EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 39, December 2005

Introduction

In any democracy, political parties form a critical pillar for the entrenchment of democratic culture and practice. This means, among other things, that for parties to add value to democratisation at national level, they ought to embrace and institutionalise internal democracy. Since they play a crucial role in the democratic process, “it is also incontrovertible that political Investigating Intra-party parties are the key to the institutionalisation and consolidation Democracy in : of democracy. Thus, sustainable Focus on Congress democracy is dependent upon well- Party and Basotho National functioning and effective parties” (Matlosa and Sello 2005, vii).

This paper looks at the role of political parties and the extent to which they By have embraced and institutionalised Fako Johnson Likoti internal democracy. Further more, the paper probes the extent to which

parties then promote the consolidation of democracy.

Functions of Political Parties

A political party can be construed as a group of people who share a common conception of how and why state ISBN: 1-920095-52-7 power and resources should be ISSN: 1811-7449 organised and utilised. Political parties, © EISA, 2005 unlike other social groups, are organised and have a structural formation. They not only seek to influence government policy, but also to replace the government in power through elections and thereafter control and implement national policies.

Dearlove (2000) argues that parties recruit people to form their support base and socialise candidates to party - 1 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 39, December 2005 ethics so that the party can be seen to geographical area, ethnicity or region work together in a principled fashion. but representing the nation as a whole. Political parties form the source from This was very important in countries which the appointment of people to such as Nigeria, whereby the framers positions of power on various state of the 1979 constitution argued that, levels is effected. Political parties for the purpose of 1979 elections a aggregate diverse interests from political party society. They collect sets of interests in ...could only be registered if it…to order to produce a common policy. satisfy the Federal Electoral Similarly, while serving their Commission that it was not an grassroots supporters they also educate association confined to a part only of them politically. This is done by the geographical area of Nigeria; its highlighting social problems to the headquarters had to be in the federal masses and outlining their approaches capital and its executive committee had as to how they will deal with these to reflect Nigeria’s Federal character problems and thus better the life of (Tordoff 1997, 120). citizens. Therefore, in trying to solve these problems for a common political The lack of intra-party democracy is platform, parties aggregate the interests likely not only to weaken parties and give weight to them as election internally, but may adversely influence issues. The parties ‘sell’ these interests their effectiveness in driving by articulating them to the wider democracy nationally, especially in populace as an election programme or emergent democracies such as manifesto. They give wide expression Lesotho. to political and social interests that would have otherwise remained Role of Political Parties private. For this process they use the media and public gatherings. One of the cardinal pillars of democracy is pluralism and multiparty Political parties mobilise people and competition. Political parties in structure the popular vote by providing democracies compete for state power a wide menu of choices at elections for through regular elections to further voters to support their individual their goals (Vanhanen 1997). While candidates. By mobilising people to a the media depicts parties as disciplined political issue, they legitimise the associations, the reality is far different election process and stabilise the (Crew 1993), as they are formed by political order. Conventionally every people with diverse interests. They elected government is first supported often protest or quit if they perceive by a political party that shape its that their interests have not been met. policies. Parties provide the link They are characterised by personal between the citizens and the state and rivalries, ideological divisions and thus make representative, responsible tensions between the leadership and and responsive government a reality. grassroots supporters. In fact parties They serve the dual function of are uneasy coalitions (Crew 1993). representation and government (Dearlove 2000). Nevertheless, political parties play a salient role in and constitute a vital In most African countries, political element of a democracy. In fact, the parties play a legitimising role for the fundamental purpose of political party that won elections held in free parties and party system is to provide a and fair conditions Parties must have a stable pattern of expectation, activities robust democratic culture not based on and behaviour for the peaceful change - 2 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 39, December 2005 of government from one faction of the demonstrated in most political circles ruling class to another or from one set in Lesotho. The fight was between the of individuals within the ruling class to two factions of the BCP. The pro- another (Nnoli 1986, 139). Prime Minister faction, “Majelathoko” (those-who-eat-apart) (Matlosa 1999) In order to live up to this expectation, and the pro-Deputy Prime Minister political parties must be democratic. faction popularly known as “the pressure group.” The party fought The Consequences of Lack of Intra- numerous court cases over the results Party Democracy of executive committee elections. The High Court