Towards a More Effective EU Foreign and Security Strategy

EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE

Europe in the world: Towards a more effective EU foreign and security strategy

Evidence Volume

Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006) ...... 4 Professor Steven Blockmans, Head of EU Foreign Policy, CEPS (Brussels) and Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance, University of Amsterdam—Written Evidence (FSP0023) ...... 12 Canterbury Christ Church University—Written Evidence (FSP0013) ...... 16 Dr Laura Chappell, Dr Roberta Guerrina and Ms Katharine Wright, University of Surrey— Written Evidence (FSP0015) ...... 23 Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006) ...... 26 Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 11-20) ...... 27 Professor Daniel Drezner and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137) ...... 34 Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht University—Written Evidence (FSP0002) ...... 47 Dr Spyros Economides, Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006) ...... 53 Mr Peter Eklund and Mr Hans Wessberg—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66) ...... 54 Professor Adam Fagan and Dr James Ker-Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149) ...... 63 Dr Catherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Nottingham— Written Evidence (FSP0008) ...... 76 The German Marshall Fund of the United States—Written Evidence (FSP0021) ...... 81 Global Europe Centre, University of Kent—Written Evidence (FSP0019) ...... 89 Dr Roberta Guerrina, Dr Laura Chappell and Ms Katharine Wright, University of Surrey— Written Evidence (FSP0015) ...... 100 Commissioner Johannes Hahn, European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission—Written Evidence (FSP0024) ...... 101 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0009) ...... 106

Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006)

Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0014) ...... 116 Professor Stephanie Hofmann, Associate Professor, and Mr Ueli Staeger, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies—Written Evidence (FSP0020) ...... 122 Professor Knud Erik Jørgensen, Visiting Fellow, Yaşar University—Written Evidence (FSP0022) ...... 126 Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp—Oral Evidence (QQ 161-174) ...... 130 Dr James Ker-Lindsay and Professor Adam Fagan—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149) ...... 142 Professor Dr Stephan Keukeleire, Professor in European Foreign Policy, University of Leuven—Written Evidence (FSP0018) ...... 143 Dr George Kyris, Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of Birmingham—Written Evidence (FSP0003) ...... 147 Rt Hon David Lidington MP—Oral Evidence (QQ 175-188) ...... 151 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) ...... 163 LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0012) ...... 180 Dr Lars-Erik Lundin and Professor Daniel Drezner—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137) ...... 183 Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London, and Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations—Written Evidence (FSP0010) ...... 184 Mr Lawrence Meredith—Oral Evidence (QQ 77-91) ...... 190 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) ...... 199 Dr Maria O’Neill, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Abertay Dundee—Written Evidence (FSP0005) ...... 217 Mr Marc Pierini—Oral Evidence (QQ 46-57) ...... 221 Quaker Council for European Affairs—Written Evidence (FSP0017) ...... 231 Mr Matthew Rojansky—Oral Evidence (QQ 150-160) ...... 236 Mr Chris Sainty, Head of EU External Department, Europe Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office—Written Evidence (FSP0025) ...... 249 Mr Chris Sainty and Mr Richard Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) ...... 250 Dr Alistair Shepherd, Senior Lecturer in European Security, Aberystwyth University— Written Evidence (FSP0007) ...... 251 General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE—Oral Evidence (QQ 109-123) ...... 254 Professor Karen Smith, Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti and Dr Spyros Economides, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006) ...... 262 Professor Karen Smith and Mr Henry Wilkinson—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-10) ...... 263 Dr Anna Katharina Stahl, Research Fellow, EU-China Research Centre, College of Europe— Written Evidence (FSP0016) ...... 275 Mr Ueli Staeger and Professor Stephanie Hofmann, Associate Professor, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies—Written Evidence (FSP0020) ...... 278

2 of 309 Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006) Professor Charles Tripp FBA, Mr Imad Mesdoua and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) ...... 279 University Of Leeds—Written Evidence (FSP0001) ...... 280 Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76) ...... 283 Mr James Watt CVO, Mr Imad Mesdoua and Professor Charles Tripp FBA—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) ...... 294 Dr Carol Weaver, Lecturer in European Security, De Montfort University—Written Evidence (FSP0004) ...... 295 Mr Hans Wessberg and Mr Peter Eklund—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66) ...... 297 Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG—Oral Evidence (QQ 92-108) ...... 298 Mr Henry Wilkinson and Professor Karen Smith—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-10) ...... 307 Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations and Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London—Written Evidence (FSP0010) ...... 308 Ms Katharine Wright, Dr Laura Chappell and Dr Roberta Guerrina, University of Surrey— Written Evidence (FSP0015) ...... 309

3 of 309 Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006)

Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006)

This written evidence is submitted by Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen E. Smith in a personal capacity. We are all members of the European Foreign Policy Unit (EFPU), which is based in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. EFPU acts as a focus for research and teaching on issues relating to European foreign policy. EFPU members are currently researching and writing on topics such as the EU's policies towards the Mediterranean region and south-eastern Europe, EU-UN relations, European diplomacy, the European External Action Service, and Security and Defence Policy. EFPU publishes working papers, and has organised conferences on European foreign policy (see http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/EFPU/EFPUhome.aspx).

As a preface to our responses to the specific questions posed by the Sub-Committee, we put forward our understanding of what a ‘foreign and security policy strategy’ should entail. Underlying any such strategy should be a clear idea of the end results the EU desires, along with a plan to achieve those. This involves the following steps:  Agreement on the shared interests and values of the EU and its member states in the field of foreign and security policy;  Agreement on a set of objectives derived from the shared interests and values;  Given finite resources, prioritisation of those objectives, which in turn entails hard choices about which are to prevail;  Assessment of the instruments and resources that are necessary to achieve those objectives within a specified time frame, decisions on directing the necessary resources to the fulfilment of the prioritised objectives and specific instruments and institutional actors devoted to implement the decisions adopted;  A feedback loop, with regular monitoring and assessment of progress made in implementation and achieving objectives, and adjustment of priorities and resources as considered necessary.

Is the High Representative’s report the right basis on which to draft the strategy proper?

We would argue that the report, while an important starting point, could have focused much more on the need to define clear goals and achieve the necessary match between ends and means in EU foreign and security policy. In addition, we think the report:  pays too little attention to the persisting impact of the economic crisis in Europe;  pays too little attention to implementation, a major challenge for the EU’s foreign and security policy;  does not adequately specify who the EU’s neighbours are (for example, the countries of North Africa and the Middle East are neighbours, as are the countries of the Western Balkans);

4 of 309 Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006)

 assumes that China’s economic and political power will continue to grow (but it may not);  could nonetheless stress that the diffusion of power in international relations will mean that EU member states will be better able to pursue and protect their interests and values if they work together;  does not critically assess the extent to which the EU is really a ‘global power’ (in all areas, not just trade and other economic fields)  does not assess how ‘strategic partnerships’ should be utilised in the pursuit of a clearer strategy;  does not consider whether ‘regional ‘geopolitics’ should be the focus of EU foreign and security policy.

What are the EU’s strategic interests? Do they coincide with the UK’s strategic interests?

A list of the EU’s strategic interests should arguably include:  driving instead of reacting to changes, especially in terms of connectivity, flows and networks;  maintaining stability in Europe and at the European borders, which includes finding a better way to relate to its neighbours;  managing Europe’s relative decline;  supporting international law and multilateralism.

The UK’s strategic interests are identical; there is no conflict between these wider European interests and British interests. Furthermore, outside of the EU, the UK would find it extremely challenging to protect its interests in a world that is increasingly multipolar. Given the extent of the combined resources of the EU and its member states, only when they are united will the EU member states be able to protect and promote their shared interests.

Is EU a global power?

A global power is understood here to mean an international actor (most often a state, but possibly the EU as well) that can has the resources, political will and institutional ability to project and protect its interests at the global – and not just regional – level.1 The extent to which the EU fulfils these conditions varies by issue area. Where the EU has strong internal competence with ‘supranational’ decision-making procedures (for example, the areas of trade policy or environmental policy), then it can more easily muster the institutional ability and political will necessary to protect and project its interests in multilateral and bilateral negotiations, within the context of the UN, and so on. In such areas, arguably the EU is a global power.

In addition, the EU has been a model worldwide for regional cooperation and integration, and for fostering reconciliation and peace-building among its member states (for which it was awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize). The difficulties that the EU has had in resolving the euro crisis, the Greek debt crisis, and the current ‘migration crisis’ have, however, dented international perceptions of the EU as a model, although it has shown a distinctive ability to

1 Based on the definition of a ‘pole’ in Luk Van Langenhove, The EU as a Global Actor in a Multipolar World and Multilateral 2.0 Environment, Egmont Paper 36 (Brussels: Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, March 2010).

5 of 309 Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006) undertake difficult political conversations between its member states (contrary e.g. to the silence of Arab countries in relation to the ‘migration crisis’).

With respect to those areas covered by the intergovernmental framework, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the answer to the question is less clear-cut. Intergovernmental decision-making affects the resources, will and ability of the EU to project its interests at global level. Thus, for numerous reasons including lack of will and lack of resources, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy has mainly produced relatively low-key and small civilian missions, mainly in its neighbourhood and in Africa. The EU has not, for example, boosted the UN’s capacity to maintain international peace and security, and could not remotely match NATO’s capabilities to defend Europe from security threats. In Asia, it is hardly a central or important political or security actor. As such, then, it is not a ‘global power’ in security and defence.

Should EU focus resources on neighbourhood?

It is imperative that the EU re-focus resources on its neighbourhood, understood here to include the countries of the western Balkans and Turkey (so pre-accession countries), the sixteen countries included in the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy, and the neighbours of the neighbours such as Russia, Iran, Iraq, and countries in the Sahel region and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The EU is now surrounded by an ‘arc of crisis’, and the effects on the EU itself have been dramatic. The conflicts in the region have created serious security threats (terrorist groups in particular) and the current refugee crisis, one of the largest in post-war history. The EU has a clear security interest to try to resolve those conflicts and ensure security in its neighbourhood. Furthermore, many of the countries where populations are most at risk of atrocities are in the EU’s periphery (Syria; Sudan; South Sudan; Central Africa Republic; Iraq; Libya) so in addition to the security imperatives, there is also arguably a moral and legal imperative for the EU to try to stop and prevent atrocities. The need for EU engagement is thus clear, and the EU will not have credibility as a ‘global actor’ if it does not seriously try to address the multiple, multi-faceted challenges in its own neighbourhood.

There is considerable scope for re-focusing resources. For example: in 2013, the EU gave aid to almost 150 countries; it conducts regular political dialogues with almost every country on earth; the EU (the Foreign Affairs Council; the EEAS; the High Representative) issues hundreds of foreign policy statements each year on issues ranging from human rights in Guatemala to the Iranian nuclear issue. Engaging in all of these activities inevitably dissipates the attention and resources of the EU. If there were a sustained re-focussing of resources and attention on the wider neighbourhood, then the EU could bring to bear considerable power and leverage which could enable it to contribute more adequately to addressing the crises on its borders.

The disadvantages of a privileged focus on the neighbourhood are twofold, but both worth paying for. First, in the current economic climate, such a strategy would divert resources from other dossiers. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it would dent discourses about Europe as a global power in the short to mid-term. It would become more difficult to sustain a European position on development if aid to developing countries were to be severely cut. In the mid to long term, this strategy could however provide a more solid basis for global claims and show how Europe can be a source of stability also for non-members. Second, and more importantly, member states are deeply divided about how to address the EU

6 of 309 Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006) neighbourhood and to respond to a variety of challenges including Russia’s foreign policy stance, migration in the Mediterranean, and economic development in neighbouring countries, A foreign policy strategy centred on the neighbourhood would entail a lot of work to identify common goals and all member states would have to commit firmly to those goals if they are to succeed. The current discussion on migration is exemplary of the problems a focus on the neighbourhood entails.

What are the EU’s interests in the MENA region? How effective have the EU and Member States been in promoting them?

The EU’s interests in the MENA region remain to create an area of shared prosperity, peace and security. However, the neighbourhood is less stable, considerably less secure and facing a more profound economic crisis than when the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched. 2 This is not because of the EU, as the instability in the area has very deep roots. However, the EU has been unable to make a real difference and lacks a political vision. Current instruments are clearly inadequate and the ENP is under revision.

In the short term, the main imperative is peace and security. This entails finding a solution to the conflict in Syria and the instability in Libya, as well as addressing the erosion of state control in other, large parts of the area (Sahel, Sinai, Lebanon). Moreover, if the Palestinian Authority were to stop cooperating with Israel, this would create a ‘perfect storm’ with the potential to unleash a regional war. The challenge is how to strengthen states and promote peace without strengthening authoritarian regimes, an issue on which member states have different views and this have led countries such as the UK and France to operate outside the EU framework in the case of Libya, although not with the hoped-for result.

In the long term, the objective must be shared prosperity. Peace and security are not sustainable if there is no shared prosperity. Since the Arab spring, the EU has emphasised ‘sustainable development,’ which means including all areas of the Southern Mediterranean countries into developmental plans. This should be expanded to ‘shared development,’ as in Euro-Mediterranean development, and must see the EU make more concessions, especially in the field of agriculture. Southern European countries are opposed to this, but their argument is very narrow. Instead, agriculture and shared prosperity are crucial to provide a positive path for youth in the periphery that risk otherwise being lured into extremism just for lack of alternatives. Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade negotiations, on the contrary, are premature.

Member states and the EU have been calling for a policy to address the ‘root causes’ of insecurity and to offer ‘tailor made responses’ to the countries in the region. What would that involve? Does the EU have the foreign policy toolkit to deliver on this policy?

The EU has for some time sought to implement a ‘comprehensive approach’ to development and security, which address the full cycle of conflict policy from early warning through to post-conflict peacebuilding, as well as drawing from the whole spectrum of EU instruments, from economic to military. In theory, the EU has a wide range of instruments that can deliver on such an approach – more and better than most actors in international politics,

2 Committee on Foreign Affairs / European Parliament, Report on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 19 June 2015 (2015/2002(INI))

7 of 309 Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006) including NATO. Challenges to implementing the comprehensive approach so far include those of: coordination across policy areas (foreign policy; migration policy; trade policy; defence policy; and so on), the relevant EU bureaucracies and the member states; prioritisation and consequent implications for re-focussing of resources; the tendency for crisis management to crowd out prevention; effective engagement with other international actors. Despite this, the potential of the EU to address root causes of insecurity is vast, and arguably larger than most other international actors. The recent re-thinking of the Security Strategy and of the ENP is going in the direction of making a better use of all EU instruments. One case where the EU has arguably been able to tackle a complex crisis in a multifaceted manner is the fight against piracy in the horn of Africa, where a variety of instruments (naval operation, legal action, development assistance) have been employed.

How can EU most effectively maximise its power – both hard and soft – in international affairs?

Soft power is arguably key here. As originally conceived by Joseph Nye,3 soft power is the power of attraction, and emanates from the attractiveness of a state’s (or the EU’s) culture, political values and foreign policies. It is different to what Nye calls ‘command power’, or the use of coercion or inducement. Soft power encourages others to do what you want them to do, because they want to follow your example, and is therefore a less costly way of attaining desired outcomes than the use of command power.

As Smith has argued elsewhere,4 the EU is a powerful model for the rest of the world: neighbouring countries wish to accede to it rather than balance or resist it, and other regional groupings around the world seek to emulate it. EU foreign policies in support of international law and multilateralism generate good will. The EU’s member states are all relatively rich democracies, with high levels of human rights protection and active civil societies, and a magnificent cultural heritage. The EU, in other words, benefits from considerable soft power – despite the euro crisis, which has damaged the EU’s standing and credibility in the eyes of many observers around the world. The current internal contestation of the EU (in many EU member states) is damaging to its influence abroad as the EU’s attractiveness to outsiders reflects its attractiveness to insiders.

The EU has considerable command power resources at its disposal, though as argued above, these could be better focused and prioritised. These include its large aid budget, trading power, CSDP capabilities, and diplomatic networks. The way the EU’s command power is used can damage EU soft power: for example, when conditionality is not credible because the EU does not use it against autocratic regimes, or when the EU appears to be making demands on third countries solely to satisfy its own interests (such as preventing asylum seekers from reaching its shores).

Is EU an effective multilateral player?

‘Effective’ here is taken to mean the EU’s ability to reach its goals and promote its interests in multilateral fora. This varies according to the issue area. In the area of trade, for example, the EU is able to promote its interests, though the growth of other trading powers is challenging. In the area of environmental policy and specifically climate change policy, the EU

3 Joseph S Nye, Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004). 4 Karen E. Smith, 'Is the European Union's Soft Power in Decline?', Current History, vol. 113, no. 741, March 2014.

8 of 309 Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006) has been less able to counter the opposition and resistance of key players, though its internal goals and policies in this area constitute a standard by which other international actors are measured. In the area of international human rights protection, the EU has also found it difficult to counter resistance to its views in fora such as the UN Human Rights Council.

The limitations to EU effectiveness as a multilateral player are both internal and external. Although its negotiating capacity has improved over time (particularly with improvements made since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty), ‘outreach’ – engaging with non-EU states – can still be a struggle: so much time can be spent reaching internal EU agreements that engagement with outsiders is limited. In other cases, like the Middle East Peace Process, ‘outreach’ (in this case keeping the United States involved) can become more important than impact. Furthermore, any EU position is inherently rigid, because revising it would mean reopening the internal bargains that produced it – though again since the Lisbon Treaty the EU delegations in New York and Geneva have a bit more flexibility now in negotiations with outsiders. The external limits to EU effectiveness are primarily posed by the fact that multilateral settings provide all actors with a voice. ‘Rising powers’ are increasingly successful in demanding more representation and voting power in key institutions (such as the IMF), which will inevitably mean European/EU representation is relatively less important, and therefore the EU will need to be more persuasive and flexible if it wishes to achieve its objectives in multilateral settings.

How can the interests of Member States be more effectively translated into EU action? How can the links between national capitals and the EU be strengthened in external affairs?

Despite the intergovernmental system of EU foreign and defence policy, which can potentially block decision-making, national diplomats based in Brussels are usually extremely good in striking fair balances between the interests of the national capitals and an effective operation of the EU machinery. They play a major part in making the whole system work smoothly: they understand what needs to be done to promote national interests while following, at the same time, the consensual norms in Brussels. Here, the links between national capitals and their Permanent Representations are crucial: the national capital needs to give clear directions, while also allowing some flexibility to their representatives. In these aspects of the negotiations process, there is the potential to influence EU policies. Some countries (including the UK) sometimes give rather rigid instructions to their negotiators: this can be counter-productive and make member states’ initiatives less effective.

Building good connections with the EEAS is important aspect if the interests of the member states are to be translated into EU action. One example: EU foreign policy is constructed on the basis of papers prepared and circulated by the EEAS. In these papers, they write down options, exclude alternatives, etc. All this work forms the basis of the discussions in which national delegations engage. In order to build solid ties with the EEAS, credibility, flexibility and a cooperative spirit can be important assets.

How would you assess the diplomatic and intelligence capacities of the EU and Member States? Does the Union have the expertise and capacity within its

9 of 309 Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006) institutions and national foreign services to respond to a more complex and complicated security environment?

This is a vital point. If Europe is to be relevant in the future international context, it is because it has better ideas, and better ideas necessarily rely on information and political analysis. To do so, member states and the EU need to strengthen cooperation and see the use of more resources as an investment in the future. While taken together the EU and member states have the necessary expertise and capacity, their cooperation is limited and dramatically under-resourced. Member states, especially smaller ones, tend to rely on the EU for the provision of political analysis and intelligence (based on the elaboration mainly of open sources). The creation of the EEAS5 and the strengthening of EU Delegations in non- EU countries have helped the EU to develop its political analysis skills, but a clearer plan and more resources are needed to make this flow of information more substantial and valuable (e.g. security experts in EU Delegation, clearer and stronger relations between crises rooms including outside the EU, common training, etc.). Larger member states (including and especially the UK) have often been tempted not to engage in conversations that would entail sharing information. However, this limits synergies on vital dossiers such as counter- terrorism, country analysis, scenario developments for regions at risk, etc. and it further curtails the UK’s capacity to influence the direction of the other 27 member states’ foreign policies.

Is the practice of ad-hoc groupings of Member states a useful template for future EU foreign policy? How could it be strengthened? What are the disadvantages of this approach?

Ad-hoc groupings are here to stay and they can be advantageous as long as they are linked to the EU. Several more or less formal groupings already exist, such as the Visegrad and Scandinavian groups. They can be faster, more effective ways of identifying options and responsibilities, and of involving non-EU members (such as the US, Switzerland, Norway, and so on) in diplomatic conversations. They work to the benefit of all EU member states when they are transparent and there is regular reporting within the EU framework to non- participants. If this is not the case, they can cause duplication of efforts and fragmentation.

How would you assess the flow of information between member states and between national capitals and the EU? What are the hurdles to deepening intelligence sharing within the Union?

The flow of information is largely a one-way street from the EU to member states, which means that it is mainly based on open-source information and the political analysis provided by EU officials. This is good, as it provides a common basis for discussion. However, the quality of the political analysis is limited by its open-source nature and depends largely on the quality of a small team of officials, which can vary from excellent to average according to the subject. Another aspect is that the amount of information available is very broad, and national and EU officials (both in Brussels and in third countries) are often unable to process it in-depth. Again, clearer plans, better organised structures and more resources would help in this direction.

5 Overall, after a slow start and despite the need for further improvements (also after and beyond the July 2013 review), the EEAS has established itself as a serious and competent actor in Brussels; and its work has been evaluated in a largely positive way by the member states, especially when compared to the six-month cycle of the Presidencies.

10 of 309 Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006)

Some of the hurdles to deeper intelligence-sharing are unavoidable, but not all. Intelligence sharing between 28 member states is a huge task and confidentiality is constantly at risk. A few changes could bring substantial improvement, though, such as the upgrading of key technical facilities for intelligence sharing, the quality of political reporting, the prioritisation of political analyses with high added value, the sharing of lessons learned across EU institutions and across the spectrum of EU foreign policy actors, to name but a few. The current reorganisation of the EEAS crisis management structure under the new Deputy Secretary General for CSDP and Crisis Response might provide some of the answers and should be supported.

How should the review address resourcing?

As indicated above, a strategy should indicate the level of resources necessary and available to achieve the prioritised objectives. This will illustrate resource constraints and thus that hard choices must be made, but also reveal the opportunities to refocus and maximise resources for the pursuit of priorities. In an ideal world, the EU’s budget for ‘global Europe’ would be agreed in conjunction with a new strategy, thus allowing the EU to match resources to priorities more efficiently and effectively; the current situation is unsatisfactory as there is a mismatch between the setting of foreign policy priorities and the debates on the EU budget (and particularly on the 7-year financial frameworks).

11 of 309 Professor Steven Blockmans, Head of EU Foreign Policy, CEPS (Brussels) and Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance, University of Amsterdam—Written Evidence (FSP0023)

Professor Steven Blockmans, Head of EU Foreign Policy, CEPS (Brussels) and Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance, University of Amsterdam—Written Evidence (FSP0023)

Mobilising the “F” in CFSP

1. Factors The political intent behind the creation of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) was to mend fences after the acrimonious division of EU member states over the question whether or not to join the US-led invasion of Iraq. This effort resulted in the adoption of the slogan of “effective multilateralism” in the ESS. Twelve years on, the post-Lisbon Treaty’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been enriched with a few signature successes: the continuation of the EU facilitated dialogue aimed at the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo; the adoption and maintenance of sanctions against Russia over its annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of eastern Ukraine; and the conclusion of a final nuclear deal in the E3+3 talks on Iran. These successes could not have been achieved without effective multilateralism at EU level. Above that level, there is less proof of “stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance” (Article 21 TEU) - a central point of the conference which the Netherlands will organise in December 2015 in the context of the consultation semester launched by High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini to move the EU’s strategic rethink process from the June 2015 strategic assessment of ‘The European Union in a changing global environment’ towards the submission of a European Global Strategy (EGS) to the European Council by June 2016.

The political factors driving the EGS process are internal too, but of a different nature than in 2003. A negative driver is the problem to mobilise enough of the right kind of resources to deal with an increasingly volatile neighbourhood and an ever-complex world. In the words of Winston Churchill: “Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we must think” (Tocci, 2015). A positive driver is the opportunity to use the new mechanisms provided by the Lisbon Treaty to forge a more “comprehensive approach” to EU external action, as prioritised by a new generation of officials at the helm of the institutions. Essential in moving from description (the strategic assessment of June 2015) to prescription (the June 2016 EGS) is to tailor the existing mechanisms, instruments and capabilities to specific EU foreign policy goals. This written submission will focus on the former.

2. Fabric The constitutional fabric is often overlooked by policy-makers. Helpfully, Article 21 TEU presents a full list of EU foreign policy objectives which were scattered across the treaties in the pre-Lisbon era. While this merger should in theory spur the inter-institutional cooperation in the development of a “comprehensive approach” to the different strands of EU foreign policy (humanitarian aid, development, enlargement, neighbourhood, trade, etc.), judicial practice shows that new institutional turf wars are being fought. In great part, this is due to the isolation of the CFSP, the only policy relegated to the TEU, largely beyond the control of the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court, and executed by way of

12 of 309 Professor Steven Blockmans, Head of EU Foreign Policy, CEPS (Brussels) and Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance, University of Amsterdam—Written Evidence (FSP0023) “specific” procedures and instruments which are foreign to the toolbox of the institutions in the operationalisation of the other external relations policies under the TFEU.

Thus far, the Court has in its post-Lisbon case law not clarified how to determine which legal regime should take legal precedence when joining up the different strands of EU foreign policy. Yet, it has been given a new opportunity by the European Parliament in a “cross- pillar” dispute with the Council about the proper legal basis for an international agreement with Tanzania on the transfer for trial of pirates (a matter of criminal justice falling under the TFEU?) apprehended by CSDP operation Atalanta (launched in the framework of the CFSP enshrined in the TEU). It is hoped that the Court sheds light on the criteria applicable to the competence delimitation between the CFSP and TFEU-based policies of the Union, for “as long as EU institutions cannot sort out their internal differences, this will be to detriment of their consensually agreed external objectives and erode the EU’s global credibility” (Merket, 2015).

3. Flexibility The strategic assessment of June 2015 applies the concept of flexibility almost exclusively to external funding: “As the largest global combined donor, the EU is a leader in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. But insufficient flexibility reduces the effectiveness of aid on the ground. Likewise, in counter-terrorism, implementation is hampered by heavy procedural requirements.”

When thinking about flexibility, most EU observers are instinctively drawn to the flexibility expressed in the variable geometric terms of the EU’s institutional architecture: the future of core groups in foreign policy. It is true that “under certain conditions, the specialisation and division of labour among EU member states [big and small] can strengthen both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the foreign policy of the EU”, especially in cases where there is a lack of interest or political will among all member states (Keukeleire, 2006). As long as such more or less structured coalitions of member states work towards the attainment of the EU’s commonly-held external action objectives, the extra efforts, money and other national resources devoted by core groups to specific foreign policy matters (regional or thematic) can help to: I. alleviate the stress on an understaffed and cash-strapped European External Action Service; II. assist in the operationalisation of EU foreign policy: and III. increase the visibility and credibility of the EU as an international actor.

In the context of diplomatic dispute settlement, the E3+3 model has been hailed as a way forward to more efficient and effective foreign policy-making by a contact group of big member states, coordinated by the HR/VP (Vimont, 2015). The latter is an important addition, as contact groups should not obstruct but rather buttress the EU’s structures in the foreign and security field. Respect by member states for the ‘constitutional’ duty of loyal cooperation with the EU institutions should prevent EU external policies and actions from being diluted, undermined, rendered less visible, and re-nationalised by core groups’ activities.

However valuable the exploration of such means to operationalise the CFSP, we should not lose sight of the fact that such actions by contact groups presuppose that member states have agreed to a common position or line of action. At the level of decision-making in CFSP, however, the general rule remains unanimity. In an EU of 28, differences in historical

13 of 309 Professor Steven Blockmans, Head of EU Foreign Policy, CEPS (Brussels) and Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance, University of Amsterdam—Written Evidence (FSP0023) trajectories, socio-economic realities and (geo)strategic and political interests contribute to the cracks in the Union’s persona as an actor on the international stage. Differences in respect for the values on which the EU is built have also shown that these normative principles form an insufficient basis for policy consensus on foreign policy issues (cf. the 2015 refugee crisis). We should not be blind-sighted by the relative success of keeping member states together on, for instance, the issue of sanctions against Russia. The risk is real that they fizzle out before Russia ends its subversive actions in the Donbas region of Ukraine. Generally, on questions about the use of force or interference in the internal matters of third states, a “common” foreign and security policy is unlikely to emerge from the divisions that separate the member states (e.g. Iraq 2003, Syria 2013). Perceptions from “strategic” partners confirm the view that, more often than not, the EU fails to coordinate a common policy response to external crises, even when the instruments and means to address them are at hand.

During the consultation semester of the EGS, serious thought should be given to the situations in which the opportunities provided by the Lisbon Treaty can be seized to render the intergovernmental method of CFSP decision-making more efficient and effective. This plea concerns in particular the first of the four exceptions listed in Article 31(2) TEU where the Council can decide by qualified majority vote (QMV): I. when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a European Council decision relating to the EU’s strategic interests and objectives; II. when adopting any decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative has presented following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative; III. when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position; and IV. when appointing an EU Special Representative in accordance with Article 33 TEU.

Arguably, the second possibility for QMV would leave the High Representative plenty of room for initiative to operationalise the EGS if requested by the European Council in 2016.

The opportunity of opening up more avenues for QMV was also enshrined in a new passerelle clause: Article 31(3) TEU enables the European Council to extend the cases of QMV by unanimously adopting a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by qualified majority in other cases, with the exception of decisions having military or defence implications (Article 31(4) TEU). This new and generous licence for extending the QMV mechanism enables the European Council to adjust the CFSP decision-making order in response to future needs and considerations of member states. This passerelle clause might well be the “thin edge of the wedge” which leads to more efficiency and effectiveness in EU foreign policy-making (Törö, 2013). However, in some member states (e.g. Germany and the UK), the government will not be able to agree to use this passerelle without prior approval by its parliament (Piris, 2010). Moreover, the condition of full concurrence of national positions among the heads of state and government guarantees that the doors to the passage from unanimity to QMV will be firmly guarded and remain shut when contrary to the vital national interests or opposition of any member state.

To be sure, the above-mentioned constellations for QMV do not undermine the continued centrality of consensus for the adoption of CFSP decisions, because they represent clearly stated derogations from the general unanimity requirement laid down in Article 31(1) TEU. In each of these cases, any member state is entitled to pull the “emergency brake” and block

14 of 309 Professor Steven Blockmans, Head of EU Foreign Policy, CEPS (Brussels) and Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance, University of Amsterdam—Written Evidence (FSP0023) a CFSP proposal “for vital and stated reasons of national policy” (Article 31(2) TEU). But as it is up to the High Representative to conduct the CFSP and to facilitate its decision-making to achieve the Union’s foreign policy objectives, she should use the ongoing process of strategic rethinking to determine which red lines member states would invoke to hold up any future use of QMV decision-making.

Finally, another derogation from the unanimity rule in CFSP decision-making deserves attention: the so-called “constructive abstention” mechanism, which allows for up to a third minus one of the member states to stand aside while the majority forges ahead. In case of an abstention, the member(s) in question “shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, [that/those] Member State[s] shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision, and the other Member States shall respect [its/their] position” (Article 31(1) TEU). The Lisbon Treaty has therefore widened the legal space to accommodate member states’ interests in abstaining from CFSP decision-making by unanimity. So far, however, the mechanism has only been used once: in February 2008, when Cyprus abstained when the Council adopted the Decision establishing the EULEX Kosovo mission. It appears that this instrument for flexibility in CFSP decision-making still has to gain in popularity. The EGS process should clarify in which cases this mechanism too could carry more practical relevance.

15 of 309 Canterbury Christ Church University—Written Evidence (FSP0013)

Canterbury Christ Church University—Written Evidence (FSP0013)

HRVP Mogherini’s report entitled ‘The European Union in a changing global environment’ has set the framework both for the 2015 overhaul of the ENP, and the envisaged third edition (2003, 2008) of the European Security Strategy, to be cast as an EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, due in June 2016. The ‘process of strategic reflection’ should reflect both Member State interests and EU capabilities and requirements. The following viewpoints encompass recent perspectives from British civil servants working within EU institutions and personal reflections based on research and analysis on key aspects of EU foreign and security policy and based on travel to and within key neighbourhood states.

1.0 Changing Global Environment and EU interests

1.1 The EU remains fundamentally uneven in its ability to respond to an increasingly threatening and complex security environment. Its CSDP remains an area-specific, out-of- area tool of limited means, incapable of operating autonomously to defend the EU. This renders the EU a rather ‘herbivorous power’ in the face of ‘hard’ predators. Its current threats remain a restive Russia operating within the boundaries of sovereign Ukraine, and the seemingly implacable forces of ISIS set to extend control over large swathes of the Middle East. In political terms, the EU’s current strategy is the goal of solidarity written into the Lisbon Treaty which allows it to implement both diplomatic and economic solutions collectively in the absence of military ones: specifically by increasing the resilience of states under Russian pressure or at the mercy of ISIS. In military terms, the CSDP on its own remains geared toward crisis management operating in areas largely beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Neither approach will be enough to underwrite an EU Global Strategy.

1.2 As regards the central philosophy of previous European Security Strategies and the CFSP itself, the entire nature of the EU as the pre-eminent ‘normative actor’, based on the prestige of operating with soft power rather than hard power instruments will swiftly have to adjust to produce an operable and sustainable EU Global Strategy. The ‘Comprehensive Approach’ which emerged from the EEAS under HRVP Ashton is a good step forward in terms of fusing together the means and ends, the tactical and the strategic, in terms of constructing and deploying policies with greater ‘bandwidth’. Rules, values, treaties and norms however are increasingly going to need to be protected, and possibly prosecuted. The EU Global Strategy, if it is to be truly global, is going to require (1) a far better spread of tools (some far more hard-power based); (2) a better assurance of Member State solidarity in the Council to underwrite it; (3) a far greater commitment in financial terms to common foreign and security policy than the parsimonious funding that the EEAS, CFSP and CSDP collectively receive from the overall EU budget.

2.0 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

2.1 The EU should has no choice but to redouble its efforts, and regain lost leverage in its neighbourhood. Much has changed from the time of the 2003 ESS which simply desired the EU to establish a ring of ‘well-governed neighbours’, law-abiding and stable and capable of cooperating politically, strategically, economically and socially with the EU. Yet the intentions

16 of 309 Canterbury Christ Church University—Written Evidence (FSP0013) of Russia and of ISIS, as well as the challenges of migration all represent substantive threats to the ESS, and are all issues rooted within the EU’s wider neighbourhood (either ENP states, or proximate regions). Failures to re-engage with a post-Arab Spring Maghreb, to respond in any real way to the increasingly volatile Mashreq overrun with the military and migratory fallout prompted by ISIS, or to contend robustly with Russian incursions (militarily, politically or via energy security) in key eastern European states beyond the use of sanctions has left the EU functionally incapable of operating as a foreign policy actor within, and on behalf of its neighborhood. The EU Global Strategy therefore needs to establish as its centerpiece a wholly reconstituted European Neighbourhood Policy, as indicated below. A string of new ENP Action Plans need to be swiftly drafted, and on far more robust and attractive terms than before. The ENP has gone from failure to fiasco because of its lackluster ability to engage leaders and societies on the basis of reform, premised on the promise of reward. The EU Global Strategy cannot work without a reconstructed ENP, and the ENP must operate from 2015 onwards to genuinely engage both with state leaders (top down) and civil society (bottom up) on both bespoke interests and generic values, rather than the current batch of perfunctory offers to join an increasingly ambiguous EU structure.

2.2 ENP + Comprehensive Approach + CSDP = EU Global Strategy

Only a decently overhauled ENP, and its constituent bilateral action plans, supported by a far more regional structure to engage states multilaterally can serve as the requisite underpinnings for an EU Global Strategy. The EU cannot hope to be strategic globally if it is hopelessly ineffective locally. A better mix is ultimately needed, i.e. sharper combination of the Comprehensive Approach used by the EEAS and its committees, combined with CSDP tools and operations to deal proactively (and not merely via soft power approaches) with the conflict and post-conflict situations in key neighborhood states, including the migration crisis. Despite the long-held goals of reform and integration, the ENP remains far too remote-control an approach to the EU’s neighbourhood, and the Commission and the EEAS and the Member States together still do not view it as a theatre for CSDP deployment. Clearly this cannot continue. The mandate of the CSDP itself is crisis management, whether preventative or post-conflict, and the sheer number of hot spots in and around the neighbourhood, both Med and Eastern Europe, require urgent practical attention.

2.3 The ENP must be the format by which EEAS Comprehensive Approach is used in combination with material support from specific CSDP missions, to achieve immediate tactical security goals, and improve the chances for mid-term goals of reform and stability as currently envisaged by DG Near, to take root. Hard power aspects of ENP need to be agreed on and deployed. Funding provisions need to emerge from CSDP budgets, but also alongside a vastly improved ENPI, to construct a worthwhile ENP that can serve as the centrepiece for a renewed EU Global Strategy. These countries need to be settled strategically, before their citizens can be resettled materially. A thoroughly overhauled ENP, alongside development tools working in conjunction with the UN Food Programme, US Aid directed at providing nourishment for refugees in camps, and working swiftly on short and mid-term solutions to ensure both safe routes to the EU for genuine asylum seekers from much of the Maghreb and Mashreq, and improved opportunities in the medium and long- term for economic migrants to find work in a staggered method to fill major labour shortages in key EU markets in the next decade or to return to decent, safe lives in their own countries. Again however, a tougher approach may be required. Overhauling the CSDP’s mandate to permit in-theatre operations, alongside NATO, may be a very real option if threats from ISIS and Russia continue or surpass current levels.

17 of 309 Canterbury Christ Church University—Written Evidence (FSP0013)

2.3 ENP Foreign Policy Instruments in the neighbourhood are not yet fit for purpose. a The general view of those within the EU who have to operationalise it, and those in both Med and Eastern Partnership states at the receiving and is that the entire ENP philosophy, beginning with its current strategy needs a complete overhaul. The ENP Action Plans and the Progress Reports were useful tools in the first half decade of the ENP’s lifecycle, but they now need to be lighter, shorter, simplified and more flexible. The more extensive formats may be useful for more advanced countries, but should be abolished for the countries which do not or cannot follow an agenda of reform and closer integration with the EU. The ENPI should be more vastly extended, more flexible and less bureaucratic (here the 2014 report from the Court of Auditors proves instructive).

3.0 MENA Upheaval

3.1 Where there are decent ENP allies, i.e. where neighbourhood engagement by the EU has made a difference, then political consolidation should be effected, to deepen both democractic/human rights grounding and to anchor economic transformations, e.g. Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, but particularly within the Med region: Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel, all of whom have (within limits) demonstrated the political will to strengthen their relations with the EU and implement or continue a reform agenda.

3.2 There is still little decent understanding about the sheer political differences between states in the Maghreb and Mashreq in terms of their different constitutional setups, governance structures, and civil society makeup, including the ethnic and tribal collectives that are now under threat from ISIS in key parts of Syria and Lebanon and beyond. Understanding, and crafting an appropriate response to ISIS must be a part of the ENP’s strategy, but can only be effected through a far more robust CSDP-led Comprehensive Approach-mandate set of activities in the region, likely bolstered by key Member State, NATO, and possibly US and Russian involvement. The latter two remain a vital part of the Quartet, and for that reason need to operate more effectively with the EU in working to craft responses to ISIS.

4.0 Capacities and Capabilities

4.1 Lisbon Toolbox: The broad spectrum of CFSP tools from basic declarations to formalized diplomatic activities is still not clear enough, neither within the Council, nor the EEAS, nor the EU Delegations. While much in the EEAS has been consolidated around core themes and country and regions, the specific foreign policy tools remain too widely spread, ambiguously chosen, unclearly understood and ineffectively deployed. A typology of tools MUST be laid out regarding both the form (the type of political framework agreements with third-country diplomatic interaction, association agreements, partnership & cooperation agreement, related financial agreements, to enable operational goals) and content (from bilaterals on key negotiation and representation to bottom-up initiatives like the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights)

4.2 CSDP and Crisis Management

4.3 While some good work has come out of the myriad actors that support the CFSP and CSDP goals of the Council and the EEAS, Member States remain unconnected with much of

18 of 309 Canterbury Christ Church University—Written Evidence (FSP0013) the work undertaken by these actors, and the actors themselves remain disparately connected amongst themselves, overlapping in remit, duplicatory in output, and functionally unresponsive to many of the critical neighbourhood issues that have been in play for the past five years. The main six actors that require serious scrutiny in terms of their effectiveness within a truly global EU strategy are the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, CIVCOM, the Politico-Military Group, the EU Military Staff unit and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Unit. While decent work has come out in the field of CSDP operations, these need to be carried far further in terms of refining the mandate of crisis management, connecting this more explicitly with the Comprehensive Approach, and redeploying the entire seat of operation to key hotspots across the entire ENP zone, from Ukraine and Moldova, to Libya and Tunis.

4.4 CSDP Neighbourhood Operations should take two forms: immediate tactical response to the most volatile situations (a robust counterpart for the maritime operations of EU NAVFOR) and a more mid-range, mid-term response to more stable states, or states slowly rendered stable, doing what CSDP ops do best: security, rule of law, police training, customs, piracy, border management and support to humanitarian aid. Equally, while the EU bears the responsibility of swift responses within its neighbourhood, it has good interoperable track record with both NATO and UN ops, and should wait no longer to put together combined ops in key neighbourhood zones, on the basis of the two-fold deployment methodology above.

5.0 Member States and the EU

5.1 Clearly, foreign and security policy continues to witness both impressive collective agreement, but also serious rifts. The Global Strategy of the EU needs to reflect how institutional changes might be effected within the Council, to conclude a list of points that can draw more effectively, reliably and swiftly upon the requirement to operate with, for and on behalf of solidarity between all Member States. QMV was recently used to push through urgently needed policies in response to the migration crisis; but as a majoritarian form of decision making that has treaty backing to be used in areas of strategic importance, it needs to be drawn on more frequently and more confidently. Equally, the use of strategic groupwork among like-minded, or geopolitically similar Member States, in the form of Enhanced Structured Cooperation, again as mandated by the treaty, remains a vital but wholly underused method of rationalizing a Union-wide response via the specificities of interested and involved Member States. Groupwork in action, in other words.

5.2 For the EU to work effectively, all Member States must chip in, the strongest helping the weakest. No foreign policy objective can reach its potential without this issue being resolved. The rationalisation of defence procurement is a key in point. The combined total of EU Member States' defence budgets is half that of the United States, but Europe's armies can achieve very little by comparison. There has been so much wastage here that could have been avoided by cooperation across the EU. The UK has been notable in helping block that progress despite being in the best position to lead on the issue, learning hopefully from the shambles of its own defence procurement policy.

6.0 EEAS

19 of 309 Canterbury Christ Church University—Written Evidence (FSP0013)

6.1 The new HRVP has made her mark in the first year of her mandate. She has achieved the deal on Iran that her predecessor has started. She is a good communicator. Often this side of diplomacy is neglected, but she is fully aware that selling the EU's foreign policy is essentially for its credibility and builds the EU's reputation and authority, both to be listened to by countries when the EU makes statements and also at the negotiating table. However she is clearly over-stretched. Unlike Foreign Ministries, She has no deputy or deputies and no plane available to take her in the shortest possible time from one hotspot to another. This should change if we are to compete with other main players, especially when it comes to conflict resolution and promoting our values agenda, which should remain one of our key policy priorities. Resourcing of the EU in the external relations field is key and certainly should be part of the strategic review.

6.2 "The EEAS was conceived in prosperity and born in austerity". The EEAS has 4,105 staff members of which over half are in delegations, alongside 3,400 EC staff. Given the Juncker cabinet's priority of jobs and growth for our citizens, it is interesting to find according to the latest figures available that 9.4% of all European Commission staff work for DEVCO while only 2.1% work for TRADE. A useful streamlining of the EEAS structure has just taken place for the first time which has rationalised and simplified the complex welding of the different EU structures when the EEAS was first born. This has also helped cut some of the redundant hierarchy that had grown out of the necessity of accommodating Member State diplomats initially into the structure. However this downsizing has continued further down the hierarchical ladder itself with across-the-board personnel cuts. The British contingent in the EEAS has shrunk to 5th position amongst other nationalities – and 9th in the European Commission, after Greece, Poland and Romania. A clear commitment must be made as part of the EU Global Strategy to ensure that staff and budget remain a priority for all EU decision- makers, not simply those affiliated with the EEAS.

7.0 British Interests within a Global EU

7.1 The challenge the UK faces is to find the path between taking all possible measures to mitigate any significant threats that the nation may be facing, whilst avoiding as much as possible any restrictions to our liberties and overburdening our economy through excessive measures. Britain continues to have a vital global role. Yet its ambitions to continue this role are not matched by the resources being devoted to it, at least in a purely military sense. Along with its European allies, Britain's defence budget as a proportion of its GDP has steadily decreased since the end of the Cold War and the so-called post-1989 “peace dividend”. It is currently squeezed because of strains on the overall British budget caused by excessive government debt, which has become unsustainable thanks to the global financial crisis6. At the same time, the costs per soldier have been rising fast7, primarily because of the increasing sophistication and consequent expense of the technology and equipment being developed– and the need to have better qualified soldiers to handle it. 7.2 The UK and the EU face the same problem, and both face upcoming strategic reviews that they could use to tackle this issue. Both actors lack the ability to implement coherent strategy. The answer is twofold: traditional military responses, and hybrid responses typical

6 In 1987/88, Britain defence budget was £18.8 bn (4.6 % of GDP), funding a total regular armed force of 316,700 personnel (source: IISS); by 2012, it was £38.7bn (2.5% of GDP), funding a total regular armed force of 180,600 (source: armedforces.co.uk). After the July 2012 defence review, a further post-Afghanistan shrinkage of 30,000 personnel is expected from the three services. 7 For long-term trends in the costs in warfare, please see: http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/sep/01/military- service-personnel-total

20 of 309 Canterbury Christ Church University—Written Evidence (FSP0013) of the Comprehensive Approach flowing from the EEAS. On the first point, military power still has a role to play, albeit a somewhat diminished one. We need to make better use of existing military alliances to the full, and build more with likeminded countries where we do not have any longer the global reach to do it ourselves. Equally because so many European countries have such weak, unusable armed forces, the UK does need to continue playing a major military role in our own European and Mediterranean neighbourhood and use our experience and expertise to get more out of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and our European NATO allies. A reduced defence budget, therefore, does not mean the UK cannot continue being a global player in other ways. It continues to have its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and to play its part in UN peace-keeping and UNSC authorised peace-related missions.

7.3 Turning to the second point, the UK needs to put more effort into developing the alternative forms of power that we need today to have influence on the world. These are often lumped together as “soft power”, but there is nothing soft about their impact if handled skilfully: institutions such as the BBC World Service (which needs to be nurtured financially but also maintain its objectivity and balance of reporting), the revamped British Council, tools like development assistance - keep Britain visible, active and gaining sympathy in the world. Key among these however is the fortitude and vision to remain within the EU and leading in its forums of decision-making and theatres of activity. The EU relies on the long-standing expertise and dedication that the UK brings to the CFSP, and the CSDP, and any goal of seriously revamping the EU’s ESS or its ENP could not be seriously undertaken in the absence of British strategic leadership and presence. The UK’s own hybrid approach to merging hard and soft power is an example that the EU needs to continue to draw upon at this critical time, as it remakes its foreign policy ambitions in light of some of the greatest threats it has encountered since the Second World War.

8.0 Conclusions

8.1 The principal change at the end of the Cold War was the increase in salience of middle powers and crisis, not their prevalence or importance. Having a coherent policy to deal with crisis and cope with the gradual emergence of a more multipolar international system, however, should remain the goal of the CFSP, and the main thrust of the EU Global Strategy. As suggested above, despite the need to continue with the normative dimension that founded both the EU and the CFSP, and which has guided the ESS, there is a need for additional ‘realism’ in the EU’s collective response to threats and greater recognition of the potential for moral values and strategic interests to conflict. At the end of the Cold War the strength of the liberal ‘West’ and the EU’s reliance on US power afforded the EU space for a values-based FP (so-called normative power Europe). The rise of non-liberal power bases, however, both within the international order (China, Russia) and within non-governed or strife-torn regions (Iraq, Syria) provides a significant challenge to the EU’s ability to conflate its moral and strategic interests. For example:  The democratization and liberalisation agenda has led to increasing instability in many regions of the world as established patterns of order have broken down (see, for example, Syria, Egypt and Libya).  Non-liberal allies are increasingly important if the EU is to make the most of a more polycentric order.  A solution of the Ukraine crisis is exacerbated by unwavering European support for the liberalisation of the country and plans for its eventual accession into the Union.

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8.2 This does not – and should not – mean the abandonment of the EU’s fundamental values. Rather, it means the recognition that the promotion of values may sometimes need to take a backseat to strategic necessity, that the relations between nations have an independent value that may transcend considerations of regime type, and that order is a fundamental value that is often necessary for other moral values to take root. The risk of continuing to espouse the ‘normative power Europe’ discourse is that it will raise expectations unduly and restrict the options open to the Union. For this reason, the principal of pragmatism, alongside strategic- led Comprehensive approaches, must be placed at the heart of the EU Global Strategy.

Dr Amelia Hadfield, Director of the Jean Monnet Centre for European Studies (CEFEUS)

22 of 309 Dr Laura Chappell, Dr Roberta Guerrina and Ms Katharine Wright, University of Surrey— Written Evidence (FSP0015)

Dr Laura Chappell, Dr Roberta Guerrina and Ms Katharine Wright, University of Surrey—Written Evidence (FSP0015)

Executive Summary 1. We are a group of scholars working on gender mainstreaming in EU Foreign and Security Policy. We are currently researching the way the EEAS and CSDP have sought to incorporate the aims of UN Security Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. 2. Our work highlights a number of shortcomings in the way the EU has implemented key foundational norms (e.g. equality between men and women) in the area of external relations. 3. Historically, the EU has played a key role in promoting women’s rights and gender equality. It has a Treaty commitment to mainstream gender in all policy areas. However, it has failed to do so in area of foreign and security policy. 4. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) and the associated Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS) provides the impetus and mechanisms for including gender in conflict resolution and peace-building. Given the track record of the EU on women’s rights and the Member States’ commitment to UNSCR 1325, it would be expected that it would assume a leading role in implementing WPS. 5. The EU’s approach to UNSCR 1325 has been disappointing. This provides an opportunity for member states to assume leadership and help shape institutional mechanisms for the implementation of WPS. For example, the UK has experience of championing WPS at the UN and NATO through the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) initiative. 6. A note of caution, in order to achieve long-lasting, transformative change, gender mainstreaming in foreign and security policy needs to move away from a functionalist approach where the issue of gender is used to add value and increase operational effectiveness.

Context and Background 7. The EU has been a key actor in promoting equality between men and women within its own borders. The introduction of gender mainstreaming as a principle in the Treaty of Amsterdam creates an obligation on European institutions to include a gender dimension in all policy areas. This includes external relations, development policy, as well as security and defence. 8. The UN Security Council adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000 paved the way for the inclusion of a gender dimension in peace building and conflict resolution. The Women, Peace and Security agenda was further strengthened by the adoption of six follow-up resolutions. Taken together these resolutions provide a mandate for women’s participation in decision-making processes linked to international security, increased awareness of the prevalence of sexual violence in conflict and measures for preventing it. 9. The UK has played a leading role within globally in both supporting the WPS agenda at the UN and at NATO. The UK has revised its National Action Plan three times. The UK’s commitment to 1325 is highlighted by the implementation of the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI).

23 of 309 Dr Laura Chappell, Dr Roberta Guerrina and Ms Katharine Wright, University of Surrey— Written Evidence (FSP0015) 10. The long-term impact of the Global Summit on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict (2014) remains to be seen. Although it brought the issue to the attention of the international media and raised the profile of the UK as a gender actor in area of security, it remains a largely marginal issue. 11. The majority of states that have adopted National Action Plans are in Europe. EU Member States therefore have a critical role in realising the potential of the WPS agenda and championing its core objectives at a supranational level. For example, Sweden championed the appointment of a Gender Adviser within the EEAS. However, the ability of the Gender Adviser to provide leadership and affect change is limited given that the reporting structure does not facilitate a direct line of communication between the Gender Adviser and the High Representative. Additionally, it marginalises the issue, making it a low level priority.

EU’s Approach to the Implementation of 1325 12. Gender equality is seen as one of the EU’s foundational values. The 2015 statement by First Vice-President Timmermans, High-Representative/Vice-President Mogherini, and Commissioners Mimica, Avramopoulos, Thyssen, Stylianides and Jorurova on the occasion of International Women’s Day 2015 highlights the centrality of equality to the EU’s identity: “Europe has been promoting gender equality since 1957 – it is part of the European Union’s DNA”. 13. The EU’s equality acquis has indeed shaped women’s employment rights within its own boundaries. However, the EU and the EEAS have been much slower at transposing this key principle to external relations, particular security and defence. 14. Two document outline the EU’s efforts in implementing UNSCR 1325: a) Comprehensive Approach to EU Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security; and b) Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as Reinforced by 1820 in the Context of ESDP. These documents seek to position women as decision-makers rather than victims. The Comprehensive Approach focuses on women “as a valuable resource for conflict resolution and peace building”. This therefore presents a value added approach rather than a rights-based approach. The Implementation in ESDP calls for improved gender balance in CSDP/ESDP missions, where the mission has direct contact with civilian population. Both documents therefore seek to use women in an instrumental way in order to enhance operational effectiveness. This ultimately undermines the core principles enshrined in USNCR 1325.

Evidence on the High Representative’s Report to the June 2015 European Council 15. The Head of Agency Report ahead of the June 2015 European Council meeting states: “the EU will need to continue its efforts to strengthen implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in CSDP missions. 2015 marks the 15- year anniversary of the Resolution. While much of the EU-policy framework is in place, more can be done when it comes to implementation, for instance by ensuring a gender perspective in the planning process, and a leadership that is adequately trained in this regard”. We agree with the call for more to be done to strengthen the implementation of UNSCR 1325 within the EU. This will require a consolidated leadership effort that supports the WPS in its broadest aspirations. 16. Our analysis of the EU’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 to date finds that it is an inadequate framework and falls short of the EU’s own ambitions as a gender actor.

24 of 309 Dr Laura Chappell, Dr Roberta Guerrina and Ms Katharine Wright, University of Surrey— Written Evidence (FSP0015) 17. The EU’s strategy for implementing UNSCR 1325, as defined by the Comprehensive Approach and The Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in ESDP predate five – out of six – follow-up UN Security Council Resolution. This would therefore indicate that current policies do not reflect full scope of the WPS agenda embodied in UNSCRs, 1820, 1888, 1889, 2106 and 2122. This would require the EU to revise and strengthen its current provisions. 18. The Lisbon Treaty establishes the European External Action Service (EEAS), whose main aim is to create a diplomatic service to ensure the coherence, consistency and effectiveness of European foreign and security policy. This institution therefore has a pivotal role to play in mainstreaming gender in external relations. 19. The EEAS yet to champion equality as a core value. This institution is still in infancy, which means it is in the process of articulating its core values. The failure to include a gender dimension in high level discussions indicates a narrow understanding of security that marginalises the human dimension.

Opportunities for UK foreign policy 20. The UK has demonstrated its commitment to the WPS agenda through PSVI and its National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325. The UK also sponsored UNSCR 2106 that focuses on conflict related sexual violence. This provides an opening for the UK to push for PSVI at the EU level in a way that is commensurate to its efforts at NATO. 21. For example, at the NATO World Summit in 2014, the UK facilitated a meeting of foreign ministers to discuss PSVI. The UK has been successful in advancing the WPS agenda in NATO as a core part of the “Friends of 1325” and in supporting the work of the Special Representative on WPS. In respect of the EU, this could include, for example, support for the creation of the position of a Special Representative on WPS within the EEAS reporting directly to the High Representative. This position would provide an important focal point for gender mainstreaming in EU foreign and security policy. 22. Going forward the challenge facing the UK, and other EU member states, is how to convert declarations and resolutions into tangible policy action. UNSCR 1325 has thus far proved to be a catalyst for debate and a useful tool for public diplomacy by international organisation as well as national governments.

A way forward 23. A way forward is learn from best practice of other international organisations. The success of NATO’s Special Representative to the Secretary General on WPS highlights the importance of senior leadership in this role. This position creates a focal point for norm diffusion within the organisation. 24. Special Representatives can be bridge between the interests of member states, the organisation and civil society. In doing, it fulfils three key functions: a) awareness raising, b) knowledge and expertise; and c) oversight. Without it, WPS in Europe is likely to remain an ambition rather than a reality. 25. Institutional mechanisms currently available for the implementation of the WPS agenda in the EU lack sufficient clout to affect change either within the organisation or its operations on the ground. WPS, as currently operationalized, adds women to the foreign and security policies without actually challenging gender power structures. This would require transformational change at European and national level.

25 of 309 Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006)

Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006)

Evidence to be found under Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith

26 of 309 Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 11-20)

Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 11-20)

Evidence Session No. 2 Heard in Public Questions 11 - 20

THURSDAY 10 SEPTEMBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Lord Balfe Baroness Billingham Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Triesman Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

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Examination of Witness Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO, former Director-General for External and Politico- Military Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union

Q11 The Chairman: Sir Robert thank you for coming before us today. You are in a sense the father not of this particular enterprise but of the idea of a European security strategy from the work you did and the many things you have written since, so we are very glad that you could come to the first of our evidence sessions. As I am sure you realise, this is a public session and everything is being taken down. It is the first of the Committee’s sessions in this exercise.

Reflecting on your experience, what are the key lessons to be learnt, and what guidance would you offer to Mrs Mogherini in drafting a new foreign policy strategy? Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: Thank you, it is a pleasure to be here. Perhaps I can just make a couple of comments about the 2003 document. When it was drafted and Javier Solana presented it to the Council, we did not attach the term “strategy” to it. It was not a strategy. Somebody else, as an amendment that was agreed by everybody, called it the “European security strategy”. It would probably be better described as a European security concept. It set out the aim and what we thought were sensible goals for the European Union, and said a little bit about what we needed to do to get there, but a real strategy ought to be much more specific about the steps that you are going to take.

27 of 309 Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 11-20)

One should never undertake such an elaborate, complicated exercise as this without knowing why you are doing it, or ask a question without knowing what answer you want. At the time we did this, we did it primarily because the European Union was deeply divided over Iraq, and the purpose of producing this document, now usually called the European security strategy, was to remind the European Union of how much they had in common and of the things they had in common, which were things where we also had very significant areas of commonality with the United States but also some significant differences. The point was simply to bring the European Union back together after, in foreign policy terms, one of the most damaging splits that we had had. The Chairman: In the light of that, what advice would you give? Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: My advice is to know what you want to get out of it. As I am sure the Committee knows, there is a preliminary document, a sort of survey of the world, and when you read it you can catch glimpses of some objectives. For example, two or three times it refers to a lack of flexibility in the way in which community development programmes are operated, which is true. They are very clumsy and very slow. There are references to lack of co-ordination and coherence. If I were Mrs Mogherini, my objective would be to try to find something. In the first strategy, our aim was to bring the member states together, and it would be a very good thing if one could find a way of bringing the institutions of the member states together so that you do not find yourself in a continual war between people who think that what matters is politics and people who think that what matters is development. Actually, the two are not so different. Another objective would be to find better ways of making the member states and some bits of the Commission function together. That is a big objective, because the European Union has so much capability in so many different areas, such as energy. If you can make it work together, it is an extraordinarily powerful machine.

Q12 Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I am not sure about this, as you are saying that a strategy was not intended, but it was endorsed by the Council. Did it have any practical use as a mandate to foreign policymakers and officials? Was it ever translated into EU action and, if so, how? Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: I do not think that there was ever an occasion when somebody said, “I wonder what we should do about the problem in Burundi?”, and looked at this document to find an answer. It set a direction. Now and then, I have been in the Council when one or two people referred to it as evidence for their case. It signalled a change in that what it underlined particularly—this is my memory of it anyway—was that the threats that Europe faced, which turn out not to be true these days, were not so much threats from conventional warfare but were either above the level of conventional warfare, namely nuclear proliferation, or below the level of conventional warfare, namely terrorism. Both have been growth areas. I think they would have been growth areas without this document, but still it helps to give people an intellectual framework. So I cannot name anything specific, but I think it helped to set a direction. I think that the effect of bringing people together and healing the wounds of Iraq within the EU was a very important result.

Q13 Baroness Coussins: Some commentators have suggested that there is not actually much appetite for an EU foreign policy strategy among some member states—notably the UK, France and Germany—and that that reluctance is compounded by a lack of interest among EU officials too. Do you understand this to be the case, and, if it is, what exactly are the reservations, and who is in favour of it?

28 of 309 Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 11-20)

Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: Generally, the UK is instinctively cautious about grand strategies. Sometimes I used to think, working in the Foreign Office, that the UK was superb at tactics but less good at strategy. It is a question of intellectual tradition. If you are German, you are normally looking for a Gesamtkonzept; if you are British, you are normally asking, “Well, what should we do next?”. Maybe the answer to that question, although I never remember the quotation from Keynes correctly, is that you are following what appears to be common sense but is actually some defunct theory. For me, the real point of strategy ought to be that when you have decided what you want to do, you should equip yourself to do it, so at the end there should be some decision about where you are going to put resources. To go back to what I was saying before, the EU started a major effort on questions of proliferation. Although the initiative for negotiation with Iran was launched initially by Britain, France and Germany, this became a major part of the EU’s work. In other ways, the EU became a great supporter of the chemical weapons convention and things like that. So in the end we put resources into those things, and there are things now that the EU needs to put resources into. Sorry, I think I have lost the thread of the question. Baroness Coussins: I was after which member states were more in favour of a foreign policy strategy as opposed to the precise reservations of those that are not so much in favour. Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: To be honest, it is often a question of intellectual tradition. It always seemed to me that it was the states from the north that were in favour, while those from the south tended to be a bit more ad hoc in their approach. This is a good moment to think a bit about this, because the European External Action Service was created maybe four years ago, with enormous difficulties. This is not a bad moment to ask yourself where we want to go and whether we have the right instrument to do so.

Q14 Lord Triesman: Given what you have said about the 2003 exercise, and the fact that this time round it is potentially a rather different one, as it moves forward how do you envisage keeping the states and national Governments engaged in the process and committed to seeing it through to becoming something valuable? Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: This is being done very differently now, and I think that is right. Mrs Mogherini seems to have created quite elaborate structures for debate and involving the national Governments all along. In 2003, we did something very quickly behind the scenes with rather minimal consultation but in the end with quite a lot of consent. In this case, having the serious debate is probably more important than the product. If you want to produce big changes in a big lumbering institution, you need to build up a consensus within the member states and the institution itself, and you do that by having the debate. Exactly how she is doing it I do not know, but I have a distant impression of a very large infrastructure on this exercise, as evidenced by the fact that they have produced their picture of the world that we are having to deal with, which I found a sensible, well-produced document. They have done that well in advance and are allowing a lot of time and space for debate. Countries such as the UK always play an enormous part in these things. The Chairman: With the UK doing what? Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: The UK, if it wants to be, will always play a large part in these debates. Once, in a particularly boring meeting, I asked a long-serving colleague in the Council Secretariat to make a list of member states in the order of impact she thought they had in the discussions on foreign policy. She put the UK second and France first. I asked her

29 of 309 Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 11-20) why, and she said she thought that the UK got its way more often than any other state but the French were so good at defending ridiculous policies that they deserved extra credit for it.

Q15 Lord Dubs: I want to go back to the question of strategy. We have partly dealt with this, but what do you think are the likely divergences between member states on the substance and process of drafting a new foreign policy strategy? Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: On the substance, there is a standing division between member states that look east and those that look south. You always have to do both; both the east and the south are important. On the question of process, I am afraid I do not know, because I would have to be there. Mrs Mogherini looks to be doing an extremely inclusive process. For me, looking back, the thing that was really missing and that needs to be done now is to ensure that you have the Commission fully on board. Last time this was about the Council; this time I think it should be about the Council and the Commission together, and about bringing them together.

Q16 Lord Balfe: What do you think are likely to be the UK’s priorities and red lines, how would you assess the involvement of the UK in the process so far, and how do you think it can add value to the evolving discussions? Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: The UK has always been one of the most important players in foreign policy questions. The Foreign Office, the armed services and the intelligence agencies all have a first-class reputation in Brussels. The most obvious of all the UK’s red lines has always been something to do with defence. It was the UK that had somebody go round counting desks in the civilian military planning cell, because it was afraid it might turn out to be a military headquarters. The UK has sometimes demonstrated an obsession about the EU not competing with NATO. It has sometimes taken this too far. There is no way the EU could compete with NATO. One of the real awkwardnesses in Brussels is that the Turkey/Cyprus problem unfortunately makes it very difficult for the EU and NATO to work together. There is one thing that the EU and NATO do together, which is the still surviving, very small military presence in Bosnia, which works better than almost anything else we do. Everybody knows this. There is a natural relationship there that unfortunately, thanks to Turkey/Cyprus, we have never been able to make function properly. That is always the big red line for the UK. I think it is a pity. I think the EU ought to be doing much more joint military procurement. I am not in favour of a European army, but I am in favour of a European rifle. You would get big production runs and so on and you could save gigantic sums of money. European countries spend enormous sums of money on defence with scandalous collective waste, but this is not the view of the UK Government.

Q17 The Chairman: The UK is about to embark on its own strategic defence and security review. That seems to be a fairly permanent process in any case. Do you feel that that exercise is going to have any political or practical implications for the UK’s participation in the wider EU exercise? Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: In doing that review, it would be very sensible to look at the European context and to look at Europe and the EU as well as NATO. With the referendum coming up, I have no idea will happen. That is going to be a political matter.

