103

3558. The Defence contends that the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses IS unreliable. 8l04 It cites, as an example, Mohamed Kabbah 's evidence that he got the information concerning the alleged radio communications between Bockarie and Yeaten during the Freetown invasion through TF 1-516 whom he alleged was Yeaten's radio operator at the time, even though , TFI -516 testified that he was only assigned to Yeaten in Liberia from about mid-1999.8IOs The Trial Chamber notes that Kabbah did become confused at one stage of his testimony when discussing a communication between Yeaten and Bockarie concerning the ECOMOG assault on the supply lines of the troops in Freetown. He first stated that this communication was initiated by Pascal, who was stationed in Liberia,81 06 but corrected his testimony to state that it was TFI-516 who was stationed in Liberia and was assigned to Yeaten. 8l07 However, Kabbah did indicate that TFl-516 was, at

8098 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16145.

8099 Mohamed Kabbah,Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173-16175; see also Tran script 12 September 2008, pp. 16143-16145, where the witness refers to the same incident ("at one time when in fact the 6 January invasion took place in Freetown when ECOMOG was pushing the men, at that time Mosquito spoke with Benjamin Yeaten and so he said, 'The situation is becoming bad at the front line. The enemies were pushing our men out of the town ', so Benjamin Yeaten told him why he was not trying to reinforce the men in the city. He said, 'You know the city is big. You need to reinforce them'"). 8100 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008. pp. 16380-14381. 8 10 1 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16379. 8 102 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16380-1438 I. 8103 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16380-14381. 8 104 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1281. 8 105 TF I-5 16, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6858. 8 106 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16168-161 69. 8 107 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008 , p. 16170.

1235 £ Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18 May 20 12 .:> one point, assigned as an operator for Yeaten,Sl08 and recognised that there was a period when Yeaten spoke to Bockarie before TFI-516 had been assigned to Liberia. 8l09 The Trial Chamber considers this discrepancy minor; in light of the passage oftime and the witness's acknow ledgement that TF 1-516 was only stationed in Liberia for a certain period of time, it is understandable that Kabbah may have become confused about precisely when that period was.8llO

3559. The Defence also pointed to alleged inconsistencies in TFI-516's evidence regarding alleged communications between Bockarie and Yeaten, noting that it conflicted with TF 1­ 516's testimony that the Liberian government did not have the codes for the RUF radio net in January 1999 and that TFI -516 later confirmed that he never heard any directive from Taylor or Yeaten concerning the Freetown Invasion.f"!'

3560. In relation to the first alleged inconsistency, the Trial Chamber notes that DCT-008 also stated that Yeaten could not have spoken to Bockarie on the radio, because Yeaten did not know the RUF communication codes.81l2 The Trial Chamber notes that it does not accept the contention of the Defence that messages between Liberian radio operators and the RUF operators could not have been relayed simply because they did not possess each others' codes, having concluded that the RUF and NPFL radio networks were accessible by 8 operators from outside their respective networks. I 13 In any case, DCT-008 also testified that in November or December 1998, Memunatu Deen, an RUF radio operator, began operating out of Base 1,8114 and that around December 1998 or January 1999, she gave the RUF codes to Sunlight so that he could take down messages while she was away.81l S Hence, it is clear

8 108 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcr ipt 12 September 2008, p. 16144; Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16134; Transcript 15 September 2008 , p. 16170 . 8109 Operational Suppo rt: Communications, Use of Liberia Communications by the RUF.

8110 T F I-37 1, Transcript 28 January 200 8, pp. 2381-2382 (CS) (Memumata Oeen was assigned to work at the RUF radi o station based in Monrovia in late 1998 and early 1999 ); Mohamed Kabbah,Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16134-1 6135. (Memu Deen, To los wife was in Monro via wo rking as a radio operator at Cisse Musa's house when Bockarie was stationed in Buedu). Note that although OCT-0 08 first testified that Memunatu would use the radio at Base One in Liberia every day in November or late December 1998, and she co ntinued to do so in 1999 (OCT-008, Transcript 27 August 20 10, pp. 47400,47407-411 , Transcript 30 August 20 10, pp. 47403­ 47404) later in his testimony he stated that there was no radio contact between the RUF and Deen in Liberia in early January 1999 because Memunatu was in Sierra Leone (OCT- 008 , Transcript 27 August 201 0, p. 47420). OCT-008, Transcript 27 August 20 10, pp. 47400-47408; Transcript 30 August 20 10, pp. 47403-47404. 8111 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1281; TFI-51 6, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7778-7779.

8112 OCT- 008, Transcript 28 August 2010, pp. 47595-4 7596.

8 113 Operational Support: Comm unications, RUF and NPFL Radio Codes and Communica tions.

8 114 OCT- 008 , Transcript 27 August 2010, pp. 47400-47408; Transcript 30 August 2010 , pp. 47403-4 7404. 8115 Witn ess OCT- 008, Transcript 27 August 20 10, p. 47406.

1236 / Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18 May 2012 393z7

that at least by the time of the Freetown invasion the Liberian operators were in possession of the relevant RUF codes. OCT-008 also testified that Yeaten was afraid of being heard on the radio, so he would not have spoken on the VHF radio, but rather only over the satellite phone.8116 However, TFI-516 testified that generally, discussions between Yeaten and Bockarie did occur via satellite phone, after which Bockarie would issue instructions over 811 the radio. ?

3561. In relation to the second alleged inconsistency, the Trial Chamber considers that the Defence has mischaracterised TFI-516's evidence. In cross-examination, the witness confirmed that he had said in a prior statement to the Prosecution that he "was not aware of any directives by Charles Taylor or Benjamin Yeaten regarding the Freetown invasion of January 1999". However, TF 1-516 explained that he was referring strictly to radio communications, and emphasised that he had also noted in the prior statement that discussions concerning military strategy were conducted via satellite phone, after which Bockarie would issue instructions over the radio.8118 In light of the witness's explanation,

the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the prior statement referred to by the Defence IS inconsistent with TFI-516's testimony.

3562. Reviewing the reliability of the evidence concernmg communications between Bockarie and the Accused or Yeaten during the Kono and Freetown operations, the Trial Chamber takes into account that much of the evidence adduced was from radio operators in Buedu during the relevant time period, and that the witnesses were careful to substantiate the basis on which they believed such communications took place. These radio operators were

either monitoring or facilitating such radio communications with Liberia,8! 19 present in the radio room when such communications occurred,8120 or present when Bockarie spoke on the satellite phone with Yeaten or the Accused. SI2 1

8 116 DCT-008, Transcript 28 August 20 10, pp. 47595-47596. 8117 TFI -516, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7778-7779. 8118 TFI -516, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7778-7779. 81 19 TF 1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 6979 (During the Freetown invasion, the witness himself called "Base I" several times on Bockarie's behalf): Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21562-21563 (On 6 January 1999, the witness was in Buedu monitoring the radio constantly): Mohamed Kabbah , Trans cript 15 September, pp. 16168-16169 (one morning after Gullit's troops entered Freetown, Benjamin Yeaten contacted Sam Bockarie over the radio from Foya. The witness and other operators in Buedu were monitoring the VHF radio and heard this conversation as it was quite loud). 8 120 TFI -567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12918 (The witness was in the radio room when radio operators in Buedu passed on updates to Yeaten's radi 0 operator, Sunlight); TFI-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp.

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 391]0

3563. The Accused contended that Kabbah's testimony that conversations on the satellite 122 phone between the Accused and Bockarie were conducted openll contradicts the evidence of other Prosecution witnesses that whenever Sam Bockarie received a call on his satellite phone, he moved away and spoke secretly.8123 The Trial Chamber notes that the Accused did not specify with which witnesses he was contrasting Kabbah's testimony and the evidence clearl y establishes that there was no particular secrecy surrounding Bockarie 's satellite phone conversations with Yeaten at this time. TFl-585 testified that the satellite phone in Buedu was located on an open veranda and conversations were easil y overheard.8124 TFl-516,8125 Abu Keita8126 and Dauda Arona Fornie8127 also heard Bockarie speak to Yeaten via satellite phone. Apart from Keita's evidence that these conversations would take place at night, none of these witnesses testified that there were any secrecy measures in place concerning the satellite phone communication.

3564. TIle Accused stated that neither he nor any official in the Liberian Government was in contact with Bockarie via satellite phone during the Freetown invasion.8128 There are inconsistencies in the Accused 's testimony which cast doubt on his denial that he was communicating with Bockarie directly or through Yeaten. First his insistence that no official in the Liberian Government would have been in contact with Bockarie during the Freetown invasion because they would have no reason to be8129 is undermined somewhat by his later acknowledgement that in January 1999, there was communication between the government of Liberia and Bockarie in order to negotiate the cease-fire for which the Liberian

15720-15721(the witness heard the radio operator on duty receive a call from Benjam in Yeaten's operator Sunlight, asking them to find Bockarie so that he could speak with Yeaten). 8121 TFl -516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943 (TFl-516 testified that he overheard satellite phone conversations between Bockarie and Taylor during the invasion ofFreetown); Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21609-21610 (The witness would often be in the radio room with Bockarie during satellite conversations with Yeaten); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16178 (The witness heard Bockarie speak to the Accused on the satellite phone); TFl-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15722-15724 (When Yeaten wished to speak to Bockarie, Bockarie went directly to the veranda where the satellite phone was located and spoke on the phone). 8 122 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173, 16175. 8 123 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29106-29108. 8 124 TFl-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15722-15724. 8125 TFl-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943. 8 126 Abu Keita, Tran script 23 January 2008, pp. 2020-2022 . 8 127 Dauda Aruna Fomi e, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21609-21610. 8 128 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29395-29396. 8 129 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 29395-29396.

1238 / Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T .,« 18 May 2012 government took credit.sl3o Further, when asked about communications between Yeaten and Bockarie through Sunlight, the Accused stated that he was not aware of such communications, but importantly, acknowledged the possibility that Yeaten, as the coordinator of security, would have reason to contact Bockarie by radio .s l 3 1 In light of these inconsistencies, and against the weight of the Prosecution evidence, the Trial Chamber does not find the Accused's denial that he was communicating with Bockarie directly or through Yeaten during the Kono or Freetown operations credible. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that in December 1998 and January 1999, Bockarie was in frequent contact via radio or satellite phone with the Accused, either directly or through Yeaten, in relation to the progress of the Kono and Freetown operati ons.

