Nigerian Soldiers.809Oabu Keita Testified That Bockarie
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Nigerian soldiers.809o Abu Keita testified that Bockarie communicated with Benjamin Yeaten and Joseph Tuah on the satellite phone, telling the witness that he was reporting to them on the status of the operation. Y" A number of witnesses agreed that this contact was frequent. Fornie testified that during the Kono operation, Bockarie would receive at least one message every three to four hours that the witness spent with Bockarie,8092 and that during the Freetown invasion, they spoke at least two or three times a day through the satellite phone. 8093 The evidence also suggests that such reports were promptly given as progress on the frontline developed. 8094 3556. Sometimes these communications concerned operational decisions. TF 1-516 stated that after conversing with the Accused, Bockarie would come to the radio station and draft instructions for the commanders, including Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit) in Freetown, regarding military manoeuvres, the setting of ambushes and attacks on particular targets. 8095 Kabbah noted as an example that when Bockarie told Yeaten about the increasing difficulties Gullit's troops were facing in Freetown, Yeaten told Bockarie to send reinforcements to the city.8096 Fornie stated that sometimes Bockarie "would contact Benjamin to consult him on some decisions before he ever took them,,.8097 3557. Kabbah attested to a complicated relation ship between Yeaten and Bockarie during the conversations concerning the Kono and Freetown operations. He stated initially that Bockarie spoke to Yeaten as part of a "sisterly or brotherly operation", or a "joint operation", where each party sought to be kept updated on each other's successes and 8090 TF 1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12918. 809 1 Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2020-2022. 8092 Dauda Aruna Fomie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21557. 8093 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, pp. 21609-21610; see also TFI-516, Transcript 8 April 2008. p. 6937 (Bockarie was in "persistent" communication with Charles Taylor, call sign "020", and Benjamin Yeaten, call sign "Base I"). 8094 Mohamed Kabbah, Tran script 15 September 2008, pp. 16176-16178 (Kabbah testified that Bockarie informed the Accused that Gullit had entered Freetown and captured State House on the day that Bockarie himself received the news); Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008. pp. 2 1581-2 1582 (Less than an hour after Bockarie received the message concerning the release of the Pademba Road prisoners, he called Benjamin Yeaten on the satellite phone to inform him). 8095 TF 1-516, Transcript 8 April 2008, pp. 6942-6943. 8096 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173-16175; see also Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16143-16145, where the witness refers to the same incident ("at one time when in fact the 6 January invasion took place in Freetown when ECOMOG was pushing the men, at that time Mosquito spoke with Benjamin Yeaten and so he said, 'The situation is becoming bad at the front line. The enemies were pushing our men out of the town ", so Benjamin Yeaten told him why he was not trying to reinforce the men in the city. He said, ,You know the city is big. You need to reinforce them'"). 8097 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 2 1615. Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18May2012 J1]Z? failures .8098 Kabbah also observed that Bockarie spoke to Yeaten as if Bockarie was in the position of a subordinate receiving instruction from a superior.S099 However, Kabbah in cross-examination then affirmed a seemingly inconsistent prior statement in which he stated that Bockarie did not "take orders" from Yeaten because Bockarie would have seen Yeaten as "inferior" in rank.8lOOKabbah explained to the Trial Chamber that while Yeaten was officiall y ofa higher rank, Bockarie viewed Yeaten as inferior because Bockarie had a larger and more important role in Sierra Leone.slol Kabbah testified that Bockarie nonetheless followed instructions by Yeaten because he would have assumed such orders came from the Accused.8l02 Even if a message from Yeaten did not specifically refer to the Accused, it was understood in the RUF that Yeaten was the conduit for the Accused's instructions as he was the Accused's "right-hand man". 8103 3558. The Defence contends that the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses IS unreliable. 