Q18 Baroness Billingham: You used the word “political” for the first time today, which I found very interesting. We have not mentioned politics at all in this discussion, but I think they are absolutely crucial. When looking at the member states individually and collectively,

30 of 309 Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 11-20) if you were drafting this strategy, what would you set out as the key foreign policy priorities for the Union? Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: First, inevitably it is the neighbourhood, in a very large sense. It is the east and the south, particularly at the moment the east. On the question of Russia and Ukraine, I do not know what historical comparison one should make. The number of cases where states have acquired territory by force is tiny. The fundamental rule is that political international stability is essentially based on territorial sovereignty, so a breach of that rule is fundamental and, for me, frightening. Until order is restored there, it will be very difficult to feel comfortable. If I had to name one priority, that is it. In a more general sense, the EU is surrounded by weak states. The Russia/Ukraine problem is partly about the weakness of Ukraine as well as the particular politics of Mr Putin’s Russia. I do not know whether the EU could have done better. It may be that we wasted 20 years with Ukraine, but Ukraine certainly wasted 20 years. We have weak states to the east, and we have a whole series, layers, of weak states to the south that are producing different kinds of problems. Weak states are weak in different ways and there is no single recipe, but we ought to be thinking of strengthening governance, legitimacy and all those things in our neighbourhood, which is a long-term project. Baroness Billingham: We wrote a report recently, which you may have seen, which was critical of the role that we played between Russia and Ukraine. We used the words “sleepwalking into”, which have been challenged. What you have said is absolutely right. We have to start looking further ahead. It seemed to us that the opportunity was missed. If it was missed there, who is to say that it is not going to be missed elsewhere within our firmament? Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: I strongly agree with you. Your report is read far outside these shores. Somebody in Vienna recommended it to me. I do not think your word “sleepwalking” is wrong. One of things the EU ought to do better than it does at the moment is admitting mistakes and trying to understand how it made them. This is true of national Governments as well. This is a really important case. One of my answers to this question is that I do not think that the EU as currently constituted gives a sufficiently important place in its organisation to the people on the ground, the delegations. The only people who can really think about Russia are not in Brussels but in Moscow. They are the ones who are following it day to day and who hear the nuances that you do not get reported in the press. Brussels tends to think it is the centre of the world. I would like to get people to go back to the more old-fashioned view of diplomacy where you take your embassies abroad very seriously and make sure you have the best people there. They are the people who have time to think. Baroness Billingham: We said exactly that. That was one of the criticisms that we made. The Chairman: I am delighted to hear about the person in Vienna.

Q19 Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Is it feasible for the EU to see itself as acting on the global stage, as the Council has mandated the high representative to take into consideration in drafting this? You have already half-answered this by talking about regional and neighbourhood priorities. Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: If you are not seen to be effective in your neighbourhood, you are not going to be taken seriously further abroad. On the other hand, the EU is taken seriously further away, and we ought to be aware of it. China is, very

31 of 309 Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 11-20) curiously, one of the strong supporters of the European Union, no doubt for its own Chinese reasons. It would like to have something to offset the US. Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: You talked a lot about the eastern part, but you acknowledged that the south is important. It would be useful if you gave assessment of EU action in the southern neighbourhood and what you diagnose as the key weaknesses or inhibitors of EU action in the MENA area. Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: It has been a big mess for a long time, but that is true of most national policies as well. For a while, if you asked what was the real motivation of a lot of policies—I am thinking particularly of the Maghreb—you would find that for a lot of countries the real motivation was probably migration and stopping flows of people. The Arab spring took everyone by surprise. It took the rulers of the countries by surprise too, so you cannot blame yourself for all surprises. We concluded afterwards that we should have taken less notice of the Governments and more notice of the societies, but like it or not the Governments are there and you have to deal with them. I do not believe in an overall strategy for this area because the problems are so particular. Libya is very different from Tunisia, although the two are related. All I can say is what I said before: you must have people on the ground who really understand the places and you must listen to them. This is not just in the countries of the Maghreb but in the layer of countries behind them in the Sahel. In the Middle East, it is not just about Syria, it is all the way through, but it is not an area where I have any expertise I am afraid, so I am not good at answering that question. There are places much further away where the EU can play and has played a very constructive role. I have some involvement in Burma where the EU ran a rather good policy and had quite a lot of impact. There, the future is still completely open, but on the whole the EU has played a constructive role. At least, when I ask friends of mine who counts in Burma, leaving aside China and Japan, they normally say the UK and the EU. The Chairman: Presumably one reason why the EU may have played a constructive role in Burma was that there were no conflicts of interest between EU member states, so it was relatively easy to form a common position. Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: Actually, there was a continual struggle. There were no conflicts of interest, but there were a lot of conflicts of attitude. There were those led by the UK, including the Netherlands and Sweden—perhaps I should say the Protestants—who thought that we should be extremely tough with the military regime in Burma and were always in favour of sanctions. Then there were those at the other end who said, “We agree that this is a lousy Government, but the only way to influence them is to engage with them”. You can make a solid case for that as well, so the EU finished up with a policy, which you might find slightly strange, of having sanctions but providing considerable amounts of humanitarian aid. I do not think it was a bad policy because we did both: we had sanctions, but we still engaged. Therefore one of my conclusions after a long time in Brussels is that the diversity of member states’ views is quite a good thing, because the compromise you reach is usually in the middle and that follows the Aristotelian principle that virtue is about avoiding extremes.

Q20 The Chairman: The agenda at the moment is dominated by the refugee crisis. If one was taking a pessimistic point of view, one might think that the differences in approach and the view that this has exposed, coming on top of all the problems in the eurozone, would overshadow what I might call the Mogherini exercise and make it impossible to get off the ground. On the other hand, one might argue—and I am putting two extremes here—that after the experience of this summer, and with another summer like it in a few months’ time,

32 of 309 Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 11-20) an element of urgency will be injected into the exercise. I wonder where you would come down between those two extremes. Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: This is a very big problem and it is not going to go away quickly. It is in an acute phase at the moment, but to be honest it is probably the beginning of a problem that will never end. The supply of people who would like a better life, the knowledge that a better life might be available somewhere, the industry taking money from these people to get them to Europe—all these things have grown very rapidly, and I do not see much chance of them ending. I doubt if the problem is going to be solved very quickly, either. Already in the preliminary documents some attention has been given to flows of people, but I think it is going to be a long-term problem. I am not sure that we are going to find the solution to it very quickly. Part of the solution comes back to my remarks about weak states and the need to find ways—this is an incredibly difficult thing to do but you set yourself a standing objective—to strengthen the legitimacy and efficiency of your neighbours. In many cases, though, it is almost impossible to do that. Still, at least you know what you want to do, and then if you know that you find opportunities. The Chairman: I fear the consequences of a situation in which Germany is taking a very strong line in one direction while other states feel that this is not a matter of generosity but of imposing German views on them at their expense. There is a contrast between Germany’s open arms on the one hand and, on the other, Denmark advertising in the Middle East saying, “Don’t come”. That creates considerable tension. Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO: I can only agree. The latest question is about the states in the former Soviet Union. Denmark has had rather a good record in taking refugees, but it has now run into domestic political problems. As it happens, I was in Copenhagen at the weekend. Denmark is a country of great diversity, with a lot of people evidently of different backgrounds who are very well integrated in Danish society. Still, it is a small country, and you can understand why, if you are that size and have a rather cosy national identity, you tend to worry about being swamped. If you go to Poland, there is almost nothing in Poland but Poles. Everybody speaks Polish and is Catholic. They say, “Well, we’ve never had immigration. We’ve always had emigration”. So it is a shock for them as well. The only thing I would say is that it will take a long time, longer than the timetable of this security strategy, for a functioning policy to evolve. You do not hear much about immigration from China, but you find small towns in Italy where there is now an extremely large Chinese population. I do not think that there is a magic solution. It is going to be a major factor from now on, but I do not think the German solution is going to be the right one. The other lesson I draw is caution about intervening in the Middle East. Part of the trouble in the Middle East is that it is awash with weapons left behind by people who intervene. The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. We are most grateful to you and will continue to read whatever you might be writing on this subject in the forthcoming months.

33 of 309 Professor Daniel Drezner and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137)

Professor Daniel Drezner and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137)

Evidence Session No. 11 Heard in Public Questions 124 - 137

THURSDAY 29 OCTOBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Billingham Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Lord Stirrup Baroness Suttie Lord Triesman Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

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Examination of Witnesses Professor Daniel Drezner, Professor of International Politics, Tufts University, and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin, Distinguished Associate Fellow, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and former EU Ambassador to the International Organisations in Vienna

Q124 The Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here ahead of time, which is a great convenience. As Dr Lundin at least had the opportunity to hear the previous session, you have an idea of the way in which we will proceed. For the sake of formality, let me make the point that this is an on-the-record meeting as part of our inquiry into the EU’s strategic review. What you say is being taken down, but if there is anything you want to say off the record, please let us know. After the meeting, if there is anything you want to write to us about or clarify, again please let us know. Let me kick off, and then colleagues will come in and ask you questions. If you happen to agree, there is no need to repeat the previous answer, but if you have different views do not hesitate to disagree. Germany has been described as a reluctant hegemon in European integration. It has been expected by other Member States to take on a leadership role and then criticised when demonstrating leadership. We see that very clearly. How do you feel other EU Member States, particularly

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Britain and France, respond to Germany becoming more assertive in EU foreign and security policy? Professor Daniel Drezner: Thank you for having me here. I apologise in advance. I came on the red-eye flight last night, so if my answers are incoherent I will blame it on jet lag rather than my own shortcomings. I would describe Germany as a less reluctant hegemon than it used to be. If we were having this hearing 15 or 20 years ago, you could probably have made that statement. With respect to European integration, Germany has been a somewhat more enthusiastic hegemon, particularly since the beginning of the eurozone crisis, which is to say that simultaneously Germany is still very keen on maintaining the European Union and strengthening the eurozone. It wants to do that by making the rest of the eurozone in particular look much more like Germany, in the belief that part of what ails the southern Mediterranean states, or other states deleteriously affected by the 2008 financial crisis, is that their microeconomic institutions do not look enough like Germany’s. Their grand bargain is that Germany is willing to step up in the provision of public good, provided that the other countries are willing to reform their institutions to look much more like Germany’s. That is the eurozone question. To some extent, they are also less reluctant with respect to foreign and security policy. The fact that Germany has taken the lead in the response to Putin’s intervention in Ukraine suggests that it was not that Angela Merkel was extremely reluctant to go forward; Germany was quite willing to take a leadership role there. The question of how other EU Member States should respond is in some ways a function of the degree to which those foreign policy preferences are at variance with Germany. Here you run into the issue that, while Germany has been more assertive, it also has a clear set of policy preferences that are probably distinct from those of Great Britain and France, particularly with respect to the use of military force. Within the last 15 years, any time the option of escalating something to the actual use of military force, even under multilateral auspices, has come up, whatever German leader has been in power has strongly resisted it, which is not to say that it is necessarily the wrong instinct every time, but it seems to be the instinct in Berlin. There are certain cases where perhaps there will be a clash of interests. The Chairman: Can I press you on that? If I understood you correctly, you said that whenever the question of the use of force has come up Germany has resisted. To go back a little way, but not so far, was Germany not responsible for NATO taking a very forward position in Croatia at the time Douglas Hurd was Foreign Secretary? Professor Daniel Drezner: That is a fair statement, and you can argue that in some ways the first example in the post-Cold War era of Germany taking a leadership role was the decision to recognise Croatia and Slovenia. That said, it is the exception rather than the rule. With respect to Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011, and Ukraine last year and this year, regardless of who has been in power, the instinct to rely on military force or use military statecraft has generally been resisted by German leaders, but I grant you that it is not always the case. The Chairman: I understand the general point you are making, and I agree with it. The reason I raised Croatia is that something we picked up when we were in Brussels was that there is a difference in the way Germany reacts to external or foreign affairs issues if they touch directly on domestic politics and the way in which it reacts if they do not. That is true of many countries. Croatia touched directly on German domestic politics. Therefore, I wonder whether the general theory you enunciated will apply equally in the future, when a

35 of 309 Professor Daniel Drezner and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137) number of other issues in the neighbourhood are likely to touch directly on German domestic politics, and we might perhaps see a change in the German approach. Professor Daniel Drezner: That is certainly a possibility, but if we take a look at how Germany responded to events in Ukraine, I suggest it would take a great deal for German domestic interests to drive German actions. It is worth remembering that in some ways Germany moved very slowly in responding to the annexation of the Crimea and the escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. It was not until the Malaysian airliner was shot down that you saw a switch in German domestic interests. Until that moment the pressure from German domestic lobbies was against an escalation of tension with Russia. The BDI and others did not want to risk what was a reasonably deep economic relationship between Berlin and Moscow. It was not until the airliner was shot down that you saw recognition among key German domestic interest groups that the game had changed, as it were, and that therefore it was right for Germany to take more aggressive and appropriate action. Dr Lars-Erik Lundin: Thank you for inviting me, Lord Chairman. I appear here in my personal capacity, being a free man after active service. I am now a researcher but not a professional one in the way the professor is. I have two lives behind me. One was as a Swedish diplomat for 20 years, basically outside the EU but working with the EU and Germany, and then for 15 years as a diplomat inside EU institutions, ending up as EU ambassador in Vienna. My experience with Germany started with arms control negotiations in Stockholm in the mid-1980s, on confidence and security-building measures, and then a posting to the embassy in Bonn in the second half of the 1980s. Then I worked with the Germans under Mr Genscher’s chairmanship of the OSCE from the early 1990s until 2011. My experience of German diplomacy, from the level at which I was able to observe, which was very often ministerial level as I represented the European Commission for many years in defence ministers’ meetings and other ministerial occasions, was that they had a huge agenda after the Cold War with the Two Plus Four agreement, enlargement, stabilising the new situation in Europe and putting the whole house in order. In order to achieve that, they were very impatient; they wanted to get things done, and I was impressed by the degree of co-operation I had with German colleagues once we could really do something. When we did not meet expectations, either at the multilateral level or in co-operation between key partners—German-French co-operation was already an important topic in the 1980s— whether that could leverage action, and there was even a book about German-UK cooperation in the second half of the 1980s. To me, it has very much to do with frustration, not least increased domestic frustration in Germany. I have great respect for the complexity of domestic politics in Germany, having been there, if there are problems mobilising there, the frustration will become considerable. In later years, a number of crises occurring one after the other have mobilised opinion. The European Council at the level of Heads of State or Government for quite a number of years was occupied fully with the financial crisis, but this year and last year, starting with Ukraine and then Charlie Hebdo and migration, we have seen a number of cases where Europe and the world are not ready to face crisis. This has led to a stronger German hand, just as it has led to greater frustration in many other capitals. The German hand has been noticed more openly because it is a strong hand in the EU.

Q125 The Chairman: If the UK were to leave the EU—speaking for myself, I hope it does not happen—how do you think it would affect German leadership in European integration, with particular reference to foreign and security policy?

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Dr Lars-Erik Lundin: Some would say that Germany would gather friends around itself and continue business as usual, but I have another view. I have friendships with many UK colleagues, some of whom you have heard earlier in this Committee, and they tell me that Germany will see the EU as much, much weaker after a UK exit. I should be glad to come back with case study examples of this from different areas. I am not studying it myself, but I am trying to gather material from a great number of case studies relevant to your strategic review, and in almost every case the UK contribution to the work achieved in the last 15 or 20 years has been absolutely crucial. Professor Daniel Drezner: From an international relations perspective, Germany would be a bigger fish but in a smaller pond if the United Kingdom were to leave. There is no question but that Germany would probably be able to get its way more with respect to common foreign and security policy if the UK was no longer part of the European Union. That said, the weight that that common foreign and security policy would carry would be considerably less. My hunch is that most Germans would not be willing to make that trade-off. If the trade-off was forced upon them, obviously that is a different question. Germany might be somewhat less inhibited by its history. I do not think it is in any way less attached to multilateralism than it has been in the past, and in some ways that is the essence of its approach to the European Union.

Q126 Lord Stirrup: The EU has a long-standing ambition for a comprehensive approach to crisis management. This is sometimes seen as a particular asset and a potential strength of the EU, but a comprehensive approach means blending the civilian and military instruments in appropriate quantities depending on the circumstances, and the purely EU use of the military instrument so far has been at a very low level. We have heard that EU-NATO co-operation is fairly ineffective for political reasons. Do you agree with the assessment that a comprehensive approach is a particular EU asset? What can the strategic review point to in order to improve the EU’s capabilities in that regard? Professor Daniel Drezner: I should preface my answer by pointing out that, coming from the United States, the argument there is also for, ideally, a comprehensive approach, except that in our case it is usually the civilian side of exercising power that we have been particularly bad at. In some ways this is a sort of clichéd answer, but I tend to agree with that assessment. The European Union certainly has a comparative advantage with respect to the civilian use of power, but on the military side it punches far below its weight. As you say, part of the issue is the relationship between the European Union and NATO. I have heard stories that in Brussels you would have meetings first of the NATO representatives and then the EU representatives. The EU representatives meet and a country will take a position that obviously makes life difficult for NATO, and then in a subsequent meeting the very same person will blast the EU for being so obstreperous about its policy towards NATO. To some extent, the multiple forums that exist for trying to conduct security policy probably make it less efficacious in this case. Dr Lars-Erik Lundin: Member States have taken a position on the comprehensive approach which they have adopted for the EU. They made Council conclusions last year and followed up with an action plan for 2015. There is also some language in the strategic review document itself that points to what I think is a healthy development: namely, that we are moving away from the notion of the comprehensive approach as an overall policy and towards the perhaps trivial recognition that you need a comprehensive approach methodology in what you do. To take a case in point, I was in Rome last week, where I was working on the maritime security strategy of the EU, which will come into the strategic review as a subheading, so to speak. The sheer task of getting our act together in the

37 of 309 Professor Daniel Drezner and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137) international community on maritime security was made evident in the Gulf of Aden and the whole area through to the Indian Ocean due to piracy and so on. In the EU it meant bringing together more than 300 different stakeholders already inside EU institutions. To refer to what the Chairman said earlier about the Commission, I would not focus necessarily just on the Commission but on the fact that national Ministers in Member State Governments have competencies in various issues relating to maritime security that have to be brought into this—the shipping industry, insurance and everything that can do something to help. It is a question of private security firms, fuel prices for tankers, shipping, security regulations and what have you. In that part of the world we have seen a very successful effort, embedded in the comprehensive approach for the region, developed not only by the EU but with the United States taking a very active part. Even China, Russia, India and other navies have been involved. For the moment, that has removed the problem of piracy. Investors (into organized crime) have moved to other things. This is a very interesting case—an area where we have had active EU naval deployments. I think most of the 10 ships deployed in the CSDP context were deployed on Atalanta, but it was embedded in a much broader context. First, there needs to be a comprehensive approach methodology if you want to do something serious, and then you have to realise that it is going to take some effort; it is not just a document or a few words on paper but a system. We debated in Rome what makes the difference. Is it the presence of private security firms on the ships? Is it the fact that there was live fire from the CSDP operation at one time, or what is it? The answer from the experts, many of them British, was no; it is the system as a whole that makes the difference and creates something more—added value.

Q127 Baroness Billingham: The promotion of effective multilateralism in international affairs has in the past been identified as a key strategic priority in the EU. Do you think this is still the case today, given the changed international environment in the EU itself? What should the EU do to strengthen multilateral forums in international affairs, and how effective is it in pursuing European interests in those forums? The Chairman: To some degree you answered that in your previous response, but perhaps you would like to add to it. Dr Lars-Erik Lundin: I must be open on one issue: I do not believe that it is mainly a legal issue. Effective multilateralism is not primarily an issue of the status of the European Union in international forums, but in my experience, not least as an EU ambassador in Vienna, it is the extent to which we can achieve something in reality. There were a couple of concrete cases in my career where I think we had sterling co-operation between EU ambassadors preparing for a summit level meeting in the OSCE and were able to achieve something using informal coalition building through policy dialogue with the United States and other like-minded countries. They were able to build up joint positions in support of not only European but international commitments and values. I had that experience when it came to human commitments in the OSCE, not least the Moscow mechanism, which may be known to some of you, which we reaffirmed at the OSCE summit in Astana in 2010, or the Middle East resolutions in the IAEA where we tried to protect the integrity of the non-proliferation treaty process through excellent co-operation with the United States and like-minded countries. That was an informal co-operation too, where the EU delegation played a role but where the essential thing was that we worked together. Effective multilateralism has to do with results rather than focusing on procedure and details. Professor Daniel Drezner: There is no question: it is tougher now than it was, if for no other reason than that you are operating in a thicker multilateral environment, and in this

38 of 309 Professor Daniel Drezner and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137) case thicker does not necessarily mean better. We are now operating in a world where it is no longer just the United States and the European Union that are creating multilateral structures. Take a look at the BRICs, the AIIB and the whole panoply of Chinese-created organisations, none of which necessarily has EU participation, or, for that matter, United States participation. As a result, you have a situation where there are simply more multilateral organisations in the same issue area, and that leads to further opportunities for forum shopping in particular, which in some ways can eventually erode the legitimacy of particular multilateral organisations. The particular challenge for the European Union in promoting multilateralism going forward is that in some cases, particularly involving economic institutions, the best way to maintain their legitimacy is to reapportion the distribution of power and influence within those organisations better to reflect what the distribution of power looks like in the rest of the world. The problem is that that means by definition that the European Union has to have less power, because relative to its economic weight 20 or 30 years ago and so on it should have less influence in that sense. Paradoxically, the best way for the European Union in some cases to strengthen multilateral forums is to diminish the European Union voice within those multilateral forums.

Q128 Lord Triesman: I was intrigued by the concept of thicker multilateral environments. I recognise that and the possibilities for forum shopping as well. There are lots of actors in a very crowded field in crisis management, and the EU has been trying to upgrade its co-operation, particularly with the UN. I would be grateful if you could tell us whether you think these upgrades are working and are successful.

Could I add another thought? Having spent quite a lot of time in a UK Government context dealing with the African Union, one of the things I observed—I do not know whether it is still the case—was that a good deal of work was done by the EU. I saw it being done during the presidency in 2005 when we were directly involved, but I also saw in relation to the African Union that both the Commonwealth and the Francophonie would run completely separate and, without question, on occasions competitive operations in that environment. Does that pull in the opposite direction to enhancing co-operation? Professor Daniel Drezner: Yes. To clarify what I said before, the thicker multilateral environment in which we operate can be an opportunity as well as a risk. The risk comes from forum shopping. The opportunity comes from an instance in which you have more and more multilateral structures all pushing towards the same goal in theory and there is not necessarily that much jockeying for power. For example, you can argue that in crisis management the multiple voices that are interested in participating might not necessarily be crowding each other out, although the example you gave of the Commonwealth and the former French organisation would seem to be another instance of that; it is remarkable to see the degree of forum shopping even in areas where you would think there would be no dispute about particular preferences. That said, everything I have heard—I stress that I have not necessarily heard that much, because it is not my area of expertise—suggests that the European Union contribution to, say, the African Union on peacekeeping and so forth has been, generally speaking, salutary. That is not an example where we saw much in the way of forum shopping. Dr Lars-Erik Lundin: I have been through in a book project with a number of colleagues who worked with the African Union and the United Nations at different levels. It was published by Routledge not too long ago. We posed some questions in that book about the way the triangle of the United Nations, the African Union and the EU worked. The point of

39 of 309 Professor Daniel Drezner and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137) view of many of the authors in the volume, who were also peace researchers, was that the UN should take the primary lead in setting the strategy for co-operation with the African Union as a regional organisation under Chapter 8. Whether formally or informally I do not know, but it should be seen in that way and the EU should then adapt. Of course, the EU has been very proud to do capacity building with Community funds through the African Peace Facility. We now have AMISOM, and I think almost €10 million a month is being transferred there. I believe that capacity building is going to be increasingly important in the context of CSDP, to do things on the ground in areas where the EU does not feel comfortable about intervening with its own staff. We see in many countries in Africa, all the way down to Mali, Niger and so on, increasing risk to all kinds of staff, so we need much more capacity-building. The way we do that, with co-ordination between the three, will need to be worked on further to make sure that we work in harmony with New York, and that the main players in New York are reasonably comfortable with what the EU is doing. By the way, one of the things we discussed in Rome, without any details, is the fact that capacity building now may lead to completely different results down the road. Resources may be diverted by corruption. We have all kinds of problems that may lead to capacity building running in the wrong direction. One has to think slowly in this context.

Q129 Lord Triesman: In most of the descriptions we have just shared, we have been talking about institutions and their capacity either to co-operate or add something, or to overdetermine an outcome that might be the desirable one, but we have not really talked about personalities. Sometimes it seems to me that the generation of people who are doing much of this work in those organisations is now an ageing one, and they all know each other very well. They may not like each other all that much, but everybody knows each other very well, to the level of knowing about their kids, grandkids and so on. Some kind of fabric is woven there. My observation is that, if you go on a little bit, hardly anybody knows anybody. Is that accurate or is there a danger in that, because just having a little context can often get things going on a rather better footing? Professor Daniel Drezner: I cannot speak right now too much in terms of first-hand experience. That said, I worked at the Treasury for a while, and one of the interesting things from that experience was the degree to which groupings that have regular, routinised meetings tend to produce the kind of familiarity you are talking about, not just among leaders but very often at staff level. If I was in charge of trying to put together a G7 Finance Ministers’ communiqué, we would start with a draft, which would be circulated among all the different parties. We would email each of the seven finance ministries. There would be back and forth at the various summits, Sous-Sherpa meetings and so on. Over time you get to know people that way, and you can argue that that is taking place right now with respect to the G20 rather than the G7. That is different from the organisations you are talking about, and I would not venture to guess at that level, but probably the more routinised the meetings, the more likely that the kind of personal networks you are talking about can be fostered. I do not know whether that affects anything except really on the margins—I stress that—but I understand the concern. Dr Lars-Erik Lundin: A very interesting study about so-called epistemic communities inside the European Union came out a few years ago. It illustrates the fact that one needs not only policy guidelines, money and staff, but to establish a link between different types of communities. One case study in that book was the EU Military Committee, but in peacekeeping, mediation, conflict prevention and security sector reform—a number of areas of expertise that have developed over the last 30 years—a strong community of friendship and expertise has been extremely important. I certainly hope it will continue.

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One of the things I would like to promote in this context is the need to focus more on training, not least in the wider context inside the European Union, to broaden that epistemic community. One of the outcomes of the strategic review that I certainly hope for as a global strategy would be a decision to upgrade the training systems in the European Union on security, broadly speaking, to empower people inside and outside the institutions to understand the scope of the challenges we are now facing in terms of security.

Q130 Lord Horam: Could I ask you about the United States and its view of the European Union as a foreign policy actor, in particular whether that view has changed very much as a result of all the recent events in Syria, the migration crisis and the actions of Putin and so forth? Professor Daniel Drezner: As a professor, I occasionally have the good fortune to go to Washington to talk to people in government, including at the policy principal level. Even though those conversations are nominally off the record, people will usually be extremely guarded in what they tell me, except if I ask them about the European Union, at which point they will be somewhat blunter, and I do not necessarily mean that in a good way. In some ways, the perception in Washington of the European Union has not changed all that much over 20 years; if you read Richard Holbrooke’s memoir about how the Dayton accord was negotiated, although the European Union was present as an actor, he found it incredibly difficult to deal with it because basically the French, the British and, I believe, the Germans, who were there as well, all told him, “Don’t talk to the European Union person. Talk to us directly”. Things have changed somewhat, but not that much. The joke Henry Kissinger always tells in Washington is: who do you call with respect to Europe? I think that over the last few years what has changed is that the answer is now Angela Merkel, which was not necessarily the case before. That said, there are three frustrations Washington has with the European Union as an actor. I would add that in part this is because the United States is no longer quite as hegemonically powerful as it was 20 years ago, and in some ways would need the European Union now more than it did perhaps 15 or 20 years ago. The first concern is the degree to which the European Union is inward rather than outward looking. Every few years a crisis grips the European Union about events within the EU, and that renders the EU somewhat less capable or less interested in taking a role outside its borders. The second concern, which has lessened somewhat but is still true, is when the European Union is speaking as a single actor and there are multiple countries within the EU speaking individually. This is incredibly flummoxing on occasion to policymakers in Washington. The final and most important problem from the US perspective is the lack of capacity-building within the European Union when it comes to things like foreign policy. To give you just one example, the crafting of economic sanctions against Russia was an important part of how the US thought it would respond to Putin’s intervention in Ukraine, and the United States certainly has a comparative advantage in the use of these sanctions as a way of punishing actors who transgress international norms. Whenever I talk to US officials about the degree to which the European Union is on board with the sanctions, there is a general recognition that usually the European Union has agreed in principle with the idea of sanctions; the problem is the enforcement of them and the machinery for monitoring them. For example, the United States has something called OFAC—the Office of Foreign Assets Control—which is the agency that truly runs and monitors sanctions and deals with the financial sector to make sure they are enforced. I believe the European Union has fewer than 10 staffers in total devoted to this question. As a result, it becomes incredibly difficult, if it is an EU sanctions

41 of 309 Professor Daniel Drezner and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137) directive, for the United States to know with whom to co-ordinate either in Brussels or in the country capitals. Dr Lars-Erik Lundin: When I started as Commission head of delegation in Vienna in 1996, the American ambassador—who was a good friend; we are still friends—was instructed more or less to ignore my presence. This changed dramatically over the years. I remember a question to us from a prominent US Representative when we discussed the coming into force of the Lisbon treaty: “Is the EU now coming together? Are we going to be able to discuss everything in one single policy dialogue? Are we also able to discuss capacity?” Of course, most of the capacities were on the Commission side, it being endowed with the only operational budget in the EU system. We said, “Yes, it should happen”. Obviously, they are still not happy about the way this is becoming true. Gradually, the High Representative is taking up her position as Vice President of the Commission as well, and, as head of the cluster of Commissioners responsible for external relations, she is starting to mobilise resources from the Commission system, but it has taken a long time after the Lisbon treaty came into force. As an example, I know for a fact that only one or two people in the External Action Service were able to work on the cybersecurity strategy, which was a huge endeavour. My main point in my writings is that Member States should use what they pay for, namely the enormous resources they have put at the disposal of the community system, and make sure that is properly valorised in the entire system. I think that was what my American colleagues thought as well. We then have to bring substance into the policy dialogue with the United States. I am proud to say that when I was in Vienna I had a one-hour policy dialogue with my OSCE counterpart, the US ambassador, every week from 2007 to 2011, over the war in Georgia and so on. It was very substantial. They were very happy with that.

Q131 Lord Risby: Turning to Syria and the Middle East, Secretary Kerry said that it was like walking out of hell. I want to move to that particular part of the world because there has been one considerable European success story, the E3+3, which I think was well recognised as an honest and neutral broker. Could you express a view on any possible role in trying to resolve the Syrian crisis? We have a situation where Russia is setting the agenda, a country with very little respect for the European Union. Nevertheless, is there any role where, echoing the situation in Iran, the European Union could have a constructive part, which presumably the United States would welcome, given that the challenge is openly admitted by the US as being a problem that is apparently intractable? Professor Daniel Drezner: The blunt way of putting it is that I do not see how it can hurt, given the situation in Syria and, for that matter, the exhaustion in Washington with respect to any kind of policy to seek a way out of the crisis in Syria. I would challenge somewhat the notion that Putin is setting the agenda there. While I recognise that he is seen as taking proactive steps, I suspect that increasingly over time it will prove just as challenging for Putin as it was for the coalition that is supposedly there to fight ISIS, in terms of changing facts on the ground. In that sense my suggestion would be that while it is possible that the European Union could play a valuable role as a neutral broker, the timing right now might not be all that propitious. The timing might be better when Vladimir Putin realises he is not going to be able to change facts on the ground in Syria in the same way he did in Crimea, precisely because there are limits to Russian capacity, as well as to Iranian capacity, in Syria. As a result, it is only going to be when they are looking for an alternative solution to what they are doing now, and that kind of learning takes time. That said, once that learning takes place—I strongly believe it will—that would strike me as a moment when the European Union could potentially play a role akin to the Iran nuclear negotiations, as you said.

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Dr Lars-Erik Lundin: I have enormous respect for the work done by Javier Solana and his successors on EU3+3. I know a little about the basis on which that was built up, since I was accredited to the IAEA during many of those years. It was based on an enormous allocation of the time of the High Representative to the task, in a very small group of people working under absolute confidentiality. For instance, in my delegation in Vienna I said to my American counterpart, “Don’t talk to me about Iran”, because we were treating it in a special way to preserve the confidence of the permanent members of the Security Council, and the EU3+3 system entrusted that role to the High Representative. My problem right now is, first, the multitasking capability of the EU. During the Ukraine crisis, we had the problem that the High Representative was unable to go into the Ukraine issue at the same time as she was fully occupied with the Iran negotiations. Something must be done in order to increase the multitasking capability in such cases. Secondly, there has to be clarification of the shuttle diplomacy that would have to take place—which stations would be allowed, so to speak. We now know that in Afghanistan, for instance, a dialogue is starting with the Taliban. What will the stations be? That will definitely be linked to the strategic review, in the sense that the EU has to clarify its positions on the parties to the conflict. What would be the instructions to such a negotiator, who would also need to have the full trust of the EU Member States? It is a huge question. I agree. I do not think that Russia is setting the agenda. I am very annoyed, as are many others, but not from that point of view, rather that they are deliberately trying to interdict good work that could be done by the Americans and others. The work with Iran and the United States and the links there could have brought more progress than we have seen so far, and now this is being interdicted in reality by Russia.

Q132 Baroness Suttie: Last week when we were in Brussels, on several occasions we heard from the people we had meetings with that EU foreign policy might currently be going through a sort of transformational shift, from viewing itself as a transformational foreign policy power to one that is more transactional in nature. What is your assessment of the balance to be struck between attempting to transform countries based on values and a more transactional approach? Dr Lars-Erik Lundin: The hesitations are related very much to failure. The fact is that we have not really understood how to apply a values-based foreign policy, and the Arab uprisings, as they are now called, are a good case in point. We have not developed a strategy to handle the link not only between democracy and dictatorship but between democracy and corruption. There are a number of cases where coups d’état have taken place in different countries, not least in Africa, as a protest against corruption and then elections take place. What is really happening is that people are becoming more modest—the word used by Pierre Vimont—or humble. He has been saying that for several years. We have to see the situation in more detail to analyse it. We cannot just make across-the-board prescriptions not only for the neighbourhood but for others. I very much agree with that. We need to know much more about the countries in which we are working to have a simple recipe for progress. The Chairman: Professor Drezner, what do you say looking at it from your perspective? Professor Daniel Drezner: I think that in part it is less to do with the European Union and more to do with the way the rest of the world looks now, as opposed to 10 or 15 years ago. Ten or 15 years ago Russia, for example, was thought of as an actor you wanted to try to export values to. Now it is a country that clearly takes great pride in resistance and the articulation of an alternative set of values. Part of the issue is that when the European Union

43 of 309 Professor Daniel Drezner and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137) is dealing with countries like Russia, China and Iran it is harder to articulate the idea of transformational diplomacy, because those are transactional relationships among great or moderate-sized powers. Therefore, any kind of transformational diplomacy cannot be front and centre; it would have to be of the soft power—track 2—variety. There are limits to what can be done officially. The other issue is that in some ways there are more black knights out there in the world. The most obvious place where the European Union could presumably have this kind of transformational effect is Africa, for a variety of reasons, including the EU’s economic weight. The problem is that if those countries can also look to China or India as alternative sources of investment, or alternative strategic partnerships, suddenly the EU’s transformational diplomacy is automatically going to be somewhat diluted, because there are limits to what the EU can do in exercising more coercive pressure, much in the same way as the United States has discovered with respect to Latin America as China has taken a greater economic interest there. Part of this is just a recognition of reality. It does not mean that transformational diplomacy cannot continue to be a part of the European Union’s strategy; it just has to be a different component of it, perhaps not front and centre and perhaps not something you would expect to achieve in the order of a few years, but rather a much longer-term, softer power project.

Q133 Lord Dubs: You have dealt partly with what my question is about, but let me ask it anyway in case you want to add to it. The EU has been described as a normative power. Do you agree with that assessment? What do you think the consequences are of a decline in the EU’s power of attraction for its ability to promote European values internationally? Professor Daniel Drezner: I would argue that perhaps the greatest accomplishment of the European Union in its entire history has been the integration of eastern Europe into the European Union. In some ways, the greatest success of the European Union is the dog that did not bark after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the falling apart of the Warsaw Pact. I am old enough to remember that when that happened there was a great deal of concern that the eastern European countries would take a turn towards authoritarianism and ethnic strife, because of the placement of various minorities. Instead, what wound up happening was that almost all those countries were so desperate and driven to join the European Union, because they saw it as the mark of modernity and being part of the West, that they swallowed whole the entire acquis communautaire, which meant that a whole host of policies were implemented that in some ways prevented those fears being realised. I entirely agree that the EU’s principal success has been as a normative power, but that has come from actors who want to join the European Union. In some ways that is what makes the EU unique, because it can potentially expand further if it so chooses and if there are other willing actors. If the continued debilitation of the eurozone and the European economy is a turn-off for other countries that might contemplate wanting to join the European Union, without question that represents a blow—an erosion of the EU’s normative power. You can also see that with respect to other regional organisations. If we were having this conversation 10 or 15 years ago, the EU would be considered the exemplar for any regional organisation contemplating further integration to push towards. I do not think you can make that case now, for a variety of reasons.

Q134 The Chairman: When one looks at what is happening right now over migration and the criticisms of Germany being voiced in Hungary, now in Poland and to a lesser extent in the Czech Republic, one sees a challenge to values, does one not? I agree with you that in the past for all kinds of reasons those countries were willing to swallow a great deal because

44 of 309 Professor Daniel Drezner and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137) they wanted to become members. Now they are members and there is a great refugee crisis, and in a sense they are putting up quite a different value system from that represented by Germany, but not only by Germany. What they are saying is quite a challenge. Professor Daniel Drezner: I completely agree. I would argue that the greatest existential threat to the European Union is the Hungarian Prime Minister’s articulation of the notion that liberal democracy as we know it is a failed model. I believe he explicitly said in a speech last year: “I am looking to Vladimir Putin as my political exemplar. I don’t think that liberal democracy has much of a future”. I think that is entirely wrong; I do not think that Prime Minister Orbán is correct in that, but what is interesting is that he felt he could say it and make a case for it. I agree with you that it is extremely disconcerting. Dr Lars-Erik Lundin: For me, the issue of values and the political importance of values is very much a question of perceptions. Almost from the perspective of the realist school of politics, we must be perceived in the EU as a force for good. To the extent that we are not seen as compassionate to normal people in other parts of the world, our effectiveness will be drastically reduced. We will radicalise people through our actions and encourage corruption and other activities that make it almost impossible for us to work effectively in the field. For instance, I note that now in Afghanistan on both a bilateral and multilateral basis it is very difficult for all our countries to work outside our embassies and compounds. I was myself protected by the UK compound in 2006 when I visited there with an EU delegation, after the tragic death of Sérgio Vieira de Mello. We need to be seen as a force for good. I would hope that as a result of the strategic review there will be a dramatically increased investment in Eurobarometers—we already have an Afrobarometer—and the kinds of studies that have been made. I think a transatlantic survey has been done of how Americans and Europeans are seen in countries such as Pakistan. We already know that in Russia our popularity has gone down; that is a pity as regards the general population, because we would like to have friendship with them, and it is essential for the future. In that sense, if we can be seen as a force for good, that makes us a good normative power.

Q135 Baroness Billingham: I want to ask the same supplementary as you did, Lord Chairman. It is about the inadequate response to the refugee crisis and how that is perceived internationally. Does it give you any feeling of optimism or pessimism as to the future of the role of the EU? For us, this is the hot topic, and we are dealing with it totally inadequately and are made to look absolutely useless. What is the world thinking about us? Professor Daniel Drezner: Before I answer, I should acknowledge that the US’s culpability, at least by inaction, is potentially one of the root causes of the refugee crisis. It is not just you. That said, unfortunately the refugee crisis plays into a pre-existing stereotype about the European Union, at least in the United States, which is that it is a problem that creeps up and suddenly consumes the EU to the point where it seems incapable of addressing other issues. Furthermore, Angela Merkel’s initial impulse to welcome the refugees has undercut the statement I made before—that you could have thought, at least recently, that Merkel was in some ways the spokesperson for EU foreign policy. I do not think that will necessarily be the case going forward, precisely because of the degree of political blowback both within Germany and among other EU Member States about how Germany responded to this and the negative externalities it created.

Q136 The Chairman: To add to Baroness Billingham’s question, I mentioned the way in which the Hungarians, Poles and others are speaking. Looking at it from a different direction,

45 of 309 Professor Daniel Drezner and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137) the EU put Turkey on the back burner for quite a long time, and from time to time took quite a strong view about the way in which the Turkish Government regarded human rights, the Kurds and so forth. Now we find the EU falling over itself to offer goodies to Turkey, even to the point of reopening the question of accession, and those other rather moral issues are falling by the wayside. Obviously, all of us are victims of circumstance and we have to deal with the problems that confront us. You replied to the two questions Baroness Billingham and I put, but how would you see the EU response to Turkey? Professor Daniel Drezner: Unfortunately, that depends crucially on what the elections reveal. I believe they are this week or relatively soon. To be fair, I am sure that part of the reason Turkey was put on the back burner was EU reticence, but there was also reticence of the AKP and Erdogan with respect to the European Union. One could see a potential window of political opportunity after the elections either from a weakened Erdogan or from an alternative party that suddenly wants to turn back to Europe, especially given that their no-problems policy in the Middle East has produced nothing but problems. One could see a potential opportunity post-election for some degree of greater co-operation between Turkey and the European Union. I would be optimistic about that. Dr Lars-Erik Lundin: I have always thought that the issue of enlargement is one of process. In particular, in the case of Turkey it needs to be seen as a process rather than just looking at the end result: Turkey as an EU member or not. Therefore, it is surprising to me that we did not apply the comprehensive approach methodology to Turkey already some time ago. If we had, we would not have made statements giving the impression that we were putting them on a back burner. In the list of strategic partners of the EU, we did not list Turkey as one of the strategic partners because we thought they were in a special category, but they have to be seen as a strategic partner of the EU and we need to engage with them, even if there are problems. If we had done that, the problems of continuity in our policies would have been fewer, although one must also recognise that the President of Turkey has had to change his policies considerably in the last few years, going from zero problems in external relations to a considerable palette of different problems now. It is difficult for us to follow the very quick changes in the region.

Q137 Lord Stirrup: While there is still much it can do, do you believe that it is possible for the EU to have a truly effective security strategy without finding a more effective modus vivendi with NATO? Professor Daniel Drezner: No. The Chairman: That is clear. Would you agree with that, Dr Lundin? Dr Lars-Erik Lundin: I would add one word. I think that more effective and intensive policy dialogue with the United States and Canada is essential. Experience over the past 10 years, not least in the region you alluded to, shows that we needed a much stronger European voice on what should have been done in different regions around the world. We need a stronger European voice. The Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much indeed. We are most grateful. It was a very interesting session.

46 of 309 Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht University—Written Evidence (FSP0002)

Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht University—Written Evidence (FSP0002)

General points 1.1 The context for the strategic review is important to consider. There are, in fact, several reviews that have taken place or are currently underway. These include the European Agenda on Security, communicated by the Commission to the European Parliament in April 2015 and the ongoing review of ENP. The rather uncoordinated manner in which other review processes are being undertaken, when presumably they are of relevance to the Strategic Review on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, could be seen as a lost opportunity for a comprehensive (strategic) approach; 1.2 The EU has no shortage of ‘strategies’ – it is drowning in them. As contrarian as this sounds, consider the sheer number of country strategies (around 140), regional strategies (15 or so), continental strategies (2) and I have not even tried to count the number of thematic or horizontal strategies. With this in mind, it seems important that any strategic review should concentrate on outlining clear priorities and make the necessary linkages with existing sub-strategies. Hence, the review should be about establishing meta-strategy, or what Jolyon Howorth called ‘grand strategy’, at the EU level; 1.3 The review process will take place in close cooperation with Member States. This leads to the interesting question of whether the Member States, and notably the United Kingdom, really wish to see the EU emerge as a more strategic actor in its own right. I sense profound ambiguity on this point from the United Kingdom who, along with France, still has pretensions towards a global foreign and security policy. Does this imply that the United Kingdom would welcome the adoption by the EU of an unabashedly global approach to foreign and security policy or would it rather see the Union concentrate primarily on the near-regions. There is also the possibility, as Adrian Hyde-Price has argued from a realist perspective, that the emergence of the EU with global strategic aspirations could be of use to the Member States as a second-order actor, leaving the (larger) Member States free to pursue first-order interests (notably security and trade), while the EU becomes a repository of second- order concerns that are mainly normative in nature; 1.4 The EU’s default strategic posture is mercantilist. In part this is due to the historical origins of European Union and the fact that, until recently, the deepest reserves of diplomatic experience within the EU were to be found in the trade area. The danger of this approach is that it leads to what Richard Youngs has called ‘geo-economic mercantilism’ – a trend that is by no means confined to the EU and might be seen in, for example, Germany’s international engagement. The negotiation of umpteen ‘free trade agreements’ suggests an EU model of engagement based on commercial reciprocity. This has never sat well with the enunciation of the more normative elements of the Lisbon Treaty (specifically Articles 3 and 21), which have always sat rather uneasily with geo-economic mercantilism. While the High Representative’s The European Union in a changing global environment does at least nod towards the need for a ‘common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy’, there is relatively little in the document that attempts to really integrate the geo-economic with the geo-political dimensions. The same was true of the 2003 European Security Strategy.

47 of 309 Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht University—Written Evidence (FSP0002) 1.5 Consultation and drafting: The drafting of the June 2016 strategy will be carried out primarily between Mogherini’s cabinet, the EU-ISS in Paris and the Instituto Affari Internazionali. Aside from the rather Italian-dominated nature of this exercise, it would be a pity if the Commissioners’ Group on External Action were not consulted at the appropriate levels in order to reinforce the ‘comprehensive’ or joined-up nature of any resulting strategy. This is, of course, in addition to appropriate consultation with the Member States and wider consultations with think tanks, academics etc that will take place through a series of conferences.

Changing Global Environment and EU Interests 2.1 The High Representative’s (HR) report is the right basis on which to draft the strategy proper, but only up to a point. The report sensibly identifies the nature of the changing world, the challenges and opportunities for the EU, and considers the implications for the EU’s external action instruments. This raises a question about the scope of the report, bearing in mind that it is not the strategy. As it stands the report can be considered as an update of the 2008 Review of the Implementation of the European Security Strategy which, in its original 2003 form, passed as strategy. The report leaves the essential elements required for a strategy unanswered (‘We need to agree our priorities, our goals and the means required to achieve them’). This is the real challenge and it remains to be seen if the Member States and the EU Institutions are capable of making the push to strategy, rather than modifying what is largely a snap shot of international relations and a list of desiderata – more or less what was served up in 2003, largely as the result of a UK dominated drafting process. 2.2 The EU’s strategic interests are largely undefined in the report. In particular the report does not hint at how to find a balance between the geo-economic aspects and the geo-political in an environment that often challenges (but does not completely dismiss) liberal narratives. This points to a core and persistent schizophrenia in the EU’s external actions which is how to attain a balance between the pursuit of ‘interests’ and ‘values’, as laid out in the Lisbon Treaty and many policy documents. What is lacking from the report is any notion that the EU will defend core liberal values above all other interests which, in rhetorical terms, is what has supposedly distinguished the EU from many other international actors. This has clearly been eroded by evidence of double-standards (think Russia, Central Asia), the barely contained annoyance at the Union’s normatively-laden dialogues (think India) or even charges of hypocrisy (China). The core issue both within the EU and beyond, concerns the nature and extent of the European project. Until there is consensus on what it is internally, it is going to be difficult to imagine a clear external strategy for the Union given the self-referential nature (this is most apparent in enlargement and the neighbourhood policy where, to put it simply, the EU has relied upon the fundamental appeal that ‘you want to be like us’). It is no exaggeration to claim that the EU as a whole is in an existential crisis where there are fundamental questions of purpose, role and identity. The report does not adequately reflect on these wider points. 2.3 The ability of the EU to respond to the new security environment depends very much on what is understood by ‘security’ and whose security is being referred to? This is also connected to broader questions of the scope of any strategy in the making (will it be primarily regional, MENA, Eastern Partnership, or will it have global aspirations?). At this stage it is difficult to say, but the main issue is how to move towards something like a ‘Policy Coherence for Security’ concept (modelled on Policy Coherence for

48 of 309 Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht University—Written Evidence (FSP0002) Development). Security is all too often portrayed in terms of the effectiveness, or otherwise, of CSDP. It is, however, inherently broader with the key issue of how to link together the different instruments and policies that pertain to security (the EU’s experience in Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation shows that the latter aspect remains by far the most problematic, or Security Sector Reform where the longer-term follow through policies also similarly challenging). The potential to respond to the ‘new security environment’ is broadly present, but this cannot be an exclusive EU effort. The harder ends of the security environment will, in particular, continue to require Member State assets, while there are also important multilateral aspects that require close collaboration with international partners (AU, OSCE, NATO and so forth). One of the main credibility challenges for the EU lies in its reluctance to embrace its hard security elements (which remain only loosely connected to the EEAS, even under Mogherini) as part of the spectrum of responses that will be required for many foreseeable security challenges. A comprehensive approach lies, fundamentally, on a comprehensive strategy which, at this time, is elusive. 2.4 The EU is, in some ways, a global ‘actor’, with more ambiguity about whether this is tantamount to being a ‘power’. In the superficial sense the presence of 140 or so EU delegations, the patchwork of agreements and dialogues, does indeed make the EU a global presence. This observation has to be qualified when it comes to multilateral fora where the Westphalian nature of many international bodies (i.e. created by states for states) excludes the EU from direct representation with very few exceptions (like the FAO). The notion of ‘power’ in the EU sense should move ahead from the corrosive assumptions of tutelage that underpin enlargement, which are then applied to the EU’s broader external actions. Such suppliant models are unlikely to work in a world that is more connected, contested and complex. The EU is likely to remain globally engaged but in order to become a ‘power’ the essential liberal values underpinning the Union should not be abandoned, but should be woven into foreign and security policy in a manner that combines elements of both soft and hard(er) power. In designing not just a strategy, but also in terms of engagement, the EU should identify and engage its ‘strategic partners’ in those areas that are consonant with these underpinning values. Few of the EU’s partners completely reject notions of liberalism. Hence, the engagement with China in anti-piracy operations, to take one example, should be developed while other aspects that are contrary to the EU’s core values should be de-emphasized, but at the same time the door should be left open for dialogue. In this manner, the relationship of actorness to power would become one that is both pragmatic but also principled.

Neighbourhood Policy 3.1 The neighbourhood policy (ENP) will be the de facto focus of the EU’s external actions. This, as the refugee crisis has underlined, is not entirely a matter of choice. For many external partners the EU’s role in the neighbourhood has become a litmus test of the Union’s powers of attraction. The question of where to focus resources, and indeed which resources, depends upon the wider priorities established in the course of the strategic review. The Union and the Member States certainly face a major credibility challenge in the neighbourhood stemming from recent history where both were content to engage with less than salubrious regimes in trade deals, with little regard for the autocratic nature of many of the governments. This was certainly reflected in the various reactions to the Arab spring, especially amongst the vast populations (around 60%) under the age of 30 in MENA. This poses the dilemma of who to

49 of 309 Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht University—Written Evidence (FSP0002) engage. Should the target of the EU’s diplomacy in the region continue to be the governments, or should more resources be moved towards engaging with civil society? The EU is currently trying to do both, with little success – the chances are high that engagement with one will complicate relations with the other. Nevertheless, it still remains in the EU’s interests to have stable and prosperous neighbours to its east and south. The question of resources is, in part, an issue of where the resources are spent; externally to try and stabilize and benefit the young and dynamic populations to the south in particular, or internally to strengthen frontiers and, if Jean Claude Juncker has his way, to form an EU coast guard and border force. 3.2 ENP is clearly in need of a major overhaul. One can only hope that the June 2016 strategic documents feeds into and informs the review of ENP (which, in many ways, may be the more serious document with more direct implications for foreign and security policy). The ENP review will appear during the course of this year (‘autumn’ is mentioned) whereas the wider review of foreign and security policy in slated for June. On the positive side, the joint consultation paper adopted by the High Representative and Commission in March asked sensible and tough questions to guide the ENP review process. It is clear that the enlargement model has limited attraction to some of the neighbours and, looking to the east, creates frustration when the development of deep and comprehensive free trade areas involves many of the sacrifices and strictures involved in membership preparation, without the ultimate carrot (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have, at one time or another, all demanded a membership prospect). This is not to argue that membership should be offered in the current geo-political environment, but the goals and aims of ENP should be far clearer. The main instrument, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), tends to be typical of a number of others with the emphasis being on budgetary lines and less on actual commitments (dispersal) of funding. The well-meaning but ultimately empty slogans, like ‘more for more’ or the Endowment for Democracy, have never been fully convincing, especially when the internal demands from many of the southern neighbours prioritizes visa and mobility issues. Those areas that could have longer-term mutual benefits, such as educational exchanges, should be underlined.

Capabilities and Capacities 4.1 Several studies have appeared during the course of the last years (see, in particular, Balfour R. and Raik. K, The European Action Service and National Foreign Ministries) which suggest that the earlier mutual suspicions surrounding national diplomacy and European-level service are largely unfounded. It has proven to be neither a case of pure uploading (of national preferences) nor downloading (of European priorities). The instruments are broadly comparable at the European and national levels when one speaks of ‘external actions’ generally, although they are packaged differently at the respective levels. The issues of whether they are ‘fit for purpose’ depends upon a clear strategic benchmark against which to measure effectiveness. In the its absence, the EU often tends to resort to process-oriented measures, such as whether funds were dispersed of in accordance with the guidelines (which can sometimes obscure any broader measures of what any instrument may have achieved on the ground). The inward process-oriented perspective also risks making the number of dialogues associated with any one external partner something of a virility symbol, rather than an indication of what is actually being accomplished.

50 of 309 Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht University—Written Evidence (FSP0002) National foreign policy instruments are, logically, primarily geared to attain national objectives. With the exception of development aid and assistance (the European Development Fund) the coordination of instruments is inadequate and may even be counter-productive (notably in the trade and development areas). The main issue is one of coordination and trust. There is evidence of far closer sharing of information between the EU delegations and national diplomatic representations (although with the frequent lament that this is often a one-way street) which, slowly, will build up trust. The argument that economic imperatives will ineluctably force change in national diplomatic practice and eventually encourage sharing (of the type seen by some of the overseas representations of Scandinavian countries) and different types of representation practice, including the hosting of national diplomats in EU delegations, has proven largely unfulfilled (the same logic has been applied to defence cooperation with little discernible effect ). There is some evidence that the experience of national diplomats working at the European level, mostly notably in the EU delegations, is having a ‘socialization’ effect. The general trend, however, suggests that national foreign policy goals, complete with a national corps diplomatique, are far from unaffordable for most EU members. This is in part a question of spending priorities, but it is also one of mind-sets – especially in the UK. This is a pity since the way in which British diplomats (including the UK Perm Rep) negotiate the Brussels quagmire is widely admired and emulated. 4.2 The leitmotif for effective cooperation at the national and European levels in the new security environment revolves, initially, around joint analysis of potential challenges and the sharing of information (this is addressed in more detail below). It is also apparent that the national strategic planning processes (UK Strategic Review) might be better coordinated so that shared objectives might be easier to identify both between Member States as well as at the European level. In terms of capabilities, such as RPVs or drones, progress is being made but there still remains enormous pressure to defend national defence industrial champions. The opening up of defence markets has been slow due, in part, to disputes about the scope of TFEU Article 346(1.b) but also due to the lack of any formal powers on the part of the European Defence Agency. 4.3 The ability of the EU to maximize its power will depend largely upon the ability to effectively link together hard and soft tools (in American parlance, ‘smart power’). This basic notion underpins the ‘comprehensive approach’ which is largely a re- wrapping of the old debates about coherence/consistency in EU external actions. It is, nevertheless, a concept that is worth retaining but needs fleshing out. There is a tendency in EU external actions to invent sound-bite terms (‘strategic partnerships’, ‘effective multilateralism’, ‘more for more’ etc.) which are often difficult to implement in policy terms. The strategic review process might usefully put some substance to such terms or, if need be, quietly retire them. The Member States have an instrumental role to play in supporting the recognition that the EU is no longer a civilian power par excellence and that it has developed hard(er) edges which are part and parcel of being effective and relevant in a modern or even pre-modern world. Concepts such as ‘human security’ have evoked little traction in the EU institutions, but the idea of joined-up approaches is central. It is also important that linkages should be made at the highest levels in the EEAS and Commission – an area that the previous High Representative/Vice-President neglected. The effectiveness of the new policy clusters, with Mogherini being responsible for the Group of External Relations Commissioners, is an interesting

51 of 309 Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht University—Written Evidence (FSP0002) idea. The initial evidence from the external relations group, based on the management of the ebola crisis, was rather promising. It remains to be seen, however, how willing Commissioners are to be ‘coordinated’ and how expansive the involvement of other Commissioners might need to be, given the potential relevance of almost every Commission portfolio for external actions. 4.4. The EU is necessarily limited as a multilateral player in international organizations (IOs). This is largely due to the Westphalian nature of many IOs where the EU is excluded from membership. The modification of the role of the EU in the UN General Assembly and the largely symbolic representational role played by the High Representative are important, but they nevertheless remain largely cosmetic. One of the key tests for the EU Members will be the extent to which they are willing to accommodate the demands from the rising (and risen!) powers for changes to their representation on key international bodies, including financial institutions. This is an especially awkward question for the EU’s members since they continue to enjoy the entrenched privileges, and some would say over-representation, stemming from the end of World War II. This will be provide an interesting gauge of the commitment of the Union and its members to genuine multilateralism. 4.5 The diplomatic and intelligence capacities of the EU and Member States is in flux. On the diplomatic side there is little doubt that the rotation of national diplomats into the EEAS on temporary assignment has greatly assisted in the development of the EEAS as a diplomatic service at the European level. The assumption of complex foreign and security policy issues at the European level is still relatively new (the EU only assumed competence for these areas with the Lisbon Treaty) – this was also why it was suggested in a response to an earlier question that the greatest reserves of diplomatic skill in the EU are probably still to be found in the trade area. For the newer EU Member States the ability to serve in EU delegations has had a welcome multiplier effect for the experience of their diplomats. Many of these countries have only recently had the ability to formulate an independent foreign policy and for vast parts of the world (sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Latin America and Asia) there was little experience. For its part, the EEAS remains fledgling and in some areas weakness is evident. One notable example is in the Global and Multilateral Issues Division where staff often struggle to cope with large and complex portfolios, often with very few people, as they simultaneously try and identify the EEAS’s role in portfolios where the resources and expertise are often to be found in the Commission (climate change, migration, energy security being good examples). On intelligence, briefly, the production of the SIAC, drawing upon civilian and military analysis, serves one very useful role that is not highlighted enough. It enables analysis from multiple sources to be compared in ways that enable the veracity of national sources of information to be double checked for bias or accuracy. For the UK, intelligence remains an especially sensitive issue due largely to the ‘five eyes’ agreement and concerns about the closeness of the UK intelligence establishment to not only information from the NSA, but association with their covert activities as well.

52 of 309 Dr Spyros Economides, Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006)

Dr Spyros Economides, Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006)

Evidence to be found under Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith

53 of 309 Mr Peter Eklund and Mr Hans Wessberg—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66)

Mr Peter Eklund and Mr Hans Wessberg—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66)

Evidence Session No. 6 Heard in Public Questions 58 – 66

TUESDAY 20 OCTOBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Baroness Suttie Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

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Examination of Witnesses Mr Hans Wessberg, Member, European Court of Auditors and former State Secretary, Swedish Prime Minister's Office, and Mr Peter Eklund, Head of Private Office, European Court of Auditors

Q58 The Chairman: Mr Wessberg and Mr Eklund, thank you very much for coming to talk to us. As I think you know, we are members of the House of Lords European Union Select Committee. We are the sub-committee dealing with European external affairs. This is part of our inquiry, and notes are being taken, but if you want to go off the record please say so and we will of course respect that. My colleagues have a number of questions in addition to the ones we sent you, but could I start, please, by asking if you could explain the role of the Court of Auditors in scrutinising EU external policy? I remember from my own time in the Commission the Court of Auditors scrutinising the Commission’s activities, but I had not thought of the Court of Auditors in quite that role until today. Mr Hans Wessberg: Thank you. I am happy to do that. Perhaps I could take the opportunity to point out that, when I was a very young man in 1980, I was summoned to a sub- committee of the House of Commons to give a statement on the student loans contract— student grants. I was then Chairman of the Swedish National Union of Students. That was at the beginning of my career, and now that I am near the end of my career I have advanced to the House of Lords and foreign affairs.

54 of 309 Mr Peter Eklund and Mr Hans Wessberg—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66)

The Chairman: We are all nearer the ends of our careers as well. Mr Hans Wessberg: I feel very much at home. I would like to say a few words about the Court of Auditors. As you know, we are the independent external auditor of all the Union’s spending and we like to see ourselves as the taxpayers’ watchdog. We are, as you know, composed of one member from every European member country, with me being the Swedish member. We are 28 members. The majority of the members are not auditors. I am a former politician and a former civil servant, but I have never worked in auditing. We publish the results of our audit work in a variety of reports. You have probably seen our annual report where we keep track of the budget as a whole, but we also publish a specific annual report and special reports, depending on the type of audit. We are a chamber organisation; 28 members are quite a lot—when Sweden joined we were 15—and I am in the chamber that concerns itself with the Union’s external activities as a whole. That means the CSDP of course, but various other things as well. We have produced, among others, four reports that I believe would be of interest to this Committee in discussing the EU strategic review and the common security and defence policy. They include European assistance to Kosovo related to the rule of law, EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, European Union direct finance and support to the Palestinian people, and, most recently, the special report on the EUPOL police mission in Afghanistan. I was the responsible member for three of them, not for the Kosovo-EULEX report. I took part in it, but I was not a report member. That is what we do. It is worth pointing out that we do not look at the common security and defence policy as such. We have not benchmarked every part of it against another. We look at specific projects and we pick them ourselves. We picked the European police organisation contribution in Afghanistan as something interesting to look at on value for money. It is not that much money compared with other things that we audit. It is €400 million. That is a lot, but how much is the whole development aid budget? Mr Peter Eklund: The EDF is €30,5 billion for the period 2014-2020, for comparison. Mr Hans Wessberg: We have a tendency to follow the money, but in this case we picked Afghanistan because we thought it was rather a difficult and complicated task. The Chairman: You seek to see what the value for money is, but how do you measure that in this rather diffuse area? In terms of agricultural policy, I can see how the audit works, but I find it difficult to see how the audit works in a matter of this kind. Mr Hans Wessberg: From my side, I cannot see how the audit really works on the agricultural thing, so— The Chairman: Well, how it should work. Mr Hans Wessberg: Maybe. I think we mean the same thing. Value for money is a complicated thing. You cannot put up specific benchmarks for it in this field—of course you cannot. In some other audits we can say that compliance with the rules is 100% or 50% or 0%. Agriculture would be something like that. Here we have to do an estimate of the effect of the money spent and the mission done. We start by looking at the goals that are put forward for the specific mission and then we try to see if those goals have been reached. To take Afghanistan as an example—it is the latest of the audits that I have been doing in this field—why did the Union start out with the EUPOL police mission? Let me go back in history a bit. When the United States and NATO forces went into Afghanistan and got rid of the Taliban—temporarily, at least—there was no such thing as an Afghan police force at all. There were definitely no police at all in the country. The Taliban had other ways of solving

55 of 309 Mr Peter Eklund and Mr Hans Wessberg—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66) problems and we should not go too deeply into that, but it was definitely not the way the Union wanted things to be done. Then various projects started to get some sort of Afghan police organisation on the road, so to speak. The Americans did a few things and other countries did a few things. For a couple of years, there was a system where Germany had leading nation responsibility for the build-up of a police organisation. Then the Union decided to make it a joint Union project. Why did that happen? Probably because the task was enormous. It is a big country. They have no police tradition—they have a violent tradition—so the task was enormous. I think the reasoning was that the Union wanted to pool its resources. That is often the case in these sorts of mission. What one member country can do is one thing, but 28 member countries can do a lot more, so the police mission was started. In the beginning it was my feeling—my feeling—that the Commission wanted to reach out to the whole of the territory of Afghanistan, to have representation in all the provinces, mainly to train police recruits and equip them and so on. In the end, that was not feasible. Why was it not? The security situation in many of the provinces was too bad to have a police training mission in it. To be honest, there were provinces where you could not move around without military protection; every base had to have some sort of military protection. In the end they concentrated on the Kabul area and went from mentoring to a real “train the trainers” system, which worked fairly well. Were they successful? Could we say that there has been value for money? Yes, I think so. Why do I think so? I will give two examples, if you will allow me. I visited Afghanistan for the first time at the beginning of 2009. I was then with the Swedish Prime Minister. The Swedish Prime Minister visited our military unit in northern Afghanistan and I joined him. When we visited Mazar-e-Sharif, the Afghan national police were held in extremely low regard by everybody. Our soldiers said that they might be a bit worried about the Taliban but they were a lot more worried about the Afghan national police. This is true. We have had in my country—the country I know best—losses among our soldiers from attacks made by the earlier Afghan national police. It really was a very unorganised and unprofessional unit. When Peter and I went to Kabul in 2014 we saw, I would say, a rather professional police organisation with equipment that worked, with communications that worked, with policemen who could read and write—not all of them, but most of them—concerning themselves not only with fighting the Taliban but with the rule of law. That was the big idea with the police organisation. When we arrived in Afghanistan they had just had their final test, I would say; they had organised and protected the freest and most secure election ever in Afghanistan. That depended heavily on the Afghan national police, so something had really happened. EUPOL played a very big role in that but there were enormous problems, and I can go into them if you want a long answer. Yes, there was value for money, but it is hard to say whether it was 100% or 0%. The Afghan national police contribute in rather a good way to building some sort of stable society.

