2009 Lawyer-to-Lawyer Referral Guide
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47 Special Section 2009 Lawyer-to-Lawyer Referral Guide
Los Angeles Lawyer DEPARTMENTS the magazine of the Los Angeles County 11 Barristers Tips 60 Closing Argument Bar Association Weighing the consequences of Section Who owns the rebate? June 2009 998 offers to compromise BY JAMES DECRESCENZO, GORDON R. DOWNING, BY PAUL EISNER AND JOSEPH J. SERRITELLA Volume 32, No. 4 12 Practice Tips 9 Letters to the Editor COVER PHOTO: TOM KELLER The future of injunctive relief in copyright infringement cases 57 Classifieds BY ANDREW J. THOMAS 58 Index to Advertisers 18 Practice Tips Applicability of the fair procedure doctrine 59 CLE Preview BY ELIZABETH L. CROOKE
LOS ANGELES LAWYER (ISSN 0162-2900) is published monthly, except for a combined issue in July/August, by the Los Angeles County Bar Association, 1055 West 7th Street, Suite 2700, Los Angeles, CA 90017 (213) 896-6503. Periodicals postage paid at Los Angeles, CA and additional mailing offices. Annual sub- scription price of $14 included in the Association membership dues. Nonmember subscriptions: $28 annually; single copy price: $4 plus handling. Address changes must be submitted six weeks in advance of next issue date. POSTMASTER: Address Service Requested. Send address changes to Los Angeles Lawyer, P. O. Box 55020, Los Angeles CA 90055. 06.09 Over 20 years experience resolving fee disputes Professional/private resolution
VISIT US ON THE INTERNET AT www.lacba.org/lalawyer Attorney Fees E-MAIL CAN BE SENT TO [email protected] Confidential Mediation/Arbitration Services EDITORIAL BOARD BRUCE E. SCHWARTZ, Esq. Chair ANGELA J. DAVIS Articles Coordinator DAVID SCHNIDER 34 Year litigator/trial attorney JERROLD ABELES 30 Year Evidence Professor DANIEL L. ALEXANDER ETHEL W. BENNETT www.attorneyclientdisputes.com R. J. COMER 1875 Century Park East #850 Los Angeles, CA 90067 (310) 277-2323 CHAD C. COOMBS ELIZABETH L. CROOKE GORDON ENG HELENE J. FARBER ERNESTINE FORREST - STUART R. FRAENKEL GREG DAVID DERIN MEDIATOR MICHAEL A. GEIBELSON TED HANDEL HONESTY • FAIRNESS • COMMITMENT • CREATIVITY • EXCELLENCE JEFFREY A. HARTWICK STEVEN HECHT AREAS OF EXPERTISE: NAFISÉ NINA HODJAT • Entertainment and • Contract and Business Torts LAWRENCE J. IMEL Intellectual Property • Real Property MEREDITH KARASCH JOHN P. LECRONE • Employment • Corporate and Partnership THANAYI LINDSEY KAREN LUONG TM “POWER MEDIATOR”, The Hollywood Reporter, ADR SuperLawyer PAUL MARKS FACULTY, Harvard Negotiation Institute ELIZABETH MUNISOGLU RICHARD H. NAKAMURA JR. CARMELA PAGAY 310.552.1062 ■ www.derin.com DENNIS PEREZ 10100 SANTA MONICA BOULEVARD, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90067 GARY RASKIN JACQUELINE M. REAL-SALAS CAROLIN SHINING KERRY D. SLATER HEATHER STERN GRETCHEN D. STOCKDALE TIMOTHY M. STUART KENNETH W. SWENSON BRUCE TEPPER R. JOSEPH TROJAN PATRIC VERRONE JEFFREY D. WOLF STAFF Publisher and Editor SAMUEL LIPSMAN Senior Editor LAUREN MILICOV Senior Editor ERIC HOWARD Art Director LES SECHLER Director of Design and Production PATRICE HUGHES Advertising Director LINDA LONERO BEKAS Account Executive MERYL WEITZ Sales and Marketing Coordinator AARON J. ESTRADA Advertising Coordinator WILMA TRACY NADEAU Administrative Coordinator MATTY JALLOW BABY
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4 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009
LOS ANGELES LAWYER IS THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 1055 West 7th Street, Suite 2700, Los Angeles CA 90017-2548 Imagine what your gift can do! Telephone 213.627.2727 / www.lacba.org ASSOCIATION OFFICERS President DANETTE E. MEYERS BE PROUD OF YOUR President-Elect FOUNDATION— DON MIKE ANTHONY Senior Vice President IT IS A ALAN K. STEINBRECHER Vice President VALUABLE ERIC A. WEBBER COMMUNITY Treasurer LINDA L. CURTIS RESOURCE. Assistant Vice President PATRICIA EGAN DAEHNKE Assistant Vice President ANTHONY PAUL DIAZ SUPPORT YOUR BAR While a single stone may make only a small splash, the ripples Assistant Vice President FOUNDATION— MARGARET P. STEVENS travel far beyond where the stone landed—just like the benefit of Assistant Vice President your single gift to the Los Angeles County Bar Foundation’s 2009- IT CANNOT EXIST JULIE K. XANDERS Immediate Past President WITHOUT YOU! 10 fund-raising campaign. GRETCHEN M. NELSON Executive Director The Bar Foundation is the fund-raising arm of the Bar Association. STUART A. FORSYTH Associate Executive Director/Chief Financial Officer The Association’s own public service projects rely heavily on the BRUCE BERRA Foundation for funding, as do many other very worthwhile programs Associate Executive Director/General Counsel W. CLARK BROWN serving our community. BOARD OF TRUSTEES L A P. PATRICK ASHOURI Donations may be made online via credit card or by mail to Los SUE M. BENDAVID-ARBIV Angeles County Bar Foundation, PO Box 55020, Los Angeles, CA, GEORGE F. BIRD JR. C B KIMBERLY H. CLANCY 90055-2020. For additional information, call (213) 896-6409 or send DUNCAN W. CRABTREE-IRELAND an e-mail to [email protected]. JEFFERY J. DAAR THOMAS J. DALY TANJA L. DARROW BEATRIZ D. DIERINGER Visit the Foundation’s Web page at www.lacba.org/foundation. DANA M. DOUGLAS PAMELA E. DUNN CAMILLA M. ENG IRA M. FRIEDMAN ALEXANDER S. GAREEB JACQUELINE J. HARDING LAURIE R. HARROLD BRIAN D. HUBEN K. ANNE INOUE LAWRENCE H. JACOBSON HELEN B. KIM RICHARD A. LEWIS ELAINE W. MANDEL JACK TRIMARCO & ASSOCIATES ELLEN A. PANSKY ANN I. PARK POLYGRAPH/INVESTIGATIONS, INC. THOMAS H. PETERS LAURA S. SHIN DAVID W. SWIFT LUCY VARPETIAN NORMA J. WILLIAMS ROBIN L. YEAGER AFFILIATED BAR ASSOCIATIONS 9454 Wilshire Blvd. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASSOCIATION BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES, INC. Sixth Floor CENTURY CITY BAR ASSOCIATION CONSUMER ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES CULVER-MARINA BAR ASSOCIATION Beverly Hills, CA 90212 EASTERN BAR ASSOCIATION GLENDALE BAR ASSOCIATION IRANIAN AMERICAN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION TEL 310.247.2637 ITALIAN AMERICAN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION JAPANESE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF GREATER LOS ANGELES JOHN M. LANGSTON BAR ASSOCIATION FAX 805.984.7042 JUVENILE COURTS BAR ASSOCIATION KOREAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Jack Trimarco - President email: [email protected] LAWYERS' CLUB OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY Former Polygraph Unit Chief www.jacktrimarco.com LESBIAN AND GAY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES LONG BEACH BAR ASSOCIATION Los Angeles F.B.I. (1990-1998) MEXICAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CA. P.I. #20970 PASADENA BAR ASSOCIATION SAN FERNANDO VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION SAN GABRIEL VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION Member Society of Former Special Agents Former Polygraph Inspection Team Leader SANTA CLARITA BAR ASSOCIATION SANTA MONICA BAR ASSOCIATION Federal Bureau of Investigation Office of Counter Intelligence SOUTH ASIAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA U.S. Department of Energy SOUTH BAY BAR ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, INC. SOUTHEAST DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA CHINESE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION WHITTIER BAR ASSOCIATION WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES
6 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009
HONORABLE LAWRENCE W. CRISPO (RETIRED)
or many veterans of the organized bar, new “bar years,” like birthdays, seem to increase in frequency and Ffamiliarity. This year, however, is different. As I prepare to pass the Los Angeles Lawyer gavel, my overwhelming sense is that the environment in which this magazine is published
has changed dramatically in the 12 months during which it has been my privilege to serve as chair of its Editorial Board. A magazine focused on substantive legal developments brings together two pro- fessions: publishing and law. Without question, both have endured enormous blows during the past year. From January 1 to May 5, 2009, law firms have laid off over 11,000 people. That statistic does not account for the many firms that are postpon- ing the start dates for new associates, those that have rescinded employment offers, and the law offices (large and small) that have permanently shut their doors. As depressing as the current economic climate has been for lawyers, it has Mediator Arbitrator arguably been worse for journalists. Barely half a year after the collapse of Heller Ehrman, employees of the San Francisco Chronicle agreed to painful cuts in an effort to save the paper from extinction. The New York Times Company reported a Referee mind-boggling loss of $74.5 million for the first quarter of 2009. Other papers have 213-926-6665 halted their conventional presses and will henceforth live only in cyberspace. The decline of traditional news media represents not only the loss of jobs for writ- www.judgecrispo.com ers but also the loss of a forum for democratic debate, and with that, a vehicle for challenging ourselves. It is no secret that when we go online, we select the topics and opinions we care about and filter out the rest, creating what Nicholas Negroponte of M.I.T. has dubbed “The Daily Me.” As New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof has recently pointed out, The Daily Me has serious implications for our individual intelligence as well as our ability to function in democratic environments. We may believe intellectually in diversity of opinion, but in practice, we are profoundly sus- ceptible to the comforts of writers who articulate our own perspectives. My own view is that, in a similar vein, organized bar activities have an enormous capacity to bring together individuals from across the professional spectrum and, accordingly, to improve our profession. Thirty years ago, this publication featured an article expressing the view that it was virtually impossible for women and minori- ties to gain election to the State Bar Board of Governors. Today, our State Bar pres- ident is an Asian woman and the five individuals most recently elected to the board included three people of color and one woman. Even more important, the insular board decried in these pages three decades ago has given way to an entity that places accountability in bar governance, elimination of bias, and access to justice at the fore- front of its concerns. All of which brings me to the conclusion that participation in bar activities—like reading a newspaper without the use of personalized filters—is an effort that will only increase in relevance in these challenging economic times. I have every confidence that LAL will continue to serve as a vital forum for the cross-pollination of ideas and infor- mation and the resulting betterment of our profession. My personal and heartfelt thanks to Publisher and Editor Sam Lipsman and Senior Editor Lauren Milicov, whose talents and tireless professionalism have made my tenure as chair both rewarding and thoroughly enjoyable. Congratulations to incom- ing chair David Schnider, who will soon lend his own style and wit to these pages. It has been an honor and a pleasure to serve as chair of LAL’s Editorial Board. ■
Angela J. Davis is an assistant U.S. attorney and the 2008-09 chair of the Los Angeles Lawyer Editorial Board. Her views do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 Justice Roger Boren’s Closing Argument, “An amend its Made in the USA law to specifi- Mason further fails to mention pending ACE for Los Angeles High School Students,” cally provide for class treatment of these legislation in the U.S. Congress to restore in the November issue of Los Angeles Lawyer claims. The federal Lanham Act, which the per se ban on RPM under federal law. Just provided an insightful behind-the-scenes look expressly allows all injured parties to sue for after publication of Mason’s article, Maryland at the inception of the Appellate Court false country of origin designations, has enacted a “Leegin repealer” law that confirms Experience (ACE) program by the Constitu- been misinterpreted by the federal courts that RPM is a per se antitrust offense in that tional Rights Foundation, the Appellate only to allow injured businesses to sue. The state. Courts Committee of the Los Angeles Coun- federal law should also be amended to cor- Without this other information, Mason’s ty Bar, the California Academy of Appellate rect this. Otherwise misled consumers are left article could lead to errant legal advice. Lawyers, and the Second District Court of without a meaningful remedy. I am a deputy attorney general in the Appeal. We want to add that the feedback we Antitrust Law Section at the California have received from students, teachers, vol- Joel D. Joseph Department of Justice, Los Angeles branch unteer lawyers, and the appellate court jus- office. I am also secretary/treasurer of the tices concerning the ACE program has been Stephen G. Mason’s “The Price is Right” in Antitrust and Unfair Business Practices Section exceedingly positive, with schools and teach- the April 2009 issue of Los Angeles Lawyer of the Los Angeles County Bar Association. ers continuing to request to participate. ACE offers a provocative viewpoint on resale price This letter reflects my own views and not serves many Los Angeles schools that lack the maintenance (RPM), also known as vertical necessarily those of the California D.O.J. or means to participate in such outreach pro- price fixing. LACBA. grams. As with many programs of its kind, However, Mason’s article is seriously ACE operates through the generosity of its incomplete as a primer on RPM, because it Jonathan M. Eisenberg volunteers and its financial sponsors. We ignores California’s antitrust law, which was encourage law firms and individuals interested not affected by the U.S. Supreme Court’s The Author Replies: Jonathan M. Eisenberg in volunteering and/or in sponsoring the pro- Leegin decision, which overturned the 1911 makes several thoughtful observations about gram to please contact us. Dr. Miles decision’s per se ban on vertical price state antitrust enforcement. In writing “The fixing under federal law. California’s Price Is Right,” however, my aim was to Randee Barak and Benjamin Shatz Cartwright Act (Business and Professions tailor the article narrowly to address the Cochairs, ACE Program Code Sections 16720 et seq.) broadly outlaws Dr. Miles decision in detail, to examine the direct and indirect price fixing and makes most influential Supreme Court decisions The article on the “Made in the USA” liti- no distinction between the horizontal and assessing and affecting its utility spanning a gation was very interesting and timely vertical varieties. Accordingly, California century, and to analyze the competing eco- (“American Made,” December 2008). As courts have repeatedly held RPM to be a per nomic developments in federal antitrust the attorney who initiated both of the lead- se Cartwright Act violation. See, e.g., Mailand jurisprudence which ultimately led to its ing California cases on the topic, Benson v. v. Burckle, 20 Cal. 3d 367, 377 (1978); demise. Kwikset and Colgan v. Leatherman, I would Kunert v. Mission Financial Services like to make a few comments. First, the Corporation, 110 Cal. App. 4th 242, 263 Stephen G. Mason authors claim that there is no bright-line (2003); Chavez v. Whirlpool Corporation, 93 standard for Made in the USA. While this is Cal. App. 4th 363, 370 (2001). Kurt L. Schmalz’s “A Fee Change” (April generally true, there is indeed a bright-line Many commentators have wondered 2009) sounds catchy but is wrong. Mr. standard in California. As the courts in whether the California Supreme Court will Schmalz's eulogy for mandatory fee arbitra- Kwikset and Leatherman ruled, a product reinterpret the Cartwright Act (and, in my tion (MFA) exemplifies that many people in cannot be advertised as Made in the USA if opinion, depart from the text’s plain and the profession do not have a clear under- any component of the product is imported. unambiguous meaning) to follow Leegin. standing of the MFAA, which leads them to The article quotes the dissenting judge’s But, as California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. disregard the many benefits of the program question in Kwikset about whether the U.S.S. Texaco, Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 1147, 1165 (1988), and prefer court or private arbitration, both Reagan (with a single foreign part) could be affirmed, courts applying the Cartwright Act venues being more expensive for the non- considered Made in the USA. The answer is are not bound by federal cases construing lawyer than for the lawyer. the product should be labeled as Assembled the federal Sherman Act. Kathleen E. Foote, The MFAA is a consumer (client) friendly in the USA. the senior assistant attorney general in charge program that allows parties to have their fee The most important conclusion of the of the Antitrust Law Section at the California dispute arbitrated without having to retain article is that legislation is needed to allow Department of Justice, has stated that Cal- counsel, in an informal, cost effective and consumers to bring Made in the USA cases ifornia’s antitrust enforcers treat RPM as a per relatively summary proceeding. It is not, as as class actions. California can and should se violation of California law. Mr. Schmalz implies, administered only
Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 9 – EXPERT WITNESS – through local bar associations (the State Bar of former Civil Code Section 990(h). In 1999, California is an alternate venue). It does not the statute was amended to extend its pro- CONSTRUCTION deal only with nonbinding arbitrations (the par- tection to those who died “within 70 years” ties may agree to binding arbitration at the out- prior to that date. See Civil Code Section 41 YEARS set). Furthermore, under the MFAA program 3344.1(h). In a July 2007 letter to the legis- CONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE it is not necessarily so that, in addition to the lature, retired State Senator Bill Campbell, the program filing fee, there are “other expenses author of California’s original law, wrote SPECIALTIES: and burdens on the client.” For example, that his legislation was always intended to Lawsuit Preparation/Residential through the Los Angeles County Bar’s program protect the rights of celebrities who had Construction, Single and Multi-family, a party can have a fee dispute arbitrated by a already died. “In point of fact,” wrote Senator Hillside Construction, Foundations, Vibration Trespass, Concrete, Floors, Tile, well trained, free, fee dispute arbitrator with Campbell, “the overwhelming testimony on Stone, Retaining Walls, Waterproofing, subject matter expertise within 4 to 12 weeks my bill throughout the legislative process Water Damages, Roofing, Sheet Metal, of the filing of a petition and payment of pro- came from heirs or representatives of celebri- Carpentry/Rough Framing, Stairs, gram fees. Experience also has established that ties who had already passed, such as, the Materials/Costs, Building Codes, Construction Contracts. in attorney-client fee disputes, over 90 percent widow of Elvis Presley, the son of John of the matters submitted to MFA arbitration Wayne, and the grandson of W.C. Fields. CIVIL EXPERIENCE: result in a final and binding resolution. There was even written testimony from the Construction defect cases for insurance What Mr. Schmalz completely and utterly widow of the great American General, Omar companies and attorneys since 1992 misses, by not mentioning it at all, is that there Bradley.” Moreover, SB 771 received the is an added, essential, component to the standard two committee hearings and votes— COOK MFAA. Should the client prevail and be enti- before the Assembly and Senate Judiciary CONSTRUCTION COMPANY tled to a refund of fees and/or costs and the Committees. It was also voted upon on the STEPHEN M. COOK attorney fails to pay, the State Bar of Califor- floors of both legislative chambers. At none California Contractors License B431852 nia has the authority to enroll that attorney of these stages was a single “no” vote cast. So Nevada Contractors License B0070588 as inactive until the award or judgment after much for any genuine claims of controversy Graduate study in Construction MFA is paid. In the absence of an MFAA arbi- or precipitousness. L.A. Business College, 1972 tration, the State Bar of California does not Finally, the article’s assertion that this Tel: 818-438-4535 Fax: 818-595-0028 have such authority nor the client such pro- clarifying legislation will prompt litigation by Email: [email protected] tections. In other words, a private arbitration “prior users who acted in reliance on their can result in a “binding” resolution, but the pre-SB 771 rights and are harmed as a result 7131 Owensmouth Avenue, Canoga Park, CA 91303 client may never collect the judgment as there of this retroactive bill” is wrong for at least would be very little pressure on the attorney three reasons. First, until the now-abrogated to satisfy it. May 2007 decision of the U.S. District Court In reading Mr. Schmalz’s article, one for the Central District of California, “prior would never know any of the above, but will users”—and would-be infringers—uniformly believe that MFAA should, and will, in time understood that California’s postmortem be exchanged for the costly, time consuming, right of publicity was possessed by those cumbersome private arbitration programs who had predeceased the law’s 1985 effective favored by some in the profession for reasons date. This understanding of the original Cal- which have little to do with any state or fed- ifornia statute was never challenged during the eral arbitration act favoring expediency or 22 years prior to that decision, and indeed has consumer protection. never been contested with respect to the sim- ilar postmortem publicity rights statutes that Anahid Agemian currently exist in 13 other jurisdictions. Second, any statute that clarifies preexisting In its opening paragraph, your cover story dis- law, or otherwise affirms an original legisla- cussing the recent legislation clarifying tive intent, does not effect any change in the California's posthumous publicity rights law law; rather, it states the law as it always was. (“Everlasting Fame,” May 2009) incorrectly In such cases, no question of retroactive appli- asserts that this amended statute is “contro- cation is involved. See, e.g., Western Security versial,” was “rushed through the legisla- Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 4th 232, ture” and “will likely spawn litigation.” All 243 (1997) and In re Marriage of Fellows, 39 three of these claims are refuted by the facts. Cal. 4th 179, 183 (2006). Third, the Senate Senate Bill 771 merely reaffirmed the Judiciary Committee specifically examined understanding of this statute that prevailed SB 771 on constitutional grounds and con- since the time it first became effective in 1985. cluded that it “would not create a new See, e.g., Miller v. Glenn Miller Productions, ‘retroactive’ effect of 3344.1.” California’s 318 F. Supp. 2d 923 (C.D. Cal. 2004) and Legislative Counsel similarly confirmed to Joplin Enterprises v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349 Governor Schwarzenegger that SB 771 was (W.D. Wash. 1992). Specifically, this law constitutional. Any misguided litigation over always protected the rights of “deceased per- these issues should be regarded as nothing sonalities”—a term statutorily defined as short of frivolous. including “any such natural person who died within 50 years prior to January 1, 1985.” See Douglas E. Mirell