3565. The Prosecution also contends that Bockarie continued to update the Accused on the Sierra Leone situation and take instructions from the Accused after the withdrawal from

Freetown. In support, the Prosecution refers to Exhibit P-261 ,8132 an audio clip of an RUF radio conversation which Oauda Aruna Fornie testified that he recorded around February to March 1999.s133 Fornie identified on the recording the voices of Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, Isaac Mongor and Sunlight, Benjamin Yeaten' s radio operator and the language in which they were speaking as Liberian English .8 134 The Defence adduced evidence from OCT-008 challenging the authenticity of this Exhibit. In particular, OCT-008 testified that he did not recognise any of the voices on Exhibit P-261 and disagreed that the second voice on the recording, which stated "35 Bravo, come in. Come in, 35 Bravo", was the voice of Sunlight, as Fornie had testified.8135 OCT-008 also stated that Sunlight never used "35B" or "35 Bravo" as the call sign for Buedu, and that although he had heard from previous

8130 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 September 2009, pp. 29096-29097; Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30452-30453. 8 131 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28738 ("The second thing factually is that I would not dispute the fact that the operator of Benjamin - because of Benjamin coordinating the security, it would not be out of reason for his operator to call Sam Bockarie, okay? [.. .]So I wouldn't have the details, and so I don't have a quarrel with the fact that maybe there's communication"). 8132 Exhibit P-261, "Audio File - Clip One (P-26 1). RUF radio conversation recorded by TF I-274 after the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999. Identifies voices of Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, Sunlight and Isaac Mongor", 8133 Dauda Arona Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21500 ("Q : Do you recall approximately when this record ing occ urred? Fornie: It was around ... February to March 1999. That was after the Freetown invasion on January 6 by the RUF"). 8134 Dauda Aruna Fornie , Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 21505 . 8 135 DCT-008, Transcript 2 September 20 10, pp. 47799-47801.

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 1239/ 18 May 20 12 39:1]2

operators that the RUF code during 1991 to 1992 was "35 Bravo",8136 from the time when Base 1 was established, until late 1999, the call sign tor Buedu was either "Planet 1" or " Bravo Zulu 4".8137

3566. The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding that Dauda Aruna Fornie IS a . generally reliable witness, and that the evidence of DCT-008 must be treated with 8138 caution. The Trial Chamber observes that the evidence of DCT-008 as to Exhibit P-261 should be treated with particular caution, noting that he had earlier testified to an incident in September 1998, in which, at the instruction of Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle),81 39 Sunlight had used the RUF frequency, "RUF 35B" to contact the RUF in Buedu,814o directly contradicting his evidence that "35B" or "35 Bravo" was no longer the call sign for Buedu.

3567 . On the basis of Exhibit P-261 and the supporting evidence of Dauda Aruna Fornie, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that around February to March 1999, after the withdrawal of AFRC troops from Freetown, there was contact between the RUF radio stations and Yeaten's radio operator. However, it notes that the content of the recording, as described by Dauda Aruna Fornie and corroborated by DCT-008, suggests no substantive discussion between the parties to the conversation concerning the situation in Sien-a Leone. As such, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that Exhibit P-261 indicates Bockarie was updating the Accused on the Sierra Leone situation or taking instructions from the Accused at this time.

b. Visits by Benjamin Yeaten to Buedu in December 1998 and January

3568. The Trial Chamber heard evidence from two witnesses concermng visits by Benjamin Yeaten to Bockarie's headquarters in Buedu in December 1998 and January 1999 immediately prior to and during the Kono and Freetown operations. Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that, prior to the December 1998 attack on Kono,8141 he saw Bockarie having a discussion with Benjamin Yeaten (a.k.a. Five-Zero) one evening at Bockarie's house, but

8 136 OCT-008, Transcript 2 September 2010, pp. 47799-47800. 8137 OCT-00 8, Transcript 2 September 2010, pp. 47799-47800 . 8 138 Credibility Assessment, OCT-008, paras 373-380; Credibility Assessment, Oauda Aruna Fornie, paras 346­ 358. 8139 Witness OCT-008, Transcript 24 August 20 10, pp. 47034-47037, 47042-47043. 8 140 Witness OCT-008, Transcript 24 August 2010, pp. 47042; Transcript 27 August 2010 p. 47375-4 7376. 8141 Oauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21560.

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 12:/ 18 May 20 12 39'1J3

did not know what the two men discussed.8142 TFl-585 also· testified that two days after Bockarie used his satellite phone to inform the BBC that his troops would be in Freetown, 8143 Yeaten came to Buedu, and Bockarie instructed her to prepare food for the visitor.

3569. The Defence contends that despite Fornie's insistence that there were other people who witnessed this meeting, no other witness corroborates his account. The Defence also points to evidence that Bockarie made a trip to Liberia to see Yeaten during this time, not the other way around, and that TFl-585 "claimed that Yeaten's first trip to Buedu was after the troops had entered Freetown".8144

3570. The Trial Chamber considers both contentions to be without merit. First, it does not consider the evidence that Bockarie made a trip to Liberia to see Yeaten during the Kono­ Freetown operation to preclude the possibility of Yeaten also visiting Buedu, and notes that in any case, the evidence was that Bockarie's visits to Monrovia took place during January 1999, while Fornie's evidence concerns a visit in December 1998.

3571. Second, the Trial Chamber notes that the Defence has mischaracterised TFl-585's evidence. She did not claim that Yeaten's first trip to Buedu was after the AFRC troops had entered Freetown. Rather, she testified that the visit in January 1999 was the first time that she herself saw Yeaten in Buedu. 8145 Given that the visit Fornie described took place late at night8146 and lasted only for about an hour before Yeaten returned to Liberia,8147 it is not improbable that TF 1-585 would not have witnessed it.

3572. The Trial Chamber recalls that it has found TFl-585 and Dauda Aruna Fornie to be generally credible witnesses8148 and has no reason to doubt their testimony in relation to these incidents. The Trial Chamber also considers that the testimony of Varmuyan Sherif that before 6 January 1999,8149 he saw Bockarie and Yeaten together in Foya8150

8 142 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21558-21561. 8 143 TFI-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15722-15724. 8144 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 899. 8 145 TFI-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, p. 15723. 8146 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21557 (the meeting took place around 1O.00pm to 11.00pm). 8 147 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21561. 8 148 Credibility Assessment, TFI-585. paras 330-333: Credibility Assessment. Dauda Aruna Fornie. paras 346­ 358. 8 149 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 865. 8 150 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 864-865.

1241 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 corroborates the evidence of TF 1-585 and Fornie that Yeaten and Bockarie met during the Kono-Freetown operations. On the evidence of TFl -585 and Dauda Aruna Fornie, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten met at least twice in December 1998 and January 1999.

c. Trips by Bockarie and his subordinates to Monrovia during the Freetown InVaSIOn

3573. The Prosecution also alleges that Bockarie took trips to Monrovia during the Freetown operation, relying on the evidence of Abu Keita. Keita testified that durin g the Freetown invasion,81 5\ Bockarie travelled to Liberia. The first time, the witness accompanied Bockarie to Foya where a helicopter came to fetch Bockarie8\52 and the witness met Bockarie on his return at Foya in a new ash-coloured Toyota Land Cruiser pick-up from the Accused loaded with clothing, medicine and bandages.8153 Keita also saw Bockarie depart on another trip to Monrovia from Foya via helicopter, on which Bockarie carried a seriously wounded soldier,81 54 although it is not clear from Keita's evidence whether this also took place during the Freetown invasion. On Keita 's evidence, when Bockarie returned from Liberia on the trip durin g the Freetown invasion, he told the witness that he had brought back a message from the Accused that the RUF should maintain its controll ed areas.8155

3574. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that Abu Keita is a generally reliable 8156 witness. The Prosecution cites TFl-516's account of Bockarie flying to Monrovia from Foya in a helicopter to see the Accused durin g the Freetown invasion in support of Keita' s account. 8157 However, the Trial Chamber notes that TF 1-516 admitted on cross-examination that he had made a mistake and that the incident he described had not taken place during the Freetown invasion, but instead, long after the Freetown operation.8158 The Trial Chamber

8 151 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 2020 ("Q. Sir, where were you when the attack on Freetown happened? A. When the attack on Freetown happened I was in Buedu. Q. Where was Sam Bockarie?A. Sam Bockarie was in Buedu. That was the time I told you that he came with these jean trousers and T'shirts and the car)". 8152 Abu Keita,Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 20 11. 8153 Abu Keita, Transc ript 23 January 2008, pp. 20 11-2013 ,2023-2024 . 8 154 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2023-2024. arss Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008 , pp. 2023-2024. 8 156 Credibility Assess ment, Abu Keita, paras 213-2 19. 8157 TF 1-516, Transcrip t 8 April 2008, pp. 6945-6946, 6962-6965; Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6980-6981. 8 158 TF I-5 16, Transcript 16 April 2008, pp. 7820-7821.

Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18 May 20 12 does not therefore consider that TFI -516's evidence corroborates Keita's evidence concerning trips by Bockari e to Monrovia during January 1999.8159 The Trial Chamber also notes that Varmuyan Sherif's evidence that before 6 January 1999,81 60 he saw Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten together in Foya supports to some extent Keita's evidence, but only 8161 partially, indicating that Bockarie did travel to Foya.

3575. However, two other Prosecution witnesses suggest that Bockarie was unable to travel to Monrovia during the Kono and Freetown operations. TFI-371 testified that when Christopher Varmoh (a.k.a. Liberian Mosquito) and Dopoe Menkarzon came to Buedu during the December 1998 attacks to discuss Bockarie travelling to Monrovia to see the Accused, Bockarie did not go because he was "waiting for the success of the operation, especially the Freetown invasion".81 62Similarly, Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that Bockarie was too busy co-ordin ating the front lines to travel to Monrovia to pick up materiel after Gullit entered Freetown on 6 January 1999 and he sent Fornie and two others instead .8163

3576. The Trial Chamber notes the evidence of TF I-37 1 that after the AFRC and RUF forces retreated from Freetown, in January 1999, Bockarie did travel to Monrovia for a week to meet the Accused, who promoted Bockarie to a "two-star" lieutenant genera1..8164 It has assessed TFI-371 's evidence concerning the promotion in a separate section of the Judgement.V'" However, it is apparent from TFI-371's evidence that this took place after the Freetown operation had concluded, after the AFRC and RUF forces retreated from Freetown.T" in contrast to the evidence of Keita that Bockarie travelled to Monrovia around the time of the Freetown attack.8167TFI-371's evidence that Bockarie was in Monrovia for a week8168 would also suggest that he is referring to a different trip to that discussed by Abu

8 159 Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused , During Sam Bockarie 's Leadership (February 1998-December 1999). 8 160 Vann uyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 865. 816\ Vannuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, pp. 864-865. 8 162 TF I-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2423-2425 (CS). 8\63 Dauda Arona Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21522, 21594-2 1595. 8 \64 TF I-37 1, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2429-2430 (CS). 8 165 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RU F/AFRC, Sam Bockarie.

8\ 66 TF I-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2429-2430 (CS). 8 167 Abu Keita, Transc ript 23 January 2008 , p. 2020 (Q. Sir, where were you when the attack on Freetownhappened? A. When the attack on Freetown happened I was in Buedu. Q. Where was Sam Bockarie?A. Sam Bockarie was in Buedu. That was the time I told you that he came with these je an trousers and T'shirts and the car). 8 168 TFI -37 1, Transcript 28 January 2008 , pp. 2429-2430 (CS).