Q59 Lord Horam: What sort of freedom of action do you have in deciding to investigate a particular thing? Are you totally able to say which subject you will do next? If you look into something and find something you are unhappy with, can you report and say that you will follow it up at a later stage? Mr Hans Wessberg: Yes. I might be a little bit off the record here, but to be very honest, every auditing organisation has to fight to keep its independence. Mr Hans Wessberg continued off the record Our independence is extremely important to us. We decide what to do. In the case of Afghanistan, we never asked anybody. We can do a follow-up if we want to. I suppose we

56 of 309 Mr Peter Eklund and Mr Hans Wessberg—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66) will not do that because Afghanistan is not comparable to anything else, but we might look at how the Commission and the EEAS use our recommendations, because we have serious recommendations on what not to do next time. They concern mainly the start-up phase of the mission when we saw serious problems in manning, planning and executing things. The answer to your question is that we are fully independent. In reality, I decide myself what to audit, together with my colleagues in the chamber; we have five members in the chamber.

Q60 Lord Horam: When you have made recommendations about how things might be improved, do you find they are followed up by the relevant directorate? Mr Hans Wessberg: I would say so, yes. I have been in this job for four years now and I have had the good fortune to be in that chamber all the time. I have never worked with cohesion, agriculture or anything else—thank God. I am really interested in foreign affairs and security things, but there are other reasons as well for me saying, “Thank God”. I must say that nowadays the Commission mainly accepts all our recommendations. In our case, Peter, they have accepted almost every recommendation. Mr Peter Eklund: Most of them, yes. Mr Hans Wessberg: Also, when we follow them up, they try to implement them. We look back sometimes and see if they have implemented our recommendations. In this particular field—I would not say that it applies to all the Court of Auditors’ activities towards the Commission—I would say that we have a very happy situation. We have no political mandate and sometimes individuals in the EU system think that we behave in a political way, that we audit the decisions. We do not. We audit the implementation of decisions. That is an enormous difference. But sometimes individuals think that we get too political. That happened in the case of Afghanistan. Individuals thought that we put too much work into whether or not we should be there. No, we do not. That is not our business at all. But when the Commission—when the Council—decided to go into Afghanistan, it was our job to see if they did it in a good way. The answer in this case was yes, relatively so.

Q61 Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: You now have some experience both from Sweden and from the EU of external affairs, of foreign policy and so on. How do you assess the success or otherwise of this process in the EU, and can you give us some examples of what you think have been successes of EU intervention and then maybe where you think they have not met the objective? Mr Hans Wessberg: This is an enormous field to dig into. I have mixed experience. I have experiences from the country I know best, when I was in the Prime Minister’s office, at the Foreign Affairs office and the Ministry for Defence. It is hard for me to separate those experiences, which I think you will understand. There are success stories and stories that are not so successful. Let me take one example. I do not know when—it was quite a few years ago—the EU system decided to have some sort of military ability. I would not say a rapid deployment force because it is definitely not rapid and it has never been deployed, and whether it is a force or not I do not know. I am sorry. I am speaking about the battlegroup system. I came into contact with this when I was State Secretary for Defence in Sweden, and Sweden opted to be lead nation for a battlegroup. You know the system—two battlegroups standing in readiness for every six- month period. Sweden being what Sweden is, of course we thought that if we were supposed to have a battlegroup ready for the first half of 2008, it must be ready in late 2007. We are the only country that says to Germany, “Can you please try to behave in an orderly fashion?” We are what we are. Our soldiers must be recruited not only to the last day of

57 of 309 Mr Peter Eklund and Mr Hans Wessberg—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66) the mandate date but for six months more because nobody knows if we need to stay longer. Anyhow, we took it rather seriously, as many other countries did. We organised a battlegroup, together with the Nordic and Scandinavian countries, and, Sweden being a small country, it was quite a challenge. The good thing about being in the EU family is that we could go to the United Kingdom—to Northwood—and say that we needed operational staff as support, because we could not organise it ourselves. Could that be done? It was easily done because both of us were EU members. Everything worked very well. I think the EU battlegroup was 2,000 soldiers strong, half of them Swedes and the rest of Finns, Estonians and Latvians and things like that, and Norwegians; even if they are not members of the Union, they are members of the battlegroup system. But they have never been used. The cost for that battlegroup force for Sweden was about 1 billion Swedish crowns. That would have been £800 million or £900 million. We could definitely afford to keep the force in readiness in our home country, but the problem was that when we had the force organised we could not send it out on other missions. We had a request for it to go to Chad and to other places in Africa, but we could not send it because it was tied up in the EU battlegroup system. It could be argued that other countries, being less German than we are, would have sent them anyhow and said, “This battlegroup is now standing in readiness in Chad instead”, but we do not do it like that. Many European countries do not do it like that. I am trying to say that a common approach is of course very successful; it is good to have a system like that, but if it is never used, is it a good thing? I have even contemplated auditing it, but, to be honest, it does not cost the Union anything. I follow the money, so I do not think we will ever do that. On the other hand—we have not audited it, of course—a success story might be the common approach to the new situation between European countries and Russia. That could be an example of when the common foreign policy is moving in the right direction. That could be two examples.

Q62 Baroness Suttie: You have to a certain degree just answered the question I was going to ask, because I am particularly interested in ad hoc alliances and groupings, but to what degree do Nordic and Scandinavian countries work together on EU defence and security policy? Would you anticipate that you would have a common response to the strategy review? Secondly, do the Scandinavian and Nordic countries have a common response if they disagree, for example, with a particularly strong German position on security and foreign policy? Mr Hans Wessberg: I will gladly answer you, but you must remember that I have to step out of my position as— Baroness Suttie: Sure, this is from your memory as a former Swedish State Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs rather than the Court of Auditors. Mr Hans Wessberg: Yes. You can see it as a titbit from the memoirs I am not going to write. Lord Dubs: Why not? Mr Hans Wessberg: Because my Prime Minister recently did and it is the most boring book I have ever read. Lord Dubs: You could make yours interesting. Mr Hans Wessberg: He would not like that, would he? This is rather a big story. It goes back in history to 1945. Nordic countries have definitely diverging experiences from the Second World War. You know this as well as I do. With Norway and Denmark having been rapidly occupied by Germany, their conclusion was that

58 of 309 Mr Peter Eklund and Mr Hans Wessberg—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66) standing alone was not an option. Finland got into conflict first with Russia, then with the Soviet Union again for a second time, and then a third time in what they called the Lapland War when they had to kick their German allies out of northern Finland in 1944; it was an extremely bloody battle. They had their own experiences that led them to the conclusion: “We could manage in 1939-45 alone, without any assistance at all. We would gladly do it again”. That would be a typical Finnish solution. Having the experience of neutrality played out rather well for Sweden—not morally, but we were not hit by the war. We had to tear down our cities ourselves in the years after the war and we gladly did, so it looks exactly the same as in the rest of Europe. The experiences vary a lot. Sweden and Finland are not NATO members, and Denmark, Norway and Iceland are NATO members, but there is some sort of co-operation and there always has been. There was a debate in 1945-46 as to whether a Nordic defence alliance should be created instead. That came to nothing and it is probably a good thing, because NATO is much more important for Norway and Denmark, and maybe for Sweden and Finland as well. There is co-operation, but it never leads to common conclusions when we come down to this city. There is close co-operation in the Nordic capitals, but when Governments send their delegations down here it is pretty much everybody for himself. That has always been the case. I would say that both Sweden and Finland prefer to be in NATO-led operations, moving on to the CSDP dimension. Sweden and Finland prefer to be in NATO-led operations, in Afghanistan, in Kosovo and other places as well, rather than in United Nations-led or even EU-led ones, because NATO operations are militarily better led. They are more professional. That is easy to understand. NATO is a professional organisation and we, not being NATO members, prefer to be led by professionals instead of being led by non-professionals. It is very simple. There is no clear Nordic identity on this; there are diverging experiences. Sweden and Finland are now moving closer to NATO than we have ever been before. We are partners and we used to say that we are better integrated in NATO than most NATO members, but then again, being Swedes—

Q63 Baroness Coussins: You referred earlier to the importance of the independence of the ECA and the fact that your mandate is not a political one. I imagine that your independence would be better safeguarded if there were more of a common shared political vision rather than 28 Member States each with their differing priorities for foreign policy and security. Drawing on your experience in the Swedish Foreign Ministry as well as from your experience at the ECA, could you comment on whether you think a shared political vision or degree of unity over foreign policy is shaping up to be more likely now, and is the current consultation over the new strategy likely to help it on its way or not? Mr Hans Wessberg: That is a very difficult question to answer. You must remember that when I take up my position, like any other member of the European Court of Auditors, I have to swear an oath not to take any instructions from anybody, including our home Governments. Most of us take that very seriously. I have been renewed once and when we are renewed we have to go to Parliament for a second time and for a hearing. The only question I was asked in Parliament on my second hearing was, “Has there ever been any attempt from the Swedish Government to influence you or to instruct you?”. Of course there has not. Most of us are in that position. When we take up our positions in the Ardennes up in Luxembourg we start to be a bit isolated from what goes on. It is easy for us to see that in Europe there is this common identity on foreign affairs, but how far reaching is it, how deep? Would it be better if it was a very clear vision, as I think the Baroness indicated? Maybe, but I am not sure. It depends a little on where you stand on European cooperation. Again, stepping out of my mandate as an EU official, I would say that, being a Swede, I was very active in the referendum campaign that led Sweden into the Union in

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1994. We entered on 1 January 1995. I was very active in that. I was in fact at the head of the campaign team. But what did I join? I joined a co-operation between nations. I wanted to join a co-operation between European nations because I, as a person, have a strong conviction that there is a European identity and a European culture; there is a European destiny—to go very high up in the clouds. But there is also definitely no place for a European super-state. Co-operation between nations is what Sweden and I joined. I feel happier without the far-reaching vision that you might be implying—I do not really know for sure. I feel rather at home with co-operation between nations. There is big variation in history on the concept of nation as well. In Britain and Sweden, both being 1,000 year-old monarchies, the idea of nation is rather strong in the population. Other countries in eastern Europe have totally different experiences of nationhood and totally different experiences of entering a union, so there will always be differences. Mr Hans Wessberg continued off the record. I think it is better to keep it that way, but this must be considered a very private opinion. Lord Dubs: As a slight digression, I think we could do with your help in the coming referendum in Britain if you have a bit of time to spare. Mr Hans Wessberg: I have done my last referendum.

Q64 Lord Dubs: Could I turn to another issue—the question of the UK’s contribution to the CSDP missions? Have you had a chance to have a look at that? Do we add any value, and have we made a lesser contribution in the recent past than we did earlier? Mr Hans Wessberg: I will try to answer this question. As you know, we do not audit specific member countries, but you understand that, so I will try to answer to the best of my ability. Peter and I both met UK policemen in the EUPOL mission. They were doing excellent work, of course. I have met policemen in the field as well doing excellent work. There are different traditions in Europe on police work. My home country and the United Kingdom both belong to the group in the non-gendarmerie tradition, which means that we usually want to use our policemen as policemen and not as soldiers. I feel very much at home with that, so I saw very competent trainers of trainers. They were held in high esteem, were they not? Mr Peter Eklund: Yes. We saw various examples of UK police officers in action training first the Afghan national police and officials in the ministry and also teaching them how to manage the police staff training college, which was then handed over to the Afghan authorities, as well as UK police officers in the field teaching the principles of civilian policing to their Afghan counterparts. That is a concrete example of UK professionalism and added value in action. Mr Hans Wessberg: I think we saw the same thing in Palestine, although they were not policemen. There is a difference. To be honest, I come from a small country and the United Kingdom is a big country. Small countries must work together within the Union to get something done. That is very simple. We simply cannot cope ourselves. If we want to do something, co-operation is the word. Small countries are often better at co-operation than big countries, because big countries always have the option of doing it themselves. Areas like Afghanistan, or for this purpose also Palestine, show that even big countries benefit a lot from working together. For me, it is quite obvious that the United Kingdom is doing that. I should not comment on your national debate, but maybe it shows a little bit in your commitment to various operations that there is an ongoing debate on whether Europe is good or not. That shows a bit, yes, but I cannot say that we have seen anything negative—

60 of 309 Mr Peter Eklund and Mr Hans Wessberg—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66) not at all. There are two countries within the Union that could do anything themselves: the United Kingdom and France—militarily, diplomatically and economically. If you are speaking about economics, you should add Germany, but not on military. During the years that I have been at the Court of Auditors, UK commitment to the common policy has been quite high. I, for one, am glad to see that; many small countries like to have co-operation with one or two of the big countries because it makes life a lot easier. Your home country is always easier to cope with.

Q65 The Chairman: Could I ask you a different question? Do you think that the exercise that Mrs Mogherini has embarked on could, from the point of view of the Court of Auditors, make the CSDP a more efficient and effective operation, or do you think that its benefits would come in other fields? Mr Hans Wessberg: That is an extremely good question. I think the answer depends on the circumstances that we are moving into. Who can say what stormy waters Europe is moving into in the CSDP field? I think the answer lies there more than in her work. I really do not know, but it is a good attempt.

Q66 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: Can I ask a supplementary on a hypothetical question in the CSDP context? It has been presented to us in evidence that, for example, the operation in the Gulf of Somalia against piracy has been a good operation. It has been presented to us that the European naval force in the Mediterranean is a good operation. I am not quite so sure that I am convinced of that yet. My hypothetical question is whether there is a role for you, or would you not take it on, in making a comparative study of the value for money of the kind of projects that would be the basis of recommendations going forward, or is that not your role yet? Mr Hans Wessberg: We could, of course. We have no limitations. We could do that. Whether we do it or not depends on whether we think that we have the capability to do it ourselves. We are a rather limited organisation. Auditors are auditors and they are relatively specialist. Peter and I do performance auditing and we could use that competence to do something comparative, as you say. It could be possible, yes, but we would think twice, or even three times, before we did it, because we would rather stick to audits where we know that we can produce a solid result. But it would be a very interesting question to compare different missions. We could definitely do it. We have never done it. Mr Peter Eklund: We have not done it so far, no. Mr Hans Wessberg: Can I go on to your different naval operations? I do not think anybody can say anything about the Mediterranean yet, but the Somalia thing—we have not audited it but I know, again from my experience in the country I know best—is rather a good example of both co-operation and delivering results. There are fewer pirates in that part of the world now. The bad story is that they have probably migrated to other parts of the world, but that is beside the point, is it not? There are fewer pirates. It is easier for cargo vessels to move around there nowadays than it used to be, so the result is good. The co-operation between nations to deliver that is also good; it does not always take place. I used to say, from my experience in the reports I have done myself, that the more important an issue is, and the more complicated a European task is, the more complicated co-operation between Member States is, because when it is really important you have instructions from home. You have to deliver this for purely political reasons. I have full respect for that, but it does not make life easier for the EU delegation with the task to co-ordinate. Palestine is a very good example. Everybody thinks that the whole issue is enormously important. Most nations share the same

61 of 309 Mr Peter Eklund and Mr Hans Wessberg—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66) view as to where the solution is as well. But since it is very important, it is also very important for politicians. That makes it more complicated for the European Union head of mission down there to co-ordinate things. It is easier when nobody cares, if I am very blunt. Earl of Oxford and Asquith: I understand. The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. That was a quite different perspective on the issues from the one we have been getting from others, so I am very glad you were able to come to give evidence to us. Thank you very much. Mr Hans Wessberg: Thank you. It is an honour. Mr Hans Wessberg continued off the record.

62 of 309 Professor Adam Fagan and Dr James Ker-Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149)

Professor Adam Fagan and Dr James Ker-Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149)

Evidence Session No. 12 Heard in Public Questions 138 - 149

THURSDAY 5 NOVEMBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Lord Balfe Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Lord Stirrup Baroness Suttie Lord Triesman Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

______

Examination of Witnesses Professor Adam Fagan, Professor of European Politics, Queen Mary, University of London, and Dr James Ker-Lindsay, Senior Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science, and Research Associate, Centre of International Studies, University of Oxford

Q138 The Chairman: Professor Fagan, Dr Ker-Lindsay, thank you very much for appearing before us. I am sure you know, but for the sake of good order, let me repeat that this is a formal session of the Committee and is part of our inquiry into the emerging European security strategy, so what you say will be taken down and used in our evidence. If, on reflection, there is anything you would like to excise from the record or make confidential, please say so. If, when we have finished, you would like to elaborate on anything that you have said, we are very open to receiving further written evidence. You have been sent a number of questions, but I am sure that my colleagues will deviate from those as well.

One other thing I need to say is that our next session at 11 am is from Washington, where somebody is kindly getting up at 6 am to speak to us by videolink. Therefore, we have to

63 of 309 Professor Adam Fagan and Dr James Ker-Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149) start the session with him absolutely promptly. I ask that you, and my colleagues, be kind enough to bear that in mind.

Finally, I have been informed that on the question relating to the western Balkans, Professor Fagan alone will answer, and on the question relating to Turkey, it will be Dr Ker-Lindsay. Otherwise, on all the other questions, please both answer, but if you agree with what the other person said, do not feel the need to elaborate.

I will ask the first question. A number of our witnesses have said that the new EU foreign policy strategy should take a very forthright approach to prioritisation. In your view, what are the principal security interests of the EU and Member States? What should the EU’s and Member States’ priorities be in the eastern neighbourhood? Professor Adam Fagan: Thank you. In my opinion, the most important thing for the EU to emphasise and deal with are attitudes towards the EU, both in neighbourhood countries and the western Balkans. There is plenty of evidence that I have been involved in gathering, as part of our project, to show that on the ground in the western Balkans there is a surprisingly high degree of support for European integration and membership. But it is declining, and there is a real danger that that will disappear. It would be interesting to hear what James has to say about this as well, but I think that the big issue now is Russia. The EU has to have far more honed strategies to counter some of the negative attitudes towards the EU that Russia supports and funds. That is a very urgent problem at this time. Dr James Ker-Lindsay: There is obviously a huge question as to how the European Union operates in the western Balkans in particular. It is very clear that this is an area that cannot be ignored by the European Union. We should be thinking of this as a question of completion of the European Union rather than enlargement. That is an important point to stress: that the European map is not complete without bringing in the western Balkans. We will talk a little more about the geopolitics, which Adam has just brought up, but we also have to bear in mind that making sure that these countries are functioning will help us to deal with a whole range of security issues that we are facing at the moment. The migration crisis is a very clear example of where we need to have the co-operation of western Balkan countries, and indeed all of south-east Europe, including Greece and Turkey, in order to manage these flows. We see here the tip of an iceberg; when you look at the situation in the region, you realise that these are the countries on the front line and they have to manage it. They do not have the resources to do this, and it will create all sorts of tension and turmoil if this is not addressed. There are all sorts of other legacies from the conflicts of the 1990s that have not been fully dealt with yet. We have to bear in mind, for example, religious radicalism in the region. This has been highlighted as a potential problem. A number of fighters from Kosovo and from Bosnia have gone off to join the forces of ISIS in Syria. There are also trafficking issues: drugs trafficking, arms trafficking and people trafficking. These are still prevalent in the region, and we cannot manage any of these without a clear policy perspective for the western Balkans to make sure that all interested parties are co-operating effectively with us in order to manage these security threats. Professor Adam Fagan: I would just like to add, if I may, that it is worth saying from the outset that there has been a process of lesson-learning. The EU strategies for the western Balkans are significantly improved, having built on the knowledge of previous enlargements. Also, the focus on justice and the rule of law is paramount. It is very easy to become rather critical and adopt an approach based on stagnation. The real change is the focus on evidence.

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The EU is absolutely aware of the importance of communication with elites in the western Balkans and giving them an opportunity to continually reflect on their progress through working groups, partnerships and structured dialogue. I did not want to give the impression in my initial comments that there is malaise or stagnation. A lot of improvements are being seen. The challenge is to make sure that these are embedded and wheeled out across different policy areas.

Q139 Lord Risby: Thank you. One of the things that have struck us in our discussions so far is the impact of Germany in many areas of the life of the European Union, not just internally but in foreign policy. Could you comment on whether, and to what extent, that influence impacts on neighbourhood policy? Dr James Ker-Lindsay: Without a shadow of a doubt, Germany is now the key actor in the European Union when it comes to dealing with enlargement issues. It is very telling that, five or 10 years ago, Britain would have played that role; we were front and centre of efforts to promote enlargement. That has fallen by the wayside now, and there are two very clear reasons for that: the internal policy debates in this country, and immigration and freedom of movement, which we know have been conflated into one question and concern for the electorate. We have seen the concern that if we take in the western Balkans, more people will come in and we cannot take it. Sadly, that concern has been allowed to take off, and it is doing a lot of damage, I think. The numbers that we are talking about are very small. If we take in all six countries of the western Balkans, it will be 17 million people. We took in 30 million with Bulgaria and Romania alone. We have passed the threshold at which it is going to matter. I think this is very dangerous. I bring this up because it has meant that we have fallen by the wayside. Interestingly, France is nowhere to be seen. I spoke to a German colleague the other day and one thing we noticed is that there is no debate on the Balkans in France these days. There is no input into policy-making at a European level by French think tanks or academics—they are almost absent. We have created a vacuum which Germany has moved into, very effectively, and is taking the lead on this. Angela Merkel developed the Berlin Process, which has set up a new dialogue between the European Union and key EU members with the countries of the western Balkans. What is particularly telling about this is that it was set up by Germany and Austria. They have now brought in France, interestingly, even though it seems to have gone relatively quiet, and Italy, but Britain is not there. It is a very big question in my mind why we have not got involved in such an obviously beneficial process to set up a dialogue with the western Balkans. My final point on this is that, within the region as well, there is a growing sense of the alienation between Britain and the European Union. These are countries that do not have a lot of diplomatic resources, so they are going to focus them on the European Union countries that they believe are most likely to deliver the result of seeing them join the European Union. They look at the estrangement and they think, “If we are going to start using our resources, it would be much better to send our diplomats and officials to talk to Berlin—win Berlin over, and Vienna will follow”. These are the real targets. There are a number of reasons, but part of the reason why we have seen Germany take this role is because the UK has moved away from it. Professor Adam Fagan: I want to answer the question slightly differently. I agree with everything that James has said, but the easiest way for me to answer it is from the perspective of Bosnia. The Anglo-German initiative has, I think, been one of the most successful initiatives in recent years. It was much criticised, and there has been an awful lot

65 of 309 Professor Adam Fagan and Dr James Ker-Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149) of negative analysis, but as time goes on we are seeing that Germany working with the UK unlocked the stalemate on Bosnia’s progress in moving forward with the enlargement process. From within Bosnia, the view of Germany’s and the UK’s role is very telling. It broke the stalemate but was also warmly welcomed by the Bosnians, who felt that it broke through the blandness of an EU strategy that was seen as being very much bureaucratic and on which no progress was being made on reporting. There was a real appetite for this level of two big powers within the EU deciding that they needed to take control and give some sort of direction. It was difficult at first; there was obviously a certain amount of cynicism about whether this, the latest in a string of initiatives, would work. But 12 months or so on from that initiative, Bosnia looks as though it is ready to apply for membership. There has not been a huge change, but the emphasis on the economy and growth, which Germany and the UK, working together, led, has, I think, made a difference. There is a lot of discussion about the role of Germany, but in the case of Bosnia it was Germany working with the UK. We must not lose sight of these sorts of examples. Rather than emphasise too much the role of Germany as a lone actor in the EU, the case study of Bosnia is very compelling and interesting. Dr James Ker-Lindsay: It is important to differentiate between the grand political position taken by Britain and those taken, for example, by the Foreign Office on the ground. The point that Adam has raised is very important. Bosnia is a very good, if rare, example. However, there are a few others. I would like to note, for example, the role of the British ambassador, Charles Garrett, in Skopje, in Macedonia. There are very deep political problems in that country. That is an example of where Britain, working with other European partners, has been able to step in. Sadly, if we look at the big picture, countries are definitely now beating a path to Germany’s door rather than the UK’s. The Chairman: We come to the third question, which is from Lord Stirrup.

Q140 Lord Stirrup: Europe’s eastern neighbourhood has been identified as a key security challenge to the EU with what has been called the return of geopolitics. As Professor Fagan noted, Russia is increasingly seen as a security threat. Has this changed security environment fostered a shared political vision among Member States in the region or has it accentuated divisions between them? Is Russia a unifying factor or a dividing factor? Professor Adam Fagan: That is a very difficult question to answer. The easiest way to approach it is to focus on what the EU needs to do to counter the influence of Russia. The big issue is communication. The EU has failed to wade in to win citizens of these countries, particularly Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova—the countries that, notwithstanding the current situation in Ukraine, are the front-runners in the neighbourhood. There has been an absolute failure to focus on citizens and the benefits of Europe. Russia emphasises LGBT issues and the idea that Europe is anti-Christian, anti-Orthodox and a challenge to indigenous values. The EU has to respond to that and not by diluting its own core values, but it also has to focus on driving home the benefits to citizens of potential EU membership. I use the word “membership” specifically and deliberately. The time has come to consider whether this group of countries can be taken as a group and whether the Commission should still be treating them as neighbourhood countries. Membership comes with all sorts of connotations and brings with it a very different focus. But we know from the case not just of central and eastern Europe but the Balkans that the golden carrot of membership is what really drives change. We have come to a point where that is worth discussing.

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I have certainly not come across any evidence that individual Member States, whether it be France, Germany or the UK, are pushing a different line from the EU. At the moment, the EU seems to be channelling a common set of policies, but the time has come to reconsider the whole term “neighbourhood”, to think about communication and work on the ground, and to rise to the challenge of Russia’s involvement and the funding that it provides for various campaigns that are very critical of the EU’s influence. The EU must do an awful lot more to promote the benefits of closer engagement with the EU. It is also time to use the regatta principle and inject a degree of competition among these countries, saying that if they make progress here, that will propel them forward to a different kind of relationship with the EU. It is really surprising that the very successful tool that was used throughout the 1990s in central and eastern Europe is not being used in this region. Dr James Ker-Lindsay: The question of Russia’s role in the region is obviously very complicated. It is important to stress that it is quite clear that Russia sees opportunities for mischief-making as things stand. But it is also very important to realise that the situation on the ground is often much more complicated and less clear-cut than is presented externally. I will give you an example of a discussion I had last year with a senior Serbian policymaker about Russia’s business involvement. This person was particularly scathing, saying, “We had to take Russia in, because we needed Moscow’s support on Kosovo. We gave them a strategic stake in energy companies. They have appointed all these directors, who are taking massive salaries, and we do not know who these people are”. Basically, he accused Russia of thievery; nothing more, nothing less. He said that they realised that the better investments are the investments that come from the European Union: it is the Fiat car factory that creates wealth on the ground, not Russian oligarchs buying into energy companies, appointing their mates as directors and then walking off with €20,000 or €30,000 a month in salary. This is the sort of thing that people there realise. It is very complicated. There is a cultural affinity, if you like, but most senior policymakers are very well aware that the real path to prosperity lies with the European Union. You can see this reflected in public opinion. A very interesting poll was published last year asking: do you think Serbia should move closer to Russia or to the EU? If I recall rightly, 54% said that it should move closer to the European Union and 52% said that it should move closer to Russia—quite why it does not add up, I do not know. What was more telling was that when they were asked where they would like their children to live, 70% said the European Union and 17% said Russia. That is really very telling. There is a sense that a certain political kinship might exist but that the real future for the country lies with the European Union. Serbia is the hotspot, if you like. The other concern that we should perhaps be paying attention to is Republika Srpska in Bosnia—although again we have to be very careful not to overstate it—and the Russian influence there. There has been a lot of talk about secession. We need to dampen down that talk, but there is no doubt that there is the possibility that Russia will see this as its best chance for mischief-making. However, we need to be cautious when we are talking about Serbia, which is the main actor in the region where Russia is exerting its influence. Professor Adam Fagan: I would just like to add two things; I agree with most of what James is saying. One is an anecdotal point. When travelling in Bosnia—I spend quite a lot of time in the country—I am always struck by the pragmatism of people. Whatever their views on Russia or negative views of the EU, there is the pragmatic idea that Russia has nothing to offer—

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The Chairman: Can I just press you on that? Obviously in historical terms it is a remarkable set of figures. Russia is Russia, but when they say “the EU”, they do not mean Spain or Ireland actually, they mean Germany. Is not that the case? Professor Adam Fagan: I think they mean the potential access to the single market, and the ability, particularly among young people, to be able to do what the Croats, Bulgarians, Czechs and Slovaks are doing, which is to study, travel and work in the rest of Europe. Bosnians are very conscious of the fact that they are not able to do that at the moment. The Chairman: But when we see these unfortunate people behind the wire in Hungary or somewhere else, wanting to get through, they are not shouting “the EU”; they are shouting “Germany”. That is why I am pressing you on this. Do they really mean the European Union, or do they mean Germany? Professor Adam Fagan: What the people behind the barricades who have traversed the Mediterranean want is very different from what the people in candidate countries, or indeed in the neighbourhood, want. As to whether people in Bosnia, to whom we were referring, identify Germany as being precisely the place where they would like to work, live and study, I do not think it is entirely that at all. Many of them would also like to come to places across Europe, whether it be to study in Italian universities or to work in London or Paris. It is that very strong pragmatism among the young generation to be Europeans. They see the prosperity and are frustrated by the slow pace of progress, but they shrewdly recognise that Russia offers rhetoric but very little else. The Chairman: We are running a bit behind schedule, but it is very interesting. Baroness Armstrong. Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I actually think they have answered my question. The Chairman: In that case, we will move on. Lord Dubs: My question has been answered as well. The Chairman: Perhaps we are running ahead of schedule.

Q141 Lord Triesman: Chairman, if we are running slightly ahead of time, may I ask a quick question? I was very interested in what was said about turning to Russia for input into businesses. Is any part of that because, when compared with Europe, the Russian Government, essentially through their own owned banks, reduce the costs of capital? Presumably China would reduce the cost of capital even further. Is this in part commercial judgments that would probably be made by anybody seeking investment? Dr James Ker-Lindsay: In the example I gave of Russian strategic investment in a very key area of the Serbian economy, there is a realisation in Belgrade that they needed to do this in order to buy Russia’s support over Kosovo, which is a key issue. I remember when this happened. To hear Serbian decision-makers saying now, “We are lumbered with this agreement and we are not happy with it”, shows that we are still in a situation, when we talk about Serbia, where we have given Russian political leaders the opportunity to get involved because Serbia still needs Russia’s support over Kosovo. This issue has not been entirely dealt with. That means that there is room for leverage. To be frank, unwittingly we created another opportunity this summer involving the Srebrenica resolution at the United Nations. Serbia wanted the resolution vetoed and Russia provided that veto. You can bet that Russia will, somewhere along the way, make its demands as to how that is repaid. That is a very disturbing element, and we need to be very cautious about opening up these opportunities for involvement. The Serbian decision-makers, wherever possible, want to look to the

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European Union. We do not want to be creating circumstances where, inadvertently even, it is better to have to take political payback. Whether they make it cheaper I do not know, but they exact a price politically if not economically. Professor Adam Fagan: I will make a very brief point. I am not an economist by any stretch of the imagination, but from the perspective of Bosnia I think that the reference point for what they want for their economy is central and eastern Europe in the early 1990s and the flood of western European capital, businesses and investment—predominantly German—in Sarajevo. They know that that happened and that what kick-started the whole process of EU enlargement, and ultimately membership, was that flow of capital and investment. It was on the back of that that political, social and economic reform really gained a foothold. Young people, again, are very aware that that is what is different in their country. It may be very different in Banja Luka and Republika Srpska, but from my experience in the country, that is what they desire.

Q142 Lord Dubs: There is a bit of my original question that I would like to dwell on. You argue that enlargement is still a real issue for the western Balkans. I think that is a fair statement. Moving further east, if we take Ukraine, Moldova and so on, is enlargement still on the table there or should we take it off the table and look at other means? Are there other things that we can do to provide incentives for them to move westwards, such as a customs union and so on? Professor Adam Fagan: It is important to say that enlargement has never been on the table. That is the point that I was trying to make in my earlier comment. There was an insinuation that if they behaved themselves as neighbours, they might be offered enlargement further down the line. That was probably prudent at the time, because at that point no former communist country had entered, but we are significantly further along now. There needs to be clear recognition that in countries such as Georgia there is a very high level of support for EU membership and enlargement. Obviously the pace of progress is patchy, but, as I said, the EU needs to move away from talking about these countries as neighbourhood countries and talk about them as potential candidates. We have the tried and tested tools of carrots and sticks, and certain criteria have to be met. I am not suggesting for one moment that we should change those criteria. On the other hand, the idea of neighbourhood as being second best is interpreted as precisely that: that it is not membership. From a Georgian perspective, the view is, “What more is there to be gained from us undertaking reforms? Where is the ceiling?” They are getting certain benefits, aid and assistance. Without the golden carrot of membership, where is the incentive? It is about putting enlargement on the table, not for all of these countries, but offering it. One final point: there is a very pragmatic way of looking at this. Because the countries of the western Balkans are not making startling progress, notwithstanding the recent progress of Serbia, there is very little to be lost. Georgia, arguably, is not a million miles away from some countries that are candidates. There needs to be some innovative thinking about how we deal with countries that are currently in one category but have the potential to make more progress, and countries in a different category, such as Macedonia, that are really not making any progress. That is not lost on the Georgians. They are saying, “Why should be in division 2 when Bosnia or Kosovo is in division 1?”

Q143 Baroness Coussins: Thank you. What you have just said leads very neatly to my question. We have heard from a number of other witnesses about the southern neighbourhood. They have said that a revised neighbourhood policy should move away from the one-size-fits-all approach and differentiate more between the countries in that

69 of 309 Professor Adam Fagan and Dr James Ker-Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149) neighbourhood. It should look either at clustering them together in smaller groups, or even at taking a country-by-country, tailor-made approach. Would this be a useful model for the eastern neighbourhood as well? If so, how would you differentiate between countries and policies towards them? Professor Adam Fagan: I absolutely agree that that is how the European Union should proceed. What amazes me is the progress that was made in dealing with the western Balkan states in terms of differentiation and being much more robust in specifying the priorities. For example, chapters 23 and 24 emphasise justice and rights. All that knowledge demystifies for these countries what they are expected to do and wades through the structured dialogue to say, “We’re going to help you and provide you with the evidence of where the shortcomings are”, as opposed to what happened five or 10 years ago, when an annual report was produced that recorded no progress. An awful lot of progress has been made in how the EU deals with the western Balkans, which could be ported to the southern and eastern neighbourhoods, saying, “We need differentiated strategies”. The EU has done that with some countries; it has exercised a high degree of pragmatism that is quite remarkable. One of the criticisms that I and others made 15 years ago is that the EU is obsessed with one-size-fits-all and shows no pragmatism. The EU has really learnt that lesson and is much more pragmatic. It is much more focused, rather than taking a scattergun approach that says: you can open any chapter of the acquis but you have to open chapters 23 and 24, it must be evidence-based, there must be impact assessments, and there must be structured dialogue. All those tools are in the tool box and could be so easily applied in the neighbourhood. The problem at the moment is precisely what I said a moment or two ago: the neighbourhood framing is the stumbling block.

Q144 The Chairman: In southern Europe, there was no great bear in the background. In the area we are talking about, there is a great bear in the background, so to what extent should be we taking account of Russian interests, and how do you think the EU should react if Russia is hostile to the sort of things you are talking about? Professor Adam Fagan: James might have something to say about the bear in the south. I think there is probably a bigger bear knocking around in the south in some respects. To deal with Russia, there is a very salient point about what the EU must do. The EU has been very timid; it has been treading very carefully, for obvious security and strategic reasons to do with not upsetting Russia. However, Russia has moved into a very different set of strategies and is funding and supporting an anti-EU movement. There is a political rhetoric that is chipping away at impressive support bases in these individual countries. The only thing that the EU can do is counter it and work through civil society to build alliances with pro-EU, pro-reform coalitions and get to citizens. It is not doing that at all. There is very little evidence in any of the eastern neighbourhood countries that that is taking place. That is the only way to counter the rhetoric that, “If we join the EU it will all be about drugs, homosexuality and debauchery”. Given the simplicity of the Russian message, it is quite surprising that there is not a much more robust response. Dr James Ker-Lindsay: Those are very good points about how Russia is approaching the matter. I think we have seen a fundamental transformation, from five or 10 years ago, in how Russia approaches the question of the European Union. At one point there was a clear Russian interest in keeping NATO out but there was, interestingly, also a clear Russian interest in getting these countries into the European Union. The European Union is a major trading bloc. You want allies sitting around a decision-making table, making sure that any agreements you reach are as favourable as possible to Moscow. For a long time we worked

70 of 309 Professor Adam Fagan and Dr James Ker-Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149) under the assumption that Russia was opposed to EU and NATO membership. It was not; it was just NATO. I think we have now seen a turning on that; they have become interlinked in Moscow’s mind and we are now starting to see much more aggressive Russian actions against the EU as well. I think Adam mentioned that. There is a cultural element to this. It appears that Russia is funding bodies in the countries of the western Balkans that are sending out the message that EU liberal values are out there to bring down the Orthodox Christian culture. That is a very powerful message in certain circles. However, we have also seen it over the migration crisis, for example. It was very telling that the Russian ambassador in Belgrade said on television and in the media, “Look at all these people. They are making their way up into the European Union, but you watch: the EU will at some point close its borders and they will be left in Serbia. It will be your problem. Look at what the EU is doing—it will sell you out. It’s guaranteed”. This is starting to drip through and is a very real danger that we must confront. Russia is trying to poison attitudes in the region against the EU, where it sees opportunities. To my mind, that is a real concern. Professor Adam Fagan: May I add two brief points about EU strategy and the instruments that it uses in the neighbourhood? Beyond better communication, the EU must allow these countries to exercise more authority when setting strategies and priorities. There is a tendency to infantilise these Governments and countries, and that is pernicious. The other thing is much more nuanced language, because pushing democracy does not work. It does not mobilise and galvanise citizens on the side of the EU in the way that it did in Czechoslovakia, Poland or Hungary in 1990. The research that we have conducted in Georgia and Ukraine suggests that it is good governance that citizens associate the EU with. The EU needs to play to that much more. Of course democracy is at the heart of what the EU wants from its prospective members and is core to its very foundation. However, on the ground in the neighbourhood, it means doing something about corruption and good governance. Russia plays on the myth of the so-called values of permissive democracy. The EU should be talking about governance. The Chairman: Lord Horam, quite a lot of your question has been covered.

Q145 Lord Horam: Briefly, to come back to the instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy, we are constantly told that it has quite a lot of resources behind it. You mentioned extensively how you want them used, but are those resources there, and are they being used at all effectively? Professor Adam Fagan: They are there. I speak only from my experience of Georgia; I have spent time there but not in any of the other neighbourhood countries. There is certainly resource there, but I do not think it is always effectively deployed. There is a big problem with absorption capacity. The EU aid cannot be absorbed. There is an enormous time lag; they are still trying to implement projects that were awarded four, five or six years ago. The EU has strategies under its belt that it used in south-east Europe and central-eastern Europe to facilitate the absorption of the aid that it has earmarked and it could do more on that. One very good example is environmental regulation. Part of the problem is that the cost of compliance for companies is prohibitive. Therefore, the initiatives and funding for the partnership schemes trying to improve environmental governance cannot be allocated and are not effective because companies need support. There is a tendency to deploy funds rather narrowly without anticipating unintended consequences or unrealised effects. There is also a need to bring in the local voice and talk to pro-reform civil society organisations and allow them more autonomy in setting priorities for funding. There is an infantilisation, and that is where there has not been enough learning. There is still a tendency for Brussels to

71 of 309 Professor Adam Fagan and Dr James Ker-Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149) set priorities and say, “This must be funded and this is the focus of the funding”, without really valuing the voice of local pro-reform networks. Much more money needs to be directed to communication. At the moment, the funding for communication going to European movements needs to be a much larger-scale endeavour.

Q146 Lord Balfe: If we could turn to Turkey, which surely must be the biggest disaster in European policy. We have been negotiating with Turkey since Turgut Özal’s time. Some would argue that we have now lost any significant leverage and that the recent election does not advance us in that way. What should we do to get it back on track? Should we face the fact that Germany does not want another big country in the EU and/or use Cyprus and any other device to prolong the agony for Turkey, or should we try to get it back on track and be realistic and try to get Turkish accession going? Dr James Ker-Lindsay: I have followed the European Union’s relationship with Turkey for 25 years now. Like many others, I was a long-time supporter of Turkish membership. I certainly have no truck with the idea—this existential debate—that Turkey is not like Europe. Europe is a heterogeneous continent; I did not have much time for the question of what makes Greeks like Latvians rather than Turks. Having said all that, I am now a staunch opponent of Turkish membership of the European Union. We cannot conceivably begin to think of Turkey joining the European Union under this current Government. Erdogan has taken Turkey in a completely different direction. Lord Balfe: May I intervene? If the current Government had lost the election, would your views be different? Dr James Ker-Lindsay: When you look at the political scene in Turkey, it is very difficult to see how you could have created a functioning coalition. I had not believed that Turkey had passed the point of no return. After this election, I really do worry that, five years from now, there might have been such a fundamental transformation of Turkish society that it will not be ready. I certainly do not think that we can seriously consider it—certainly not under this Government, looking at everything that has happened since May 2013 and the Gezi uprisings and the way the Government have responded. By any reasonable measure, we should not be talking about Turkish membership of the European Union. It should be off the table. Having said that, I am acutely aware that we are left with a problem. Turkey is, technically, a candidate. It is a country that has strategic significance. Is this a country that we want to upset? We know that Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a very unstable character. I have worked long enough in south-east Europe, and there is a principle that I often like to bring up called inat. To anyone from south-east Europe, that is well understood. It does not have a direct English translation but we can think of it as cutting your nose off to spite your face. It means that people will do things in order to make a political point; it is an honour point. This is the worry that exists in the European Union: if you push Erdogan too far, he could take a substantial step in order to get back at the European Union. I do not think that anyone wants that. We are left with the huge problem of what to do with Turkey. This is not a country that we can conceivably think of as being a member of the European Union. Lord Balfe: But if they change their Government, we could. Dr James Ker-Lindsay: If they change their Government and roll back a lot of the illiberal measures that have been taken, potentially we could. But I think that we are moving further and further away. The culture of the country is becoming more and more embedded. That nice western liberal elite that had for so long controlled the country is fighting a rearguard action now.

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Lord Balfe: It is called the military. Dr James Ker-Lindsay: No, it was far more than that. If you were to go Istanbul and speak to the business leaders and intellectuals, you would have seen that these were the people who very much had a full understanding of how the European Union worked. You would see them interact and know that, at that level, Turkey was a very European country. But now look at the way that it is acting. There was a case last week of two boys, aged 12 and 13, who are up on lèse-majesté charges for insulting the President because they tore down an electoral poster: children on trial for political dissent. Lord Balfe: They are not on trial. Dr James Ker-Lindsay: Well they have— Lord Balfe: I think we should call this a draw. We fundamentally disagree. The Chairman: I am worried about time. Can I ask Lord Triesman to ask his question?

Q147 Lord Triesman: Professor Fagan, a number of people have advocated that EU action is now more easily conducted by small groups of states within the EU, rather than the EU as a whole, using the Commission instruments and external services. What is the potential for that in the western Balkans? Professor Adam Fagan: I go back to the first point I made about the Anglo-German initiative in Bosnia. There were huge benefits in that. I disagree with the idea that this is a recent innovation. Go back to the enlargements of the 1980s and the agency of individual states or groups of countries; look at the 1990s and Germany’s support for particular countries of the former Yugoslavia, such as Croatia. It has always been so, and the potential is huge. That is partly because, from the perspective of candidates, following year after year of progress reports and bureaucratic engagement with the Commission, the injection of realpolitik to deal with the Government of a powerful state is often very welcome. It feels like the unblocking of a stalemate. Stalemate is the reality: even for countries that make good progress, it is very slow. That language of initiative and thinking differently to try to unlock the stalemate and inject a degree of pragmatism is to be welcomed. We agree on most things, but I fundamentally disagree with James on Turkey. I would just like to say something on that. The Chairman: We have one more question on the list, so please be brief. Professor Adam Fagan: There has never been a more compelling time to keep EU membership for Turkey on the table. The problem with Turkey is not that its progress has stalled but unfortunately that there has been significant backsliding, particularly around the rule of law. That is no reason for giving up—I am not suggesting that that is what James was saying. The gauntlet must be thrown down. The EU is very good at doing this, at saying, “This is what we need you to do, so let us have a road map”. Maybe this sounds naive, and I do not have James’s experience on Turkey, but there is plenty of evidence, from much smaller countries such as Slovakia and elsewhere, to show that throwing down the gauntlet works. The EU must say what it is that Turkey needs to do in order to make some progress. Getting back on track could unlock all sorts of political change in Turkey. The liberal voices within Turkey need Europe more than ever as a normative benchmark for where things have degenerated so greatly. The Chairman: This leads rather to the next question.

73 of 309 Professor Adam Fagan and Dr James Ker-Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149)

Q148 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: Yes it does. You have made very clear your views on the candidacy of Turkey for the EU. In recent months, the Heads of State of the EU have beaten their way to Ankara, as have the directorates and other parts of the European Commission. European Union instruments have been offering all sorts of things to Ankara. Would you agree that that is a consequence of a lack of strategic policy being formulated over recent years? Would you see the present refugee crisis as a trigger for creating the strategic policy that is needed, or would you see it on the contrary as diverting people’s attention from a strategic relationship with Turkey? Dr James Ker-Lindsay: It is quite clear that we do not know how to deal with Turkey. Recently, what has been seen in more and more Commission statements is an emphasis on partnership with Turkey and less on the question of Turkish membership of the European Union. Then, out of the blue, we had this comment about how they were going to unlock four chapters with Turkey. I have looked at Turkey and the western Balkans for a long time. It makes a mockery of the EU process. We are now expecting the latest progress reports to be published. We do not quite know when that will be, but we are trying to take a hard line with the western Balkan countries. I completely agree with Adam; we have seen results in smaller countries, but Turkey is not a small country. It is a country that believes that it is the perfect equal of Germany when it comes to joining the European Union. It is not willing and ready to make the sorts of concessions that we need it to make in order to make sure that it can join the European Union. What are we going to do? Will we produce progress reports, year in, year out, to say to Macedonia, “You are not fulfilling media freedom rights, so we are going to rescind the recommendation to start accession talks with you”? That was the statement in last year’s progress report. Turkey is doing far worse, but for political reasons we are going to keep it going. That gets read by other countries. They see this double standard, and it undermines our ability to bring about change in the smaller countries, which I think we should be focusing on in the western Balkans. We need to think seriously about what we do with Turkey. I do not see how EU accession is now going to bring about any fundamental reforms. Erdogan wants to say, “We are an EU candidate”, and keep it on the table for the meanwhile, because it serves his political purpose. But there is no way he is going to be willing to make the fundamental reforms that the EU wants to see him make. We have seen him go too far in the other direction. The real problem is that we are undermining the credibility of the process across the rest of the European Union by turning a blind eye to Turkey or suddenly saying that we are going to open up chapters when quite clearly the conditions in which to do so are not ready. The Chairman: You may not agree, Professor Fagan. Professor Adam Fagan: No, I do not agree. I think the strength of EU enlargement has always been precisely that degree of pragmatism and an ability to use politics and geopolitics to favour some countries at certain times and make decisions that veer from a rational notion that somehow countries can only enter when they have met all sorts of conditions. I will point to Bulgaria and Romania. Of course, there were difficulties; there was a need to intervene after accession to ensure that there was implementation. But those decisions were taken for compelling reasons. We start from the premise that countries, including Turkey, would be better in the EU. If that is our guiding principle, we must do everything not to lose sight of that and to use the mechanisms and strategies that are in place. Of course it is not going to happen in a short time. I am not suggesting that. The opening of four or five chapters is significant, because for those in Turkey who have lost enthusiasm for EU accession, it is precisely because chapters are not being opened and closed. If the EU picks

74 of 309 Professor Adam Fagan and Dr James Ker-Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149) the chapters very carefully, in consultation with Ankara, it could make a huge difference to instigating a liberal reform agenda where that has almost disappeared.

Q149 The Chairman: Can I ask you one question, which will have to be the last? Do you think that the European Union has the appetite any more to take on the problems of a new member, whether it is a smaller country, let alone a larger one? There is a big difference between a large and a small country. It is one thing for Mr Orban to kick over the traces in Hungary and another for Mr Erdogan to do it in a country that is however many times larger. Very briefly, because we have to set up a videolink with America, do you think that the European Union is in practice capable of or open to enlargement? Professor Adam Fagan: I will answer very briefly. Had you asked me that question six months ago, I would have said probably not. In the light of what has happened over the summer, I would say yes. Angela Merkel’s activities in Ankara are indicative of that. That does not mean that there is no recognition of the huge costs involved, but it has brought the importance of taking EU membership for Turkey seriously back into the mainstream debate. Dr James Ker-Lindsay: It is very telling that Angela Merkel is on record very recently as saying that she does not believe in Turkish membership. This is just straight-out politics. It is giving Turkey a little of what it wanted going into the elections. There is no intention to take in Turkey. To put it facetiously perhaps, if Turkey were not a candidate, would we be having a conversation about whether we would be opening candidacy talks with the country? Not a hope. Why do we not extend that to Russia or to Libya? If we believe that the better thing is that we can bring about fundamental reform by bringing them closer to the European Union, why do we not open the gates and let everyone in? That is a very troubling approach to take at the moment. But we do have a set of countries for which there is a vital argument to speed up the process and work closely with them: that is the western Balkans. What we do beyond that is troublesome, and we need to make a break between candidacy for the western Balkans and candidacy for Turkey. Turkey is a very different problem that we are going to have to learn to confront in very different ways. The Chairman: I am advised that we really must finish. Thank you both very much. It was interesting to hear where there was discordance between you.

75 of 309 Dr Catherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Nottingham— Written Evidence (FSP0008)

Dr Catherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Nottingham—Written Evidence (FSP0008)

Two preliminary points:

1. The new European Security Strategy (ESS) should be renamed the ‘European Development and Security Strategy’ (EDSS), as development is vital to guarantee security in the long term, and as the European Union (EU) presents the advantage of conducting extensive and complementary work in both development and security issues. The term ‘EDSS’ is used in this document. 2. The United Kingdom has a crucial role to play in the drafting of the EDSS, as it is one of the most important states, together with France and Germany, in terms of initiators of EU foreign policy. In addition, British and French cooperation is key to an independent, vocal and effective EU foreign policy, which would also make the EU credible vis-à-vis the United States, China, Russia and all the developing countries.8

Why the EU should make Africa a priority in the new European Development and Security Strategy

The EDSS must include Africa for six reasons related to: legality, history, ethical ideas, security interests, economic interests, and prestige. Legally, the EU must contribute to the eradication of world poverty, as 28 Member States have signed up to this, and they should honour their contract with the EU. In 2000, the European Council adopted a joint statement with the Commission on the European Development Policy in which it confirmed the principal objective of the Community development policy as the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty.9

Historically, the Robert Schuman declaration of 1950, which was the founding text of the EU, stated that Europe had to produce coal and steel, and that with increased resources, Europe would be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent. Ethically, European values stand for the respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights. These values should be protected for both Europeans and non-Europeans.

Africa, together with the Middle East, should be the two main priorities of the new EDSS in order to protect European security interests. The EU should contribute to peace mediation in conflicts in these two regions to prevent wars, poverty, instability, extremism, transnational organised crime, drugs and arms trafficking, and migration. It should act now, because in 2050 there will be two billion Africans, and if poverty and lack of security are still rife in some African states, they will migrate to other regions in the world, including Europe.

8 Catherine Gegout (2010) European Foreign and Security Policy: States, Power, Institutions and American Hegemony, University of Toronto Press, p. 195. 9 European Union (2000) ‘Joint Statement on EC Development Policy, Council and Commission’. http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/lex/en/council20001110_en.htm.

76 of 309 Dr Catherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Nottingham— Written Evidence (FSP0008) Stability in Africa means economic opportunities for European companies. These opportunities can rise if the EU helps fight money laundering, tax evasion, corruption and illegal trade. In 2008, developing countries lost more than $1.25 trillion due to illegal activities, whereas at the same time, only $620 billion of international aid and foreign direct investment flowed into such countries.10 In a context of rising Chinese economic presence in Africa, it is important for the EU to keep its strong trade and development aid links with Africa.

Finally, by giving development aid, acting diplomatically in conflicts, intervening military in African states, and promoting international law, the EU enhances its credibility in terms of hard and soft power in African states, the Arab world, the United States and the United Nations.

Why Africa has become less of a priority in the last ten years

Despite these six reasons for focusing on Africa, EU member states have been conducting deliberate abstentionism in policy decisions on Africa. For most EU states, Africa is not a priority due to the following. First, EU states prefer to concentrate on economic and political problems within the EU and its neighbourhood. Second, Europe’s trade with Africa used to represent five per cent of Europe’s world trade in 1980, but it has represented less than three per cent since 1990. Third, conflicts in Africa imply costs for the EU, if it decides to intervene militarily in these conflicts. Intervention is costly financially, therefore difficult to justify within Europe at a time of economic recession and crises in EU states such as Greece. Intervention entails serious human cost as it endangers the lives of European troops.

Policy recommendations on how the EU should make Africa a priority in the new European Development and Security Strategy

The EU should be committed to achieving the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) discussed at the United Nations in September 2015.11 It should improve both its foreign policy decision-making process, and its foreign policies, and include the following points in the new EDSS.

Concerning the foreign policy decision-making process:

The EDSS should include recommendations on themes to address, on agents who should be present in the different negotiations related to EU foreign policy, on capabilities to use in security affairs, and on the evaluation of the impact of EU policies.

1. A comprehensive framework

The EU should be committed to implementing the comprehensive framework of 2014, which should bring together all relevant domains of EU external action, including diplomacy, security, development, humanitarian assistance, justice and migration, at headquarters and on

10 Saferworld (2015) ‘Addressing transnational drivers of conflict’. http://www.saferworld.org.uk/what/transnational- conflict-drivers. 11 United Nations (2015) ‘Sustainable Development’, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html.

77 of 309 Dr Catherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Nottingham— Written Evidence (FSP0008) the ground.12 Presently, when policy decisions are made on relations with African states, officials in the Commission’s directorate general for trade have practically no contact with officials in the Commission’s directorate general for development and cooperation.

2. Partnership in negotiations

The EU should be committed to including local communities and trade unions, with a balanced representation of men and women, in all policy negotiations. At the moment, negotiations only take place between officials in European and African states and organisations, and with an overwhelming presence of men. The EU has made clear that it wants to involve the civil society, and that ‘women's and girls’ rights, gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls … should be strengthened and coherent in all areas without exception’.13

3. Multilateralism

The EU should be committed to inviting American and Chinese partners to take part in military and counter-terrorism operations in Africa, and allow their participation in meetings on development aid and trade organised both in Brussels and in African states. At the present time, the EU, the US and China are only cooperating in the Gulf of Aden.

4. Leadership

The EU should be committed to supporting the High Representative both politically and financially in his/her mediation role. It should encourage the High Representative to reinstate special representatives in states with problems of instability and conflict. At the moment, only three representatives deal with African affairs, which encompass the Horn of Africa, Human Rights, and the Sahel. The EU should expand the network of its representatives to deal with: security and gender, development and gender, trade and gender, the African Union, West Africa, the Southern Mediterranean region, Libya, and the Great Lakes. EU special representatives are an important instrument for mediation in diplomacy.

5. Capabilities

The EU should be committed to using both the armies of EU states and EU battlegroups. For the moment, the EU has not yet used its own battlegroups. In addition, the EU should be committed to creating a fund for its military operations and its security relations with African security organisations which would be independent from regular development aid. Present funds for the African Peace Facility come from the EU’s development aid budget (that is, the European Development Fund).

6. Evaluation of the impact of EU policies

The EU should be committed to making regular independent and fair evaluations of its foreign policies. Current evaluations can be inaccurate, as the EU uses either EU personnel

12 European Union (2014) ‘Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach’. ‘http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf. 13 European Union (2005) ‘European Consensus on Development’. http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf; European Union (2015) ‘Council Conclusions on Gender in Development’. p. 4. http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9242-2015-INIT/en/pdf.

78 of 309 Dr Catherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Nottingham— Written Evidence (FSP0008) or external experts who can choose to ignore the negative impact of EU policies in their reports.

Concerning foreign policies:

The new EDSS should include recommendations on security policies. However, as present military action is like a plaster on a broken arm, the EDSS should also include recommendations on trade and aid policies, and respect for international law.

1. Security

The EU should be committed to answering every request of troop deployment made by the United Nations. The response should occur within a maximum period of one month. The deployment should last as long as it is deemed necessary by the United Nations. Until now, EU states have been reluctant to deploy troops in Africa, and EU military intervention has been extremely limited in time (short-term operations) and space (operations confined to a small geographic area) in African states.14

The EU should be committed to training civil and police forces and law officials (both men and women) in African states to ensure the security of women and children in conflict areas. The EU should continue to be active in financing the African Union, and training its troops.

2. Trade

The EU should make sure that its trade agreements with African states include a strategy for development.

The EU should be committed to regulating illegal and legal commercial activities which are detrimental to development, and carried out by non-EU and EU citizens on the EU territory, and by EU citizens outside the EU territory. It should:

 prosecute leaders who have invested illegal funds on European territory.  act against hedge funds in Europe.  impose sanctions on European companies which damage the environment, and do not adhere to the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); and praise those that protect the environment and promote CSR principles. CSR includes the respect for responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries, and forests.15  require all companies (banks, telecommunications and infrastructure companies, and not only companies which focus on resource extraction such as oil, diamonds, gold, and the ‘3T minerals’ of tin, tungsten, and tantalum) to make public both their contracts and the names of their beneficial owners, and make them accountable.  tax multinational companies, and redistribute the funds to local Small and Medium Enterprises in African states.

3. Aid

14 Catherine Gegout (2009) ‘The West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1996–2006)’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, n. 2, pp. 231-244. 15 Food and Agriculture Organisation (2014) ‘Principles for responsible agriculture and food investments are approved’. http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/260518/icode/

79 of 309 Dr Catherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Nottingham— Written Evidence (FSP0008)

The EU should meet its commitment to achieve the UN goal of Overseas Development Aid (ODA) reaching 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI). At the moment, it is 0.43%. The EU should praise states which exceed 0.7% GNI (in 2015: Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark and the United Kingdom), and shame those which reduced their ODA (in 2015: France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). It should continue to give aid in grants as well as loans.

The EU should encourage all forms of aid, and not only focus on aid to states. It should focus its development aid directly on citizens in African states, both men and women. The EU should enhance the technical and financial capabilities of local communities, and again focus on both men and women within those communities, on their health, education, housing and sanitation.

The EU should continue to support private sector development, and it should concentrate on support for the creation of a private sector in the poorest developing states, especially to develop agriculture and industrialisation.16

The EU should continue to encourage states in Africa and the developing world to have effective social protection systems.17 It should encourage states and European companies to adopt a minimum living wage for employees both in and outside the EU. It could for instance give a special label to companies which do this.

The EU should facilitate the flow of remittances through European banks, as this is an important and direct form of aid to citizens in African states.

4. Respect and promotion of international law

The EU and its member states should continue to encourage states in Africa and elsewhere in the world to sign and ratify the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). EU states have not systematically supported the work of the ICC.18

The EU should take the initiative for international negotiations on the reduction of arms sales by all states within and outside Europe, and encourage other international actors to do the same.19 It should continue to encourage states to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty of 2013. The ATT was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2013, and aims to establish common international standards for regulating international trade in conventional arms, and prevent the illicit trade of these arms.

The EU should support negotiations wanted by the G77, a group of 130 states, on general tax standards with all developing and developed states in the world. At the moment, negotiations are conducted by developed states in the OECD. The EU has released a blacklist of tax havens, and it should clearly show its continued commitment to the fight against tax havens.

16 European Union (2014) ‘Communication on “A Stronger Role of the Private Sector in Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Developing Countries”’. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0263&from=EN. 17 European Union (2012) ‘Council conclusions on Social Protection in European Union Development Cooperation’. ‘http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132875.pdf. 18 Catherine Gegout (2013) ‘The International Criminal Court: limits, potential and conditions for the promotion of justice and peace’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, n. 5, pp. 800-818. 19 Catherine Gegout (forthcoming) Why Europe Intervenes in Africa: Security, Prestige, Vestiges of Colonialism, Hurst.

80 of 309 The German Marshall Fund of the United States—Written Evidence (FSP0021)

The German Marshall Fund of the United States—Written Evidence (FSP0021)

Summary The following paragraphs address a number of questions asked by the House of Lords committee on the process and focus of the exercise which the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) is carrying out with the aim of producing an ‘EU global strategy on foreign and security policy’.

The main arguments developed are:  the analysis and process carried out are appropriate and pertinent to the current environment. The exercise in itself has the potential to support further cooperation on foreign policy matters at a time when it is increasingly evident that member states cannot address complexity alone, yet are politically less motivate to work together.  The exercise will address issues of capabilities, which is understood here to include institutional capabilities and the degree to which the Lisbon Treaty changes have overcome previous institutional challenges, as well as capabilities of the toolkit. While the latter can be improved, doing so requires better working procedures among the institutions, addressing the governance challenge of devising and implementing ‘comprehensive’ external policies. The EU ideally placed to do so, together with the member states.  Alongside EU institutions, member states need to move closer on their strategic assessments of the global environment. Underpinning the capabilities is the ability to develop more a common understanding of international developments. It is in this sphere that a greater strategic convergence is needed; improved capabilities will follow

Changing global environment and EU interests

Inquiry questions:  Is the High Representative’s report the right basis on which to draft the strategy proper?  The High Representative sets out a changed and more threatening global environment. In this new environment, what are the EU’s strategic interests? Do they coincide with the UK’s strategic interests?  Is the EU ready and capable to respond to the new security environment? What are the opportunities that it presents for the Union?  The High Representative, endorsed by the European Council, calls for an “EU global strategy on foreign and security policy.” Is the EU a global power? Is the High Representative too ambitious and if so, where, and on what, should the EU focus?

Answers 1. The High Representative’s analysis of the changing global environment, the implications for the EU and its first census of EU tools is an informed and informative document which correctly captures the major challenges for European states and societies. The analysis of global trends is extensively based on major recent research-based assessments carried out

81 of 309 The German Marshall Fund of the United States—Written Evidence (FSP0021) by consortia of research institutes for the EU. There are two areas which could be further explored. The first pertains to the analysis of the global environment: the document insufficiently explores the complex relationship between domestic and international societies,, both in terms of trends and events and in terms how this affects decision-making. One important consequence of globalization and democratic deliberation is that foreign policy is no longer a domain reservé of an informed elite: policy is shaped by a broader and often cacophonous set of influences which make ‘strategy’ far harder to design and to implement.

2. The second area refers to the ability of the European Union to respond to these challenges. While the document recognizes the difficulties in ‘coordination’ among the member states, it underestimates that the political reasons for these difficulties are deeper than ‘coordination’ issues and refer to enduring and strong national perceptions of international events, of the so-called ‘national interest’, and of the opportunity of cooperating with other EU member states in responding to international events. In other words, the differences among EU member states on foreign and security matter pose continuous challenges not merely in coordinating responses, but in generating commonly shared understanding of international developments and challenges. Continuing insistence and arguments about divergent national and European interests reiterate those divergences, undermining the ability of EU institutions and member states to understand current international developments concertedly and to devise responses as a consequence of such common exercise (which need to preclude member states carrying out their own national assessment in parallel to contributing to a common European analysis).

3. The analysis of the global environment in itself, indeed, gives a strong justification of the need for EU member states to work together more closely on foreign and security policy and for this reason the High Representative’s exercise is an important, if ambitious, attempt to address persistent weaknesses of the EU’s external action. However diverse the positions and interests of member states, they are closer to each other than with any other international actor. Secondly, the nature of the challenges outlined in the HR’s analysis clearly highlight that they cannot be addressed by member states alone but require multilevel governance and a plethora of different tools and resources.

4. Alone the EU is not prepared to respond to the changing security environment, but together with its member states and through existing security structures and institutions it can make far greater a contribution to global peace. Perhaps never before has the evidence for the need for a stronger EU in the international arena been so compelling. Similarly, the domestic consequences of insufficient collective European capacity to respond to international crises have rarely been so evident. The most recent refugee crisis encapsulates all the current challenges: it is the consequence of the international community’s failure to prevent the deterioration of the war in Syria, its impact is felt directly in European societies, and member states divided responses further undermined the ability to address the challenge.

5. Seen from this perspective, it is hard to see how the UK’s strategic interest can diverge significantly from those of the other member states. As a member of the UN Security Council and with a legacy of global power, the UK (as France) will always have strong national interpretations of international developments. In the two decades since the EU formulated its Common Foreign and Security Policy, Britain’s distinctive global role has not been negatively affected by EU developments. Conversely, the UK’s national interest has

82 of 309 The German Marshall Fund of the United States—Written Evidence (FSP0021) been well served when Britain worked effectively with and through the EU, such as in the case of the Balkans, EU enlargement policy, negotiations with Iran, supporting transition in Burma, coordinating sanctions. If the HR’s exercise will serve the purpose of persuading the member states that it is to their advantage to cooperate further under the EU umbrella on international matters and that their interests are best served also through the EU, it will have been a worthwhile exercise.

6. A final reason to seek greater strategic convergence lies in the global reach, presence, and projection of Europe. There is no doubt that the EU is a global power, where power is intended in non-military terms. This does not mean that the EU has a ‘global strategy on foreign and security policy’. The wording chosen is perhaps not the most fortunate and should be interpreted in terms of ambition: Europeans cannot afford not to have global policies and presence also on foreign and security matters. This does not mean that the EU will be equally present and engaged through foreign and security policy with every corner of the globe.