8l04 It cites, as an example, Mohamed Kabbah 's evidence that he got the information concerning the alleged radio communications between Bockarie and Yeaten during the Freetown invasion through TF 1-516 whom he alleged was Yeaten's radio operator at the time, even though , TFI -516 testified that he was only assigned to Yeaten in Liberia from about mid-1999.8IOs The Trial Chamber notes that Kabbah did become confused at one stage of his testimony when discussing a communication between Yeaten and Bockarie concerning the ECOMOG assault on the supply lines of the troops in Freetown. He first stated that this communication was initiated by Pascal, who was stationed in Liberia,81 06 but corrected his testimony to state that it was TFI-516 who was stationed in Liberia and was assigned to Yeaten. 8l07 However, Kabbah did indicate that TFl-516 was, at 8098 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16145. 8099 Mohamed Kabbah,Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16173-16175; see also Tran script 12 September 2008, pp. 16143-16145, where the witness refers to the same incident ("at one time when in fact the 6 January invasion took place in Freetown when ECOMOG was pushing the men, at that time Mosquito spoke with Benjamin Yeaten and so he said, 'The situation is becoming bad at the front line. The enemies were pushing our men out of the town ', so Benjamin Yeaten told him why he was not trying to reinforce the men in the city. He said, 'You know the city is big. You need to reinforce them'"). 8100 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008. pp. 16380-14381. 8 10 1 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16379. 8 102 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16380-1438 I. 8103 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 16 September 2008, pp. 16380-14381. 8 104 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 1281. 8 105 TF I-5 16, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6858. 8 106 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, pp. 16168-161 69. 8 107 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008 , p. 16170. 1235 £ Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18 May 20 12 .:> one point, assigned as an operator for Yeaten,Sl08 and recognised that there was a period when Yeaten spoke to Bockarie before TFI-516 had been assigned to Liberia. 8l09 The Trial Chamber considers this discrepancy minor; in light of the passage oftime and the witness's acknow ledgement that TF 1-516 was only stationed in Liberia for a certain period of time, it is understandable that Kabbah may have become confused about precisely when that period was.8llO 3559. The Defence also pointed to alleged inconsistencies in TFI-516's evidence regarding alleged communications between Bockarie and Yeaten, noting that it conflicted with TF 1 516's testimony that the Liberian government did not have the codes for the RUF radio net in January 1999 and that TFI -516 later confirmed that he never heard any directive from Taylor or Yeaten concerning the Freetown Invasion.f"!' 3560. In relation to the first alleged inconsistency, the Trial Chamber notes that DCT-008 also stated that Yeaten could not have spoken to Bockarie on the radio, because Yeaten did not know the RUF communication codes.81l2 The Trial Chamber notes that it does not accept the contention of the Defence that messages between Liberian radio operators and the RUF operators could not have been relayed simply because they did not possess each others' codes, having concluded that the RUF and NPFL radio networks were accessible by 8 operators from outside their respective networks. I 13 In any case, DCT-008 also testified that in November or December 1998, Memunatu Deen, an RUF radio operator, began operating out of Base 1,8114 and that around December 1998 or January 1999, she gave the RUF codes to Sunlight so that he could take down messages while she was away.81l S Hence, it is clear 8 108 Mohamed Kabbah, Transcr ipt 12 September 2008, p. 16144; Transcript 12 September 2008, p. 16134; Transcript 15 September 2008 , p. 16170 . 8109 Operational Suppo rt: Communications, Use of Liberia Communications by the RUF. 8110 T F I-37 1, Transcript 28 January 200 8, pp. 2381-2382 (CS) (Memumata Oeen was assigned to work at the RUF radi o station based in Monrovia in late 1998 and early 1999 ); Mohamed Kabbah,Transcript 12 September 2008, pp. 16134-1 6135. (Memu Deen, To los wife was in Monro via wo rking as a radio operator at Cisse Musa's house when Bockarie was stationed in Buedu). Note that although OCT-0 08 first testified that Memunatu would use the radio at Base One in Liberia every day in November or late December 1998, and she co ntinued to do so in 1999 (OCT-008, Transcript 27 August 20 10, pp. 47400,47407-411 , Transcript 30 August 20 10, pp. 47403 47404) later in his testimony he stated that there was no radio contact between the RUF and Deen in Liberia in early January 1999 because Memunatu was in Sierra Leone (OCT- 008 , Transcript 27 August 201 0, p. 47420). OCT-008, Transcript 27 August 20 10, pp. 47400-47408; Transcript 30 August 20 10, pp.