Substance in Kant
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Substance in Kant Silje Johanne Eggestad Master Thesis in philosophy at IFIKK, Faculty of Humanities Supervisor: Camilla Serck-Hanssen UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Autumn 2013 © Silje Johanne Eggestad Year: 2013 Title: Substance in Kant Author: Silje Johanne Eggestad http://www.duo.uio.no/ Print: CopyCat Forskningsparken 2 And indeed the question which, both now and of old, has always been raised, and always been the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance? Aristotle, Metaphysics Z 3 4 Abstract In this thesis I discuss the concept of substance in Kant. The guiding question of the thesis is: “How are we to interpret the claim that substance is to be encountered in the objects of perception?” I frame the discussion around two main arguments for the concept of substance as they occur in the First Analogy in the Critique of Pure Reason. Through evaluating these arguments in accordance with the guiding question we gain some insight into what a Kantian substance is. 5 Acknowledgments First and foremost I wish to thank my supervisor, professor Camilla Serck-Hanssen, for sharp-sighted philosophical guidance, inspiring conversations, continuous encouragement and support from day one. My sincere gratitude to professor Eric Watkins for the way I was welcomed at UCSD and for having introduced me to the wonders and difficulties of the Critique in an intelligible way. Special thanks to Eirik Ørevik Aadland and Carl Martin Rosenberg for proofreading the thesis. I wish to thank all the great people that I have been so lucky to meet during my student years at the University of Oslo and UCSD. Truly grateful for your friendships, the memorable moments we have shared, and the philosophical debates and coffee breaks that never ended. Special thanks to all my Kantian friends for helping me understand and developing my views. I further wish to thank my other friends in Oslo, dear friends from childhood, from Øytun, my stay in Italy, the U.S. and France, and my cohabitants in Valkyriegata for always being there. Warm thanks to my extended family in Trøndelag and at Stabekk for long-standing care and consideration. My deepest gratitude goes to my father, mother and my two beloved brothers, Hallvard and Erlend Benjamin. Thank you for your love and support. 6 References and Abbreviations References to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the standard A and B pagination of the first and second editions from 1781 and 1787. Other references to Kant are to the volume and page of Kants gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902), also known as the “Akademie” edition. References to Aristotle use the standard Bekker numbers of the Corpus Aristotelicum based on the page numbers of Aristotelis Opera, edidit Academia Regia Borussica, 5 vols. (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1831–1870). If not otherwise noted I am quoting from the English translations listed in the bibliography. Original text in German is quoted from Kants gesammelte Schriften in italics. Abbreviations and shorthand names in brackets: Aristotle Cat Categories Met Metaphysics Kant A/B Critique of Pure Reason, english translation, A and B edition (First Critique; Critique) KrV Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Akademie edition BL The Blomberg logic ID On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World (Inaugural Dissertation) L Logik Mr Metaphysik Mrongovius MH Metaphysik Herder MNS Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Foundations) MV Metaphysik Volckmann ND A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition (Nova Dilucidatio) NM An Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy OPA The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (The Only Possible Argument) Prol Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Come Forward as a Science (Prolegomena) R Reflexionen VL The Vienna logic 7 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................1 1.1 ARISTOTLE AND THE INQUIRY INTO BEING ................................................................................1 1.2 THE GUIDING QUESTION .............................................................................................................2 1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ........................................................................................................4 2 SUBSTANCE AS OBJECT OF PERCEPTION ...........................................................................7 2.1 THE BACKDROP ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................7 2.1.1 Objections to the argument ..................................................................................................8 2.1.2 The alteration argument .....................................................................................................11 2.2 SUBSTANCE – PERCEPTIBLE OR NOT? ......................................................................................13 2.2.1 The transitory character of our representations .................................................................13 2.2.2 Pre-critical determination ..................................................................................................16 2.2.3 Perception and transcendental time-determination ...........................................................18 2.2.4 Determination as synthetic predicate ................................................................................21 2.2.5 Substance, the substantial and substantiality .....................................................................23 2.3 A LOGICAL FALLACY ................................................................................................................25 2.3.1 The backdrop thesis revisited ............................................................................................26 3 SUBSTANCE AS ALTERING SUBJECT ..................................................................................29 3.1 THE ALTERATION ARGUMENT REVISITED ...............................................................................29 3.1.1 The alteration argument + p ..............................................................................................29 3.1.2 The anchoring argument ....................................................................................................31 3.1.3 Substance as unconditioned ...............................................................................................35 3.1.4 Substance as an anchor ......................................................................................................39 3.2 THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EXPERIENCE OF CHANGE .................................................................41 3.2.1 The meaning of change .....................................................................................................41 3.3 THE ARGUMENT FROM VERIFIABILITY ....................................................................................44 3.3.1 An alternative definition of change ...................................................................................46 3.3.2 From subjective to objective succession ...........................................................................49 3.3.3 Van Cleve’s objection .......................................................................................................50 3.3.4 Sufficient conditions for knowledge .................................................................................51 3.3.5 Interdependence in the Analogies .....................................................................................54 3.3.6 Knowing substance ............................................................................................................55 3.4 THE KANT–FREGE VIEW ...........................................................................................................57 3.4.1 Thinking substance ............................................................................................................58 3.5 ALLISON’S ALTERATION ARGUMENT REVISITED .....................................................................60 9 3.5.1 Perception vs. experience ..................................................................................................64 3.5.2 Connected perceptions ......................................................................................................66 3.5.3 Conceiving of substance ....................................................................................................68 3.6 POSSIBLE PITFALLS ...................................................................................................................69 3.6.1 Substance considered apart from its schema .....................................................................70 3.6.2 Substance as transcendental object ....................................................................................71 3.6.3 The soul as substance ........................................................................................................76 3.6.4 The noumenon in the positive sense ..................................................................................78 4 CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................82 4.1 SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION ................................................................................................82