Capabilities and Capacities

Inquiry questions

 What are the EU and Member States’ most effective and useful foreign policy instruments? Are they fit for purpose? Are they being used effectively? What structural reforms are required in order to make the EU’s foreign policy work more effective?  How would you assess the diplomatic and intelligence capacities of the EU and Member States? Does the Union have the expertise and capacity within its institutions and national foreign services to respond to a more complex and complicated security environment?

Answers 7. The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009, produced significant reform to improve the foreign policy toolkit, yet the implementation of such innovation has been extremely uneven. There is scope to improve the functioning of the existing toolbox, but to ensure their functioning the focus needs to be ‘upstream’, on the structural problems which are still hampering EU performance on foreign policy. Among the Lisbon Treaty innovations was the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The tools, however, remained under the competence of the Commission, complicating the EEAS’s ability to use financial resources. Even the Foreign Policy Instrument, the financial tool to implement Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), is under the Commission’s authority even if managed together with EEAS.

8. It is well know that the relationship between the Commission and the EEAS has been one source of disfunctioning policies, revealing in particular an inability to coordinate longer-term policy (such as negotiating trade agreements or framing the objectives of Action Plans in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy) with shorter-term diplomatic action.

9. A working model bringing together the institutional and political components which can move policy decisions forward exists and has already proven successful with the facilitation of the Serbia-Kosovo ‘normalisation’. The EEAS-based negotiating team worked with the

83 of 309 The German Marshall Fund of the United States—Written Evidence (FSP0021)

Commission staff in charge of enlargement (in the case of the Balkans the creation of the EEAS and the consequent reallocation of staff was not a traumatic experience); the HR consulted with the member states on agreeing to provide incentives to the two countries to help the implementation of the agreements reached through negotiations; the EU Delegations supported the parties in implementing the agreements on the ground; the international community backed the entire process. This could represent a model to organize work in other areas too, especially in contexts or countries with which the EU and its member states enjoy extensive relations in diverse policy areas which require complex institutional coordination, the use of significant financial resources, and the intelligence gathered by diplomatic missions on the ground.

10. The HR has acknowledged the need to improved relations between the EEAS and the Commission and is committed to regular meetings with the external relations Commissioners. It is early to see the impact on concrete policy, though EU climate change diplomacy in the run up to the Paris summit suggests greater coordination among institutions. The EEAS also needs to consult and coordinate with the other institutions, such as the European Parliament and the European Council, which has been playing a growing role on major international crises (such as in the confrontation with Russia over Ukraine and in the refugee crisis).

11. Other institutional/structural reforms which have been put in place regard the ability of the EU to respond to man-made or natural disasters. The Commission and the EEAS have set up crisis response mechanisms to activate the relevant actors and instruments needed to intervene in complex crises, involving international organisations, the full range of EU institutions and agencies, and member states by creating the Situation Room in the EEAS, the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response, the decision-making mechanism, and the European Emergency Response Coordination Centre which brings together the EEAS, ECHO’s crisis centre and National Civil Protection. In this field, the EU’s learning curve has been evident, even if it needs to stand the tests of implementation.

12. Beyond the institutional challenges of coordination, EU external policy also has conceptual weaknesses. It remains focused excessively on trade and aid, each policy domain governed by its own entrenched logic and path dependencies. Neither, however, seemed relevant to address the root causes of the Arab Spring, for example. Other areas of action, such as human rights support, continue to receive little financial and political/diplomatic backing and thus remain marginal components of EU external policy. Conflict prevention too, part of the Union’s DNA as much as human rights promotion, is scarcely included in the EU’s long-term policies and the institutions are barely equipped to conduct early warning or conflict-related analysis. The two small units in the Commission’s Development Cooperation Directorate General and in the EEAS are insufficient to integrate conflict prevention into the EU’s external action. Giving centrality to these two areas of action could guide EU policy reflecting its own achievements and purpose while simultaneously addressing the sources of insecurity and instability which disrupt international and domestic societies.

13. With the creation of the EEAS, the EU now has an extensive network of missions in third countries and in international organisations. EU Delegations have proven able to upgrade the quality of EU work on the ground, of relations with partners (government and non-governmental), and have frequently provided the added value of the EEAS to the member states. Their performance has varied depending on the quality of its staff and its adaptability to the expectations of the Lisbon Treaty, but overall report there are positive

84 of 309 The German Marshall Fund of the United States—Written Evidence (FSP0021) reports about them. About 40% of Delegation staff comes from national diplomacies: Delegations have thus been able to benefit more rapidly than headquarters of the cultural change introduced with the Lisbon Treaty of bringing together EU officials and national diplomats. Expanding the skill set of Delegation staff has been key to upgrading the EU’s relevance and performance.

14. A few Delegations have national attachés to provide understanding of areas in which former Commission staff do not have a strong background, such as a British military attaché in the Islamabad Delegation. This practice should be extended to other Delegations and to other areas in which EU officials still have too few competences – inter-religious affairs, gender, culture, transitional justice, migration. At the same time, training Delegation staff into diplomatic work will help consolidate in-house capacity. Such training could be carried out for both national and EU diplomats to save costs. Indeed, the Delegations provide numerous opportunities to rationalize costs which some member states are exploring together with the EEAS.

15. Reporting from the Delegations has improved over time, with guidelines issued from Brussels. Political reports are crucial to analyzing political developments around the world. The reports are especially valuable to the many member states which do not have an extensive network of missions abroad and can thus benefit from insights which were otherwise not available. Only 8 countries in the world have diplomatic representations of 25 EU member states. EU intelligence gathering has thus improved and expanded though it continues to suffer from insufficient sharing of information from EU member states to EEAS and Delegations. While the EEAS shares information with the member states, the opposite flow is often not evident.

16. This reflects the fact that the EEAS and its diplomatic network is of enormous added value to the smaller member states with limited national representation in the world but of limited advantage to those member states, such as the UK, which have far more extensive networks than the EU. Alone, with 139 Delegations and 3350 staff and an administrative budget of 489 million Euros (in 2013, the UK had, respectively 245, over 13,000 staff and 1.2 billion Euros), the EEAS’s network is comparable to that of Belgium. It therefore cannot aspire to duplicate the work of a national Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, its role in coordinating EU and member states’ policies on the ground give the Delegations an added value also with respect to large diplomatic missions, to avoid duplication of activities, strengthen diplomatic responses, provide information about doing business in Europe etc. To be more effective and relevant, the staffing and training of the EEAS in Brussels and in the Delegations needs to enhance competences in a far broader range of issues beyond the project management approach which the previous Commission Delegations managing development aid had to include language and communication skills and a broader policy knowledge (security, agriculture, climate change, migration, culture, religion, education and so on).

17. Furthermore, EU Delegations are essential for the development of joined-up policies in the field, based on a closer analysis of local needs, and playing a key role in devising bottom- up ‘comprehensive’ policies, which draw on a broad toolbox ranging from development aid through institution-building to military cooperation, which are increasingly recognized as the appropriate approach to managing the complexity of the 21st century. The governance challenge to developing and implementing comprehensive policies is well-known nationally and at the EU level: EU Delegations, working together with the national diplomatic networks

85 of 309 The German Marshall Fund of the United States—Written Evidence (FSP0021) abroad, can play an essential role not merely in implementing strategies defined at headquarters but in shaping those strategies reflecting local needs and developments.

18. If strengthened, resourced and staffed, the Delegations can take on additional tasks to reduce the burden on national diplomacies. For instance, should the Delegations be strengthened to include, member states’ Liaison Officers on migration issues, they could play a larger role in liaising with local authorities on identifying migration flows and report back to Brussels as well as to national capitals. This would not impinge on member states’ bilateral relations with countries of origin; it would simply provide an equal level of analysis to all upon which member states can further develop national strategies.

19. In other words, the EU’s ability to manage the challenges of a more complex world requires far greater and in depth cooperation among the various institutions and member states, and the latter play a vital role.

Member States and the EU

Inquiry questions  How can the interests of Member States be more effectively translated into EU action? How can the links between national capitals and the EU be strengthened in external affairs?  Is the practice of ad-hoc groupings of Member States leading on foreign policy dossiers (as in the E3+3 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme) a useful template for future EU foreign policy? How could it be strengthened? What are the disadvantages of this approach?  How would you assess the flow of information between Member States and between national capitals and the EU? What are the hurdles to deepening intelligence sharing within the Union?

Answers 20. The ‘logic of diversity’ among the member states has been the single largest detractor to a more common foreign policy and successive waves of institutional reform have not been able to foster processes of greater cooperation. Yet member states do coordinate with each other on a vast number of dossiers and the links have grown stronger with the creation of the EEAS, notwithstanding frequently visible temptations towards ‘renationalisation’.

21. One way to improve the linkages would be to improve analytical exchanges among capitals and with EU officials. The Political and Security Committee’s agenda tends to be dominated by identifying responses to crises and has little time to address issues in greater depth. More strategic discussions should also take place through the meetings of the Policy Planning Units of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the EEAS, and extended to national diplomats working on geographic and thematic desks other than the Europe office. While there are initiatives to bring together national diplomats already working on Europe with their EU counterparts, this is not done sufficiently on the other MFA units which do not deal with Europe on a daily basis.

22. The European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs has started twice-yearly meetings with their national counterparts in the country holding the rotating presidency of the EU. This too will help bring decision-makers closer. These processes will help embed

86 of 309 The German Marshall Fund of the United States—Written Evidence (FSP0021) member states’ positions and preferences in the EU’s mechanisms. Initiating in-depth exchanges and fostering analysis outside the context of crisis response will help member states play more constructive roles in shaping EU policy.

23. With 28 member states, it is inevitable that shaping common responses is a challenge. A recent trend has been to have a few member states pioneering policy responses. On Iran the HR was empowered by the E3 group; Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine was addressed first by the Weimar format, then by the Normandy format; other initiatives, from defence cooperation to Eastern Partnership, have been pushed by small groups of countries. Some formats are institutionalized sub-regional cooperation, such as the Nordic Council or the Visegrad 4, others reflect ad hoc initiatives. These will continue to function as drivers for foreign policy, and may see broader policy entrepreneurs get involved. On global human rights, for instance, member states have often found an ally in the European Parliament.

24. Such policy entrepreneurship has so far shown a number of patterns. Firstly, when an initiative involves more than two member states, it is has been hard to pursue it outside the EU framework. Member states ultimately have preferred to ‘Europeanise’ regional interests, as the examples of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership have shown. So far, Europeanisation has been preferred to a regional fragmentation of interest groups. Also, the resources that the Commission could bring to the initiative was seen as an incentive. And even when EU institutions have been hostile to member state initiatives, they have never obstructed their development.

25. Secondly, experience has shown that pioneer groups can be more effective in terms of impact, thus have a logic of efficiency which negotiating at 28 does not have. The Iran negotiations are such an example, where the division of labour between EU, national and other actors was made possible by a carefully crafted strategy with clear objectives.

26. Some of these initiatives have enriched the EU’s foreign policy agenda and helped those member states without a strong foreign policy agenda to be socialized into international affairs. Poland, for instance, stands out among the countries which joined the EU in 2004 as having undergone a transition from a country without a foreign policy, to a European policy (accession), to a country with a global outlook. In other words, these initiatives have so far not been to the detriment of further foreign policy cooperation.

27. Fourthly, these policy entrepreneurship patterns have not created a directoire running foreign policy nor a have they spilled over into other foreign policy areas. The ‘big three’ (Britain, France and Germany) have not shown joint leadership aspirations for the EU on foreign policy; in fact they diverge on plenty of matters. France and Britain have cooperated on defence and have been closer to each other on some issues (such as military interventionism) but have not teamed up to develop a different policy on Libya following their intervention there. Britain and Germany have cooperated on Balkan issues but it has not led to greater cooperation on other matters. Sweden and Poland repeated cooperation depended more on affinities between foreign ministers than systematic efforts to lead.

28. The implication is that these instances of policy entrepreneurship, are effective in stimulating initiatives and in pushing consensus-building at 28, have so far not negatively affected foreign policy making, and do not necessarily create an inherent logic to pursue further cooperation. The policy consequences are two-fold: these examples do not add up to a model which could serve for future cooperation and that the EU has a collection of

87 of 309 The German Marshall Fund of the United States—Written Evidence (FSP0021) initiatives without any clear prioritization. This development to adds justification to the exercise the HR is carrying out.

Process

Inquiry questions  How should the High Representative conduct the review? What would be the most useful outcome? How should the UK feed into the review?  How should the review address the resourcing of the EU’s foreign policy strategy? Should the High Representative also outline the operational plans for advancing the EU’s foreign policy strategy?

29. The HR is conducting the review with widespread consultations with EU institutions, member states and some outreach activities with the think tank community and the media. The breadth of the consultation will help stimulate public debate on Europe’s global role, which can only be a welcome development. The challenge will be to avoid producing a document which, in an effort to find consensus among the EU and national decision-makers, is thin on content and does not go beyond the classic ‘common minimum denominator’ which will not be effective. On the other hand, a strategy which does not have the buy-in from the member states and the EU institutions will not be implemented.

30. These risks are both significant. However, the review process can be of value in itself if the member states contribute to it. It can constitute an important moment of exchange even if it will not lead to an EU global strategy which can actually be put into practice. The HR has decided to differentiate this process to the 2003 exercise which led to the European Security Strategy, but having a short part of the EU global strategy highlighting the EU ‘doctrine’, rather than its actual policies, could be a good outcome of this consultation process, which could aim to bring EU member states and institutions closer together at least in their assessment of global change.

31. The review needs to address the question of resources, as their use needs to reflect whatever prioritization may emerge in the final strategy. In this regard it would be useful to address some broader principles governing the use of resources. The EU’s difficulties in responding effectively to events are also tied to the governance of its financial instruments, which is insufficiently flexible and burdensome. This is because decisions on financial instruments are the outcome of complex negotiations and of accountability requirements. Some flexibility needs to be introduced into the system to make policy change possible, if needed. The Foreign Policy Instrument could be better resourced. EU Delegations, which have proven to be an asset to the EEAS and to member states, also need to be far better resourced and staffed, as they are currently overburdened.

Dr Rosa Balfour, Senior Fellow

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Global Europe Centre, University of Kent—Written Evidence (FSP0019)

Executive Summary This report briefly examines the interplay between the European security strategic vision and capabilities, its institutional architecture (Member States & EU institutions) and policy implementation practices (case studies), with a particular focus on the EU consular affairs, EU democracy promotion and EU engagement in frozen conflicts under the Neighbourhood Policy (Appendices 1-3).

This report contends that in order for the EU to develop an effective and sustainable global security strategy, it first, has to reconcile its vision and understanding of strategic priorities within its inter- and intra-institutional settings. Second, a serious effort is required to develop an integrated view on European security, which will not only focus on the internal dimensions of the EU Security strategy (capabilities), but will equally draw on its external aspects - a genuine inclusive approach that would blur internal and external dimensions of security. For this to succeed a deeper understanding of a partnership-building process (especially of strategic partnership) is needed. Finally, while legitimation of the new security vision is essential within the EU (by way of security consultative forums), a greater emphasis should be placed on its external environment, which must not only include a cross-cutting approach to multiple policy instruments as suggested by the EEAs, but more essentially, their connection with the interests and needs of third parties. Case-studies in appendices elaborate further on some specific aspects of EU security within the eastern neighbourhood context.

I. Setting the scene: from fragmented to a more integrated European Security Strategy The EU has considerably progressed in fostering a common vision for the European Security Strategy. It moved beyond the national priorities of individual Member States to collectively consider the interests of the European Union (EU) as a whole, and to separately articulate its external (2003) and internal (2010) security priorities. At the same time, more challenging tasks still lie ahead relating to (i) the facilitation of a joined-up vision, merging external and internal dimensions of security; (ii) the development of a joined-up inter-institutional approach involving all Members States and EU institutions, and connecting policy instruments and geographical silos into a European Security Model (ESM); and (iii) the facilitation of sustainable partnerships (including of strategic interests) with regional and global actors. If successful, this would enable the EU to extend its security impact well beyond its borders, and to move closer to its aspiration to become a global (rather than regional) security player.

The overview below explores the opportunities and gaps in the EU security thinking in the process of fostering an effective, sustainable and legitimate European Global Security Strategy (EGSS) (June 2016). In particular, sections 1.1-1.3 highlight a rather fragmented inter-institutional vision of EU security strategy and its priorities, underscoring the need for (i) a more integrated understanding of the external and internal aspects of EU security; (ii) a more comprehensive inter-institutional architecture and its objectives; and (iii) more reflective external approach, with an emphasis on strategic partnerships. These three

89 of 309 Global Europe Centre, University of Kent—Written Evidence (FSP0019) priorities are subsequently evaluated in sections 2-4, and conclude with general and specific recommendations relating to EU consular affairs, EU democracy promotion and EU conflict approach under the ENP/EaP in the appendices.

I. European (External) Security Strategy 2003 (EESS) The 2003 ESS of 2003 was explicitly externally facing, underlying the importance of developing a uniform response (’effective multilateralism’) to global challenges – ‘No single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own (2003:1)’ – and the need to enhance the EU’s presence and leadership in the global governance system.

Three particular objectives were recognised as strategically important:  Addressing global threats: including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organised crime, and state failure  Building security in the neighbourhood – to ‘promote a ring of well governed countries.., with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’ (Ibid:8)  Fostering effective multilateralism – ‘a rule-based international order’ (Ibid:9) – by developing closer cooperation with WTO, NATO, OSCE and regional organisations (ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and African Union)

Four Action Guidelines were envisaged for the implementation of the EU’s external security strategy:  a more active approach to realising EU strategic objectives;  developing more capabilities especially via EU-NATO cooperation;  more coherent alignment of the EU Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Security and Defence Policy (CSDP);  and a more open approach to strategic partnership-building

In summary, the EESS was too narrowly-focused prioritising only the external aspects of security, and it was too context-laden, valid for a specific political time and promoting narrowly defined multilateralism and strategic partnerships. This led to the 2008 review of the strategy, in an attempt to balance out strategic priorities.

II. European (Internal) Security Strategy 2010 (EISS) The 2010 ESS focused more exclusively on the internal aspects of the ESS, with the purpose to strengthen the EU operational capacity, and develop ‘a larger consensus on the vision, values and objectives which underpin EU security’ (2010:7).

It identified three strategic objectives: - Protecting people in Europe as part of the global response - Addressing global threats: including terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime, cross-border crime, violence, and natural and man-made disasters - Developing a European Security Model (ESM) consisting of common tools; cooperation and solidarity between Member States (MS) and all EU institutions; and recognising ‘a greater interdependence between internal and external security’ (Ibid: 12).

Ten Action Guidelines were envisaged for the implementation of EU internal security strategy: - a wider and more comprehensive approach to facilitate horizontal and vertical cooperation synergies;

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- more effective democratic control and judicial supervision of security activities; - a more proactive and intelligence-led approach – for prevention and anticipation of conflicts - a more comprehensive model for information exchange - more operational cooperation, involving effective coordination by COSI of law- enforcement and border-management authorities and EU agencies - more cooperation in judicial matters - better integrated border management - commitment to innovation and training - more cooperation with third countries, based on ‘mutual interest, concerns and possibilities’ (Ibid:29) - more flexibility to adapt to future challenges

Furthermore, two specific operational steps were prioritised, which remit and rationale, however, caused much contention at the national level (Home Office 8293/15, 2015): 1) development of the operational capacity of COSI – Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security; 2) establishment of an internal security fund to promote the implementation of EISS.

In summary, this EISS focussed too narrowly on developing internal capabilities and institutions to improve the implementation practices. Consequently, the excessive emphasis on internal instruments, capacities and agencies brought about more inter-institutional fragmentation and conflict of interests that the desired unity of response (see section III).

III. Towards a European (Global) Security Strategy 2015/16 (EGSS) It is therefore anticipated that the EU currently finds itself in the process of reflection and development of a new ESS, this time aiming to foster an integrated (cross-institutional and cross-thematic) global vision on European security. Not only is this driven by the changing global environment (especially in the neighbourhood and the implications for the EU’s internal security), this also involves a much-needed reflection of (i) possible synergies between external and internal aspects of security, (ii) existing incoherence between the multitude of instruments and agencies; and (iii) the limited leverage over the external environment, which prevents the EU to punch its weight and act a global effective player (EEAS 2015:1-2).

The High Representative’s (HR) report (2015) offers a comprehensive overview of the achieved, but also of challenges ahead. Notably, it identifies five specific geographic regions – a broader European neighbourhood (Western Balkans, EaP region, and Turkey), MENA, Africa, Atlantic partnerships and Asia – where it believes the EU could make a difference. To do so, it requires the EU’s external action instruments to be fit for purpose and be: - more direction and strategic vision - more flexibility - more coordination - more leverage and - more capabilities

At the same time, while acknowledging the availability of multiple instruments and policies (Ibid:14-15) – i.e. CFSP, CSDP, counter-terrorism (CT), cyber issues, humanitarian assistance, trade, migration policy, climate policy, ENP and enlargement – the HR’s report underscores the need not for their proliferation, but rather, for their more effective, better

91 of 309 Global Europe Centre, University of Kent—Written Evidence (FSP0019) integrated and coordinated use. The report suggests that this could be achieved by way of fostering; - a joined-up approach which would (i) connect the above policy instruments ‘not only in conflicts and crises, but across all fields of EU external action’ (Ibid:20), and (ii) overcome geographical silos, and vertical and horizontal inter- and intra-institutional divisions; - a sharper definition of ‘strategic partnerships’ for maximising the EU’s global influence (Ibid: 15).

This call for reflection, however, instead of synergising the internal and external dimensions of security, shifts the emphasis back on to the latter (the external aspect), and the development of capabilities, which would not succeed without the proper partnership-building approach and the EU’s decentring from its own agenda. ’Global’ (and more comprehensive) vision is essentially missing from the discussion.

In summary, the above overview of the EU strategic objectives and actions explicitly highlights the following ‘disconnects’ in the EU’ security thinking: - there is a definitive need to develop an integrated approach to European security which would merge the external and internal aspects into a comprehensive and global strategy; - there is an urgent need for a joined-up approach, which would draw on cross-institutional, cross- governmental and cross-policy thematic perspectives – for the purpose of building a comprehensive EU security model, which could be applied across the board; - there is urgency to understand and connect with the EU external environment, especially by way of defining the meaning of partnerships (including of strategic interest), and developing greater awareness about the recipient side.

We will explore and offer recommendations for each of the three priorities below.

II. Towards a comprehensive and global strategy (Member States and EU institutions): While a joined-up strategy is envisaged for the developed of the EGSS, across institutions, government agencies and thematic policies, there is no integrated vision and understanding between the main EU institutions as to how to achieve this objective and drive it forward.

The European Council is tasked by the treaties to offer a strategic direction for the EU’s development, especially at the time of crises. While realising the importance of developing a ‘common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy’, it nevertheless narrows its concerns to the capability-building initiatives (by way of empowering COSI to coordinate and monitor implementation actions) and to renewing the EISS for 2015-20, with a particular responsibility for fostering systematic EU defence cooperation, mobilising EU instruments, ensuring sufficient defence budget in support of EU defence actions and monitoring the progress of implementation of Internal Security strategy (9798/15; JAI442: 10-11). The external dimension of security is circumscribed to an area of intensifying partnerships with the UN, NATO, OSCE and AU (EUCO 22/15:5-6), the kind of multilateralism which so far has not proved effective. This ‘micro-management’ and a circumscribed view of multilateralism (while ignoring new and emergent regional and global players – BRICS, Eurasian Union etc), may hinder EU leverage, and hamper its positioning (2020+) as a global leader.

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The EEAS has offered an apt and reflective report outlining the need to radically rethink the EU’s security strategy. It believes that traditional multilateralism is no longer responsive to the new challenges, and the EU needs a more inclusive strategy forward. At the same time, the report shows a limited understanding, on the one hand, of how the synergies between the external and internal dimensions of security could be achieved (still placing more salience on the internal aspects of security); and on the other, how to foster a joined-up approach to overcome ‘horizontal and vertical silos which hamper the EU’s potential global role’ (EEAS 2015:20).

Conversely, the Commission, while also advocating for the development of a shared European Security Agenda on Security between the Union and Member States, places more emphasis on forging ‘a global perspective with security as one of our main external priorities’ (COM (2015) 185: 20). At the same time, likewise the Council and the EEAS, it prioritises the reconfiguration of the EU instruments and policies, rather than developing a full understanding of the external environment, e.g. by way of defining the meaning and objectives of a partnership-building approach.

The European Parliament, in turn, believes, that the main priorities should lie in developing mechanisms of legitimising security strategy (via EU Security Consultative Forum) and establishing performance indicators for key EU instruments (including benchmarks and roadmapping, and their regular monitoring) (PE557.263v01-00).

In summary, while there is an understanding of the need for a joined-up approach to security which would synergise its external and internal dimensions, and would define common priorities to advance the EU’s global potential, there is a limited inter-institutional vision for the shared agenda and for the need to develop a more ‘outside-in’ perspective – via strategic partnerships and joint interests

III. Institutional architecture and capabilities: tensions and opportunities Stemming from the above, there is also a number of tensions emerging from the envisaged institutional operationalisation of the forthcoming European Security Model.

While the Council believes that empowering COSI should be a priority, to facilitate its closer cooperation with the Commission, EEAS and JHA agencies; its remit and capability are seriously questioned by the European and national agencies. The Commission, on the other hand, insists on empowering EU delegations and their better integration into decision-making processes in Brussels. The EEAS, conversely, is more concerned with a top-down rebuilding of the cross-sectoral architecture of the external action policies, which may cause further intra- and inter-institutional tensions. Consequently, the institutional re-mapping may require a system overhaul and some unification under the EEAS roof, if a genuine ‘joined-up approach to all EU fields of EU external action’ were to be forged.

Overall, there is no vision or understanding of what the ESM should be, institutionally and thematically, and whether (and how) it should pursue an all-encompassing security style over the targeted set of policy priorities.

In relation to the individual thematic policies – enlargement, neighbourhood, migration, energy, CT and Security and defence – the EEAS calls for the dismantlement of policy and geographical silos. At the same time, the conclusions of the inter-parliamentary conference (September 2015) suggest that a more differentiated approach to individual policy’s contents and objectives should be the priority.

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The best way forward would be indeed to prioritise individual policies - the ENP, migration, trade, border management and energy – with the view to expand their impact and connectivity, before considering blurring their operational and geographical silos. For more detailed overview and suggestion see Appendix 1 on the EU strategic role in consular affairs; Appendix 2 – on EU relations with Azerbaijan; and Appendix 3 – on EU approach to frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space.

IV. Towards more effective and sustainable Strategic Partnerships: To enable the successful development and implementation of the EGSS, the EU needs to radically rethink the meaning of ‘partnership’ (including of strategic interest). While the notion of partnership has been extensively used in the EU external discourse, it avails no proper meaning.20 As one EU senior official commented: ‘It is true the EU has an evolving meaning of “partnership”. The EU has developed strategic partnerships and special relations with substantial partners, whom the EU takes seriously... whereas, [for example] partnership under the ENP is [aimed] for smaller countries.’21 This differentiation also infers whether partnership-building should be driven by mutual interests (as in strategic partnerships) or solely by EU norms (known as conditionality approach). As practice shows, even if it is driven by reciprocity in strategic partnerships, the EU tends to dominate and behave as a norm-maker, in trying to ‘socialise’ its partners into the EU’s way of thinking.22 This is problematic as it violates the very nature of partnership, and prevents the EU from learning about its external environment, as EU-Russian relations have recently attested to.

V. Recommendations Premised on the above analysis, the following general recommendations could be made:  First, in order for the EU to develop an effective and sustainable global security strategy, it has to reconcile its vision and understanding of strategic priorities within its inter- and intra- institutional settings.  Second, a serious effort is required to develop an integrated view on European security, which will not only focus on the internal dimensions of EU Security model, but will equally or even to a greater extent, consider the external aspects of security – a genuine inclusive approach that would blur internal and external dimensions of security. For this to succeed a deeper understanding of a partnership-building process (especially of strategic partnership) is needed. Finally, while legitimation of the new security vision is essential within the EU (by way of security consultative forums), the emphasis should also be placed on its external environment, which will not only include a cross-cutting approach to multiple policy dimensions, but more essentially, their connection with the interests and needs of the third parties. Case-studies in appendices further elaborate and offer specific recommendation on some specific aspects – EU role in consular affairs, democracy promotion and engagement in frozen conflicts – of security challenges within the eastern neighbourhood context.

Appendix 1: Case study of the EU’s role in Consular Affairs Igor Merheim-Eyre

20 For detailed discussion see Korosteleva, E (2014) The EU and its Eastern Neighbours: Towards a more Ambitious Partnership? Routledge 21 Interview with a senior official, DG RELEX, College of Europe, 6 September 2010 22 This has been especially noted and openly resisted by Chinese and Russian officials. For more details see Korosteleva (2014)

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New external security threats and the process of European integration have resulted in the emergence of new actors and practices, not traditionally associated with the consular sphere, including the protection of EU citizens outside of the European Union (EU), and the issuance of Schengen visa.

Over the past two decades Member States of the European Union have been developing a framework within which a citizen in distress may seek assistance from consular or diplomatic representatives of another Member State if their state is not represented in a particular third country outside of the Union.

The consular protection of EU citizens can be linked to a general shift within the EU towards ‘soft’ security issues, such as man-made and natural disasters (Merheim-Eyre 2014), but also on post-disaster resilience (Lundborg & Vaughan-Williams 2011). Over the past two decades, EU Member States have sought various way of developing joint post-disaster contingency planning both within and outside the borders of the EU. In this context, consular protection of citizens takes place in the form of evacuations, immediate humanitarian or medical assistance through EU-funded or individual Member States’ responses. While daily assistance to EU citizens in areas such as loss of passport or imprisonment remains the most frequent consular tasks, post-disaster response is an increasingly important part of local and national contingency planning.

Issuance of Schengen visa to non-EU citizens is another consular dimension that has known a shift towards growing competencies at the European level and towards externalisation beyond the Union. Externalisation in this case refers not merely to ‘Smart Borders’, but also to the increasing participation of third countries in the management of EU external borders, a particularly important tool in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. The externalisation of EU border management through visa issuance is (‘visa diplomacy’), unlike in the case of consular protection of EU citizens, about the prevention of potential risks reaching the borders of the EU, by managing migratory flows and security threats beyond the borders of the Union. Rather than based on exclusionary politics of fence-building, it acts as a filter by incentivising local reform and capacity-building through a managed but inclusionary process of visa facilitation and visa liberalisation. The success of such approach is highlighted in the low number of illegal crossings on the eastern borders (Frontex 2015), and Moldova’s successful reforms in border and migration management.

Recommendations:  To consider the growing importance of consular affairs as a vital external aspect of EU internal security, highlighting the need for reciprocity between the internal and external dimensions of EU security  To utilise the new Council Directive on consular protection (Council of the EU; 2015/637) as an opportunity to strengthen consular cooperation between Member States on both inter-ministerial and local level, and make a more strategic use of existing structures on the European level, in particular, the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism in contingency planning  To explore the emerging ‘visa diplomacy’ in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, as an important instrument of facilitating more ‘inclusive’ relations with our immediate neighbours, and managing potential security risks beyond the borders of the Union.

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Appendix 2: Case study of EU-Azerbaijan relations and recommendations Eske Van Gils

Relations between the EU and Azerbaijan are generally conducted in an amicable way, and co-operation is overall strong, in particular in the field of economy and (energy) trade. However, there are significant tensions over two policy areas, namely value promotion and the way the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is being addressed in bilateral relations.

In both cases, a main hindrance appears to be that current policy-making mechanisms do not allow for sufficient input from Azerbaijan, and that the relationship is therefore not truly based on principles of partnership. Azerbaijan appears to be increasingly denouncing this EU’s one-sided policy. The Azerbaijani government has indicated that it feels ‘not heard’ by Brussels, and that its own national (security) concerns are not being taken serious the EU (interviews with Azerbaijani representatives, May 2015). There are signals that the country is now re-considering certain aspects of co-operation with the EU (see e.g. APA 2015).

In terms of security this is problematic because reduced co-operation with Azerbaijan may harm the EU’s own security interests as well, and due to limited input the EU might systematically miss out on valuable information on the regional context that Azerbaijan possesses.

With regards to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan has indicated that it wishes further engagement from the EU in the conflict resolution process, following disappointment in the OSCE Minsk Group’s efforts (Babayev 2014). While the EU is reluctant to become directly involved (Council 2010b: 2), it does not appear to communicate its views and arguments clearly, and moreover, Azerbaijan perceives that the EU upholds different narratives on the matter in relations with Armenia. This issue not only undermines the EU’s credibility but also increases Azerbaijan’s frustration over the matter – the government has indicated that it is losing its patience and that it may undertake military action in case the international community does not intervene pro-actively. Again, allowing more input from Azerbaijan (as well as Armenia) would benefit the case, and a strategy should be designed not solely by the EU but together with all relevant actors.

Recommendations:  The EU should focus its resources on its neighbourhood, however, only on the basis of a differentiated approach: countries such as Azerbaijan have no need for financial support, however they may appreciate political and security support – which should also become available outside of the policy frameworks currently on offer (notably the AA and membership). Since Azerbaijan is not interested in EU membership or integration, enlargement is no useful tool in these relations and more diverse and effective instruments for co-operation should be made available.  Equal input from partner states is essential: these partner states hold crucial information about the situation in the region (national governments as well as civil society and experts). Moreover, without an equal input and acknowledgement of national security interests, partner states may lose interest in in-depth cooperation with the EU. Therefore, the review of the ESS should indeed pay more attention to the operational plans as well as resourcing and allocate a strong role for partners in this process.

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 The capacity of the EEAS in Brussels should be increased, to enable thorough processing of policy input coming from both the EU Delegation in Azerbaijan as well as Azerbaijani actors including civil society organisations and the national government. Because of its in-depth knowledge and close cooperation with the local government, the EU Delegation should also obtain a greater role in the design of the policies vis- à-vis Azerbaijan.  To prevent losing credibility or partners’ confidence, the EU should pay more close consideration to the country’s national security priorities, notably the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While the EU may not want to get actively involved in the conflict mediation, what is very important at this point is clarity about the Union’s policy, towards Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia.

Appendix 3: Case study of the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space Irena Mnatsakanyan

The unresolved conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), Abkhazia, and South Ossetia have the potential to become the next unavoidable wars in the EU`s Eastern neighbourhood, with a spill-over effect for the wider Europe. So far the EU’s response and engagement with frozen conflicts on the post-soviet space have been limited. Its major achievements included appointing an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and developing regional cooperation under the ENP/EaP to positively contribute to conflict resolution. At the same time, the practice reveals much inconsistency and ineffectiveness in the EU security approach towards these specific conflicts, which however enjoy much similarity in terms of their geographic proximity to the EU, geopolitical environment, historical roots and dynamics of conflict escalation. While the EU remains the biggest international donor supporting post-conflict rehabilitation in the conflict regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Astrov 2011:87) for the past ten years, in the NK’s case it did not manage to establish direct engagement in the region.So far, none of the EU representatives managed to visit NK and there have been no needs-assessment or fact finding missions there. Furthermore, EU Action Plans (APs) for Armenia and Azerbaijan include two contradictory principles: ‘territorial integrity’ for Azerbaijan, and the ‘right of nations for self- determination’ for Armenia (Kuzmicheva 2011). Furthermore, in the Azeri AP the NK resolution is number one priority,23 while in the Armenian AP it is number seven24.

Our research indicates that more internal inter-institutional coherence for the development of the EGSS is necessary, as well as greater awareness of other geopolitical players in the region.

Recommendations for improving internal coherence:  The EU should eliminate inconsistency between the two ENP APs for Armenia and Azerbaijan, and include unconditional support to the OSCE proposed peace plan based on Madrid Principles25  It is necessary to improve coordination between the activities of the Council and the Commission not only at the policy planning stage, but also at the implementation stage. The inter-institutional division of policy responsibilities within the EU mainly between the Commission and Council is highly fragmented (Wolf 2007:4)

23 EU-Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf .( p.3). 24 EU-Armenia ENP Action Plan. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf. (p.9) 25 Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries. 10 July .2009. http://www.osce.org/mg/51152

97 of 309 Global Europe Centre, University of Kent—Written Evidence (FSP0019)

 One of the most crucial issues is to increase cooperation between the actors in Brussels (Commission, EEAS) and in-country officials (EUSR, EU Delegations) during the implementation of the EU crisis management activities.26

Recommendations for improving external coherence:  Considering the recognition of Kosovo by most EU member states, and the EU engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is essential that the EU directly engage in N-K in the form of financial and humanitarian support, de-mining activities, and fact finding missions is significant.  The EU cooperation with Russia is an essential factor. Russia’s politicization of frozen conflicts has led some Russia-friendly EU member states to withdraw from supporting a more active EU engagement in the frozen conflicts. Hence, a more uniform position is needed, to develop a coherent security policy towards these conflicts  There is a need to increase EU cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EU`s performance in the frozen conflicts also depends on the local demand from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia for its involvement in the frozen conflicts. In the conflicts where there was high local demand, the EU involvement was significant. Compared with Georgia, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan enjoys very close relations with the EU, and hence the local demand for the EU’s greater involvement in NK is limited.

References: APA (Azerbaijan Press Agency) (2015). The Cabinet of Ministers to reconsider Azerbaijan’s participation in the Eastern Partnership. Published on 15.09.2015, available at http://en.apa.az/news/232029 Astrov A. (2011). The Great Power Mismanagement: The Russian Georgian War and its Implications for the Global Political Order. Ashgate Babayev, A. (2014). Weder Krieg noch Frieden im Südkaukasus: Hintergründe, Akteure, Entwickelungen zum Bergkarabach-Konflikt. Baden-Baden: Nomos Council of the European Union (2015) Draft Council Conclusions on the Renewed EU Internal Security startegy 2015-20. Brussels 9798/15, 10 June Council of the European Union (2015) Council Directive on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries. Brussels 2015/637, 20 April European Commission (2015) The European Agenda on Security. COM (2015) 185 final. Strasbourg, 28 April European Council (2003) European Security Strategy: Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels, 12 December European Council (2010) Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: towards a European Security model. Brussels, March European Council (2010b). Eleventh Cooperation Council between the European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Brussels: Council of the European Union European Parliament (2015) Draft Motion for a resolution on European Agenda Security. PE557.263v01-00 Frontex Migratory Routes Map (2015) http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory- routes-map/ (Accessed 25/09/2015)

26 European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue. 2012. Debriefing EU Mediators. Summary and Key Lessons from a debriefing with former EUSR for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby (p.6)

98 of 309 Global Europe Centre, University of Kent—Written Evidence (FSP0019)

Guarian, the / Liston, E. (2014). Azerbaijan’s president threatens war with Armenia via Twitter, 7/08/2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/azerbaijan-president- threatens-war-armenia-twitter Home Office (2015) European Agenda on Security. (36829), 8293/15, to the attention of the Home Affais Committee, and European Committee B, House of Commons Inter-Parliaemntary Conference for the CFSP and CSDP. Draft Conclusions. Luxembourg, 3 August Korosteleva, E. (2014) The EU and its Eastern Neighbours: towards amore ambitious partnership? Routledge Kuzmicheva, L. (2011) Unresolved Conflicts in the Common Neighbourhood. SPES Policy Paper, available at http://www.iepberlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/SPES_Policy_Papers/SPES_Policy _Paper_2011_Larisa_KUZMICHEVA.pdf Lundborg, Tom & Nick Vaughan-Williams (2011). ‘Resilience, Critical Infrastructure and Molecular Security: The Excess of ‘Life’ in Biopolitics’, International Political Sociology 5:4 Merheim-Eyre, I.(2014). Towards a more ambitious framework for cooperation? FCO Consular Services, the European Union and the challenges of consular protection; Evidence for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office BoC Semester 4 Merheim-Eyre, Igor (2015). Protecting citizens, securitising outsiders? Consular Affairs and the externalisation of EU internal security in Bossong, Raphael & Carrapico, Helen (2015). Shifting borders and politics of EU internal security; Springer Press Berlin The European Union in a Changing Global Enviornment: a more connected, contested and complex world. EEAS report. Brussels, June Wolf, S. (2007) Report on The European Union and the Conflict over the Nagorno- Karabakh Territory. Centre for International Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution. University of Nottingham

Professor Elena Korosteleva 27 Igor Merheim-Eyre Eske Van Gils Irena Mnatsakanyan

27 Corresponding author. We wish to acknowledge useful feedback from Professor Richard Whitman, University of Kent

99 of 309 Dr Roberta Guerrina, Dr Laura Chappell and Ms Katharine Wright, University of Surrey— Written Evidence (FSP0015)

Dr Roberta Guerrina, Dr Laura Chappell and Ms Katharine Wright, University of Surrey—Written Evidence (FSP0015) Evidence to be found under Dr Laura Chappell, Dr Roberta Guerrina and Ms Katharine Wright

100 of 309 Commissioner Johannes Hahn, European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission—Written Evidence (FSP0024)

Commissioner Johannes Hahn, European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission—Written Evidence (FSP0024)

QUESTIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

We have been informed that to be effective–particularly in the Middle East and North Africa–Commission tools need the strategic direction, political will and expertise of Member States alongside them. In the MENA region, where, and how, do you judge that the Commission can add value to the foreign policy of Member States and demonstrate real leverage?

The Commission – together with the EEAS – has just finished a major review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with a joint High Representative/Commission Communication published on 18 November. The process of this review involved intense consultations with Member States and with partner countries, not just at the level of governments but also with civil society, social partners, businesses, International Financial Organisations, think tanks and academics. Our public consultation and our outreach generated over 250 responses. The Communication itself and a Staff Working Document explaining the background to the review and an overview of the responses received can be found here: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2015/181115_enp_review_en.htm

Work on this review reinforced my belief in the real strength of the EU in bringing the interests and political weight of 28 Member States together to work on common interests with our partners. Our consultations brought out the strong need for stabilisation to be the main priority in our work; the need for differentiation in our relationships with our partners and the need to focus on fewer mutual priorities – good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights; economic development for stabilisation; energy security and climate action; security and migration and mobility. We are more effective when we pool our expertise and our resources to tackle these issues together. This applies in terms of sending consistent messaging, maximising our political leverage and delivering most impact with our financial aid.

As we go forward on implementing the results of the review, we will continue to coordinate with Member States – in particular on increasing opportunities for joint programming and on the visibility of EU action. The EU's European Neighbourhood Instrument operated with full Member State oversight with funds of €15.4bn between 2014-2020 gives us the leverage and the ability to coordinate our actions with International Financial Institutions and other donors. There are numerous examples of how the EU uses this coordinating power to effectively supports its partners in the neighbourhood – from institutional reform in Morocco; to supporting the Tunisian transition to democracy to efforts to support countries hosting refugees from the Syria crisis.

101 of 309 Commissioner Johannes Hahn, European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission—Written Evidence (FSP0024) We have heard that enlargement is not a panacea and moreover, has been a distraction of public and political attention. Would the Commission accept this statement? If so, what approach will guide future policies in the eastern neighbourhood?”

The EU’s enlargement policy is an investment in peace, security and stability in Europe. It provides increased economic and trade opportunities to the mutual benefit of the EU and the aspiring Member States. The prospect of EU membership has a powerful transformative effect on the countries concerned, embedding positive democratic, political, economic and societal change. The most recent enlargements to central and eastern Europe have provided many new opportunities for EU citizens, companies, investors, consumers and students from new and established Member States. Trade and investment have increased. The EU's single market is the largest in the world, serving 500 million citizens and generating 23% of world GDP.

Enlargement needs to be understood as a process which supports reform and the fundamental changes needed to meet the obligations of EU membership. Such changes inevitably require time. This makes it all the more important to reaffirm unequivocally the European perspective of the enlargement countries. If the prospect of moving forward on the road to the EU is seen as real and credible, the risk of countries turning away from the EU will be mitigated, as will the risk of disillusionment with the process or even failing in or backsliding on reforms. Enlargement can only be of benefit to the EU and to partner countries if there is genuine, sustainable reform. Through this process countries will become fully ready to join the EU and be able to reap the benefits and assume the obligations that arise from membership.

As for the Eastern neighbourhood, the ENP has never aimed to prejudge – for or against – whether or not a European neighbour might aim for membership. Some partners see this as their ultimate goal, but the ENP is focussed on more immediate challenges as well as promoting closer cooperation that can deliver concrete results and benefits for both parties. The prospect of accession is often regarded by partners as a goal on the horizon that could serve to maintain support for reform, or maintain pro-European political alliances. It is indeed not a panacea and premature promises lead to disappointment. Therefore, the most effective policy is to have a relationship that is relevant to both sides, based on our interests and theirs, and where promises can be met. Therefore we propose strengthening cooperation in areas that are in the EU's and partners' mutual interests, such as economic development, security and migration. Differentiation within the revised ENP will enable further cultivation of links with countries wanting further integration into the EU. However, we cannot afford to disengage with any partner in the Eastern Neighbourhood and this is why we will maintain the Eastern Partnership as a common framework.

102 of 309 Commissioner Johannes Hahn, European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission—Written Evidence (FSP0024) We have noted that EU policy towards Turkey has been rather uncoordinated, and that an overall strategic vision for Turkey has not been articulated by the EU. The evidence we received from the Commission suggested that–after years of stalled negotiations–in light of the migration crisis, the accession process is now a priority. How do you suggest that the EU and Turkey should rejuvenate their relationship? What practical and concrete projects would you propose to move beyond the impasse?

The Commission stands ready to re-engage with Turkey on the entire spectrum of our shared interests, and in particular, in line with the 15 October European Council conclusions and as endorsed by the leaders at the first EU-Turkey Summit on 29 November, the accession process needs to be reenergised in accordance with the negotiating framework and the relevant Council conclusions.

As it has recommended in its Strategy Paper of 10 November 2015, the Commission is taking steps to implement the European Council conclusions. Member States have now agreed to the Commission's proposal to open Chapter 17– Economic and monetary policy and an Intergovernmental Conference has been announced on 14 December 2015. This will be the first chapter to be opened since November 2013 (Chapter 22 – Regional policy). The Commission will also pursue with Turkey the preparatory work for the opening of Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights), Chapter 24 (Justice, freedom and security), Chapter 15 (Energy), Chapter 26 (Education and culture) and Chapter 31 (Foreign, security and defense policy). The Commission has initiated the process of updating the preparatory documents for these Chapters and we plan to submit these updated documents in the first quarter of 2016. Discussions can then start in the European Council on all these chapters, without prejudice to the position of Member States. In particular, re-launching preparations towards opening chapters 23 and 24 will enable the EU to provide Turkey with a comprehensive roadmap for reforms in the essential areas of the rule of law and fundamental rights.

With this in place we are working towards generating a new momentum in the accession process in the coming period. It will be essential that the new government in Turkey reinvigorates reforms, particularly in the areas of rule of law and fundamental rights in order to move accession negotiations forward. And it will be of particular importance that progress is made in the UN-led settlement talks in Cyprus as soon as possible. The Commission will do its utmost to provide political and practical support to these talks.

In the spirit of the 15 October European Council conclusions, the Commission is also looking forward to re-engaging with the new government in cooperation in all key areas of shared interest, including visa liberalisation dialogue, migration, mobility, refugee crisis management, security and counter-terrorism, economy and trade, energy cooperation. One immediate objective is to monitor the implementation of the Joint Action Plan on migration endorsed by the EU-Turkey Summit on 29 November, in order to effectively bring order into migratory flows and stem irregular migration. We consider that delivery on the Joint action plan and visa roadmap benchmarks will lead to an acceleration of the visa liberation process in 2016. We will also pursue with determination the preparations towards opening trade negotiations by the end of 2016, to modernise and extend current bilateral trade relations under the Customs Union - an impact assessment study is ongoing and a public consultation will take place next spring. We finally envisage, in the first quarter of 2016, a reconvening of the high level energy dialogue as well as the launch a high level economic dialogue, combined with a business-to-business initiative.

103 of 309 Commissioner Johannes Hahn, European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission—Written Evidence (FSP0024) We have heard from witnesses that while working relations between the EEAS and the Commission are good, changes to working rules and procedures might further improve coordination and speed up the processes. What concrete steps would you propose to improve coordination and working practices between the two institutions?

In his mission letter to me, President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker set out a new way of working in which the High Representative Vice President coordinates a Commissioners' Group on External Action to develop a joint approach on external policy. This group meets at least once a month28. This system is working well and leads to coordination at all levels between Commission Directorates General concerned with external affairs and the EEAS. Our staff co-ordinate the agenda for these meetings and work together to prepare Foreign Affairs Councils and other meetings.

During the ENP review the High Representative and I worked closely together and our teams undertook outreach, consultation and drafting of the review together, a practice that will continue in the review's implementation. The same practices happen in our work together on enlargement. As well as in Brussels, in Delegations, Commission and EEAS staff work together under the same roof.

Working relations between the EEAS and the Commission are good. I hope that as this College of Commissioners goes forward in its work that we will build on these good practices already in place and further embed them, making continued close coordination between the Commission and the EEAS second nature for everyone.

28 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/hahn_en.pdf

104 of 309 Commissioner Johannes Hahn, European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission—Written Evidence (FSP0024) The review of the European Neighbourhood Policy has taken place in advance of the High Representative’s strategic review. What steps will be taken to ensure that the revised ENP is aligned with, and implements, the strategy set out in the High Representative’s review?

The review of the European Neighbourhood Policy jointly undertaken by DG NEAR and the EEAS was requested by President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker to be undertaken in the first year of this Commission's mandate. Events in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods - protracted conflicts, rising extremism and terrorism, human rights violations and major refugee flows – have demonstrated that there was a pressing need for a new approach to the region and the need for a new focus on the shared interests of Member States and partner countries.

The results of our extensive consultations on this review will feed in to the wider work on the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy. The strategic review document already published earlier this year reflects many of the same concerns that have been raised during our review29. When the further work on the Global Strategy is concluded we will reflect its recommendations in our continuing policy and programming discussions with Member States and partner countries.

29 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/docs/strategic_review/eu-strategic-review_strategic_review_en.pdf

105 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0009)

Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0009)

The EU’s Global Strategy – Challenges in North Africa and the Middle-East

Summary This contribution provides an update and critical assessment of EU action in the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA), a region frequently referred as to the European Southern Neighborhood. It examines the different instruments and approaches, which are put at work by a variety of institutional actors, notably the EU Commission, Directorate-Generals (DG) International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), Neighbourhood and Enlargement (NEAR), and the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO); as well as the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the member states, which in their combination are shaping the EU’s MENA policy.

The analytical questions are: What can we reasonably expect from EU external action in Middle-East and North Africa? Does EU foreign policy-making at all affect power and governance structures in the MENA region? To what extent, and under what conditions is the EU likely to contribute to promoting democracy and stability? The particular focus hereby is put on the politico-organizational interplay between the EU’s institutional architecture, and the effects of EU policies on the political order in Middle-East and Arab world.

Zooming in on the cases of Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria, this piece of evidence analyses the design and implementation of EU policies in the areas of security, crisis management, international cooperation and development, and studies the effects thereof in these four key- countries within the region. Based on document review, interviews with policy makers and direct observation, taking into account the local context, as well as the regional and geopolitical dimension, the paper contributes empirical research on EU action in a global hotspot area, undergoing turbulence and violent transformation. Results point to an overstrained Europe, remaining paralyzed in shock and awe, faced with a radically transformed socio-political and security context.

After a brief introduction and presentation of the country cases, section two of this evidence starts with a brief overview of EU Southern Neighourhood Policy since the 1990s, before analyzing ongoing activities. The final section draws a number of conclusions, discussed in the light of the present debate on the EU’s Global strategy and commenting on the discussion paper released in June by HRVP Federica Mogherini.

Keywords: EU foreign policy, external action, ‘Global Strategy’, European southern neighbourhood, international cooperation and development ‘beyond aid’; Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

Introduction The Arab and Middle-Eastern region, neighbouring on Europe’s Southern borders has become an area of high risk with an increasing number of open conflicts, both suffering from

106 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0009) and an emitter of terrorism, perceived a direct threat to the European mainland. The turmoil in the South Eastern rim, together with spreading civil war and increasing influence of radical Islam in the Middle East, constitute a massive challenge for EU foreign policy and crisis management capacities. This situation causes tremendous human suffering and triggers refugee movements that, in combination with ‘unfiltered’ South-to-North migration from the Sahel, the Horn or Sub-Saharan Africa, puts enormous pressure on the EU’s external borders and the MS that are most targeted by refugees. So far in 2015, estimated 1.5m refugees have made their way into Europe.

The Arab region, comprising the the sub-regions Maghreb, Mashrek, parts of the Levant and the Arabian peninisula, has been linked with Europe through history, with cultural ties and trade. For centuries, the Middle East and North Africa are known for their political volatility. Wars, power vacuums, grave human rights violations and forced migration have long been common in the region, making it an area of high risk and ‘limited statehood’ (Börzel and Risse 2010, Risse 2013, Krasner and Risse 2015). From the European perspective, a number of open conflicts turn the region into a source of instability, putting the lives and livelihoods of local populations at risk, and representing a threat to international peace and security.

Ever since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, frictions within the Arab societies along religious, ethnic and tribal lines have never ceased and been exploited by some for their mostly short-term political games. In addition, the ability to adapt to a changing environment for the ruling establishment was and is limited. Nevertheless, communication and interconnectivity have improved the knowledge base of the populations and made inequalities and inadequate governance system more visible. As a result of rigid governance structures and failed economic policies, the predominantly young population took to the streets in a movement that has been labelled “Arab Spring”. What started as an act of desperation and public outrage in Sidi Bouzid, a rural town in Tunisia, quickly became a wide-spread movement and only few regimes in the region, and at considerable cost, could shield themselves from the revolutionary frenzy.

This article provides an overview over the EU’s actions in the Middle-East and North Africa, a region grouped by the EU into the European Southern neighborhood. In the light of current developments in the South (as well as in the East) of Europe, it is a fair statement to say that the EU neighbourhood policy has, in many respects, failed (Juncos and Whitman 2015). Whether this is due to the overburdening expectations, to an unforeseeable turn of events or due to structural inadequacies, remains subject to discussions. In March 2015, the High Representative of the Union’s Foreign Policy (HRVP) Mogherini and Neighbourhood Commissioner Hahn jointly announced a review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), through which they will ‘[…] work together in the next months, first of all with our partners […] on what has had worth over these years and what has to be improved or changed starting from a listening process” (European Commission 2015).

This contribution critically assesses the different instruments and approaches, which are put in place by a variety of institutional actors, namely the EU Commission, Directorate- Generals (DGs) Development Cooperation (DEVCO), Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR) and the EU’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO); as well as the European External Action Service (EEAS), which in combination with the member states (MS) are shaping the EU’s MENA policy.

107 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0009)

The EU is a relatively new actor on the international diplomatic scene and only a marginal actor in the areas of security and defence, where states have both a traditional quasi- monopoly and hundreds of years of experience – and, as an organization, even the UN has half a century advance. Moreover, the EU has to prove its standing and legitimacy in the midst of fundamental internal crisis and transformation as well as faced with increasingly complex and challenging external political contexts, especially in the Middle-East. Only recently established and explicitly mandated to propose and coordinate the Unions external action, including the common foreign and security policy, the EEAS, as a young institutional creature, is struggling to demonstrate it is worth the investment. Given this peculiar situation combined with a critical lack of operational resources, the politico-organizational interplay between the EU institutions and member states may turn specific actor constellations and the details of policy-making arrangements into crucial factors for the outcome of EU actions. The EU – and most of its member states alike – has neither capabilities nor the experience to settle the any of the accounts in terms of ‘high politics’. It therefore has to rely on a carefully orchestrated approach of ‘push and pull’, using the full range of EU’s external policy instruments, combining humanitarian aid, development, and trade with migratory policies, financial commitment and its ‘carrots’ of partnership and association polices as well as its symbolic power (or what remains thereof).

The cases examined in this study shed some light on the peculiarities of the design and implementation of EU external policies, as the product of multi-level and multi-stakeholder interaction, and highlight the effects or the lack thereof in partner countries within the region. Both ‘European ‘neighbourhoods’, as Europe unilaterally classifies the regions bordering on peripheral member states, have undergone radical transformation and traversed violent conflict over the past five years. In the East, recent Russian provocations and aggression pose an immediate threat to Europe’s security, and the developments in Syria and Iraq clearly show the limits of EU policies and capacities. These challenges put the Union’s coherence and its action capacities to a test.

Whether the perceived failure of EU policy in the MENA region is due to the overburdening expectations, to the unforeseeable turn of events or due to structural inadequacies, remains subject to discussions and will be examined in this study. Based on empirical evidence from elite interviews and survey data conducted among EEAS and Commission officials, this research examines how international and EU policy-makers evaluate the evolution of the ENP over the last decade, and what options they see for Europe to adjust or re-draft its strategies and instruments.

Case studies Based on document study, interviews with policy makers and taking into account the local context in recipient countries, as well as the regional and geopolitical dimension, the article contributes empirical research on EU action in a global hotspot area undergoing turbulence and violent transformation. The main instrument used for investigating these cases is process tracing, because such a qualitative approach of interpretative observation and sense-making may help to better understand the contextual factors and the dynamics of inter- and intra- organizational interactions.

Regarding the data, this research examines fresh empirical evidence from elite interviewing and sources from inside EEAS and Commission services, with respect to how EU policymakers themselves evaluate the evolution of the ENP and related strategies over the last decade, and what options they see for Europe to adjust or re-draft its strategies and

108 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0009) instruments. Since not all countries can be dealt with individually in the format of this study, the following cases have initially been selected for this piece of written evidence:

Iraq is a case of post-war reconstruction and state-building, after a foreign, US-led intervention and democratization campaign, chasing Saddam Hussein out of power and eventually executing him, and replacing the rule of the Baath party by a US friendly government. Following this external regime change, sectarian rivalries and the US-backed Sunnite government using their upper-hand to impose themselves over the Shia parts of the population, fragilized the country and drove it towards the brink of discomposure. In 2014 America withdrew its forces and left the country to itself and the goodwill of the international community. As a result, in 2015 the country is de facto partitioned into a Shiite South, Sunni East, and a relatively independent and secure Kurdish North. In response to the destabilizing effects of cross-border terrorist flows, the Council adopted a “Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da’esh Threat”, reiterating the need for a comprehensive approach, including security, humanitarian and development policies.30

Syria, Iraq’s Eastern neighbour, is entrapped in a devastating civil war, originating from internal upheaval against an anti-democratic government and later fuelled by the inflow of Muslim extremists. Between 2011, when the Arab spring movement reached the largest Middle-East state and threatened to end the autocratic Alawite regime of the Assad family, and 2015, 200.000 people are estimated to have been killed and 7 million people have been forced to flee their homes, seeking shelter in neighboring countries – and in Europe. A policy of non-intervention (and, as far as the EU is concerned, ‘neutrality’) contributed to a humanitarian tragedy of epic dimensions, to weaken the diverse rebel groups, and brought the West into the situation of having to choose Assad, over the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) in 2014. Since then Syria has become a pole of attraction for radicalized youth from Europe to join the Jihad under the banner of Da’esh, the Islamic State, as foreign fighters. EU action related to Syria is presently limited to humanitarian intervention on behalf of the refugees.

Post-revolutionary Egypt, after the Arab Spring movement took root in what has probably been its most emblematic protest on Cairo’s Tahir Square led to a short period of democratization from within, ending with ousting the first democratically elected President Mohammed Mursi, is about to – or has effectively – relapsed into an army-supported strong- man rule, relatively similar to the pre-revolutionary situation of quasi-dictatorship by Hosni Mubarak. Ever since the US withdrew parts of their traditionally generous support to the Egyptian Military, after the overthrow of the first democratically elected President by General al-Sisi, Russia seems to have grasped the opportunity to step in and knit closer ties with the leadership in Cairo (The Economist 18 April 2015, p. 33-34). The EU has struggled to adapt its policies and so far not tabled any convincing proposals nor shown the ambition to do so.

Libya, after the internal upheaval and external intervention by a UK- and French-led coalition, today is basically a failed state, a lawless space, divided between two governments, an Islamist regime, allegedly leaning towards and supported by a branch of Al Qaeda, in Tripoli, and a moderate government in Benghazi, both unable to effectively control the territory. Libya, after the eccentric dictatorship of Muammar Qaddafi represents a double challenge for the EU mainland, first as a breeding ground for terrorism; and second

30 Council (2015), ’Conclusions on the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da’esh Threat” (7267/15), of 16 March.

109 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0009) questioning its core values, the universality of Human Rights, as a major harbor of departure for migrants, many of them risking or losing their lives on their perilous fare over the Mediterranean Sea. Libya is a case of both internal rebellion and external (airborne) intervention, through NATO force led by France and the UK. In 2013, the EU has established a border assistance mission (EU BAM Libya) and ships under the EU NAVFOR ‘TRITON’ mission are patrolling Libyan coastal waters, in order to control the refugee streams.

Notwithstanding the diversity in the individual cases, what they have in common is best characterized as ungoverned spaces or ‘areas of limited statehood’, i.e. “countries where the state does not have administrative capacity (either material or institutional) to exercise effective control over activities within its own borders” (Krasner and Risse 2015: 546; Börzel and Risse 2010, Risse 2013), to different degrees confronting and challenging the EU as provider of both development assistance, governance capacity and – to a limited extent – human security. By studying EU foreign policy making across and vis-à-vis these countries, the present research aims at examining how the EU performs in these roles, and whether and to what extent it lives up to the expectations and to the EU’s own objectives guiding its external action, i.e. in foreign and security, neighbourhood and development policies.

EU Foreign Policy in the Arab world In the recent past, attempts to define relations between EU and the MENA date back to the Barcelona process, established by the Barcelona Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 1995. The three “baskets” for this process, namely (1) political stability and security, (2) Economic and financial cooperation and (3) cooperation on social, cultural and economic issues were later institutionalized in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. To implement the Barcelona working programme and part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU provided technical and financial assistance through the Mediterranean Development Assistance (MEDA) and loans by the European Investment Bank. Subsequently, the EU signed a series of association agreements with Tunisia (1995), Israel (1995), Morocco (1996), Jordan (1997), the Palestinian authority (1997), Egypt (2001), Algeria (2002) and Lebanon (2002). The negotiations with Syria remained inconclusive.

In spite of these attempts, one can still not speak of a unified comprehensive EU policy towards MENA. First of all, EU institutions do not have the competence to decide about specific foreign policies, especially security and defence remain prerogatives of the member states, even though frequently community capacities are needed to accompany action in these areas. Secondly, the countries in question are too different in their development and state of democracy, and too diverse are their specific problems, issues and interests to include them in a ‘one-size fits all’ approach (Börzel and Risse 2004). The EU itself as a composite and multilevel system comprises a number of actors with diverging competences, agendas, and interests, different also in their organizational setup, modus operandi and the political support, they can mobilize. Democracy promotion in the MENA is a cross-sectoral, shared-competence and multi-level effort, involving community and intergovernmental competence areas, requiring administrative capacities at several layers and of different organizational types, drawing on various political and bureaucratic power and resource bases.

Figure 1 schematically depicts the main institutional external actors in the EU system:

Figure 1 – EU foreign policy actors

110 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0009)

Source: Own depiction, 2015

Looking at how EU foreign policy is actually ‘made’, one might be well-advised to start with the different instruments and resources at the EU’s disposal. Figure 2 summarizes the different policy tools, pertaining to the different competence areas. The EU budget relevant for external relations can be categorized according to different legal bases: under the community pillar there are the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), global initiatives such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights31 and the EDF (European Development Fund – currently the 11th EDF, financed outside the EU budget by the MS, yet managed by the Commission); in addition, at the disposal of the EEAS there are the Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability (IcSP, formerly Instrument for Stability, IfS, managed by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments). In addition, the EU Parliament exercises a ‘droit de regard’ on CFSP and, since Lisbon, has full co-decision powers on all other aspects of the EU’s external action.

Financial means are defined in the multiannual financial framework (currently 2014-2020). In the area of foreign relations and development a distribution among third countries is worked-out, according to needs and areas of intervention, resulting in a number of country and thematic envelopes.

The instruments are depicted below:

Table 2 – EU foreign policy tools

31 See: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/human-rights-and-governance/peace-and-security/instrument-contributing- stability-and-peace_en; and: http://www.eidhr.eu/

111 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0009)

EU Foreign Policies toolbox with MENA

Common Security and Defence Cooperation tools with MENA Partnership with Policy (CSDP) financed by MS financied by EU budget Industrialised countries budget •Development Cooperation financed by EU budget Instrument (DCI) •Common Statements •Instrument for cooperation with •Sanctions •European Neighbourhood Policy Industrialised Countries (ICI +) •Joint Actions Instrument (ENPI) •Humanitarian assisatnce policy (ECHO) •Global tools such as the EIDHR (i.e. Election Observation) •Trade policy •Instrument to contribute to peace and stability

Source: Own compilation 2015

The overall coordination of EU external policies is done by the External Action Service (EEAS) - a new service under the self-legitimation pressure to demonstrate its value-added to achieve a coherent external policy. It thus has to combine, on the one side, the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), defined and elaborated by the member states via the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC), with, on the other side, the external instruments of neighbourhood, development, humanitarian and trade policies, all within the remit of the Commission. The implementation of EU action, which in the present cases is predominantly situated under the umbrella of aid and development, is also mostly done by Commission officials, attached to EU Delegations in third countries. In more detail, policy and action are distributed in the following way across the two competence areas:

‘Accidental power’ Europe? The EU measures adopted under the intergovernmental CFSP structures, such as sanctions or civilian and military crisis management are supported and implemented by supranational EU institutions and decisions in the areas of commercial policies, internal market, trade and finance. The supply of these underlying governance resources and low-politics capacities also equips the EU with actorness in foreign policy and contributes to its status and role as a small/soft/normative etc. or an ‘accidental power’.