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 20 12 Keita, who told the Trial Chamber that Bockarie was gone from Buedu for only a day. TF1­ 371 also does not refer to Bockarie bringing back, as Keita testified, either a vehicle containing jeans, t-shirts, medicine and bandages or carrying with him to Monrovia a seriously wounded soldier. l!16'1 According to TFI-371, Bockarie returned with two sets ofthe SS uniform used by the Accused's securities.l!170 TFI-371 also does not refer to any instruction by the Accused that the RUF should maintain its controlled areas. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber is of the view that the trip described by TFI-371 to Monrovia is not the same trip described by Keita and that the trip described by TFI-371 took place later than that referred to by Keitao

3577 . The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that both TFI-371 and Dauda Aruna Fornie are generally reliable witnesses,8171 and considers that their evidence supports the conclusion that during the Kono and Freetown operations, Bockarie was too occupied with the military front to travel to Monrovia. The Trial Chamber notes that it has previously considered and accepted the Prosecution allegation that Dauda Aruna Fornie travelled to Monrovia during the Freetown invasion to obtain materiel. 8172

3578. In light of the lack of corroborative evidence, and the testimonies of TFI-371 and Dauda Arona Fornie, the Trial Chamber does not accept Abu Keita's evidence that Bockarie travelled to Liberia during the Freetown operation to take instruction from the Accused.

(ii) Contact between Bockarie and Daniel Tamba, Joseph Marzah and Sampson Weah during the operation

3579. The Prosecution also contends that during the December 1998 offensives, Joseph Marzah , Sampson Weah and Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) met with Bockarie in Buedu and reported back to Yeaten. 8173 The Prosecution relies primarily on the evidence of witness TFI-371. The Trial Chamber notes that TFI-371 did testify that Marzah, Weah and Tamba,

8169 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2011-2013. 8 170 TF 1-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2430-2431 (CS). 8171 Credibility Assessment, TF 1-371. paras 220-226: Credibility Assessment. Dauda Aruna Fomie, paras 346­ 358. 8172 See Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused, During Sam Bockarie's Leadership (February 1998-December 1999). 8 173 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 175.

Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18 May 2012 :19]]r

along with other subordinates of the Accused, Christopher Vannoh and Dopoe Menkarzon, were frequent visitors to Buedu and Bockarie often briefed them on operation plans.8174

3580. However, the Trial Chamber notes that TFI-371 did not himself say that these persons passed the briefings given by Bockarie to Yeaten. Furthermore, according to TF 1­ 371, as the Defence pointed out,81 75 these individuals travelled to Buedu for a number of different reasons. For example, TF 1-371 recalled that on one occasion Marzah received looted materials, including generators and TV sets, to take back to Monrovia, while on another Vannoh and Menkarzon came to discuss the organisation of an RUF fighting force to give support to the Liberian Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) under attack in Lofa Count y by LURD rebels. 8176 While the Trial Chamber considers that it is likely that these individuals did report back to the Accused on briefings they received from Bockarie, the Prosecution has adduced no evidence to establish a basis for a finding that this did in fact occur.

(iii) Specific directions from the Accused

a. To release the captured ECOMOG soldiers

3581. Turning to specific directions alleged to have been given by the Accused to Bockarie, the Prosecution alleges that the Accused ordered Bockarie to release ECOMOG soldiers captured in the attacks on Koidu Town in December 1998.8177 lt is not contested that 11 or 12 Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers were captured by the RUF after this attack, and detained in Buedu8178 or that they were eventually released.8179 However, the Defence contests the allegation that the peacekeepers were released pursuant to the Accused's 'orders, .8 180

3582. In support of its allegation, the Prosecution relies primarily on the evidence of Abu Keita, who testified that after a meeting between Benjamin Yeaten and Bockarie at Dawa, Yeaten informed Bockarie that the Accused wanted the ECOMOG soldiers released to him

8 174 TFI-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2423-2425 (CS). 8175 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 888. 8 176 TFl-371, Transcript 28 January 2008, pp. 2423-2425 (CS). 3177 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para . 171.

3 178 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1291; 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 6 August 20 10, pp. 45583- 45585; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2028-2029; TF 1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12918. 8 179 1ssa Sesay, Transcript 9 July 2010, pp. 44154-44158; Transcript 6 August 20 10, p. 45587. 3 180 Defen ce Final Trial Brief, para. 1291.

Case No.: SCSL-03-0 I-T 18 May 2012 in Liberia. After a "couple ofdays", Bockarie told the witness that he had a call from Yeaten telling him that the Accused's request was in fact an order, follo wing which the witness, Marzah, and Sampson drove to Foya in Liberia and handed over the soldiers to Yeaten and Joe Tuah.8181While witness TFI-567 also testifi ed that after the capture of Koidu Town in December 1998, RUF radio operators informed Benjamin Yeaten' s radio operator,Sunlight, about the capture of Nigerian soldiers,8182 he did not state what happened to these soldi ers. Keita is the only witness to testify as to instructions from Yeaten concerning their release.

3583. Keita's evidence is contradicted by Issa Sesay, who contends that there were 12 ECOMOG prisoners captured in the December 1998 offensive, who were held at Buedu until Sankoh ordered Bockarie during the Lome peace talks to release them as a show of commitment to the peace talks.8183 In his examination-in-chief, Sesay was questioned about Exhibit P-361, an RUF radio log book recording a message sent by Issa Sesay to Foda y Sankoh on 27 Jul y 1999 in response to a previous directive by Sankoh to his commanders to tum all prisoners of war over to ICRC, UNOMSIL or ECOMOG.8184 The message from Sesay notes the existence of 12 Nigerian "war prisoners" at Sesay's headqu arters ready to be released to the ICRC.818S Sesay confirmed in his testimony that this message referred to the release ofthe 12 ECOMOG prisoners captured during the December 1998 attacks. 8186

3584. Sesay's testimony is corroborated by TFI-1 68 and Fayia Musa, both of whom the Trial Chamber has found to be credible witnesses,8187 also held prisoner in Buedu during the first half of 1999 and released as part of the Lome peace talks, who testified that in the same camp where they were held, there were also Nigerian ECOMOG prisoners of war, one of whom was executed in February 1999 after having contracted tubercul osis.8188 TFl-168 stated that these prisoners were captured from the Kono attack in December 1998.8189

SISI Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2028-2029. SIS2 TF I-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12918. SIS3 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1291. SIS4 Exhibit P-361, "Radio Log Book coveri ng communication for the period - 28/04/ 1999 - 11/09/1999 ­ 00008636 - 00008726 (CMSPGS 21955-22046)", ERN 8667. SIS5 Exhibit P-361, "Radio Log Book covering communication for the period - 28/04/199 9 - 11/09/1999 ­ 00008636 - 00008726 (CMS PGS 21955-22046)" , ERN 8697; Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 20 10, pp. 44385 ­ 44386 (confmning that the message recorded the release of the 12 ECOMOG prisoners). SIS6 Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 20 10, pp. 44385-44386. SIS7 Credibility Assessment, TF 1-168, Pre-Indictment period ( 1988-1996), para. 2328; Credibility Assessment, Fayia Musa, Pre-Indictm ent period (1988-1996), para. 2557. srss TFI-168, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23369-23370; Fayia Musa, Transcript 21 April 2010, p. 39510 ; see

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 ~~a 3585. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the 12 Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers referred to by Sesay, TFI-168 and Fayia Musa are the same Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers referred to by Abu Keita. In light ofthe fact that Keita's evidence is uncorroborated, and that his testimony is directly contradicted by Prosecution and Defence witnesses, the Trial Chamber does not accept his evidence that, on the Accused's orders, these captured ECOMOG soldiers were released in December 1998 to Liberia.

b. To send pnsoners released from Pademba Road Prison to RUF controlled areas

3586. The Prosecution further alleges that around 7 January 1999, the Accused ordered Bockarie, via Yeaten, to send the high profile prisoners released from Pademba Road Prison to RUF-controlled areas at Buedu.8190 TIle Defence made no specific submission as to the alleged instruction to release prisoners from Pademba Road Prison.

3587. Prosecution and Defence witnesses agree that shortly after their entry into Freetown, the troops led by Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) released a number of political detainees from Pademba Road Prison, including, among others, the fonner President of Sierra Leone Joseph Momoh.8191 All the witnesses, except Perry Kamara,8 192 agreed that on Bockarie's directi ve, the released prisoners were sent to Buedu. Three ofthe five Prosecution witnesses who testified as to this event, Kabbah,81 93 Perry Kamara,81 94 TFI_585, 81 95 did not mention any instruction by Benjamin Yeaten or the Accused relevant to the Pademba Road prisoners. Issa Sesay specificall y denied any involvement by Yeaten or the Accused in the invasion of Freetown on the 6 January 1999.8196

also Exhibit P-277, Confidential, p. 65.ERN 15895. 8 189 TFI-1 68, Transcript 22 January 2009, pp. 23369-23370. 8 190 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 172,556. 8 191 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21581, 21588; TFI -516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6932-6933; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16171, 16179; TFI -585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15730-15731; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3226; Issa Sesay, Transcript II August 20 I0, pp. 45974-45976. 8192 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008. p. 3226 (The witness recalled that pursuant to Bockarie 's orders , Gullit took the released prisoners directly to Makeni. Only in relation to one of the prisoners, Hilton Fyle, did Sam Bockarie request to be taken to Buedu). 8193 Mohamed Kabbah , Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16171, 16179. 8 194 Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3229-3230. 8195 TF 1-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15730-15731. 8 196 Issa Sesay, Transcript II August 20 10, pp. 46078-46079; Transcript 12 August 20 10, pp. 46106-46107.

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 20 12 3588 . However, Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that less than an hour after Bockarie received the news from Brima concerning the release of the prisoners, he called Benjamin Yeaten on the satellite phone8197 and Yeaten told Bockarie that the Accused wanted him to ensure that the prisoners released were transferred to Buedu for their protection.8198 Fornie testified that he was present when Bockarie spoke on the satellite phone to Yeaten to inform him of the release ofthe prisoners,81 99 that he knew Bockarie was speaking to Yeaten because Bockarie asked the person on the line to confirm that it was " Five-Zero", and that when the conversation ended, he heard Bockarie telling Mohamed Kabbah that he had received instructions from the Accused through Yeaten.8200 TF 1-516 testified that after Benjamin Yeaten's radio operator, Sunlight, intercepted Bockarie's radio communication to Brima about the release of prisoners from Pademba Road Prison in Freetown, Yeaten contacted Bockarie by radio to congratulate him on the release of the prisoners.8201While TFl-516 did not specifically state that Yeaten gave Bockarie any directive concerning the Pademba Road prisoners, he later testified that the instruction that Bockarie gave to Brima to send the prisoners released from Pademba Road Prison to Buedu was made following a conversation with Yeaten's radio station "Base 1".8202 TF 1-516 stated that he monitored the conversation between Bockarie and Brima on the radio, but it is unclear from his evidence whether he also heard the conversation with Base 1.8203

3589. The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that TFl-516 and Dauda Aruna Fornie are generally credible witnesses.V'" However, it notes that their accounts differ slightly. TF1­ 516 stated that the conversation preceding the instruction to send the Pademba Road prisoners to Buedu was made with Yeaten's radio station "Base 1",8205 while according to Fornie, Bockarie spoke to Yeaten via satellite phone.8206 The Trial Chamber considers such

&197 Dauda Arona Fornie , Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2158 1-21582.