of Lesotho became the The consequences of a lack of intra- gallery for these events (CIV/APN/84, party democracy are many and vary 96, CIV/APN/1/97, CIV/APN/75/97), within each party. A lack of intra-party (Sekatle 1997, Pule 1997). democracy within major parties in Lesotho has produced undesirable On 3 May 1996, Prime Minister Ntsu consequences for both the Basutoland Mokhehle removed members of the Congress Party (BCP) and the pressure group faction from the Basutoland National Party (BNP). Cabinet after protracted infighting with his faction, “Majelathoko” (Matlosa The BCP 1998). This faction was opposed to the The Basutoland Congress Party has, perceived undemocratic nature of the since its inception in 1952, always party in dealing with the election of been riddled with protracted internal office bearers. Among the most power struggles. The 1960s saw protracted of these conflicts, which prominent BCP leaders being expelled came to the fore and precipitated the or resigning from the party executive birth of Lesotho Congress for committee. Most of these competent Democracy (LCD) in 1997, was the leaders left the party because of incessant power struggle over the Mokhehle’s leadership and this “came membership of the BCP’s Executive after long disillusionment with Committee (NEC). Some these Mokhehle’s authoritarian mode of members were seen as sell-outs and as operation” (Weisfelder 1999, 44). This being too close to the BCP leader. This characteristic of the BCP leader was infighting culminated in the break up even more explicit during the of the BCP. December 1961 annual conference when Mokhehle, the BCP leader, On Monday, 9 July 1997, the Prime succeeded in amending the party Minister convened a press conference constitution and thus increasing his on the grounds of the National term of office from one to five years. Assembly and announced that he had Most importantly, however, he gained formed a new party to be known as power to suspend and expel party Lesotho Congress for Democracy. He members. This undemocratic tradition argued that, “because we have support was carried into the 1993 period. of the majority of parliamentarians, there will be no change of There is no party in Lesotho politics, government” (Pule 1999, 22). which has spent so much time and resources than the BCP fighting over This party was formed following a positions in the party. Immediately long-running dispute within the party after the BCP elections victory in concerning Mokhehle’s leadership. A 1993, intra-party conflict could not few years later, the election of another only be sensed but was clearly NEC within the ruling LCD was to - 3 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 39, December 2005 haunt the party yet again. On 14 The breakaway group “Lesiba”, now September 2001 the party experienced Lesotho Peoples Congress, were at yet another fragmentation (Matlosa pains to announce that “the train had 1999, Pule 1997). derailed” (meaning that the Prime Minister does not consult and work A breakaway group from the ruling with his cronies), and it was their LCD, the Lesotho Peoples Congress obligation to put the train back on track (LPC), brought to an end an (Nonyana 2001). They claimed that the extraordinary marriage of convenience government was becoming among the incompatible role players in increasingly dictatorial and the party leadership (Public Eye authoritarian. In most cases, the October 12–18). government had deliberately deviated from its electoral mandate and it was What is even more striking is the the LPC’s quest to put the Mokhehle similarity of events leading to the split. magic back (Public Eye October The main cause of the LPC break-up 2001). was the disputed results of the January 2001 National Executive Committee The issue of a derailed train cited by elections held at its annual conference. the new interim LPC leader clearly There was vitriolic bickering within indicates that Mokhehle’s personality members of LCD, which was cult is as strong as ever. In all their reminiscent of the pre-1997 June public gatherings, both LCP and LCD period that was also motivated by the invoke Mokhehle. The major blame for executive committee elections. the fragmentation as presented by the LPC newspaper Nonyana, of 10 The central issues in both 1997 and October 2001, has been laid solely at 2001 had been the executive elections the doorstep of the Prime Minister and the dominant personality cult Mosisili, as an inept, inefficient and around that had undemocratic leader for the past four assumed various meanings for each years of this marriage of convenience. party. Mokhehle has wielded Firstly, he was being charged for considerable power over the BCP since allegedly fomenting division within the the early 1950s. His name has become party (LCD), by appearing to a trademark in Lesotho Congress accommodate one faction over the politics and the country as a whole other. It was further alleged in this (Matlosa 1999). paper that he relied too much on the southern faction rather than the northern faction of the country The two warring factions within LCD (MoAfrica 2001). were now commonly known as “Lesiba” (Feather), for the Deputy Secondly, and most importantly, the Prime Minister Kelebone Maope’s Prime Minister had on numerous group who constituted the outgoing occasions defied the party’s Executive National Executive which lost the Committee by his unilateral actions. elections in January 2001 and He had vehemently refused to work “Sehlopha” (Group), who belonged to closely with this committee, which had the incoming National Executive lost the January 2001 elections. The Committee elected in the same other cited case was the incident in the contentious period. This group enjoyed Mafeteng constituency involving the support of the current Prime Minister Lesao Lehohla. It was Minister (Sekatle claimed that he contested the 1999). constituency while his party