Also in other regional and political contexts, the EU has drawn on from its ‘conventional’ governance capacities to enter the arenas of power politics or to become, e.g., the most prominent promoter of regional integration worldwide (Beeson 2005, Murray 2010), by actively encouraging and directly supporting such processes, but also by creating secondary incentives and indirect benefits for adopting ‘EU-like’ or EU-compatible structures in a mimetic fashion (parallel to ‘external governance’, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2008). Supranational competences and the community method in decision-making about ‘low politics’ (trade, market, economy and finance, agriculture) become the force of implementation and the organizational infrastructure for EU foreign and security policy action, or ‘high politics’.

112 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0009)

By defining and framing groups of countries as ‘neighbourhood countries’ or ‘neighbours of neighbours’, and treating them like a (subaltern) region of gradual association, the EU contributes to shape identities and to exercises an influence on political allegiances (East vs. West, Judeo-Christian vs. Muslim countries, fundamentalist regimes vs. secular democracies). The EU has been trying to reconstruct MENA as a region and according to its own image, along the lines of ‘shared or preferred values’ (Pace 2014: 974). During many years, the EU has been projecting its own values, superficially conceived, disguising the underlying interests governing the relationships with a series of pre-revolutionary, authoritarian regimes – interests such as stability and security, maintaining the status quo, containing of illegal migration, trade, and flow of natural resources (gas and oil). “In reality, the EU ensured its economic interests in the MENA were secured through its endorsements of authoritarian regimes at the expense of addressing the MENA people’s claims for their rights and freedoms” (Pace 2014: 974).

For systemic reasons, it is no coincidence that the EU has adopted an expansionist approach also in its external action, including the ENP. The EU’s administrative capacities have an inherent organizational bias for task expansion, incessantly launching initiatives, claiming and taking on ever new competences and responsibilities. A potential institutional lock-in and pro-integrationist bias of supranational EU institutions at the central EU-level has been detected earlier. Other than a competitive pressure for budget maximization between organizational sub-units, i.e. between the Commission and the EEAS, creating an opportunity structure favouring pro-active policy positions, all of the EU’s supranational institutions are driving cooperation through offering advice and incentives to adopt the Union’s rules (external governance effects) with the prospect to gain better access to the single market and benefit from the effects of the EU’s zone of economic prosperity and stability. This effect has been shown to lead to a permanent exercise of adaptation pressures, attraction and gradual absorption/co-optation of neighbourhood states/neighbouring countries. Previous studies (author, forthcoming 2015) have demonstrated how the Union’s ‘low politics’ activities and instruments (pre-accession strategy, economic assistance, external governance etc.) has shown to build up momentum and have – at times paradoxical – effects in areas of ‘high politics’, as security and defence.

Conclusions and recommendations The gist of the argument presented here was that ENP activities (the EU’s entrepreneurialism in the Middle-East, e.g. Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Syria, the North African countries – despite considerable setbacks) are rooted in the supranationalist bias inherent in the institutional logics (working-dynamics) of the EU external action administration (EEAS and relevant Commission services). Even though member states remain the principal actors behind the EU’s foreign and security policy also the specific organizational characteristics of the EU’s new external affairs administration influences policy design and implementation. International bureaucracies, such as the European External Action Service (EEAS), put in charge of coordinating, devising and conducting EU outward directed policies, may bias administrative decision-making and introduce a supranational action orientation, such as a predilection for integrated, supranationally coordinated and ‘joined-up’ or ‘comprehensive’ approaches, into the process of EU preference formation (Henökl 2015, Henökl and Trondal 2015, Simon 1972). Such a latent supranational orientation may play an increasingly important role in combination with a ‘high-politics’ component of EU-relations to the MENA and the Arab world.

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The review of the EU neighbourhood policy that will be presented in November 2015 should be seen as and should form an integral part of the EU’s Global Strategy. The new ENP, with a focus on bilateral relations and concrete areas of cooperatoin, promoting ‘differentiation’ and ‘flexibility’ of EU activities, will unavoidably cement the split between countries as well as the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, although keeping both in one overarching ‘pro-forma’ framework. As for the Southern neighbourhood, Europe’s ambitions will be adapted to the new realities and a number of painful lessons need to be carefully studied: The EU’s democracy promotion agenda has contributed to destabilization and radicalization. Europe is unable to spread its model and extend its zone of prosperity in the region. The key-concepts are ‘differentiation’, ‘flexibility’ and ‘pragmatism’. The ENP will need to differentiate and adopt more targeted approaches, offering aid, cooperation and market access (via ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements’, DCFTA) to those countries that are willing and able to embark on a reform path, e.g. Tunisia. With other countries the EU is likely to very pragmatically cooperate on individual initiatives on a case by case basis, including the areas of humanitarian and development aid, service provision, migration. The grand strategy of promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law will if not be abandoned altogether need to be scaled down to size, as expression of a new Realpolitik in the MENA region.

An EU Global Strategy would have to clearly outline the priorities for all fields of external action and develop a ‘full-spectrum EU diplomacy’ (Smith 2013: 664) or an ‘integrative’ diplomacy (Hocking et al. 2012), guide other Commissioners and provide a clear direction. In other words, this global strategy ought to be an overarching approach, including and integrating other strategies, reform and review processes. This holistic view seems to be missing at this point of time. Surprisingly, the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are but mentioned at the margins, and only with reference to development cooperation. This may indicate neglect of the SDGs in the Brussels' foreign policy community, rather putting the focus on a security strategy. As opposed, the SDGs could become an important reference point for the EU's overall external action, reflected the Global Strategy and related, ongoing review processes (EU 2020, EU sustainability strategy, trade review, European consensus on development, EEAS review). In order to achieve this, leadership by HRVP Mogherini and President Juncker would be required, mobilizing support for SDG by the extended group of external relations Commissioners as well as of the member states. The SDGs could be the way to substantially improve coherence across foreign policy areas, and provide common vision and guidance for frequently isolated efforts, following the silo- logics of separate portfolios. Otherwise, even President Juncker’s recently announced Africa- fund runs the risk to become a drop in the ocean.

References Börzel, T. and T. Risse (2004), ‘One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’, paper at the Workshop for Democracy Promotion, Centre for Development, Democracy and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, Oct. 4-5.

European Commission (2015), ‘Joint press conference by High Representative/ Vice- President Federica MOGHERINI and Commissioner Johannes HAHN on European Neighbourhood Policy Review’, Brussels, 4 March 2015, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4553_en.htm.

Henökl, T. (2015), ‘How do EU foreign policy-makers decide: institutional orientations within the European External Action Service’, West European Politics 38 (3), 679-708.

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Henökl, T. and J. Trondal (2015), ‘Unveiling the Anatomy of Autonomy: Dissecting actor- level independence in the European External Actin Service’, Journal of European Public Policy, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1020833.

Hocking, B. L., J. Melissen, S. Riordan, and P. Sharp (2012), Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st century. Netherlands Institute of International Relations' Clingendael'.

Howorth, J. (2015), ‘Strategy-less in a World of Power Transition’, Paper presented at the Fourteenth Biennial EUSA Conference, Boston (MA), March 5-7.

Lavenex, S. and F. Schimmelfennig (2008), ‘EU rules beyond EU borders: Theorizing external governance in European politics’, Journal of European Public Policy, 16(6): 791-812.

Mead, W.R. (2014), ‘The Return of Geopolitics – The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, pp. 69-79.

Missiroli, A. (2015), ‘Towards an EU Global Strategy – Backgrounds, processes, references’, EUISS report, September 2015.

Pace, M. (2014), ‘The EU’s Interpretation of the ‘Arab Uprisings’: Understanding the Different Visions about Democratic Change in the EU-MENA Relations’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(5): 969-984.

Risse, T. (2013), Governance Without a State? Policies and politics in areas of limited statehood, (New York: Columbia University Press).

Simon, H.A. (1972), ‘Theories of Bounded Rationality’, in: C.B. McGuire and R. Radner (eds.), Decision and Organization, (Princeton, N.J.: North Holland Publishing Company).

Smith, M.E. (2013), ‘Beyond the comfort zone: internal crisis and external challenge in the European Union’s response to rising powers’, International Affairs, 89(3): 653-671.

The Economist, ‘Russia and the Middle East: Putin’s targeted strike’, 18 April 2015, pp. 33-34.

Juncos, A. E., and R.G. Whitman (2015), ‘Europe as a Regional Actor: Neighbourhood Lost?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, early view July 2015.

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Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0014)

What place for Asia in the EU’s Global Strategy? And, which role for the EU in Asia? Any at all?

Introduction Over the past ten years the European Union’s (EU) enlargement and institutional reforms, not least of its external action have consumed a lot of the attention and energy of European policy makers, and since 2008 the focus has been on the European sovereign debt crisis. The agenda of the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been largely dominated by the member states’ engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the anti-piracy operation off the Somali shores. In the meantime East Asia – with emerging China and the ensuing changes in the regional political dynamics and its global repercussions – has crystallized as a strategic arena, decisive for international economic development, stability, and peace. Unlike Europe, Asia has no 'superstructure' and no underlying canon of common values, giving bilateral structures, especially regarding traditional security-issues, more weight. This piece of evidence sheds some light on the inner workings of Asia-Europe relations and explores by what means effective multilateralism can be achieved and how it is connected to international cooperation and development. The question this paper addresses is thus whether the EU’s efforts to promote multilateral global governance structures and international development by emphasizing region-to-region interaction and thereby promulgating its own model of regional integration in other geographic areas can be successful in an Asian context, where the rivalry between the US and China result in power politics and heightened security concerns. The presence of a regional hegemon and the absence of an existential threat are rendering it unlikely that Asia will establish effective regional governance mechanisms (Warleigh-Lack 2008). “Geopolitically, this means that the task facing Asian regionalism is Herculean in comparison to that seen during the European project” (Breslin and Wilson 2015: 128). Europe’s policy of multilateral engagement as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ may work as a buffer and add a ‘soft pole’, with the focus on international norms and regime building, thereby easing frictions between the two ‘hard- power players’. By showing what ‘orchestration’ (Abbott et al. 2015) can do for global public policy-making, this piece of evidence highlights potential venues for inter-regional engagement to the benefit of economic development, as well as regional security and stability. The lines of investigation are: What are the conditions conducive to multilateralism? When and why are actors inclined to actively engage in interregional endeavours?

To answer these questions the paper examines the EU’s ambitions to promote innovative elements of global public policy and emerging governance structures pertinent to international security, human rights, conflict management, trade and development, with evidence from both EU-Asia and intra-Asian cooperation. Particular importance is thereby given to the connection between traditional forms and aims of foreign policy and the specific characteristics and needs of development and humanitarian policies, the security- development nexus as well as the development-trade nexus. Without security, comprising the dimensions of traditional and non-traditional security issues as well as human security, beyond the immediate absence of violent conflict, it is impossible to create sustainable development and public welfare; on the other hand, in order to create lasting peace and

116 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0014) stability, it is necessary to build resilient communities, maintaining economic activities to sustain the livelihoods of local populations. Equitable trade in turn increases the chances for prosperity, whilst at the same time peace and a certain economic level are necessary to enter into fair and mutually beneficial exchange of goods and services. Finally, states, societies or ethnic groups tied together by trade relations, enabling and securing the livelihoods of their populations are also less likely to resort to violence to manage social or political conflicts, and to fall victim to fragilization or institutional failure. The specific challenge lies in ensuring policy coherence, and at the same time guaranteeing the prerogatives and independence of development and humanitarian policies. Considering China’s dominant role in the region and its struggle for power and influence in various contexts, Chinese development policy, in Asia as well as in other parts of the world, has given rise to suspicion as to both its intentions and outcomes, and has been seen a means of primarily securing its own political and economic interests (cf. Breslin 2015). Simultaneously, given the current soaring of tensions, in the South East China Sea, a peaceful and prosperous Asia is of European strategic interest in terms of international security and global economic development.

The EU’s regional approach to Asia The EU strategy towards Asia aims at mutual involvement of partners on both sides across a variety of regional institutions, governance structures and fora of cooperation, such as ASEAN, Asian Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), or the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Thereby the EU also seeks to increase coordination among Asian countries. It is a deliberate policy choice of a ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners 2002) as well as that of a ‘market power’ Europe (Damro 2012) to foster political and economic stability and development, to de-escalate confrontation and solve conflicts and crises. At the same time, over the last decades the EU has tried to reproduce its model of regional integration in other parts of the world (Murray 2010).

In conducting its external relations, during the 1990s and early 2000s the EU developed a preference to deal with third countries collectively, to lay out regional strategies, aid programs, specific agreements with countries in a particular region, and thereby encourages regional groupings. This was a ‘natural choice’ as the EU had reached the deepest degree of regional integration worldwide. “The extent to which the EU groups countries together on a regional basis is a striking and unusual feature of its foreign relations; no other international actor does this to the same extent” (Smith 2014: 69). These inter-regional relations are handled in varying formats, differing in intensity and broadness of approach. However, promoting regionalism and even shaping regions by externalization of the EU’s own principles of functioning has been interpreted as ‘euro-centric’, as a feature of “narcissism” or “a propensity [of the EU] to reproduce itself” (Smith 2014: 70). The pro-argument for classifying countries together and supporting regional groupings is fostering awareness of transnational problems and interdependence, as well as achieving effective multilateralism and contributing to a multipolar world. Recent tendencies of integration and centralization within ASEAN and a creeping institutionalization of the cooperation among its member states are probably a consequence of the regionalization-support provided by the EU over the last 20 years. Possibly as a result, ASEAN is more integrated at the institutional level than ever before and more closely resembles the EU. Now the ‘ASEAN Community (AC)’ comprises three communities (like the former European Communities, predecessors of the European Union), consisting of (1) an economic, (2) a society and culture, and (3) a security pillar. The new role and position of the ASEAN’s Secretary General (SG), represents the most significant innovation. The SG, to some extent became a supranational figure, typical of

117 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0014) the EU, and now sits at the negotiating table with member state representatives and is authorized to represent the AC position.32 Taking a certain path dependency in the organizational evolution of international bureaucracies into account, some degree of homogenization or emulation of EU structures may be attested and more isomorphism may be expected.

EU’s ‘supralateralism’ Even though member states remain the principal actors behind the EU foreign policy also the specific organizational characteristics of the EU’s new external affairs administration influences the design and implementation of foreign policies. International bureaucracies, such as the European External Action Service (EEAS), put in charge of coordinating, devising and conducting EU outward directed policies, may bias administrative decision-making and introduce a supranational ‘action orientation’ into the process of EU preference formation (Henökl 2015, Henökl and Trondal 2015, Simon 1972). Such a latent supranationalism dominating the behavioural dynamics of the EU’s foreign policy bureaucracy may play a particularly important role in combination with the EU’s predilection for the region-to- region component of its interaction with Asia. Rooted in the EU's internal experience with deliberation and coalition-building processes, a natural inclination towards negotiated order has been seen as an explanation for the EU’s ‘compulsive multilateralism’ (Smith, M.H. 2013: 668). This inclination may further help ‘governance transfer’ (Börzel 2013, 2015) and the export of European practices of coordination and cooperation, institutions of consensus building, agenda shaping as well as the creation of administrative capacity at the regional level.

Due to system-inherent mechanisms the EU has become the most prominent promoter of inter-regionalism worldwide ( Murray 2010), by actively encouraging and directly supporting such processes, but also by creating secondary incentives and indirect benefits for adopting ‘EU-like’ or EU-compatible structures in a mimetic fashion. Exercising such homogenization pressure towards isomorphistic adoption of a model, considered legitimate and successful – at least, as long as it is (or was) successful, i.e. 1992-2008 – is a natural behavioural trait, built into the Union’s organizational matrix. Lifting and co-opting multilateral ambitions to the supranational level, and conceiving and framing them as a prerogative of the Union is clearly a policy preference pre-determined by the organizational choice-structure; thus ‘supralaterlism’ is understood here to denominate the phenomenon of attracting and co- opting the competence and to embrace the discursive leadership for multilateralism by the EU level, as a behavioural preference engrained in the EU’s administrative decision-making premises (Henökl 2015).

The 2015 "Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council - The EU and ASEAN: a partnership with a strategic purpose"33 launching the initiative for the first strategic partnership with a non-state actor, may provide an opportunity to ask whether Europe’s supralateralism has become less attractive with the Euro-crisis or whether the measures adopted to secure European economic and financial stability are recognized as being an example of successful or adequate crisis management, witnessing of European solidarity and loyalty, as a model of reliable and steadfast mutual support. Michael H. Smith (2013: 662) suggests that the EU’s external influence “has been damaged by the revelation of its own vulnerability in the light of the eurozone debt crisis”, and that “the appeal of the EU

32 See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations (SAARC), ‘Roadmap for an ASEAN Community (2009-2015)’, Jakarta, April 2009; available at: www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/east_asia/dl/ASEANblueprint.pdf 33 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9025-2015-INIT/en/pdf

118 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0014) as an extraregional partner has been tarnished by its internal economic and financial travails” (ibid. 668). Especially the responses of two regional powers in Asia will be of interest here: Japan’s and China’s reactions may be informing of Asian perceptions of the EU’s problem solving capacity and ability of joint crisis management, in short its attractiveness as a partner and as a model to emulate. Despite these difficulties, regional integration may be furthered by institutionalizing inter-regional cooperation, and thereby from the outside entrenching the delimitation of the region, to some extent, defining a geographical space as a region by ‘out- of-area spillover’.

Discussing Asia in the EU’s Global Strategy process In June 2015, the HRVP has launched a scoping paper, to inform the discussions in the run up to the EU’s strategic review, due in 2016. This document, drafted by a working group involving the cabinet of the HRVP as well as senior EEAS officials, is mainly advocating the objective of the comprehensive approach and the need for the EU institutions and the member states to work together. The watchwords of the scoping paper are thus ‘joined-up’ action and holistic or ‘whole of government’ approach.

As a scoping paper for an EU global strategy, it provides a detailed overview of the challenges and complexities, talks about shifts and diffusion of power away from the state etc., but it fails to acknowledge the fundamental geopolitical power transformation that has been going on over the last decade. The language used is sometimes surprisingly casual and refers to “a rounded approach to Asia” without explaining what that might be. Less of a surprise the paper concludes that the EU can no longer afford the 'luxury' of vertical and geographic silos in policy making. EU foreign policy has long been criticized for the divisions and strict separations between policy sectors, a direct effect of the hierarchical organizational structure, with different vertical ‘competence-fiefdoms’, next to each other. Linked to wording as well as to a new efficiency focus, the text contains a lot of austerity- influenced language, emphasizing the urgent need to take action, and insisting on reduced action-capacity due to the financial crisis, alluding to a post-prosperity EU (as opposed to the EU at its peak in 2003 when the first Security Strategy was adopted, and in contrast to a – until recently – rapidly growing China). Alluding to China’s New Silk Road Initiatives and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established in 2015, the strategy discussion paper explicitly mentions “China’s efforts to develop infrastructural ties with Central and Southeast Asia as well as Europe” and “the growth of regional and sub-regional groupings in East Asia” as a source for dynamism and as the current ‘geo-economic’ mega-trends.

At the same time, this strategic review document adopts a critical tone towards China, with regards to human rights violations and its military assertiveness in the East and South China Sea, identifying it as a potential threat for “trade routes financial flows and a regional order in a part of the world which is of paramount importance to the EU” (EEAS 2015). In fact, the regular soaring of tensions in the South East China Sea challenge a peaceful and prosperous development of Asia as well as international security and global economic stability. The maritime dispute also tests the EU’s credibility to mediate and its capacities to help policing the respect of the rule of international law. With regard to capacities, the strategy paper touches upon the question of upgrading EU defense capabilities but does not make any direct reference to an "EU army" in order to avoid opposition by member states.

The overall assessment is that the document raises a number of important questions and delivers on substantial issues, providing rich material for interesting discussions and further reflections – reflection painstakingly needed in order elaborate a genuine EU-Asia strategy

119 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0014) that deserves this name. An informed debate about a European grand strategy needs to address the question whether the EU has or, in the negative case, how it could acquire the capacity to provide leadership in the quest for a negotiated international order as a crucial global public good.

Conclusion: A renewed EU engagement in Asia EU-Asia interregional relations are a vehicle for the promotion of multilateralism since in essence inter-regionalism is a multilateral process, i.e. ‘a way of acting that involves several states […] working together as a matter of practice’ (Scott 2013: 31). Japan has long been a partner in different regional and interregional fora (APEC, ASEM, ARF), for China regionalism is a relatively new policy option. So far, it is only part in the ASEAN plus tree mechanism (APT, namely ASEAN plus China, South Korea and Japan) and the Shanghai Organization for Cooperation, SOC, an intergovernmental security organization involving China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), as well as in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Not least because of the US’ pivot to Asia and the Pacific, the strategic importance of regional politics and economic development, decisive for stability, prosperity and global governance, has become clearly visible. EU engagement in Asia, and in particular the ASEAN-EU partnership, may be equally seen as a means of jointly orchestrating multilateral cooperation, international norm-setting and regime building (Henökl and Reiterer 2015). In such a perspective, the EU-ASEAN relationship becomes a venue for orchestration of both sides’ preferences for a multilateral global governance architecture.

On the other hand, the establishment of the AIIB may be seen as a case of successful Chinese orchestrating, especially in view of strengthening its relations with and affirming its influence on the String of Pearls, and providing a funding platform for its New Silk Roads initiative (Renard 2015). A number of states have overlapping, common interests, namely economic development and investments in infrastructure in Asia. This does not exclude the simultaneous existence of side-agendas, driven by divergent particular interests (e.g. counterbalancing the dominance of traditional global financial institutions) or expected political and economic advantages (trade and market access, return on investments etc). Whether China’s AIIB initiative can be seen as signalling a shift in strategy to a new multilateral approach away from its traditional bilateral cooperation remains to be seen. In the light of recent case studies (Henökl and Webersik 2015) this observation is not corroborated – quite the opposite: rather obviously China uses the leverage of the asymmetric relations it has in the cooperation with individual countries to the benefit of its own interests.

Comparing the EU to China begs the question, whether supra-national development cooperation is more effective and sustainable than bi-lateral cooperation. From a recipient point of view, a number of countries have benefited from large-scale Chinese infrastructure projects, as well as from China’s the political and military support. The disadvantages of such relationship are frequently negative terms of trade and a growing debt burden and a potential loss in authority over the control of domestic natural resources. Politically, close relations with China (including military assistance) may compromise relations with other regional powers, such as India, another ‘regional champion’ with great leverage on shaping domestic political and economic affairs.

On the European side, growing dependency of a number of low-income countries on Chinese investment and cooperation activities are increasingly raising concerns among policy makers. While the EU has in the past projected an image of a value-driven actor for global development – although with some discrepancies between discourse and action – it seems now to be

120 of 309 Dr Thomas Henökl, German Development Institute—Written Evidence (FSP0014) awakening to a changing global order, where the promotion of political and economic self- interest has returned to the debate about European foreign policy and its post-2015 development agenda. At the end of the day, the rationale here appears to be that if the EU wants to be a global actor that matters, it has to make sure by promoting its own agenda and interests through its external activities to put itself in a position to be able to shape and influence the future of international cooperation. As China is quickly learning the lessons from its own as well as European successes and failures, Europe will need to invest in orchestrating its partners worldwide in order to transform its cooperation agenda and particularly the sustainable development goals into a widely shared common interest and to translate them into joint global governance action.

References: Börzel, T.A. (2013). ‘Comparative Regionalism: European Integration and Beyond’, in: W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage, pp. 503-530. Breslin, S. (2013). ‘China and the global order: signaling threat or friendship?’ International Affairs, 89(3): 615-643. Breslin, S. and J.D. Wilson (2015). ‘Towards Asian Regional Functional Futures: Bringing Mitrany back in?’, American Journal of International Affairs, 69(2), 126-143. Henökl, T. and M. Reiterer (2015). ’Orchestrating Multilateralism: Cases of EU and East- Asian Inter-regional Engagement’, Regions and Cohesion, 5(3), Special Issue, Winter. Henökl, T. and C. Webersik (2015). ‘The European Union and China in a sustainable development goals framework: Comparing means and ends of development policies in Sri Lanka and Myanmar’, paper presented at the 9th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, 23 –26 September 2015, Giardini Naxos, Sicily, Italy. Renard, T. (2015). ‘Partnerships for effective multilateralism? Assessing the compatibility between EU bilateralism, (inter-)regionalism and multilateralism’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09557571.2015.1060691 Scott, D.A. (2013). ‘Multipolarity, Multilateralism and Beyond …? EU-China Understandings of the International System’, International Relations, 27(1), 30-51. Smith, M.H. (2013). ‘Beyond the comfort zone: internal crisis and external challenge in the European Union’s response to rising powers’, International Affairs, 89(3), 653-671.

121 of 309 Professor Stephanie Hofmann, Associate Professor, and Mr Ueli Staeger, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies—Written Evidence (FSP0020)

Professor Stephanie Hofmann, Associate Professor, and Mr Ueli Staeger, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies—Written Evidence (FSP0020)

1. Is the EU ready and capable to respond to the new security environment? What are the opportunities that it presents for the Union? In relative terms, the EU is ready and capable to respond to a contested and fragile security environment. Except for the U.S., no other international actor can project military capabilities as much as the EU (for the next decade to come). In addition, the EU (and its member states) has been an important donor in development aid.

That said, it lacks military capabilities and honest political rhetoric that create opportunities to respond to the current security environment. First, it lacks military capabilities (such as transport aircrafts and helicopters) to project its power independently. Second, the EU encourages a discourse that suggests that a powerful EU needs to be a united EU. In other words, having political will and can only be understood as such if the EU acts as one. This perception will always weaken the EU.

Given that the threats and risks are diverse, interconnected and complex, and given that the EU has many different policy tools at its disposal, “to agree to disagree” should become acceptable. This principle has a strong political foundation of every democracy in which political parties can represent different political opinions (constrained by a common constitution). Contestation can be strength and not a weakness of the EU. Given that the difference within Europe are often not radical in nature, political will within the EU could be re-conceptualised to make the EU more capable for the current security environment (I am not sure what is new about it, we just open our eyes to it slowly).

Today’s security environment needs comprehensive security policies and tools. Here, the EU needs to focus on its strengths and identify a limited few, realistic areas for tangible process. For example, the EU could develop a comprehensive military-civilian CSDP doctrine – at the Union level and with a distinct added value to member states’ policies. The EU’s long-term perspective on conflicts, its leadership in the field of development and its experience with military-civilian cooperation distinguishes it from other (Western) actors. Within the EU, fully putting into practice the ‘comprehensive approach’ means to develop a powerful hybrid or ‘soft security’ toolbox at the Union level. This will enable Member States to pool their resources for civilian and military-civilian peacebuilding. Yet again, to “agree to disagree” must be possible also within a comprehensive approach.

2. The High Representative, endorsed by the European Council, calls for an “EU global strategy on foreign and security policy.” Is the EU a global power? Is the High Representative too ambitious and if so, where, and on what, should the EU focus? The term global power suggests that the EU is a unitary actor. As I have outlined above, I find this a misplaced characterization of the EU. The term also suggests that the global distribution of power is static. However, the discussion on rising powers and BRICS shows that this is rather not the case.

122 of 309 Professor Stephanie Hofmann, Associate Professor, and Mr Ueli Staeger, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies—Written Evidence (FSP0020) I think it is better to understand the EU and its member states as actors with global reach. And this reach varies with the tools in question: the EU has diplomatic relationships across the globe, can project power and trade and/or invest development aid globally – but more so in some places than others. Hence a global strategy is welcome – not ambitious but reflecting the realities on the ground.

The very fact of drafting a new strategy can already improve upon some problems in EU foreign policy-making. Strategizing and prioritizing across the different EU institutions and among member states is a useful process to identify concrete areas where past EU rhetoric has been overly ambitious, and other areas where the EU’s global reach can do with more strategic orientation.

3. Should the EU focus its resources more closely on its own neighbourhood? What are the advantages and disadvantages of doing so? The EU’s thinking about its so-called neighbourhood needs to reflect a global perspective. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) might be trade and reform-oriented, but it has undeniable geopolitical implications. The upcoming ENP review should therefore, regardless of its substantial modifications of the policy, also bring about a change in strategic thinking about the ENP. The ENP needs to be further distinguished from the current ‘enlargement light’ approach: The EU’s neighbourhood requires different, globally aware policies.

Indeed, the EU’s neighbourhood is interconnected with its own neighbourhood as well. This can lead to spillover effects of many sorts. Interdependencies need to be taken seriously before this question can be answered in any meaningful way. Anecdotally, given that interactions with Armenia, Ukraine or Georgia also impact the EU’s relationship with Russia, for example, the neighbourhood definition needs to be assessed. The recent conflict in Mali has demonstrated that the Sahel region is connected to Western Africa.

Should the EU insist to focus on its institutionalized relationship with its neighbourhood, it creates predictable expectations but also forecloses deeper relationships with countries relevant to its own safety and security.

The EU’s narrow understanding of ‘resources’ as financial means limits its abilities at having global relevance. Particularly since the inception of the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU diplomacy offers an alternative resource for EU foreign policy. Precisely with its neighbours’ neighbours, Union-level diplomacy offers a welcome port of entry for sometimes strained relations. Coincidentally, both in the South and the East of the ENP neighbourhood, the African Union and Eurasian Economic Union respectively present a regionally integrative, distinct diplomatic challenge. Interregional dialogue and cooperation could not only serve EU interests in the short term, but also could ensure the long-term development of these regional integration processes in partnership with the EU.

4. How can the EU most effectively maximise its power – both hard and soft – in international affairs? Be more honest and realistic:

First, it can present an honest discourse over its ambitions, opportunities and constraints and follow through with (rhetorical) promises. A strategy without concrete implementation is superfluous. This honest discourse counters expectations that cannot be realized in the end. For example, the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force was drawn on paper in the end of

123 of 309 Professor Stephanie Hofmann, Associate Professor, and Mr Ueli Staeger, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies—Written Evidence (FSP0020) the 1990s (Helsinki Summit) but never really saw the light of day. This led to commentators arguing that the EU is constituted on a rhetoric-capability gap – while disregarding that the EU had many troops under command that sum up to the Rapid Reaction Force, many of which were deployed in national, EU or NATO missions.

Second, as already mentioned, the EU can institutionalize the principle to “agree to disagree.” This way, member states with a very ambitious or conservative policy agenda cannot utilize the EU as a scapegoat for (in)action.

Third, the EU should lead by example. Claiming to be a normative power but than acting like a realpolitiker does undermine the EU’s tools and capabilities.

Fourth, EU member states have to acknowledge that the EU is not their only multilateral forum and that they sometimes chose international organizations where their preferences are better met. In the realm of foreign and security policy, NATO and OSCE are such organizational options.

5. Is the EU an effective multilateral player? The EU’s impact on international and transnational foreign and security policy is undeniable. It has, for example, collected arms in conflict-ridden areas, monitored elections, trained police forces, took over executive tasks in foreign countries, conditioned other states to implement human rights legislations before conducting trade with them, and supported development projects. As such, it is an effective multilateral player in its own right.

Effective multilateralism does not just include EU internal cohesiveness, but also power over outcomes in other multilateral fora. The EU – or its member states – acts also within other multilateral arenas such as the UN, the OSCE or NATO. It is here where we can question its effectiveness. Acting as a block in the UN causes the G77 members to go against EU proposals more often than necessary. And acting as a block in the OSCE causes Russia to feel side-lined.

Acting as if it should be a unitary actor in NATO causes NATO-EU lack of cooperation (Cyprus can take EU-NATO negotiation hostage by insisting that they EU cannot negotiate with NATO in strategic matters). A joint EU position in multilateral fora is certainly welcome, but the EU should safeguard some flexibility and avoid coming to the negotiating table with “take it or leave it” positions. For example, confidential fall-back positions and specific negotiation mandates at the UN would enhance the EU’s ability to reach consensus without alienating others.

6. How can the interests of Member States be more effectively translated into EU action? How can the links between national capitals and the EU be strengthened in external affairs? Given the preceding discussion on the necessity to agree to disagree, member states preferences can be more effectively translated into EU action if they act upon a principle that has been established with the Lisbon Treaty: permanent structured cooperation. Acting upon this existing (but never used) principle can make the EU more effective, more visible and accommodates differences.

In addition, there could be more EU-level processes that invite member states to present their preference, concerns and hesitations. For example, the UN conducts regular reviews of

124 of 309 Professor Stephanie Hofmann, Associate Professor, and Mr Ueli Staeger, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies—Written Evidence (FSP0020) its policies. The EU could invite independent panels to review its foreign and security apparatus (e.g. the UN currently conducts a review of its peace operations) and then discuss the results with its member states before presenting its strategic review. In addition, there is still no mechanism based on which the EU and member states can exchange the experiences and lessons learned of peace operations that have been conducted either through the EU umbrella, other multilateral organizations/initiatives or unilaterally. Even within the EEAS, institutional memory and ‘lessons learned’ processes often fail to feed into the strategic and operational doctrine of future missions and operations.

More informal institutions could be created (for example bringing together smaller groups of states interested in particular issue areas) that can tease out possible negotiation channels for issues where no consensus exists or negotiations are stalling.

EU external affairs will always be more receptive of capitals’ needs if member states make use of the bodies they created. Transgovernmental bodies such as CIVCOM and EUMC are invaluable fora to shape EU responses to crises from the first instant. Permanent structured cooperation offers an opportunity to work towards specific goals. The EU Situation Room is in constant contact with EU representations across the globe and could, if used effectively, become a cornerstone of a reactive, coordinated policy of the EU.

In short, EU foreign policy is what member states make of it.

125 of 309 Professor Knud Erik Jørgensen, Visiting Fellow, Yaşar University—Written Evidence (FSP0022)

Professor Knud Erik Jørgensen, Visiting Fellow, Yaşar University— Written Evidence (FSP0022)

Changing global environment and EU interests  Is the High Representative’s report the right basis on which to draft the strategy proper?

The report should be seen as (only) part of the basis for outlining a strategy; consultation with key stakeholders (eg. chiefs of military staff, MFA directors, business Europe, major NGOs) should be an additional source of information. Yet the strategist would have to make selections among all the input and make priorities. It should not be a dreadful shopping list but a document that can provide guidance and rationale for the making of specific policies. It cannot and should not attempt to make everybody happy.

 The High Representative sets out a changed and more threatening global environment. In this new environment, what are the EU’s strategic interests? Do they coincide with the UK’s strategic interests?

If there are any UK strategic interests left they seem these years to be increasingly defined by isolationist sentiments and retreat (where is the UK in the Ukraine, Syria, vis-a-vis Russia? Rising China?).

In the new environment, the EU’s strategic interests comprise: a continued yet reformed military alliance with the United States, including building a capacity to self-reliance in territorial defence and crisis management missions; containment of an increasingly aggressive Russia; de-escalation of conflicts in the MENA region; an engagement in de-escalating tension in the Far East; a revived global trade agenda; a minilateral approach to climate change

 Is the EU ready and capable to respond to the new security environment? What are the opportunities that it presents for the Union?

It seems to me not to be the case. The EU and member states are not ready and not capable of responding. Russia has been bullying around for 6-7 years and been met by muted sanctions only; turmoil in the EU’s neighbourhood has been met with lack of engagement; Turkey is slipping away from Europe, partly caused by some EU member states, partly caused by a lack of interest in meeting membership criteria.

 The High Representative, endorsed by the European Council, calls for an “EU global strategy on foreign and security policy.” Is the EU a global power? Is the High Representative too ambitious and if so, where, and on what, should the EU focus?

The EU is foremost an aspiring global power. Yet a global power only in a few issue areas; in other areas a potential global power (e.g. the EU-28 a global No. 2 in defence spending and in terms of number of diplomats the EU-28 is a world leader, though the number does not translate into influence). The HR seems not to be too ambitious; the problem is rather a limited understanding of the nature of strategy. The review looks like a X-mas tree full of ‘things we already do’ and no end to “what we should do”.

126 of 309 Professor Knud Erik Jørgensen, Visiting Fellow, Yaşar University—Written Evidence (FSP0022)

Neighbourhood policy  Should the EU focus its resources more closely on its own neighbourhood? What are the advantages and disadvantages of doing so?  How would you assess EU policy in the neighbourhood? Are the foreign policy instruments in the neighbourhood fit for purpose? Should enlargement remain the major tool of in the EU foreign policy toolkit in the neighbourhood?

The EU’s ENP has been a disaster, zig-zag-ing from support to dictators one moment to moral support to demonstrators on the streets and squares the next moment; half-hearted intervention in Libya yet no sustained engagement. The only comfort is that the misery can be shared: other major actors have been equally vague and without much influence.

 What are the implications for the EU’s foreign and security policy of the Greek crisis?

Countries believing there are reasons for resentment vis-a-vis a missionary and preaching Europe (democracy, human rights and good governance) have got a good laugh. In short, the EU has lost credibility as an international actor and the pull of attraction (soft power) has been seriously damaged.

Upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa  What are the EU’s interests in the MENA region? How effective have the EU and Member States been in promoting them? What have been the obstacles to effective EU action in the region?  Member States and the EU have been calling for a policy to address the “root causes” of insecurity and to offer “tailor made responses” to the countries in the region. What would that involve? Does the EU have the foreign policy toolkit to deliver on this policy?

Capabilities and Capacities  What are the EU and Member States’ most effective and useful foreign policy instruments? Are they fit for purpose? Are they being used effectively? What structural reforms are required in order to make the EU’s foreign policy work more effective?  What additional capabilities, if any, are required for the EU and Member States to act effectively in the new security environment, for instance in response to emerging threats to its cyber-security?  How can the EU most effectively maximise its power – both hard and soft – in international affairs?

Soft power flows from being seen as a model example that others would like to copy. Being an economic crisis-ridden region does not help build such a model example. EU claims about being a normative power has been de facto destroyed during the summer of 2015 and the treatment of refugees the single most importance sources of lacking credibility. Moreover, most of the world is unaware of the EU. It is not on the radar so why copy it.

Maximizing hard power is equally difficult as it would imply not wasting military spending that EU-28 combined makes Europe a global number 2 but without the collective will to use

127 of 309 Professor Knud Erik Jørgensen, Visiting Fellow, Yaşar University—Written Evidence (FSP0022) military power to pursue European interests, defined on the basis of our identity ie what we Europeans are and want to be recognized for.

 Is the EU an effective multilateral player?

Well, the short answer is that it varies across issue areas and over time. The EU’s performing quite well in the WTO but not in the IMF, UN, FAO, NATO and several others. Ineffectiveness is typically caused by member states’ obstruction, the state-centric institutional structures of multilateral institutions. The long answer is in my three books on the topic.

 How would you assess the diplomatic and intelligence capacities of the EU and Member States? Does the Union have the expertise and capacity within its institutions and national foreign services to respond to a more complex and complicated security environment?

The diplomatic capacity of the EEAS is deliberately being kept at a level that approximates the Dutch foreign service and thus hardly what it takes to act as a global power. The US has app. 15.000 diplomats.

The Union does have the expertise and capacity within its institutions and (especially within) national foreign services to respond to a more complex and complicated security environment? However, the expertise and capacity is not organized in such a way that it can be used to respond; it is too compartmentalized to serve such a purpose.

Member States and the EU  How can the interests of Member States be more effectively translated into EU action? How can the links between national capitals and the EU be strengthened in external affairs?  Is the practice of ad-hoc groupings of Member States leading on foreign policy dossiers (as in the E3+3 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme) a useful template for future EU foreign policy? How could it be strengthened? What are the disadvantages of this approach?

It is a useful but insufficient alternative to a common approach. 3 and ‘in’ and engaged yet 25 are ‘out’ and do therefore not feel ownership to approaches or agreements. Sometimes key states can have their policy ‘multilateralized’ within the EU and thus have their policy writ large (for instance UK+F during the break-up of former Yugoslavia, yet the contact group was met with scepticism due to exclusion. In any case, the policy was wrong and did not deliver the formulated objectives.)

 How would you assess the flow of information between Member States and between national capitals and the EU? What are the hurdles to deepening intelligence sharing within the Union?

Process  How should the High Representative conduct the review? What would be the most useful outcome? How should the UK feed into the review?

128 of 309 Professor Knud Erik Jørgensen, Visiting Fellow, Yaşar University—Written Evidence (FSP0022)

 How should the review address the resourcing of the EU’s foreign policy strategy? Should the High Representative also outline the operational plans for advancing the EU’s foreign policy strategy?

Case Studies  Can you give examples of where EU foreign policy has succeeded and when it has struggled? What are the causes in each case?

129 of 309 Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp—Oral Evidence (QQ 161-174)

Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp—Oral Evidence (QQ 161-174)

Evidence Session No. 14 Heard in Public Questions 161 - 174

WEDNESDAY 11 NOVEMBER 2015

Members present

Lord Balfe Baroness Billingham Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Lord Stirrup Lord Triesman Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

______

Examination of Witness Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp, President of the Federal Academy of Security Policy, Berlin

Q161 The Chairman: Dr Kamp, can you hear me? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: Yes, I can hear you perfectly, Lord Chairman. It is a privilege to be in that position.

The Chairman: It is extremely kind of you to agree to give evidence to us. Let me begin by thanking you very much for that and also for the paper that you sent us. As I think you realise, this is a formal meeting of the Committee. Therefore, what you say is being recorded and will be made public. If you want to go off the record, do say so. Otherwise we will assume that everything is on the record. You have been sent a list of questions, I think. But I am sure my colleagues will have other questions to ask as well.

I will kick off with the first question. The UK is clear that NATO should remain the cornerstone of European collective defence and that the EU common security and defence policy should therefore focus on crisis management. Other Member States and the United

130 of 309 Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp—Oral Evidence (QQ 161-174)

States wish the EU to take more responsibility for its own defence. Where do you think there might be a middle ground between these two positions? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: Perhaps I may start with one sentence describing my own position. I am a staunch Atlanticist and always was, and do not believe in the overambitious ideas of the EU acting independently in the military field. However, having said that, these ideological disputes—these beauty contests, if I may call them that—are long over and we have now a much more pragmatic approach. I am happy to speak on the record. The Federal Academy, of which I am the President, is part of the German government, but I speak in my private capacity now. On your specific question, the point that the EU has to be focused on crisis management is no longer disputed. It is absolutely clear that any Article 5 operation is under the auspices of NATO. The middle ground that you asked about is what is happening now with the Ukraine crisis. We have NATO doing not the crisis management part, but the prevention of potential military attacks by Russia through deterrence and the strengthening of defence. That is one part. The other part is the EU, which is actually in the crisis management business, through sanctions, supporting Ukraine and reaching a gas deal. But the EU does not deal with any military means. No one speaks about battle groups in that respect. I think we have now found a natural share of labour that the big “ambitionists”, some 15 or 20 years ago when we had the “praline summit”, never envisaged. It has become clear through evidence and pragmatic necessity that, when we talk about European security and defence, it is always a Euro-Atlantic effort in which the EU has its role and in which the EU might act independently in a crisis management operation with the support of NATO or without it. Much of the fire is taken off the entire issue. The supreme relevance of NATO for the security of Europe is undisputed.

Q162 The Chairman: Thank you. Following up on that, what would be the implications, in your opinion, for the future direction of the EU common security and defence policy and for EU-NATO co-operation if the UK were to vote to leave the European Union? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: My Lord Chairman, I am not in a position to take a view on whether or not the UK should do that. But I think that the implications of such a move would be severe, and not only on NATO-EU co-operation, which is a pretty tiny aspect of a much broader picture—by the way, as you know better than I do, that does not work that effectively anyway for a number of reasons. It would end in an overall weakening of Western—and I use that term intentionally—security and defence due to two reasons. First, we would have the Scotland problem, in the sense that the UK would have a severe problem with regard to its nuclear capacity. It is not for me to judge whether you would be able to deal with it, but it will be a problem. Secondly, Scotland might decide to stay, under whichever formula, in the EU. At the end of the day, I think Vladimir Putin would exploit this as a means of disunity. That is why I used this term “Western” specifically. If I may add one thought, I think that Russia has a pretty clear strategy on what to do. I am not sure whether it is successful—I do not think it is. Strategy always has a goal and a way to that goal. I think the goal is to re-establish Russia’s grandeur and its key position in international politics. The way to this goal is to find cracks in Western unity and to exploit and possibly widen them. This would certainly be one crack that Russia could widen. I am not sure whether this will have any impact on the UK decision, but the implications would be significant. The Chairman: That is very interesting. Thank you very much.

131 of 309 Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp—Oral Evidence (QQ 161-174)

Q163 Lord Stirrup: Thank you. Herr Doktor, you said that NATO is fundamental to European security. But we have been told that the Berlin Plus arrangements are dead in the water, therefore leaving the EU with no practical access to hard military capability. Do you agree with that assessment, and if you do, what practical and political steps do you think are necessary and can be taken to improve the mechanism between the EU and NATO? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: Berlin Plus was agreed upon 15 years ago. It was a completely different time; a time when we did not have the experience in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan we realised from the beginning that Berlin Plus was pretty useless; not useless in itself but in Afghanistan we needed something completely different. We did not have an EU crisis management operation in need of capacities from NATO. We had a NATO crisis management operation, or a NATO-led, 50-nations crisis management operation that needed a host of other things, not least from the EU itself, to deal with the situation there. So we came to the famous term “Comprehensive Approach”. It is a nice term, and we all use it, but it is very difficult to implement in reality because everyone likes to co-ordinate but no one likes to be co-ordinated. This is something with which Berlin Plus does not help us much. If someone says that Berlin Plus is dead in the water, it is probably because it was not able to swim. At the same time, by the way, we have, once again pragmatically, a situation in which NATO has developed all the flexibility in the world to deal and to operate in a variety of combinations: NATO nations only; NATO nations with or without the US; NATO nations plus non-NATO nations; only European NATO nations; only EU NATO nations. That would be possible provided that it had the consent of the others. You may lament or complain that Berlin Plus is dead—yes it is—but it does not change the course of the world that much. Probably it was needed as an evolutionary step to the situation where we are now, but I am not worried that it is basically dysfunctional.

Q164 Lord Horam: Herr Doktor, you very kindly sent us your policy brief of March 2015, Closing Ranks: Aligning NATO and the EU’s Strategic Priorities, which we were all very interested to read. In that, you said that one option to reinvigorate EU-NATO co-operation might be for a European pillar within NATO. How exactly would that work? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: My line of reasoning was that we have a fundamental change in our security requirements due to two developments in 2014. One is the attack of Russia on Ukraine, which means that Russia ended, once and for all, the partnership with the West— and by the way, this is not a bad-weather period but a fundamental climate change. The second is the situation in the new Middle East in which we have developments that are apparently beyond our control. Taking these two things together, we have a fundamentally new security situation and are back in the Article 5 world. Not having fully understood what this means and all the implications, we are now, step by step, developing this. If this is the case, this also has an impact on the EU’s ambition for military action, because the EU has two problems. As we said in the very first question—now, I will sound pretty much anti-EU; I do not mean it that way—if the EU’s logic or reaction is crisis management, I do not see crisis management in major operations along the lines of Libya and potentially Syria happening. Why? Number one, we have intervention fatigue in all our societies because the result of our operations were, for a number of reasons, not that successful. Secondly, as I said earlier, there is not much that we can do, for example, in the Middle East. People say that we should fight the root causes in Syria. This is always right and always nice, but it is just not going to happen. To deal with the root causes in Syria means to get rid of Assad and to

132 of 309 Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp—Oral Evidence (QQ 161-174) do it in a way that Russia accepts and that Iran finds nice, and in a way that we get to a post- war situation. This is just not going to happen. This leaves the political field, the politically responsible people like you, in a completely new situation. We have to deal with the consequences, and refugees are one such, without being able to deal with the root causes. Having said all that, it is very unlikely, except for some small operations with a few people, that NATO as NATO, or the EU as the EU, will enter into a major crisis management operation; it would be on a bilateral basis or the basis of a coalition of the willing. If that is the case then the EU has a problem because its military ambitions are dependent on the logic of crisis management. NATO does not have that problem; even if it does not do any crisis management any more, crisis management is only one of its three core strategic functions. NATO always has its justification under Article 5 on self-defence. Actually, if you put my reasoning into an extreme case, the reasoning for EU military capacities is eroding. This leads me to the logic that, since we can imagine the necessity of using military force for all kinds of reasons, it does not make sense any more to split this into the EU doing crisis management and NATO working under Article 5. It would make sense to understand the European NATO members, or the EU members, as the caucus in NATO. Yes, we have some side issues, which you know better than I do—Turkey, Cyprus, Greece—but the overlap of members is so high that, at least conceptually, I would return to the idea of security that we had before St Malo. We also only have one set of forces, by the way, so why does it make sense to split this up? This is just an idea, kicking a stone to get it rolling, to look at how this is done institutionally. You will never cancel the St Malo agreement, but we must understand that, as I said at the beginning, the beauty contest is over and the EU and NATO can act together. This was my basic reasoning.

Q165 Lord Stirrup: Herr Doktor, on this point, the key difficulty seems to be that within NATO you can have a variable-geometry NATO operation, as we have had in the past, but the military and political aspects of the operation are all considered in the same institution, NATO. Is there a prospect of a European operation, or NATO—essentially, the EU nations—being run not just militarily but also politically from inside NATO with no direct involvement of the EU institutions? Is that not going to be a really difficult practical problem with your suggestion? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: You will have all kinds of practical problems, but the idea is to change the basic thinking of our political leaders. Not that I have the ambition to do that, but by writing such an article I was putting forward the idea that there was a different way of thinking about it. It would certainly depend on the contingency and on the political will of the nations involved. One thing surprises me on the point that you just mentioned: in many cases the same people are acting in different fora. They go to one forum and say this, then go to another and say that. For a political outsider like me, an amateur, that sounds a little bizarre. By the way, in my view this is the major flaw of this overambitious EU thinking: I cannot foresee a military crisis big enough to involve all the EU members but not big enough to also involve the US. In my view, there is always that natural link. We have another positive development in dealing with these institutional problems. You are completely right, and I am not expert enough to understand how the different institutions in Brussels could interact. However, we have one fundamental change on the other side of the Atlantic, if you recall that the former US permanent representative once said that the EU developing its own military capacities would be a threat almost as big as the Soviet Union. Give me a break, with all due respect. So there the ideological thinking has dwindled significantly. We had long discussions about whether or not military improvements would happen within the EU or in NATO, and we were fighting back and forth. Now Washington

133 of 309 Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp—Oral Evidence (QQ 161-174) says, “If the Europeans manage to strengthen their defence capacities, we don’t give a damn where they are. We only care if they happen at all. What counts for us is that they’re there”. On that basis, accepting all your caveats on potential institutional difficulties, if it was decided by the leaders at top summit level, I do not think the Commission or the Council would create severe problems.

Q166 Baroness Billingham: Good afternoon. You have already touched on two parts of the answer to the question that I am going to put to you, which refers to the Berlin Plus arrangement. It has been suggested to us that there should also be a reverse Berlin Plus arrangement, which would allow NATO to call upon EU soft power assets and financing. Do you think that is a good idea? What assets could we mobilise? In what scenarios could you envisage such arrangements working? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: In my humble view, although I am not an expert on tricky EU or NATO internals, Berlin Plus was an arrangement that had a bureaucratic background. It was necessary to negotiate to see what was possible or not. I will come to your point about Berlin Plus in a second, but first, what are we talking about? Basically, we are talking about the readiness of the US to grant its military capacities to the EU, and you need to negotiate the details of that. At the top level, it requires the willingness of the US to do that. If that is there, everything else is pretty much the nitty-gritty. I assume that a sharing of operational capacities would also have been possible even without the Berlin Plus agreement. Now, let us transfer that to a reverse Berlin Plus. Many academics have had the idea of a reverse Berlin Plus, but what does it mean if you really think it through? What are the EU’s soft power assets? The most important one is money. Do you really foresee that Washington will say, “You know what? We need a little money from the EU budget for a certain operation”. If that were to happen, it might be because your Prime Minister, my Chancellor and the US President agreed on something, but not because we had a Berlin Plus, or reverse Berlin Plus, agreement. Once again, even if we had it now, I think a reverse Berlin Plus would have the same fate as the Berlin Plus. It stems from a time when we were discussing two different entities as if they were on different planets. Sometimes in Brussels, as you well know, to go from the EU to NATO was to go to hostile ground. That is over, so I do not see the necessity and I cannot imagine a real requirement, any contingency, in which such an agreement would be of any value. Baroness Billingham: In my humble opinion, I think you are right.

Q167 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: I have a quick supplementary on that, Herr Doktor. You quite rightly point out that NATO has developed the concept of a joint task force, which will operate in a flexible way. I think that was adopted back in 1994 at the Brussels summit, but the first time it was used was 20 years later when Operation Inherent Resolve, I think it is called, against ISIL was started in October or December last year. At the latest count, that has about 60 or 61 nations associated with it. Do you think there is the political need or the political will to sharpen up that concept before it can be considered a credible potential tool? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: Would you mind repeating the last sentence? The connection was interrupted. Earl of Oxford and Asquith: Do you think that the concept of a Combined Joint Task Force needs to become a lot more credible and a lot more precise before it can be adopted as a practical tool?

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Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: I think the Combined Joint Task Force agreement was, first and foremost, like Berlin Plus and all these things, more or less about an intellectual concept being crossed in saying that NATO is not just nine to five but has changed. In 1994, we had a completely different situation. We all believed that we were surrounded by friends, and that has slightly changed now. If you recall, NATO at that time was desperately trying to prove its relevance. We had all these pretty groovy—from today’s point of view—ideas about NATO being a subcontractor of the UN and maybe doing crisis management, because hardly anyone could imagine a severe Article 5 crisis any more. That has now changed significantly. As I have said, I am a military layman, but the Combined Joint Task Force idea has been supplemented by so many practical agreements. We have arranged a number of practical ways of co-operating in Afghanistan, which were done pragmatically and as needed. We have today’s idea of improving NATO’s defence capacities without spending too much money—I will not comment on whether that is a good idea or not. The Germans brought in the idea— I forget the name of it—that other smaller nations should group around a leading nation for certain operations, which is now before NATO. I have gone blank about the actual acronym or the exact description. All these elements enable NATO to co-operate with non-NATO nations. I think we are perfectly fine doing this. It has been proven in Libya and Afghanistan. I do not think that it will, but should a Syrian operation become necessary, it would work there as well. I do not think that a formal sharpening of a concept that is basically 20 years old is necessary now.

Q168 Lord Dubs: Herr Doktor, I dare say you would agree that the disagreements or tensions between Turkey and Cyprus pose difficulties for closer EU-NATO co-operation. Do you see any signs that Turkey might modify or reconsider its opposition to Cypriot participation in formal EU-NATO meetings, and can anything be done to resolve this problem? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: I think we all know that Turkey is a problem—probably the key problem, although not the only one. When it comes to the question of EU-NATO cooperation, my personal opinion, speaking in my private capacity, is that some of the allies happen to hide behind Turkey when it comes to better co-operation between NATO and the EU or when it comes to a more political discussion in NATO, which is deeply necessary. Then we have other nations that tend to block things and always point to the case of Turkey. So there is much that could be done. Do I have an idea of how to solve the Turkey problem? No, I do not, but sometimes I feel that if it were tackled at the top level it would not be impossible to solve it. But I do not understand how Turkey can block NATO from discussing certain issues. I am sorry, but I do not understand the logic. France, by the way, does the same thing, but if the other 26 wanted to discuss it, they could do. With certain steps that require the full consent of all NATO nations, and formal decisions of course, every NATO member including Turkey has a blocking power. But much in NATO, as you know, is dealt with informally through tacit agreement, through silent procedure. I do not have an idea for solving this formally, but there needs to be political will. With the Ukraine crisis for instance, there was an urgent need for more NATO-EU co-operation on the issue of hybrid warfare, which is a national issue that has to be tackled by individual nations. We are talking about police forces and how to deal with the little green men—you do not shoot them but send police and ask them for their passports. This is not happening and I am completely astonished. You can say that we have quadrupled the number of EU- NATO meetings from, I think, one or two in recent years to four now, but there is still much to do, and I do not think this is about just Turkey.

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Q169 The Chairman: Do you think the current strategic review can make any difference in this context in terms of EU-NATO co-operation? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: Do you mean the new NATO Strategic Concept or the current strategic review? The Chairman: I meant the Mogherini exercise. Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: Once again, you are asking a non-EU expert. I found the 2003 EU strategy had an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage was that it had a small number of ambitions, defined on paper in a straightforward way. That is the good news. The bad news is that it was not a strategy because it had no force behind it. Now, of course, it makes a lot of sense after 12 years to have a new concept. What I hear now from the Mogherini approach—forgive me for this simple talk—is that it is everything from Plato to NATO. The title alone—what is it, “global strategy”?—suggests that it is not like the NATO Strategic Concept, with the EU defining its military ambitions, which we can agree or disagree with, and realistically asking what it can do and what tasks it can undertake. I am concerned that this is, once again, one of these EU treaty papers with 750 pages which no one reads. I am missing focus. The problems that you are pointing to are very precise. How do we deal with NATO and the EU? What about the EU’s crisis management capacities in a world which is reluctant to manage crises? How do we deal with a lack of resources on both sides? How do we deal with a US government who might redefine it? There are all these questions. This is my personal opinion. I hope I will be completely wrong, but they will be worried by the global ambition of the EU, even though the EU is not actually a global actor, at least not in the military field. The Chairman: Thank you. Lord Balfe is going to ask a question about Turkey and NATO, which was later on our list of questions but follows naturally here.

Q170 Lord Balfe: Yes, Herr Doktor, I would like to follow up on the Turkey issue. The military in Turkey, which used to be all-powerful, has gradually been rolled back and is now a much less powerful force within the Turkish state. I wonder whether you see a further shift in the balance of power following the recent very decisive election of the party that has done the most to roll back the power of the military. Do you think there will be a shift in Turkey’s commitment and approach to NATO? You say that you are not an EU expert, and that is a different question, but my question here is about its approach to NATO. Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: My Lord, I worked for NATO for six years, and my experience is that on a number of issues NATO is not an easy ally. By the way, some allies are not easy either, and if you like we can now discuss who is the worst. On the other hand, I have to grant that Turkey is in a particular geographic environment and being confronted by certain things. I am not supporting or justifying Turkish policies; I would wish for a different Turkish government, but we do not have that so we have to deal with them. At the same time, 10 Turkish cities now have a Syrian majority. We have to grant that Turkey has a number of problems that we have only to a much smaller degree, and that of course affects Turkish policy. Point number two is that yes, Turkey is exploiting its role, position and our need to deal with it. I still have not understood how the refugee question is changing the entire fabric of NATO and the EU, but for a number of reasons I have a concern that that is going to happen. So we have to deal with Turkey as it is. Do I see Turkey being a member of the EU? No, I do not. Not least, we would need public votes in a number of countries, including France, for that to happen. So Turkey will remain a difficult partner. On the other hand—

136 of 309 Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp—Oral Evidence (QQ 161-174) maybe I am overoptimistic; I always am—Turkey is also in need of NATO’s defence. The fact that the NATO Secretary-General declared NATO’s readiness to defend Turkey in case of need is something that is important for Turkey as well. Would I prefer to have a different Turkey? Yes, I would, but unfortunately it is as it is and we have to deal with it. Mr Erdogan is a difficult person. He may be—once again, this is not to be quoted—overambitious. There is another term for that, which I do not want to use now. Still, that is the person that we have, and we must deal with him. I think we can deal with Turkey as we always did in the past. I think that Turkey realises two limitations to its own power. The first is the economy. I am not sure that the Turkish economy will go as well in the next 10 years as the Turks hope it will. Secondly, I think Turkey has understood that the ambition it was selling to us a year ago—“We are the bridge between Orient and Occident”—did not work out that way, and Turkey’s other ambition of “No problem” did not work at all; Turkey has a lot of problems and is increasingly aware that it needs allies to deal with them.

Q171 Baroness Coussins: Turning to military capacity and resources within the EU, you will be aware that at the NATO summit in Wales a number of Member States promised to increase their defence spending to 2% of GDP. Do you agree with other witnesses who have suggested to us that that is not a credible promise? Secondly, considering the strategic context facing the EU, where would you say the serious defence shortfalls are within the EU, and where should Member States invest? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: Is the promise made in Wales of spending 2% credible? Is it as credible, or indeed as un-credible, as all such promises have been in recent years, as they have been a couple of times? Is this only bad news? No, we have bad news and good news. Yes, only five countries in NATO today reach the 2% bar. The fact that Greece is the second best performer is probably not what we wanted to come out of the 2% promise. The good news is—I can say this at least for my own country—that we have a tidal change in the perception of our parliament on how to deal with defence spending. Are we keen on spending more and more? No, we are not, but a couple of years ago if you only mentioned the possibility of raising the defence budget, you would have heard an outcry of protest. That is over. An increase in German defence spending—I will come to your question in a second—will happen homeopathically, as it always does in Germany, but the fact that it is happening at all is a fundamental change. The bad news is that six European countries have increased their defence spending but six have cut it further. That is something that I find completely unacceptable. The fact that eastern European countries and even Baltic countries are among them scandalises me, again in my private capacity. It is unacceptable because, as the US President said a while ago, “We, the US, cannot take more care of Europe than it can take care of itself”. I think he is absolutely right. Where are we heading to? Will all NATO and EU allies fulfil their promise? No, they will not. In fact, with all due respect, I am not sure whether countries such as the UK, Poland or France would like Germany to match that figure; since our GDP is so high, that would mean a defence budget significantly higher than the UK’s, France’s or Poland’s. That might cause some political eyebrow-raising because we would end up in the range of some €55 billion. That is not realistic, and I think the German Chancellor said in Wales that our current level of 1.3% was unacceptable but 2.0% was unrealistic, so we would end up somewhere in between. There are ideas of different ways of measuring the contributions quality-wise. I am not sure whether they are credible as they are difficult to measure. At the end of the day, once again, we have at least two pieces of good news. You can quote all the bad news in the world; indeed, there is too much bad news, and you are right to point to it. We are not spending enough on defence. Why? In many European countries we

137 of 309 Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp—Oral Evidence (QQ 161-174) do not have an awareness of the threat. Germany in particular is not a country like the UK, which has a tradition of global responsibilities. We might have to learn that, as might other European countries. However, as I said, there are two pieces of at least slightly good news. The first is that there is increased awareness of the fact that we are in an Article 5 world, which requires different thinking about the budgets and resources that we are willing to spend on security. Having said all that, you see an increase in military capacities. You see that NATO, including its EU members, is much better at fulfilling its promises on the readiness action plan. Some countries, including Poland, were concerned after Wales and said that they had signed a nice declaration but would not actually implement it, but in general we Europeans, we Germans, did much more than other people believed we would. Is that enough? I am not sure, but at least the situation is not as bleak as some people portray it.

Q172 Lord Triesman: Good afternoon, Doctor. Your paper says that the strategic context “poses challenges”, but it looks sufficiently threatening to potentially generate enough political will in the Member States of the EU to take on a more capable military role and become a more capable military actor. If you look at the states’ national interests and traditions and the increasing reluctance across European politics and among political elites to intervene militarily, do you think there are any steps that could be taken to make the EU a more willing partner in engagement, or should we simply turn to NATO for that engagement? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: My Lord, the fact that we have intervention fatigue in all our societies is in my view not so much because people do not want to intervene or take responsibility. I must say I am surprised by my own Government, who, in 2014, promised to take a greater international role. Believe it or not, they did, against the public will, so things are developing. The reason why we have intervention fatigue is that apparently, our possibilities to change things on the ground, particularly in the Islamic world, the greater Middle East and Africa, are limited. We have all experienced the completely surprising news and insight of what happens even with a successful operation. I would say that Afghanistan was not a failure— not at all. It was very successful. We achieved a lot but now we have a situation in which the people there burn the schools we have built and kill the teachers we have trained. So apparently, the idea that through crisis management operations, be they military, civilian or whatever, you can do some social engineering and improve a situation is overambitious. We all have to become humble. I still have not yet figured out what went wrong in Libya. Basically, neither the EU nor NATO really assesses this and learns lessons from it. What went wrong? What was the moment when we failed? Are we really in a situation whereby this crisis cannot be tackled? So what I am saying is that this is not a case of our unwillingness or lack of insight about the need; it is just the realisation that if almost every crisis has become worse after our intervention, this leads to the public saying, “Sorry, guys, but this is not something we want to subscribe to”. That is understandable. On the other hand, I am surprised to see that people are ready to fight. Basically, we have two pieces of good news. First, people are ready to fight for defence reasons—as I said in relation to Article 5. I was surprised by the cohesion shown by the EU on sanctions, and I think Mr Putin was pretty much surprised by it. Sanctions work. We Germans had an easy say in the matter but a country like France or Italy, with its back more or less against the wall, has problems with the sanctions. But still the EU is holding together and NATO is holding together, although probably Portugal has a completely different threat assessment than Poland has. So this is pretty good news, which I find surprisingly stable. As I said, Mr Putin completely miscalculated our capacity to keep our cohesion.

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The second piece of news is, remember what was said in all our societies—in the UK, Germany, and France—by the academics who all said that we are the post-heroic societies. Our societies are no longer willing to suffer harm. They are not taking casualties. Maybe the Brits and the French are because they have a tradition of doing so, and maybe the Americans are, but the Germans will not and the Poles will not. All our nations were in Afghanistan for 14 years; we all had casualties. We in Germany were allowed to refer to casualties. We were not allowed to call Afghanistan a war for quite a while. Even now, medals are awarded for bravery. So what I am saying is that the security policy maturation of those EU nations not as mature as the UK and France due to their history, is incredible. This surprises me but is this enough for the future? I do not know but it is certainly more than we had in 2001. I know that is not an answer to the question, but I only can report about moods and feelings which I sense in my society and in the NATO societies.