8 198 Dauda Arona Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21586-2 1587.

8 199 Dauda Arona Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21583-21585. 8200 Dauda Arona Fornie , Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21587 ("And when Mosquit o finished he told the operator directly that he had instructions from Benjamin from above, that is Charles Taylor through Benjamin . that Benjamin had told him that the Pa had said that they should make sure that those people who had been released from Pademba Road should come to Buedu"), 820 1 TFI-516. Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6938-6939 . 8202 TFI-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, pp. 6977-6978. 8203 TF 1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008. p. 6978.

8204 Credibility Assessment, TFI-516, paras 275-284 Credibility Assessment, Dauda Arona Fornie, paras 346­ 358. 8205 TF 1-516, Transcript 9 April 2008. pp. 6977-6978.

&206 Dauda Arona Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2 1583-2 1585.

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 20 12 a discrepancy to be inconsequential, having regard to the witness's practice of using the Liberian radio call signs, "020" or "Base 1", even when referring to satellite phone conversations.8207 The Trial Chamber also notes that while Fornie stated that Bockarie instructed Mohamed Kabbah to send a radio message to Gullit to send the released prisoners to the rear for their safety,8208 Mohamed Kabbah himself did not attest to having personally received this instruction, or being told by Bockarie that it came from Yeaten or the Accused. Howe ver, having testifi ed prior to Fornie , Kabbah was not questioned further on his testimony concerning the release of the Pademba Road prisoners. The Trial Chamber considers that the failure to mention such an instruction is explicable by the passage of time and does not undermine Fornie's evidence.

3590. OCT-008 testified that, to his knowledge, Sunlight never intercepted a message between Gullit and Bockarie about the release ofprisoners from Pademba Road, although he acknowledged that Base 1 did intercept messages within the RUF net at a later period between Bockarie and Sankoh.82D9 The Trial Chamber recalls its finding that the evidence of OCT-008 must be treated with caution.82lD

3591. On the evidence of Dauda Aruna Fornie, as corroborated by TFl-516, which the Trial Chamber considers to be credible, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused passed on instructions Bockarie to transfer the Pademba Road prisoners to Buedu.

c. In relation to military strategY/sending reinforcements

3592. The Prosecution alleges that immediately after the retreat from Freetown and after speaking to the Accused's radio operator, Bockarie issued a command to AFRC/RUF troops near Freetown to set ambushes and set specific attacks.Y II The Prosecution relies primarily on the evidence of TFl-516. TFl-516 testified that there were communications betw een Bockarie and the Accused during the invasion of Freetown, after which Bockarie would

8207 TF 1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 692 1 ("Q. When they say go on the 21 what do they mean ? A. That is to put the telephone on, go to the telephone. Q. Which teleph one? A. T he satellite telephone which Sam Bockarie had. Q. And when he switched on the satellite phone who would he be communicating with? A. Sometimes from Base 1 the principal of Base 1 was Benjamin Yeaten and the principal of 020 was the president"). 8208 Dauda Arun a Fornie, Transc ript 3 Decemb er 2008 , pp. 21586-2 1588. 82M DCT-008, Transcript 28 August 20 I 0, pp. 47595-47596 . 82 10 Credibility Assessment, DCT-008, paras 373-380. 82 11 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 172.

l 2~ Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 20 12 come to the radio station and draft instructions for the commanders regarding military manoeuvres and instruct Alex Tamba Brima in Freetown to set ambushes and go on 8212 attacks .

3593. However, the Trial Chamber notes that while TFl-516 testified that Bockarie would instruct his commanders after communicating with the Accused via satellite phone, TFl-516 did not directly assert that Bockarie received any instructions from the Accused.8213 While TFl-516 testified that he was in close physical proximity to Bockarie when he undertook these satellite communications.Y'" the witness did not give evidence as to the content of those conversations.8215

3594. In response to the Prosecution's allegation, the Defence points to8216 evidence from Mohamed Kabbah that he did not recall hearing any orders or instructions from the Accused or his subordinates regarding the Freetown invasion8217 and, importantly, that Yeaten never gave Bockarie advice or instructions on military strategy.821 8

3595. The Trial Chamber notes that on cross-examination, Kabbah acknowledged having stated in a prior statement that Yeaten never gave Bockarie "advice or instructions" on military strategy.8219 However, Kabbah also testified that on one occasion, when Benjamin Yeaten contacted Sam Bockarie over the radio from Foya during the period when ECOMOG were putting increasing pressure on the troops in Freetown,8220 Kabbah stated that Yeaten told Bockarie to reinforce the troops in Freetown so that they would not lose the city.8221 When asked about how this evidence coheres with his prior statement that Yeaten never gave Bockarie "advice or instructions" on military strategy, Kabbah explained that he did not consider that Yeaten telling Bockarie that he should send reinforcements to be an

8212 TFI-516, Transcript 8 April 2008 , pp. 6942-6943 . 8213 TFI -516, Transcript 8 April 2008 , pp. 6942- 6943 . 8214 TFI-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6943 ("Q. Were you present when the satellite communication was going on, or - A. We were in the vehicle and sometimes by the vehicle, if I was not on duty and we heard the satellite phone just in the room and we had the vehicle parked, let us say, by the window") . 8215 TF 1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008 , pp. 6942-6943. 8216 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 920 .

8217 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16350-1 635 2. 8218 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16144; Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173­ 16175. 8219 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16144; Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173­ 16175. 8220 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September, p. 16170. 8221 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September, pp. 16168-16169.

1250 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ~ 18 May 2012 instruction related to military strategy.8222 Kabbah affirmed that while Yeaten did not give directions relating to military strategy in the sense of whether the RUF should attack particular areas or set a certain ambush, he did occasionally offer suggestions in response to problems that Bockarie informed him about, such as the need for reinforcements.Yv'

3596. The Trial Chamber considers that although Kabbah drew a fine distinction between military and non-military advice, and between advice and instruction, such a distinction is not implausible or unreasonable against the texture of the evidence as to the relationship between Bockarie and Yeaten. Hence, for example, the Trial Chamber agrees with the Accused's suggestion that Bockarie, being an experienced General, would not likely have needed Yeaten 's specific advice on the need to send reinforcements to Freetown.8224 Even on Kabbah's evidence, Bockarie told Yeaten when Yeaten made the comment concerning reinforcements that he had already given instructions to RUF commanders to reinforce the troops in Freetown.8225 However, that Yeaten offered suggestions and advice in response to problems that Bockarie informed him about,8226 rather than instructions or directives is consistent with Kabbah's evidence that communication between Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten during the Freetown invasion ret1ected a tense relationship in which rank and

8222 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008 , pp. 16351-16352. CA. I would not accept that is a military strategy, because it was something that had been going on within our rank and file that if there was an operation going on and it was difficult they should send reinforcement. [... ] I am not taking it to be apiece of advice that he had been instructing that man to do it. I am not going to accept it like that. It was just a suggestion, sort of '). 8223 Mohamed Kabbah , Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16350-16352 (When asked what he meant when he previously stated that "Yeaten would not give Bockarie any advice or instructions on military strategy", the witnes s explained "Military strategy which I meant , like when Yeaten would tell Sam Bockarie that they should attack such and such an area or he would tell you to go and set an ambush on a particul ar area, those are the military strategies 1 am talkin g about. When it comes to this area of giving a piece of advice. at times if they discussed if at all anyone complained about anything he would advise him, he would just say that, 'Why wouldn't you do this", just like a suggestion, but it would come in the form of an advice. It is just like a suggestion that he had been giving to him. Ifanything was going out of hands or ifanything had been happening, you would need a piece of advice"). 8224 Charles Ghankay Taylor. Transcript 16 September 2009. pp. 29 104-29 105. 8225 Mohamed Kabbah , Transcript 15 September, pp. 16168-16169. 8226 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008 . pp. 16350-16352 (When asked what he meant when he previously stated that "Yeaten would not give Bockarie any advice or instruction s on military strategy", the witness explained "Military strategy which I meant, like when Yeaten would tell Sam Bockarie that they should attack such and such an area or he would tell you to go and set an ambush on a particular area, those are the military strategies I am talking about. When it comes to this area of giving a piece of advice, at times if they discussed if at all anyone complained about anything he would advise him, he would just say that. "Why wouldn't you do this", just like a suggestion. but it would come in the form of an advice. It is just like a suggestion that he had been giving to him. If anything was going out of hands or if anyth ing had been happening, you would need a piece of advice"} .

Case No.: SCSL-03 -0l -T 18 May 2012 equality between the parties was a sensitive issue.8227 Hence, while the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that any "suggestions" made by Yeaten pertaining to military strategy were in the nature ofinstructions or directives, the evidence indicates that Bockarie frequently consulted Yeaten on operational and military decisions. The Trial Chamber considers Fornie's evidence that sometimes Bockarie "would contact Benjamin to consult him on some decisions before he ever took them" to be corroborative ofthis view.8228

d. To bum down Freetown

3597. The Trial Chamber has also had regard to TF 1-516's evidence that on one occasion when the forces in Freetown were under increasing pressure from ECOMOG attack, he overheard Bockarie speaking to Gullit on the radio specifically instructing Gullit to bum down areas in Freetown, including government buildings, in order to attract the attention of the international community.8229 According to TF 1-516, this order followed a satellite phone conversation with "020" in Liberia.823o

3598. The Accused testified that he did not know about or have anything to do with Bockarie's instructions to Gullit to bum government buildings to raise alarm in the international community.823I The Accused testified that he did not condone amputations carried out on civilians in Sierra Leone, emphasising that he had no motive whatsoever to ord er any kiIn d 0 f atrocities. ..In Freetown .:"8'"' 32

3599. The Defence suggests that the violence coinciding with the AFRC retreat from Freetown after the January 6 invasion was attributable to a general breakdown of command and control and the rogue elements within the retreating forces, rather than any specific order.8233 They cite the evidence of TF 1-371 that immediately after the retreat from Freetown in 1999, discipline was not under control for the AFRC faction leaving Freetown, although somewhere along the way the commanders took control oftheir men.8234 However,

8227 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16379. 8228 Dauda Arona Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21615. 8229 TFI-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6934-6935 . 8230 TFI-516, Transcript 9 April 2008, p. 6977. 823 1 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30453-30454. 8m Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, pp. 29278-29280 8m Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 921. 8234 TFI-371, Transcript I February 2008, pp. 2807-2808 .