10 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 barristers tips BY PAUL EISNER
Weighing the Consequences of Section 998 Offers to Compromise
OFFERS TO RESOLVE CIVIL LITIGATION frequently come in two since they expand the release to cover matters beyond what would forms: a settlement offer, or an offer to compromise under Code of be covered in a judgment. Therefore, adding additional terms to a Civil Procedure Section 998. While a settlement offer and an offer to Section 998 offer may turn it into an ordinary settlement offer and compromise both involve attempts by one or more parties to a dis- render it invalid for the purpose of shifting costs.8 As a result, once pute to resolve a matter in litigation or arbitration, an offer to com- a properly made offer to compromise is accepted, an attorney must promise pursuant to Section 998 is very different from a settlement use care in preparing its release and dismissal, making sure that they offer because it is subject to different standards and has different con- do not contain terms or add parties or otherwise go beyond what is sequences upon acceptance or rejection. allowed in an offer to compromise. The offer to compromise provides defendants with advantages and disadvantages relative to a standard settlement offer. The major Application of Section 664.6(a) advantage to a defendant is the consequences that a plaintiff faces if The language of Section 998(b)(1) provides that judgment should be he or she rejects the offer and goes to trial or arbitration and fails to promptly entered or an arbitration award promptly rendered. An achieve a more favorable result. The consequences are the cost-shift- accepted offer to compromise (unlike an offer for entry of judg- ing provisions of Section 998(c)(1), in which postoffer costs that a ment) is not self executing, so the settlement enforcement provisions defendant normally pays are instead paid by the plaintiff if the plain- of Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6(a) may apply. A defendant tiff fails to achieve a better result. A defendant’s disadvantages in mak- who after acceptance of an offer to compromise 1) insists on releases ing an offer to compromise include limits on when an offer to com- protecting nonlitigating parties, 2) adds other terms that go beyond promise may be made, the terms that may be included, and the a general release and dismissal before payment of any agreed amount, parties that may be included in a release. or 3) fails or refuses to pay the agreed amount faces the possibility The time frames in which a settlement offer or an offer to com- that the plaintiff may, pursuant to Section 664.6(a), make a motion promise may be made are different. A settlement offer may be made for entry of judgment in the agreed amount. and accepted anytime. In contrast, Section 998(b) requires that an offer Despite the limitations on the scope of allowable releases and to compromise be made at least 10 days prior to arbitration or trial, preclusion of other terms, a properly made offer to compromise can and Section 998(b)(2) provides that the parties to whom the offer to give a defendant significant advantages over a standard settlement. A compromise is made shall have either 30 days or to the time of trial Section 998 offer can shift postoffer costs to the plaintiff should the or arbitration, whichever is sooner, to accept the offer. plaintiff fail to do better at trial. On the other hand, a properly made offer to compromise subjects a defendant to significant disadvan- Additional Terms tages, because under Section 998 a defendant cannot 1) obtain Section A settlement offer may contain whatever terms the offering party pro- 1542 waivers, 2) prevent future actions by the plaintiff that are not poses, but an offer to compromise may not. A defendant’s ordinary covered in the pending litigation, 3) obtain releases of nonlitigants, or settlement offer will often contain more than a simple release and dis- 4) obtain additional terms that would not be part of a judgment. missal. The release, for example, will frequently list more than the lit- A Section 998 offer to compromise is a double-edged sword, so igating parties, adding the defendant’s agents, servants, employees, a defendant needs to use it with care. A defendant may find that a prop- heirs, successors in interest, and anybody else the defendant wants to erly made offer to compromise, when accepted, is nothing more protect. The settlement offer may also provide for the release of than the resolution of but one round of an ongoing dispute in which unknown claims, include a Civil Code Section 1542 waiver, make war- additional battles involving additional issues and additional parties ranties of nonassignment, and append other recitals, for example a will still remain to be fought. ■ statement that the settlement is not an admission of fault. On the other hand, although courts have expanded the permissible scope of a 1 Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro, 27 Cal. App. 4th 899 (1994). offer to compromise beyond the Section 998 statutory language to 2 Barella v. Exchange Bank, 84 Cal. App. 4th 793 (2000). 3 add judgment equivalents of an offer of payment in exchange for a Valentino v. Elliot Savon Gas, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 3d 692, 700-01 (1988); Goodstein, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 908. dismissal,1 the terms that may properly be contained in an offer to 4 Fassberg Constr. Co. v. Housing Auth. of Los Angeles, 152 Cal. App. 4th 720, compromise are limited. 765 (2007). See also Valentino, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 700-01. If an offer to compromise contains terms (including release terms) 5 Valentino, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 697-98; Barella, 84 Cal. App. 3d at 800. beyond what could be obtained had the case proceeded to judg- 6 See Goodstein, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 908 and Barella, 84 Cal. App. 4th at 800-01. ment—such as a confidentiality clause,2 a waiver of other potential 7 See Chen v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club, 164 Cal. App. 4th 117, 122- or additional litigation claims,3 or the inclusion of additional poten- 23 (2008). 8 Barella, 84 Cal. App. 4th at 801-03. tial nonparty and unnamed defendants4—the terms dilute the mon- etary worth of a standard settlement,5 making valuation impossible.6 Inclusion of Section 1542 waivers also appear to be precluded,7 Paul Eisner is with the law offices of Duncan David Lee.
Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 11 practice tips BY ANDREW J. THOMAS
The Future of Injunctive Relief in Copyright Infringement Cases
TWO MOTION PICTURES are slated for release on the same day by dif- marketplace sued eBay, Inc., for patent infringement. A jury found ferent studios, both of which become the target of lawsuits seeking that the patent was valid and that eBay had infringed, but the district prerelease injunctions. The first studio is sued because its film, while court declined to grant permanent injunctive relief. The Federal nominally fictional, is alleged to portray the real-life plaintiff in a Circuit reversed, purporting to apply a “general rule that courts will defamatory way. Assuming the plaintiff establishes a likelihood of pre- issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent excep- vailing on his or her libel claim and presents abundant evidence that tional circumstances.”7 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. his or her reputation will be irreparably harmed by the film, will the In an opinion by Justice Thomas, it held that under “well-established plaintiff get a preliminary injunction? Almost certainly not: The principles of equity” a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction under court most likely will hold that an interim injunction barring the release the Patent Act must satisfy the traditional four-factor test by demon- of the film would be an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech and strating “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that reme- will deny the plaintiff’s motion—citing Supreme Court precedent dies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to dating back to Near v. Minnesota.1 compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hard- The second studio, however, is sued because its film briefly but ships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is war- prominently displays, without permission, the plaintiff’s copyrighted ranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a sculpture. Assuming the plaintiff establishes a likelihood of prevail- permanent injunction.”8 ing on his or her copyright infringement claim but presents little if In holding that these familiar equitable principles “apply with equal any evidence of irreparable harm, will the plaintiff get a preliminary force to disputes under the Patent Act,” the Court noted that the Patent injunction? The answer—at least until three years ago in most Act itself expressly defers to equitable precepts when it states that courts—was probably yes. Because the case was a copyright suit, the injunctions “may” issue “in accordance with the principles of equity.”9 court most likely would have presumed the existence of irreparable The Court emphasized that this approach “is consistent with our treat- injury based on a showing of likely success on the infringement ment of injunctions under the Copyright Act.” It then cited three deci- claim and granted the motion—citing scores of appellate decisions sions in which it had stated that injunctive relief should not auto- across the country to that effect.2 matically follow upon a finding of copyright infringement—Dun v. In recent years, many lawsuits like this have been filed on the eve Lumbermen’s Credit Association, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, of (or immediately following) the nationwide release of motion pic- and New York Times v. Tasini—cases the Court said “consistently tures—including Amistad, The Devil’s Advocate, The Full Monty, rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with Twister, The Island, Knocked Up, and most notoriously, 12 Monkeys. a rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination that In the 12 Monkeys case, a graphic artist sued Universal for copying a copyright has been infringed.”10 the plaintiff’s drawing of a wall-mounted chair as a set design that On this latter point, the Court noted that copyright law, like appeared for a total of five minutes in Universal’s 130-minute film.3 patent law, gives the owner of the intellectual property “the right to The court found the plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of suc- exclude others from using his property,” but that the Copyright cess on his infringement claim and accordingly concluded that Act’s injunction provision likewise is not absolute: It provides that a “irreparable harm is presumed.” The court then issued a preliminary court “may” grant injunctive relief “on such terms as it may deem injunction, requiring Universal temporarily to withdraw the $30 reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.”11 million film from theatrical distribution.4 Similar scenarios can Justice Thomas’s relatively short opinion for the unanimous Court threaten the release of other works, like software applications or video drew two concurring opinions. In the first, Chief Justice Roberts, joined games, that take years and cost millions of dollars to develop, and by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, stresses that the Court’s opinion does that may incorporate copyrighted artwork, music, or computer code. not mean that district courts are left to write on a “clean slate” in Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay, Inc. applying the four-factor equitable test. Noting that since the early nine- v. MercExchange, LLC,5 such cases arguably should come out dif- teenth century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding ferently, or at least should be analyzed in a way that makes it less likely of infringement in the “vast majority of patent cases,” the chief jus- that a court will grant injunctive relief reflexively. In eBay, the Court tice observes that, while this “historical practice” may not entitle a held that permanent injunctive relief in patent infringement cases plaintiff to a permanent injunction, it nevertheless should inform the should be guided by the traditional four-part equitable test, instead application of the equitable test since, “in this area as others, a page of a collapsed test that assumes an entitlement to injunctive relief based of history is worth a volume of logic.”12 on a showing of infringement. The extent to which eBay applies In a second concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices beyond the patent context or undermines the conventional wisdom Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, observed that such historical practices are that irreparable harm may be presumed in intellectual property cases6 remains an open question. Andrew J. Thomas is a partner in the Los Angeles office of Davis Wright In eBay, the holder of a business method patent for an electronic Tremaine LLP. His practice focuses on intellectual property and media litigation.
12 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 When the pressure is on, GREAT LAWYERS rise to the occasion.
This is Elizabeth Yang, Associate with Howrey LLP, one of the largest international law firms in Los Angeles and Class of 2006 graduate. Read Elizabeth’s story at www.go2lavernelaw.com/elizabeth
The University of La Verne College of Law has been provisionally approved by the Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association since 2006. The Section of Legal Education may be contacted at 321 North Clark Street, Chicago, IL 60610 or by phone at (312) 988-6738. less relevant when a court is confronting dif- irreparable injury based on a finding of The Central District of California has ferent circumstances and considerations than infringement, provided they consider all four gone the opposite way. In the most detailed in the classic paradigm of patent infringe- traditional equitable factors—including the analysis to date of eBay’s application to copy- ment.13 In particular, Justice Kennedy referred public interest—in exercising their discretion right injunctions, Judge Wilson in Metro- to the rise of an industry “in which firms use to grant injunctive relief. Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, patents not as a basis for producing and sell- A number of courts have been reluctant to Ltd.24 granted a permanent injunction in ing goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining abandon longstanding rules that irreparable favor of the plaintiff copyright owners and licensing fees.” For these firms, he noted, an injury will be presumed upon a finding of against StreamCast Networks, the operator injunction can be employed as a “bargaining infringement and that a plaintiff is entitled to of the Morpheus peer-to-peer file-trading ser- tool to charge exorbitant fees.” He cautioned a permanent injunction upon showing the vice. Judge Wilson found that eBay governed that “[w]hen the patented invention is but a defendant’s past infringement and threat of the injunction request and held that the Ninth small component of the product the companies continuing infringement. Two recent New Circuit’s former two-part test for a permanent seek to produce and the threat of an injunction York cases illustrate this trend. injunction in copyright cases—proof of past is employed simply for undue leverage in nego- In Lennon v. Premise Media, the district infringement plus a likelihood of future tiations, legal damages may well be sufficient court denied a motion for preliminary injunc- infringement—had effectively been overruled to compensate for the infringement and an tion brought by the owners of a copyright in by eBay, which required the court to apply the injunction may not serve the public interest.”14 the John Lennon song “Imagine” based on the traditional four-factor test.25 inclusion of 15 seconds from the song in the Judge Wilson then held that “the pre- Decisions after eBay motion picture Expelled: No Intelligence sumption of irreparable harm no longer inures Does eBay’s rejection of a categorical rule Allowed. The court found that the plaintiffs to the benefit of plaintiffs.”26 He relied on the favoring injunctions upon a showing of could not establish a likelihood of success on Supreme Court’s statement in eBay that plain- infringement apply beyond the patent context the merits because the defendants were likely tiffs “must demonstrate” that the traditional to copyright actions and other intellectual to prevail on their defense of fair use.19 Before factors favor an injunction, which he inter- property litigation? Given the eBay Court’s making its fair use finding, however, the court preted to mean that the plaintiff has the bur- explicit reliance on copyright case law in opined in dicta that eBay did not disturb the den of proof on the question of irreparable reaching its result, the answer surely must be longstanding Second Circuit rule that irrepara- harm and that even a rebuttable presumption yes. To date, however, only one federal appel- ble harm will be presumed if the plaintiff is no longer permitted.27 In finding irrepara- late court has squarely held that eBay applies makes a prima facie case of copyright infringe- ble harm, Judge Wilson looked beyond the to copyright infringement cases. In ment. The court read eBay narrowly to pro- defendant’s established liability for secondary Christopher Phelps & Associates v. Galloway, hibit only a categorical rule that required an copyright infringement and considered the the Fourth Circuit held that a copyright plain- injunction upon a showing of infringement fact that StreamCast had actively induced tiff is not automatically entitled to permanent and concluded that under Second Circuit law infringement, that it would not have been injunctive relief upon a showing of copyright the court still exercised its equitable discretion feasible for the plaintiffs to file suits against infringement and a threat of continuing to grant or deny an injunction even after it the myriad direct infringers who used the infringement; instead, courts must apply the presumed irreparable harm.20 Morpheus service, and that the defendants traditional four-factor equitable test.15 In Warner Bros. Entertainment v. RDR could not remotely satisfy the massive statu- Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to Books, Warner Bros. and author J.K. Rowling tory damages award that would be justified address eBay in a copyright case, the court has brought a copyright infringement suit against by the magnitude of the infringement of thou- indicated that eBay will apply to permanent the publisher of a “companion book” to the sands of copyrighted works.28 injunction cases generally. In Reno Air Racing Harry Potter series of novels called The Notably, Judge Wilson contrasted the mas- Association v. McCord, the court noted that Lexicon. Following a bench trial, the court sive and deliberately induced infringement at eBay “reiterated” that courts should apply engaged in a fair use analysis and concluded issue in Grokster with the defendant’s infringe- “traditional equitable principles” in deciding that The Lexicon was not a fair use, largely ment in the “patent troll” scenario addressed whether to grant permanent injunctive relief. because of its extensive literal copying and by Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in It upheld the district court’s grant of a per- close paraphrasing from the Potter novels eBay. Unlike the situation in which the manent injunction after a bench trial in a and from two earlier companion guides by patented invention “is but a small compo- trademark infringement case, noting that the Rowling.21 In considering whether to issue a nent of the product” the defendant companies defendant did not challenge the district court’s permanent injunction, the court held that in seek to produce and “the threat of an injunc- application of these principles.16 The Fifth and eBay “the Supreme Court made clear that an tion is employed simply for undue leverage in Eleventh Circuits also have strongly hinted injunction does not automatically follow a negotiations,” Judge Wilson found that that eBay should control trademark injunc- determination that a copyright has been “StreamCast’s entire business was built around tion requests.17 While some district courts infringed.”22 The court noted the question the fundamental premise that Morpheus have accepted that eBay applies to copyright of whether the Second Circuit’s presumption would be utilized to infringe copyrights.”29 injunction cases, many have continued to of irreparable injury survives eBay but con- grant injunctions based on less than weighty cluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated eBay and Preliminary Injunctions showings of irreparable injury.18 irreparable injury in any event, relying mainly Before eBay courts generally applied a pre- Courts have disagreed whether, in light of on Rowling’s testimony that publication of the sumption of irreparable harm at the prelim- eBay, irreparable harm still may be presumed defendant’s Lexicon would have disheartened inary injunction stage as well.30 Although based solely on a showing of infringement. her as an author and destroyed her creative eBay does not expressly address preliminary Read narrowly, eBay merely precludes courts desire to publish her own Harry Potter ency- injunctions, the case casts doubt on this long- from automatically granting a permanent clopedia, on a finding that the Lexicon would standing rule. A preliminary injunction can injunction based on a finding of infringe- suppress sales of Rowling’s earlier companion have a devastating effect on the defendant, as ment. In theory, it does not preclude them guides, and on a finding that the defendants illustrated above. Moreover, because of the from continuing to presume the existence of likely would continue infringing.23 relatively undeveloped factual record at the