Q173 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: Germany has shown its willingness to take a political leadership role in Ukraine and it has also undertaken its own security and defence review. If we just leave aside the issue of defence spending increases, which you quite rightly say can sometimes be a bit irrelevant to the assessment of building capacity, would you say that the German security review is likely to result in any recommendations for new political military capabilities for Germany, particularly within the EU? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: My Lord, yes; as you say, Germany is taking greater responsibility, and it realises, stunningly, two effects which come with taking greater responsibility. I will come to your question in a second. The first is that Germany gets criticised, regardless of what it does. That is something the US, in part also the UK or France, as bigger international powers, are pretty much used to—namely, you are damned if you do and damned if you don’t. This is a new experience for some of our key decision makers. The second insight is that politicians realise that engagement alone, which we show, and foreign policy activism do not lead to the solving of problems. This is a new insight. I can tell you that there has never been so much foreign policy in Berlin as in the last one or two years. We have had Kerry here and Netanyahu. At the end of that, we are not able to solve the problems in either Syria or Libya, or any of the issues which we have. It takes a while for politicians to digest this insight. I come to your question about capacity. By the way, the term I was lacking before was the famous Framework Nations Concept. I am sorry; it escaped me earlier. How can we generate new capacities with limited resources? I always annoy my military colleagues here in the institute with my layman’s comparison. I say to them, “Sorry guys; yes, I can understand your complaint about lacking resources, but if we take the defence budgets of all NATO and EU states together, and we add all the other ones from the axis of the good in the world— the West, the Swedes, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Finns, and God knows what—we end up with some 70% to 75% of global military expenditure”. If this is not enough to cope with the challenges, something is wrong here. Then we come to the endless discussions on how to spend money wisely—do we have personnel costs that are too high?—but that is where we are. On the ideas in the Framework Nations Concept, smart defence was, with respect, a silly term more or less from the beginning; there is no such thing as a dumb defence. But the idea of more co-operation is the right one. If I may add one catchword, which I missed in your set of questions, half a year ago we were discussing the European army vigorously. There was a huge debate that started in Brussels, and we had it in Germany. There will have to be pragmatic co-operation between the Dutch and the Germans, because the Dutch do not have any tanks any more, and between many

139 of 309 Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp—Oral Evidence (QQ 161-174) other European countries because they lack capacities, so we will get something like a European army. It will not be the army that people thought of—as an actor of the European state, or that sort of thing—but we will have the Europeans acting militarily, with or without the US and in a constructive manner. Our capacity-building will go that way. In Germany, which you specifically asked about, we are now increasing our defence budget. That is the good news. The bad news is that most of that increase will be consumed by salary increases for the soldiers. However, at the same time we will have a chance. The signal is that we will constantly increase our defence budget, and we will use this to reactivate desperately needed issues. If you saw now where capacity-building is needed in Germany, for instance, you would not believe it. We have had an exercise in NATO on how to bring one brigade from Portugal to the Baltics. It took 21 days just to get all the permissions to get this thing done, with all the customs and regulations. It took another 10 days to find all the trains that were able to transport tanks. The entirely reforged industry for reinforcements that we had in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s is gone, so we have to start there. However, since the awareness is there, I think that we will have this. As you can see, we now have the VJTF with 4,000 men. Now we can debate endlessly whether that is enough. Given the 60,000 to 70,000 men being mobilised in a snap exercise, it may not be— but it changes Putin’s risk calculus. My last point, if I may, is that we will always have a debate in NATO and in the EU between those who say “Not enough” in eastern Europe and those who say “It is way too expensive already”, such as Italy, France, Spain and Portugal, due to geography and different interests.

Q174 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: That is a very interesting exposition. I have a follow- up question from what you were saying about the last two years and how Berlin has been a hub for foreign policy-makers and people visiting. This Committee has heard evidence that the US increasingly sees Germany as its main interlocutor in the EU. Our simple question is: do you agree with this assessment? Particularly, what are the implications for German influence from within the EU in the NATO discussions? Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp: My Lords, I fully understand the political sensitivity of this question because, in Germany, the Chancellor is well aware of the needs. Whenever Germany is a leading power or defined by others as the hub with regard to dealing with the Russian crisis—the German Chancellor had some 50 phone calls with Vladimir Putin—we are well aware of the fact that this might also cause eyebrow-raising, due to our history as an overambitious Germany. This is not the case. The German Chancellor tries particularly carefully to convey the message so that the practice is always to include the smaller allies— to keep them in the loop—and to deal with the other big ones. We are well aware that the UK and France are, in military capacities, far ahead of Germany and we are not competing with that. So there is a high sensitivity not to raise the impression of a new German Großmachtstreben, or having big power ambitions. That is not there. Politics is made by people. I think that Mrs Merkel has a certain policy style, which goes well with certain crises now. The close US-German co-operation, which by the way was not always the case in the Obama-Merkel period, is not exclusive but inclusive. There are press articles—not by me—saying, “Where is the UK in this entire business? Aren’t they lacking?” That is a decision for the UK to take on how to include itself in ongoing diplomacy. It would be nice if France could be less occupied with its own domestic problems, as it is now. The point I want to make is about the German government, due to their geographical position now. We have a German Chancellor who speaks Russian,

140 of 309 Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp—Oral Evidence (QQ 161-174) because she learned it, and that almost automatically gives us a certain access to Russia. We have a certain economic weight, which comes with certain obligations. But there is definitely not an idea of monopolising any contacts. That is certainly not the case. The Chairman: Dr Kamp, thank you very much. We have been speaking for an hour. I do not know whether any of my colleagues have any supplementaries. Lord Risby, who was unavoidably detained, may have a question that he would like to ask. No? On behalf of the Committee, then, I thank you very much. We will send you a transcript of your evidence so that if there is anything you want to correct in that, you will have the opportunity to do so. I am really most grateful. We are very far down the track with this inquiry and you have helped to fill in a number of gaps. The clarity with which you responded was very helpful.

141 of 309 Dr James Ker-Lindsay and Professor Adam Fagan—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149)

Dr James Ker-Lindsay and Professor Adam Fagan—Oral Evidence (QQ 138-149) Transcript to be found under Professor Adam Fagan and Dr James Ker-Lindsay

142 of 309 Professor Dr Stephan Keukeleire, Professor in European Foreign Policy, University of Leuven—Written Evidence (FSP0018)

Professor Dr Stephan Keukeleire, Professor in European Foreign Policy, University of Leuven—Written Evidence (FSP0018)

Changing global environment and EU interests Is the High Representative’s report the right basis on which to draft the strategy proper? In the changed and more threatening global environment, what are the EU’s strategic interests? Do they coincide with the UK’s strategic interests? The High Representative, endorsed by the European Council, calls for an “EU global strategy on foreign and security policy.” Is the High Representative too ambitious and if so, where, and on what, should the EU focus?

The High Representative’s report and particular its first two parts are the right start to draft the strategy proper as it provides a remarkable sharp analysis of the daunting challenges and threats which result from an increasingly connected, contested and complex world. The report clearly points to the foreign policy and security implications of the dramatic demographic developments (particularly in the Mediterranean, Africa but also Asian countries) and the at the same time increasing (youth) unemployment, inequality and exclusion.

However, the third part of the report (‘Implications’) is disappointing as it does not dare to draw the consequences in terms of the policy changes that are required. Daunting challenges in a dramatically changing international environment require innovative, creative and daring proposals for an upgraded and adapted European and Western foreign policy, and these cannot be found in this report. This reflects a rather general fear in the EEAS and Commission that the member states and particularly the large member states would not accept fundamental changes in the EU’s foreign policy, resulting in a not very inspiring last part of the report. The UK can take the lead in requesting the High Representative to be more ambitious and to propose innovative policy changes which are concomitant to the challenges in an increasingly connected, contested and complex world in which Europe and the West are no more dominant.

The EU’s strategy should indeed be a “global strategy”, as an increasingly connected, contested and complex world does not permit the EU and the European countries to only focus on Europe’s neighbourhood. The current instability in the Mediterranean and the migration problems point to the close link with the instability and chaos in sub-Saharan Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan, etc.

In addition to the various specific strategic interests (mentioned in the report), the EU’s overarching strategic interest is to make sure that Europe is seen as able to make a real difference for people in other parts of the world. The EU’s new Global Strategy has to include innovative policies and concrete policy adaptions which can help to obtain effective and tangible changes in the socio-economic situation of people and young people in particular. The EU and its member states indeed often fails to translate its impressive foreign policy toolbox and budgets into relevant changes in the daily life’s of people in the surrounding regions. And as Europe is seen as having nothing to offer, they do not surprisingly revert to other actors and ideologies (cf. the rise of Islamic states,

143 of 309 Professor Dr Stephan Keukeleire, Professor in European Foreign Policy, University of Leuven—Written Evidence (FSP0018) movements and parties) or try to enter the EU (cf. the ongoing dramas on the Mediterranean area).

A people- and youth-oriented policy requires reforms in traditional policy fields such as trade and regulatory policies, in order to increase the chance of economic development and job creation in third countries. Europe has no more the luxury to mainly focus on Europe’s own economic interests, and disregard the spectacular unemployment and lack of any hope in the future in the surrounding regions. Related to this is the need to devise and develop innovative and comprehensive policies to help strengthening the capacity of third countries to tackle the daunting socio-economic situation in their countries.

The EU can in this respect find inspiration in the American policy after World War II, when the US accepted to set aside some of its own interests in order to allow for the economic reconstruction of Western Europe and for the strengthening of societies in Western Europe. For example, the US then accepted temporary protectionist measures in Western Europe (to the detriment of American business sectors) in order to allow for a revival of the European industrial structures and create jobs in Western Europe.

Neighbourhood policy Should the EU focus its resources more closely on its own neighbourhood? How would you assess EU policy in the neighbourhood? Are the foreign policy instruments in the neighbourhood fit for purpose? Upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa What are the EU’s interests in the MENA region? How effective have the EU and Member States been in promoting them? What have been the obstacles to effective EU action in the region?

See the answer in the previous section on the EU’s overarching strategic interests and the need for a people- and youth-oriented foreign policy, in order to avoid that people in these regions revert even more to radical or nationalist movements and believe systems.

Capabilities and Capacities Are they fit for purpose? What structural reforms are required in order to make the EU’s foreign policy work more effective? What additional capabilities, if any, are required for the EU and Member States to act effectively in the new security environment? Is the EU an effective multilateral player? How would you assess the diplomatic and intelligence capacities of the EU and Member States? Does the Union have the expertise and capacity within its institutions and national foreign services to respond to a more complex and complicated security environment?

The answers in the first section already pointed to the need of a structural adaptation of traditional policy fields such as trade policy and regulatory policy to the needs of Europe’s overarching strategic interests. The EU’s policy priorities, its financial regulations, the paradigms of its trade policy and its internal procedures do often restrict the EU’s possibility to tackle the dramatic socio-economic situation in other regions. However, Europe has not more the luxury to see its foreign policy constrained by its traditional but maladjusted external policies and internal priorities, paradigms and procedures.

144 of 309 Professor Dr Stephan Keukeleire, Professor in European Foreign Policy, University of Leuven—Written Evidence (FSP0018) Needed too is the possibility to more easily combine the expertise of the EEAS, the many specialized DG’s in the Commission, and specialized agencies in the member states and other international organizations. This will allow for a ‘comprehensive policy’ which goes much further than is the case at this moment. An illustration that this both possible and needed is the EU’s support for security sector reform (SSR) in several third countries, with policies going beyond traditional training and monitoring of soldiers and policy. This policy also entailed the establishment of a biometric census of troops, of human resource management, of developing and effective and transparent chain of payments system, of fostering a banking systems to guarantee that people receive their salaries, of related informatics infrastructure and networks, etc.

This example demonstrates that an effective and people-oriented Europe foreign policy should incorporate the expertise of a wide range of ‘internal’ or ‘sectorial’ administrations and agencies from the member states as well as from the EU. This points to a challenge which is also at the top of the priorities of the current European Commission: restructure the EU’s organizational system and simplify the working methods and financial procedures. This should facilitate the combination of the EU’s CFSP/CSDP, external relations and trade instruments, the tools available in other specialized Directorates-General as well as the capacities of the member states.

Concerning the diplomatic and intelligence capacities of the EU and Member States: the EU and the European diplomacy is seriously constrained in their capacity to respond to a more complex and complicated environment as a result of budgetary and other constraints which particularly the large member states, including the UK, impose on the EU. However, as was already emphasized in an earlier report of the House of Lords, this is also to the detriment of the EU’s capacity to foster and promote also British strategic interests.

The EU and most of its member states suffer in particular from a serious knowledge gap. The limited language skills of diplomats (particularly of non-European languages such as Arabic, Mandarin etc.), the limited expertise of the currently very important traditional or pre-modern communities (such as the many influencial tribes, clans, Islamic movements, etc.) and the limited number of real area specialists hamper the ability of the EU and most European countries to understand the increasingly non-Western world and to develop an effective diplomacy. Tackling this knowledge gap and overcoming Western- centrist perspectives is therefore of crucial importance and should be included in the new Global Strategy. See in this context: Stephan Keukeleire, ‘Lessons for the Practice and Analysis of EU Diplomacy from an “Outside-in” Perspective’, in Gstöhl, S. and Lannon, E. (eds.), The Neighbours of the European Union’s Neighbours: Diplomatic and Geopolitical Dimensions beyond the European Neighbourhood Policy, Farnham: Ashgate, 2014, pp. 227-241.

European diplomacy should in this context also be more able to detect the main interests, sensitivities, ambitions and initiatives of other global and regional powers; to examine which of these can be compatible with the EU’s interests; and to determine how the EU can contribute to or become part of these initiatives or ambitions. And in case of rivaling interests, EU diplomats should develop creative initiatives in order to turn zero-sum games into positive sum games. Also this can require structural changes in the EU’s policies, including in its trade policy, possibly with short-term pains which though can be compensated by long-term gains.

145 of 309 Professor Dr Stephan Keukeleire, Professor in European Foreign Policy, University of Leuven—Written Evidence (FSP0018) An excellent example, where the UK took the lead, demonstrates how the Europeans can strengthen the own position and positively change the context by going beyond the traditional Eurocentric or Western approach: the decisions by EU member states decided to resolutely support the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which was launched by China and which thus stemmed from the priorities and ambitions of the main new world power. The One Belt, One Road project proposed by the Chinese President Xi Jinping may offer another useful point of inspiration for a smart EU foreign policy which takes non-European initiatives as point of departure.

Pursuing a relevant foreign policy which takes into account the interests and needs of other countries and powers does not stand for a naïve European foreign policy which neglects the own interests. On the contrary, it points to a smart foreign policy which recognizes that in an increasingly instable world in which Europe is unavoidably in decline, a shift from ‘myopic’ self-interests to ‘far-sighted’ or ‘other-regarding’ self-interests is unavoidable.

The example of the AIIB already indicates that member states and EU foreign policy can be mutually reinforcing. It also indicates that the UK can also play a leading role in this process.

146 of 309 Dr George Kyris, Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of Birmingham—Written Evidence (FSP0003)

Dr George Kyris, Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of Birmingham—Written Evidence (FSP0003)

The High Representative sets out a changed and more threatening global environment. In this new environment, what are the EU’s strategic interests? Do they coincide with the UK’s strategic interests? Is the EU ready and capable to respond to the new security environment? What are the opportunities that it presents for the Union?

For these questions, I choose to focus on a specific but very important security challenges for the EU in recent times, which I have extensively researched: self-declared states, which are not recognised, such as those of Donetsk and Luhansk which have emerged during the Ukraine crisis. With little progress in the resolution of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and with those unrecognised states consolidating day by day, it is important to see how the EU can respond to security challenges and what opportunities are offered. At the same time, other, older unrecognised states, like south Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria or Nagorno Karabakh in the ex-soviet space but also Kosovo, Palestine and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus relate to major conflicts and regions where the EU engages to promote security and stability, also through the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Unrecognised states are not a new phenomenon for the EU but they have received very little attention from researchers. My research has tried to address this gap and I have published my findings in many articles and my book, which represents the most concise summary of my research and has been praised as a ‘significant contribution to the literature on the development of unrecognised states and on the role of the European Union in conflict situations’ (James Ker-Lindsay, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK). Based on years of research, here is a summary of the challenges but also the opportunities that unrecognised states present the EU with in major conflicts in the region, like the Ukraine-Russia conflict, the Cyprus conflict or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Under different themes, I talk about both the challenges but also the opportunities in conflicts that relate to unrecognised states:

Lack of recognition The relationship between the EU and unrecognised states is rather challenging because the former does not recognise the latter and therefore cannot develop full diplomatic relations with local public authorities, which is the EU’s preferred way of developing relations. In Cyprus, for example, the EU has not been able to fulfil all of its objectives in the area, like a 2006 proposal for trade with the Turkish Cypriots, which is still pending amidst opposition fro the EU member state Republic of Cyprus (led by Greek Cypriots) who argues that implementation could mean a diplomatic ‘upgrade’ of the unrecognised state. The pending implementation of the Trade proposal has been a cause of frustration towards the EU amongst Turkish Cypriots but also some of their supporters, like Turkey. Beyond Cyprus, other unrecognised states also face similar issues. For example, Azerbaijan has objected to dealings between the EU and the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, such as a 2007 visit of the EU Special Representative. This however does not mean that the EU has been completely unable to work in unrecognised states towards promoting a series of aims. For example, rather than meeting in

147 of 309 Dr George Kyris, Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of Birmingham—Written Evidence (FSP0003) the ‘ministerial’ offices of the unrecognised state, EU representatives (such as from the Commission) and Turkish Cypriot officials get together in unofficial and politically neutral venues. Also, the EU has worked extensively with non-state actors, particularly civil society, like the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, which has undertaken roles that in normal circumstances would have been given to public authorities (such as the ministry of Trade). These lead us to two observations: first of all, the EU is able to devise solutions to overcome the fact that diplomatic relations with unrecognised states are problematic, particularly through engaging more with non-state actors, especially civil society. Secondly, unrecognised states give an extra opportunity to the EU to develop relations with civil society, as an alternative to public authorities of the unrecognised state and free of diplomatic risks partner. Indeed, the EU should engage more with civil society actors, where they cannot or do not prefer to engage with local authorities, either in unrecognised states or even in cases where the a government of a recognised state is not enjoying legitimacy (e.g. ‘Arab Spring’ or the regime of Viktor Yanukovych in the early phases of the Ukraine crisis). Through that, civil society also becomes a very good ‘ally’ of the EU in promoting resolution of conflicts, security and stability and this has been the case in many conflicts, including Cyprus but also Ukraine. In this regard, there needs to be even more investment in civil society as a partner of the EU on the ground, with a more long-term strategy on how to engage (short-termism has been a particular problem in many EU actions for civil society, which has damaged the sustainability of assistance in many case). These observations also provide answers to the question posed by the Committee on what are the EU and Member States’ most effective and useful foreign policy instruments, whether they fit for purpose and whether they are being used effectively.

International isolation Because they are not recognised, self-declared states they are also extensively isolated in world politics, i.e. they do not have trade, diplomatic or political links. In the past, the EU has devoted resources in order to help the international integration of people who reside in unrecognised states (for example, the Turkish Cypriots in northern Cyprus by means of the Financial Aid Regulation) through, for example, educational and networking visits to Brussels. This underlines the opportunities that exist for the EU to address the international isolation of unrecognised states by assisting the integration of their people into world structures, promoting certain norms that are shared by the EU, the development of societies in unrecognised states and ultimately increase its influence, also vis a vis other actors who compete for influence in those area and conflicts, such as Russia in the unrecognised states of the ex-soviet space.

When researching the example of Cyprus, I also found that this international isolation has pushed Turkish Cypriots to support a resolution of the Cyprus conflict, which would allow them to join the EU via a federation with Greek Cypriots. Other unrecognised states, such as Abkhazia in Georgia, also seem to view the EU as a way-out to international recognition. This underlines another opportunity for the EU to condition further European integration on the resolution of those conflicts and by that motivate parts of the conflict towards resolution. We have witnessed how conditionality has successfully procuded the resolution of other disputes near Europe, such as the one between Kosovo and Serbia but also Croatia and Slovenia (see also below, question on EU Enlargement).

‘Patron’ states in unrecognised states Another characteristic that many unrecognised state share is the extensive economic, political and security involvement of certain third states in their domestic affairs, what I

148 of 309 Dr George Kyris, Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of Birmingham—Written Evidence (FSP0003) schematically call ‘patron states’. This creates certain challenges for the EU, as it competes with influence over the unrecognised states and the related conflicts. In my study on Cyprus I found that Turkey's increased influence over Turkish Cypriots has been particularly challenging for the role of the EU. For example, Turkish Cypriots receive much greater financial support from Turkey than they do from the EU, which looses influence in comparison. But Turkey’s influence is a controversial issue and some Turkish Cypriots view the EU as a better alternative to Turkey, associated more with values like democracy and human rights and with less intervention in domestic affairs. This role of a ‘patron’ state is also strong in other unrecognised states, especially those in the post-Soviet space, which rely a lot on Russian support – the Ukraine crisis and the self-declaration of the states of Donetsk and Luhansk is perhaps the most recent and obvious example but, again, we saw how a significant part of Ukrainians viewed the EU more favourably in compare to Russia. In this regards, the EU needs to invest on those aspects of its role that are appealing and are different to ‘patron’ states (e.g. the promotion of certain norms and values, like promotion of democracy and human rights) but link them to more tangible benefits on the ground- for example, technical and financial support of local agents, like civil society, who support those objectives. This will provide not only financial assistance (which might be comparable to ‘patron’ states’ assistance) but also technical assistance and the support of causes and agents that might not be assisted by the patron states. These observations are also important for understanding how can the EU most effectively maximise its power – both hard and soft – in international affairs, which is another question posed by the Committee.

Should enlargement remain the major tool of in the EU foreign policy toolkit in the neighbourhood? And examples of where EU foreign policy has succeeded and when it has struggled and what are the causes in each case.

Enlargement continues to be the most important tool that the EU has in promoting security in its near abroad. Because of the appeal of EU accession -which is much stronger than other benefits, such as trade agreements and so on- conditionality remains the EU’s most powerful tool in promoting security in its neighbourhood. This can be seen in many occasions, which indicate both successes and failures of EU foreign policy. For example, a success of the EU, which showed the power of EU accession conditionality, was the resolution of the dispute between Slovenia and Croatia, because it was a condition for the EU accession of the latter. Similarly, the breakthrough 2013 agreement between Kosovo and Serbia was another success that was result of the fact that normalisation of relations between the two sides is a precondition of their European integration. In this regard, the EU seems to have learned from past failures. Perhaps the biggest failure to utilise Enlargement as a tool to promote security was the case of Cyprus in 2004, where the resolution of the conflict in the island was not achieved also because it was not part of accession conditionality. The then President of Cyprus had openly called Greek Cypriots to vote against the UN proposal (‘Annan Plan’) for reunification in order to secure EU accession as a separate state rather than a reunified state with the Turkish Cypriots, thus underlining how EU accession rather than helping the resolution of the conflict became a reason for its entrenchment.

What are the implications for the EU’s foreign and security policy of the Greek crisis?

The Eurozone crisis does not seem to have weakened the appeal of the EU as an important international actor and partner for many third states. In this respect, there is no major

149 of 309 Dr George Kyris, Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of Birmingham—Written Evidence (FSP0003) negative impact on the standing of the EU in the world or its ability to develop relations with other states or actors.

However, the widespread euroscepticism, which has also been a result of the Eurozone crisis, poses certain obstacles to the development of common foreign and security policies. In today’s eurosceptic climate (vividly depicted in the 2014 European Parliament election results, also in the UK with the win of UK Independence Party), public and national governments stand sceptical towards cooperation and integration, especially in ‘high politics’, like security, which are considered to be strongly linked to (often divergent) national interests. The difficultly to reach an agreement on how to deal with the 2015 refugee crisis is a very good example of how the Eurozone crisis and eurosceptic attitudes (often combined with nationalism and scepticism towards migration) throughout Europe might pose obstacles to common foreign policy objectives, even if the refugee crisis is an issue which touches upon both foreign and internal EU policies.

With regard to the Greek crisis in more specific, many suggested that the rise of leftist and eurosceptic Syriza to the government as a result of extensive austerity would impact EU’s foreign policy because Syriza was considered to be much friendlier to Moscow. However, this did not seem to be the case. While undoubtedly Syriza tried to foster stronger relations with Russia and they have often made statements that denoted scepticism towards EU’s strategy vis a vis Russia and the Ukraine crisis, they have not gone as far as vetoing EU sanctions towards Russia. In practise, therefore, the Greek crisis and the eurosceptic government that has brought has not substantially impacted EU’s foreign policy and security.

150 of 309 Rt Hon David Lidington MP—Oral Evidence (QQ 175-188)

Rt Hon David Lidington MP—Oral Evidence (QQ 175-188)

Evidence Session No. 15 Heard in Public Questions 175 - 188

THURSDAY 19 NOVEMBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Baroness Suttie Lord Triesman Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

______

Examination of Witnesses Rt Hon David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Q175 The Chairman: Minister, thank you very much for coming. I know this has been in the book for some while, but I imagine you are more than ordinarily busy at the moment, and we are appreciative of the fact that you have still come and have not changed anything. You know the preamble: this is a formal meeting of the Committee, and is in fact the last of our evidence sessions in our inquiry, although whether we may feel the need for more remains to be seen. You will obviously get a copy of the transcript.

In the light of recent events, we thought it right to change the order of questioning a little. We also put ourselves to some extent in your hands. We thought that we would start off with a question about Article 42.7, to which we will add a question about why you think the French invoked Article 42.7 instead of Article 222. Then we will ask questions 7 to 10, and then go back to the beginning. That is also an easier way to do it in the light of recent events. If your officials do not have Article 222 ready to hand, I gather the difference between Article 42.7 and Article 222 is that Article 42.7 asks for assistance from the Member States, whereas Article 222 asks for assistance from the institutions.

What is your assessment of the significance of the request under Article 42.7? What do you judge to be the likely response by other EU Member States? Do you see any significance in the fact that they invoked 42.7 and not 222?

151 of 309 Rt Hon David Lidington MP—Oral Evidence (QQ 175-188)

Rt Hon David Lidington MP: I will take the second part of your question first, Lord Chairman. As you said, the distinction between the two articles is that 222 explicitly says that, “The Union and its Member States shall act jointly”. So it explicitly brings in the EU institutions in a way that Article 42.7, which is intergovernmental in nature, does not. You would really need to have a French Minister in front of you to explain the choice that they made, but it means that we do not have to have any arguments about where competence lies in this. Seeking to place myself in the position of the French Government, I think there are two things behind their invocation of Article 42.7. First, it is very important for France to be able to demonstrate internationally, including to the terrorist groups and their sponsors, but also to its own people, that it really has the solidarity of its fellow democracies in Europe. That is true of other democratic countries around the world as well, but the article provides an institutional means for EU Member States to demonstrate that solidarity. Both the Foreign Secretary and I have found in our conversations with French opposite numbers in recent days that they have been hugely appreciative of the support that they have been given and offered by the United Kingdom and other European countries. Now, what does it mean? To some extent we are in the hands of the French here. As I said, I think there are two reasons why they invoked it. France is clearly going through a rapid reassessment of how its own immediate foreign and security policy priorities need to be reordered in the wake of the terrorist outrage in Paris. We have already seen an intensification of French military activity in the Middle East, attacking ISIL targets, which clearly raises questions about whether France might wish to seek either some kind of practical support from some of its partners—refuelling comes to mind—or for partners to step forward and take on duties elsewhere in the world that are currently being carried out by French forces that they might wish to release. After all, this is what Germany did at the time of the coalition intervention in Libya. Germany chose not to take part in that, but said that she would intensify her activity in Afghanistan to relieve the pressure on France and the UK. The Chairman: I think I have seen somewhere that the Irish have offered to send troops, although I cannot imagine it would be very many, to Mali in order to help. On your point about solidarity, I remember very well when I was in Brussels at the time of the Falklands War how very important it was to HMG, to the Prime Minister—notwithstanding her budgetary problems with the EU—and to British public opinion when the whole of the EU rallied round within hours of the invasion. Rt Hon David Lidington MP: That was very important indeed. The same could be said if we look back to the 7/7 outrage in London. The Gleneagles summit was taking place at the time, and the then Prime Minister Mr Blair was able to look immediately to his European colleagues for very strong expressions of moral, and if required practical, support and cooperation. The Chairman: Would anybody like to follow up on this question? There is one final thing on this. As far as you know, did everybody sign, as it were, immediately, or were there any hesitations? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: As far as I am aware, there have been no quibbles about this. In fact, the Foreign Affairs Council, which met on Monday, the foreign affairs and defence configuration that met on Tuesday morning and the General Affairs Council on Tuesday afternoon all resolved unanimously to offer full support for France.

Q176 The Chairman: Something that concerned us earlier in our investigation was the nature of the co-operation between the EU’s intelligence and assessment capacities. We

152 of 309 Rt Hon David Lidington MP—Oral Evidence (QQ 175-188) have been hearing about suggestions for strengthening the EEAS’s capabilities and those of the Member States in sharing intelligence. Is it a fair representation of the UK view to suggest that you would disagree with these suggestions, or would that be unfair? In any case, in the light of recent events, where do we stand now so far as the shared intelligence and assessment capacity of the EU Member States are concerned? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: I would describe that as an oversimplification, Lord Chairman. My starting point is that the treaties themselves are explicit that national security remains a Member State competence. The treaties are also clear, in their provisions on common foreign and security policy and on security and defence policy, that those policy areas and the External Action Service itself as an institution are basically at the service of the Member States, which have to act by consensus when it comes to any foreign or security policy position governed by those treaty articles. The United Kingdom Government’s approach is therefore that we do share information and intelligence with trusted partners. That happens operationally on a day-by-day basis. The Committee will obviously not expect me to go into details, but this country’s security and intelligence agencies and police forces have trusted relationships with equivalents in European countries, and those relationships will continue. Clearly, in the wake of what has happened in Paris, we will, as you would expect us to, be reviewing further whether we need to seek improvements. The Home Secretary has already made it clear that in the context of counterterrorist work she feels that there is a need for improved information sharing between Member States of the European Union. We all face a common threat. I am not at all persuaded that one should then take the further step of saying that somehow there should be a separate, self-standing EU intelligence agency or intelligence structure. Some good co-operative arrangements already exist, notably the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre, with which we do share intelligence that we can, which provides intelligence analyses, early warning and situational awareness to both the High Representative and the EEAS but also to decision-makers at senior levels in the appropriate parts of the Commission and to Member State Governments. We think that the structure is there; it is a question of bringing the focus and the political will to bear to make those structures effective. Too often, there is a bit of a comfort zone for the European Union, which does not just apply in this area of policy. If I have a criticism, it is that in the past five and a half years I have observed that the comfort zone for the EU is that the default position can be that we must do something institutionally. Actually, it is not always institutional change, let alone the creation of a new institution, that is what you need to solve a problem.

Q177 Baroness Suttie: Thank you very much Minister. You touched on this a little in your first answer. One of the things we have heard in our evidence sessions, including in Brussels, is that ad hoc groups of Member States have been suggested as a way forward for EU foreign policy. What is HMG’s response to this, and what do you believe needs to be done to ensure that such ad hoc groupings do not undermine the cohesiveness of an EU foreign policy and that no Member States, particularly perhaps smaller ones, feel left out? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: The Committee will have heard the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary talking about foreign policy work involving networks rather than blocs. I think that is increasingly the reality today. I completely understand the point that Baroness Suttie makes about ensuring that nobody feels that they are excluded. The fact that there cannot be any formal EU position on any foreign policy subject without unanimity is the ultimate safeguard written into the treaties. Not even the smallest EU member can be overridden by a majority vote. At the same time, the reality is that there are a large number of Member States, particularly the smaller ones, whose geographical focus in foreign policy

153 of 309 Rt Hon David Lidington MP—Oral Evidence (QQ 175-188) will be regional or will reflect that country’s particular interests. By contrast, for the bigger Member States there will be more of global outlook, because countries such as ours, France and Germany will have global interests, both economic and political, as well as the capacity, in terms of the size of diplomatic services and so on, to address those issues. I do not see the rise of ad hoc groups of Member States as a threat, because there is that safeguard of the requirement for unanimity. That reflects the reality of the diverse nature of the European Union today. I know that the Committee has heard evidence from other witnesses who have talked about a divergence, to generalise a bit, between the central European countries that see the priority as being Russia and the eastern neighbourhood, and the Mediterranean countries that are looking south at Africa and to the Near East. That is a fact of life. If you are Lithuania, you are going to be very interested in Belarus, Russia and therefore Ukraine. If you are from the Government of Greece or Spain, you are will have a different focus because of your different geography and your different historical and cultural links. I do not think that is something we should be fearful of. It actually means that the many different Member States each bring something to the table. For the EU to work effectively on foreign policy, you will often need initiatives to be developed by a smaller group of countries that are prepared to do the work and then present it to their colleagues as a way forward. I can give a recent example of that, which was the initiative to try to re-energise political progress in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was very much the child of UK-German thinking just over a year ago. Both here and in Berlin there was deep concern that Bosnia was at risk of slipping backwards and that there was a stasis in trying to form stable governance there or to secure progress towards EU enlargement. Our officials, and ultimately our two foreign Ministers, got together and agreed on a plan. We talked to the High Representative and other Governments about it, and it was eventually, after discussion, accepted as the position of the EU as a whole. That was a good illustration of how this can work to everybody’s benefit.

Q178 Lord Horam: Minister, in answer to a question from the Chairman, you indicated your scepticism about the fact that the European Union’s frequent response to problems was to invoke further institutional change, when sometimes it could just act. None the less, I want to ask a question about institutions, in particular the absence of shared politico-military institutional structures within the European Union. Do you think this has weakened the EU’s capacity to exercise collective strategic decision-making? In the light of this, is there an argument for the UK to reconsider its opposition to institutional reform such as an EU operational headquarters or even some sort of shared military capacity? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: I see no evidence that the absence of a permanent operational headquarters inhibits effective EU policy. There are a fair number of surplus headquarters buildings available in different parts of the EU. We made Northwood available, as the Committee knows, for Operation Atalanta. I have been there, and if the Committee gets the opportunity, I very much recommend a visit. You have all the kit and systems there that you need for such an operation, hosted by the UK but with an EU operation that has all Member States represented. In the room next door there is the complementary NATO operation as well, so the two can work pretty seamlessly together. That is a good model to follow. The idea that you have to have a new building with 28 flagpoles outside for the EU to do anything seems to me to be the wrong way to go about addressing this issue. I would say to Lord Horam that there are more important structural issues that deserve concerted work, not least of which is the fact that there is sometimes still a gap between the External Action Service and the Commission. One of the ideas behind the arrangements embodied in the Lisbon Treaty was that they would make possible much more coherent policy-making, drawing on the diplomatic expertise of the External Action Service and the budgetary

154 of 309 Rt Hon David Lidington MP—Oral Evidence (QQ 175-188) instruments and broader policy responsibilities of different Directorates-General in the Commission. Yet there have still been recent examples of where that inter-institutional relationship has not worked as effectively as it ought to have done. That is a pity and it needs to be addressed when we are facing challenges from hybrid conflicts, as we are seeing for example in Ukraine, where we are not talking about conventional military force being the only thing that is involved—we are seeing energy and strategic communications used as powerful political weapons. Or we can look at the Baltics, where we have seen cyberattacks and cyberthreats as something of significant potency.

Q179 Lord Risby: Minister, you mentioned the synergy between the External Action Service and the European Commission. I wanted to ask you a little bit more about whether there were other institutional reforms that you thought could make the foreign policy of the European Union more efficacious, but I also wanted to ask you something else in that context. If you are sitting in Washington looking at Europe, you see, first of all, an unwillingness among the European nations to spend money on any kind of defence capability—we already have the situation of course with NATO—and that is confirmed by public opinion in European countries, which is very unwilling for those countries to be engaged in military involvement. In that context, do you feel that the efficacy of the EU, from a long-term strategic point of view and in terms of its credibility in foreign policy, is negatively influenced by this attitude of mind and indeed by this institutional lack of synergy that you referred to? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: I think it is true that there has been a growing sense of resentment in the United States at what they see as Europe consuming security that is being paid for by United States taxpayers. Roughly 70% of the NATO budget is funded by the United States of America. We have seen, for example with Libya and in Mali, a readiness on the part of the United States to say, “Well, actually this is not going to be an issue where we are the first ones to step forward. We think that you Europeans need to sort out how to take the lead on this, although we will be supportive”. I regard the single telephone number as a bit of a red herring. It is an interesting question as to whether there is always a single telephone number in the United States on these matters, because getting interagency agreement in Washington can sometimes be a challenging process. I think every American Administration recognises that so long as you have the reality that members of the European Union are independent countries and that foreign policy remains—under the treaties and as a matter of day-to-day democratic political reality—the province of national Governments, you have to work through a system that is somewhat complex and involves relationship- building with key players. My experience was that Baroness Ashton, when she was High Representative, developed an extremely good and fruitful working relationship with successive Secretaries of State and with key members of the United States Administration. Federica Mogherini is obviously still relatively new to the job, but she has worked extremely hard to build up a comparable set of relationships with John Kerry and others, which complement but do not substitute for the relationships that the United States has with this country, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and so on. In my view, in the end it boils down to political will and developing the habit of working together. I have seen European CFSP and CSDP be most effective where Foreign Ministers have talked to each other and to the High Representative and have worked out the positions, rather than waiting for a formal Foreign Affairs Council meeting to sort things out. It is that habit of working together routinely and intimately that is at the heart of what is needed, not further institutional changes. As I say, there are still some challenges with the EAS-Commission relationship, and there are some problems and challenges in planning. When a new CSDP mission is proposed, having some idea of the exit strategy ought to be part of the plan. What is the objective that, when

155 of 309 Rt Hon David Lidington MP—Oral Evidence (QQ 175-188) achieved, would lead to the CSDP mission being ended and Commission programmes to do with international development, funding for improved governance and the like coming into play instead?

Q180 The Chairman: I now come back to where we were going to begin. It has been suggested that a new EU foreign policy strategy should focus on the threats that have a direct impact in the security of the Union—which are, in effect, the turmoil in the neighbouring periphery and its consequences. Would you agree with that, and what do you assess to be the strategic priorities of the EU? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: I would broadly agree, although I have a couple of caveats. If the EU cannot deal with the neighbourhood, then a lot of people around the world are going to ask whether the EU is capable of dealing with anything. There are very serious challenges both to the east and to the south. They have to be clear priorities, but they cannot be the sole priorities, because European countries have global interests. Something like the challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear programme, where the EU was extremely active in brokering and negotiating the deal, is an example of an area of policy that has an obvious global dimension and goes way beyond just Europe’s immediate neighbourhood. There is a need for clear priorities, because otherwise there is the temptation to have a shopping list that grows ever longer or to think that the EU needs to have a clear policy position on absolutely every foreign policy issue under the sun without ranking them at all. Broadly speaking, yes, the eastern and southern neighbourhoods need to be the first priority, while not forgetting of course the western Balkans or Turkey, where we are looking at countries that are on the path to European Union accession one day. The Chairman: Perhaps I could slightly rephrase this. I absolutely take the point you make that asks what, if you cannot manage your neighbourhood, you can do beyond that. But quite apart from its proximity, one of the most important characteristics of the neighbourhood is that what happens within it has a direct impact on domestic affairs within the Member States. We see this this most clearly in relation to immigration, but obviously the people involved in the Paris atrocities came from the neighbourhood, and the particular concerns are concerns that affect people within the domestic populations of the Member States. The neighbourhood is not just a matter of external affairs; it is a matter of actually dealing with issues that cross the boundary between the Foreign Office and the Home Office, if I could put it like that. Rt Hon David Lidington MP: I completely agree, and that reinforces the point I made earlier about the need for the EAS’s diplomatic work to be complemented by very active engagement by the Commission in putting together a genuinely comprehensive approach to these big challenges. I need to add, Lord Chairman, that although you are right in saying that people from the neighbourhood seem likely to have been behind the atrocities in Paris, it also looks as if at least some of those who took part in that terrorist outrage were citizens of European Union countries themselves. Clearly, if we are going to deal with the challenge in Europe’s southern neighbourhood, part of this is going to be about classic diplomatic activity, where I would cite the efforts to bring about a Government of National Unity in Libya as one example. That would include efforts to improve the quality of governance, political stability and the quality of military and police forces in countries—that is what is happening in Mali at the moment and might happen in Libya in the future if we get an effective unity Government established there. We also need a comprehensive approach to address the reasons why people in African countries feel they have to throw in their lot with ruthless people traffickers. That takes us into issues of humanitarian relief, international development and long-term efforts to improve governance in what are very fragile and

156 of 309 Rt Hon David Lidington MP—Oral Evidence (QQ 175-188) sometimes failing states. I could make similar but slightly different points as regards the eastern neighbourhood. One point I will just throw in in relation to our partners in the Baltic countries is the precedent set by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and then her intervention in the Donbass. That has thrown into question, in the eyes of those Baltic Governments, whether Russia accepts their statehood and their right to self-determination at all. I remember going to all three of the Baltics after the Ukraine crisis broke, and this was a very live issue that was dominating domestic political debate. The Chairman: Lord Triesman will run two questions together.

Q181 Lord Triesman: Thank you Chairman. I apologise to you and to David, and indeed to colleagues, for arriving late. The High Representative’s review is scheduled to be published in June next year. In the meantime, the European Neighbourhood Policy is due to be released this month, and we think the new action plan for Turkey has already been agreed. But the budget process for EU external activities seems to be on a completely different cycle. Do you expect the strategic review to be successful in pulling together and co-ordinating these different threads of EU external policies?

For efficiency, I will just run on to the next question, as I have logged them both. The EU’s policies in the Middle East and north Africa raise difficult questions about how the EU can most effectively promote values. We think that it is moving towards a more pragmatic approach to this. Do you agree? Do you judge that the balance has been struck correctly between values and interests in EU external policy? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: On the first question, we see the strategic review as providing for an overarching strategy, beneath which the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Turkey action plan and the Valletta summit action plan would all sit. We think that the purpose of the strategic plan should be to promote coherence between the different elements of the existing CFSP and, by setting priorities, influence how priority is given to spending within heading 4 of the EU budget. The other clear opportunity in the strategic review, because of the double-hatted nature of the High Representative’s job, is to set the diplomatic work alongside the work led by the Commission on energy, humanitarian aid, development, trade and so on, within that broad context of Europe’s strategic foreign policy priorities. Lord Triesman’s second question is worthy of a seminar in its own right. My starting point on this is that we have to deal with the world as it is and with the crises and challenges that face us today. That will mean that we have to deal with Governments who do not necessarily share our values; if we restrict ourselves to talking to Governments who share democratic values, we are going to restrict our diplomatic engagement. Behind that, there are also some very important realities about the world in the 21st century. If you look at the demographics of most of the countries in the Middle East, north Africa and, for that matter, sub-Saharan Africa, you are looking at countries where probably between 60% and 70% of the population in most cases is aged under 30. Increasing numbers of those young people will be digital-savvy and will have knowledge, at least to some degree, of what happens and what is said and thought elsewhere in the world. It is not a guarantor that they will subscribe to the sort of values that we regard as the core of our political beliefs; for some young people it will take them off towards more extreme fundamentalist ideologies. What is true is that when young people are such a disproportionate part of the population, they will demand of their rulers some greater say moving forward in how those countries are run. That is something that those countries will have to confront. I also firmly believe that our strategic objectives have to include securing greater prosperity and better-quality governance in those countries, because that is in our very direct, practical self-interest. A

157 of 309 Rt Hon David Lidington MP—Oral Evidence (QQ 175-188) country that is well governed and prosperous is going to find it easier to prevent and defeat terrorism and extremism, and such a country is also much less likely than a failing state to find that many of its citizens want to get out at almost any cost. In my experience as a Minister talking to British business, I get a very clear message that business invests in places where it is confident about the independence of the judiciary and confident that licences and permits will be determined by independent courts and not through doing political favours for some relative of the president. They also obviously want to have transparency and free markets so that they can see exactly what they are trading and with whom. Businesses have said to me, “There are lots of other places in the world where we can put our money”. Both economic and political reform, in line with what are often described in the Brussels talks as European values, seem to align themselves with our more hard-headed self-interest. As Lord Triesman’s question implies, there is a balance to be struck there. One must not abandon one’s values, but actually our values can help those countries to make a transformation that will be to our mutual benefit.

Q182 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: Events in Syria are obviously developing rapidly and the assessments of policy requirements must be overtaking each other quite rapidly. The Committee would not expect you to comment on any current policy negotiations or reviews, as it were, but there are now multifarious interests at play—Iraq, Syria, Iran, Russia and the US are all present in some form or other. In the past, it has been suggested to the Committee that the EU institutions—or more likely the Member States—could play a role as an honest broker or mediator. That might seem a little ambitious at the moment, but do you see EU states playing a participatory or co-operative role, whether we call that a contact group or a coalition? If so, how would that work in practice? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: Both the EU, through the High Representative, and the larger Member States—us, Germany, France and Italy—have already been taking part in the talks in Vienna through the International Syria Support Group. That is about trying to press the parties in Syria towards political talks that will enable a transition away from the current regime to take place and the emergence of a Government who can be a genuine focus of national unity in Syria. I do not think it would work if we tried to reproduce exactly the E3+3 format, which was well tailored to the Iran question. There is also of course very active UN involvement in Syria through Staffan de Mistura, who has said that he wants to bring the Syrian parties together for talks. We see the role of the ISSG in Vienna as in large measure just about trying to support and facilitate the work that de Mistura is leading on behalf of Ban Ki-moon. Having said that, there is also a massive EU humanitarian effort to help both people displaced inside Syria and those in the neighbouring countries. Donations from the EU and its Member States together have now exceeded €4 billion, with the UK contributing about €1.4 billion, which is what we have either given or pledged.

Q183 Lord Dubs: Thank you. Could we turn to Turkey? In the evidence that we have taken, I think we have found that EU policy towards Turkey has in the past been characterised by strategic neglect, perhaps, and now even by disarray in response to the refugee crisis. It seemed to us that we have been a bit muddled towards Turkey and that divisions between Member States have weakened the offer of membership of the Union to Turkey. How do you think the EU and the Member States should reconsider and revive their partnership with Turkey? How should the EU respond to the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Turkish regime, while acknowledging that there is a bit of progress on Cyprus at the moment?

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Rt Hon David Lidington MP: I never want to sound overoptimistic, but I would characterise what is happening in Cyprus as rather better than a little bit of progress. People in the leaderships of both communities in Cyprus to whom I have spoken talk in terms of this being the best opportunity since the Annan plan. We are doing what we can to support the work that Espen Eide is leading. On the question of Turkey, we see Turkey as being of critical importance in two respects: it is a candidate for EU accession and a strategic partner. It has been a member of NATO for decades. It is a significant player in the politics of the Near East but also a country with significant reach into Africa, particularly but not only north Africa, and into central Asia and the Caucasus. In all those areas there are important Turkish links and economic and cultural ties. We see those two roles—candidate and strategic partner—as complementary. On the question of Turkish politics, we think that Turkey has quite a way to go before she would meet the standards that would be necessary were we to complete chapters 23 and 24 of the EU accession process—and of course those chapters have not even been opened yet. It is worth just noting that Turkey remains a multiparty democracy. We are not now looking at a country of the kind that it was perhaps 30 years ago, which was under military rule or at risk of a military coup. It is a very vigorous, rumbustious multiparty democracy, and there have been general elections this year. The results of both those elections have been accepted by all the political parties, albeit sometimes with some complaints about particular tactics. We need to recognise the good as well as what still needs to be done, but I am very firmly of the view that the best way to address the issues of the rule of law and human rights, including minority rights, in Turkey is through the EU accession process. That is, after all, how we succeeded in central Europe and how we have begun in the western Balkans to institutionalise human rights and the rule of law in those countries.

Q184 Lord Dubs: Traditionally, over the years, Germany, France and I think Austria have sent fairly negative signals to Turkey about the possibility of accession. Have those signals become less serious—in other words, have those countries modified their stance? Or does the fact that Britain remains a key country to welcome Turkey into the EU, while some of these other players do not, reduce the attractiveness of the EU to the Government in Ankara? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: Whenever I have talked to my Turkish opposite numbers, they have been absolutely adamant that they see Turkey’s future in the EU, complementing the role that Turkey has as a key member of NATO. As Lord Dubs says, it is true that other European Governments have been more sceptical in recent years, but Turkey remains a candidate country. We did get agreement on opening another chapter last year, and I hope that we will get agreement before long on opening further chapters. I believe very strongly that it is in the strategic interests of the whole European Union that we are able to anchor Turkey, through the accession process, firmly in a Euro-Atlantic alignment. We must never forget that there are millions and millions of people in Turkey who look at their country in that way. We need to press on with that. We should not ignore the challenges or pretend that they do not exist, but that is the way forward. It is also the key to unlocking the inadequate level of co-operation that is currently permissible between NATO and the European Union. Above all, it is the stand-off over Cyprus that has led to seamless EU- NATO co-operation being impossible. It really would make sense if we had a system in which it was just natural for the hard military capabilities of NATO to be complemented by the extensive soft-power assets of the European Union. At the moment that is not possible. If we can bring Turkey forward and deal with the Cyprus issue satisfactorily, then huge possibilities open up that really are very much in our interests.

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Q185 Lord Risby: Could I just ask you to elaborate a little on the subject of Cyprus? From a Greek point of view, one way of putting it would be that it probably has some obligations to others currently in a way that perhaps it has not had before. But there have also been some noises from the Turks that seem to be quite encouraging. In the context of this whole dynamic that is going on and this new look at Turkey, as well as what has happened to Greece more recently of course and our incredibly important role in what has been an intractable problem for decades, can you give us a little more insight into what might be happening? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: I will try to do so. I think the mood in the last year has been transformed, in that we have now, for the first time in many years, two leaders in President Anastasiades and Mr Akinci who are very publicly and strongly committed to securing a settlement on the island. They are working with a UN envoy, Espen Eide, the former Norwegian Foreign Minister, who both sides trust and who is relatively new himself in the job and has therefore come to it without any history of difficult relations with either side. There have been a number of extremely welcome moves forward. You see this most obviously in the way in which the leaders have met frequently. They have both declared themselves publicly ready to address the really difficult issues—not just the low-hanging fruit—and have both agreed that they are going to get together and the take the key decisions, and will give mandates to their chief negotiators rather than keeping the negotiators at arm’s length and not taking responsibility themselves for what happens. We have seen it also in a number of symbolic acts, such as when President Anastasiades and Mr Akinci walked together across the green line in Nicosia and took coffee in different cafes, first in the south and then in the north. Those sorts of gestures mean something in an island that has been divided as long as Cyprus has been. We see the role of the United Kingdom as being to support the efforts of the UN and of both community leaders in Cyprus. We have tried to help: for example, I invited the presidents of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot chambers of commerce to London last year, so that they could advertise the economic benefits for everybody in Cyprus of a political settlement there. But it is not for the UK to lay down the blueprint for a solution. In fact, that would be the one thing that would be guaranteed to bring everybody in Cyprus together in unanimity: they would all say, “There is absolutely no way you are telling us what to do”. But we are helping, and our High Commissioner in particular is extremely active behind the scenes. The Foreign Secretary will be in Cyprus very soon, and he and I have both taken a very close interest in what is going on there. The stage we are at now is that the leaders and the negotiators are tackling some of the most difficult issues, such as the question of sovereignty and how you define the reunited Cypriot state. Our position remains that we want to see a bi-zonal and bi- communal federation in conformity with the relevant United Nations resolutions and with respect for human rights for all. They are starting to talk about the issues of property and what you do about the fact that there are families who moved north to south and south to north in 1974 and how you deal with that very difficult question. There are questions about territory, such as what the fair territorial division of the island is between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot zones and to what extent that would involve swaps of land currently one or other side of the green line. Then there is the question of security, where we, as one of the guarantor powers, will have some kind of role in the discussion at the end of the day. How are we to underwrite the security of the new settlement? Historically, the Turkish Cypriots have looked to Turkey to provide that, whereas the Greek Cypriots, particularly since 1974, have seen that guarantor role of Turkey as a threat to them. How do we overcome that? It would be wrong of me to go into much more detail in public, but I am

160 of 309 Rt Hon David Lidington MP—Oral Evidence (QQ 175-188) really heartened to see that the leaders themselves and their representatives are addressing those issues.

Q186 Baroness Coussins: Switching focus again, I would like to talk about Russia. I know that you are familiar with the report that was published last February on the inquiry this Sub- Committee undertook into EU-Russia relations. In that report, we noted how important it was to see unity among Member States in relation to sanctions against Russia. It is clear that that unity has been sustained and that sanctions are having an effect. Alongside that, we are not clear that any further steps have been taken on either the political or diplomatic front to defuse or resolve the situation in east Ukraine. Indeed, one witness said to us that the more tense relationship is not merely bad weather but a new climate. If that is the case, how should the EU recalibrate its strategic posture towards Russia? Is there any discussion of a new approach to Russia at the EU political level? Clearly, we have seen some movement in relation to Syria recently, but whether in relation to Syria, Ukraine or indeed elsewhere, are there potentially constructive discussions actually happening? If not, what chance do you think there is of that coming down the line? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: The starting point has to be being honest with ourselves about where Russia is coming from. We have seen co-operation over Iran, and it may also be possible to find ways in which we can co-operate with Russia on Syria despite all the difficulties that were set out in the Committee’s report. But I come back to the truth that Russian intervention in Ukraine, particularly the annexation of Crimea, which Russia itself had recognised as an integral part of Ukrainian territory, represented a very serious breach in the way we had become accustomed to doing business in Europe since the Helsinki Final Act. This was the outright annexation of the territory of one European country by another—one OSCE Member State by another. That is not a precedent that we can simply sit back and pretend has not been set. Add to that the language, which President Putin has used in the past, about Russia having the right to intervene anywhere in order to protect the interests of Russians or Russian-speakers, which is seen as threatening by countries from Georgia to Latvia that have significant Russian or Russian-speaking minorities. Add to that the way in which gas supplies to Poland and Slovakia were switched off temporarily last year. Look at the interference, even before the Ukraine sanctions and countersanctions came in, with Lithuanian agricultural exports into Russia. Look at how Russia has acted in Moldova— leaving aside Georgia for the moment, where we have unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The picture is very troubling. I am forced to conclude that the Government of Russia have chosen to treat Europe more as a strategic adversary than as a strategic partner. I do not think we can take it for granted at all that Russia sees its future in its gradual integration into a rules-based international order. It was that assumption, after all, which led to the policy that United Kingdom Governments and European Governments generally pursued of bringing Russia into the G7—the G8—the World Trade Organization and so on. We have to maintain a very cautious approach to our relationship with Russia while this concern persists as to whether Russia genuinely recognises the right of sovereign countries that were once part of the USSR to decide their own future. I agree with the implication behind Baroness Coussins’ question that in the longer term we need to establish a strategic approach to the relationship with Russia. It is a major power in its own region and in the world. The idea that you should simply not talk to Russia at all is laughable, but we should not pretend that the Russian authorities are acting in a way that is more attractive than the reality.

Q187 Lord Horam: One of our witnesses said that what Russia really wants from the international community is respect, as well as some sense of acknowledgement of its

161 of 309 Rt Hon David Lidington MP—Oral Evidence (QQ 175-188) historical near-neighbourhood and so forth. It has tried the nice way over the last 20 years and that was ignored, by America particularly: NATO was expanded and all sorts of verbal undertakings were broken. It has not got anywhere with the nice way, so it is now trying the nasty way. How do you respond to that interpretation of Russia’s attitude? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: It is not an accurate representation of history. For a start, it was not a question of NATO forcing its way up to the borders of Russia; it was a case of the Baltic states, which had the most appalling history in the mid-20th century, coming to NATO and battering at the door demanding to be let in. That was something that Russia did not complain about until the last few years. Russia has had an offer from Europe, and from the West more generally, to treat it as a very respected partner. I have already mentioned the G8 and the WTO. Russia was on the path to OECD membership, and NATO established the NATO-Russia Council so that there could be a dialogue between Russia and NATO as an institution. Huge efforts were made and I regret the fact that Russia acted as she did in Ukraine. The reality is that the Russian Government was not prepared to allow Ukraine to decide its own future. When President Putin described the break-up and collapse of the Soviet Union as the worst disaster in international relations in his lifetime, I think he was speaking from the heart. That sends a very troubling message.

Q188 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: You have given a very accurate and comprehensive account of the historical background over the last two years to Russia’s behaviour, but given where we are now—with Syria, with what has happened in Paris and with the statements that President Hollande and President Putin have made—is it realistically possible to make some progress strategically with Russia without some modification of, let us say, the sanctions policy or our existing relationship with Russia? Rt Hon David Lidington MP: Yes, I do think it is possible. The Iranian precedent demonstrates that it is possible. The E3+3 talks continued with Russia being an active and constructive participant even while Russia and the West were at daggers drawn over Ukraine and while sanctions and countersanctions were being introduced. ISIL—Daesh—is a threat to all of us. Our information is that 85% of Russian air strikes in the early days and weeks were actually on non-ISIL targets inside Syria, but Russia certainly has an influence over the regime in Damascus that far exceeds that of any western European country or the United States. As the Prime Minister said, we believe that Assad cannot be the focus of a Government of national unity, but we would like to agree with Russia an arrangement for a political transition whereby Assad would step aside but people associated with his regime could find common cause with the moderate elements of the opposition to start to rebuild some structure of governance inside Syria. That is what the Prime Minister was talking to President Putin about in Antalya last weekend. The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed Minister. We have had you for over an hour. Thank you for the fullness and frankness of your answers.

162 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34)

Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34)

Evidence Session No. 3 Heard in Public Questions 21 - 34

THURSDAY 17 SEPTEMBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Lord Balfe Baroness Billingham Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Baroness Suttie Lord Triesman Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

______

Examination of Witnesses Mr Richard Lindsay, Head of Security Policy Department, Defence and International Security Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Mr Chris Sainty, Head of EU External Department, Europe Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Q21 The Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming before us. You have probably been through exercises such as this in the Lords or the Commons before, but for the sake of formality this is a public session. It is part of our inquiry into the emerging European security strategy. We will assume that everything you say is on the record, but if there is something that you wish to say which you do not wish to be on the record, please say so.

We sent you a list of questions. I think—I hope—that all the questions will be asked, but there may well be other questions that are asked. If, by any chance, there are questions that you would like to have answered but that were not asked, I would be very grateful if you would inject those thoughts into the discussion. If at the end you feel there is anything you would like to write to us about, either to enlarge on what you have said or to cover

163 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) something that we have asked which you do not feel able to answer at present, again, please do so.

I am a little hard of hearing. Last week we did not find the microphones very good, so could you please be sure to speak into the microphones. I think that is it.

I will kick off with a general question. Does the UK support the strategic rethink of EU foreign policy, and what kind of priority is it for us? In answering that, could you take account of the rather serious and divisive policy debates that are threatening to overwhelm the EU at the moment, migration and Greece being the obvious ones? I do not know whether Mr Lindsay or Mr Sainty would like to start. Mr Chris Sainty: I will start, if I may. First, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today to give evidence to this Committee. The Chairman: You are speaking clearly, I am glad to say. Mr Chris Sainty: Good. I am glad you can hear me. If I may, I will take that question in two parts. The first part is whether the Government support this review. The answer is yes, absolutely. The world has changed in many ways since the European security strategy—the so-called Solana strategy—was published in 2003. That document began with the now slightly infamous words, “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history”. That language now causes many to raise their eyebrows. I do not think it was outrageously complacent, given the context of the time, but of course the point is that the context has changed a very great deal in the intervening period. I think that the foreign policy challenges that we face now in the neighbourhood in particular are of a very different nature and magnitude from those we faced then, so to have a fresh strategy that properly reflects the changed world in which we now live, which defines what the EU is trying to achieve and how it is going to achieve it, and which perhaps also helps the EU to prioritise, seems to us a very reasonable proposition. The second part of your question was: is the strategy review a UK priority at the EU level? That is a bit more difficult to answer. The UK obviously has quite a number of priorities at the EU level, some of them of a very far-reaching and political nature. It might be an overstatement to say that this is right at the top of the list for the UK, but we certainly think that it can be a very useful and very important exercise in focusing the EU and the Member States on what we are really trying to achieve and how we best go about doing that. I am conscious that you also asked me to touch on how the strategy might interrelate with the divisive debates on Greece and the migration issue. Perhaps I might first invite my colleague Mr Lindsay to say a little from a security and defence perspective, and then we can perhaps come back to the question of the relationship with these other questions. Mr Richard Lindsay: Our perspective is that the strategy gives us an opportunity to look at the totality of the EU’s tools. It has a comprehensive approach—this is something that we have long advocated and supported—and gives us an opportunity to look at that in its totality. The tools of the CSDP are but a number of the EU’s tools, and the strategy gives us an opportunity to look at those in the round and at the way in which the EU can act with other actors to achieve the goals that we set out for it. Linking together its civilian, military, economic, diplomatic and development tools in a joined-up way is how we would like the strategy to conclude.

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Mr Chris Sainty: I will follow up by answering your further question about the way that the EU responds to the Greece crisis and the migration crisis. That is a really interesting question and one that we have certainly thought about a lot. There is no obvious direct link between the Greek and eurozone crises and the external policy review. On the whole, those issues are dealt with by different people and different bits of the EU machinery. However, I would just add two thoughts on that. First, at the level of the European Council, that is the level of leaders, the same people are dealing with Greece and the eurozone on the one hand and the external agenda on the other. It is inevitable that when leaders are preoccupied by a difficult internal debate, as we have seen over the last few years, there is much less time and inclination to focus on foreign and security policy questions. The second thought is that clearly when the EU goes through a difficult period internally, as it has done, that does not go unnoticed by our external partners and third countries and so on. That will of course have an impact on the way they perceive us, the European Union. But I think that is more about perception than real impact. The fact is that throughout the period when the EU has been wrestling with the eurozone crisis and Greece, it has forged and maintained unity on sanctions against Russia, and it has contributed to successful outcomes in Iran, as well as many other interventions. The migration crisis, on the other hand, is a little different in that it has a very clear external dimension to it. However, again, I would argue that probably the most divisive part of the internal debate—the very difficult justice and home affairs discussions about relocation and what to do with the migrants and asylum seekers once they have arrived in the EU—does not have a direct read-across to the external security strategy. But of course the external dimension of the migration debate—which is all about our relationship with the countries of origin and transit and the action that the EU can take to promote stability, security and prosperity in those countries and ultimately to deter the migratory flows—needs to be right at the heart of this strategy project. It is very hard to think of a higher priority for the EU in the coming years.

Q22 The Chairman: I think you have almost answered this, but I was going to ask you how you see the High Representative’s report as a basis for a new European foreign policy. I think that you have pretty much covered that. Mr Chris Sainty: Can I just say a few words about the High Representative’s report? Mr Lindsay might like to add something as well. We think that the report is definitely useful. We followed its development closely and my colleagues in Brussels discussed it with the High Representative’s team on a number of occasions, so I think it is probably fair to say that we had quite a lot of influence over what went into it. The result is a good piece of work that describes the foreign policy and security challenges that the EU faces in terms that we, the UK, recognise and agree with. One thing that we particularly like about the report—one of its strengths—is its breadth of scope, which is very much in line with the comprehensive approach that we have already alluded to. By that I mean that the report does not focus narrowly on the traditional foreign policy and security tools; it gives appropriate weight to a whole range of instruments at the EU’s disposal—for example, energy policy, trade, migration, climate, development and so on. Joining all this up is something that we think the EU needs to get better at doing, and this report seems to us to signal an important willingness to move further in that direction.

Q23 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: The Union often has rather a large number of foreign policy priorities, some of them generated by short-term events and some of them rather diffuse. I would be very interested to hear whether the UK thinks that there is scope for

165 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) concentrating the Union’s priorities. I think you almost answered that when you talked about migration, but I would like to explore that in a rather more general context, and whether those priorities are in line with our own national priorities. Mr Chris Sainty: That is a very good question. I would almost like to answer that question the other way round and make the point initially that I think it would be very surprising and certainly a little worrying if the foreign policy priorities of the European Union were not closely aligned with those of the UK, given that we are a large member state with global foreign policy interests. Indeed, all the evidence suggests that that alignment is there. High Representative Mogherini set out her view of the EU’s external priorities at a conference in Munich earlier this year. She talked—unsurprisingly, I think—about focusing on the immediate and the wider neighbourhood, and the western Balkans. She talked about Russia and Ukraine. She talked about the situation on the southern flank, from Libya and the Sahel to Syria and Iraq. She talked about migrants and refugees, the Middle East peace process, the Iranian nuclear issue, and so on. I take your point: it is quite a broad list and it is quite an ambitious list for the EU, but that list does coincide pretty closely with how the UK would identify its top priorities in the foreign policy arena. Pre-eminent in that list is the multiplicity of problems and challenges that are thrown up by the neighbourhood, to both the east and south, and I think everybody accepts that those are the overwhelming foreign policy priorities of the EU. Again, those are also very high priorities for the UK. The migration crisis is an illustration of how those same issues impact on our own national interests, so again that alignment is there. I will turn to Mr Lindsay in a moment. One other point I would make is that this emphasis on the neighbourhood sometimes leads people to ask whether the EU has any business looking further afield—is it right that the EU should aspire to be a global actor or should it confine itself to the neighbourhood, where the problems are, after all, extremely challenging? Briefly, the answer we would give to that is: yes, the EU does need to have a global vision, because whether it likes it or not it is a global actor. For example, in areas where we have very significant economic interests, such as China or the US, it is extremely important that the EU is engaged, although in many cases that engagement may be led more by the Commission than the External Action Service. Then, of course, on some cross-cutting global issues such as climate change the EU is unquestionably a global player and therefore has to be part of that global dialogue and negotiation. Perhaps Mr Lindsay would like to add to that. Mr Richard Lindsay: Just to go back to the genesis of the question—whether our interests are the same as the EU’s interests—of course as we go through our strategic defence and security review, that identifies our own priorities and interests, and that will then feed into the way in which we influence the High Representative’s own strategic review. But underpinning all that is that there are different roles for the EU and specific roles where the EU is and can be the most effective actor and others where it is not, and the flexibility that we have as a member of the EU allows us to use those tools in pursuit of our foreign policy priorities where they are most appropriate and to pursue other routes where they are not.