- 4 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 39, December 2005 membership had expired. The addressing his party’s internal unilateral appointments of Cabinet problems and also in his failure to raise Ministers and members of Senate, the civil servants’ salaries on a par including the establishment of a with inflation. Instead, he only gave Commission of Inquiry headed by them a 2% subvention which was Judge Pius Langa in collaboration with regarded as worthless and thus the South African government, the damaging LCD future electoral unfortunate results of which support. These allegations were, precipitated the 1998 instability in the however, not exhaustive. It became country, with the subsequent formation clear from these accusations that the of the Interim Political Authority and party lacks an internal mechanism for the mixed member electoral system, addressing dissenting views. This was are some of the serious allegations exacerbated by lack of inter-party levelled against the Prime Minister democracy within the party. Therefore, which fuelled the split (Nonyana power struggles between the factions 2002). ensued in earnest, at all levels of the ruling party. (Pule 1999). This Thirdly, the Prime Minister failed to undemocratic culture was not confined consult the party Executive Committee to this party, as it also occurred in the and Members of Parliament as national second largest party in the country, the representatives in the selection of BNP. senior civil servants and the country’s ambassadors abroad. This was the The BNP, after dismally losing the main factor among many that created 1993 elections, proceeded with the instability within the party. He was charade of refusing to recognise the further charged with accepting advice BCP’s election victory. The party from outside the party structures. engaged in concerted and unsuccessful court battles to unseat the BCP with Fourthly, matters came to the fore the claim that the elections were rigged during the 26-28 January 2001 and not free and fair. On realising that Executive Committee election when the BNP lack a single representation in the Prime Minister insisted that Parliament, the leader of BCP in 1993, Minister Lehohla was an LCD member nominated the then BNP leader to the even though he had not renewed his Senate. It was this nomination that membership. He is said to have sparked serious debates within the suddenly introduced an electoral party. The BNP leader declined this system not agreed to by the party. This nomination. He opined that the BNP issue was so divisive that it was sent to would not be part of an illegitimate the High Court of Lesotho even though government that rigged the elections. It a satisfactory outcome was never was this action that motivated the split reached. Instead of intervention from within the party. The deputy leader the LCD leader, he appeared to be berated the leader for taking a intolerant, lacking vision and unilateral decision rather than a subsequently advised the aggrieved democratic one. He accused his leader party in the dispute to abide by the of denying the BNP representation in unpalatable court decision. This did the Senate without consulting the party not solve this political problem, but executive and other internal party exacerbated it instead. structures.

Finally, the Prime Minister is alleged Another and even more emotive to have been grossly insensitive by not dispute within the party surrounded the