14 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 preliminary injunction stage, there is a greater isfy the traditional four-factor test and must The infringing “proportion is so insignificant risk that courts may enjoin the distribution of demonstrate “that irreparable injury is likely compared with the injury from stopping expressive works—that is, constitutionally in the absence of an injunction.”37 Echoing appellees’ use of their enormous volume of protected speech—that are not infringing or its pronouncements in eBay (and again invok- independently acquired information, that an otherwise unlawful.31 ing Amoco), the Supreme Court stated that injunction would be unconscionable.”39 In particular, collapsing of the traditional “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, the equitable test to presume an entitlement to remedy never awarded as of right,” and “[i]n Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s preliminary injunctive relief upon a show- exercising their sound discretion, courts of rejection of the defendant’s fair use defense of ing of likely infringement can lead to injunc- equity should pay particular regard for the its parody of the song “Pretty Woman.” In tive relief in situations in which the allegedly public consequences in employing the extra- doing so, the Court cautioned that copyright infringing material is only a small part of ordinary remedy of injunction.”38 injunctions are not mandatory and suggested the expressive work that is sought to be Although Winter is not an intellectual that courts should refrain from imposing enjoined, or in which monetary damages property case, its embrace of the traditional injunctive relief in cases involving “close ques- almost certainly would provide an adequate equitable test and its rejection of “lenient” tions” of fair use.40 The Court quoted at length remedy.32 Nevertheless, one might argue that approaches to finding irreparable harm cer- from Judge Leval’s influential article on fair use, it would be consistent with equitable princi- tainly suggest that eBay will apply with equal which argues that while in the “vast majority ples to presume irreparable harm and issue force at the preliminary injunction stage in of cases, [an injunctive] remedy is justified interim injunctive relief upon a plaintiff’s copyright cases. because most infringements are simple piracy,” showing of a likelihood of success on its such cases are “worlds apart from many of infringement claim—even if such an approach Limits on Copyright Injunctions those raising reasonable contentions of fair is foreclosed at the permanent injunction After eBay, studio defendants may no longer use” in which “there may be a strong public stage. After all, preliminary injunctions are face the doomsday scenario of a preliminary interest in the publication of the secondary temporary and often are conceived of as injunction that prevents the release of a movie. work [and] the copyright owner’s interest may merely preserving the status quo. Indeed, in such situations as eBay, it may be adequately protected by an award of dam- The Southern District of New York have the most impact on the decisions of dis- ages for whatever infringement is found.”41 embraced this view in Lennon v. Premise trict courts to grant or deny injunctions in The Supreme Court returned to this theme Media Corporation. The court drew a dis- copyright cases. Defendants can argue that the in New York Times v. Tasini, in which it held tinction between preliminary and permanent court must consider all four factors in the tra- that the republication of newspaper articles in copyright injunctions, opining that even if ditional equitable test for injunctive relief, electronic databases was not a “revision” of a eBay precluded a presumption of irreparable including whether the plaintiff can be ade- collective work permissible under Section harm at the permanent injunction phase of a quately compensated with money damages. 201(c) of the Copyright Act but instead copyright case, “A presumption temporarily Moreover, the Supreme Court’s instruction— infringed the copyrights of the freelance writ- removing the need to prove irreparable harm in eBay and Winter—that courts must con- ers who contributed some of the articles in the may serve the ends of equity at this early sider the “public interest” in deciding whether database. In response to arguments from the stage of the litigation.”33 to issue injunctions may open the door to defendant publishers that the Court’s ruling Other courts, however, have assumed that more explicit considerations of First Amend- would have dire consequences in the form of eBay’s reasoning applies equally to prelimi- ment values in the determination of appro- injunctions requiring the deletion of articles nary and permanent injunctions in intellectual priate copyright remedies. from online databases, the Court explained: “It property cases.34 This conclusion finds sup- When the material that allegedly has been hardly follows from this decision that an port in the eBay opinion, in which the infringed constitutes only a small portion of injunction…must issue.” The Court noted Supreme Court twice cites its earlier opinion the defendant’s expressive work, or when the that the courts and Congress “may draw on in Amoco Production Company v. Village defendant presents a strong argument that numerous models for distributing copyrighted of Gambell, a 1987 decision holding that a its use of copyrighted material is protected by works and remunerating authors….”42 presumption of irreparable harm at the pre- the fair use doctrine, the public interest favor- liminary injunction stage in an environmen- ing the dissemination of the defendant’s Circuit Court Antecedents tal case “is contrary to equitable principles.”35 work—including First Amendment interests in A number of appellate decisions anticipate The inference that eBay applies to intellectual free expression—is at its strongest. In contrast, and support this view as well. In Rosemont property cases also finds support in the when the defendant is accused of wholesale lit- Enterprises v. Random House, for example, Supreme Court’s decision last year in Winter eral copying, as in piracy cases, no public the Second Circuit reversed a preliminary v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., interest is likely to be negatively affected by injunction restraining publication of a 1966 in which the court reversed and remanded a preliminary or permanent injunctive relief biography of Howard Hughes that allegedly preliminary injunction, affirmed by the Ninth upon a showing of infringement. infringed the copyrights of three Look mag- Circuit, that prohibited the Navy from con- The three copyright cases cited by the azine articles, noting that the injunction ducting training exercises using active sonar Supreme Court in eBay all support this view. deprived the public of an opportunity to due to alleged environmental harms caused to A century ago, in Dun v. Lumbermens Credit learn about a “newsworthy personality.”43 In marine mammals.36 Association, for example, the Supreme Court Abend v. MCA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held The Court rejected as “too lenient” the upheld the lower court’s refusal to enter an that the defendant’s release of the motion Ninth Circuit’s longstanding preliminary injunction in a case in which it found that the picture Rear Window without a valid renewal injunction standard, which allowed for the defendant publisher improperly had copied copyright infringed the plaintiff’s copyright in issuance of injunctive relief on a showing of some information from the plaintiff’s reference the short story on which the movie was based. a mere “possibility” of irreparable harm, if the book for use in the defendant’s similar refer- But in remanding to the district court, the plaintiff demonstrated a strong likelihood of ence book. The Supreme Court held that an court observed that the case presented “com- prevailing on the merits. Instead, the Court injunction preventing the dissemination of the pelling equitable considerations” because an emphasized that the moving party must sat- defendant’s entire work would be inequitable: injunction could result in “great public
Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 15 injury.” The court noted that the success of liminary or permanent injunctive relief. 6 Many courts—including the Ninth Circuit—have the movie Rear Window “resulted in large Nevertheless, it would appear that injunc- held that irreparable injury may be presumed in trade- mark cases upon a finding of a likelihood of confusion. part from factors completely unrelated to tive relief still may be obtained fairly readily See, e.g., GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F. the underlying story”—including the “out- in cases—like Grokster—of simple copying or 3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000). standing performances” of Grace Kelly and piracy, provided the plaintiff can establish 7 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 401 F. 3d James Stewart and the “brilliant directing of some palpable risk of harm beyond its show- 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Alfred Hitchcock,” and that an injunction ing of past infringement. 8 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 9 would cause public injury “by denying the Case law has yet to address fully the ques- Id. at 391-92 (quoting 35 U.S.C. §283). 10 Id. at 392. public the opportunity to view a classic film tion of eBay’s application to copyright 11 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. §502(a)). 44 for many years to come.” infringement suits in which the material 12 Id. at 395 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, The Eleventh Circuit echoed the Supreme infringed amounts to only a small portion of 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)). Court’s admonitions in Campbell about the defendant’s expressive work or in which 13 Id. at 395-96. Specifically, Justice Kennedy observed: injunctions in close fair use cases in Suntrust the defendant raises a colorable fair use “To the extent earlier cases establish a pattern of 45 granting an injunction against patent infringers almost Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company, in defense. Based on Supreme Court and circuit as a matter of course, this pattern simply illustrates the which it reversed a preliminary injunction decisions, however, these scenarios—in which result of the four-factor test in the contexts then preva- that restrained the publication of Alice free speech interests are at their strongest— lent.” Id. at 396. Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, a fictional may present the most likely opportunity for 14 Id. at 396-97. 15 parody that drew substantially on the novel courts to apply eBay to limit the use of injunc- See Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F. 3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007). Last year, the Gone with the Wind. The court cited tions in copyright actions. ■ Federal Circuit, applying Ninth Circuit law in a rare Campbell for the proposition that “while copyright appeal, observed, with only a passing men- injunctive relief may be particularly appro- 1 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 tion of eBay: “[W]here a copyright holder has shown priate in cases involving simple copying or U.S. 713 (1970); Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 likelihood of success on the merits of a copyright ‘piracy’ of a copyrighted work,…such relief U.S. 539 (1976); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 infringement claim, the Ninth Circuit has held that (1931). may not be consistent with the goals of copy- irreparable harm is presumed.” Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 2 See, e.g., Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp., F. 3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008). right law in cases in which the alleged 125 F. 3d 824, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997); ABKCO Music, 16 Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F. 3d 1126, infringer…has a colorable fair-use defense.”46 Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F. 3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2006); accord Geertson Seed Farms After eBay, all owners of intellectual prop- 1996). v. Johanns, 541 F. 3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 2008) (eBay’s erty would be well advised to assume they no 3 See Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. four-factor test governed a plaintiff’s request for a longer can rely solely on a general presump- 62, 65 (S.D. N.Y. 1996). permanent injunction based on violation of the National 4 See id. (citing Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Environmental Policy Act.). tion of irreparable injury, without concrete Mfg., 25 F. 3d 119, 124 (9th Cir. 1994)). 17 See Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Sigmar, 86 proof of such harm, in seeking either pre- 5 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1813, 1820-21 (5th Cir. 2008) (per (2006). curiam); North Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F. 3d 1211, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2008). 18 See, e.g., Designer Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 2008 WL 4174882 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2008) (applying eBay and granting permanent injunction based on threat of continuing infringement, noting that actual damages were difficult to assess and statutory damages might not be available); Propet USA, Inc. v. Shugart, 2007 WL 4376204 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 13, 2007) (cit- ing eBay and granting permanent injunction based on ongoing infringement, defendant’s “obfuscation,” and the lack of any countervailing public interest). 19 See Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 320 (S.D. N.Y. 2008). World Class Training for the Complete Mediator 20 See id. at 320 n.1. 21 See Warner Bros. Entm’t v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 539-51 (S.D. N.Y. 2008). 22 Id. at 551. Mediating & Negotiating Commercial Cases 23 Id. at 552-53. See also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Blake, 2007 WL 1853956 (E.D. N.C. June 26, 2007) with Lee Jay Berman (citing eBay but concluding without analysis that for advocates and mediators irreparable injury is presumed when a plaintiff succeeds on the merits); Warner Bros. Entm’t v. Carsagno, 2007 Mediating Divorce Agreement WL 1655666 (E.D. N.Y. June 4, 2007) (applying eBay and granting permanent injunction in a default judg- with Jim Melamed ment case involving the defendant’s distribution of for advocates and mediators the film Million Dollar Baby on a peer-to-peer file-trad- ing network). Settle For More: Mediation Advocacy Secrets 24 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Judge with Lee Jay Berman and Friends Wilson earlier had granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the question of liability as against StreamCast Networks. See Metro-Goldwyn- See our complete listing of courses and dates at: Mayer Studios, Inc v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 2006). www.AmericanInstituteofMediation.comm 25 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 1209 213.383.0454 (discussing MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F. 2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993)). 26 Id. at 1211.
16 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 27 Id. 28 Id. at 1217-18. 29 Id. at 1216. JudgeJudge Michaelichael D. Marcuscus (Re(Ret.).) 30 See, e.g., LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes of Nev., 434 F. 3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2006); Mediator Arbitrator Discovery Referee Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F. 2d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 1989). EXPERIENCEDEXPERIENCED PPERSERSUASIVEASIVE EEFFEFFECTIVETIVE 31 See Mark Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, Daily JournalJournal Topop 3030 NeutNeutralal 20072007 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (arguing that courts should be more reluctant to enjoin copyright infringement at Employment Legal Malpractice the preliminary injunction stage than at the permanent Business Real Property injunction stage, because of the danger of restraining Personal Injury Intellectual Property speech that ultimately is found not to be infringing). 32 See, e.g., Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62, 65 (S.D. N.Y. 1996). But see Chase- Centutury City Downtownwn Losos Angelesngeles Orangeange Couounty Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1259 tel:el: 310.201.0010310.201.0010 wwwww.ma.marcusmedicusmediation.tion.comom Available exclusively at email:email: mdm@[email protected] (C.D. Cal. 1997) (refusing to enjoin theatrical release of the movie Amistad because of doubts about the mer- its of the plaintiff’s claim that movie infringed her novel and because the balance of hardships weighed in the defendant’s favor); Monster Commc’ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490, 493-97 (S.D. N.Y. 1996) (declining to enjoin television broadcast of documentary because the defendant was likely to prevail on fair use defense and balance of equities favored the defendant). 33 Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 320 n.1. (S.D. N.Y. 2008). 34 See, e.g., Allora, LLC v. Brownstone, Inc., 2007 WL 1246448 (W.D. N.C. Apr. 27, 2007) (declining to pre- sume irreparable harm at preliminary injunction stage in copyright case). 35 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (citing Amoco Prod. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987)). 36 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 37 Id. at 375 (emphasis in original). 38 Id. at 376-77 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court held that “even if plaintiffs have shown irrepara- ble injury from the Navy’s training exercises, any such injury is outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s interest in effective, realistic training of its sailors.” Id. at 376. 39 Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n, 209 U.S. 20, 23- 24 (1908). 40 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994). 41 Id. (quoting Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1132 (1990)). 42 New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001). 43 See Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366 F. 2d 303, 310-11 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Belushi v. Woodward, 598 F. Supp. 36, 37 (D. D.C. 1984) (denying preliminary injunction sought by photogra- pher Judith Belushi over one of her photographs in a biography of John Belushi, despite finding a likelihood of success on the merits; legal remedies “would vin- dicate any rights that may have been impinged” and that the public interest in “the promotion of free expression”outweighed the plaintiff’s interest). 44 See Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F. 2d 1465, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); see also Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 368 F. 3d 77 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Dun and Abend in holding that an injunction barring publica- tion of a Dorothy Parker poetry collection was an abuse of discretion, where plaintiff had only a “slight” protectible interest in some of the poems). 45 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F. 3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 46 Id. at 1265 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994)).
Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 17 practice tips BY ELIZABETH L. CROOKE
Applicability of the Fair Procedure Doctrine
WHEN GOVERNMENT ACTION or inaction threatens protected inter- ests, state and federal due process clauses guarantee certain procedural protections as well as substantive limitations on government power.1 However, these constitutional guarantees generally offer no protec- tion when a private organization or association excludes or expels members. This void can be harmful. Individuals subjected to adverse membership decisions by professional or social organizations can suf- fer a devastating economic impact. In 1944, the California Supreme Court announced a common law right, under certain circumstances, to judicial review of membership decisions by private organizations and associations.2 In James v. Marinship Corporation, the court held that a union could not arbi- trarily deny membership privileges to applicants on grounds of race if the union held monopolistic power over the right to work.3 The judi- cial remedy for the arbitrary exclusion of the plaintiffs as potential members was injunctive relief. Later cases referred to this common law right as the fair procedure doctrine to avoid confusion between it and constitutional due process rights.4 The use of the fair procedure doctrine has expanded since 1944, and its arsenal of remedies now includes substantial tort damages. When an organization or association serves as a gatekeeper to a pro- fession or trade, that entity must offer members or prospective members a fair procedure when it makes exclusionary membership decisions. For a procedure to be fair, it must include adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. However, the California Supreme Court has stopped short of defining the procedural rules that must be followed in exclusionary membership decisions. notable and consistent themes have emerged. Instead, the court has left this task first to the organizations them- The right identified by the court in Marinship was not necessar- selves and then to trial and intermediate appellate courts, which con- ily new. Earlier decisions justified court intervention on the premise tinue to draw the contours of the doctrine as well as the means to of protecting property rights in members’ funds and assessments.7 implement it. Marinship was groundbreaking because it offered a remedy to those A purely private enterprise may affect the public interest by pro- who were excluded, not expelled, and who thus had no property inter- viding important products or services, by making representations to est. The court departed from the property right requirement in favor the public about those products and services, by superior bargaining of a more expansive rule grounded in public policies underlying the power, by legislative recognition, or a combination of those factors.5 right to work. If that entity also possesses substantial power to thwart an individ- ual’s pursuit of a lawful trade or profession or to control the man- Expanding the Doctrine ner in which it is practiced, that entity’s membership decisions may In the ensuing decades, California courts expanded the doctrine in right- be subject to judicial review for substantive rationality and procedural to-work cases, most notably in the medical and dental professions. For fairness. instance, the supreme court applied the doctrine in Pinsker v. Pacific The doctrine today, with its elements of public interest and eco- Coast Society of Orthodontists (Pinsker I).8 The case involved exclu- nomic interest, is flexible and has been applied to situations outside sionary decisions by associations that certify specialists in orthodon- of the context of unions, including healthcare providers, expert asso- tics. Since those associations held a virtual monopoly to determine pro- ciations, the Boy Scouts, and even private clubs. Still, it is not with- fessional standards, they were imbued with the public interest, out limits. Nevertheless, the doctrine has been invoked in settings that subjecting their membership decisions to judicial review. Although mem- show it to be sufficiently robust to supply procedural safeguards when bership was not essential for a specialist’s certification, it had become a private organization or association acts as a gatekeeper with power a practical necessity. Applicants thus had the right to have their appli- to influence or control the right to practice a trade or profession.6 Although the decisions invoking the fair procedure doctrine may Elizabeth L. Crooke litigates mass tort cases on behalf of plaintiffs for
RICHARD EWING appear at times to be inconsistent in their application and scope, some Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack.