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 TFl-371 explicitly noted that the AFRC faction in Freetown "managed to remain cohesive despite maybe insubordination from other commanders".8235

3600. The Trial Chamber recalls that a number of witnesses testified to a specific directive from Bockarie to Alex Tamba Brima to destroy property in Freetown as Brima retreated . For example, TF 1-516 overheard Bockarie speaking to Gullit on the radio specifically instructing Gullit "to bum down the fucking place".8236 Therefore the violence coinciding with the AFRC retreat cannot entirely be attributable to rogue elements. However, according to TFl-516's evidence, Bockarie only made this directive after a conversation with the Accused in Liberia; TF 1-516 did not testify that the Accused otherwise had anything to do with the order or even that it was discussed in the conversation. Due to the lack of evidentiary basis, the Trial Chamber is not able to find that the Accused, either directly or through Yeaten, directed or advised Bockarie that the troops in Freetown should destroy property in Freetown as they retreated after the 6 January 1999 invasion.

e. In relation to the ceasefire announced in mid-January 1999

3601. Finally, the Prosecution cites the Accused 's evidence that he and his government successfully secured a ceasefire between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone in mid-January 19998237 as evidence of the Accused 's "control" over the Freetown operation. 8238 However, neither the Accused nor any other witness suggest that the Liberian government's role in securing a cease-tire reflected any control of or involvement by the Accused in the Freetown operation, or that it was indicative of any superior-subordinate

8235 TFI -371, Transcript I February 2008, p. 2808 ("A. I mean the taction, the faction they had, they had their own commanders and they managed to remain cohesive despite maybe insub ordination from other commanders, so somewhere along the way they took control of their men. Q. Somewhere along the way? A. Yes. Q. But there was a period when it was out of control? A. Yes, immediately after" ). m6 TFI-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp 6934-6935; Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 2 1590-2 1593. (After ECO MOG had forced Gullit's troops to commence their retreat from Freetown . Fornie monit ored a live conversation in which Bockarie gave Gullit instructions to pass onto the RUF/AFR C troops in Freetown to "cause a lot of mayhem in the city", including destroying government buildings and amputating civilians, in order to draw attention and force the international conununity to intervene); Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16171 (Bockarie told Gullit that as the troops retreated they should "make the area fearful". The retreating troops were to destroy everything so that anyone passing in the area after the rebel troops would know they had been there); TF I-585, Transcript 8 September 2008, pp. 15725-15727 (Gullit informed Bockarie over the radio that they were being pushed out of Freetown by ECOlvl0G. Bockarie ordered Gullit to leave Freetown and kill many people and bum down many houses along the way) . 8237 Charles Ghankay Tayl or, Transcript 10 August 2009, pp 26270-26272; Transcript II August 2009, pp. 26433 -26436; Transcript 16 September 2009 , p. 29048. 8238 Prosecution Final Trial Briet: para. 173.

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18May2012 relationship between the Accused and the AFRC/RUF. The Accused himself stated that the cease-fire was engineered as part of the ongoing peace talks.8239 Due to the lack of any evidentiary basis in support, the Trial Chamber considers that the Liberian government's role in securing a cease-fire does not implicate the Accused's involvement in the Freetown operation.

(iv) General evidence that the Accused directed the Freetown operation

3602. TIle Trial Chamber has also considered the evidence of Varmuyan Sherif that on 6 January 1999, he heard Sockarie over the SSC stating that he would not retreat from Freetown except when his "father", the Accused, told him to,8240 and the evidence of Joseph Marzah that he personally took part in the Freetown attack and that during the attack the RUF took instructions from Charles Taylor.8241

3603. In relation to Sherifs evidence, the Trial Chamber notes that of the SSC broadcasts in December 1998 or January 1999 admitted into the record, none support Sherifs testimony that Bockarie made any reference to the Accused or that he would only stop fighting on the instruction of the Accused.8242 On the contrary, Exhibit P-350A, a clip from SSC Focus on Africa dated 8 January 1999 indicates that instead, Bockarie said his forces would only stop fighting if Foday Sankoh was freed from prison.8243 No other witness corroborates Sherifs account of So ckarie making any statement to this effect. In light of the lack of testimonial evidence corroborating Sherifs evidence, the lack of documentary evidence of the SSC broadcast Sherif testified to, and considering the content of the SSC broadcast of 8 January 1999 that is in evidence, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied beyond

8239 Charles Ghankay Taylor. Tra nscript 10 August 2009, pp 26270-26272; Transcript II August 2009, pp. 26433-26436; Tra nscript 16 Septemb er 2009, p. 2904 8. 8240 Varmu yan Sherif. Transcript 9 January 2008. p. 866. 824 1 Joseph Marzah, Transc ript 12 Marc h 2008, p. 5952 .

8242 See Exhibit P-340A, "S SC Focus on Africa Clip from track I - D0000524. 22 Dece mber 1998"; Exhibit P­ 340 S, "Transcript - SSC Foc us on Africa Clip from track I - D0000524, 22 December 1998 CMS PG 23589"; Exhibit P-430 C, "Excerpts from: News articl e, Sierra Leone Web - Sierra Leone News Archive, Decemb er 1998 (pages 5 & 6 of 8)"; Exhibit P-430D, "Excerpts from : News article, Sierra Leone Web - Sierra Leone News Archive. December 1998 (pages 3 & 4 of 8)"; Exhibit P-343A. "SSC Focus on Africa Clip from track 2 ­ D000053 7 27 December 1998"; Exhibit P-343S, "Transcript - SSC Focus on Africa Clip from track 2 ­ D0000537 27 Decemb er 1998 CMS PG 23596"; Exhibit P-430E. " Excerpts from: News article, Sierra Leone Web - Sierra Leone News Archive, Decemb er 1998 (page 2 of 8)". 8243 Exhibit P-350A, "SBC Foc us on Africa Clip from track I- D0000554, 8 Janu ary 1999"; Exhibit P-350S, "Transcript - SSC Foc us on Africa Clip from track I - D0000554, 8 January 1999 - CMS PG 2361 1".

1 2~ Case No.: SCSL-03 -0 1-T 18 May 20 12 reasonable doubt that Bockarie made a statement over the BBC stating that he would not retreat from Freetown except when the Accused told him to.

3604. Concerning Marzah's evidence, the Trial Chamber recalls that Marzah's evidence must be treated with caution and requires corroboration.F" Significantly, no other witness places Marzah in Freetown during the January 1999 attack. The Trial Chamber notes that Defence counsel confronted Marzah with a statement that he made to the Prosecution on 13 March 2006 , in which he said that he was in Monrovia and medically unable to join the RUF during the Freetown attack of January 1999.8245 Marzah could not recall the year in which the Freetown attack took place but explained that during the attack, he was injured by a rocket and could not continue, and that he met Johnny Paul Koroma and Eddie Kanneh in Buedu but did not know how he had gotten there.8246 In light of these inconsistencies, the Trial Chamber is not able to accept Marzah's evidence that he participated in the Freetown attack or his evidence concerning the role of the Accused in that attack.

(v) Conclusion on whether the Accused had control over the Freetown operation

3605. Although the evidence establishes that the Accused and Bockarie, whether directly or via Yeaten, communicated regularly and frequently during December 1998 and January 1999 concerning the operations in Kono and Freetown, it is not clear that the Accused had any level of control over the conduct of these operations. While the evidence indicates that Bockarie consulted Benjamin Yeaten or the Accused from time to time on operational decisions, the tone ofthese communications was largely in the nature of"suggestions" made by Yeaten rather than instructions and Bockarie spoke to Yeaten as part of a "sisterly or brotherly operation", or a "joint operation".824 7 Even if, as Kabbah testified, Bockarie followed instructions by Yeaten because he assumed such orders came from the Accused,8248 there is little evidence that such orders were given. Of the instructions that the Prosecution allege that the Accused gave to Bockarie, the Trial Chamber has found that only one has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, that the Accused instructed Bockarie to transfer the Pademba Road prisoners to Buedu for their protection. The Trial Chamber

8244 Credibility Assessment, Joseph Marzah, paras 263-2 68.. 8245 Joseph Marzah, Transcript 12 March 2008, p. 5952; Transcript 13 March 2008, pp. 5990-5991. 8246 Joseph Marzah , Transcript 13 March 2008, pp. 5991-5993. 8247 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16145. 8248 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16380-14381 .

1255/' Case No.: SCSL-03-0 I-T ~ 18 May 2012 considers that this is insufficient to establish, as the Prosecution has alleged, that the Accused directed or had control over the Kono and Freetown operations in December 1998 and January 1999.

Findings

3606. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused gave advice to Bockarie and received updates in relation to the progress of the operations in Kono and Freetown in the implementation of their plan. Bockarie was in frequent and even daily contact via radio or satellite phone with the Accused in December 1998 and January 1999, either directl y or through Benjamin Yeaten. Yeaten travelled to Sierra Leone to meet with Bockarie in Buedu during this period.

3607. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Bockarie travelled to Monrovia during the Kono-Freetown operations to take instruction from the Accused .

3608. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused directed Bockarie : 1) to release the ECOMOG soldiers captured in December 1998; 2) to bum down Freetown, 3) to effect a ceasefire in mid-January 1999; 4) to send reinforcements to Freetown; or 5) generally in relation to military strategy.

3609. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused directed Bockarie to send prisoners released from Pademba Road Prison to RUF controlled areas.

3610. The Trial Chamber finds that the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the Accused directed the Kono and Freetown operations in December 1998 and January 1999.

Summary ofFindings

3611. The Trial Chamber has found that -

(i) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that when the AFRC/RUF forces were pulling out of Kono during the Intervention, the radio station of Benjamin Yeaten in Monrovia, intercepted a radio transmission

1256 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 20 12 between AFRC/RUF radio stations about the withdrawal and intervened to ask why the forces were withdrawing.

(ii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused told Johnny Paul Koroma to capture Kono, and after a first failed attempt, the Accused gave instructions for a second attack, which led to the ultimate

recapture of Koidu Town In Kono District by the AFRC/RUF in late February/early March 1998.

(iii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused told Bockarie to be sure to maintain control of Kono for the purpose of trading diamond s with him for arms and ammunition.

(iv) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused participated in the planning of or instructed the AFRC/RUF to recapture Kono in mid-June 1998, as the first step in a detailed plan with an overarching mission to recapture Freetown or otherwise.

(v) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused advised Bockarie to recapture Kono so that the diamonds there would be used to purchase amlS and ammunition. Such advice was transmitted to RUF commanders both through Bockarie and Liberian emissaries, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) and/or Ibrahim Bah, and resulted in the Fitti-Fatta attack in mid­ June 1998.

(vi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that In November/December 1998 the Accused and Sam Bockarie jointly designed a two-pronged attack on Kono, Kenema and Freetown as the ultimate destination, the Accused emphasising the need to first attack Kono District.

(vii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused told Bockarie to make the operation "fearful" in order to force the Government into negotiation and free Foday Sankoh from prison and that after the Waterworks meeting, the Accused told Bockarie to use "all means" to get to Freetown in a satellite phone conversation. Subsequently, Bockarie named the operation

Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18 May 20 12 J/]9

"Operation No Living Thing", implying that anything that stood in their way should be eliminated.

(viii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Gullit resumed communications with Bockarie on the death of SAl Musa and that Gullit maintained frequent daily contact with Bockarie throughout the Freetown operation to discuss the ongoing military situation in the capital.