- 5 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 39, December 2005 decision not to participate in by- engineered the election defeat of his elections. Boycotting the by-elections previous National Executive. This was by the BNP took most political except for two members who were commentators by surprise since this seen to be very close to him. This action was not only uncalled for but, created great animosity within the the reasons were not clear. The party, to the extent that the BNP lost its questions that must be asked are how value in Parliament as a leading the second largest party could behave opposition party. Among its twenty- in this manner and furthermore, one Members of Parliament, eighteen whether the BNP is indeed openly opposed the leadership and undemocratic as a political party. A engaged in unsuccessful efforts to oust political party must participate in the General from the leadership of the elections, not outside elections. How party. was it going to mobilise its support if it did not participate in elections? These These disgruntled MPs put forward were some of the hard questions that their leadership choice as Thabang the party could not answer. Similarly, Nyeoe. The BNP Executive only this decision was unilateral and no acknowledged his candidature2 by consultations were made1. The Deputy putting a stamp on his letter to the Leader of the BNP was enraged by the Executive, but fell short of informing undemocratic behaviour of his party the party supporters in a democratic leader, Evarastus Rets’elisitsoe way as mandated by their Constitution. Sekhonyana. This decision divided the By the time the leadership elections party and its grassroots support base. were held in April 2005, of the eighty Following these undemocratic demarcated constituencies, decisions, the BNP deputy leader left representatives from only seventy two the party and formed a splinter party, attended the conference. However, the National Progressive Party. when Thabang Nyeoe was nominated from the floor, the Executive ignored With time, this lack of democracy the proposal and went on with its within the party has become prolific business. This undemocratic behaviour (Likoti 2001). In 1999, under the sparked more acrimony between the leadership of the newly elected leader Thabang Nyeoe and Lekhanya Major General Metsing Lekhanya, supporters. Consequently, fifty-three appears suspect of any internal constituency committees supporting opposition, particularly from both Nyeoe walked out of the conference. It Secretary General Majara Molapo and was also claimed that a further twenty Leseteli Malefane. He successfully have been added to this support. engineered their expulsion from the Regardless of these protestations, the elected posts and suspended them from conference went on to endorse the party, similar to Ntsu Mokhehle’s Lekhanya as a leader of the BNP. This action in the 1960s. struggle is currently being played out in the High Court of Lesotho (Likoti Following the 2002 National Executive 2002). The BNP’s performance in elections, the BNP intra-party conflict Parliament left much to be desired. became more pronounced. While this Since it lacked a proper mechanism to did not lead to fragmentation of the ameliorate internal discontent and party, General Lekhanya successfully build an internal democratic culture,

1 Since 1993 to date the party has boycotted all 2 Thabang Nyeoe’s Letter declaring his by-elections and the 2005 local government candidature for 2005 BNP Leadership elections. Elections. - 6 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 39, December 2005 the party began to wash its linen in other than their own constitutions, public by chastising its Members of which have proved to be outdated and Parliament who wanted democracy not in keeping with democratic norms within the party. It was this lack of and values. In fact, selection of intra-party democracy which led to candidates has been ad hoc with no disunity, especially in Parliament. The proper mechanism in place to manage Leader of the party, General Lekhanya and monitor internal party elections accused the reformist element within (Matlosa and Sello 2005). This proved the party of fighting the leadership and extremely challenging for democratic instead, adhering to the LCD influence. consolidation within both the party The truth of the matter was that in system and the Lesotho polity as a 2003 General Lekhanya, together with whole. his Deputy, had unilaterally written to the government without consulting the For the BNP, its refusal to accept party. They wished to seek a defeat and recognise the LCD victory Government of National Unity and made it difficult for a democratic certain ministerial positions. The transition in Lesotho since “the Government rejected these demands acceptance of the validity of founding with scorn. elections by losing parties is crucial because it marks the first tentative The continued BNP non-participation consensus on democratic rules” in by-elections has made it difficult to (Bratton and Van de Walle 1998). judge with certainty the extent of its support base. However, the fact The persistent refusal to legitimise the remains that its support had been victorious party appears to stem from dwindling as a result of alienating the party’s internal culture that seems many people due to its undemocratic devoid of democratic practice. Since internal behaviour. 1993, elections the parties have been afflicted by internal dissent as a result Impact on Voter Participation of lack of tolerance. Not only did the BNP refuse to endorse the 1993 This chain of events has created voter elections results, it went on to refuse to apathy within Lesotho. The accept the 1998 results as well and Independent Electoral Commission mobilise its supporters and other (IEC) has, in recent times, been at parties to claim that the elections were pains to encourage voter registration. rigged. People have seemingly lost interest in the political system as the IEC’s efforts have continuously been undermined by The BNP stance was the same in both low registration. The Parliament, the 1998 and 2002 elections, despite which is supposed to be vibrant, has the fact that in the latter, the party was become a talking shop with low quality able to participate in Parliament under Members of Parliament (Makoa 2005). the new electoral model (Likoti2002). This incessant infighting within major Democratic Consolidation parties appears to be motivated by the perception that the loss of position The fact of the matter is that internal within the party is equated with the party differences and party functions loss of one’s employment opportunity. have not been regulated since the This is due to Lesotho’s lack of a establishment of these parties. This robust national economy, which lacks means that parties have not been expansive opportunities for regulated and governed by legislation employment creation.