Q24 Lord Dubs: Can we turn specifically to how the UK will engage with the review process? It seems to me that there are a number of difficulties for us, such as the potential referendum—both our efforts to negotiate a new position and possibly the outcome. Does that not make it more difficult for us to be influential in the review process? Mr Chris Sainty: The first part of the question is easier than the second part, but I will start by talking about how we intend to engage with the process, and then I will try to say a bit about the relationship between that and the more political question of our EU membership.

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On the first part of the question, I would certainly argue that we have been instrumental in shaping the process to date. I have already spoken about how we engaged with the High Representative’s team in the preparation of the report, which has set the context for the whole project. We and a number of other member state Governments have been clear, including in foreign affairs councils and at the June European Council, which of course gave the High Representative the mandate to conduct this exercise, that the review process should be owned by the High Representative. Our thinking there is that we would much rather avoid lengthy negotiations at 28 with the inevitable risk that we end up with a rather diluted strategy. But at the same time we have been clear that Member States need to be closely involved and consulted, and the June European Council language reflects that. There is a question about the final status of this strategy—whether or not it might at some point in the future receive some form of endorsement from the Council or the European Council—which we have left open for now. Our sense to date is that our views are being listened to and taken on board. As I mentioned, the High Representative’s report sets out the issues and challenges in terms that we can support. As we go forward, there will be more opportunities for UK engagement with the process. I am expecting our Ministers to provide some written input fairly shortly. We will certainly continue to engage closely with the High Representative and her team in Brussels. We know that the External Action Service is planning to hold a series of conferences and seminars around the European Union, including some in London. Those will provide us with further opportunities to influence the debate. The issue will undoubtedly be on the agenda of some council meetings in the coming months. Finally, we will also routinely—in fact we already do—discuss and co-ordinate views on the review with other Member States in the course of our normal bilateral relationships. On the second part of the question about how this might play alongside the renegotiation question, that is a slightly delicate area for an official to get involved in and comment on, if I may say so. But I can say this: as the Committee is undoubtedly aware, the Prime Minister’s position is to negotiate reformed terms of membership for the UK and then recommend that to the British people as a basis for remaining in the European Union. Unless and until something changes, we will continue to engage fully and positively, including with this review, and I do not think that any of us see any incompatibility between those two things. On a point of information, the mandate from the June European Council to Mrs Mogherini requires her to report back to the European Council by June 2016. I am not in a position to offer any privileged insight into the timetable for the referendum and that negotiation, but of course those two timings may turn out to be rather different.

Q25 Lord Triesman: Just a few moments ago, Mr Sainty, you talked about the opportunities that would arise in seminars and other gatherings to make our view known. Can you elaborate a little on the ways in which we are preparing to create the best possible synergies between our position and the positions that would emerge? How are we doing that? What machinery and mechanisms are there for that kind of debate? I assume—tell me if I am wrong—that we do not have so many completely pre-baked positions that we could inflexibly follow a strategy without reviewing our own position. In your last comment, Mr Lindsay, you made the point that we have positions, the EU has positions; on occasions the EU position adds greater value than ours does. Can you give us a couple of illustrations of when we have chosen to use the EU as the principal vehicle rather than ourselves? Mr Richard Lindsay: As I alluded to in my last answer, we are going through our own strategic defence and security review. As part of that, we are going through quite an extensive outreach process, discussing and understanding our own assessment and sharing it

167 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) with our largest EU partners and indeed with the totality of the Member States, as well as with the EAS directly. So within our own strategic review we are outreaching, and engaging with and informing our partners. Once that has concluded, which will likely be in November, we will be in a position to be clearer about our own priorities in the defence and security sphere with the EU. We will do that with the EAS directly, as Mr Sainty described. On your second question, migration is probably the easiest example to come to, certainly in the CSDP context. We recognised in June this year that last year there was an urgent requirement to take action at sea due to the loss of life. We moved very quickly, through the EU, to develop the EU NAVFOR operation. That has been going on and will move to its phase 2 very shortly. That is an example of where we, the UK, were quite instrumental in getting the EU to implement a CSDP operation very quickly in response to need where it could not have been done individually or nationally by different nations. There are similar examples in Africa where, on the CSDP, the EU is playing a very significant role. It is a maximiser of our influence. Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia, which has suppressed piracy, has been a really strong example over the last few years of where a significant impact has been made, bringing EU Member States and their assets to bear. Because it is the EU, it is reaching out to non-EU states that would otherwise perhaps have found it less easy to engage in that naval operation.

Q26 Lord Risby: Mr Sainty, you alluded to the migration issue as an extension of the European interest in the countries of origin and how that is dealt with. The only reason that I say this is that, for all the successes that you mentioned—perhaps dealing with Ukraine at one level or with sanctions against Russia—this is an area that is very testing as regards public support, not only in this country but right across the European Union, because there is such a division of view on it. On the specific issue of public support, we have heard that this is an essential component of the success of a foreign policy. I do not want to overemphasise this, but it is a key indication of the difficulties among Member States. What is the mechanism for trying to determine what public support there could be or should be in this country for this process? Are there consultations with civil society organisations, for example, or with foreign policy stakeholders? How does one determine in a very difficult atmosphere what the mood is and how it can reflect and play into a common dynamic for foreign policy for Europe? Mr Chris Sainty: That is a very interesting question. I would make one point initially. As I have already mentioned, ownership of the EU’s strategy review does not rest with the British Government— but with the High Representative. For that reason, we, the Government, do not think that it would make sense for us to run a formal consultation exercise in parallel with the engagement which the High Representative is planning with European civil society. That might risk giving the impression that we were in some way in control and responsible for the outcome, which is not the case and is not the impression that we would want to create. But of course I agree entirely with your point that a credible strategy needs to be underpinned by a strong degree of public support, so we will certainly look for ways to ensure that a range of British views and opinions are heard in the course of this review exercise. If I may say so, this inquiry makes an important contribution in that regard. We know that the External Action Service is planning to run a series of conferences and seminars around the EU, some of which will be held in the UK. We know, I think, that the EAS is looking at organising events in London with the LSE, and with the European Council on Foreign Relations, as well as possibly some other events. We will certainly work with the

168 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) organisers in order to achieve a strong representation of British academics, think-tankers, NGOs and what one might describe as other foreign and security policy stakeholders from civil society. It is also worth making the point that there is already in that community a high level of awareness about this process, not least because people read the European Council conclusions and know that this process is under way. We also see evidence of a desire to contribute. Some of these organisations and individuals have already published papers on this subject, for example. So the interest is there and we will do what we can to sustain it and make sure that that contribution is heard. It may also be worth adding in this context that many of the questions that have arisen— very naturally, I think—in the context of a strategic review of the EU’s external policy were addressed in the UK’s Balance of Competences review in 2013. That exercise assembled a very large body of evidence from a wide range of public sources. In fact, there is a case to be made that there has already been quite a lot of public consultation on this issue in the UK, and we already have a reasonable idea of the range of views out there. In the course of the autumn I am sure we will discover more from High Representative Mogherini about her plans for how to interpret her June European Council mandate, which talks about preparing a strategy in close co-operation with the Member States. Certainly it is our hope that she will interpret that mandate in a broad way and look for as many ways as possible of engaging civil society, and we will support her in doing that. Lord Risby: You mentioned how the High Representative was driving this, and I understand the way you want to interact. You also mentioned that there will be seminars and discussions. Do you happen to know whether this is happening in other European countries? Do you happen to know whether there is a similar process over a similar distance or whether a more integrated process is going on? Mr Chris Sainty: I know that there is a plan to hold these events across the European Union. I do not know exactly what position each individual member state has taken on consulting its own civil society, but I would expect it not to be that different from the way I have articulated the UK’s position. Mr Richard Lindsay: Perhaps I may add to that, again to put it in the context of our own SDSR. I do not think that it will give the Committee any particular surprises if I say that emerging themes in the SDSR are the rules-based international order, our adherence to and encouragement of it, and the way in which we will use our allies and our partners—by which I include our relationships with Member States but also through the EU—to pursue our own goals. As that gets published and is announced in Parliament and then more broadly, it is hoped that a wellspring of public support will be building for those outcomes, which will describe the EU and its tools as part of the toolbox that the UK has at its disposal. Mr Chris Sainty: Yes, I very much agree with that.

Q27 Lord Horam: Mr Sainty, perhaps I can ask you the fundamental question: what do you see as the strengths of the European Union as a foreign-policy actor? Where does it add value and do you think it has been damaged by the recent divisions that have already been referred to on immigration and so forth? Mr Chris Sainty: Big question. In fact, this question, or one very similar, was explored in considerable detail in the Balance of Competences review, so there is some useful material and evidence to draw on there. Although that report is now two years old, that evidence base remains very solid and very valid. That exercise argued that the EU had a number of

169 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) strengths as an actor in the foreign policy arena that enabled it to add value to what individual Member States might otherwise be able to achieve through their own national activities. I will briefly summarise some of those key strengths. First, the EU is able to achieve a very significant impact on the international stage by virtue of being able to speak with a single voice on behalf of 28 countries. It is an obvious point, but those 28 countries include four G7 economies, two permanent members of the UN Security Council, the bulk of NATO’s membership and so on. So there is real strength in numbers, or at least there can be real strength in numbers. Then there is the range of instruments that the EU can deploy in support of its external policies, probably more than any other international organisation. In addition to the conventional diplomatic and security activity, up to and including military missions, the EU can use all these other levers, such as energy, trade, migration, development and so on, to help deliver its priorities. Then there is an important point about the economic strength of the Union and the international weight of the EU’s single market, which gives the EU the power to deliver commercially beneficial trade agreements. This also gives the EU influence in other areas of external action because, as we know, trade is used as a lever to promote values such as human rights, democracy and political reconciliation. We have a lot of examples of that in places such as the western Balkans. Then there is the size and reach of the EU’s financial instruments, particularly development budgets and economic partnerships. The EU is the largest aid donor in the world, so there are some very substantial carrots that it can dangle in order to achieve its external objectives. A final strength is that on occasions the EU’s perceived political neutrality can also be an asset that can give it an edge over what an individual member state such as the UK might be able to achieve. The obvious recent example of that is the Iran nuclear negotiations, where to some extent the EU was able to play the part of a neutral broker between the E3+3 and the Iranian Government. Lord Horam: Do you see any other examples of where that might be achieved? Iran is an interesting example, but is it a special case? It took a long time to achieve and I wondered whether there was anything else. Mr Chris Sainty: It is quite a special case; I would need to scratch my head to come up with another similarly impressive example. Mr Richard Lindsay: Going back to the reference to the work off the coast of Somalia, it was quite evident that there was a terrible piracy problem and that it needed quite hard-end naval activity to tackle that but individual nations were not capable of doing it. NATO alone would have been provocative and challenging. The EU was able to contribute to that space with Operation Atalanta. By bringing in and associating with Korean, Japanese and other naval forces—which would not necessarily have joined in with a NATO operation, for example—it fulfilled a unique role. Similarly, in Operation Althea in Bosnia, the EU was able to take on a role from NATO and has been delivering a transition process from a very hard- end NATO operation many years ago to gradually building the capability to allow the Bosnians to take over their own security. Lord Horam: Thank you for making that point. The downside of the numbers, the size and so forth is the difficulty getting agreement. How far do you feel that the position and the strength of the European Union have been damaged by recent differences of opinion? Mr Chris Sainty: I will say a few words first and perhaps Mr Lindsay can add to them. You are absolutely right: there are real challenges in working in an intergovernmental framework at 28. Of course, decision-making can be slow and can lead to lowest common denominator

170 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) results. The example that is often given of the EU’s failure to get its act together quickly enough is the response to the Arab Spring in 2011. There is also the risk, which we already alluded to, that different parts of the EU that are responsible for external action, primarily the Commission and the External Action Service, are not as well joined up as they should be. That can also lead to a poorly co-ordinated and sometimes ineffectual response. Yes, those risks are very much there. It is worth making the point that those risks are in the nature of multilateral intergovernmental business, but we, the Member States, have a choice; we do not have to pursue our foreign policy priorities through the European Union, and if we judge that there is a better, more efficient way of getting the job done, if there is a better partner with whom we can work or whatever, it is always open to us to do that. As a counterexample that might be worth throwing in, Russia is a subject on which you might imagine that it would be immensely difficult for the EU, at 28, to rally around a common position, but over the past year or so we have seen a remarkable unity of purpose from the European Union on the sanctions package. It has been a hard slog, no doubt, but that has been quite an important and positive example. Lord Horam: Has that surprised you? Mr Chris Sainty: It has come as a bit of a surprise to us, although it is also a reflection of a great deal of diplomatic heavy lifting around the EU and its capitals, in which we have played a very important part. It has had two important effects. There is the direct impact of the sanctions themselves on Russia, but it has probably also sent a psychological message to President Putin that actually the EU is not quite as easy to pick off as he might previously have imagined.

Q28 The Chairman: Could I raise two slightly discordant points? The argument that you put to Lord Horam, if I may say so, was very well put; it is also a familiar one. Would you agree with me that until the eurozone crisis really took hold, the EU was seen around the world as an exemplar of modern interstate relations and of how in a postmodern world countries can pool resources to the benefit of all, and that gave the EU a moral cachet that has been significantly damaged by the way in which the eurozone crisis has been handled?

My second question relates to the sanctions—where, again, I agree with you and you are no doubt familiar with our EU-Russia report—where the EU was coming to the support of those who were on the eastern side of the EU, nearest Russia, and some of the Mediterranean countries have suffered, Italy and Greece have suffered from the sanctions. One wonders whether in the light of what is happening over migration there will not be a bit of a challenge to some of the renewal of sanctions down the road. How would you react to those two points? Mr Chris Sainty: They are two quite challenging questions. Has the EU squandered its moral authority through its internal divisions and difficulties over the eurozone and so on? I am not sure that the evidence really suggests that. I think that in the last couple of years the EU has had some significant successes on the international stage. We have talked a bit about the Iran nuclear negotiations; we have talked, up until now anyway, about the successful maintenance of the sanctions package against Russia; and Mr Lindsay has talked about the anti-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa. It is an interesting debating point. My response is that I do not see a great deal of evidence that the EU has in some way lost its capacity to act. However, I am quite sure—I think that I made this point at the very start of this session—that the EU’s internal crises will have some impact on the way we are perceived by others, and we have to acknowledge that that is the case.

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On the second question about possible divisions emerging a bit further down the track on things such as sanctions against Russia because of the southern-eastern divide, my answer is that that is very possible—that risk is there. There is of course a great diversity of views and interests across the European Union when it comes to the big Russia question. I would just repeat what I said that, despite those potential divisions within the European Union, we have succeeded in keeping a fairly remarkable solidarity of purpose over the last 18 months or so. It would certainly be our intention to try to sustain that as we go forward, but I am sure that it will continue to be a hard slog.

Q29 Baroness Billingham: My question is in two parts. The first is: what specific case studies would you highlight where the EU has developed as an effective international security actor? You partially answered that in your responses to Lord Horam and the Lord Chairman.

The second part is, I think, much more difficult. Looking forward, are there specific foreign policy dossiers where the EU could take a leading role? I ask that question against a background of enormously volatile public opinion, which must affect the decisions that are taken in the future. The churning that we now see across Europe is going to have a dramatic impact on the decisions that we are going to have to make. Mr Chris Sainty: That is a very interesting question. If you will allow me to do so, while we are dwelling on the positive case studies I would like to say a little more about the Iranian negotiations, because I think that those really are interesting and a model of a really successful intervention by the EU. Perhaps I could start off by saying a word about that. Mr Lindsay, do you want to come in after that? Then we can perhaps turn to the very difficult question of how the EU might engage positively in the future. On the Iran question, preventing Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon while seeking progress on human rights and other key issues has for a very long time, as this Committee will be very well aware, been a top foreign policy priority for the UK. We worked very closely with the EU to secure the peaceful negotiated solution that we now have—at least, in writing— through the dual-track approach. That involved, first, engagement with the Iranians through the so-called E3+3 format—the UK, France and Germany, together with the Americans, the Russians and the Chinese. The other part was the restrictive measures, including sanctions, which maintained pressure on the Iranians and kept them at the table negotiating in a serious way. During that process, the High Representative acted as the E3+3’s informal spokesperson. On the sanctions front, the EU took a lead, supported very much by the UK, in increasing pressure on Iran. The sanctions regime that was put in place against Iran was far-reaching. It ranged from a ban on the EU import of Iranian oil to asset freezes against Iran’s Central Bank, travel bans against entities and individuals associated with the nuclear programme and, towards the end, the imposition of financial measures prohibiting Iranian bank transactions. Those really had an effect and worked in terms of keeping the Iranians at the table. Going back to the role that the High Representative played, Mrs Mogherini and her predecessor Baroness Ashton, supported by a team of External Action Service diplomats, played an instrumental co-ordination and facilitation role when it came to the negotiations. I think that those negotiations have been very widely acknowledged as contributing in a big way to the positive outcome of a comprehensive agreement with Iran on its nuclear programme aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation. Of course, that is not the end of the story and I do not want to sound complacent—the deal needs to clear the US Congress and needs to be implemented, and we do not underestimate the challenges ahead—but to have

172 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) reached the point that we are at now is a significant achievement, and crucially the European Union really did play an important part in that, both through the facilitation of the dialogue and through the sanctions regime. It is a really good case study and a really good example of the EU stepping up in a very interesting way, playing a role that it had not really played before on an issue of that kind. Mr Richard Lindsay: Perhaps I can go back a little to the example that I gave earlier about tackling piracy off the Horn of Africa. Operation Atalanta was launched in 2008 and since 2012 there have been no successful pirate attacks on shipping off the Horn of Africa. More than 150 pirates have been apprehended and more than 120 of those are now in jail. There is a continuing naval presence, which has suppressed and continues to suppress piracy. There are other EU missions in the region—EUCAP Nestor and the EU training mission in Somalia. We will be reviewing all three of those together by the end of this year so that the EU can genuinely demonstrate its comprehensive approach, building capacity with the naval forces and building capacity for the interdiction, the judicial process and the onshore security forces. That is an example of the EU bringing together its different elements within the toolbox, and the outcome is quite startling, I think. Mr Chris Sainty: Looking to the future is very tricky. I was thinking through my answer as Mr Lindsay was speaking. You could accuse me of being a little overoptimistic here, but it seems to us that there is at least a realistic chance that we may, in the reasonably near future, see some sort of political settlement emerging in Libya and the formation of a Government of national unity—in other words, a credible interlocutor in Libya with whom we can do business. If that were the case, one could certainly foresee a pretty significant role for the EU, through various possible interventions that one could devise, in restoring peace, security and stability in Libya. That is one example that I would suggest, but I very much take your point that this is all going to be difficult. We are of course overwhelmed to some extent by all the different issues raised by the current migration crisis. Many countries are involved in that. It is unrealistic to imagine that the EU will be able to do everything. That comes back to a point that I made earlier, which is that we have choices to make about which actors, which combination of actors and which groups of countries intervene in different situations. We will have to make those judgments as and when the opportunities arise. In some cases, the EU will be the appropriate actor, perhaps in collaboration with others; on other occasions, other organisations and other countries may well be better placed to intervene. I hope that that goes some way towards answering your question. The Chairman: Lord Triesman and Lord Oxford have supplementary questions. Lord Triesman: Perhaps I could probe that Libya example a bit further to see whether or not it is unduly optimistic. There is a Government who we recognise and others recognise. There is another body that claims to be the Government and which controls very large parts of the territory, albeit not unchallenged. They have each appointed people to various multinational organisations. There seems to be some competition over who is going to recognise which person in which role and little agreement between the two Governments— if I can call them both Governments—as to how to resolve those kinds of questions. How do we and the EU approach this? It may be different or it may be the same. Are we talking to both in order to get them to co-operate, or are we trying to build up one of them so that the other falls in line? Are we aligned across Europe in doing that? Mr Chris Sainty: With the caveat that I am not a Libya specialist, my understanding is that the process of trying to identify a single credible interlocutor in Libya is being led by the United Nations. It is a UN process, with Special Representative Bernardino León in charge.

173 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34)

The cause of my optimism is a sense of relative optimism coming from him and his UN team that there is the prospect of bringing the opposing parties in Libya together and forming a Government with at least enough of the different stakeholders involved to be able to have a credible relationship. Mr Lindsay may know more about this than I do. Mr Richard Lindsay: The León process has a time limit. We are getting towards the end of that time. There is some optimism, as Mr Sainty said, that that is going to come towards a conclusion. If that does come to a conclusion—and it is right that it is a UN-led process— the EU has a huge portfolio of tools which we would look to draw on to support a Government of national accord, if that is what we get. A Government of national accord will need considerable external support and we would expect the EU to be a very well-placed actor to provide both financial and practical support for that Government. The detail of what that would look like remains to be seen, because we have not yet got the recipient Government, as it were—or requesting Government, indeed—to work with. But there are plenty of opportunities to exploit and demonstrate the utility of the totality of the EU’s toolbox. Earl of Oxford and Asquith: I think you have already answered my question in your replies to Lord Triesman, thank you. The Chairman: They both rather trespassed on your question, Jean.

Q30 Baroness Coussins: Not really—slightly. My question goes back to the issue of migration and refugees. We have touched on the current crisis several times. It seems fairly clear that the flow of people is going to remain part of the EU’s security context in the mid- to long-term. In fact, you went so far as to say that you thought it was hard to think of a higher priority for the EU over the coming years. It seems self-evident that the EU needs to develop more effective and co-ordinated ways of responding to the flow of people, but alongside that, should the EU be considering and revising its policies towards the countries of origin and transit in the Middle East and north Africa, and if so, how? What should the focus of such a revised policy platform look like, in your opinion? Mr Chris Sainty: Thank you. I will attempt to answer a very far-reaching question. First of all, we would thoroughly agree with the proposition that the Middle East and north Africa, particularly the countries currently most affected by the migration crisis, will be a very major priority for the EU in the mid- to long-term. Of course, the challenges pretty much write themselves: tackling extremism and terrorism, tackling the migration routes and the human traffickers who profit from them, tackling the acute political instability that exists in a number of those countries, and tackling violent conflict in others. Then of course there is the need to engage in a positive way in a wide range of areas, such as energy co-operation and what one might call the prosperity agenda in many countries of the region. All that means that the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy—our posture towards the southern and south- eastern neighbourhood—will require at least as much attention as some of the other issues to the east that we have been talking about. There is an important point here, which I have already made in another context. The challenges are really immense in this region and no single actor, including the EU, can do all that. Again, it is a question of the EU and its Member States needing to work out where the EU best fits alongside the other actors in the region, which include, among others, the US, the UN, other multilateral organisations, the Gulf states and so on. Of course, because we as the UK are members of so many of the key international organisations and groups, and with our permanent membership of the Security Council, we are often in a good position to make those judgments about who is best suited to intervene in particular situations.

174 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34)

Going back to the question of the southern neighbourhood, in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is currently being reviewed, one of the ways in which we contributed to that review was with thoughts on the question of differentiation; in other words, there is no one-size-fits-all EU policy that can be applied as a template to all the countries. We simply have to look at them intelligently on a case-by-case basis and work out what are the right policies and interventions that the European Union could meaningfully pursue. If you look at the region in those terms, the countries fall broadly into three categories. There are countries such as Tunisia, Morocco and perhaps Jordan, which are making progress with reforms and may well be interested in a closer partnership with the European Union. In a sense, those are the easy ones. Those are the ones to which we should be aiming to provide deeper, closer support across a very wide range of issues, and can do so relatively easily. Then there is a group of countries that are perhaps less interested in a close partnership with the European Union and making the sort of long-term reforms that the EU would encourage. There, our view is that we need to focus on key areas where it is in the EU’s interests to provide support. That may still add up to a pretty substantial relationship but it needs to be focused on encouraging those elements in that country that respond to the European agenda—things such as economic stability, job creation and the rule of law. There, the EU needs to strike a delicate balance, retaining a sense of partnership and avoiding coming across as imposing, but there is also an important point about remaining consistent and clear in support of our values: democracy, human rights and so on. The third category, which is the most difficult of all, is the countries that are currently in conflict. There, the priority has to be to work to resolve the conflict. That may require some new ways of working: that is, instead of focusing on long-term formal agreements and reform action plans, which may not go anywhere, the EU needs to focus on short-term conflict resolution activities, looking at political solutions, humanitarian work and so on. That is the sort of analysis we would like the strategic review to make when it is looking at the MENA region, without in any way claiming that it is going to be easy to find any productive solutions or ways forward. We feel that the EU needs more flexibility to decide the priority requirements for each country at an early stage and then to be able to react and respond—for example, by reprogramming funding quickly as the security issues rise and fall on the agenda—and that comes back to the point about co-ordination between the EU institutions and other things that we have already been talking about. That flexibility point is certainly an important element of our wider approach to the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Q31 Lord Horam: Carrying on with the theme of the Neighbourhood Policy, can we just switch to the eastern neighbourhood? It is yet again a different category—it is a tour d’horizon with a vengeance. You were saying just now that it is important for the European Union to decide its priorities in relation to the different categories and different needs in its neighbourhoods. Clearly, Ukraine is yet another example that is extremely worrying. How do you see the situation there at the moment, and how do you see the European Union taking a positive stance there? Mr Richard Lindsay: If I may start on this question, it is a challenge to answer your question directly, because the EU is not delivering the Normandy format; it is delivered by different members, as is appropriate in the circumstances. It goes back to what we described earlier concerning the appropriateness of the circumstance. However, after the Ukraine crisis the

175 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34)

EU very quickly established the EU mission to assist with security sector reform within Ukraine. That has moved very quickly and is starting to deliver effect within Ukraine. I want to go back to the point that Mr Sainty made earlier about the sanctions, which have been the most effective tool in response to the Ukraine crisis that the EU has applied. Of course, part of the origin of the Russian approach to Ukraine has been its relationship with the EU in itself, so the EU is less likely to be the most effective actor in solving a conflict in that region. Perhaps I can broaden the question a little to talk about the way in which we incorporate eastern partners into some of our CSDP operations. That is a helpful part of the EU’s neighbourhood policy. Take, for example, the Georgians’ contributions to CSDP missions. They are the second biggest contributor, after France, to the mission in the Central African Republic. That is a demonstration of the way in which we are helping integration and development with some of the eastern partners. Lord Horam: Looking at it from the Ukrainian point of view, do you think that the European Union has been seen to be helpful, or has it been seen as a great disappointment? Mr Richard Lindsay: It is very difficult to answer that question without getting into the fundamentals of the Ukraine/Russia relationship and the origin of the Russian activity in Ukraine. Lord Horam: Is it not therefore very difficult for us to have a view of Ukraine outside our view of Russia and our relationship with Russia? That is the difficulty, is it not? Mr Chris Sainty: It is quite important that we make the effort to see Ukraine as separate from the question of the EU’s relationship with Russia. There is a fundamental principle there, which is that Ukraine is a sovereign, independent nation whose sovereignty has been effectively under attack. I think that we, the European Union, must stand up for the values that we espouse. Regarding the Ukrainians and indeed some of the other eastern partners that perhaps face similar pressures, although not quite as strikingly and as intensely as in the case of Ukraine, from their big neighbour, Russia, we need to stand up for their sovereign rights and do what we can to enable them to make their own choices about their future. Lord Risby: Lord Horam was absolutely right in the point that he made. There cannot be a potential resolution of the Ukrainian problem—and we are getting into new territory on this—without, ultimately, some sort of accommodation with Russia. I wonder whether it is possible to be updated on some ideas that have been mooted by European Union officials at different times about recognising the status of the so-called Eurasian area—I think it is Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Armenia. The suggestion is to extend the idea that has been extended to Ukraine, which has a deep and comprehensive free trade area relationship with the European Union. Is it possible to have a bit of an update on whether this has any viability at this point, or has it just got lost in the sands of the difficulties of conflict and the sanctions? Mr Chris Sainty: I would probably have to say that that is a little bit outside my area of expertise. If it would be useful, I would be very happy to follow up in writing after this session. Basically, you are asking for an update on the Eurasian Economic Union. Lord Risby: Yes, and our relationship to this and whether there are fresh developments. That would be very helpful. It is just part of the whole dynamic that Lord Horam has talked about.

Q32 Baroness Suttie: The question that I was going to ask about co-ordination you have already covered in several of your answers. I am interested in the practical realities. You

176 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) have already touched on the potential for Libya, where there could be a greater role for the European Union and EU projects.

With regard to capacity-building and development projects on the ground, my experience is that quite often we have national projects and EU projects that are not fully co-ordinated, and sometimes I have even found them to be contradictory. It is certainly not the best use of limited financial resource. This is obviously extremely important in the Middle East/north Africa region, where we are trying quickly to rebuild—or hope eventually to rebuild— democracies and capacities.

You have already touched on the fact that you think the review might be an opportunity to improve this co-ordination. How, in practical terms, would you see a more facilitating and co-ordinating role for the European Union or indeed the Member States in making sure that there is no doubling up or, even worse, that there are no contradictory projects on the ground? Mr Chris Sainty: That is a really good question. What I have been talking more about up until now has been internal co-ordination within the European Union between the External Action Service, the Commission and any other institutional actors involved in delivering projects and assistance, or whatever it might be, in other parts of the world. I think that your question goes a bit wider than that. It talks about co-ordination with what Member States and others may be doing on the ground. It is a very good question but a tricky one, and I am not sure that I have an answer, or at least a very developed answer, to give you, other than that I think that within this strategy process itself it is one of the questions that ought to be out there. It ought to be the subject of full and frank discussion between those who own the process, High Representative Mogherini’s team and the Member States. It is a problem that we need to acknowledge, and we need to develop some mechanisms for better co-ordination, perhaps at the centre, before different actors start intervening in different ways in the same parts of the world in ways that, as you say, may from time to time conflict. However, I am afraid that I do not have a recipe for success that I can present to you today. Baroness Suttie: I do not think that there is an easy answer, but acknowledging that there is a problem would be a starting point. If you look at the Arab spring countries, there were masses of uncoordinated projects on the ground trying to help with democracy-building and capacity-building, and I feel that it should be on the agenda for this review. Mr Chris Sainty: It would be good to think that a lot of lessons had been learnt from that Arab Spring episode. Indeed, I very much hope that that is the case, and that some of that experience can perhaps be brought together as part of this process. That would be very useful.

Q33 The Chairman: Coming back almost to where we began, you may have read the transcript of our evidence last week in which Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO said that it was a pity that the UK was obsessed with ensuring that NATO remained the primary security alliance in Europe. That leads me to ask you: what is the Government’s view of the faltering progress of the Common Security and Defence Policy, and what do you diagnose as the main constraints on an effective EU military capability? Should it be a tool of EU foreign policy? Mr Richard Lindsay: Perhaps I can answer that. We are focused on NATO as our primary defence provider. That is very clearly the Government’s position and will remain so as a

177 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) cornerstone of European defence. So there is an obsession there. We do not believe that there is any detriment to the development of EU military capabilities because the EU does not have any military capabilities. Indeed, one of our strong positions towards the EU is that it should not have any military capabilities because military capabilities are owned, controlled and invested in by Member States. Our approach has been to build a complementarity between NATO and the EU as security actors in their differential ways, but it is Member States in both organisations that drive the policy towards that. We have been working through the June European Council and since, using the EDA—the European Defence Agency—to help Member States develop their own capabilities where there are shortfalls, but focused on differentiating between the role that NATO should play as the defence provider, and the Common Defence and Security Policy that the EU can do and the way in which its comprehensive approach can be put into action. So I am quite comfortable to be described as relatively obsessive about NATO, and I think that strand will come through very strongly in the SDSR when it is published. On the other part of your question, about the faltering CSDP, again I challenge that because, as we have described in a number of different answers, the CSDP has demonstrated the utility of its toolbox. The support that the CSDP can provide for conflict-affected states can provide some hard-edged security, as we have described, off the coast of Africa or indeed in the Mediterranean; those are examples of how it has evolved very rapidly and is continuing to evolve to be a more effective tool for us. We would like to see—Mr Sainty alluded to this—it becoming more agile and more connected, but in a way that is complementary to the actions of Member States. It goes back to the question you were asking earlier. It is about the complementarity of the CSDP.

Q34 The Chairman: Thank you. That is very clear and unequivocal. I have one final question, unless my colleagues have others. Witnesses have suggested to us—and it was a point that this Committee, with a rather different membership, took up in our last report— that the EU and Member States need to rebuild their diplomatic assessment and analytical capacity in third countries, particularly those in the eastern and southern neighbourhood. We picked up very clearly in our last report a sense that not only in London but in other major EU capitals diplomatic assessment and analytical skills had been rather subordinated to other priorities. Obviously, that led to a disagreement with the Foreign Office in its report, but it is a strand that we constantly hear. I was very struck by the number of ex-diplomats— not just British ones—who got on to me in support of what we had said. How would you respond to that? Mr Chris Sainty: Well, as a not yet ex-diplomat, I probably have to toe the party line here. I think the Government would certainly accept and agree that the External Action Service should focus heavily on the neighbourhood and develop the right assessment and analytical capacity to be able to do that. We also have some other priorities that we would like the External Action Service to focus on, including the relationship with what we regard as our strategic partners a bit further afield, such as India and China. We want it to get better at crisis management and, as we have already discussed, we want it to improve the coherence of its work with that of the Commission. Those are the key priorities as we see them, but certainly getting the neighbourhood right and understanding the neighbourhood is right at the top of that list. We think that the EAS is getting better in those areas, but there is more to be done. We think it would probably acknowledge that. We have also made it clear that since the EAS is an organisation that is essentially at the service of the Member States, we would expect it to prioritise its resources within agreed levels to address what we determine as our common priorities. That is another way of saying that we will not be

178 of 309 Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) proposing large increases in its budget so that it can increase its capacity—we think that the capacity is there; it is a question of prioritisation—nor are we going to be suggesting that it takes on new competences and responsibilities. As you are probably aware, we have resisted the idea that the External Action Service should acquire competences to deal with consular matters in third countries. The other part of your question was about Member State capacity and whether we should be doing more to focus on the neighbourhood. There may be a case for that, but it also quickly gets you into a debate about the resourcing of our diplomatic services—I am probably not the right person to get into that question. Certainly, the Foreign Office has already reprioritised in order to strengthen the directorate that deals with eastern Europe and central Asia. It has had a staffing uplift of around 25%. That is principally to deal with Ukraine and Russia and is therefore a response to the immediate demands of the Ukraine situation, but it is also a recognition that Russia is a huge strategic challenge that requires a lot of analytical capacity within our organisation, and it is a problem that we are going to be dealing with for many years to come. I will make one final observation about this. I think that the EU as a whole, in which I include the Member States and the EU institutions, actually has a formidable amount of resource devoted to external policy in the neighbourhood. There is a very large reservoir of knowledge and experience on an issue such as Ukraine, for example, in the foreign ministries of Poland and some of the eastern Member States. So I would argue that it is perhaps less about bolstering capacity with lots of extra resource and so on and more about making the best possible use of the experience and capacity that between us we already enjoy. The Chairman: I hope it will be a long time before you become an ex-diplomat. Mr Chris Sainty: Thank you, Lord Chairman. The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed for the fullness and frankness of your answers. If, on reflection, you feel there is anything you would like to add or emphasise, do please let us know. We have had a very helpful session, thank you very much indeed.

179 of 309 LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0012)

LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science— Written Evidence (FSP0012)

 Is the EU ready and capable to respond to the new security environment? What are the opportunities that it presents for the Union?

1. In assessing EU response to recent crises for the Dahrendorf Forum at LSE IDEAS, former diplomats Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO and Wolfgang Ischinger emphasised the importance of 'hybrid diplomacy' in confronting the hybrid nature of modern security threats.

2. For example:  Promotion of entrepreneurial diplomacy, which involves sponsoring smaller and target oriented projects.  Finding and promoting success stories, which will become increasingly important in information wars.  Maintaining strong diplomatic missions will be especially crucial in modern crises, when lines of communication at governmental level may be disrupted and central governments exercise less control over actors on the ground.

More information: Taking stock of Europe’s role in the world - After the year of crises 2014 September 1st 2015

 What are the EU’s interests in the MENA region? How effective have the EU and Member States been in promoting them? What have been the obstacles to effective EU action in the region?  Member States and the EU have been calling for a policy to address the “root causes” of insecurity and to offer “tailor made responses” to the countries in the region. What would that involve? Does the EU have the foreign policy toolkit to deliver on this policy?

3. A group of experts discussed the effect of the European Neighbourhood Policy on North Africa at a 'Chatham House style' Dahrendorf Forum workshop in Berlin.

4. They concluded that "the ENP and its toolbox seem to be outdated and not flexible enough to respond to the complex developments on the ground while bridging the member states’ divergent preferences"34.

5. A key obstacle to effectiveness of the EU in the region was a lack of resources, particularly the number of dedicated External Action Service staff. The EU needs to enhance its local presence and invest more into country staff to build local capacity and to boost support and cooperation.

34 European Neighbourhood Policy Review: Lessons From North Africa August 25th 2015, p.1

180 of 309 LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0012)

6. Participants agreed that increasing the degree of differentiation between ENP countries in North Africa was crucial to success. Additional staff will be required to provide additional flexibility.

7. The best tool to achieve this is micro-level conditionality, with financial allocations tied to specific profess in democratic reforms and the promotion of the rule of law on a 'more for more' and 'less for less' principle.

8. In sharpening conditionality tools, the EU should work to avoid short-term political or economic interests in the region undermine the long term aims of the ENP e.g. arms exports. It should also seek to maximise impact of the leverage points that the EU already has, including targeted measures in the key areas of the arms trade, tourism, and diplomacy.

More information: European Neighbourhood Policy Review: Lessons From North Africa August 25th 2015

 Should the EU focus its resources more closely on its own neighbourhood? What are the advantages and disadvantages of doing so?  How would you assess EU policy in the neighbourhood? Are the foreign policy instruments in the neighbourhood fit for purpose? Should enlargement remain the major tool of in the EU foreign policy toolkit in the neighbourhood?

9. The success of the European Neighbourhood Policy has created advantages as successful foreign policy tool but "while EU enlargement has made a fundamental contribution to stabilising post-Cold War Europe, unintended consequences intensified difficulties with Russia in some cases".35

10. The European Eastern Partnership (EaP) was the first EU policy met by Russian policymakers by a level of rhetoric usually reserved for NATO. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is both a reaction to, and appears to have been modelled on, the European Union's transformative power. Its development shows that Russia has belatedly recognised the power of developing and encouraging regulatory and market norms, the effectiveness of the tool in re-orienting target country policy prompting a response from Russia.36

11. The effectiveness of enlargement as foreign policy tool has been undermined by 'enlargement fatigue' amongst members of the European Union. Enlargement fatigue has followed every period of expansion of the European Union, as shown by the disbanding in 1973 enlargement taskforce that had successfully completed accession talks with the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway.

12. Modern enlargement fatigue has led to 'accession fatigue' (also known as 'adjustment fatigue' and 'evaluation fatigue') in neighbourhood countries, particularly the Balkans. Domestic policy-makers and interest groups perceive EU expansion fatigue of reducing the long-term benefits of European external incentives. "Accession-driven reforms can

35 The Crisis of EU Enlargement, LSE IDEAS Special Report, November 2013, p.50 36 The Geopolitics of Eurasian Economic Integration, IDEAS Special Report, June 2014

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succeed and EU norms can be substantively internalised only if the EU can provide a credible promise of membership."37

37 The Crisis of EU Enlargement, p. 42

182 of 309 Dr Lars-Erik Lundin and Professor Daniel Drezner—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137)

Dr Lars-Erik Lundin and Professor Daniel Drezner—Oral Evidence (QQ 124-137) Transcript to be found under Professor Daniel Drezner and Dr Lars-Erik Lundin

183 of 309 Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London, and Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations—Written Evidence (FSP0010)

Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London, and Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations—Written Evidence (FSP0010)

1. At their December 2013 summit, the EU’s national leaders set time aside to discuss how to re-energise their Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). “Defence matters”, they portentously declared. And, moving beyond the usual platitudes, they set out a specific agenda for reviving European defence, under the heads of operations, capabilities and industrial base. Better still, they set deadlines – and promised to take stock of progress when meeting as the June 2015 European Council.38 2. Subsequent events might almost have been designed to confirm that defence does, indeed, matter. Russia’s assault on Ukraine has been followed by the intensification of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, precipitating the greatest displacement of peoples since the Second World War and a refugee crisis which has shaken the very foundations of the EU. 3. The response to that crisis to which the EU seems to be feeling its way is rightly multidimensional, involving working together to accommodate those already in Europe, and to put in place humane and effective arrangements for receiving and ‘processing’ those yet to arrive. And the European Council, meeting in emergency session on 23 September, has also recognised the need to tackle the crisis upstream, in the ‘countries of origin and transit’, by substantially increasing aid to the neighbouring countries who have borne the brunt of the flight of Syria’s population; by engaging more effectively with Turkey (whose role in the crisis has been at best ambiguous); and by re-addressing the possibilities for engineering some sort of internationally-agreed deal to end the fighting in Syria. 4. But Syria is not the limit of the problem. The desperate, and the hopeful, are heading to Europe in their hundreds of thousands from across the Middle East and Africa. And it may well be Africa, where demographers expect the last great explosion of human population growth over the next two decades, which presents Europe with the most enduring migration and refugee challenge. So while today the burning issue is Syria, Europeans must also focus on helping Africa achieve the prosperity and stability it will need if its burgeoning population is not to head inexorably north. Development assistance and investment will be crucial; but so too will European help with dousing the conflicts which peacekeepers from the United Nations and African Union struggle to contain unsupported.39 5. Against that background, with their continent surrounded by a ‘ring of fire’, the European Council’s promised stocktake of their defence initiatives at their June 2015 meeting seemed likely to be particularly searching.

A False Summit 6. But no review, searching or otherwise, took place at all. Defence is covered in the June communique in a few dismissive sentences – ‘work will continue on a more effective, visible and result oriented CSDP’.40 Of course, national leaders on the day found they

38 European Council, 19/20 December 2013, Conclusions, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press- releases/2015/06/26-euco-conclusions /http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf 39 Richard Gowan and Nick Witney, ‘Why Europe must Stop Outsourcing its Security’, December 2013, ECFR 40 European Council, 25/26 June 2015, Conclusions, p. 6, available at

184 of 309 Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London, and Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations—Written Evidence (FSP0010) had better (or, rather, worse) things to talk about - notably the Greek and refugee crises, with even a short ‘commercial break’ to discuss David Cameron’s renegotiation agenda. Yet this is not a convincing excuse. Ensuring that prior commitments are addressed, reports are prepared and recommendations offered - ensuring, in short, that even if the meetings themselves are hi-jacked by events, the participants have something to ‘nod through’ - is precisely what bureaucracies are for. Less good than a properly engaged discussion, but at least a way to keep the show on the road. Incomprehensibly, no such procedure was followed on this occasion. 7. Some idea of what has or has not happened on the December 2013 agenda (the ‘EC agenda’) can, however, be derived from separate reports prepared earlier in the year by the High Representative (HR) and the Commission, as well as from the rather limp- wristed ‘Conclusions’ of the EU foreign and defence ministers who went over the ground themselves in May41. 8. There are a few seemingly encouraging aspects. The HR has picked up with gusto the mandate to review the EU’s global strategy (and, in fairness to the June summiteers, they did at least endorse the second phase of this work). And a degree of real progress has been made in at least two of the four capability areas highlighted in the EC agenda. Ten member states are working with the European Defence Agency (EDA) on a shared acquisition of significant new air-tanking capability; and France, Germany and Italy, yielding to pressure from their increasingly work-starved aerospace industries, have embarked on a joint project for a Medium Altitude, Long Endurance surveillance drone. 9. Beyond these elements, however, the picture is dismal. The member states have again demonstrated their unflagging readiness to talk about Concepts, Frameworks and Roadmaps, and to re-emphasise their commitment to the Comprehensive Approach and to Engagement with Partners. What they are not prepared to do is put their hands in their pockets, contribute to operations, or commit to joint projects. In short, gradual national decline is still apparently preferable to them to concerted attempts to forge effective multilateral action. 10. True, Vladimir Putin has effectively halted the free-fall of European defence budgets – Poland raised its defence spending by 20% and Lithuania by 50% in 2015 according to SIPRI figures. But expenditure on defence research, the seed-corn of the future, is at half the agreed target levels and declining. The issue of common funding for operations is dead-locked – as the HR rather gloomily accepted in her contribution to the June 2015 European Council. Only where there is a prospect that someone else might pay (the Commission for defence research; the European Investment Bank or the still somewhat elusive Juncker Investment Initiative for projects) have the member states shown enthusiasm. 11. In May, the foreign ministers announced that “the EU and its Member States are assuming increased responsibilities to act as a security provider”. Yet there were 7,000 Europeans deployed on CSDP operations in December 2013 (most of them safely concentrated in the Balkans and off the Horn) – and there are no more today. After eighteen months of chaos on Europe’s periphery, there are now 17 ongoing EU operations – a net increase of one. A security advisory team was deployed to Ukraine last year with an initial budget of less than 3 million euros; the security team in Niger (the epicentre of so much instability in the Sahel) has been ‘beefed up’ to about 50; and the refugee crisis has produced a not-evidently-successful effort to find ways of

41 HR and Commission reports are available at http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2015/report-csdp_en.htm; the May 2015 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions are available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/18- council-conclusions-csdp/

185 of 309 Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London, and Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations—Written Evidence (FSP0010) destroying traffickers’ boats. None of this is much more than tokenism. Meanwhile, when it comes to getting the member states to contribute to operations, the HR notes that on the vexed question of battle-group deployment there has been no substantive progress. And on the civilian side the continuing foot-dragging raises broader questions of political will and credibility. 12. Things are no better in the capabilities and industrial domains. One of the key elements of the EC agenda was the demand for “increased transparency and information-sharing in defence planning”, to allow collaborative opportunities to be identified early on: a framework was required by end 2014. But the bureaucracies seem to have decided to ignore this, persisting instead with the old system whereby member states hold their planning cards to their chests and float the idea of cooperation only if unilaterally convinced that they will benefit. Even this inadequate approach has thrown up some new possibilities, listed in the HR’s report – but ignored by the ministers. 13. Meanwhile, the insertion of drones into regulated airspace (a crucial requirement for the future of the civil aerospace industry in Europe) will evidently not be achieved as mandated by 2016, though no explanation or revised forecast is forthcoming; military foot-dragging is preventing progress on the required pan-European system for military aircraft air-worthiness certification (currently one of the most egregious examples of waste and unnecessary duplication); the cyber defence push is stuck for want of a lead nation; the Commission’s proposal to review the operation of its directives aimed at freeing up the defence market in effect concedes that these are being widely ignored; the EC’s instruction to replicate the successful model of cooperation embodied in the European Air Transport Command has produced no response; and so on. 14. Of course, much of the EC agenda is genuinely difficult. Some of the deadlines may have been over-ambitious. But the December 2013 summit was tacit recognition that institutional inertia and resistance to matching words with action in CSDP is such that it will require sustained political impulse from the highest level to galvanise progress. So an agenda was laid down, and deadlines set, which for the most part have been either ignored or missed. The European Council’s failure to conduct its promised stocktake this year, and demand real explanations, is thus not just incomprehensible – it was a dereliction of duty.

If not Now, When? 15. So what should be done? Certainly not more fine words, declarations, targets or ‘headline goals.’ Such things might have a purpose when it comes to translating real political will from the highest level into action lower down the political food chain. Absent such will, however, words remain nothing but words. And empty ones at that. 16. The simple fact that European politicians must confront is that their countries are no longer – to the extent they ever were – capable of ensuring their own security alone. The ‘defence deficit’ - the gap between the military capabilities possessed by its states and those required to defend their interests42 - continues to grow whilst member states continue to ignore it. There are several problems bundled into one here. At their root is the fact that many Europeans -- and particularly the populations of those member states that matter most in terms of collaborative European defence initiatives – are increasingly uninterested in defence. Only 49 per cent of British, 47 per cent of French, and a mere

42 Anand Menon, ‘The Other Euro Crisis’ ¨Foreign Affairs, 10 December 2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2013-12-10/other-euro-crisis

186 of 309 Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London, and Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations—Written Evidence (FSP0010) 38 per cent of German respondents expressed support for the idea that their country should use force to defend an ally involved in a serious military conflict with Russia.43 17. And it is not only that Europeans have become leery of military interventions. They are also, increasingly, insular and parochial in their outlooks. For all Germany's impressive response to the refugee crisis, the fact remains that Berlin remains staunchly unwilling to think in terms of addressing the problem at source, in the Middle East and North Africa. Equally, the current British Government, like its predecessor, seems to view foreign policy simply as trade policy, an integral part of the much vaunted ‘prosperity agenda’ that allows us, for instance, to cuddle up to the Chinese with no reference to the geopolitical anxieties plaguing East Asia. That said, Prime Minister Cameron’s latest decision to commit 300 British troops to support of UN operations in Somalia and South Sudan is an unexpected and welcome departure. 18. Today’s political leaders, of course, tend to lead rather than follow. Their increasing parochialism (and we should, in fairness, perhaps exclude France from this criticism, as it has engaged in the Sahel, its international activism apparently in inverse proportion to its weight within EU debates) reflects that of the countries of which they are in charge. 19. So the challenge that faces us is not of rustling up good intentions in Brussels, but a far longer term, and more difficult one, of convincing Europeans, and, thereby, their political masters, that we live in uncertain and dangerous times, and that Europeans should perhaps cease to believe in their own Kantian myths about having created a peaceful, post-modern world for themselves. 20. The evidence, as we have suggested, is not hard to find. Nor is it confined to just the immediate neighbourhood. Whilst Europeans are becoming increasingly uninterested in the geopolitics of the world further afield, events there have the potential to affect us. As a group of trading nations, the EU is heavily dependent on the maintenance of the stable, rules, based liberal world order that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. Yet despite this dependence, Europeans seem largely content to either the ignore geopolitics, or leave it to others. For evidence, one need look no further than the way Europeans deal with China. Whilst the United States adopts a pragmatic, precautionary approach to the potential dangers related to the emergence of a new superpower, Europeans remain divided and supine. Attempts to define a common EU position are undermined by jostling for advantage by national capitals. Individual governments prostrate themselves at the feet of China’s new emperors in their desperation to secure lucrative contracts. When David Cameron goes to Asia, he does not even talk geopolitics. 21. The dangers of such an approach should be all too apparent. The world is a dangerous place, and the role of foreign policy planners is to anticipate and prepare for the threats that will confront us. It may not be the case that ISIS will spread its tentacles and become a direct threat to the west, but it might. It may not be that China’s rise will lead to unrest and potentially even conflict, but it might. It may not be that Russia will continue to seek to destabilise Europe’s eastern fringes in a quest to regain lost prestige, but it might. Europeans are currently unprepared to deal with any of these eventualities. 22. Nor, increasingly, are the Americans prepared to step in and take up the slack. A combination of fatigue, of increasingly insular public opinion, and of diminishing resources has undermined US willingness to act as a global policeman. Moreover, the Washington foreign policy establishment is increasingly coming to see Asia as the main focus of its attention. Consequently, the United States is anxious that its allies take over more of the burden of maintaining security in their own backyards. And in stark contrast to earlier

43 http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/1-nato-public-opinion-wary-of-russia-leary-of-action-on-ukraine/

187 of 309 Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London, and Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations—Written Evidence (FSP0010) periods, Washington has increasingly come to believe that, in order that Europeans be able to do this, they will need to work together more effectively within the EU. CSDP therefore no longer stands in contradistinction to the transatlantic relationship but, rather, is one of its primary building blocks. 23. So our political leaders need to actually lead. And their message must be threefold. First, that defence policies matter and that military force still has a role to play in securing Europe’s interests. The wealth and security many in Europe have come to take for granted is contingent and not assured. Second, in order to assure that security, Europeans need to invest in the means to protect themselves – the steady decline in defence spending sparked by the economic crisis is simply unsustainable. Finally, whatever individual European states choose to do will not be enough. Recent interventions in Libya and Mali underlined all too clearly that even the largest among them lack the wherewithal to undertake even small interventions alone. European action must be coordinated and collaborative in order that security policy objectives be achieved. 24. While taking steps to educate their own publics about the nature both of the threats confronting us and any response that can even pretend to be credible, governments themselves must act to deal with the strategic myopia that has increasingly come to characterise their foreign policies. Significant cuts to Foreign Affairs and Defence budgets need to be reversed. Equally importantly, member states must press on with the long- standing but still elusive effort to coordinate their external policies. A relatively recent and extremely through analysis of the national strategic plans of all 28 member states painted a stark picture of the ‘cacophony’ these represent.44 Arriving at any kind of consensus between these differing perspectives on international politics is of course what the HR is now attempting with her global strategy review -- though whether it amounts to anything more than a nice text will wholly depend on the degree of real engagement and buy-in by the member states. 25. So June’s abrogation of responsibility by the European Council must not be repeated. Foreign and defence policy must figure regularly and substantively on their agenda. Its members must instruct their Foreign and Defence Ministers to continue the work of securing at least minimal agreement on priorities between their summits. It is only in this way that, slowly, the key actors – member states – can be made to both recognise the challenges confronting them and seek to address them collectively. 26. This is not to say that we propose the kind of ‘European Army’ recently suggested by Commission President Juncker. Absolutely not. Such an idea is unthinkable and unworkable. And it would fail to address the real issue as a former US Ambassador to NATO put it, Europe’s problem ‘is not that it lacks an army. It is that it lacks a serious commitment to defence — national, European or transatlantic’.45 27. Rather, we believe member states themselves must take the lead, working amongst themselves and through EU (and indeed NATO) structures where appropriate to enhance their ability to confront security threats. Even small steps could generate significant gains. Why not share information on planned cuts imposed by austerity? At least coordinated cutting would reduce the danger of significant capability gaps appearing through oversight. But then, this was one of the December 2013 instructions that the European Council failed to follow up on. 28. In the first place, the onus rests on the two original architects of the European defence project -- the UK and France. The UK, of course, is currently absorbed with its

44 Olivier De France and Nick Witney, ‘Europe’s Strategic Cacophony’. 2013. ECFR 45 Ivo Daalder, ‘Europe lacks commitment to spend on defence,’ Financial Times, 11 March 2015.

188 of 309 Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London, and Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations—Written Evidence (FSP0010) upcoming referendum on EU membership. But if the vote is for 'In', one of the first ways for Britain to renew its commitment to Europe should be an effort to coax France back from its 'go-it-alone' posture to join it in a joint effort to rally the other member states. 29. For in matters of defence it is the member states who count: it is they who retain the money, and the decision-taking authority. So it is up to the European Council, therefore, to take the lead. It is all too easy to use CSDP as an alibi, to hide behind grand declarations made in Brussels as apparent evidence of action over security. Over a decade of doing so, however, has whittled away Europe’s security capacity. In a world becoming ever more dangerous and uncertain, Heads of State and Government need to reverse this damaging trend and take steps to ensure that, collectively, Europeans are able to defend their interests.

189 of 309 Mr Lawrence Meredith—Oral Evidence (QQ 77-91)

Mr Lawrence Meredith—Oral Evidence (QQ 77-91)

Evidence Session No. 8 Heard in Public Questions 77 - 91

TUESDAY 20 OCTOBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Baroness Suttie Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

______

Examination of Witness Mr Lawrence Meredith, Head of Strategy and Policy, DG NEAR, European Commission

Q77 The Chairman: Thank you very much for coming. I know that you have been parachuted in for this at short notice. In case you are not seized of what we are about, we are all members of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, in particular the Sub-Committee on External Affairs. Our last report was on EU-Russia; now we are doing European security strategy. We had a good meeting at UKREP last night with Angus Lapsley. We met a host of people this morning, and now we have the pleasure of seeing you. You are one of those rare birds, a British official in the European Commission, so could you first tell us what you do? Mr Lawrence Meredith: Thank you very much. The Commissioner is sorry he was not able to join you today, but I am pleased to be able to represent him on this occasion. I am head of strategy in DG NEAR, which means that I do two things of most relevance to you. First, I am the person preparing the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy on behalf of Commissioner Hahn. I also have a counterpart in the European External Action Service, so we do this jointly. Secondly, I also prepare the enlargement strategy, because one of your questions leans in that direction. Those are my main areas of responsibility.

190 of 309 Mr Lawrence Meredith—Oral Evidence (QQ 77-91)

Q78 The Chairman: To kick off, the impression one gets talking to people is that increasingly the Mogherini exercise is expected to focus on the neighbourhood rather than broader. Would you define what you mean by “the neighbourhood” in this context? Mr Lawrence Meredith: We are reviewing the neighbourhood policy, which in European Union terms means that we cover 16 countries stretching on the south side from Morocco through to and including Syria—I can list each and every country if that is helpful—and the six so-called eastern partnership countries: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Chairman: Where does Turkey figure in that? Mr Lawrence Meredith: In EU-speak, Turkey is one of our enlargement countries, so we cover it under our enlargement policy.

Q79 Lord Horam: One thing witnesses have said to us is that some of the instruments traditionally used in EU policy have proved to be a little technical without a political framework and need to be looked at again, in the light of the changes since the Solana review and so on. Do you see the need for a political framework and a more realistic approach to the use of these instruments? Mr Lawrence Meredith: This is not the first review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which was set up in approximately 2003-04. The last review, as you may know, was completed in 2011 in the rather specific political context of the so-called Arab spring. The main reason we are doing the review again so soon is that there have been substantial changes and increased instabilities, primarily in the neighbourhood. In that context, the main thrust of the review is to adapt to the changed realities. If there is one overriding theme driving this, it is that we need a more tailor-made approach, which is an answer to your question. Therefore, we need to look at the whole set of instruments at our disposal and see to what extent they are fit for purpose and for which country, because we are seeing a big differentiation between the needs from a Syria, for example, through to a Ukraine.

Q80 The Chairman: In the past, the EU presented itself as a rather transformational institution that underlay the Solana exercise, which our compatriot had so much to do with. Now it appears to be a much more—how can I put it—down-to-earth transactional arrangement. We are not talking so much about human rights, spreading democracy and all that; we are talking about living with the world as it is. I am overstating the contrast perhaps, but how would you react to that? Mr Lawrence Meredith: First, the values agenda, as it is called, remains extremely important. This is one of the European Union’s key interests. It is not so much a question about that as an objective; it is about how to achieve it. We are looking at what has been best practice, where we have achieved leverage and what we can build on what we have learnt over the past 10 years in this, frankly, difficult context, so we are making a difference on the ground and having an impact on the values side. Secondly, in the nature of this review—we had a public consultation and received over 250 inputs that we have been analysing, which is an important point to make—some people said that it had been too much “enlargement-lite style without the carrot”. I know that is something you have been looking at yourselves. In that context, one has to recognise that one needs the political will in the countries to change. It is extremely difficult to create political will, so we have to put incentives on the table but also build where there are opportunities to make progress.

191 of 309 Mr Lawrence Meredith—Oral Evidence (QQ 77-91)

Q81 The Chairman: There is one point I should have asked you to clarify at the beginning. Can you explain how your review of the neighbourhood fits into the Mogherini exercise? Mr Lawrence Meredith: When President Juncker took up office, he made a commitment that we would review, within the first year of the new Commission’s mandate, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and that is the exercise we are currently engaged on. We had a joint consultation paper, published in March, to which we had 250 replies, and that is leading to a policy response, which should come out in mid-November. High Representative and Vice-President Mogherini is working on the global strategy. A paper was put to the European Council in June, and now an engagement to continue that exercise until June next year. As the person leading at service level the neighbourhood policy exercise, I have been asked to work extremely closely with the team working on the global strategy, and I am doing that. At a political level, the High Representative herself has oversight of, and responsibility for, both exercises. I can assure you that this is being closely co-ordinated, for obvious reasons.

Q82 Baroness Suttie: Forgive me for asking a political question, but perhaps you would not be surprised that it comes from me. You are the first UK representative we have seen today. Do you feel that in the process of your neighbourhood review and the wider Mogherini strategic review the current uncertainty because of the British referendum is putting us at a disadvantage? Are we properly or fully engaged, or do you feel that we are slightly out of the loop in some of the discussions going on at the moment in these reviews? Mr Lawrence Meredith: I can speak only as a civil servant of my own experiences at working level. The short answer is no.

Q83 Lord Dubs: What is the situation regarding enlargement for countries—I am not talking about the Balkans—like Moldova, Georgia and so on? What sort of policy do we have? Is the eastern neighbourhood an end in itself, or what? Mr Lawrence Meredith: That is another very good question. The main point I want to make—I am looking to quote it exactly—is that this issue has been extremely hotly debated between Member States. The result is what we have in the so-called Riga summit in May on the eastern partnership countries. That is the outcome we have been able to reach at 28. From memory, that talks clearly about recognising these countries’ European aspirations and choices46. That is where we have got in that debate. Lord Dubs: I am sorry to ask, but what does that mean? Mr Lawrence Meredith: That means that we hear them signalling a clear desire to be closer and, in some cases, an expression of interest in membership of the European Union. The discussion reached at the level of the 28, the EU response, is set out in this much- debated and carefully worded language. That is about as far as I can go. What I can say is that we are doing everything possible to support those aspirations through our work. They have the most ambitious agreements ever reached in the form of the new generation association agreements and the deep and comprehensive free trade areas, and we are providing very strong support and additional financing to help them with implementation. Implementation will be a major challenge, and some people have estimated that it could take as long as 10 years fully to implement the current commitments in the association agreement.

46 Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Riga 21-22 May 2015 available here: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/05/21-22/

192 of 309 Mr Lawrence Meredith—Oral Evidence (QQ 77-91)

Q84 Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: As to Turkey, we have been talking about enlargement. We gather there has been lots of activity between different parts of the Commission and Turkey in the last couple of weeks, and certainly there has been from the Council too. Enlargement was offered as a kind of carrot, but the whole thing stalled and has gone downhill until there has been a crisis. How do you assess the EU and its relationship with Turkey? Mr Lawrence Meredith: I am not directly responsible for Turkey, but I will do my best to answer that. Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: You are doing enlargement. Mr Lawrence Meredith: I have a view on the strategy. I am just making that point. First, we believe that accession is the best available path for the future of EU-Turkey relations but that there are many other aspects on which we also engage with Turkey. Accession is a key vision that they have stated they want. The conditions are clear, and both sides are working towards that. We can discuss the points you have made about the speed of that progress if you wish, but that is one track. Secondly, we are currently engaged in looking at a number of other avenues to support the broader political relationship. That is done by the European External Action Service, but in close co-ordination with the DG NEAR, for example working towards establishing a high- level economic and energy dialogue47. We have strong shared interests on migration48 and the security side. I think you see that broader relationship, together with the clear accession path, in contrast, by the way, with what we have offered to the 16 neighbourhood countries we have been discussing. It is important to remember that. We have had Lord Dubs’s question. You see that in the strength of the engagement right now. One of the reasons I am here is that my director is on a plane again to Turkey; otherwise, he would have liked to be here. I do not know whether that counts as a strong reason, but that is a factual clarification. The Chairman: We have the impression that almost everybody is on a plane to Turkey. Mr Lawrence Meredith: I am with you for as long as you need me. The Chairman: There is a certain amount of chaos in this. It has been put to us in some of the earlier evidence we have had that everybody is now queuing up to see the Turks, but there is no very coherent approach. Mr Lawrence Meredith: As I said, the people most directly responsible for Turkey are there already, are on their way or are just coming back. From my angle, I can say only that I understand there has been extremely close co-ordination. Obviously, in a moment of intense engagement, different parties may have different views, but I believe there is extremely close co-ordination both inside the institutions and with Member States.

Q85 Lord Risby: If we cross the Mediterranean for a moment, we see an enormous diversity of countries with different political systems, underpinnings of democracy, economic development, stability and everything else. From a practical point of view, you mentioned that, when you interface as part of the neighbourhood policy, you give incentives. I am

47 The envisaged high-level economic dialogue, which Commissioner Hahn intends to launch in 2016 together with the Commissioner for economic and financial affairs, will be underpinned by the opening of Chapter 17 (economic and monetary affairs) accession negotiations. A high level energy dialogue was launched in March 2015 by Vice-President Šefčovič. DG NEAR has launched preparation with DG ENER of an updated screening report for Chapter 15 (energy) to feed into this dialogue.

48 The EU acknowledges the considerable pressure the Syrian refugee crisis imposes on Turkey and has so far set aside EUR 176 million under different EU instruments.

193 of 309 Mr Lawrence Meredith—Oral Evidence (QQ 77-91) curious to know how that works. When you are talking to an individual country as part of the neighbourhood, are the incentives, shall we say, streamlined to fit local conditions? Are we talking about using aid as part of the incentive, because we heard this morning that increasingly it is part of the European Union view to have a more strategic objective, or is it giving encouragement to access our enormous single market? I am curious to know how this works in practice as you evaluate each country under the general umbrella of the neighbourhood policy. Mr Lawrence Meredith: It is all of the above, but, to link back to the earlier question, we are currently reviewing exactly how all this package works together. We do not have a final position on how we are going to set it out, but I can say that we are looking to ensure that there are three important changes going forward, learning from the 10 years in which we have been engaged so far. First, we believe it does need to be much more strongly tailor- made to each of the countries. We are seeing much greater differentiation in their political and economic situation than was the case in 2003-04. Secondly, in that context but not only, also building on lessons learnt, for each country there needs to be a strong package, and that will include the elements you have been describing and the political vision of that particular relationship, which may vary from one partner to another. For example, some have association agreements and some have co-operation agreements. They have different degrees of engagement and different structures to support implementation. We also have a mobility angle, which is a very strong lever and incentive. We have the access to the market that you describe and the particular trade regime, which is more ambitious in the case of deep and comprehensive free trade, or slightly less so for those not aspiring to that. We also have substantial funds. For the period 2014-20, €15.4 billion will be made available. This is a considerable sum. We also understand that the challenges are considerable, and there are 16 countries. It is really important that as we go forward for each country there is a clear package blending different available instruments, so we fully agree with you. Thirdly, we are not acting on our own. The EU institutions are only one part of this approach. Therefore, I think there will be a very strong commitment in the Mogherini global strategy—and we are taking this on board in the neighbourhood policy review—to much stronger engagement with Member States, both formally and informally, in appropriate ad hoc groupings, and not just with Member States. There needs to be stronger ownership by the partners. One of the key points is that once we are developing a package it is not something we sit in offices here and invent; it is negotiated with partners so there is true ownership. When it comes to financial matters, not just assistance but the broader economic vision, we need to engage strongly with international financial institutions—the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, as we do—and put that package together also with them so we get the most bang for our buck. I hope that addresses your point.