(ix) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Bockarie ordered his troops to advance towards Freetown, with the aim ofjoining forces with Gullit in Freetown, and that Gullit , Bockarie and Bockarie's commanders coordinated in order to achieve that aim.

(x) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that although the attempts at coordination were largely unsuccessful, a small contingent of the

troops Bockarie sent as reinforcements were able to join Gullit's troops 10 Freetown some time after Gullit 's forces had captured the State House.

(xi) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that when Gullit's forces withdrew from Freetown, Bockarie instructed his forces on the outskirts of the city to ensure a secure line of retreat for the withdrawing troops, and that after the retreat from Freetown the RUF and AFRC made joint efforts to re-attack the city.

(xii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that, throughout the Freetown operation, Bockarie issued a number of instructions to Gullit, including an order to use terror tactics against the civilian population on the retreat from Freetown, which were implem ented by Gullit and the fighters in Freetown. Bockarie exercised effective command and control over Gullit during the capture ofthe State House and Pademba Road Prison.

(xiii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that following his first conversation with Gullit after the death of SAl Musa, Bockarie and Gullit coordinated in their efforts to capture Freetown. From that point on, SAl Musa's original plan to attack Freetown was abandoned, and Gullit's

1258/' Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 J13~1

movements were incorporated into the Bockarie/Taylor plan, as had been contemplated by Bockarie and the Accused.

(xiv) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused gave advice to Bockarie and received updates in relation to the progress of the operations in Kono and Freetown in the implementation of their plan. Bockarie was in frequent and even daily contact via radio or satellite phone with the Accused in December 1998 and January 1999, either directly or through Benjamin Yeaten. Yeaten travelled to Sierra Leone to meet with Bockarie in Buedu during this period.

(xv) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Bockarie travelled to Monrovia during the Kono-Freetown operations to take instruction from the Accused.

(xvi) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused directed Bockarie: 1) to release the ECOMOG soldiers captured in December 1998; 2) to bum down Freetown, 3) to effect a ceasefire in mid-January 1999; 4) to send reinforcements to Freetown; or 5) generally in relation to military strategy.

(xvii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused directed Bockarie to send prisoners released from Pademba Road Prison to RUF controlled areas.

(xviii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the Accused directed the Kono and Freetown operations in December 1998 and January 1999.

Conclusion

3612. In February 1998, ECOMOG forces intervened in Sierra Leone and expelled the RUF/AFRC Junta from Freetown, reinstating Tejan Kabbah's SLPP Government to power in March 1998. Although ECOMOG initially forced RUF and AFRC forces to withdraw from Kono, under the orders of AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma, these forces managed to recapture Koidu Town in late February/early March 1998. A few weeks later, ECOMOG forces regained control of Koidu Town . In mid-June 1998, forces under the ultimate direction of Sam Bockarie, who had by then assumed leadership of the RUF/AFRC forces,

1259 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012 made another attempt to take Koidu Town , code-named Operation Fitti-Fatta. The Fitti-Fatta attack was unsuccessful, and in late November/early December 1998, after a trip by Bockarie to Liberia where he met with the Accused, a meeting was held at Waterworks in which Bockarie ordered RUF/AFRC troops under his command to carry out a two pronged attack on Kono and Kenema, with Freetown as the ultimate target. The attacks on Kenema and Kono were launched in mid-December 1998. While the f01111er was unsuccessful, the latter attack succeeded, and the RUF/AFRC troops continued towards Freetown. On 6 January 1999, a group of predominantly AFRC troops led by Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) launched an assault on Freetown.

3613. The Trial Chamber has found that from the time ofthe Intervention, the Accused and his subordinates communicated the imperative to maintain control over Kono, a diamondiferous area. When the AFRC/RUF forces were pulling out of Kono during the Intervention, the radio station of Benjamin Yeaten, Director of the Accused's Special Security Service, intercepted a radio transmission between AFRC/RUF radio stations about the withdrawal and intervened to ask why the forces were withdrawing. Then, in several satellite phone conversations with Johnny Paul Koroma, who was trying to make arrangements to get to Liberia by helicopter, the Accused instructed Koroma to capture Kono. After a first failed attempt, the Accused gave instructions for a second attack, which led to the ultimate recapture of Koidu Town in Kono District in late February/early March 1998. Once Kono had been recaptured, the Accused told Bockarie to be sure to maintain control over Kono for the purpose oftrading diamonds with him for arms and ammunition.

3614. The Trial Chamber has found that the Accused advised Bockarie to recapture Kono following its loss to ECOMOG, again so that the diamonds there could be used to purchase a1111S and ammunition. Such advice was transmitted to RUF commanders both through Bockarie and Liberian emissaries Daniel Tamba (a.k.a Jungle) and/or Ibrahim Bah and resulted in the Fitti-Fatta attack on Koidu Town in mid-June 1998. Contrary to the Prosecution's submission, the evidence did not establish thatthe Accused participated in the formulation of a multi-axis operational attack plan leading to Freetown prior to the Fitti­ Fatta attack.

3615. The Fitti-Fatta attack was unsuccessful, and in November 1998/December 1998, Sam Bockarie went with a delegation to Burkina Faso via Monrovia, meeting the Accused on the way to Burkina Faso and on the way back to Sierra Leone. In their meetings, the

1260 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T .: 18 May 2012 Accused jointly designed with Bockarie the two-pronged attack on Kono, Kenema and Freetown as the ultimate destination. This plan was outlined by Bockarie to his commanders in a meeting at Waterworks on his return to Sierra Leone. Although the idea to advance towards Freetown was already in discussion when Bockarie went to Monrovia, the Accused emphasised to Bockarie the need to first attack Kono District and told Bockarie to make the operation "fearful" in order to pressure the Government of Sierra Leone into negotiations on the release of Foday Sankoh from prison. After the Waterworks meeting, Bockarie brief the Accused over a satellite phone conversation about the meeting. During this conversation, the Accused told Bockarie to use "all means" to get to Freetown. Subsequently, Bockarie named the operation "Operation No Living Thing", implying that anything that stood in their way should be eliminated.

3616. The Trial Chamber has found that at this time there were two plans to attack Freetown , one made by Bockarie with the Accused, and one made by breakaway AFRC commander Solomon Anthony Joseph Musa (a.k.a. SAJ Musa), whose troops had already started an advance towards Freetown at the end ofJune/beginning ofJuly 1998.

3617. Consistent with discussions he had made with the Accused, Bockarie invited SAJ Musa after the Waterworks meeting to join his efforts to attack Freetown but Musa refused. However, with SAJ Musa's death in or around 23 December 1998, when Gullit took over the leadership of the troops at Benguema and resumed contact with Bockarie, Bockarie and Gullit coordinated in their efforts to capture Freetown. From that point onwards, the SAJ Musa's original plan was abandoned, and Gullit followed the Bockarie/Taylor plan, as had been contemplated by Bockarie and the Accused . During the operation, Bockarie exercised effective command and control over Gullit, issuing a number of instructions to Gullit, including the order to use terror tactics against the civilian population on the retreat from Freetown . The Trial Chamber did not make a finding as to how SAJ Musa was killed, but noted that his death had been mentioned by Bockarie at the time ofthe Waterworks meeting.

3618. The Trial Chamber has found that the Accused gave advice to Bockarie and received updates in relation to the progress of the operations in Kono and Freetown in the implementation of their plan. Bockarie was in frequent contact via radio or satellite phone with the Accused in December 1998 and January 1999, either directly or through Benjamin Yeaten. Yeaten also travelled to Sierra Leone to meet with Bockarie in Buedu during this period. However, it is not clear that the Accused had any level ofcontrol over the conduct of

1261 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T -/ 18 May 2012 these operations. Of the instructions allegedly given to Bockarie by the Accused during this period, the Trial Chamber finds only one to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, that being that the Accused instructed Bockarie to transfer the Pademba Road prisoners to Buedu for their protection. This finding is insufficient to establish, as the Prosecution has alleged, that the Accused directed or had control over the Kono and Freetown operations in December 1998 and January 1999.

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 D. Operational Support

1. Communications

(a) Radio Equipment and Training

Submission of the Parties

36 19. The Prosecution alleges that the Accused provided communications equipment and training to the RUF, the benefits of which continued throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone.8249 For example, through radio sets provided by the Accused, the RUF was later able to communicate with the Accused in Liberia and the RUF in Cote d'Ivoire.825o In addition, radio operators such as Foday Lansana (a.k.a. CO Nya), an NPFL member, installed equipment in Sierra Leone and then continued to operate with the RUF in Sierra Leone duriunng t h e con fliICt.8-')51

3620. The Defence denies that the Accused provided communications equipment and training to the RUF which benefited the RUF during the conflict in Sierra Leone. The Defence concedes that the Accused sent an NPFL radio and NPFL radio operators to Sierra Leone during the period of the two groups' cooperation against ULIMO, in 1991 or 1992. 8252 The Defence argues, however, that the only purpose of this was to allow the NPFL to monitor the progress of NPFL operations in Sierra Leone.8253 The Defence claims that no NPFL radio sets or operators were left inside Sierra Leone after the NPFL withdrew, and that no RUF operators had been trained by the NPFL.8254

3621. The Defence also notes that the RUF was capable of training radio operators of its own without assistance from the Accused, for Sankoh was an expert in communications, and that the RUF used radio sets captured in combat.8255 Finally, the Defence contends there is

8249 Prosecution Closing Brief, paras 7, 49, 93-94 , 308. 8250 Prosecution Closing Brief para . 308. 825 1 Prosecution Closing Brief, para. 308 . 8252 Defence Corrected and Amended Final Trial Brief, para. 982. 8253 Defence Corrected and Amended Final Trial Brief, paras 982, 984. 8254 Defence Corrected and Amended Final Trial Brief, para. 984 . 8255 Defence Corrected and Amended Final Trial Brief, para. 988 .

1263 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18 May 20 12 no evidence to prove that the Accused knew that RUF fighters were being trained on the radio by NPFL.8256

Evidence

Prosecution Witness Foday Lansana

3622. Witness Foday Lansana testified that he was born in Liberia, and joined the NPFL in February or March 1990.8257 Shortly thereafter, he underwent two months of training with the NPFL to become a radio operator, and was instructed by Emmanuel Zor and Roosevelt Nyameleyan.8258 In September or October 1990, James Galakpalah, the deputy overall signal commander of the NPFL, requested that the witness undertake an advanced training on codes.8259

3623. While Lansana was working as a radio operator for the NPFL in Foya, Liberia, around July or August 1991, the operators received an instruction from the overall signal commander of the NPFL, Victor Gensei, through his deputy James Galakpalah, requesting that some of the communications operators in Foya be a part of the communications operations in Sierra Leone. Lansana, Nyameleyan and Moses Gargue, another operator in Foya, then travelled to Sierra Leone.8260

3624. They arrived in Koindu, Sierra Leone in July or August 1991.8261 Sankoh instructed Lansana and the other radio operators to install a radio at his headquarters near Koidu Town in an area called Baidu. They installed the radio and tested it, calling various stations in Liberia.8262 The witness testified that this was the very first radio station operated under Sankoh in Sierra Leone, and was the only radio station there at this time.8263

8256 Defence Correc ted and Amended Final Trial Brief, para. 987. 8257 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 43 15-4320. Lansana confirmed that he also goes by the name CO Nya. Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008, pp. 4703-470 6. 8258 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008 pp. 4322-4327. 8259 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 Febru ary 2008 pp. 4337-4339. 8260 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008 pp. 4356-4358. 8261 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 Febru ary 2008, pp. 4359-436 I. 8262 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4362-4364.4411 . 8263 Foday Lansana, Transcrip t 20 February 2008, pp. 4364-4367.