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Economic Dimension of Intra-party prospects of recovery” (Ceaser 1990, Conflict 87). The major diagnosis has been the incessant infighting as a result of NEC As we have intimated above, Lesotho elections. These parties have lacks a robust and well-endowed succumbed to authoritarian leadership. national economy with an expansive The cracks within these parties were private sector to generate sustainable more acute in the early 1990s than in jobs. Consequently, Basotho tend to any period during their history. Their look to the state for employment ability to perform party functions was generally. The public sector shoulders compromised by their functionalism. the larger chunk of the labour force compared to the nascent private sector. Conclusion This has, in part, been the major reason that has fuelled intra-party conflicts It is evident from the discussion in this and made elites in Lesotho attempt to paper that political parties in Lesotho stay in power by all means necessary are at the crossroads. This is in part (Likoti 2001). Since there is no explicable by the fact that the major alternative source of employment for parties (BNP and LCD), who are those elites formerly in power, it supposed to be the drivers of makes sense to stay in power through democracy, appear to suffer serious all means possible. This has led to deficiencies in terms of internal political elites fighting for power democracy. Furthermore, political within political parties. Almost all parties are afflicted by divisive sectors depend on the public sector. factional politics. This will not benefit With the introduction of a mixed Lesotho’s development efforts, let member proportional representation alone its democratic governance electoral system, the fight to stay in agenda.. power in these major parties has intensified (Makoa 2005). While democratic values are many and varied, among these values is voter The struggle for leadership positions participation in elections. It is clear within the major parties (BNP and that lack of internal democracy within LCD) is thus linked to the struggle for parties has made people apathetic and easy access to state resources. This is less interested in politics. People tend why political elites in Lesotho perceive to consider politics as catering for the loss of power/executive position within few rich elite but not as a means to their parties as the loss of access to develop the country and better the lives their livelihoods. It is this perspective of the majority of the poor and which appears to have intensified their marginalised. Judging from several by- fight for political positions within their elections held since 2002 and the parties. Inevitably, this faction-fighting recent local government elections, has brought about authoritarian voters’ participation has drastically tendencies within the parties. This has declined. This lack of interest in in turn undermined any likelihood of politics was also exacerbated by the promoting and building a democratic BNP failure to participate in these culture and practice within these elections. On the other hand, the institutions. BCP/LCD fragmentation has also made people despondent about the The political parties in Lesotho, political behaviour of elites in power. similarly to the American parties in the The apparent LCD victories in these 1970s, can be said to be “declining, by-elections and the 2005 local decaying or atrophying, with no government elections have made - 8 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 39, December 2005 people believe that their participation people jostle for positions of power, will make no meaningful difference. often through undemocratic means.

It therefore appears that democratic The lack of a robust and dynamic consolidation will suffer as long as national economy in Lesotho has also these parties do not adhere to had a negative impact on the political democratic principles. Differently elite. They have realised that not to articulated, it would be a mistake to participate in the National Executive of expect undemocratic parties to drive the party means one cannot be and promote the culture of democracy included on the PR list and thus is left in Lesotho. It has been this lack of out of the national cake. In order to intra-party democracy which has sustain one’s livelihood it is rational to placed the future of Lesotho’s stay in politics because there is no democracy at the crossroads. Unless viable alternative employment the two major parties discussed in this opportunity outside the state sector. paper create clear internal democratic avenues, the Lesotho polity will This realisation has contributed to the always be torn asunder by intra-party lack of democracy within parties as conflicts and apathy among the voters.