18 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 cations “considered in a manner comporting thus the right to practice a lawful profession, to fair procedures.25 While a claimant may be with the fundamentals of due process, includ- the licensee seeking to remain in the resident obliged to first exhaust administrative reme- ing the showing of cause for rejection,”9 and program was entitled to “rudimentary pro- dies, once that is accomplished, the organi- that cause must not be arbitrary or capricious. cedural and substantive fairness.”18 zation under scrutiny may be exposed to tort The court built on that foundation in Medical insurers as well are fair game for damages for failure to afford fair procedures.26 Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Ortho- the fair procedure doctrine when they have the These judicial forays into the managed dontists (Pinsker II), explaining that an organ- power to control the flow of patients to healthcare setting skirt an important but ization’s decision to exclude or expel an indi- healthcare professionals through a preferred competing policy issue. When patient care is vidual may be arbitrary either because the provider network. A public interest is affected at issue, an uneasy tension exists between reason for doing so is irrational or because the when medical services are provided through management autonomy and quality of care. organization has proceeded unfairly.10 A pri- the “unique tripartite relationship among an Judicial deference to a legitimate business vate organization’s exclusionary decisions insurance company, its insureds, and the rationale—such as public safety or “eco- that affect the public interest must be sub- physicians who participate in the preferred nomic credentialing”27—may take a back stantively rational and procedurally fair.11 provider network.”19 In Potvin v. Metro- seat to a healthcare practitioner’s quality-of- This means that the applicant must be noti- politan Life Insurance Company, the court care decisions if those decisions lead to expul- fied of the reason for the proposed rejection trained its focus on public and consumer sion or “deselection” from a plan or pro- and given a meaningful opportunity to be interests that, along with economic restraints, gram. While some commentators and heard. The court stepped away from the “due justified extending the doctrine again. The opinions make the case for judicial restraint process” language it had used in Pinsker I, dis- court concluded that the insurer “possesses in a hospital’s disciplinary process,28 others tinguishing the common law right of fair power so substantial that the removal [from argue for intervention after concluding that procedure from broader constitutional the preferred provider network] significantly the public interest may be affected by exclu- duties.12 impairs the ability of an ordinary, compe- sionary decisions. Courts may be asked to Since the court was reluctant to second- tent physician to practice medicine or a med- confront these issues with greater frequency guess the management decisions of a private ical specialty in a particular geographic area, as the economics of modern medicine and organization, it was naturally unwilling to set thereby affecting an important, substantial managed care collide with the medical ethics rigid rules. Justice Tobriner wrote, “The com- economic interest.”20 Health insurers hold a of patient care. mon law requirement of a fair procedure virtual monopoly on managed care and have does not compel formal proceedings with all substantial economic power over physicians Invoked and Not Invoked the embellishments of a court trial [citation], on the preferred provider lists by controlling Courts have remarked repeatedly on their nor adherence to a single mode of process. It the flow of patients. If expulsion of a physi- reluctance to interfere with management may be satisfied by any one of a variety of cian from an insurer’s preferred provider list autonomy.29 Thus it is no surprise that when procedures which afford a fair opportunity for will impair the physician’s practice of medi- they have done so, they have refrained from an applicant to present his position….[T]his cine and thereby affect an important eco- drafting mandatory guidelines to be followed court should not attempt to fix a rigid pro- nomic interest, the insurer must afford fair by managers, opting instead for a flexible cedure that must invariably be observed.”13 procedures.21 analysis. The organization itself has the pri- The court thus left it to associations them- A groundbreaking decision in 2008 gave mary responsibility to devise a method that selves to devise methods that provide appli- new teeth to the fair procedure doctrine by provides the applicant or member with ade- cants with adequate notice and an opportu- recognizing a cause of action with a tort rem- quate notice and a reasonable opportunity to nity to respond. edy for an organization’s failure to afford be heard—orally, or in writing. Whether a In Ezekial v. Winkley,14 the supreme court fair procedures. That same decision placed the particular procedure is “fair” depends largely stretched the fair procedure doctrine to reach determination of the factual basis of the doc- on the nature of the issue in question.30 the expulsion of a surgical resident from a pri- trine squarely in the hands of a jury. In Palm Under the doctrine’s relatively spartan vate hospital’s residency program. The court Medical Group, Inc. v. State Compensation requirements, the reasonable notice should made a pragmatic decision that was grounded Insurance Fund,22 an occupational medical provide the reasons for the membership deci- in economics. Expulsion and exclusion impli- clinic was excluded from an insurer’s pre- sion, and the hearing or procedure should cate different concerns, because a member ferred provider network and was thus omit- afford the member or applicant with an on whom a benefit has already been con- ted from its online search tools, which are an opportunity to respond to those reasons. ferred enjoys broader legal protections than an important means for steering patients to the This opportunity to respond may be nothing initial applicant for the same benefits. The clinic. The clinic sued and secured a hefty jury more than the chance to make a written post-license specialty training of physicians verdict for damages for violation of the fair defense submission.31 Articles of association through residency programs is part of the procedure doctrine, but the trial court granted or an organization’s bylaws may supply pro- “vital link” of private regulation that is essen- the insurer’s motion for judgment notwith- cedural rules for charges against a member, tial to modern medical practice.15 No longer standing the verdict. but those rules do not supplant the underly- did the court couch its concerns in terms of the However, the court of appeal reversed, ing obligation to act fairly. public interest or restraint of trade. Instead, the making three noteworthy observations. First, The California Legislature has recognized court acknowledged that residency programs a corporate plaintiff is entitled to the same fair the need for procedural protections and, substantially affect an “important economic procedure protections as individuals.23 Next, accordingly, has codified the right to fair pro- interest.”16 Exclusion from this type of pro- the issue of the insurer’s power over the local cedure in some settings. For instance, gram is deemed “arbitrary” when it is sub- market is one of fact for the jury to decide.24 Corporations Code Section 18320, as adopted stantively unreasonable, internally irregular, or Finally, the court affirmed a monetary tort ver- in 2005, requires that when a property right procedurally unfair.17 Because a private hos- dict for the clinic’s lost profits, over the insur- or important substantial economic interest is pital’s resident admission and expulsion poli- er’s objection that the only remedy under the involved, the expulsion of a member of an cies effectively control a physician’s practical fair procedure doctrine is remand to the organ- unincorporated association must be done in ability to use a state-issued medical license and ization to reconsider its decision, pursuant good faith and in a fair and reasonable man-
Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 19 ner. This can be satisfied by including the ization that promotes the integrity of expert divorce.39 The member was entitled to notice procedures in the unincorporated associa- testimony in firearms forensics. It was not a and an opportunity to be heard, because she tion’s governing documents, such as deliver- surprise that this group was of special inter- used her membership to help earn a living as ing notice and a statement of reasons for est to the judiciary. The court held that its a real estate agent—an economic interest the expulsion at least 15 days before the effective members were entitled to fair procedure in court deemed important. Country club mem- date of expulsion, and providing an oppor- censure proceedings.36 berships are property rights, and members are tunity to be heard, orally or in writing, at least The exclusionary policies of the Boy entitled to fair procedure to protect rights they five days before the expulsion. Expulsion of Scouts have been successfully challenged enjoy as members.40 a member is reviewable, if suit is timely filed, under the doctrine, resulting in judicial review California courts usually hold that the and the court may order any relief it deems for fair procedure when the Scouts attempted fair procedure doctrine is not applicable when equitable, including reinstatement.32 Similarly, to expel a Scout because of his homosexual- the economic- or public-interest threshold membership in a nonprofit mutual benefit ity.37 The court returned to the doctrine’s has not been met. When organizations do corporation cannot be terminated unless the origins in the public interest to prohibit an not perform a gatekeeper function for a pro- statutory minimum requirements for notice arbitrary expulsion based solely on the Scout’s fession, courts generally find that the organ- and procedures have been met.33 The notice status as a homosexual. However, while the izations cannot be compelled to supply a fair and hearing procedures outlined in these pro- Boy Scouts may not arbitrarily expel a Scout, procedure to offended applicants. For visions serve as useful guidance for corpora- their refusal to promote a Scout to the rank instance, neither the Academy of Motion tions and organizations in drafting their own of Eagle Scout does not affect a substantial Picture Arts and Sciences nor the Producers governing documents. economic interest; the loss of prestige and Guild of America was considered to be a Fairness in physician peer review also has honor did not suffice to justify judicial inter- gatekeeper controlling the right to practice the been the subject of legislation.34 While com- ference in the organization’s autonomy.38 trade or profession of movie producing. The mon law still applies in those settings, courts In a modest departure from the economic court further observed that they did not oper- may also rely on the uniform procedures pro- and public interests that animated Marinship ate in the public interest, so no fair procedure vided in a codified procedural scheme.35 and its progeny, the fair procedure doctrine concerns were implicated when one of the As with healthcare providers and insurers has been extended to apply to private golf and producers of the Academy Award-winning that have power to restrict the flow of busi- country club memberships, which may have film Crash was bypassed for award recogni- ness, an association that privately peer reviews only a remote influence over a member’s pro- tion because the Academy did not feel that he the work of experts may be construed to fessional opportunities. The court ruled that met the award criteria.41 occupy a gatekeeper function. For instance, a club with a “men-only” policy contained in The courts have given institutions of the Association of Firearm and Toolmark the club’s bylaws could not unilaterally ter- higher learning a pass when dealing with Examiners was held to be a gatekeeper organ- minate a woman’s membership upon her tenure considerations, holding that a uni- versity does not exercise sufficient control to thwart a professor’s right to pursue his or her profession. Thus a university is under no obligation to provide a hearing before remov- ing the professor from the tenure track.42 Further, a nonprofit sports organization’s dis- ciplinary suspension of two volunteer umpires was also not subject to fair procedure require- ments, as neither public nor economic inter- ests were deemed to be threatened by the organization’s decisions.43 Although finding that there was no legal obligation to afford fair procedure under common law, the court observed that the organization’s disciplinary procedure was nonetheless fair and complied with Corporations Code Section 7341. That section is part of the laws governing non- profit corporations that are designed to cod- ify existing case law concerning the procedural steps required for suspending or expelling members. Organizations that are accustomed to management autonomy may now wish to reexamine their procedures for participant selection and deselection in light of decisions applying the fair procedure doctrine. With tort damages potentially available to an offended party, it is reasonable to expect that the fair procedure doctrine will be invoked with greater frequency and in new settings. An organization making exclusionary decisions must now weigh the potential for tort dam- ages in membership decisions that may
20 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 adversely impact a member or applicant’s 15 Id. at 274. 28 See Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs of Associations livelihood and should provide the appropri- 16 Id. at 277. Not for Profit, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993, 1021-29 (1930) 17 ate fair procedures as a result. ■ Id. at 272. (discussing policies against judicial interference). 18 Id. at 278. 29 Chafee has suggested that judicial efforts to construe 19 Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 4th the rules of private organizations would lead to a “dis- 1 CAL. CONST. art. I, §§7, 15; U.S. CONST. amend. 1060, 1070 (2000). mal swamp.” See id.; see also Berke v. Tri Realtors, 208 XIV, §1. 20 Id. at 1071. Cal. App. 3d 463, 467 (1989). 2 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721 (1944). 21 In an earlier case, the court expansively interpreted 30 Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 279 (1977). 3 Id. at 732 (quoting Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail the doctrine, holding that a dental health plan had 31 Kurz v. Federation of Pétanque, U.S.A., 146 Cal. App. Deliverers’ Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 197 A. 720 attained “quasi-public significance” so its compensa- 4th 136 (2006). (1938)). The Marinship court reasoned: “Where a tion decisions were subject to fair procedure review. 32 CORP. CODE §18320(e). union has…attained a monopoly of the supply of Delta Dental Plan v. Banasky, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1598 33 CORP. CODE §7341. labor…such a union occupies a quasi public position (1994). 34 BUS. & PROF. CODE §§809 et seq. similar to that of a public service business and it has 22 Palm Med. Group, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 161 35 Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. Sacramento County Superior certain corresponding obligations….Its asserted right Cal. App. 4th 206 (2008), rev. denied. Court, 128 Cal. App. 4th 85, 100 nn.13, 102 (2005). to choose its own members does not merely relate to 23 Id. at 217-18. 36 Dougherty v. Haag, 165 Cal. App. 4th 315 (2008). social relations; it affects the fundamental right to 24 See Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int’l Inc., 17 Cal. The Association of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners work for a living.” 25 Cal. 2d at 731. 4th 93, 108 (1998) (“All of the elements of the gov- censured Dougherty after he gave testimony that his 4 Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc’y of Orthodontists (Pinsker erning standard are triable to the jury.”). peers deemed to be groundless. Dougherty sued for a II), 12 Cal. 3d 541, 550 n.7 (1974). 25 Palm Med. Group, 161 Cal. App. 4th at 225. writ to force the AFTE to reverse its censure. The 5 Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 4th 26 Id. at 226. See also Cumbre, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. court identified 18 separate steps that the AFTE took 1060, 1070 (2000). Fund, 2007 WL 1404612 (2007) (holding that fact to supply “an avalanche of ‘due process’”—well beyond 6 See Yari v. Producers Guild of Am., Inc., 161 Cal. questions precluded the insurer’s motion for summary the rudimentary demands of the fair procedure doctrine. App. 4th 172 (2008) (first judicial reference to gate- adjudication of a fair procedure cause of action 37 Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, keeper analogy). prompted by the insurer’s decision to terminate a pre- 147 Cal. App. 3d 712 (1983). 7 See, e.g., Otto v. Tailors’ P. & B. Union, 75 Cal. 308 ferred broker agreement). 38 Kim v. Southern Sierra Council Boy Scouts of Am., (1888); Van Arx v. San Francisco G. Verein, 113 Cal. 27 The American Medical Association has defined “eco- 117 Cal. App. 4th 743 (2004). 377 (1896). nomic credentialing” as “the application of economic 39 Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 214 Cal. 8 Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc’y of Orthodontists (Pinsker criteria unrelated to quality of care or professional App. 3d 646, 658 (1989). I), 1 Cal. 3d 160 (1969). competence to decisions concerning appointment, reap- 40 Youngblood v. Wilcox, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1368 9 Id. at 166. pointment, or delineation of staff privileges.” Richard (1989). 10 Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc’y of Orthodontists S. Liner, Note, Physician Deselection: The Dynamics 41 Yari v. Producers Guild of Am., Inc., 161 Cal. App. (Pinsker II), 12 Cal. 3d 541, 545 (1974). of a New Threat to the Physician-Patient Relationship, 4th 172 (2008). 11 Id. at 550. 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 511, 513 n.8 (1997) (quoting John 42 King v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 138 Cal. App. 3d 12 Id. at 550 n.7. D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialing into 812 (1982). 13 Id. at 555. Managed Care Selective Contracting, 22 AM. J.L. & 43 Kurz v. Federation of Pétanque, U.S.A., 146 Cal. App. 14 Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267 (1977). MED. 173, 176 (1996)). 4th 136 (2006).