1264 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18May 2012 3625. In May 1992, Taylor gave an instruction for all NPFL forces to evacuate from Sierra Leone. Lansana testified that he left Sierra Leone and went to Vahun, Liberia, bringing with him the radio set which he had installed in Sierra Leone for Sankoh.3264

3626. Approximately two weeks later, Galakpalah sent a message to Lansana's commander in Vahun, stating that Sierra Leone did not have any radios, and requesting that Lansana go to Pendembu, Sierra Leone with a radio set for Sankoh.8265 Galakpalah also communicated that Lansana had been promoted by the NPFL8266 to be Overall Signal Commander for the RUF in Sierra Leone. 3267

3627. Lansana moved to Sierra Leone immediately, and travelled to Pendembu with the radio set he had taken from Baidu. He installed the radio at Sankoh's residence there, and tested it by establishing radio contact with Taylor.8268 Lansana remained in Pendembu for the rest of 1992 and 1993, where he was asked by Sankoh to train RUF fighters on how to conduct communications and encode and build radios. 8269

3628. In 1992, a Guinean and Nigerian contingent of government troops under the NPRC attacked the RUF position in Bayama, Sierra Leone, and the RUF captured communications equipment. Because of this they set up radio stations in Kailahun, Bunumbu, Gandorhun, Koidu, and Quiva, which were installed by the operators Lansana had trained. 827o A few of the fighters whom Lansana trained included Alfred Brown, Sam Lamboi, Sahr James, and

King Perry Kamara, among others. 8271

3629 . Lansana continued his work as an overall commander in Kangari Hills, Sierra Leone from April 1994 until 1997.8272

8264 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4378-4379. 8265 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4378-4379. 8266 The witness confirmed that the NPFL promoted him to this position, but did not indicate the specific person who did so, only specifying that it was "Gbarnga" that did so. Foday Lansana , Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4380-4381; Transcript 25 February 2008, pp. 4684-4685. Gbamga was the NPFL headquarters at this time. 8267 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4380-4381. Upon cross-examination the witness testified that because ofcoordination between the NPFL and RUF, he was working for both parties in 1991-1992 : he was "on assignment with the NPFL" in Sierra Leone, but reported directly to Sankoh. Foday Lansana, Transcript 25 February 2008 pp. 4698-4699. 8268 Foday Lansana , Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4379-4381, 4386. 8269 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4386-4387. 8270 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4388-4389, 4393 . 8271 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4390. 8272 Foday Lansana, Transcript 20 February 2008, pp. 4406-4407.

1265 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 Prosecution Witness Perry Kam ara

3630. Witness Perry Kamara, an RUF radio operator,8273was captured by the RUF in April 1991 in Zimmi, Sierra Leone, and taken to an RUF training base in Pujehun, Sierra Leone. Two months later Foday Sankoh came to the base and told them he needed people to be trained in radio operations.8274 The witness and twelve others were trained by Sankoh.8275 After one month oftraining, Sankoh told the witness and the other trainees that he was going to Liberia to meet with Taylor and ask for additional radios . While Sankoh was in Liberia, Sierra Leonean government forces attacked, and so the RUF fled to Liberia.8276

3631. In 1992, Kamara returned to Sierra Leone with the RUF and Sankoh requested his fighters to continue their communications training in Pendembu, Sierra Leone.8277 Foday Lansana, an NPFL officer from Liberia, was introduced to the fighters and told them that Taylor sent him to provide training on the use of Liberian and Sierra Leonean code, as well as how to send and recei ve messages from Liberia. 8278 Lansana trained 15 men, including the witness.8279 Kamara remained an RUF radio operator until at least 1998.8280

Prosecution Witness Dauda Aruna Fomie

3632. Witness Dauda Aruna Fornie (a.k.a. DAF)8281 a Sierra Leonean, was captured by RUF rebels in Apri l 199 1 at the age of 16.8282 He testified that late in the rainy season of 1991, he was taken for advanced military training in Bomi Hills, Liberia. 8283 At that time, Foday Sankoh arrived in Bomi Hills and told Bockarie to assign men to various units . Fornie joined the NPFL Signal Unit in Bomi Hills for training, which lasted until mid_1992.8284 Joseph Demmy, who was also called "Bedcat", or "Beckier", was in charge of the NPFL

8273 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 Febru ary 2008, p. 3039.

8274 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3025-3027. 8275 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 3028. 8276 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008 , pp. 3028-3029 8277 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008 . p. 3037 . 8278 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008 , p. 3037. 8279 Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3037-3038. 8280 Perry Kamara, Transc ript 6 February 2008, p. 3200. 828 1 Fomie confirmed that his nickname was "DAF" .Dauda Arun a Fomie, 1 December 2008 pp. 21292-2 1293. 8282 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Tra nscript 1 December 2008, pp. 21297-2 1300. 8283 Dauda Arun a Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 31310-21312 . 8284 Dauda Arun a Fornie, Transcript 1 December 200 8. pp. 21335-2 1338. 2 1348.

1266 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May2012 Signal Unit at that time.8285The witness recalled that at this time the RUF had a radio station in the Kailahun area based in Pendembu at which Foday Lansana was the commander.8286

3633 . During this time, the RUF did not have its own communications system and depended on the NPFL's, and the two groups shared codes. 8287 In late 1992, the witness moved to Pendembu, where Sankoh taught the operators British voice procedures. The RUF operators then used different codes from the Liberian operators, more specifically, British codes, but used Liberian codesto communicate with the NPFL.8288

3634. After the training, the witness was assigned to Kuiva and then Mendekeima, Sierra Leone . At that time, at the end of 1992, the RUF had four radio stations in Sierra Leone which could contact stations in Liberia. 8289 Sankoh later assigned the witness to Kailahun town , Sierra Leone, where he became a control station commander, responsible for transmitting instructions between Sankoh and the frontlines, and between Sankoh and Taylor.829o The witness continued his work as a radio operator until 1999.8291

Prosecution Witness TFI-585

3635 . Witness TFI-585, an RUF radio operator,8292 was trained for three months in 1995 by Foday Lansana to be a radio operator in Sierra Leone. The witness was later sent to Zogoda, where she was trained for six months by Foday Sankoh.8293 The witness worked as 8294 a radio operator in the Western Jungle from 1995 to 1997. The witness then worked as an operator for Bockarie in 1999-2000, and for Yeaten for six months in 2001.8295

Prosecution Witness Mohamed Kabbah

8285 Dauda Arona Fomie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21337 . 8286 Dauda Arona Fomie, Transcript I December 2008, pp. 21349-21350. 8287 Dauda Arona Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21349-21350, 21374-21375, 21378. 8288 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21372-75 . 8289 Dauda Arona Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, p. 21376. 8290 Dauda Arona Fornie, Transcript I December 2008, pp. 21383-21387. 829 1 Dauda Arona Fornie, Transcript 1 December 2008, pp. 21395-21398 ,21427,21458-21469 ; 21476-21479. 8292 TFl-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, pp.15589-15592 (PS). 8293 TF 1-585, Transcript, 5 September 2008, pp. 15586-15588 (PS). 8294 TFl-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, p. 15590 (PS). 8295 TF 1-585, Transcript 5 September 2008, p. 15592 (PS).

1267 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 I-T 18 May 2012 3636. Witness Mohamed Kabbah testified that he was born in Kailahun Town, Sierra Leone, and captured by "rebels" there in April 1991.8296 In early 1992, Kabbah was sent to Gohun village, in Kailahun, Sierra Leone to train as a radio operator. 8297 He testified that he was trained by CO Moses, who was from Liberia, while Foday Lansana, also from Liberia, conducted an exercise with the trainees to check what they had learned. 8298 Kabbah completed his radio training in early 1992, and worked as a radio operator until at least 1999.8299

Prosecution Witness TFI-516

3637. Witness TFI-516 testified that in approximately 1994 he was trained to be a radio operator by Foday Lansana at Kangari Hills, Sierra Leone.830o Foday Sankoh later requested that all newly trained radio operators, including the witness, be transferred to his location at Zogoda, Sierra Leone. The witness spent six more months being trained by Sankoh in radio operations in Zogoda, and completed his training in late 1995 or early 1996.8301The witness remained a radio operator until at least 1999.8302

Prosecution Witness Alice Pyne

3638. Witness Alice Pyne, an RUF radio operator,8303 testified that she was captured by NPFL fighters in April 1991.8304 In December 1993, she arrived in Ngiema, Sierra Leone with CO Mohamed and CO Papa, her immediate commander. Foday Sankoh thereafter passed an order for CO Mohamed and CO Papa to recruit radio signalers. CO Mohamed selected Pyne for training, and she was trained by Foday Lansana in radio operations.j''" In

8296 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16087-16088. 8297 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16088-16096. 8298 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16106-16107. 8299 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16126-16127; Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16248-16250. 8300 TF 1-516, Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7456-7457. 8301 TF 1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6828-6839. 8302 TFI-516, Transcript 8 Apri12008, p. 6857. 8303 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, p. 12074. 8304 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12048-12049. 8305 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12066-12072; Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12105.