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References

Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. (1998) Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ceaser James W. (1990) “Political Parties-Declining, Stabilising, or Resurging”. In Anthony Kid ed, The New American Political System, 2nd ed. Washington DC; American Enterprise Institute. Crewe, I. et al,(1993) “Parties and Electors” in Budge The Developing British Political System: The 1990s, 3rd ed. London: Longman Dearlove, J. et, al. (2000) Introduction to British Politics, 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press Likoti, F. J. (2001) “Intra-Party Conflict in Lesotho.” A paper presented at Multi-Track Diplomacy and Conflict Transformation Workshop 8-28 August 2001 University of Maryland USA Centre For International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). (2001) “Politics and the Betrayal of Electoral Mandate in Lesotho.” A paper presented at the National University of Lesotho on 22 November 2001. (2002) “Conflict management in Lesotho.” A paper presented at Maseru Cabanas conference organised by Lesotho Network for Conflict Management in preparing for the 2002 elections. Makoa, F. (1997) “A Lesotho Voter and Election: A Note on the 1998 General Elections.” Lesotho Social Science Review, Vol.3, No.2 December 1997, pp 27-54. (2005) “Interparty Relations are Adversarial, A Situation Compounded by the Combination of Proportional Representation and First-Past-the-Post Systems of Electing MPs.” South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol.12 (Summer/Autumn) pp 61-71. Matlosa, K. (1999 ) Conflict and Conflict Management: Lesotho’s Political Crisis After the 1998 Election” Lesotho Social Science Review, Vol.5. No. 1 June, pp 163-196. and Caleb Sello. (2005) Political Parties and Democratisation in Lesotho. EISA Research Report, No. 23. Moafrica Maseru, Vol. 10, No. 49, 7 December 2001. Public Eye,( Maseru), October 12-18 2001; 16-22 November 2002 Pule, N. (1999) “Power Struggle in the Basutoland Congress Party.” Lesotho Social Science Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp1-30. Nnoli Okwudiba (1986) Introduction to Politics. Singapore; Longman Singapore Publishers Nonyana, Maseru, Vol. 1, No.1, 10 October 2001; No.8, 28 November 2002. Sekatle, P. (1999) “The Lesotho General Elections of 1998.” Lesotho Social Science Review Vol.5, No.1 June, pp 31-45. “ The Formation of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy: Implications for the 1998 Elections” Lesotho Social Science Review, Vol.3, No. 2 December 1997, pp 69-92. “The Political Dynamics of the 1998 ”. Paper prepared for the SAPES Regional Conference on the Crisis and Intervention in Lesotho, Maseru, 5-6 February 1999, p 7. Tordoff, W. (1997) Government and Politics in Africa, 3rd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Vanhanen, T. (1997) Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries. London: Routledge. Weisfelder, R.F. (1999) Political Contentions in Lesotho 1952-1965. Roma: Institute of Southern African Studies.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Fako Johnson Likoti is a PhD Candidate at the University of the Western Cape and Political Science Lecturer at National University of Lesotho. Email: [email protected]

THE EISA MISSION STATEMENT EISA’s mission is to strengthen electoral processes, good governance, human rights and democratic values through research, capacity building, advocacy and other targeted interventions

ABOUT EISA EISA is a not-for-profit and non-partisan non-governmental organisation which was established in 1996. Its core business is to provide technical assistance for capacity building of relevant government departments, electoral management bodies, political parties and civil society organisations operating in the democracy and governance field throughout the SADC region and beyond. Inspired by the various positive developments towards democratic governance in Africa as a whole and the SADC region in particular since the early 1990s, EISA aims to advance democratic values, practices and enhance the credibility of electoral processes. The ultimate goal is to assist countries in Africa and the SADC region to nurture and consolidate democratic governance. SADC countries have received enormous technical assistance and advice from EISA in building solid institutional foundations for democracy. This includes electoral system reforms; election monitoring and observation; constructive conflict management; strengthening of Parliament and other democratic institutions; strengthening of political parties; capacity building for civil society organisations; deepening democratic local governance; and enhancing the institutional capacity of the election management bodies. EISA is currently the secretariat of the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) composed of electoral commissions in the SADC region and established in 1998. EISA is also the secretariat of the SADC Election Support Network (ESN) comprising election- related civil society organisations established in 1997.

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