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Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 21 by R. Alexander Pilmer and Mark T. Cramer Swindlers’
Formal dissolution proceedings are usually necessary to LISTsort through the wreckage of failed Ponzi schemes
Until the collapse of Bernard Madoff’s reported $65 billion invest- investment opportunities providing substantial returns, but those ment scheme late last year, many people had never heard the term returns are not supported by any type of underlying, legitimate busi- “Ponzi scheme”—and those who had would have been hard-pressed ness. Instead, investors are paid profits from the principal sums paid to define it. Thanks to Madoff, Ponzi schemes are now part of the by newer investors. The initial investors usually receive the promised mainstream lexicon and are no longer solely the obscure subjects of returns, which attracts additional investors. To keep the scheme court opinions and law review articles. Indeed, talk of Ponzi schemes going, Ponzi operators must garner more new investors in order to seems to dominate not only the headlines but also late-night talk shows, continue paying earlier investors. cocktail parties, and weekend soccer games. Ponzi schemes are a species of pyramid scheme. In essence, Ponzi Despite all the recent notoriety, most people (including many schemes are upside-down pyramids that inevitably collapse because attorneys) still have no idea what happens when Ponzi schemes col- lapse. For law enforcement, attorneys, accountants, and other pro- R. Alexander Pilmer and Mark T. Cramer are partners at Kirkland & Ellis LLP fessionals, that is when the real work begins. Given the prevalence in Los Angeles, where they are members of the firm’s litigation department. of these schemes and the rate at which they are being discovered, the Pilmer and Cramer handled hundreds of cases arising out of a failed Ponzi legal and logistical issues involved in excavating the financial ruins scheme operated by Reed Slatkin, including In re Slatkin and Neilson v. of a collapsed Ponzi scheme will remain for years to come. Union Bank of California, N.A. They are currently counseling a number of
Operators of Ponzi schemes typically represent them as legitimate investors in the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme. RON OVERMYER
22 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 they are structurally unsound from their inception. While Ponzi under the Bankruptcy Code to undo many financial transactions schemes can last for years, eventually—and inevitably—their oper- conducted by Ponzi operators in the 90 days leading up to the bank- ators are unable to recruit enough new investors to fund the with- ruptcy filing.4 The purpose of undoing these “preferences,” as these drawal requests and returns of the earlier investors. Thus, like death transactions are known, is to spread the effect of the bankruptcy across and taxes, the ultimate failure of a Ponzi scheme is certain. a greater number of creditors and prevent earlier-paid creditors who The Ponzi scheme’s namesake, Carlo “Charles” Ponzi,1 was an received money immediately prior to the bankruptcy from receiving Italian immigrant who, in the 1920s, solicited other immigrants to a windfall. invest their life savings with him.2 Ponzi falsely claimed that his Another tool available to trustees that would not be available out- investors’ money would be used to buy international postal coupons side the bankruptcy context is the ability to obtain documents and that he could resell for a 100 percent profit. Ponzi convinced his testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004.5 investors that he was able to earn substantial profits by exploiting dif- At any time after a bankruptcy petition is filed, the trustee may seek ferences in international currency exchange rates. In fact, the only thing an order from the bankruptcy court to conduct an examination Ponzi exploited was his investors’ trust because he was not actually under oath of “any entity”6 and compel the production of documents.7 using their money to purchase postal coupons and, therefore, would Consistent with the rule’s purpose to discover information regarding not earn any return on their investments. Instead, he used the money the assets of the bankruptcy estate, a permissible “2004 examination” he received from new investors to pay the returns he had promised is broad in scope.8 To that end, and distinct from depositions and other to earlier investors. Although Ponzi convinced more than 20,000 peo- standard discovery devices, a trustee can obtain information through ple to invest more than $10 million, an audit of Ponzi’s assets after 2004 examinations without initiating litigation. the scheme collapsed turned up less than $100 worth of postal Separate from and independent of the claims brought by the coupons. trustee or receiver, certain aggrieved investors in a Ponzi scheme Many Ponzi operators target specific religious or ethnic groups to may have standing to pursue various claims of their own. These can get their schemes off the ground. They exploit the built-in trust of these be pursued individually or on a classwide basis on behalf of all sim- so-called affinity investors or affinity groups to establish their cred- ilarly situated investors. These claims, however, are likely to have no ibility, to identify potential investors, and to promote their schemes. value because a Ponzi operator will almost always be the subject of There are countless examples of this sort of affinity fraud in the con- a receivership or bankruptcy case. The investors also may have text of Ponzi schemes. Ponzi himself targeted his fellow Italian immi- claims against third parties who had some connection with or facil- grants. More recently, Madoff preyed on members of the Jewish itated the Ponzi scheme. community, including numerous Jewish charities. A large percentage Upon appointment, a trustee or receiver must investigate, assess, of the investors in Reed Slatkin’s $600 million Ponzi scheme—one of and account for the finances of the Ponzi operator’s personal estate the largest Ponzi schemes in U.S. history—were followers of L. Ron and any business entities associated with the scheme.9 Because fraud Hubbard’s Church of Scientology. Other recent schemes have targeted artists rarely maintain complete (much less accurate) books and Baptists, Mormons, and members of the Saddleback Church, as well records, this process can be painstaking, time consuming, and com- as African Americans, Koreans, and Latinos. In recent years, hardly plicated.10 The trustee or receiver typically will rely on bank records any religious or ethnic group has been spared from some sort of affin- to re-create the activity predating his or her appointment. In most cases, ity fraud.3 the trustee or receiver will need to retain forensic accounting experts As Ponzi schemes progress, some investors—typically those who not only to complete the process reliably but also to provide expert were recruited early in the scheme—withdraw more money from the testimony to support the methodology used and the conclusions scheme than they invested. In essence, these early investors receive fic- reached.11 Armed with that data, the trustee or receiver will then 1) titious profits on their principal investments, while other investors identify creditors (those who are owed money), 2) identify debtors receive either less than they invested or nothing. Whether an investor (those who owe money to the estate), 3) initiate litigation against the receives more or less than the principal investment looms large in deter- debtors to recover the sums owed, and 4) ultimately distribute the pro- mining the investor’s status in future litigation. ceeds to the creditors. The first two steps involve a calculation of cash in and cash out: Liquidation, Mitigation, and Litigation comparing each investor’s payments to and withdrawals from the Ponzi Failed Ponzi schemes often end up in bankruptcy, SEC receivership, operator. The “net winners” in the scheme are those investors who Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) liquidation, or received more payments from the scheme than they paid to it. The other formal dissolution proceedings. Any number of business enti- “net losers” are those who received less in return than they invested ties created in connection with the schemes, in addition to the per- in the scheme. Depending on when the net winners received their pay- sonal estates of the Ponzi operators, may need to be liquidated as well. ments (relative to the date the Ponzi scheme collapsed or the date a Depending on the circumstances, the personal estates of Ponzi oper- bankruptcy petition was filed), they may be legally required to pay ators and related business entities may file for liquidation in a bank- back some or all of their fictitious profits. ruptcy or through a receiver appointed pursuant to securities laws and Given this reality, it is critical for Ponzi scheme investors—espe- regulations. cially those unaware of the fraud before the collapse—to immediately The bankruptcy trustee or the receiver may pursue claims against identify how much money they invested with the Ponzi operator coconspirators, financial institutions, and certain investors. The compared to their actual returns. Investors who made money will likely recoveries based on these claims often are among the largest assets face litigation by a trustee or receiver seeking to claw back the over- the trustee or receiver has available to pay creditors’ claims, includ- payments. ing the claims of investors who lost money in the scheme. Trustees Nearly all investors in Ponzi schemes consider themselves inno- and receivers share the same objective—namely, to return as much cent victims. Whether they were net winners or net losers in the money as possible to the victims of the scheme. scheme, most investors will feel betrayed by the Ponzi operator—some- While trustees and receivers have many of the same rights and abil- one they considered a trusted adviser, if not a friend. Beyond that, even ities to pursue money from potential defendants, the Bankruptcy the net winners who made money in the scheme often feel victimized Code provides trustees with some additional powers that are not avail- because they thought they still had money legitimately invested with able to receivers. For example, bankruptcy trustees are empowered the Ponzi operator, only to find that it was an elaborate hoax. Indeed,
24 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 these investors likely will have used the proceeds from the scheme to rights of a creditor under state law, thus empowering the trustee to pay various expenses, such as capital gains and income taxes related bring state law fraudulent transfer claims.18 In addition to fraudulent to the investments, or unrelated and unrecoverable expenses such as transfers under state law, the Bankruptcy Code contains its own college tuitions and property taxes. Moreover, most investors will have fraudulent transfer provisions.19 received periodic “account statements” in which the Ponzi operator The test for determining whether a Ponzi operator made a trans- reported the supposed value of the investments. But these fraudulent fer with the “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor statements typically have no weight or relevance for purposes of of the debtor” generally requires an inquiry into the Ponzi operator’s determining whether a particular investor is a creditor or a debtor of subjective state of mind.20 To establish an intentionally fraudulent
the estate. All that ultimately matters is the calculation of cash in ver- transfer claim, only the subjective mental state of the Ponzi operator sus cash out—not the phony amounts the Ponzi operator reported to is relevant. The investors’ intent is irrelevant to the analysis and is con- investors based on fictitious profits. sidered, if at all, only to determine whether a potential “good faith” Given the necessarily increasing complexity and size of their defense applies.21 schemes, Ponzi operators rarely act by themselves. Those who par- To establish a Ponzi operator’s subjective intent, the trustee or ticipated in the scheme with a Ponzi operator are likely to be the tar- receiver will often rely on affirmative evidence—such as admissions gets of claims by the receiver or trustee; they may also be targeted by or a plea agreement—from the operator. Courts have consistently held law enforcement. the guilty pleas and other admissions of Ponzi operators to be admis- In addition to the receiver’s or trustee’s claims, individual investors sible and binding on the issue of actual intent to defraud.22 Similarly, also may pursue claims against third parties. The targets of these claims actual intent to defraud can be established if the court finds that the can, and commonly do, include the Ponzi operator’s banks, accoun- operator was in fact running a Ponzi scheme.23 tants, and lawyers. The Ponzi operator also is likely to have taken at If the trustee or receiver is unable to demonstrate actual fraud, net least some of the proceeds of the scheme and invested them in any winners may still be liable based on a constructively fraudulent trans- number of different businesses, including real estate ventures, shares fer claim. In constructively fraudulent transfer cases, the key issues in publicly traded companies, or closely held enterprises. The receiver are whether the transfers were made at a time of insolvency, and or trustee will closely scrutinize all aspects of the Ponzi operator’s prior whether the recipient provided reasonably equivalent value. Insolvency dealings, many of which will also end up in litigation. is rarely an issue in Ponzi scheme litigation; given their fraudulent nature, Ponzi schemes are consistently held to be insolvent from Avoidance of Fraudulent Transfers their inception.24 Trustees and receivers both have a powerful tool at their disposal— A recipient of a fraudulent transfer—even a transfer made by a namely, the ability to avoid fraudulent transfers. Many states, includ- Ponzi operator with the actual intent to defraud his or her creditors— ing California, have adopted some version of the Uniform Fraudulent may establish a defense (and keep the money or property trans- Transfer Act.12 ferred) if the recipient provided reasonably equivalent value and There are two basic types of fraudulent transfers: actual (or received the payment in good faith. Whether the recipient provided intentionally) fraudulent transfers, and constructively fraudulent reasonably equivalent value turns on the nature of the payments transfers.13 An intentionally fraudulent transfer is a transfer made received. Some courts have held that no reasonably equivalent value with the “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” any creditor.14 can be given for the fictitious profits of a Ponzi scheme.25 In contrast, A constructively fraudulent transfer is a transfer made without most courts will allow innocent investors to retain the payments receiving reasonably equivalent value when the transferor: 1) was they received, up to the amount of their principal investment. Critical insolvent when the transfer was made or became insolvent as a to this analysis is whether the investor received the payments in result of the transfer,15 2) was engaged in or was about to engage in good faith.26 a business or a transaction for which his or her remaining assets were In fraudulent transfer litigation, however, “good faith” has a dif- unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction,16 or ferent meaning than it does in other areas of the law. Courts apply 3) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed an objective standard in determining what the recipient “knew or that he or she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as should have known”; the recipient’s subjective good faith is irrele- they became due.17 vant.27 Moreover, the burden to establish good faith falls on the recip- The Bankruptcy Code gives bankruptcy trustees the avoidance ient of the fraudulent transfer.
Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 25 HELP WANTED
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To find out more, visit www.lacba.org/careersupport Another key issue in Ponzi scheme litiga- tion involves how far the trustee or receiver can “reach back” to avoid the fictitious prof- its distributed to net winners. Federal bank- ruptcy law provides a two-year reach-back period for fraudulent transfer claims.28 But federal bankruptcy law also empowers a bankruptcy trustee to bring fraudulent trans- fer claims under applicable state law.29 State law claims to recover fraudulent transfers vary and can exceed the Bankruptcy Code’s two-year reach-back period. California law provides a seven-year statute of repose for intentionally fraudulent transfer claims.30 Certain claims for transfers beyond four years must be brought under California law within one year after the fraudulent transfers could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.31 Thus, depending on the jurisdic- There is no substitute for experience. tion, and whether the claims are brought by a receiver or a trustee, investors could be Over 1,250 successful mediations faced with disgorging all payments that they 14 years as a full-time mediator received between one to seven years before the 92% of cases resolved scheme collapsed. Director, Pepperdine Law School’s Potential Claims against Third Parties “Mediating the Litigated Case” program Just about any third party who conducted business with a Ponzi operator faces some lit- LEE JAY BERMAN, Mediator igation risk. The Ponzi operator’s attorneys, 213.383.0438 •• www.LeeJayBerman.com accountants, banks, and even certain investors may find themselves the target of litigation after the scheme collapses. Class actions brought by investors who have suffered dam- ages are fairly common in the context of The name Ponzi scheme litigation. A Ponzi operator’s coconspirators, includ- ing individuals and business entities, can face you’ve known and direct liability for damages if they indepen- dently committed torts against investors or other parties suffering harm. Among other trusted since 1978... claims, coconspirators may have engaged in fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, or other torts, depending on the coconspirator’s relationship with the Richard M. Squar plaintiff. CPA, CVA, ABV, CFF, MBA-Tax Aggrieved investors also may pursue vi- carious liability theories against third par- ties, including financial institutions. The most EXPERT WITNESS – LITIGATION SUPPORT SERVICES common of these theories are conspiracy and TAX AND FINANCIAL CONSULTING aiding and abetting. Under basic tort princi- BUSINESS VALUATIONS ples in many states, including California, a claim for conspiracy is proper if there is an agreement to commit a tort and the plaintiff suffers damage as a result of an act commit- ted in furtherance of the agreement.32 Squar As for aiding and abetting, “liability may…be imposed on one who aids and abets Associates the commission of an intentional tort if the certified public accounting person (a) knows the other’s conduct consti- litigation support & business valuation tutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to www.squarassociates.com so act or (b) gives substantial assistance to the 2064 Phalarope Court Costa Mesa, CA 92626-4734 other in accomplishing a tortious result and Tel: 714.825.0300 Cell: 949.375.4388 Fax: 866.810.9223 the person’s own conduct, separately con-
Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 27 sidered, constitutes a breach of duty to the other person.”33 A plaintiff must plead and Schulze Haynes Loevenguth & Co. prove the existence of an underlying tort, FRAUD EXAMINERS AND FORENSIC/LITIGATION EXPERTS such as fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, and an intent to aid or abet the commission of the tort.34 Designations include: Significant experience in investigation and ✒Certified Fraud documentation of Ponzi schemes and investment Aiding and abetting claims do not require Examiner (CFE) frauds of all types that the defendant owe the plaintiff an inde- ✒Certified Public pendent duty or that the defendant finan- Accountant (CPA) CONTACT KARL J. SCHULZE 35 ✒Certified in Financial cially gain from the tort. The two critical ele- Forensics (CFF) [email protected] • www.schulzehaynes.com ments are whether the third party actually ✒Certified Valuation knew of the Ponzi operator’s breach of duty, Analyst/Accredited in 213.627.8280 949.474.6060 and whether the third party substantially Business Valuation 660 S. FIGUEROA STREET, SUITE 1280 17461 DERIAN AVENUE, SUITE 108 (CVA/ABV) LOS ANGELES, CA 90017 IRVINE, CA 92614 assisted in that breach of duty. “Constructive knowledge” will not support an aiding and abetting claim. The “substantial assistance” element “requires the plaintiff to allege that the actions of the aider/abettor proximately Stefano Vranca, CFE caused the harm on which the primary lia- [email protected] bility is predicated.”36 9171 Wilshire Boulevard, 5th Floor Ponzi schemes inflict a significant financial Beverly Hills, CA 90210 and emotional toll on the innocent victims tel: 310.273.2770 who are tricked into investing their money in fax: 310.273.6649 the fraud. In any failed Ponzi scheme, stories abound of hardship and tragedy, with ripple www.rkco.com effects that go far beyond monetary losses. Although the legal system can never put the victims’ lives back together, victims do have
AUDIT • TAX • ADVISORY rights under the law that can provide some measure of redress. Of course, in an ideal world, investors would be vigilant about too- good-to-be-true investment opportunities. The silver lining in the cloud of recent invest- ment scams is that their widespread public- Do You Need a Forensic Accountant ity will encourage investors to be more wary 1,25600 or Fraud Examiner? of, and therefore less vulnerable to, future 2588000 schemers. Unfortunately, even though all 3,252,00 Maybe you need both and more—not all Fraud Examiners Ponzi schemes are certain to fail from their and Forensic Accountants are the same! inception, it is just as certain that future schemers will devise new frauds and find new victims, if only until those frauds BUSINESS/PERSONAL • ESTATES/TRUSTS • FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE inevitably collapse. ■
• FRAUD ALL WE DO IS FRAUD 1 Charles Ponzi is often credited with being the first to INVESTIGATIONS mastermind the type of scheme that was eventually named for him. Although Ponzi was perhaps the most • FORENSIC Private Investigators, CPA, Certified Fraud Examiner and famous fraudster to carry out such a scheme, he was ACCOUNTING Certified Financial Accountant on staff not the first. Just before the start of the twentieth cen- • INVESTMENT tury, a man named William Miller engineered a scheme FRAUD Copas & Copas, Inc. has experienced and highly trained in which he cheated investors out of more than $1 mil- professionals giving you a significant advantage over hiring • PONZI SCHEMES lion by promising 10 percent investment returns per traditional accounting or private investigation firms. We week. For that, he was nicknamed “520 Percent” • EMBEZZLEMENT specialize in financial investigations to uncover financial fraud Miller. Miller’s fraud was widely publicized and, • MONEY schemes other firms may miss. notwithstanding its failure, probably inspired Ponzi to LAUNDERING devise his own scheme. 2 See generally Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 LET US “FOLLOW THE MONEY” SO YOU CAN FOCUS • KICKBACKS (1924). ON THE LEGAL ISSUES. 3 • ASSET PROFILES See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Commission Client AND NET WORTH Alert, Affinity Fraud: How to Avoid Investment Scams ANALYSIS That Target Groups, available at http://www.sec Copas & Copas, Inc. .gov/investor/pubs/affinity.htm. 4 See 11 U.S.C. §547. CCI FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIONS CA PI#25429 5 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004. Because these examina- 631 Del Monte Drive tions are authorized pursuant to the rule, they are Hollister, CA 95023-7213 831.634.9400 www.copas-inc.com often referred to as “2004 examinations.” 6 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(a). The right to take SERVING CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FOR CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 2004 examinations is not limited to trustees. The rule permits “any party in interest” to seek an order from
28 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 the Bankruptcy Court to take this type of examination. the transfer in good faith and provided value in vent from day one.”). See id. exchange for the transfer. 11 U.S.C. §548(c); CIV. 25 See, e.g., In re United Energy Corp., 944 F. 2d 589, 7 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(c). CODE §3439.08(a). In the context of Ponzi scheme lit- 595 n.6 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[S]uch excess amounts [like 8 Courts have consistently held that the scope of a igation, this defense typically insulates a good faith the fictitious profits the trustee seeks to avoid here] 2004 examination is “unfettered and broad.” See, e.g., investor’s principal investment but not the investor’s would be avoidable because the debtor would not In re Table Talk, Inc., 51 B.R. 143, 145 (Bankr. D. fictitious profits. have received reasonably equivalent value for them.”); Mass. 1985). 22 See, e.g., In re Slatkin, 525 F. 3d 805, 811-15 (9th Independent Clearing House, 77 B.R. at 857, 859 (“If 9 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §1106(a)(3) (The trustee shall Cir. 2008) (affirming partial summary judgment regard- the use of the [investors’] money was of value to the “investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and ing actual intent to defraud as a matter of law based debtors, it was only because it allowed them to defraud financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the on the Ponzi operator’s plea agreement); In re AFI more people of more money….In such a situation, the debtor’s business…and any other matter relative to the Holding, Inc., 525 F. 3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2008); see use of the defendant’s money cannot objectively be case….”). also Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F. 3d 750, 762 (7th Cir. called ‘reasonably equivalent value.’”). 10 See, e.g., In re Bonham, 251 B.R. 113, 116 (Bankr. 1995); In re Bayou Group, LLC, 396 B.R. 810, 835 26 11 U.S.C. §548(c); CIV. CODE §3439.08(a). D. Alaska) (concluding that “the trustee has estab- (S.D. N.Y. 2008) (“Courts have consistently found 27 See In re Bayou Group, LLC, 396 B.R. 810, 844 (S.D. lished the existence of a Ponzi scheme through a metic- that criminal proceeding admissions of a fraudulent N.Y. 2008); see also In re Agricultural Research & ulous reconstruction of the debtors’ disarrayed scheme to defraud investors made in guilty pleas and Tech. Group, Inc., 916 F. 2d 528 (9th Cir. 1990). records”). plea allocutions are admissible as evidence of ‘actual 28 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(A) (actual fraud); 11 U.S.C. 11 See id. at 118-25; see also In re Bayou Group, LLC, intent’ to defraud creditors.”). §548(a)(1)(B) (constructive fraud). 396 B.R. 810, 831-33 (S.D. N.Y. 2008). 23 See Cohen, 199 B.R. at 717 (“Proof of a Ponzi 29 11 U.S.C. §544(b). 12 CIV. CODE §§3439 et seq. scheme is sufficient to establish the Ponzi operator’s 30 CIV. CODE §3439.09(c). 13 CIV. CODE §§3439.04, 3439.05. actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors for 31 CIV. CODE §3439.09(a). 14 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(a); CIV. CODE §3439.04(a)(1). purposes of actually fraudulent transfers….”); In re 32 See, e.g., Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia 15 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I). Agricultural Research & Tech. Group, Inc., 916 F. 2d Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 511 (1994). 16 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II); CIV. CODE 528, 535 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The mere existence of a 33 Fiol v. Doellstedt, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1325-26 §3439.04(a)(2)(A). Ponzi scheme…has been found to fulfill the requirement (1997). 17 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(III); CIV. CODE of actual intent on the part of the debtor.”). California’s 34 Gonzales v. Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC, 532 F. Supp. 2d §3439.04(a)(2)(B). fraudulent transfer statute lists 11 factors that also 1200, 1206 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Casey v. United States 18 11 U.S.C. §544(b); see also In re United Energy can be considered in assessing a Ponzi operator’s actual Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 127 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1145-47 Corp., 944 F. 2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A bank- intent. CIV. CODE §3439.04. (2005) (and cases cited therein). ruptcy trustee has the power to avoid fraudulent trans- 24 See, e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F. 3d 750, 755 (7th 35 See Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. fers pursuant to state law and/or the provisions of the Cir. 1995) (Investors’ claims made a Ponzi scheme 2d 1101, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[S]uch a cause of Bankruptcy Code.”). insolvent from inception.); In re Randy, 189 B.R. 425, action does not require that the aider and abettor owe 19 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1). 441 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“Having been convicted of a plaintiff a duty so long as it knows the primary wrong- 20 See In re Cohen, 199 B.R. 709, 716 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Ponzi scheme, Randy was insolvent from its incep- doer’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty, and it 1996). tion as a matter of law.”); In re Independent Clearing substantially assists that breach of duty.”). 21 Under the good faith defense, a fraudulent transfer House, 77 B.R. 843, 871 (D. Utah 1987) (“By defini- 36 See Mitchell v. Gonzales, 54 Cal. 3d 1041, 1052-53 cannot be avoided to the extent the transferee received tion, an enterprise engaged in a Ponzi scheme is insol- (1991).
Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 29
MCLE ARTICLE AND SELF-ASSESSMENT TEST By reading this article and answering the accompanying test questions, you can earn one MCLE credit. To apply for credit, please follow the instructions on the test answer sheet on page 35.
by Anthony V. Salerno and Elana Goldstein Predators’ Net
In 1981, six-year-old funds are grants generally applied to law a state sex offender registry but, more recently, Adam Walsh was enforcement and drug laws. a publicly searchable sex offender Web site— abducted from a According to a Justice Policy Institute a product of Megan’s Law.7 The AWA effec- Sears store in Holly- study, it will cost California $59,287,816 tively seeks to displace existing state sex wood, Florida. His just to implement SORNA in 2009. But if offender laws and state-run sex offender reg- severed head was California chooses not to implement SORNA, istries. found two weeks it will lose 10 percent of its Byrne Grant Under the AWA, the national registry and later in a canal 120 money, or a mere $2,187,682 per year.5 The Web site will be an amalgam of each state’s miles away. Adam’s tragic death quickly drew study found that in all 50 states, the first-year sex offender registry and will also include national attention, but it was not until 2008 costs of implementing SORNA are signifi- those offenders who have been convicted of that investigators revealed that his murderer cantly greater than the financial loss of a 10 federal sex crimes. To create this Web site, the was a convicted serial killer who had died in percent reduction of Byrne Grant funding.6 AWA requires each state to maintain a sex prison.1 Since Adam’s death, his father, John Given today’s economy and the financial bur- offender registry that conforms to SORNA. Walsh, has become a famous advocate for den that the AWA imposes, many states are However, the AWA only provides the mini- missing children and unsolved crimes and not complying with the AWA because they mum standards that states must impose on hosts the well-known America’s Most Wanted cannot afford to do so. Equally, if not more, their sex offenders. States are free to set more television show. With John Walsh’s efforts, important are the thousands of state and fed- stringent requirements for offenders and to many child protection and sex offender laws eral lawsuits that have been filed across the enforce harsher penalties.8 have passed, including the Adam Walsh Child country alleging that the AWA is unconsti- SORNA creates a three-tiered classification Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (AWA). On tutional and therefore unenforceable. system of sex offenders who must register. Tier July 27, 2006, the AWA became federal law, The constitutional challenges to the AWA I offenders—the least serious offenders, but and with it came nationwide fiscal and con- have arisen due to the unprecedented and not defined by SORNA—will be required to stitutional controversy.2 aggressive requirements that the AWA imposes register for 15 years, renewing once annually.9 The AWA’s most significant provision is the on convicted sex offenders and state gov- Tier II offenders generally are felons con- Sex Offender Registration and Notification ernments. By requiring all states to adopt victed of, among other crimes, sex trafficking, Act (SORNA), which mandates the creation SORNA, the AWA endeavors to standardize of a national sex offender registry. Pursuant the various state sex offender registries so Anthony V. Salerno is the principal of Salerno & to the AWA, every state in the country is that one uniform national sex offender reg- Associates, a full-service criminal defense firm, and required to implement, or at least substantially istry can be created. However, all states have Elana Goldstein is an associate and trial attorney comply with, the provisions of SORNA no adopted their own laws regarding which sex at the firm. Salerno and Goldstein represent clients later than July 27, 2009,3 or lose 10 percent offenses are registerable and maintain their charged in state and federal court for white collar of its allocated Byrne Justice Assistance Grant own individualized sex offender registries. offenses, felonies, misdemeanors, and DUI/DMV funds for each year of noncompliance.4 These California, for example, maintains not only matters.
32 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 Implementation of the Adam Walsh Act raises fundamental questions of constitutional rights
the use of minors in prostitution, sexual con- or she is under no current obligation to reg- or her name, employment, or student status. tact with minors, and the production and ister as a sex offender.13 The offender must appear in person in at distribution of child pornography. Tier II All offenders required to register under least one of the applicable jurisdictions, and also includes Tier I offenders who reoffend. SORNA will, at the very minimum, have to that jurisdiction must inform all the other Tier II offenders must register for 25 years, provide the following to the national reg- jurisdictions in which the offender is required renewing every six months.10 Tier III offend- istry: names and aliases, e-mail addresses and to register.15 The AWA enables states to deter- ers, the most serious offenders, generally are other Internet identifiers like instant message mine the penalties to impose on an offender felons convicted of crimes such as aggravated addresses, telephone numbers, Social Security who fails to properly keep up with registra- sexual abuse, sexual acts with a child under number, residence and travel information tion requirements. Though states have broad 13 years old, and nonparental kidnapping (for example, passport information), employ- discretion, the AWA requires that the maxi- of a minor. Tier III also includes Tier II offend- ment information, school information, vehi- mum prison term for failure to register must ers who reoffend. Tier III offenders are sub- cle information, date of birth, physical be greater than one year.16 ject to lifetime registration, which must be description, criminal history, current photo- Aside from the new registration require- renewed every three months.11 Tier I offend- graph, fingerprints, DNA sample, and driver’s ments, the AWA also includes provisions that ers can apply for removal from the registry license or ID card information. Each state affect those who have been convicted of fed- after 10 years, and juveniles classified as Tier must provide the following for disclosure on eral sex crimes. Specifically, the AWA revises III offenders and Tier II offenders can apply the national Web site: name of the offender, the definition and classification of a sex for removal after maintaining a clean record residence address, address of employer, offender, creates the Jimmy Ryce Civil for 25 years.12 Nonjuvenile Tier III offenders address of school, vehicle information, phys- Commitment Program for sexually dangerous will never be allowed to apply for removal ical description of the offender, a list of the offenders, lengthens the statute of limitations from the Web site. Under existing California offender’s sex offense convictions, and a cur- for various sex crimes, expands more vic- law, by contrast, all sex offenders required to rent photograph. Each state has discretion to tims’ rights, creates more stringent discovery register must register for life, with no possi- require additional information from each rules in sex cases, and imposes pretrial release bility for early removal. offender.14 conditions.17 Under the AWA, sex offenders with con- SORNA imposes other stringent require- In response to the AWA and SORNA, a victions that predate the enactment of the ments for registration. All offenders must host of constitutional challenges have emerged AWA must register under SORNA. SORNA register in the jurisdictions in which they to these laws. Federal and state courts disagree applies to anyone who is currently incarcer- were convicted and in all jurisdictions where on how to implement and enforce the AWA. ated or on parole, anyone who currently reg- they live, work, and attend school. The time- The two most contentious issues that already isters as a sex offender, or anyone previously line within which to register is very exact: plague the implementation of the AWA are: convicted of a sex offense who reenters the Registration must be accomplished no later 1) whether the AWA’s application to sex system due to a conviction for a new offense than three business days after the offender offenders convicted before the AWA was that is not necessarily a sex crime—even if he moves to another jurisdiction or changes his enacted violates the ex post facto clause of the
Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 33 U.S. Constitution, and 2) whether the AWA’s the passage of the AWA on July 27, 2006, and mined whether SORNA may be applied new Civil Commitment Program violates the the attorney general’s interim order on retroactively to offenders who travel inter- equal protection and due process clauses of February 28, 2007. The court declared that state, it will soon have the opportunity to do the Constitution. SORNA applies to all sex offenders retroac- so. On September 11, 2008, the U.S. District tively. The defendant in May argued that Court for Nevada entered a preliminary Retroactive Application SORNA did not apply to him because he injunction against the state of Nevada in The AWA does not specify whether the new traveled in interstate commerce after the pas- American Civil Liberties Union v. Catherine law applies to offenders who were convicted sage of the AWA but before the attorney gen- Masto.33 The district court enjoined the state before implementation of the AWA. Instead, eral’s interim ruling.27 The Eighth Circuit from retroactively enforcing state legislation the AWA delegates authority to the U.S. attor- denied the defendant’s challenge under the ex designed to comply with the AWA and ney general to determine whether the new law post facto clause because the defendant “trav- SORNA. U.S. District Court Judge Mahan applies retroactively. On February 28, 2007, eled in interstate commerce and failed to ruled that the retroactive application of in response to Congress’s grant of authority, update his registration after enactment of Nevada’s sex offender registration law, inter then Attorney General Alberto Gonzales SORNA.” alia, violated the constitutional ban on ex issued an interim order (later codified and The court explained that SORNA applies post facto laws and violated the due process made into a final order18) stating that SORNA to all sex offenders and did not change in the clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend- applies to all sex offenders, including those period between its enactment and the interim ments.34 In October 2008, the Nevada attor- convicted of a sex offense prior to the enact- order because “the Attorney General only ney general’s office appealed Judge Mahan’s ment of the AWA.19 Therefore, those who fall promulgated the rule as a precautionary mea- ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap- under the new national standard of a sex sure to foreclose such claims as May’s by peals.35 At press time, it was uncertain offender will be required to register nation- making it indisputably clear that SORNA whether oral argument, much less a briefing ally, regardless of when they were convicted. applies to all sex offenders regardless of when schedule, had been scheduled in the case. Under the AWA, it is a federal offense for they were convicted.”28 Therefore, the court However, it appears that the Ninth Circuit state registrants, whether they were convicted held the statute was not retroactively applied will soon hear this case of first impression. before or after the AWA was enacted, to to May and did not violate the Constitution’s travel interstate and thereafter fail to register ex post facto clause because May traveled and Challenges to the Civil Commitment in the new jurisdiction.20 This crime is pun- failed to register after the AWA was enacted.29 Program ishable by up to 10 years of imprisonment.21 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Another hotly contested component of the An offender’s registration requirements fol- holdings in Husted and May. In United States AWA is the implementation of the Jimmy lowing interstate travel do not depend on v. Dixon, the defendants relied upon Husted Ryce Civil Commitment Program,36 which whether the state to which he or she travels and May for the propositions that they did not authorizes the allocation of federal funding to has implemented SORNA.22 If sex offenders violate SORNA because they had traveled the supervision, care, and treatment of “sex- are required to register in their home state, interstate before the AWA was enacted and, ually dangerous people.”37 While many states, they are required to register in every state to further, that their failure to register occurred including California, have laws providing which they travel and stay longer than seven before the attorney general issued his order for the civil commitment of sexually violent days.23 Even an offender whose underlying regarding retroactivity of SORNA. The predators, the AWA is the first federal pro- offense was a state crime can be found guilty Seventh Circuit disagreed and held that gram to commit sexually dangerous people.38 of the federal offense of failure to register after SORNA could be applied retroactively to Under the AWA, the government can seek to interstate travel. The federal offense occurs as sex offenders who travel interstate before civilly commit any federal prisoner—not only soon as offenders fail to register by the end the AWA was enacted. Unlike the Tenth those convicted of sex offenses—and can stay of the third day after they change their resi- Circuit, the Seventh Circuit found that the the release of that person for the duration of dence, school, or work.24 need to track sex offenders traveling interstate the civil commitment proceedings. The gov- The retroactive application of SORNA “is as acute in a case in which the offender ernment need only prove by clear and con- has divided state and federal courts across the moved before the AWA was passed as in one vincing evidence that 1) the defendant has country—most notably among the U.S. in which he moved afterward.”30 engaged or attempted to engage in sexually Circuit Courts of Appeals. For example, in The Dixon court reached this holding by violent conduct or child molestation, and 2) United States v. Husted, the Tenth Circuit analogy to a felon with a gun who crosses is sexually dangerous to others. If the gov- held that a prosecutor must prove that an state lines: The danger to the public remains ernment carries its burden in proving both ele- offender “travels in interstate commerce” for the same no matter when the gun crosses ments, then the defendant is committed to the the offender to be prosecuted for failure to state lines. So too, the danger to the public custody of the U.S. attorney general until the register after crossing state lines. The AWA’s exists whether sex offenders travel before or state will assume responsibility or until the seemingly deliberate use of the term “travels,” after the attorney general issued his retroac- defendant is found to be no longer sexually the court reasoned, is prospective and only tivity order.31 The court was unconvinced dangerous.39 applies to offenders who travel after the AWA by the Tenth Circuit’s present tense analysis Under the AWA, the government can wait was enacted.25 Thus the court held that since of the word “travels” and instead referenced until an offender has completed his or her the defendant traveled and failed to register a Ninth Circuit case that held that a word prison sentence before moving for a deter- before the AWA was enacted in July 2006, he from an opinion that was used in the present mination of sexual danger. Consequently, the was not guilty of failing to register under tense could be applicable to past, present, or offender remains in custody beyond his or her SORNA.26 future actions.32 Therefore, the defendants sentence, without the opportunity to post In United States v. May, the Eighth Circuit who traveled before the AWA passed but bail. While the government must afford a agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s rationale in failed to register once the AWA became law hearing for each person being evaluated for Husted but considered whether a SORNA were found guilty of violating SORNA’s reg- civil commitment, the government has no violation applies to a registered sex offender istration requirements. obligation to provide an attorney or present who travels interstate in the period between While the Ninth Circuit has not yet deter- Miranda warnings.40 Furthermore, the bur-
34 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 MCLE Test No. 182 MCLE Answer Sheet #182 PREDATORS’ NET
The Los Angeles County Bar Association certifies that this activity has been approved for Minimum Name Continuing Legal Education credit by the State Bar of California in the amount of 1 hour. Law Firm/Organization
1. The national sex offender Web site, launched 10 True. Address years ago, is being revamped in the wake of new False. City legislation. 12. On February 28, 2007, the U.S. attorney general State/Zip True. issued an order stating that SORNA applies E-mail False. retroactively to all sex offenders. Phone 2. The Adam Walsh Act was named for the abducted True. State Bar # and murdered child of John Walsh, host of America’s False. Most Wanted and an advocate for missing children. 13. In United States v. Dixon, the Seventh Circuit INSTRUCTIONS FOR OBTAINING MCLE CREDITS True. held that sex offenders who traveled interstate False. 1. Study the MCLE article in this issue. before the AWA was enacted are still subject to the 2. Answer the test questions opposite by marking 3. One of the most significant provisions of the AWA federal offense of failure to register because they the appropriate boxes below. Each question is SORNA, the Sex Offender Registration and pose a danger to the public no matter when they has only one answer. Photocopies of this Notification Act. travel. answer sheet may be submitted; however, this True. True. form should not be enlarged or reduced. False. False. 3. Mail the answer sheet and the $15 testing fee ($20 for non-LACBA members) to: 4. States that do not comply with the AWA will lose 14. The Ninth Circuit ruled that SORNA applies 10 percent of their Byrne Justice Assistance Grant retroactively to California sex offenders. Los Angeles Lawyer funds for each year of noncompliance. True. MCLE Test P.O. Box 55020 True. False. Los Angeles, CA 90055 False. 15. The AWA creates the Jimmy Ryce Civil Make checks payable to Los Angeles Lawyer. 5. It will cost California close to $10 million just to Commitment Program, the first federal program to 4. Within six weeks, Los Angeles Lawyer will comply with the AWA in 2009. commit sexually dangerous people. return your test with the correct answers, a True. True. rationale for the correct answers, and a False. False. certificate verifying the MCLE credit you earned through this self-assessment activity. 16. 6. A Justice Policy Institute study found that in all 50 The government cannot move to commit an 5. For future reference, please retain the MCLE states, first-year costs to implement the AWA will far offender who has completed his or her prison test materials returned to you. exceed the financial cost of losing 10 percent of their sentence. government grants allocated for law enforcement True. ANSWERS and drug laws. False. Mark your answers to the test by checking the True. appropriate boxes below. Each question has only 17. Prisoners are afforded free legal representation one answer. False. for a hearing under the Civil Commitment Program. 7. States are not allowed to create more stringent True. 1. ■ True ■ False requirements for sex offenders than those provided False. 2. ■ True ■ False by the AWA. 18. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Comstock, True. 3. ■ True ■ False held that Congress exceeded its power under the False. 4. ■ True ■ False commerce clause when it created the Civil 8. Under SORNA, offenders must register in all Commitment Program. 5. ■ True ■ False jurisdictions where they live, work, and attend True. 6. ■ True ■ False school. False. 7. ■ True ■ False True. 19. Offenders have argued that the Civil 8. ■ True ■ False False Commitment Program violates due process because 9. ■ True ■ False 9. Under SORNA, Tier I offenders, including those the AWA permits the government to detain inmates 10. ■ True ■ False convicted of possessing child pornography, are past their release dates without bail and without the ■ ■ required to register for life. right to a prompt postdeprivation hearing. 11. True False True. True. 12. ■ True ■ False False. False. 13. ■ True ■ False 10. Circuit courts disagree on whether the AWA 20. In advance of the AWA compliance deadline, fed- 14. ■ True ■ False should apply to sex offenders convicted before the eral courts are in agreement on how to implement the 15. ■ True ■ False AWA was enacted. new law. 16. ■ True ■ False True. True. ■ ■ False. False. 17. True False 18. ■ True ■ False 11. It is a federal offense for offenders to fail to ■ ■ register within three days after changing their home 19. True False address, work, or school. 20. ■ True ■ False
Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 35 den of proof to determine whether an offender ment that the civil commitment provisions of The court, agreeing with the government, is sexually dangerous is not based on the the AWA exceed the powers of Congress held that SORNA falls under the power of reasonable-doubt standard; rather, the stan- under the commerce clause. First, the court Congress to regulate interstate commerce dard is clear and convincing evidence.41 held that the federal civil commitment pro- because SORNA is a lawful attempt to ensure Although committed offenders have the right gram “lie[s] beyond the scope of Congress’ that the channels of interstate commerce do to request a review of their commitment every authority. The Constitution does not empower not “become the means of promoting or 180 days, a civil commitment actually is akin the Federal government to confine a person spreading evil, whether of a physical, moral to a life sentence because it is very difficult for solely because of asserted ‘sexual danger- or economic nature.”52 Furthermore, offenders to be removed from the program. ousness’ when the Government need not although the court admitted that SORNA For an offender to be released from civil com- allege (let alone prove) that this ‘dangerous- has shortcomings and “is not as narrowly tai- mitment, the court must find by a prepon- ness’ violates any Federal law.”45 Just as the lored as it could be,” the court held that the derance of the evidence that the committed states control civil commitment of the men- registration requirement in potentially mul- person is no longer sexually dangerous. tally ill, so too should the states have juris- tiple jurisdictions is a proper exercise of con- Not surprisingly, common challenges to diction over civil commitment of sex offend- gressional authority under the commerce the Civil Commitment Program have been ers because, as the court noted, the federal clause because it appropriately tracks offend- based on the due process, equal protection, government has no general police power. ers who move across state lines.53 and commerce clauses of the Constitution. Next, the Comstock court found unper- Defense attorneys have crafted a variety Defense counsel have argued 1) that the AWA suasive the government’s arguments that civil of additional arguments to challenge the permits the government, in violation of due commitments fall under the commerce clause AWA, with little success. Some have argued process, to detain inmates past their release and the necessary and proper clause. The that the Tenth Amendment prevents the fed- dates without bail or the right to a prompt court relied upon United States v. Lopez, in eral government from forcing state officials postdeprivation hearing, 2) that the law is too which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a fed- to carry out federal laws.54 Other challenges broad because it applies to all federal pris- eral law regulating the possession of a firearm have been based on the doctrines of separa- oners in violation of the equal protection in a school zone exceeded the powers of tion of powers and nondelegation. These two clause, and 3) that civil commitment is not Congress under the commerce clause because arguments essentially address the same issue: related to any economic or commercial activ- the law lacked a sufficient nexus to inter- whether Congress, by giving the attorney ity in violation of the commerce clause. state commerce. The court held that, likewise, general the sole power to determine the To date, no Ninth Circuit or California “sexual dangerousness does not substantially applicability of SORNA to those convicted of district court cases have addressed these con- affect interstate commerce.”46 Furthermore, sex offenses prior to its enactment, imper- stitutional challenges regarding the civil com- a federal civil commitment program is not missibly delegated a legislative task to the mitment of sex offenders under the AWA. necessary and proper, according to the court, executive branch. Thus far, challenges based However, courts in other jurisdictions have because the federal government only main- on the doctrines of separation of powers and considered these arguments. The U.S. District tains jurisdiction over offenders while they are nondelegation have been largely unsuccessful. Court in Massachusetts, in the First Circuit in federal prison. The government does not One of the primary purposes of the Adam Court of Appeals, recently held that because continue to possess this power after the prison Walsh Act is to create uniformity among civil commitments fall under civil law and are sentence expires. If the government retained states. However, the question remains whether therefore not intended to be a criminal pun- this power, it would clash with the parens this goal can be achieved within the para- ishment, due process procedures required in patriae power, or police power, reserved for meters of the U.S. Constitution and individ- criminal proceedings are not mandatory in the states.47 ual state constitutions. The difficulty lies in civil commitment hearings.42 The court fur- While the Ninth Circuit has yet to rule on the fact that each of the 50 states has the abil- ther held that there is a rational basis for the these issues, the U.S. District Court for the ity to create more stringent rules than required government to differentiate between a sexu- Northern District of California recently held by the AWA or simply disregard the require- ally dangerous offender and a person with a in United States v. Hardeman that SORNA ments and instead lose a small portion of mental disorder without violating the man- does represent a valid exercise of Congress’s grants. Before the looming state compliance dates of equal protection: “[A] person with power under the commerce clause.48 The deadline arrives, courts are already in dis- a mental disorder of a sexual nature is qual- Northern District made this determination agreement over how to apply the AWA and itatively more dangerous than another men- notwithstanding the fact that other district SORNA. With inconsistent judicial decisions tal patient who nonetheless threatens danger courts have found SORNA unconstitutional across the country regarding the constitu- to himself or others…and so, the differing under the commerce clause.49 Congress has tionality of these new laws, the AWA and provisions…pass rational basis review.”43 the power under the commerce clause to reg- SORNA face a certain fate: a date with the Conversely, the U.S. District Court in ulate 1) the channels of interstate commerce, U.S. Supreme Court. ■ Massachusetts held in another case that the 2) the instrumentalities of interstate com- standard of clear and convincing evidence is merce, or people or things in interstate com- 1 Rich Phillips, Police: Drifter Killed Adam Walsh in not a sufficient evidentiary threshold to force merce, and 3) activities that substantially 1981, cnn.com, Dec. 16, 2008, available at an inmate into civil commitment. Accordingly, affect interstate commerce.50 The defendant http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/12/16/walsh.case .closed/index.html. the court held that “any application of the in Hardeman argued that SORNA is uncon- 2 AMY BARON-EVANS & SARA NOONAN, THE ADAM [AWA] to an individual without a finding stitutional because there is no nexus between WALSH CHILD PROTECTION AND SAFETY ACT—PART I, beyond a reasonable doubt of sexually violent interstate travel and the defendant’s crime— Oct. 19, 2006, available at http://www.fd.org/pdf conduct or child molestation is [u]nconsti- the failure to register. The government, on the _lib/Adam%20Walsh%20MemoPt%201.pdf. tutional. The government can meet its burden other hand, maintained that SORNA squarely 3 States can receive up to two one-year extensions on by demonstrating that the person has been pre- falls within the parameters of Congress’s power the July 2009 deadline. 42 U.S.C. §16924(b); see LORI MCPHERSON, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE ADAM 44 viously convicted of a relevant sex crime.” under the commerce clause because Congress, WALSH ACT (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj In United States v. Comstock, the Fourth by enacting SORNA, is regulating the move- .gov/smart/pdfs/practitioner_guide_awa.pdf. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the argu- ment of people in interstate commerce.51 4 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, WHAT WILL IT COST STATES
36 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 TO COMPLY WITH THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION GUIDELINES FOR SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND ity, or disorder and, as a result, the person has serious AND NOTIFICATION ACT?, available at http: NOTIFICATION, supra note 8. difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or //www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-08_FAC 24 U.S. Department of Justice, Frequently Asked child molestation. Pub. L. No. 109-248 (July 27, 2006), _SORNACosts_JJ.pdf. Questions: The Sex Offender Registration and Noti- supra note 9. 5 Id. fication Act Final Guidelines, available at http://www 39 United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 527- 6 Id. .ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/sorna_faqs.pdf. 28 (E.D. N.C. 2007). 7 See http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/ for California’s sex 25 United States v. Husted, 545 F. 3d 1240, 1243 (10th 40 AMY BARON-EVANS & SARA NOONAN, ADAM WALSH offender Web site. Cir. Okla. 2008). ACT III: IT’S NOT THE SENTENCE, IT’S THE COMMIT- 8 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL 26 Id. at 1246. MENT…, Sept. 10, 2007, rev’d, Sept. 25, 2007, avail- GUIDELINES FOR SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND 27 United States v. May, 535 F. 3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. able at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/Adam.Walsh.III NOTIFICATION, June 2008, available at http://www Iowa 2008). .REV.9.24.07.FINAL.pdf. .ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/final_sornaguidelines.pdf. 28 Id. at 919. 41 Id. 9 Pub. L. No. 109-248 (July 27, 2006), available at 29 Id. at 920. 42 United States v. Carta, 503 F. Supp. 2d 405, 409 (D. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname 30 United States v. Dixon, 551 F. 3d 578, 582 (7th Cir. Mass. 2007). =109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ248.109.pdf. Ind. 2008). 43 Id. at 408-09. See also LORI MCPHERSON, supra note 3. 31 Id. (citing Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 44 United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 331 10 Id. (1977)). (D. Mass. 2007). 11 Id. 32 Id. at 583 (citing Coalition for Clean Air v. Southern 45 United States v. Comstock, 551 F. 3d 274, 280 (4th 12 LORI MCPHERSON, supra note 3. Cal. Edison Co., 971 F. 2d 219, 225 (9th Cir. 1992)). Cir. N.C. 2009). 13 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL GUIDE- 33 American Civil Liberties Union v. Catherine Masto, 46 Id. at 280. LINES FOR SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFI- Case No. 2:08-cv-00822 JCM-PAL (D. Nev.) (filed 47 Id. at 281. CATION, supra note 8. June 24, 2008). 48 United States v. Hardeman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14 Id. 34 Carri Geer Thevenot, Permanent Injunction: 7561 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009). 15 Pub. L. No. 109-248 (July 27, 2006), supra note 9. Offender Statute Restricted, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Sept. 49 See United States v. Myers, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16 42 U.S.C.S. §16913. 11, 2008, available at http://www.lvrj.com/news 99384, 2008 WL 5156671 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“The 17 AMY BARON-EVANS & SARA NOONAN, supra note 2. /28232419.html. jurisdictional element of ‘interstate travel’ is an indef- 18 28 C.F.R. §72.3 (2009); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 35 David Kihara, State Appeals Sex Offender Law inite requirement that only requires a person to have THE NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR SEX OFFENDER Ruling, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Oct. 31, 2008, available at traveled in interstate commerce. The purpose attached REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION, supra note 8. http://www.lvrj.com/news/33628204.html; American to the travel is left unstated and is utterly divorced from 19 28 C.F.R. §72.3 (2009). Civil Liberties Union v. Catherine Masto, Case No. 08- the activity being regulated: knowingly failing to reg- 20 18 U.S.C.S. §2250. 17471 (9th Cir.) (notice of appeal filed on Oct. 29, ister as a sex offender.”); United States v. Powers, 544 21 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL 2008). F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1333-34 (M.D. Fla. 2008). GUIDELINES FOR SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND 36 42 U.S.C.S. §16913. 50 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). NOTIFICATION, supra note 8. 37 Pub. L. No. 109-248, tit. III (July 27, 2006), supra 51 Hardeman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7561, at *12. 22 United States v. Gould, 526 F. Supp. 2d 538, 542 (D. note 9. 52 Id. Md. 2007). 38 According to the AWA, a “sexually dangerous per- 53 Id. at *16. 23 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL son” suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormal- 54 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 37 by MARK ANCHOR ALBERT
REQUIRED CLASS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CLASS ACTIONS AGAINST INFRINGERS, PLAINTIFFS NEED TO MEET THE FOUR PREREQUISITES OF FEDERAL RULE 23
atent holders are often victims of multiple infringers but rarely use class actions to prosecute their patent claims collectively. Typical class actions involve a named plaintiff that seeks to represent a class of unnamed plaintiffs whose interests are aligned with those of the named plaintiff. Another type of class, however, that may achieve efficiency in patent litigation is a non-opt-out, or mandatory, issues class. This class can be created to resolve issues of patent ownership, validity, enforceability, and claim construction. PIn a mandatory class action, class members cannot voluntarily exclude themselves from the class as defined in the court’s class certification order. A rarely used feature of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for certification of a mandatory defendant class action. In this suit, a named defendant is compelled, almost invariably against its wishes, to represent a class of unnamed defendants that share one or more common issues appropriate for joint adjudication. Mandatory defendant class actions are a potent tool to resolve common issues involving mul- tiple defendants. The drafters of Rule 23 intended the rule to enable those with small claims to achieve relief even if their individ- ual claims are too small to be viable. Another purpose of Rule 23 is to “achieve economies of time, effort, and expense and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bring- ing about other undesirable results.”1 Rule 23(a) establishes four prerequisites to maintaining a class action: 1) the number of people or entities in the class should be too numerous to permit their joinder, 2) members of the class should share common questions of law or fact, 3) the “claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,” and 4) the “representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.” Of these prerequisites, the second is central to the creation of a common issue class, but the other three must also
Mark Anchor Albert is a business litigator and appellate lawyer in Los Angeles. KEN CORRAL
38 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 be considered. The first, numerosity, exists In general, Rule 23(b)(1) permits the use action provides adequate procedural due when a proposed class is so numerous that of the class action device when necessary to process. The court approves competent class joinder is impracticable. “Impracticable” prevent the possible adverse effects—on either counsel to represent the class, and represen- does not mean impossible.2 A reasonable the parties opposing the class or on absent tative plaintiffs (also court approved) have an estimate of the number of purported members class members—that might result if separate incentive to pursue class claims identical or satisfies the numerosity requirement; a precise actions were brought, with a risk of incon- substantively similar to their own. Another number is not required.3 Numerosity is pre- sistent results. Structurally, that provision is due process safeguard is that the trial judge sumed at the level of 40 class members.4 divided into two clauses that describe the must approve class certification and any set- Indeed, one patent case in which a defen- risk of prejudice, which is to be avoided by tlement or dismissal. Further, absent class dant class was certified—Dale Electronics, allowing class action. A Rule 23(b)(1) class members are rarely subject to discovery and Inc. v. R. C. L. Electronics, Inc.—involved action applies when the defendant or plain- are almost never liable for attorney’s fees, only 13 alleged patent infringers.5 tiff is obligated to treat class members alike, costs of suit, or judgment.21 The third test, typicality, “is a permissive when class members are asserting claims The plaintiff class in Shutts was certified standard.”6 The basic inquiry is whether the against a common fund in which joint or under the Kansas equivalent of Rule 23(b)(3)— action is based on claims or defenses that common rights or obligations demand uni- not Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2)—and the Court are unique to the class representatives: tary treatment, or when there is a limited expressly limited its opt-out requirement to “Typicality refers to the nature of the claim fund that is insufficient to satisfy all the “those class actions which seek to bind known or defense of the class representative, and claims.13 A Rule 23(b)(2) class action was plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or pre- not to the specific facts from which it arose intended to focus on cases in which broad, dominantly for money damages,”22 noting or the relief sought.”7 Issues of patent valid- classwide injunctive or declaratory relief is that the Court’s “discussion of personal juris- ity and invalidity, patent ownership, and necessary.14 Finally, a Rule 23(b)(3) class diction [did not] address class actions where the claim construction (among others) are stan- action—by far the most common—was jurisdiction is asserted against a defendant dard in many patent infringement actions. intended to embrace other cases in which a class.” The Court offered “no view concern- Cases often are based exclusively upon plain- class action would be “convenient and desir- ing other types of class actions, such as those tiff-specific facts and legal principles that are able,” including those involving complex lit- seeking equitable relief.”23 Accordingly, Shutts identical for all defendant class members and igation for money damages.15 should not be read as establishing opt-out therefore apply classwide. Typicality should The drafters of Rule 23 deemed it unnec- rights in actions maintained under Federal be found to exist if the claims of class repre- essary, however, to provide subdivision (b)(1) Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2). sentatives arise from the same events and and (b)(2) class members with a universal A better reading of Shutts is that the opt- practices as the claims of absent class mem- right to notice or to opt out of the class. This out right does not apply to classes that have bers and are based on the same legal theories.8 right is part, however, of Rule 23(b)(3) class 1) the same interest in a particular patent, 2) Rule 23(a)’s fourth prerequisite—ade- actions, which primarily seek monetary recov- the same defense regarding a particular patent, quate representation—“depends on the qual- eries.16 In the three subsections, the different or 3) allegedly violated the same claim or ifications of counsel for the representatives, presumptions of homogeneity and cohesive- claims of a particular patent. In the post- an absence of antagonism, a sharing of inter- ness of interests among members of the classes Shutts decision Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corpora- ests between representatives and absentees, that may sue support each section’s different tion,24 the Court rejected a mandatory class and the unlikelihood that the suit is collu- procedural safeguards.17 Aside from com- based upon a litigation-generated limited sive.”9 To satisfy this requirement, the patent mon fund or limited fund cases, in cases that fund that would have bound all potential holder plaintiff should consider, if possible, seek ordinary monetary remedies the varying asbestos claimants in a single action. However, naming a defendant that can afford to and has characteristics of individual claims often com- the Court made clear that mandatory classes the incentive to retain a law firm with the plicate class relief.18 Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) are still appropriate in proper cases.25 experience and resources to handle complex cases, on the other hand, typically involve rel- patent litigation.10 Any unwillingness on the atively homogeneous and cohesive groups in Common Issues part of defendants to represent the class is which a unitary result may not only be prefer- The issues of patent ownership, validity, entitled to little weight in the certification able but necessary, given the group nature of proper claim construction, and enforceabil- analysis. What defendant ever wishes to be the harm inflicted and the interrelated nature ity may be appropriate for mandatory adju- sued, or if sued, seeks to represent other of the relief sought. dication in an issues class under Rule unnamed defendants?11 For these reasons, “[c]ertification under 23(c)(4)(A). Under the rule (“[w]hen appro- either (b)(1) or (b)(2) constitutes a mandatory priate, an action may be brought or main- Three Class Categories class. That is, the class members may not tained as a class action with respect to par- Once the requirements of Rule 23(a) are sat- opt out of the action and ‘pursue separate lit- ticular issues”), a district court is empowered isfied, the plaintiff patent holder must demon- igation that might prejudice other class mem- to certify a mandatory defendant class only strate compliance with one of the three dif- bers or the defendant.’”19 Many courts have with respect to particular issues, even if sub- ferent categories of class actions listed under held that mandatory classes under Rule sequent actions would be required regarding Rule 23(b). The different requirements of 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(2) fully com- issues of infringement and damages.26 The these three categories attempt to strike a bal- port with due process.20 plain language of Rule 23(c)(4)(A), its struc- ance between the desirability of classwide In Phillips Petroleum Company v. Shutts, tural relationship with Rule 23(a), and the adjudication and the interests of class mem- the Supreme Court considered the due process Advisory Committee Notes that accompany bers to pursue claims separately or not at requirements necessary to bind an absent it permit trial judges not only to sever issues all. The different type of class actions are plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) state court money for class certification purposes and for trial but categorized according to the different objec- damages class action. The Court chose not to also to employ those procedures when doing tives of class treatment envisioned by the insist upon “minimum contacts” as the touch- so would facilitate Rule 23’s purpose of rule’s drafters, or the nature or effect of the stone of due process for jurisdiction over “achieving economies of time, effort, and relief being sought.12 absent plaintiffs. The structure of a class expense, and promoting uniformity of deci-
40 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 sion as to persons similarly situated.” has been separately tried. E.g., appropriate for classwide resolution. Mandatory certification also serves Rule 1’s Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. The facts relevant to patent validity also goal of ensuring a fair and efficient remedy.27 Method Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp. are the same regardless of the identities of As one court has noted regarding manda- 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968). Thus, defendant defendants or absent class members and tory certification, Rule 23(c)(4)(A) is “intend- class actions are commonly used in a include the properly construed patent claims, ed to advance judicial economy by permitting conservative fashion to adjudicate less the patent specification, and the relevant adjudication of any issues common to the than the whole controversy.30 prior art, which by definition is publicly avail- class even though the entire litigation may not The Rule 23(a)(2) commonality require- able to any defendant, named or not. Any accused infringer may challenge the validity of any issued patent by showing with clear and convincing evidence that the patent fails to meet any one of the statutory require- ments for patentability, such as showing that the claimed invention is anticipated by, or obvious in view of, prior art, or that the patent specification is insufficient. Patent validity therefore also is an issue which may be common to and typical of accused infringers who are members of an issues class. Finally, the issue of patent enforceability also may present common questions appro- priate for mandatory adjudication in an issues class. An accused infringer may allege—by way of affirmative defense or counterclaim, for example—that the patents are unenforceable due to the inequitable conduct of the inventors and their attorney while prosecuting the patents, that the paten- tees misrepresented the content of prior art references to the patent examiner, that the patentees provided too many references to the patent examiner, or that the patentees inten- tionally withheld relevant references from the patent examiner. The evidence necessary to prove patent enforceability or unenforce- ability under such circumstances would be the same regardless of the identity of the defendant. Under the circumstances, patent enforceability would present issues that are common to and typical of the named defen- dant and other unnamed members of the defendant class.35 satisfy the requirements of Rule 23.”28 The ment is not difficult to meet.31 Because Rule relevant inquiry for a court is whether reso- 23(a)(2) is written in the disjunctive, a sin- Patent Claim Construction lution of particular common issues would gle common question of either fact or law The issue of patent claim construction also materially advance the disposition of the lit- should satisfy the commonality require- may often be appropriate for mandatory igation as a whole. If the resolution of even ment.32 Accordingly, a plaintiff patent holder defendant class resolution. In Markman v. one common issue would simplify subse- may want to request that the issues of patent Westview Instruments, Inc.,36 the Federal quent individual proceedings, certification of infringement and damages be tried sepa- Circuit held that a district court in a patent that issue for class treatment under Rule rately under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure infringement case must first construe the 23(c)(4)(A) may be appropriate.29 42(b) after the mandatory defendant issues meaning of the claim terms of a patent before In many cases, a classwide resolution of class is certified and the class issues are adju- determining whether any claim of that patent the common issues of patent ownership, dicated.33 is infringed by any defendant class member, validity, enforceability, and claim construction The issue of patent ownership, when dis- or whether any claim of these patents is would materially advance the disposition of puted, is a common question that may be invalid. Claim construction involves an exam- litigation. In subsequent actions for infringe- appropriate for treatment in a mandatory ination by the district court of the patent ment and damages, those key issues would not issues class. The patent holder has the burden claims and the intrinsic evidence (i.e., the need to be adjudicated again. In re Gap Stores of proving that it is the owner of the patents patent specifications and file histories). Securities Litigation holds: it asserts.34 Whether a patent holder owns the Extrinsic evidence may also warrant review In patent cases, for example, this has patents it asserts in a particular patent in appropriate cases.37 For purposes of a meant that issues of patent validity, infringement action typically will involve defendant issues class, the evidence neces- fraud on the patent office, and patent unique facts. The issues are the same regard- sary to construe the claims will be the same misuse have been litigated as class less of the identities of defendants and absent regardless of the identities of defendant class issues while each case of infringement class members—and accordingly may be members. Claims are not construed by ref-
Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 41 erence to any accused methods or systems.38 action there would be a risk of incon- issues class under Rule 23(b)(2). Certification In Shire LLC v. Sandoz, the Federal Circuit sistent or varying adjudication with of a class is proper under Rule 23(b)(2) if the granted review, however, to decide whether respect to individual members of the party opposing the class has acted on grounds collateral estoppel and/or stare decisis applies class which would establish incom- generally applicable to the class. When to a previous court’s unappealed claim con- patible standards of conduct for indi- allegedly infringing defendants assert a reverse struction rulings. District courts have reached vidual class members.41 declaratory relief action requesting a decla- conflicting positions on this issue.39 It is The Dale Electronics court reached the ration that the plaintiff patent holder’s patents unclear what effect the Federal Circuit’s deci- same conclusion based upon the same analy- are invalid and unenforceable and that the sion in Sandoz may have on binding rulings sis, noting that actions involving patent valid- patent holder does not own the patent or on claim construction applied to defendant ity are particularly well suited for Rule otherwise have the right to enforce it, and issues classes. 23(b)(1) defendant class treatment: when the action requests the issuance of a per- Sandoz may be significant in light of Rule The prosecution of separate actions manent injunction prohibiting the plaintiff 23(b)(1)(A)’s requirement regarding “incom- by or against individual members of patent holder from claiming infringement or patible standards of conduct.” Depending the class would create a risk of incon- requesting licensing fees from defendants and on the outcome of Sandoz, defendants may sistent or varying adjudications with other class members, a mandatory defendant be able to argue that when it comes to claim respect to individual members of the class with respect to the class issues may construction issues, defendant issues classes class which would establish incom- comply with the letter and spirit of Rule are unavailable under Rule 23(b)(1)(A). This patible standards of conduct for the 23(b)(2). is because in these situations a plaintiff faces party opposing the class. Rule 23(b) (1) The Methode Electronics court certified a no risk of inconsistent judgments, and thus an (A). While Blonder-Tongue makes an defendant patent infringement class under issues class is not necessary. After Blonder- invalidity determination final and bind- Rule 23(b)(2) under similar circumstances. Tongue, a judgment of patent invalidity ing on the plaintiff, it does not meet the The court held: against a plaintiff precludes it from pursuing problem of a possibility of a validity [B]y obtaining patents, notifying some further patent infringement actions, and any finding by this court and an invalidity alleged infringers of the patents, and inconsistent rulings could be resolved by the finding by another court. The alleged threatening some of them with Federal Circuit. infringers could continue infringing infringement suits unless they take In Blonder-Tongue, the Supreme Court until such time as the plaintiff brought licenses, and by bringing civil actions held that when a patent is found invalid or suit against each of them and reliti- against some of them, the plaintiffs unenforceable in one action, the patentee is gated the question of validity.42 herein have acted on grounds generally collaterally estopped from claiming that the A Rule 23(b)(1)(B) defendant class also applicable to the class and any sub- patent is valid or enforceable in another, so may be warranted. As previously noted, Rule classes thereof. Further plaintiffs’ long as the patentee had a full and fair oppor- 23(b)(1)(B) class treatment is appropriate if claims for relief against each defen- tunity to litigate the validity of its patent.40 individual adjudications either would be dis- dant contain prayers for injunctions. Following Blonder-Tongue, several patent positive of the interests of other class mem- Each defendant has amended its coun- infringement defendant class actions have bers or would substantially impair or impede terclaims to pray for declaratory and been certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A), on the the ability of absent class members to protect injunctive relief. These prayers are typ- ground that inconsistent or varying adjudi- their interests. Certification of a defendant ical of the requests for relief usually cations on validity and enforceability issues class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is appropriate in made by patentees and alleged in individual actions could establish incom- patent infringement actions because the typ- infringers in patent infringement patible standards. ical expense and complexity of a patent actions. By these counter-claims final For example, in Standal’s Patents, a patent infringement action may, as a practical mat- injunctive relief and declaratory relief infringement action involving sawmill equip- ter, give patent rulings in one court significant with respect to the class as a whole has ment, the court certified a defendant class persuasive value in other court, even in the been made appropriate.45 under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) despite the argument absence of a published decision or any res To be sure, the certification of a defendant that Blonder-Tongue meant that the absent judicata or collateral estoppel effect. As the issues class may not always be appropriate. defendants would not be harmed by an court indicated in Research Corporation v. In Tilley v. TJX Companies, Inc.,46 the court adverse ruling and could only benefit from Pfister Associated Growers, Inc.: stated that “there will be no single act or separate adjudications in separate actions: The difficulty of subject matter inher- refusal to act on the part of the plaintiff (the Suppose that Standal’s brought an ent in most patent cases…give selected party opposing the class) that makes injunc- action against one infringer, i.e., the adjudications of validity or invalidity tive or declaratory relief appropriate.”47 In first class member, and its patent was more than the usual weight when a patent lawsuits presenting a true “reverse found valid. Under Blonder-Tongue court is considering the adoption of declaratory relief case” that satisfies Rule Standal’s would be permitted to bring another court’s opinion or reasoning by 23(b)(2)’s requirement of a request for “final an action against the second means of comity. This practical fact, injunctive relief” or “corresponding declara- infringer—the second class member. added to the great expense of defend- tory relief” in favor of the class and against As long as the patent was found valid ing a patent suit of this type, would the party opposing the class,48 however, cer- in each subsequent action, Standal’s tend towards impairing or impeding tification of a defendant issues class may be could bring an action against the next the nonparty class members’ ability appropriate. infringer. However, once the patent to protect their interests.43 When, as in Methode Electronics, a patent was found invalid, for example, in the Other decisions, such as Technograph and holder allegedly has acted on grounds gen- tenth suit, Standal’s would be pre- Dale Electronics, have reached the same con- erally applicable to members of the defendant cluded from seeking redress from any clusion.44 class—and in particular, when the defendant of the other 260 alleged infringers. If A plaintiff patent holder may also wish to accused infringer has raised one or more this action were not certified as a class request certification of a mandatory defendant common issues by means of its affirmative
42 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 FREE TRAINING PROGRAM
HIV & AIDS Discrimination in Employment: Reasonable Accommodations and Disclosure Considerations
PANELISTS: THURSDAY, JULY 9, 2009 • 9:00AM – 10:30AM REGISTRATION : 8:30-9:00 David Schulman Light breakfast will be provided Supervising Attorney Los Angeles LOCATION: Davis Wright Tremaine LLP City Attorney AIDS 865 S. Figueroa St., Suite 2400, Los Angeles, CA 90017 Discrimination Unit Parking: Available in the building and will not be validated and 1.5 hours of CLE credit Peggy Farrell COST: FREE Legal Director for the HIV & AIDS Legal Services This training will address the historical implications of HIV & AIDS Alliance discrimination and the evolution of current legal protections for persons with HIV disease and will provide practical tips for legal practitioners representing both employers and employees regarding workplace accommodations and disclosure considerations. The CLE will also provide useful information for employers and human resources managers regarding legal obligations to accommodate HIV+ employees and to limit liability by preventing unlawful medical inquiries and negligent or willful disclosures of an employee’s HIV status.
SPONSORED BY: State Bar of California Labor & Employment Section; Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, HIV & AIDS Legal Services Alliance and LACBA Barristers AIDS Legal Services Project defenses or a counterclaim for declaratory a simple matter of judicial economy. Having Seeking an Experienced relief—a classwide adjudication in accordance “tested” the strength of its patents in prior with Rule 23(b)(2) and (c)(4)(A) that con- nonclass proceedings, the plaintiff patent Arbitrator/Mediator? cerns those issues may be necessary and appro- holder may be able to significantly increase the priate under Rule 57 of Federal Rules of Civil likelihood that the same common issues Procedure and 28 USC Section 2201(a), which would withstand more intensive scrutiny in STEVEN govern declaratory relief actions.49 a subsequent defendant class action in which multiple defendants may combine their defen- RICHARD Class Notice sive resources. ■ SAUER, ESQ. Although notice to members of the defendant class is not automatically required in a manda- 1 See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 23(b)(3) Advisory Committee tory defendant issues class under Rules Notes (1966). COUNSELOR AT LAW • SINCE 1974 2 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (c)(4), the plaintiff patent Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F. 2d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1964). holder usually should request that notice be 3 See General Tel. Co. of Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 “He is truly a master given anyway. The court is given discretion by U.S. 318, 330 (1980); Pederson v. Louisiana State in his art.” Rule 23(d)(2) and (c)(2)(A) to direct “appro- Univ., 213 F. 3d 858, 868 (5th Cir. 2000). priate” notice to be given in Rule 23(b)(1) and 4 See Ansari v. New York Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 114 (b)(2) class actions “for the protection of the (S.D. N.Y. 1998). 5 6,000 members of the class or otherwise for the Dale Elecs., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 534 (D. N.H. 1971). Settled over 5,000 Federal & 50 fair conduct of the action.” 6 Thomas & Thomas Rodmakers, Inc. v. Newport State Litigated Cases Following notice to absent defendant class Adhesives & Composites, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 159 (C.D. members, well-funded and motivated defen- Cal. 2002). dants may step forward. Plaintiff patent hold- 7 Weinberger v. Thornton, 114 F.R.D. 599, 603 (S.D. ers should recognize that the provision of Cal. 1986). 323.933.6833 TELEPHONE 8 Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F. 2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. notice to absent defendant class members in 1992). [email protected] E-MAIL a high-stakes patent infringement case—even 9 Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust if the infringement issue itself is not being Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F. 3d 1152, 1162 4929 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 740 adjudicated in the lead proceeding—may (9th Cir. 2001). 10 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90010 result in the intervention or joinder in the See Sullivan v. Chase Inv., 79 F.R.D. 246, 258 (N.D. Cal. 1978); see also United States Trust Co. of New action of additional defendants that have the York v. Alpert, 163 F.R.D. 409, 422 (S.D. N.Y. 1995). incentive and resources to mount vigorous, 11 See Research Corp. v. Pfister Assoc. Growers, Inc., supplemental defensive challenges to the 301 F. Supp. 497, 499 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (“This court plaintiff’s claims. Such defendants may seek, weighs the defendants’ protestations that they do not for example, to reopen claim construction ‘desire’ to represent the entire class, but this is hardly enough to overcome the overwhelming evidence of issues or to challenge patent validity based on their ability and intention to challenge the plaintiff’s the production of new sources of alleged assertions of validity and infringement.”); Technograph invalidating prior art. This scenario may Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. increase the delay and cost of the proceedings. Supp. 714, 721 (N.D. Ill. 1968). Therefore, a defendant issues class may be 12 See Amschem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 appropriate only in cases in which the plain- (1997); United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1980). tiff patent holder is quite confident in the 13 See Advisory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 100- validity of its patent(s), is well versed in all 03 (1966). prior art, and has chosen an initial defen- 14 See id.; see also Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 dant class representative and class counsel that F. 2d 1144, 1155 n.8 (11th Cir. 1983). 15 can be expected to mount a comprehensive, See Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 615; see also Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F. 2d 989, 993 thorough, and vigorous defensive effort that (5th Cir. 1981) (citing FED. R. CIV. PROC. 23 Advisory will not leave defensive “holes” that subse- Committee Notes (1966)). quent intervening defendants can exploit. It 16 See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 23(c)(2). may be prudent in some circumstances for a 17 See Holmes, 706 F. 2d at 1155-56. 18 plaintiff patent holder to first bring one (or See id. 19 Bunnion v. Conrail, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7727 even more) non-class-action patent infringe- (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citation omitted). ment cases against one or more select defen- 20 See, e.g., Dosier v. Miami Valley Broad. Corp., 656 dants to obtain favorable rulings on com- F. 2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981); Laskey v. United mon patent ownership, validity, enforceability, Auto. Workers, 638 F. 2d 954, 957 (6th Cir. 1981); and claim construction issues before com- Robertson v. National Basketball Ass’n, 556 F. 2d mencing a subsequent defendant class action 682, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1977). 21 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808- proceeding in a separate case. This is so 10 (1985). because, although the prior favorable rulings 22 Id. at 811 n.3. See also KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-223. against the nonclass defendants would not 23 Id. be binding on subsequent class defendants in 24 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 25 a separate action, such prior rulings on com- Id. at 864-65. 26 See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 23(c)(4)(A). mon issues nonetheless, as a practical matter, 27 See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 23(c)(4)(A) Advisory likely would be highly persuasive on the dis- Committee Notes (1966); see also In re Joint E. & S. trict judge in the subsequent proceeding—as Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 489-90 (E. & S.D.
44 Los Angeles Lawyer June 2009 N.Y. 1995); In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 735 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 28 Emig v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 395 “OUTSOURCE” PATENT WORK TO MICHIGAN (D. Kan. 1998) (citing 7B WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1790 (2006)). FOR VALUE... 29 In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F. 2d 769, 740 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959, 110 S. Ct. 377, 107 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1989). ● We deliver 100% value at 50-75% of West Coast pricing 30 In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 293 (N.D. ● Named a Top 100 Patent Firm in Intellectual Property Today Cal. 1978). ● Representative clients: NASA, General Motors 31 See Thomas v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 201 F.R.D. 386, 392 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citation omitted). 32 Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F. 248.380.9300 2d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1964). UINN AW ROUP PLLC www.quinnlawgroup.com 33 See Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Q L G , QLG Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 720 (N.D. Ill. 1968). 34 Kunkel v. Topmaster Int’l, Inc., 906 F. 2d 693, 695 MECHANICAL, CHEMICAL, ELECTRICAL, MATERIALS, AEROSPACE, AUTOMOTIVE, IT, AND SOFTWARE ARTS (Fed. Cir. 1990). 35 Research Corp. v. Pfister Assoc. Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 499 (N.D. Ill. 1969). See also Tech- nograph Printed Circuits, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. at 723; Dale Elecs., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, MOTORCYCLE EXPERT WITNESS 536 (D. N.H. 1971); Standal’s Patents, Ltd. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1185 (D. Or. 1986); Webcraft Techs., Inc. v. Alden Press, Inc., EXPERIENCE AREAS OF SPECIALITY 2 F. R. Serv. 3d 1396, 1403, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS CA Licensed (#32551) Motorcycle Dynamics 16966, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 184 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Professional Mechanical Engineer Motorcycle Performance Analysis 36 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F. 3d M.S. in Mechanical Engineering Accident Reconstruction 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Motorcycle Road Racing Expert Vehicle Testing & Data Acquisition 37 See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F. 3d Edward P. Milich, P.E. License Holder PO Box 5 Finite Element Analysis 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995). National Roadracing Champion, Torrance CA 90507 Technical Writing & 38 See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F. 2d #1 Plate Holder 310. 710. 4708 voice Communications 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Member, Society of Automotive 310. 533. 9152 fax Engineers, Motorcycle Technical 39 Shire LLC v. Sandoz, 07-CV-00197-PAB (D. Co. [email protected] Committee WHEN YOUR CASE REQUIRES Dec. 5, 2008). Compare, e.g., TM Patents, L.P. v. www.epmengineering.com 20 Years of Motorcycle Experience A CHAMPION International Bus. Mach. Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, Former NHTSA Associate 377 (S.D. N.Y. 1999) (A claim construction in a Markman hearing is a final judgment for purposes of issue preclusion.) with Graco Children’s Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Int’l, LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“[D]espite a previous court having held a hearing on the claim construction of a patent pursuant to Markman,” issue preclusion would not apply under the facts of the case.) and Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469 (W.D. Va. 2001) (Issue preclusion applies only where the earlier claim construction “was essential to a final judgment on the question of the patents’ infringe- ment.”). 40 Blonder-Tongue Lab. Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334 (1971). 41 Standal’s Patents, Ltd. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., Civil No. 86-219-FR, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16623, at *19 (D. Or. Dec. 11, 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 42 Dale Elecs., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 537 (D. N.H. 1971). 43 Research Corp. v. Pfister Assoc. Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 499-500 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 44 See, e.g., Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 723 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Dale Elecs., 53 F.R.D. at 537. 45 Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp. at 723. 46 Tilley v. TJX Cos., Inc., 345 F. 3d 34 (1st Cir. 2003). 47 Id. at 39. 48 See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 23(b)(2). 49 See Société de Conditionnement v. Hunter Eng. Co., Inc., 655 F. 2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1981); Research Corp. v. Pfister Assoc. Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 500 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 50 See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 23(d)(2); FED. R. CIV. PROC. 23(c)(1)(C)(2)(A); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §21.311 (West 2004). See also Kerney v. Fort Griffin Fandangle Ass’n, Inc., 624 F. 2d 717 (5th Cir. 1980).
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