1268 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ~ 18 May 2012 late December 1994 to January 1995, Pyne was trained in advanced radi o operations by Sankoh.8306 She worked as a radio operator until at least 1999 .8307

Prosecution Witness Isaac Mongor

3639. Witness Isaac Mongor, a Liberian trader and RUF seruor commander.Y'" was captured by NPFL rebels in December 1989.8309 In March or April 1990, he was instructed by Taylor to help Foday Sankoh train people to fight in Sierra Leone, and the witness thereafter trained fighters at Camp Naama.83lO Mongor testified that after they captured Pendembu in 1991, Sankoh brought them a radio operator named Foday Lansana, who brought a radio set with him. Sankoh said that Taylor had given him Lansana in order to establish radio communication and operate the radio for them .83II

The Accused 3640. The Accused denied knowing Foday Lansana, saying that he first saw him on the stand at trial, and denied sending Lansana to train RUF fighters in Sierra Leone.8312 He also testifi ed that Lansana was not NPFL,8313 but stole an NPFL radio and went to Sierra Leone on his own initiative.8314 The Accused stated that he gave direct orders to cease communications with the RUF after May 1992, and did not believe that Galakpalah wou ld have gi.ven ord ers to L ansana counter to tIhiS. 8315

3641. The Accused also questioned why a young person such as Lansana, without significant experience, and of whom the Accused had not heard, would have received a

8300 Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12081-12084. 8307 Alice Pyne, Trans cript 19 June 2008, pp. 12272-12273 . , 8308 See for example : Isaac Mongor, Transcript II March 2008, pp. 5749-5750, 5760-5764; Transcripl 31 March 2008, pp. 6204-6206, 6224-6225; Transcript 3 April 2008, pp. 6512-6513,6551-6556,6613-66 15. 8309 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008 p. 5647. 8310 Isaac Mongor, Tran script 10 March 2008, pp. 5660-5666 . 83 11 Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008 pp. 5675-5677 . 83 12 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, p. 28978; Transcript 30 September 2009 pp. 30037­ 38; Transcript 27 October 2009 pp. 30394-95 , 30466-67. 30471. 8313 Charles Ghankay Taylor. Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28978-28979; Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30490-91 ; Tran script 28 October 2009 pp. 30499-30500. The Defence challenges Lansana 's testimony as to the fact that he was ordered to Sierra Leone because Sankoh had no radio by observing that Sankoh had communication with Liberia before May 1992. This is a misinterpretation of Lansana's testimony, as Lansana testified that he installed a radio in Sierra Leone July or August 1991. Sankoh used this radio until May 1992, at which point Taylor ordered the withdrawal of troops, and Lansana took the radio back with him to Liberia. Lansana contends that he was ordered to return this very same radio to Sankoh two weeks later. 8314 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, p. 30490. 83 15 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 27 October 2009, pp. 30487-30488.

1269 Case No.: SCSL-03 -01-T 18 May 2012 speci al assignment to train radio operators in Sierra Leone with Sankoh.8316 The Accused also suggested that Lansana could not have travelled from Liberia into Sierra Leone after Operation Top Final in May 1992 without encountering ULIMO.8317

3642. The Accused stated that "to the best ofhis knowl edge", Foday Sankoh captured most of the radios he used from Sierra Leonean government forces .831 8

Defence Witness Martin George

3643 . Witness Martin George, (a.k.a. Mao Mao), a lieutenant, captain, major, brigade commander, colonel, and area commander of the RUF,831 9 testified that while he was being trained at Crab Hole, a section of Camp Naama, in Liberia, from January to March 1991, he was trained in radio communications by Foday Sankoh.832o

3644. A few months later, when his RUF battalion was in Sierra Leone in 1991 to 1992, they captured a long-range Thompson radio in Zimmi before they reached Pujehun. They installed the radio station in Potoru, in Sierra Leone and from then on were in communication with Foday Sankoh and others in Kailahun so they could keep each other updated as to their positions. When the RUF moved towards Pujehun, they left the radio in Potoru. They were able to capture other radio sets along the way and installed one in Pujehun.8321

3645 . George testified that Alfred Brown, of the RUF, trained Dauda Aruna Fornie and King Perry, and he knew this was so because "[tjhere was nobody to train signal men whom [he] knew because [Brown] was the most senior".8322

Defence Witness Sam Kolleh

3646. Witness Sam Kolleh testified that Foday Sankoh was an expert on radio communications.8323

83 16 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, pp. 30514-30515. 8317 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 28 October 2009, p. 30516. 83 18 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 15 September 2009, pp. 28964-28965. 83 19 Martin George, Transcript 21 April 20 10, p. 39592; 22 April 2010, pp. 39627, 39708,39710; 23 April 20 10, pp.39766,39787-39795. 8320 Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39610-39614. 8321 Martin George, Transcript 22 April 2010, pp. 39666-39669. 8322 Martin George, Transcript 26 April 20 I0, pp. 39981-39982.

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 .17:161

Defense Witness [ssa Sesay

3647. Witness Issa Sesay, an RUF commander.Y'" was recruited into the RUF in approximately 1990 by Foday Sankoh.8325 He testified that from 1991 to 1993, the RUF used field radios captured from government troops to comrnunicate.Y'" Sankoh was a professional communications expert, and so he was the one who trained all ofthe RUF radio operators while he was head ofthe RUF. 8327

Defence Witness John Vincent

3648. Witness John Vincent, a Liberian Vanguard commander,8328 joined the RUF in 1990.8329 He testified that while training at Camp Naama, in Liberia in 1991, Foday Sankoh taught the recruits how to use radio sets. He stated that Sankoh told them he had learned how to operate a radi10 dunng. hiIS time In. th e S'terra Leonean Army.8330

3649. Vincent also testified that when he was stationed in Pendembu, Sierra Leone, in 1991 Sankoh had a radio, and Sankoh's radio operator was Foday Lansana. Vincent heard that Lansana was a former NPFL radio operator who had escaped a ULIMO attack in Liberia and had entered Sierra Leone with his radio. He heard that Lansana met some Liberians who took him to Sankoh, and Lansanajoined the RUF. The witness believed that Lansana's radio was the one he encountered with Sankoh in Pendembu.833I The witness captured a long­ range communication radio, at Lelehan, Sierra Leone, in December 1991, when he captured a ULIMO soldier. 8332

Defence Witness OCT-292

8323 Sam Kolleh , Transcript 4 November 2010 , pp. 48391-483 92. 8324 Issa Sesay, Transcript 26 July 2010 , pp. 44590-44591, 44596. 8325 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 20 I0, p. 43604. 8326 Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 2010, p. 43684. 8327 Issa Sesay, Transcript 8 July 2010 pp. 44034-44036. 8328 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 20 10, pp. 38107, 38114-38116, 38118, 38137, 38145 ; 30 March 2010 , pp. 38226, 38239; 31 March 2010 , p. 38390, 38408, 38460 , 38461. 8329 John Vincent, Transcript 30 March 20 10, pp. 38261-38 262. 8330 John Vincent, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39613 -39614. 833 1 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010 pp. 38044-38047. 8332 John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010 pp. 38043-38044.

1271 Case No.: SCSL-03 -01-T 18 May2012 ----L 3650. Witness DCT-292 was a member of the RUF from 1990 to 1995.8333 He testified that the NPFL did not have communication with the RUF in 1991 to 1992, as the RUF did not have a radio in Koindu, Sierra Leone. The RUF only acquired radios when Kono, Sierra Leone was attacked around 1994.8334

Defence Witness Joseph Dehmie

3651. Witness Joseph Dehmie, (a.k.a. Bearcat), an NPFL radio operator,S335 testified that he was born in Liberia and was a member of the NPFL from 1990 to 1997.8336 After one month he was recruited by James Galakpalah to train with the Signal Unit as a radio operator. 8337 Dehmie worked as a radio operator known as Bearcat in Bomi Hills for two 8338 years, from September 1990 to October 1992.

3652. Dehmie knew Dauda Aruna Fomie, but denied that Fomie trained as a radio operator in Bomi Hills in 1991, claiming that Fomie was his cook.8339 It was not possible that Fomie was an operator without Dehmie's knowledge, because had he been an operator there at that time, Dehmie would have known .8340 He stated that at the time he was in Bomi Hills, non­ radio operators were not allowed in the radio room, and Fomie never operated NPFL radios.8341He further denied that the NPFL sent radio operators to Sierra Leone.8342 Dehmie also denied that Sankoh arrived at Moni Hills and instructed Bockarie to assign men to units , stating that Sankoh did not once come to Bomi Hills from October 1990 to September 1992.8343

3653. With regards to the evidence of Foday Lansana, Dehmie denied that Galakpal ah ordered Roosevelt Nyameleyan and Lansana to travel from Foya, Liberia to Sierra Leone to set up radio communication there. First, there was no radio station in Foya between 1991 and 1992. Second, the witness knew Nyameleyan, and stated he was never assigned to a

8333 DCT-292, Transcript 31 May 2010, pp. 41673-41674 (PS). 8334 DCT-292, Transcript 2 June 2010, p. 41894.

8335 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 2 1 May 20 10, pp. 414 67, 41494, 41523. 8336 Joseph Dehmie,Transcript 18 May 2010 , pp. 41 133- 41135. 8m Joseph Dehm ie, Transcript 18 May 2010, pp. 4115 2-471 58. 8338 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 20 10, pp. 41223-41225.

813') Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 20 10, pp. 41285-41292; Transcript 3 1 May 20 10, pp. 4 1623-4 1626. 8340 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 20 May 20 10, pp. 413 12-4 1323 , 41340-41343. 834 1 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 20 10, pp. 41292-41293, 41311 -41312. 8342 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 19 May 2010, pp. 41298-41299.

8343 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 20 May 20 10, pp. 41324-41325.

1272 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18May20 12 Jr.1!j

radio station in Foya between 1991 and 1992.8344 Finally, Dehmie stated that throughout his entire career with the NPFL, he never heard of a person named CO Nya, Lansana's nickname. 8345

Deliberations

3654. It is undisputed that one or more NPFL radios and radio operators entered Sierra Leone during the NPFL's cooperation with the RUF in their fight against ULIMO, from 1991 to 1992.8346 The Prosecution contends that these NPFL operators, including Foday Lansana, trained RUF fighters in radio communication, and the RUF continued to benefit from this training throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone.8347 The Prosecution also alleges that the Accused provided radio sets to the RUF, which the RUF later used to communicate with the Accused in Liberia and with the RUF in Cote d'Ivoire during the conflict in Sierra Leone.8348

3655 . The Defence contends that all equipment and operators were evacuated in 1992,8349 and denies that any ofthese NPFL operators, including Lansana, trained RUF fighters at this time .835o The Defence also argues that there is no evidence to prove that Taylor knew that RUF fighters were being trained on the radio by NPFL.8351

3656 . The Prosecution has presented substantial evidence that Foday Lansana trained RUF fighters in Sierra Leone in radio communications from 1991 until as late as 1995. Lansana himself testified to this fact, and it was confirmed by several witnesses, including Perry Kamara, TFI-585, Mohamed Kabbah, TF1-516, Alice Pyne, and Isaac Mongor.8r2:)

3657. The Defence contends that Lansana was not sent by the NPFL but entered Sierra Leone independently and of his own accord, citing the evidence of Defence Witness John

8344 Joseph Dehmie, Transcript 20 May 20 10. pp. 41357-41359, 41358-41360 8345 Joseph Dehrnie, Transcript 20 May 20 IO. pp. 41360-41361. 8346 Prosecution Final Trial Brief. para. 308; Defence Final Trial Brief. para. 982. 8347 Prosecution Final Trial Brief. para. 308. 8348 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 308. 8349 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 984. 8350 Defence Final Trial Brief. para. 986. 8351 Defence Final Trial Brief. para. 987. S35 ~ Perry Karnara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3037-3038; TFI -585. Transcript 5 September 2008, pp. 15586-15588; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008. pp. 16106-16107; TFI-516, Transcript 14 April 2008, pp. 7456-7457; Alice Pyne, Transcript 17 June 2008, pp. 12066-12072; Transcript 18 June 2008, p. 12105; Isaac Monger, Transcript 10 March 2008. pp. 5675-5677.

1273 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-1' / 18 May 2012 _ fJ