Q86 Baroness Coussins: Going back to the eastern region, our last inquiry into EU-Russia relations produced one conclusion, which was that Member States had not had sufficient focus on that region. One of the reasons everybody seemed to be taken by surprise by what happened in the Ukraine and Crimea was that neither the EU nor individual Member States, not least our own Foreign Office, had sufficient analytical capacity, including language skills, to be able to be on top of developments. Had they had more analytical capacity, they might have been able to foresee what was coming down the line. If you are

194 of 309 Mr Lawrence Meredith—Oral Evidence (QQ 77-91) engaged in creating new neighbourhood policy, is it your impression that things are now beginning to turn for the better in that regard? Do the EU and Member States now have the political will, analytical capacity and the necessary resources to back up a new policy? Mr Lawrence Meredith: I could answer the question in Russian, if that is helpful. Baroness Coussins: I am glad to hear you could. Mr Lawrence Meredith: I am just making the point that we do take this extremely seriously. Capacity can always be strengthened, and if the Member States are kind enough to offer us more resources we will do an even better job. There has been a strong readjustment. That is clear from what followed the Vilnius summit, in particular because I think it was a Russian decision that led to the conflict in Ukraine. The Vilnius summit is one thing; then there is what happened in Ukraine. In response to that, there has been a lot of attention to this area. There was a tension before, which was why we ended up with the Vilnius summit, so I slightly challenge the premise that there was no tension in the region. As to the way things evolved, the situation was not one that people had foreseen. Of course that is correct, but we have spent a lot of time on this and will continue to do so. I work constantly on this with the European External Action Service. I have just come back from a mission to Moscow, which is the first of its kind for over 15 months because of the difficulties in the relationship. We felt that it was important to inform what we were doing and to listen to their views both on that and other issues. The intensity of the discussions with both partners and Member States around the Riga summit shows how fundamentally important is the relationship between the EU and its eastern partners now, and that we are also aware of the importance of the relationship with Russia in this context. This is all very well documented. I hope that addresses your point. If there is any other aspect you want me to cover, I will do my best to help. I am not working directly on the EU-Russia relationship, but I have just come back from Moscow and so am quite well briefed.

Q87 Baroness Suttie: How would you assess generally the relationship now between the Commission and the EEAS? We have heard from other witnesses that this may not be as functional as it could or should be. In the context of the Mogherini strategic review, how do you think that relationship could be improved, if indeed you think it should be? Obviously, it is a big question, but I ask it in the context of your personal experience. Mr Lawrence Meredith: In my personal experience, let me say two things. First, at working level, I am head of a secretariat that is running the review of the neighbourhood policy. I have a co-head of the secretariat in the European External Action Service. More important than us, this process is led by the HRVP and Commissioner Hahn, and under them they have appointed as respective heads of the task force the Secretary General of the European External Action Service and my director general. It is the top people in each of the organisations who have been meeting regularly almost on a monthly or, where needed, more than monthly basis. As to my contacts, “daily” does not do it justice. I was talking to my counterpart before meeting you; I will see him shortly after meeting you. I am sure he will want to know what has been discussed, apart from anything else, so in this exercise there is extremely strong co-operation. I would like to add for the record that this also reflects my own personal experience since the EEAS was created. I was also involved in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue where, without

195 of 309 Mr Lawrence Meredith—Oral Evidence (QQ 77-91) such joined-at-the-hip co-operation between the External Action Service and us, supported at the time by Baroness Ashton, we could not have delivered the results that we were able to deliver. I have been given the clear instruction, based on my past experience, to make the relationship seamless and effective. Others will judge how successful I have been on that, but certainly it is a key part of my job description. Your question went broader. The clear message to staff in President Juncker’s Commission is that this needs to be joined-up policy, in which context, as I answered the earlier question about links with the global strategy, we are asked, and want to, work together seamlessly and intelligently, complementing each other. The only way for me to do that, as one of the co-authors of the neighbourhood policy review, is to work with the two co-authors of the global strategy extremely closely. I know that when looked at from the outside these processes and the institutional set-up can seem complex and complicated, but those of us who have been here for 20 years do our very best to make it work. I believe it works well.

Q88 The Chairman: Can I ask you a mechanical question? You talked about close contact with Member States. There are 28 Member States and not everybody is equally interested in everything, so how does that work? Some Member States will be very interested in a particular area, some less so. In the World Bank, there are groups, are there not? You have a director who represents seven, eight or more countries. If you are dealing with north Africa, for instance, which perhaps is not at the top of Ireland’s or Latvia’s agenda, how does this work? Mr Lawrence Meredith: Let me answer on two levels. You know as well as I do that there are structures that relate to contacts between the Commission and the External Action Service, with Member States. For example, in preparing both the joint consultation paper and the review communication that we will issue shortly, we have had regular joint meetings—I have been trying to avoid jargon for the benefit of the record—with MaMa and COEST, which cover the south and the east. That is the easiest way of expressing the two Council working groups. We brought them together, so that is already one choice. We have done that six or seven times—I do not know exactly how many—and we have also had at least two engagements. You said you were speaking to the UKPSC ambassador. We have had two engagements with the full Political and Security Committee, and we have also met COREPER, so at all levels this review has been thoroughly discussed and prepared formally with Member States. The reality of being a Commissioner or EEAS official here is that we make ourselves available on request to any Member State that wishes to talk to us, either individually or in smaller groupings. We do not have a formal structure such as you describe in the World Bank for ad hoc groupings, but that is how it works in practice. I would add one clarification. When I was embarking on this review, I went with my director general to the then Latvian presidency. They made a point of engaging on the south. Everybody knew that they had strong interests in the eastern partnership, but they actually led the discussion on the south. It was their political choice to send a signal that, as the presidency, they wanted to cover the whole agenda. Although they did not put it like this, subliminally they understood that to make progress on the areas most important to them they also needed to have full discussions on the areas important to other Member States. The EU is now a very well-judged machine. A lot of Member States think carefully about how they want to achieve their objectives and realise that they need to bring others fully on board to do so.

196 of 309 Mr Lawrence Meredith—Oral Evidence (QQ 77-91)

The Chairman: If I understand you correctly, countries whose primary interest is to the east would none the less engage in the south because they are aware of the need to have support for what they want to do in their area and that it is more likely to be forthcoming if they are engaged in the other area. Mr Lawrence Meredith: That is one of the reasons why, looking forward, we are very likely to maintain a common framework. It is a strong binding instrument inside the European Union precisely because some Member States have stronger interests in the south and some in the east. To reach a consensus, be it on policy objectives and in particular financial objectives, it works rather well to discuss the 16 together for precisely that reason.

Q89 The Chairman: The continuing migration crisis in the summer has had a huge impact. Would you be able to define what you think has been the principal impact on your working methods: “intensification”, “urgent” and all the rest of it? Mr Lawrence Meredith: The area for which I am responsible and which we are currently discussing—the European Neighbourhood Policy—is a key aspect of the current debate on the refugee crisis, precisely because one of the most important sources of refugees is Syria, for example. It is obvious that as that crisis unfolds, evolves and continues we are looking at it extremely carefully. First, it has led to an even more prominent role for issues related to migration management and also careful reflection on how to take that forward in a positive way, because it is not only on the management side; you need the relationship with the countries, as is clearly signalled in the relevant European Council conclusion. We are responsible. The impact of the review and policy will be the future shape of the EU’s relations with these countries. That needs to be done in a way that supports the objectives agreed at the European Council on the current crisis. For our part, we have been vocal inside the house in saying we need these countries also to deliver on the objectives over the longer term. It is important to see this review together with the work, and that we are also consulted, where possible, on the measures being prepared on the migration side, such that we have oversight of how that impacts on the relationship with the country. We believe that the long-term buy-in and engagement of these partner countries is crucial to the long-term solution. As you said yourself, urgent measures are being taken, but this policy review looks at the medium to longer-term relationship with these countries. We believe that is really important.

Q90 Lord Horam: Following up the point on the refugee crisis, particularly in the southern Mediterranean countries, one aspect is that it affects not only the countries inside the ENP, and we should involve them, but also the neighbours of the neighbours and the Sahel countries—Mali, Chad, Central African Republic, Somalia and so on—from which many of the refugees or economic migrants came originally. They are simply coming through Libya, Tunisia or whenever. How far has that affected your view of the operation of the ENP? You have to deal not only with the neighbours but the neighbours of the neighbours. Mr Lawrence Meredith: Perhaps there are two points I can make in response. First, careful consideration has been given as part of this review—indeed, it was one of the questions in the public consultation in March—as to whether the current framework, i.e. the 16 countries I described at the beginning, is the right one. That will have been addressed. On balance, we are moving towards confirming that it is, although there is no final decision on the policy. What is clearly needed is a much more flexible, pragmatic and longer-term engagement and a recognition that, if you want to talk about migration—we had identified this even prior to

197 of 309 Mr Lawrence Meredith—Oral Evidence (QQ 77-91) the intense nature of the current crisis, but it is more than confirmed by what is happening now—it is not sufficient to talk in a bubble of 16 countries because it happens to be the European Neighbourhood Policy. That is not our wish or objective. There are reasons why we think that is a useful grouping for the policy per se, but we also recognise that there are key issues. I do not know where we will finally land in the paper itself, but consideration is being given to issues such as migration, energy and security. When you discuss these, you may wish to have more flexible formats not limited by where the EU happens to have drawn the line on its policy. We are currently in deep reflection— ideas are welcome—on how we can best do this in practice so we do not end up with a one-off conference, and what kind of process you might want to put in place. Then there are the complex issues that we have been discussing. If the EU moves, it moves at 28. That creates a certain framework in which to operate. Which partners do you want from the European Neighbourhood Policy? Which other partners would you want? We completely agree with that aspiration, and we are trying to work out how best to do it in practice.

Q91 The Chairman: Now that opinion in Germany has turned somewhat and the barbed wire is going up around an increasing number of frontiers—Hungary, Croatia and so on—do you have any information as to whether the flow of people out of Syria and Turkey, or across the water and land, to Europe is diminishing, or are the numbers continuing unchecked? Mr Lawrence Meredith: I am afraid that today I am not in a position to answer that, but I could certainly look into it and try to provide you with a written answer as rapidly as possible. The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed, and for coming in at short notice.

198 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45)

Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45)

Evidence Session No. 4 Heard in Public Questions 35 - 45

THURSDAY 15 OCTOBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Lord Balfe Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Baroness Suttie Lord Triesman Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

______

Earl of Sandwich

Examination of Witnesses Mr James Watt CVO, former British Ambassador to Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, Professor Charles Tripp FBA, Professor of Politics with reference to the Middle East, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and Mr Imad Mesdoua, Political Analyst, Africa Matters Limited

Q35 The Chairman: Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you very much indeed for agreeing to come before us. It is extremely kind of you. You all three understand that this is a public meeting as part of our inquiry into the emerging European security strategy. You have received a list of questions. If, at the end of the session, you feel that we have not covered something that we should have covered, or you want to add or subtract from something you have said, please feel free to write to us. As we have three witnesses, I hope that you will not all feel obliged to answer each question. Your expertise varies from the Middle East to north Africa and so forth. If you feel strongly, obviously you must intervene, but we do not need to have everybody answering everything. I would like, if I can, to deal

199 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) with this matter in not much more than an hour and a quarter. With that in mind, I have merged some of the questions. My colleagues are free, of course, to ask supplementary questions if they wish to.

Let me kick off with the first question. Do you think that there is genuine political will among Member States to pause and undertake a strategic review of EU policies in the region? Given the experience we have had, what lessons do you think can be learnt from the past in endeavouring to do that? Mr James Watt CVO: I do not think there is any resistance at all to taking a strategic look at the past five years, let us say. At the same time, of course, a lot of major policy issues are emerging as part of the regional crisis, and policymakers in Brussels and in capitals are very tied up with trying to handle those and devise responses to them. We have seen some signs of that, for example, in the report by the High Representative, which I think you have before you—the recent one on the changing environment for the European Union—and a little on the Middle East and north Africa. She refers to the way in which the EU has to devise new and more tailored responses to the situations that are developing. So I think there is an awareness at the top, probably among policymakers throughout capitals as well as in Brussels. Whether they have actually had the time to sit down and turn that into a well- thought-through strategic review, I do not know; I have seen no evidence of that. What are the conclusions? Very broadly, back in 2011 everybody was taken by surprise, including the actors on the ground, by the developments in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and then Egypt, Libya and Syria. The result was that policymakers in Brussels and many capitals reached for the file from 1989 and the end of the Soviet rule in eastern Europe and decided to bring about reform, particularly to governance and democracy in countries that were supposed to be emerging from a position of not having them. A lot of the formulae were adapted or just simply copied straight from there, which clearly did not work. It was a very different environment in the Arab world. Each Arab country had a very different political and social environment, and there was quite a lot of resistance to this Eurocentric view of how to deal with the new opportunities, which for many were far bigger risks than opportunities. So there was a general closing of ranks against the kind of formulae that were embodied in the conditionality clauses in the association agreements for example. Without going on for too long, I should say that the big lesson to learn, which I am sure has been learnt progressively over the past five years, is that you cannot do that; you have to have tailor- made responses, which is exactly what the High Representative is now writing about. Professor Charles Tripp FBA: My impression is quite similar. Clearly, the will comes out of the shock of the Arab spring. In a sense, we did not see it coming or what contributed to it, and so as a motive for creating the political will to think about how it might not only be responded to but also prevented from disrupting EU and Member States’ relations with the Middle East and north Africa, that has been part of the reason. I think that that is still very strongly there. But I also agree with James that I have not seen much evidence of a coherent strategy. There have frequently been attempts to review it, and one sees it a bit in the sense of the emphasis on economic assistance. Particularly, one of the things that comes out of some of the documents of the EU which is quite interesting is the realisation that the Arab Spring was caused not just by the desire to overthrow tyrants, but the very economic structures that had sustained them, in which the EU was partly complicit, or Member States of the EU were complicit. Many EU statements since have talked about “inclusivity” of economic reform. One of the problems was that previously, economic reform and success in Tunisia and Egypt had largely been judged in terms of macro figures, but had completely

200 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) ignored the huge inequalities within those countries which had been the drivers of revolt. I think that that was a part of it. The second point, of course, is about why there is a political will. Clearly, one can see that the events of the past six to nine months, with the unfolding and unravelling of some countries as a result of the uprisings of the Arab spring, have led to a massive refugee crisis that Europe clearly does not have a strategic plan to deal with. It has been scrabbling around both individually and in concert, and for an outsider that is one of the more depressing aspects of the lack of strategic review. The political will is there to try to get something going, whether it be the naval force in the Mediterranean or border controls, but as we can see, the disarray has been quite significant. The Chairman: Do you have a view on this question, Mr Mesdoua? Mr Imad Mesdoua: I agree with the other experts on the panel. There seems to be a will towards reviewing some of the EU’s policies and frameworks in the region, but there is as yet no evidence of how that is going to materialise. Certainly the intentions are there and they are good, particularly when it comes to moving towards tailored approaches and moving away from the Eurocentric paradigms which have dictated some of these association partnerships, frameworks, et cetera. But it remains to be seen how they are going to materialise into a concrete policy in the coming year. I do not want to repeat what others have said, and I mostly agree with what they have indicated.

Q36 Lord Dubs: This question is directed to Mr Watt, unless the other witnesses feel they wish to speak. There seems to be a tension at the heart of EU policy which is based upon trying to reconcile liberal democratic and humanitarian mandates with what might be called a more realistic approach, which probably means security. Do you agree with that, and do you think that this is part of the division between member states’ security agendas and the more democratically inclined view of the Commission? Mr James Watt CVO: I think there is a tension. Of course, the conditionality in the association agreements and so on is not simply on human rights and democratic governance—economic reform is also there and somehow the two blend together in some ways. This comes back to the question of equality or inclusiveness that Charles Tripp was talking about. The problem with the emphasis on liberal democracy is that many of the countries concerned did not feel that they were ready for that and that it was positively dangerous. When I was in Egypt, for example, you had the surprise overthrow of President Mubarak—that was not expected by anyone—and the army taking control and allowing democratic elections later in 2011. The strongest contenders for success in the democratic elections were the Muslim Brotherhood, which duly won and which the following year were successful in getting a candidate elected as President. This of course created a huge risk as far as many Egyptians could see, of the country being Islamised, which was in fact I believe the real agenda and the inevitable outcome of those parliamentary and presidential elections. By putting power in the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood, you would have got the transformation. As time went on under the Morsi presidency, you could see that Egypt was indeed being challenged in its very identity as a nation state. Egyptians were far more attached to Egypt as a nation state than the idea of some pan-Islamic state or whatever. They actually quite liked what was familiar to them. The western liberal agenda was seen as supporting and empowering, if you like, that Islamic takeover. So that is why the reaction against the kind of language that we have, which we take as normal and proper in our conditionality, was extremely strong. Egypt is a particularly clear example, but there are other countries where they honestly felt that going further down the track of parliamentary

201 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) elections, power to the people and so on, was going to empower groups that were very well organised to carry out that kind of transformation. I hesitate to use the word “takeover” because it would be democratic, but it would actually be doing much more than apparently was being said. I think that this is a real problem and the European Union has obviously become more cautious since then. We just have to be less trusting that liberal democracy is the solution at this moment of history for a great number of these countries. All the principles remain good—accountability, human rights, individual rights, equality before the law and so on—and they are absolutely correct, but whether you can get there by taking a step now to majority parliamentary rule is another question. Professor Charles Tripp FBA: Perhaps I may also say that I am not convinced that there is a tension between the EU on the one hand and Member States on the other because precisely that tension between the foreign policy of a Member State based upon human values, democracy and so on comes up against hard interests. We have seen that this week in this country in relation to Saudi Arabia. So that debate is something that is constantly at the forefront of public support in democracies for the use of foreign relations and relations with regimes that one might find deeply distasteful in other circumstances. I agree with James Watt that it has certainly been very evident in the language of the EU, but it is also there among Member States. I would not try to portray the EU as committed to large principles and Member States scurrying around doing rather dodgy deals. Earl of Oxford and Asquith: I have a brief question in the context of what you have been saying. Given the High Commissioner’s report, would you recommend that we use a slightly different language, without obviously retreating from the defence of our liberal values? Should we talk less about democracy and economic reform and more about economic prosperity and security: that is, economic freedom? That is because quite a lot of the issues in Egypt and Tunisia were more about just having the freedom to trade. Mr James Watt CVO: There is value in keeping both, of course, but I like the clarity of the language in the latest report by the High Representative. If we look back to March of last year, the communication to the European Parliament and the Council by the Commission on policy towards the ENP, the European Neighbourhood Policy, including obviously the Near East and north Africa, was very mealy-mouthed. It never brought out clearly what the changes were, rather it described a lot of new activities in response to crises. The latest version, which is a slightly different document, is actually far clearer that we need to be more agile and to have tailor-made solutions, but it does not say that we need to abandon some of the basic principles. Coded language is always going to be part of how the EU speaks. I prefer this clearer coded language, but it should keep both. Mr Imad Mesdoua: On the issue of democracy and the promotion of democratic values, I believe that it should remain as it is worded in the document, but there should be a greater focus on specific measures and how they can help in the promotion of democracy. There is, for example, too much focus on elections and political parties (procedural vision of democracy) and not enough on strengthening the capacities of these countries at the grass- roots level. There is not enough focus on civil society groups. A number of programmes which have worked in the past were very effective, particularly in countries like Tunisia, where there have been programmes to help civil society. I am talking about programmes such as the European Endowment for Democracy, which has done fantastic work in Morocco and Tunisia working with civil society groups. The focus should shift when it comes to proposals for supporting democratic consolidation. It should move more towards concrete measures.

202 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) Lord Balfe: Are you saying, which I would agree with, that we need to distinguish between western-style democracy and universal human rights, and concentrate on the latter? Professor Charles Tripp FBA: I agree with that. Taking up something which Imad has just said, there is a danger that if one concentrates only on democracy, you get obsessed by procedural democracy rather than any substantive kind. Clearly the conditions under which human rights are protected and fully realised are those which create the grass-roots basis of a structural democratic possibility rather than simply political parties, elections and so on. Not that those are irrelevant, but there is a danger that if you concentrate only on those, it both annoys the country concerned and it causes despair among many civil society organisations.

Q37 Lord Risby: This is a question for Mr Watt and Professor Tripp. Mr Watt, you talked about the understanding of the need to have a strategic overview, and that is certainly reflected clearly in the High Representative’s report, while Professor Tripp said that there was ultimately no coherence in this. What I want to understand is the synergy or the relationship between what essentially are the two following elements of European policy. If you look at the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is meant to be about economic and political reform, and if you take the Union for the Mediterranean, which is about regional cooperation and then in turn co-operation with the EU, where regional co-operation is certainly rather lacking, how do these two elements, which in practice are essential, elide, if at all? Mr James Watt CVO: A lot of the countries in the region are very preoccupied with their internal struggles, some of which are existential and some of which are very violent. They really do not have much of an attention span for regional co-operation and, indeed, for soft power generally, either of the kind which is cultural and educational or for things like market access. I remember when I was in Egypt, the European Union thought that offering even more generous market access packages to European markets would somehow be an incentive to do the things we wanted them to do. Not at all—they really could not concentrate on that, and even today I do not think it adds up to very much. Soft power really does have its limits when these acute crises are going on. We should not abandon it, of course, but we should not build too much hope on it either. The Union for the Mediterranean, for example, was a revamping of the Barcelona process, which everyone said had failed, but it is quite hard to see how the Union for the Mediterranean has actually made any material improvement to what the Barcelona Process was doing. It is not because people are not trying hard, it is just that it is not sufficient, and doing more of it is not the answer. What we need are policies which, while not necessarily being hard-edged, are not soft power; they are to do with the actual power politics of countries. So, for example, the intervention in Libya in the form of the UN mediator who is a European diplomat, is doing exactly the right thing in trying to solve that crisis first before adding in other kinds of incentives. Professor Charles Tripp FBA: It is rather tiresome that we are all echoing each other because you want us to disagree so that you can really get your teeth into something. There is a sense that something like the Union for the Mediterranean is a kind of performative platform. It does not actually have any real resources. When you look at the signatories and what they signed up to, you know that it was going to go nowhere because it was far too large and diverse in terms of the regime types within it, so I do not think that it even has much congruence with the European Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP does have the advantage of having real resources behind it and putting them into particular countries, and some of that is very well thought through. I would not have any problem with that at all.

203 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) Also, we have to think about how within the region itself there are forms of co-operation. I cite the Agadir Agreement among countries. However one thinks that that has developed, at least there was an intention to create a sense of regional co-operation which has been sadly lacking in many parts of that region. One could argue that while the Union for the Mediterranean does not do anything, it does not really interfere with anything, whereas the important thing, as James Watt said, are the resources that the European Neighbourhood Policy can actually put into countries, thus doing things concretely and substantively. Lord Horam: I was just going to say that it almost seems as though the instruments sometimes get in the way of a realistic and sensible policy. For example, one of our witnesses said that it is much more important to listen to what our people are saying on the ground rather than paying attention to the formulaic instruments that we happen to have. Would you agree? Mr James Watt CVO: The only way to get foreign policy consensus among 28 members in terms of soft power is by saying that it has to include a lot of safeguards, as it were, against neo-colonialist thinking or whatever, because that is the prevailing spirit in the European Union and the Member States. It is therefore expressed very turgidly, which is always a problem not just for partners to understand, but for some of us who are trying to implement the policies. It is also very wishy-washy and inevitably it is soft power; it never approaches hard power. It takes a real crisis to shake people off that and to give the European Union something concrete to do, like the UNSMIL mission in Libya. So, yes, it is a handicap and it is incredibly difficult to change. When things suddenly started changing very fast in December 2010 and January 2011, it was difficult to get anyone to review these texts on the conditionality and association agreements, which had really been cast in concrete. We, the European Union, could disburse hardly any money to help, even with straightforward economic things that were sensible and helpful, leaving aside the political agenda in any of the countries, because we could not breach those conditions. For example, the conditionality includes that there should be an IMF agreement before certain major chunks of EBRD money or indeed before grant money from the European Union can be disbursed. A lot of countries just did not have or even want an IMF agreement; there was no time to do that. A lot of rigidity was built into it and I am very much hoping that the new top-level language we are getting will translate into much more flexible performance formulae for actually doing things on the ground. Professor Charles Tripp FBA: I agree that there is evidence of perhaps a bit more flexibility, but I agree completely that the danger is if you have set up conditionality and then the recipient or the target no longer fulfils those conditions, what do you do? Do you not do anything or do you do it despite that and then get attacked for doing so? But there is the notion of what is called the “umbrella agreement”, the more for more, which is a kind of incremental process that is not as harsh and rigid as conditionality. It is a more imaginative way of saying that if people, states or governments have achieved elements of reform in these areas, there is then a decided economic incentive not to change direction, but actually to reinforce the things that are already being reinforced. I noticed that that was a new language that was being used, and perhaps that is a more encouraging sign. Lord Risby: I should like to ask about relationships with Parliaments. I do not want to be UK-centric, but our Arab partnership agreements and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy have an interface with Parliaments. This is going on substantially in Algeria at the moment. Is there a European dimension to this: that is, of parliamentary interaction under the umbrella of what we have been talking about, and if there is, is it efficacious? You have some experience of this.

204 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) Mr James Watt CVO: Yes, as you know, there is quite an active programme of visits by parliamentarians from the region to Strasbourg. I think that it is beneficial up to a point, but again it can do only a certain amount, and doing much more of it does not make any difference. It is quite difficult because obviously there is a certain element of junketing involved because it is very nice to be invited to Strasbourg, particularly if you are coming out of some war-torn city. But as you know, parliamentary democracy is not well established because the parties themselves are not well established unless they are the party of a single- party state like the Ba’ath party in Syria and Iraq. Parliamentarians do not necessarily share the same responsibilities as their constituents or indeed have the same attitudes towards democracy that we have here. There is an interesting meeting of very different cultures when these things happen. The effect may be long term; it should be good, but it is not going to do much in the short term.

Q38 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: We turn now to what sort of policies we should be formulating, and perhaps this is something on which you might have a difference of opinion. It is widely understood that the new strategic review must focus more, that if you want to have a strategy you must set yourself more precise objectives, and given the financial resources, you must prioritise. What do you think should be our prioritisations in the objectives, and how do you think we should best engage with the other main actors in the region? Mr Imad Mesdoua: I would probably frame it in another way. First, it is important to look at the states themselves, at each state, and consider what their specific needs are. What is the political, social and economic environment? Some states will require a focus by EU policies and EU assistance in different domains. Countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt all require different sets of programmes. That said, I would tend to focus more on what I was talking about earlier, and that is—to use a terrible buzzword—capacity building. It remains an important area in which the EU can contribute to these states, particularly in north Africa. In Tunisia, for example, I would emphasise the importance of security sector reform. The country is now facing a security challenge as a result of what is going on in Libya and domestically with radicalisation. Security sector reform is therefore an important area in which the EU can assist. Another area is economic infrastructure, and this applies to many of the countries in the region. James was talking earlier about access to markets being a potential for leverage, but a lot of expertise sharing can be done as well which can assist these countries in building an economic infrastructure. Obviously the last area which might be important, thinking specifically about north Africa and countries like Libya where there will be so much to do once, hopefully, there is political agreement, is that of helping in the construction and consolidation of political institutions—a state infrastructure. Libya has been ravaged by the conflict and we have virtually no Libyan state any more. There are two rival Governments and countless militia. When they hopefully come to a political agreement and form a national unity government, there will be lots to do in helping them to rebuild state institutions. Professor Charles Tripp FBA: I agree very much—again, so tiresomely—that one needs to think about this country by country. The notion that there can be a Middle East and north Africa policy for the EU, as for any particular member state, is really dangerous. But there are two things that one has to be quite careful of. One is the notion of what might be called technical support, which looks good and effective and looks at the kinds of things you can do, but in giving it, it may also be the thing that reinforces pre-existing forms of power and inequality. If one takes the example of security sector reform, there is an obvious logic to it in a country like Tunisia or elsewhere, but there is also a fear that it is militarising security or

205 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) adding to the militarisation of security because it is trying to make it more effective on the borders and it is doing far less in terms of making the security organs trusted by the Tunisian people. There is a great fear in Tunisia at the moment that the new anti-terror legislation may be used and abused to reinforce certain kinds of political advantage for certain groups. The report from the EU was quite interesting because it said rather despairingly that it could not see any strategic vision within the Ministry of the Interior to reform itself, which is probably almost exactly true. So one of the dangers of technical assistance is that it may play into things that are already problematic from other perspectives. The substantive assistance, however, is important, and that is where two points have come up already about economic assistance in the areas that count. It could be argued that one of the clear needs to address after the Arab Spring is glaring inequalities. That is not simply class inequalities within countries, but also regional inequalities. The notion that one should concentrate all one’s investment in the capital or in the metropolitan area is problematic. Let us look at the prelude to the Syrian civil war. It came from regional inequality, it was not just sectarian and other issues. That is the case in Tunisia and many other places, which is interesting, and Libya is a prime example. The notion of ensuring that aid is targeted not just to your old mates, as it were, and the ones you recognise as your interlocutors because they are people who have come to Europe a lot, but at groups that you might not have dealt with before. That needs some kind of imagination. I am not saying that it is not there, but the determination to do that on the part of both Member States and the EU would surely be more effective. Mr James Watt CVO: I agree with Imad and Charles on not only the need to rebuild economic infrastructure, and there will be much to rebuild when the fighting in different places stops, but also that we must avoid reinforcing autocratic power structures, which are simply going to lead to the same problems all over again. We have an opportunity here because we already play a major humanitarian role. We have a peacemaking role in Libya, and I wish that we had more of one in Syria and Iraq. We can focus more on social investment, or social transformation if you like, in a non-ideological way by investing in education. A part of that is education without trying to use undue influence, not just in academic subjects, but in civic behaviour, inclusiveness in attitudes, and expectations of individual rights and justice. That is for the long term and requires massive resources, but we would be well placed for it, in addition to peacemaking and the physical rebuilding work. Mr Imad Mesdoua: Perhaps I may make one last point. Underpinning everything we have mentioned is obviously the issue of ownership of policies and aid programmes. When we are tailoring these programmes and policies for each specific country and in each specific context, it is important that there is ownership through a contribution to the formulation of policies and programmes so that they are adapted to local needs. Otherwise, as with anything else, you will have rejection or ineffective policies and no follow-through from local authorities.

Q39 Baroness Suttie: In the context of this inquiry, we have regularly heard that EU action in the region would be improved by better co-ordination between Member States. What is your view of how bilateral Member State action contributes to overall EU policy and coherence? How can the European Union best utilise these bilateral relationships in the context of the overall EU policy? Mr James Watt CVO: I must say that it is about the right mix at the moment of individual action being taken by states which have the means, confidence and motivation to do something, as long as it is not contradicting the main thrust of EU policy. It is extremely

206 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) difficult to get all the member States to agree on a particular line. So particularly where speed of response is important, it is not a good thing to co-ordinate even more. Lighter coordination rather than more co-ordination would be my preference. Professor Charles Tripp FBA: The EU provides, one could argue, a framework or at least a set of statements which I imagine Member States take seriously. I do not see any real and profound contradictions in, for instance, economic aid and the provision of assistance to civil society to different places. There may be different interpretations, and I suppose what one would like to think is that EU policy as a whole is informed by certain Member States’ expertise in particular areas. Obviously, there are historical links between certain Member States and parts of the Middle East and north Africa. Sometimes that can have its problems. They bring prejudices on both sides and there is a baggage train, if you like, which can be difficult. Even so, I do not think that that is the case. In some places like Tunisia, from what I can see, there is a fair amount of co-ordination in terms of what they achieve. As far as I understand it, French aid to Tunisia is at least equal to that of the EU as a whole, but I do not see them treading on each other’s toes. As far as France obviously supports the EU policy, it must ensure that its activities come within that framework. Of course there may be differences about things, and I take James’s point very much that the speed of response at that level is not always too brilliant, but maybe one should not be expecting that. As long as the Member States operate within a general framework that they have already bought into, it seems to be operationally more effective. Mr Imad Mesdoua: I would add one point in the context of north Africa. On the EU’s involvement in terms of foreign aid to these countries, it should be leveraging individual Member States’ strengths in them. For example, a country like France will have its obvious advantages, connections, links and know-how in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and we can see the same with the UK in Egypt and Italy in Libya. Ahead of this witness hearing, I researched the different sectors to which Member States were contributing in different countries as opposed to the areas to which the EU was contributing. You will see from the graphs that there are areas in which they are complementary, where both the EU and a Member State are actually putting in far more money and doing far more. But I am guessing that there is a lack of co-ordination and information sharing on where the money is going and how it is being spent in specific areas. When you see the graphs, it is actually quite glaring. You can see that France is spending a whole lot of money in Tunisia on social infrastructure, whereas the EU is spending far more money on the economic infrastructure. They are complementary in that respect, but they should be working hand in hand. That is the only point I wanted to add.

Q40 Baroness Coussins: I think that my question has already been largely covered by your earlier answers. I was going to ask about whether trying to formulate a regional policy when it comes to the Middle East and north Africa is actually the right place to start or the right objective. We have heard from other witnesses that it would be the wrong way and that it would be better to classify the countries in the region into three groups. Your earlier answers seemed to go further than that when you talked about a country by country approach rather than grouping the countries. The classification which has been suggested to us is that there should be one group of countries where there would be a positive welcome for EU partnerships, a second one where there might be a specific focus of support on issues like security sector reform, which has been mentioned, and the third would be where there is conflict and the priorities are humanitarian programmes and conflict resolution. Would you go along with that classification or would you stick to recommending a country-by- country approach? Whichever you go with, what would be the policy outlines involved? If it

207 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) were a country-by-country approach, do we still need any kind of overarching policy to glue it together, or is country by country where we need to begin and end? Professor Charles Tripp FBA: There are two things to be said about that. One is the danger that whatever kind of classification one uses, one gets trapped by it if one applies it too rigidly. I think that that is why we are talking about country by country. But I agree completely that when any country or the EU is looking at a region, they have to think about similarities and complementarities between regional states, and therefore how they tailor their policies to those states. It may be that there is a lot in common between this country and that country for that reason. They also have to tailor in or factor in the rivalries between countries. They may look the same on the outside, but there are deep histories of problems between them. Clearly the classification cannot simply be by region. If you compare Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, each one is utterly different in many important respects as far as EU and other policies are concerned. The classification would have to be quite a functional one. We have to think about what resources we have and what means we have to effect any change that we would describe as being for the better or to our advantage, and to the advantage of the countries themselves, and then see it functioning. Conflict-torn countries are going to be in a separate group, but as Tolstoy said about families enduring their own horrors, they are each of them unhappy in their own ways and it would be a nonsense to try to ignore that. You cannot put Yemen in the same box as Libya, although clearly one wants to end those conflicts. You made the important point about countries which are more receptive to technical support. I think one might bring that together, but sometimes it can be for rather sinister reasons. And then there are countries with clear historic and other forms of links with Europe. One has to remember that Tunisia, which I have been working on, has 14 Members of the Tunisian Parliament who sit for European constituencies. It is a huge integration, if you like. There are something like 1 million Tunisian citizens in Europe, half of whom are in France. It is a very different relationship from that which James had to deal with in European or British relations with Egypt, where there are different sensitivities. There are close relations, but it is a very different set-up. The notion of country by country has to be done initially and meaningfully. That is because you also have to get different Member States to buy into it. If the EU comes along with a massive policy, even if it used three categories or five categories, it would not make sense if the Member States had not fed into it in terms of their own experience. That is why one has to start from a research base at the country by country level and then see what the EU can meaningfully do. Mr Imad Mesdoua: I would echo the point about identifying policy priorities—quick wins— in these countries. The reason I say that it should be done country by country is because, as has been mentioned, there is a danger with classifications that they become too rigid and therefore you do not have policy flexibility, and there is also the risk of alienating local constituencies and populations if the classification is public. It could create a kind of “good states/bad states” club, which obviously can backfire. The most important thing is to identify the policy priorities and the financial resources which are available and can be placed towards those priorities. We must also make sure that it is a results-oriented programme so that each country has specific targets and priorities and specific deliverables that we can point at afterwards. From there, it might be easier to group countries together based on success stories and objectives delivered. The Chairman: The next lot of questions is made up of three questions grouped together on Tunisia and then three questions on Libya. But before passing on to Tunisia, perhaps I may ask one question of which you have not been given notice. We have dealt with a lot of

208 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) interesting subjects, but one word that has not featured in our discussion thus far is Israel. I felt that I ought to ask to what extent you feel that the EU’s relationship with Israel and the nature of the debate taking place in a number of European Member State Parliaments about Israel impacts on the subjects we have been talking about. Mr James Watt CVO: I think that the populations in the region take very seriously not only what is happening in Jerusalem today, but also what has happened over the past several decades in Palestine. That is a major factor. Governments are on the whole focusing on the power struggles within their own country, or on their economic and political struggles. It is interesting how little, in my recent experience, Israel as a subject has cropped up in these Arab Spring-type situations. But it is an underlying factor and should never be forgotten. Professor Charles Tripp FBA: Going back to the notion of what the EU thinks it can do effectively, it must govern how it relates to Palestine and Israel. Clearly there has been a retreat from the optimism that might have once existed after Oslo that the EU had something to contribute to the peace process. As we know from the participation of the quartet and after that, the peace process has run into the ground, and the EU is never going to be able to initiate policy there. Where I suppose it can try to do things, and it does to some extent, is precisely trying to deal with aspects of Palestinian civil society by giving people an opportunity which they might not otherwise have under military occupation. But of course that has its opponents both within Member States and within the region itself. I would say that it is a very low-key and functional set of relations because, given that we have been talking about conflict-ridden zones, which it is primarily, the EU itself has no answer to that conflict and no mechanism or means of bringing it to an end. Mr Imad Mesdoua: I do not have much to add. I would prefer it if we move on.

Q41 Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: We see Tunisia as one of the more successful countries. Two of you have talked about Tunisia quite a bit, and I know that you have both done significant work there. We want to learn the lessons about its success, why we think that it has been successful, and what input have the EU and individual Member States made which has led to that success. Does that mean that there should be a continuing relationship and intervention, investment or whatever you like to call it? Also, as Professor Tripp was saying, Tunisia highlights the historic individual relationships of Member States. How can we help to make sure that the individual relationships between Member States are co-ordinated effectively with EU policy? I suspect that that is one of the things that we are working towards. What are the lessons we can learn, and how should we develop that success in Tunisia? I do not want to overblow success, but what can we then apply to other countries in the region? Professor Charles Tripp FBA: That is a large set of questions. I shall simply think about three things. One is that when you look at the crisis in Tunisia—terrorism apart, although you cannot necessarily say that—it is an economic crisis. It is about youth unemployment at 33%, women’s unemployment at 22%, and overall a 15% unemployment rate in the country. It is also the inequality of the distribution of those unemployment figures from north to south and from the interior to the coast. There is a real underlying economic crisis, and you could argue that without addressing it, all the hopes and aspirations of the Arab Spring, which is evidence of an extraordinary spirit of co-operation and aspiration within Tunisian society at all levels and is truly impressive, will not be realised. One of the fears is that one cannot keep that spirit alive just by civil society assistance, although that is a part of it. One has to keep it alive by persuading people that there are jobs and things are happening. Clearly the EU is trying to do that. I think that the Trade Commissioner is in Tunisia at the

209 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) moment trying to make more effective the free trade agreements and to deepen them in some way. I suppose that one of the concerns in Tunisia is the flow of capital and the flow of people. One does not always match the other. Something that becomes very apparent in the €20 billion or so trade between the EU and Tunisia, which constitutes around 60% of Tunisia’s foreign trade, is that the deficit or imbalance as far as Tunisia is concerned is something over €2 billion in the EU’s favour. There is a sense in which there are trade imbalances that may have to be addressed structurally. I am not an economist so I do not know how to do that, but clearly it is one of the things to think about. If the trade imbalance is structural and equally there is an outflow of capital, both of which are weakening the Tunisian economy and having an effect on growth and employment, the EU would seem to be extraordinarily well equipped to deal with it. It has the instruments to do so, and I would have thought it has the will to do so. If it does not address that, all the other things it is doing will be put in jeopardy. I see that as the huge priority. I do not decry the things that Imad was talking about in terms of civil society assistance and I recognise that the EU is not coming to Tunisia saying, “Let us tell you about the virtues of civil society”. The Tunisians are very well aware of them. It is a lively, disputatious, interested and committed society. Some of the aspects of its civil society we may find deeply troubling in our view: how they conduct themselves or the values that they espouse, but that is nature of the variety of the political struggle in Tunisia. I have two things to say. One is that the economy must be the area where the EU has strength in terms of what it can do and its modalities. The other is this: be relaxed about what you see emerging in terms of political dispute there, because in a sense that is what is going to make a Tunisian democracy. It is not the institutions and the technical aspects or the purely formalistic aspects. What is going to make it are the Tunisians being able to express themselves, sometimes to the outrage of other Tunisians and maybe problematically for people outside the country. So there is the commitment of resources and finding ways of trying to encourage the Tunisian economy, and also being relaxed about some of the manifestations of Tunisian popular politics. Do not take, as it were, the establishment view of Tunisian politics within Tunisia as the only way in which politics can be conducted. That is somewhat the fear I get from Tunisian friends. It is the Essebsis, the established figures of Tunisian democratic change, who become recognised. The Nobel Peace Prize to the quartet has that double-edged sword. On the one hand the Tunisians are very cheered by it, but on the other they recognise that UTICA and UGTT at least, were also part of the old establishment, under different leaderships. There is a kind of slight uncertainty there too. Mr Imad Mesdoua: The first question was about what has made Tunisia a success. I can summarise that by saying that it was because, as Charles has already mentioned, a strong civil society had existed in the country historically. Through the unions—the UGTT for example—and there was even a political alternative prior to the regime falling. There were opposition groups, some in exile and some underground, but they existed, which is not the case in other Arab spring countries where people had to create oppositions from scratch. There were also NGOs. One of the major things that has played in favour of Tunisia’s success story which is often overlooked is the fact that Tunisia historically has had a depoliticised army, which other countries in the region do not; they have the strong involvement of the army in local politics, but not in Tunisia. There is a strong interior ministry and police force, but the army was not involved in politics, and that partly explains its success. Looking at the challenges, I again agree with Charles about the issues. There are two looming crises in Tunisia, or they are already there if you wish to put it that way. There is the economic crisis which is reflected in the structural inequalities between north and south,

210 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) urban versus rural, and youth unemployment is the greatest manifestation of that structural weakness. Then the security challenge is linked in many ways to the economic and political challenges the country is facing. The security issues of Tunisia are due not only to the regional climate, but also to domestic economic issues. Young people who are marginalised and without jobs, who have faced repression in the past or are radicalised, are more likely to join terrorist groups. The EU should primarily turn its attention to the two aspects that Charles mentioned earlier: helping Tunisia to address its structural and economic weaknesses, whether they are domestic or external, and in my opinion addressing political and social capacity building through NGOs and security sector reform which can take on a whole range of manifestations, particularly when it comes to accountability, respect for human rights and so on.

Q42 Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Any lessons for how the EU should act in future in Tunisia and elsewhere? Professor Charles Tripp FBA: Maybe one of the lessons is that it should play to its successes in the sense that for the past four years the EU has seriously sought to address in terms of economic aid and trade agreements a determination to change the relationship and to address it in some form. If one is thinking about where that can apply across the region, it comes back to the question that was raised before. Those preconditions do not necessarily all exist across the region in the same way, but clearly where they do, they need to be dealt with in some form. The other side of learning from that is that just as in many other countries in the region, the hardest thing for the EU to address, and therefore it should go very carefully about it, is trying to address the balance of power within a country in a very direct and obvious way, because then you touch on real and raw nerves. Although those nerves may not be quite as raw in Tunisia as they are in Egypt and elsewhere, that creates alienation and entrenchment, which is a problem. I do not know whether one calls it soft power because economic power has a huge material effect on people’s lives, but there is a sense in which that is playing to its success. The area of trying to redistribute and tell the Tunisians how to reallocate power within the country is problematic. One hopes that that will come about as a result of changes to the structure of the economy. Mr Imad Mesdoua: One lesson I would also point out for Tunisia is this. During the troika and the early days of post-Arab Spring period in Tunisia, one of the strengths of the EU’s policy and its involvement, whether in the form of individual Member States or as a whole, was that they favoured the long term sustainability of the political environment as it was over short term considerations over stability, which was not necessarily the case in other Arab Spring countries where a compromise or choice was made for stability over sustainability. That always comes back to haunt us. For the time being it has proved to be an effective means of looking at the political situation in Tunisia. Lord Horam: I am interested in what Professor Tripp was saying, particularly about the importance of the economic issues in Tunisia, which he emphasised very strongly. Does that present a problem for the European Union in addressing Tunisia as a whole? In particular, does it mean that the classical external affairs policy and security policy are really less important and that we should be relaxed about our politics because what really matters is getting the economic systems properly directed? That of course is a matter for the trade side, which is a very different part of the European Union and is not particularly connected to Mrs Mogherini’s area. Professor Charles Tripp FBA: That is one of the things that I would have thought is hugely important. Sustaining that separation is a nonsense and actually quite damaging. One could

211 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) argue that in the Tunisian case, EU policy should be driven by the trade side because that is going to have a material effect on the economy. It does not mean to say that one ignores whatever assistance can be given to the Tunisian Government on security and so forth on a technical level. However, the idea that trade and, with any luck, the successful outcome of trade negotiations that favour Tunisia and allow it, if you like, to restructure its economy vis- à-vis the EU in a much more favourable way—without it, there is nothing. If it is not deeply linked to European external affairs, that would be very strange indeed. If the link does not exist, I am depressed. Lord Horam: That may be quite difficult for the European bureaucracy. Professor Charles Tripp FBA: Yes, that is something that other people are more expert on than myself, but I would have thought as an urgent matter, if you like, that if there is a lesson to be learnt not just about a country but about EU effectiveness, one has to say that this is a case where they must be linked up because it would be a nonsense if one thing was being done in the economy while another initiative was being taken on the external affairs side that alienated people. Again, we come up against the problem that if we do not join them up, they are not going to be cumulatively effective. They might be individually effective, but that would be by chance.

Q43 Lord Triesman: Lady Armstrong asked whether there were lessons out of a relatively successful involvement, so let me turn to what seems to be an almost completely unsuccessful one—but maybe you will tell me that I am wrong. At the beginning of the process of the decisions on intervention in Libya in 2011, there were plainly some significant differences among the nations of the European Union as to what they should and could do. Is there a legacy from that which is still impacting on the way in which the EU responds to events in Libya? That is the first of the questions.

The second is that while people have said that they can see “a pretty significant role” for the EU, can you say what you think the active role for the EU could be and whether the view of the active role for the EU is a view which is also shared by the Libyans? Would they recognise it as the role that they would like to see the EU play or is it dissonant in any respect?

Finally, are the policies that are emerging in Europe likely to be too limited in their future application to do a substantive job in Libya? These are also big questions, but I always ask big questions of ambassadors. Mr James Watt CVO: I do not think that there are any serious lingering disagreements about the policy on Libya. Everybody is behind the policy of the EU and of the UN representative, who is of course an EU diplomat, in promoting the formation of a government of national unity, which we may be close to. I do not think that France and Britain have a particularly privileged role, it is just that we have put much more effort into trying to understand what is going on in Libya by talking to the actors and trying to influence them. To that degree, we do have a bigger role than others, although Italy is also playing a big role. Once a national unity government has been formed, while that would be tremendous, I still think that there will be an ongoing security problem. Violent jihadism is based in Sirte at the moment, but we must remember that Libya has pretty much uncontrollable borders to the south, where there are still major problems because of the Sahel jihadism. Security support would be important, as would lifting the arms embargo if the conditions are right. That needs to be taken forward quickly, if possible. Restoring economic growth, particularly by restoring the production and export of oil, will be important. Libya is

212 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) relatively easy—well, it is not easy! —because what to do is very clear. It has only 6 million people compared with the huge populations of some of the other countries and the country has a source of natural wealth in the form of oil which it should be possible to restore. Otherwise, at the economic and social policy level, I think that the Libyans would like it if we did a lot on the humanitarian side in the form of hospitals, schools, the urban environment and so on. There is some trust to be rebuilt. I have the impression that many Libyans feel that the EU did not give the right backing to the elected national assembly. When the GNC decided to come back and take over in Tripoli, the European Union decided to ride both horses rather than say, “No, we do have something called legitimacy here”. I am not close enough to the action to know how justified that position was, but it has left, certainly among some sections in Libya, a sense of bitterness and mistrust of Europe which has to be overcome by patently good and helpful actions at a social level. As for the actors prioritising relations with individual Member States, I do not particularly see that with individual Member States. Of course you have foreign sponsors of jihadism, or people prepared to support jihadist resistance to anything like the secular future that we all envisage for Libya, but they are obviously not Member States. Professor Charles Tripp FBA: I am not sure that I have a huge amount to add, but as James has made clear, unless there is something of unity among the Libyans, it is very difficult to think of any kind of policy that has more than a very short-term effect. What is a real problem not only for the EU but also for the Member States is that in somewhere like Libya, if the gun rules, how do you deal with the rule of the gun? How do you get people either to come together and put down their guns or deter them from using them? When you look at the widespread nature of provincial rebellion and factionalism, apart from the split between the two Governments, much of it is retained by force. So whether it is an attack on the airport or the Parliament, or the kidnapping of people, regardless of which group is doing it, they are all using them. That is a real problem for the EU and actually for the Member States. I do not think that it is a problem which is particular to the EU. However, if we get to the point where the EU might be able to play a role in bringing the different parties together, then of course you can begin to think about all kinds of technical aid. Imad made the point earlier that it is a devastated country in terms of its infrastructure, and so the capacity for assisting just on the technical level and in a non-lethal way is going to be enormous. Libya will need all the assistance it can get, but again, I cannot see that ever happening without some kind of agreement. So on the last point of your question, which was how do the Libyans view the EU activism, having talked to some Libyans, they reflected the point that James made, which is that many of them feel let down. On the other hand, if you look at the variety of views within the Libyan spectrum, even though it is only 6 million people—some of them heavily armed and some not, some very concerned about their provincial interests and so on—for some of them the EU is not actually very meaningful because it does not engage with what they are concerned about. They have a much closer enemy to hand, which is the group in the next town or the Government in Libya. The other point to be made is about the refugee and migrant crisis, which is an outcome of the disintegration of central authority in Libya. It is clear that Europe has been left trying to deal with the symptoms of that in one form or another as humanely as possible, but with limited resources. Even there one can see differences between Member States about whether you go in and use military force to prevent the people smugglers from operating or do you simply collect the people they are smuggling. There is a problem in that the immediacy of the crisis is bound to trouble the EU in terms of how to develop a concerted policy that brings all the Member States along in terms of the symptoms of the problem. Addressing that is not going to solve the Libyan problem, but it may be thought to solve

213 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) some aspect of it as it affects European interests, but even there, there is disagreement. So much hinges upon things that it cannot yet be said with any certainty will be realised, and therefore it becomes very problematic indeed. Mr Imad Mesdoua: I do not see many policy differences in the EU regarding the position towards what needs to be done in Libya. Right now, everything hinges on the political dialogue, which is at best very fragile. That is because even if the groups come to an agreement politically as to the formation of a unity government, what the membership of the government looks like, who would head it et cetera, there is a clear disconnect—I want to make it clear to Members of the Committee—between the people who are negotiating at the political level and the armed groups on the ground. There is such a vast proliferation of armed militia, jihadist groups and criminal organisations that it is difficult to see how the political process can rein them in the short term. This is where the EU can be of assistance, and that is why I have mentioned technical support for institutional capacity building. If a unity government is put into place, it will need time to cement its authority, to grow, and really to rebuild the foundations of the Libyan state. The European Union can contribute both directly and indirectly to that, which would have a positive effect in a number of areas; it is not just assistance in the political realm. It can help to resolve security issues, whether we are talking about terrorism or the migration issue, because that is also an institutional capacity issue in Libya at the moment. It can also have a positive effect on the economy by helping the country to start exporting again. A lot of the country’s capacity has been limited because of the fighting and the security issues. On the Libyans’ view of the role of the EU, I tend to agree with what the other experts have mentioned about Libyans feeling disappointed. They feel as though there have been key junctures where the European Union’s involvement was not strong enough, or clear and coherent enough, that led to a number of complex situations which in turn have led to the situation we are in now. The last point I would make is that the EU should continue in the role that it is playing now alongside the UN in mediating for the Middle East because nothing is more important than the political process in Libya at the moment. All priorities should be geared towards that, making sure that the process is successful before really examining what role the EU can play in terms of programmes and assistance. That is because realpolitik suggests that now it is impossible to have a concrete and meaningful impact on the ground.

Q44 Lord Triesman: Can I ask one supplementary question, which comes out of a comment made earlier on made by Mr Watt. You talked about the porous character of the borders. I know that we are not talking about Algeria today, but one of the things which threatens capacity, with or without European help to build a solid trading basis, is to be able to operate the facilities that you have. What we saw in Algeria was in effect a number of oil producers being driven out and some of them killed, including by Algerian military forces. In understanding what we might do in Libya, how serious might attempts to strengthen those borders be? That is because almost all of the economic activities that one would want see start up again, or starting up to a greater extent again, might appear to the oil companies, for example, to be threatened. Mr James Watt CVO: You can secure oil facilities in the mid-south, but it would take some effort, and it is the kind of assistance that the EU could give. The southern borders of Libya on to Chad and the wider Sahel of course have the potential for highly mobile jihadists to move through and strike. So that is just one element in addition to the home-grown ground elements that the other two experts have referred to. It should be possible, but it would take some investment and effort, and perhaps government assistance, perhaps by the EU.

214 of 309 Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) Mr Imad Mesdoua: As an Algerian, the situation has been pretty much stabilised since the attack in Amenas, which I think is what you are referring to. Oil groups are still present in that part of the country and are operating normally. Algeria has invested a lot of money in securing its border with Libya, which it now sees as the major threat to its national security. Something like 30,000 to 40,000 Algerian troops are stationed at the border with Libya, but one could say that actually that remains insufficient because it is such a long border that even 30,000, 40,000 or 50,000 soldiers would not suffice. But the country is investing in securing that border and making sure that terrorist and criminal groups do not pass through. There are threats that continue to exist with regard to Libya’s southern border, where other states do not have the same capacity. Algeria has the military and financial capacity to enable it to invest a lot of money in securing its borders, but that is not necessarily the case for Chad or Niger, which are suffering. There is a big influx of weapons which has gone all the way down to Nigeria, one could argue, through Niger and Chad to supply groups like Boko Haram. So the threat is more at the southern end of Libya. Tunisia also has problems at its border with Libya. Lord Triesman: Perhaps I may pursue this a little more. I am familiar with the deployments and reasonably familiar with what I suspect has actually been a greater restriction in oil production because people are servicing their plants and so on rather than necessarily pumping oil. Are there things which the European Community could provide which would add significantly to the effort; not personnel on the ground, but technical things like satellites for observation of the borders, which would give the capacity for much more rapid response by people on the ground? Mr Imad Mesdoua: I would say that the most important issue is intelligence sharing and coordination. The EU and the EU Member States have a capacity when it comes to gathering information and data, as well as border surveillance. I am sure they are already doing some joint work, but you often hear complaints by security officials on that side. They say that the intelligence is not shared in real time, which is when it is most valuable. So perhaps the issue of co-ordination and intelligence sharing, along with the provision of data in real time, is what is most necessary. That requires a political dialogue at a very high level. I think that it already exists between some states and individual EU Member States, but perhaps there should be a new high-level dialogue or a new framework that makes it more concrete and effective day to day. The Chairman: You have talked about rebuilding the foundations of the Libyan state. Of course, they were never very deep. Do you take it as axiomatic that we should think in terms of a single state or ought we to be open to the idea that the area described as Libya might be better off if it was more than one state? Mr James Watt CVO: One answer to that would be: how would you divide the oil and water resources between the three parts without setting up continual conflict between them? My view is that I am very strongly in favour of Libya remaining a unitary state.

Q45 Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I just wanted to follow up on what the witnesses said earlier about Libya. The EU and the Member States lack the analytical capacity and interlocutors on the ground to be able to understand the many different issues that you have been talking about internally which give rise to the more regional conflicts within Libya. Do you have a view about that? Mr Imad Mesdoua: One of the good things that has emerged out of this conflict and the difficult political crisis that Libya is facing is that the EU has now begun to rely much more on regional actors who have an involvement and a direct stake in the conflict. Countries like

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Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia are Libya’s neighbours and they understand the political realities. They have their connections in the country and their own role to play. I think that the EU has begun to rely a bit more on their mediation and involvement. Algeria and Morocco have both hosted political talks for Libya, which is an encouraging sign of the EU working hand in hand with regional partners. They are important and I do not think they can be ignored. It is better than taking an approach that says we should go it alone and have a Eurocentric view of how things should be. That has been a very positive development. The Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much. I thought that we would take an hour and a quarter, but we have been an hour and a half. You have been generous with your replies. Again, thank you very much indeed.

216 of 309 Dr Maria O’Neill, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Abertay Dundee—Written Evidence (FSP0005)

Dr Maria O’Neill, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Abertay Dundee—Written Evidence (FSP0005)

Changing global environment and EU interests

 Is the High Representative’s report the right basis on which to draft the strategy proper?

1. The High Representative’s report is very much addressing the perceived need for a “comprehensive” EU global strategy. However, while it would be good to challenge all issues/ threats equally, recognising financial and personnel limitations, it might be better to prioritise the issues which should be addressed first, or with the greater resource allocation, leaving other issues to be dealt with as time and resources permit. 2. It is arguable that the immediate neighbourhood of the EU, covering not just the European Neighbourhood Policy but also the Euro-Mediterranean countries and the EU direct relationship with Russia, through the Four Common Spaces Programme should be very high on the EU’s list of priorities. 3. The report does point out at point 2, first paragraph, that the issue of “economic and financial crime, terrorism and trafficking” arise. This is a point of particular interest to this contributor,49 and one which is not further developed in detail in the report, given that the EU sees internal and external security as being “inseparable”.50 For its part the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA (Justice and Home Affairs),51 speaks of an increasingly interconnected world, with the need for the EU to make JHA issues a central priority in its dealing with third countries,52 particularly in order to ‘respond to the security threats of terrorism, organised crime, corruption and drugs and to the challenge of managing migration flows.’53

1. While both the EU and the UK may have very broad Foreign Policy strategic interests, their shared security strategic interests should be in their immediate neighbourhood. The nock on effects of conflicts or state weakness in the EU’s geographic neighbourhood, broadly defined, is more likely to be felt within the EU, and its individual member states, than is a military invasion from any one of those countries into the EU. EU security issues should not however, be mistaken for be

49 O’Neill, M.; The Protection of Fundamental Rights and The External Dimension of the EU’s Fight Against Terrorism: Current and Future Challenges ahead of the EU Accession to the ECHR, in Herlin-Karnell and Matera, (eds.) External Dimension of the EU Counter-Terrorism Policy, CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2014/2, TMC Asser Institute, The Netherlands, and O’Neill, M.; Security cooperation, counterterrorism, and EU–North Africa cross-border security relations, a legal perspective, European Security, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 3, 438–453. 50 ‘Europe in a globalised world – the external dimension of freedom, security and justice’ in ‘The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens’, OJ [2010] C 115/01, 4.5.2010, section 7, third paragraph. 51 Council of the European Union, ‘A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice’, Brussels, 30 November 2005, 14366/3/05. 52 Ibid. para. 1. 53 Ibid.

217 of 309 Dr Maria O’Neill, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Abertay Dundee—Written Evidence (FSP0005) defence interests only. While there will be an ongoing need to provide the defence requirements of the member states of the EU, security is increasingly being seen outwith the context of [traditional] military risks. In the academic community there is a shift from traditional state security to defining security as the “provision of individual or human security”.54 The focus on the security of the individual no longer sees security as being exclusively a military, intelligence of policing issue, but rather sees these resources as being all deployed in the protection of individuals. In particular counter-terrorism and organised and serious crime risks, which often require a number of security resources to be deployed, need to be properly addressed, not only in the context of within the EU, but in the EU’s relationship with third countries. A particular requirement is the need to develop relations with the EU’s immediate neighbours, (where neighbouring states are sufficiently functioning), in order to address these risks. The “fourth” basket of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements reflects this need, with these issues also being addressed in the European Neighbourhood Agreements and the Four Common Spaces Programme with Russia. It is arguable that these security issues should now gain a higher profile in the development of the European Security Policy. The European Security Strategy,55 the European Counter Terrorism Strategy56 and the European Internal Security Strategy57 (which has provisions on external EU provisions) should be seen as being on a continuum in addressing security risks, recognising that EU internal and external security are inextricably linked.

 Is the EU ready and capable to respond to the new security environment? What are the opportunities that it presents for the Union?

1. The EU’s CFSP needs to be refocused in order to address the current “security” threats to the EU and its member states, and be focused on those issues, not only where the EU can provide additionality to the activities of the EU member states, but also on those tasks which are achievable with current EU resources and capacity.

1. The EU High Representative needs to focus more on the security threats, broadly defined, to the EU, from its immediate neighbourhood. While she also has a remit to address commercial issues, at a global level, much of the work on the non-security issues are already well covered by the European Commission. In addition many of the hard military issues are addressed, for its members, by NATO.

Neighbourhood policy

 Should the EU focus its resources more closely on its own neighbourhood? What are the advantages and disadvantages of doing so?

54 C. Hillebrand, Counter-terrorism Networks in the European Union; Maintaining Democratic Legitimacy after 9/11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 24. 55 A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 56 Council of the European Union, 30 November 2005: The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 57 Internal security strategy for the European Union: Towards a European security model, March 2010.

218 of 309 Dr Maria O’Neill, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Abertay Dundee—Written Evidence (FSP0005)

1. The EU’s immediate neighbourhood is covered by three distinct policy processes, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the European Mediterranean Policy (which has a substantial overlap in member states with the ENP, however the focus of the agreements are not identical) and the Four Common Spaces Programme with Russia. All three of these programmes should have a higher priority in the EU’s CFSP policy.

 How would you assess EU policy in the neighbourhood? Are the foreign policy instruments in the neighbourhood fit for purpose? Should enlargement remain the major tool of in the EU foreign policy toolkit in the neighbourhood?

1. EU policy in its neighbourhood can only develop as far as the partner third country wish it to develop. Russia, for example, has been reluctant to take up the offer of an ENP agreement with the EU, not wishing to overly import EU norms into the Russian state. It might, however, be more interested in addressing some of the law enforcement issues that it shares with the EU. It has recently indicated an interest in developing further on counter-terrorism issues. Many other third countries are seeking to reform and develop relevant areas of their operations. Access to the EU market has often been used as a “carrot” in these negotiations. Membership of the EU is not always required to progress these policy areas. A shared interest in tackling particular issues will lead to “strong incentives for adaptation”58 in the absence of the traditional carrot of EU membership. 2. Shared understandings, or the lack of them, in the context of human rights and due process issues may complicate progress in this area, however work should start/ further advance on addressing these issues.

Capabilities and Capacities

1. The EU has an Intelligence Sharing Centre, IntCen, located within the CFSP, and answerable to the High Representative. It is not a facility which advertises its capacity to deal with intelligence. It is understood by this contributor that military intelligence capacity of individual member states are involved in its operation, and national security agencies may share intelligence with it, should they choose to do so. The EU is expressly leaving national intelligence services to make their own arrangements with regard to the sharing of national security intelligence, as set out in Article 72 TFEU.59 Some academics have been reporting that some intelligence services of the EU have been developing such relationships. Representatives from the UK national intelligence services would be better placed to comment on such developments.

58 Lavenex, S. 2011. Channels of externalisation of EU Justice and Home Affairs. In: M. Cremona, J. Monar, and S. Poli, eds. The external dimension of the European Union’s area of freedom, security and justice. Brussels: College of Europe Studies, P.I. E. Peter Lang, 119–138, p.122. 59 Article 72 TFEU: It shall be open to Member States to organise between themselves and under their responsibility such forms of cooperation and coordination as they deem appropriate between the competent departments of their administrations responsible for safeguarding national security.

219 of 309 Dr Maria O’Neill, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Abertay Dundee—Written Evidence (FSP0005) Europol and Frontex also develop intelligence products, relevant to their own areas of operation.

220 of 309 Mr Marc Pierini—Oral Evidence (QQ 46-57)

Mr Marc Pierini—Oral Evidence (QQ 46-57)

Evidence Session No. 5 Heard in Public Questions 46 - 57

TUESDAY 20 OCTOBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Baroness Suttie Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

______

Examination of Witness Mr Marc Pierini, Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Europe and former European Union Ambassador to Turkey, Tunisia and Libya, Syria, Morocco

Q46 The Chairman: Mr Pierini, thank you very much for agreeing to come before us. As I think you know, we are a Sub-Committee of the European Union Committee of the House of Lords. Our role is to look at EU external affairs. The last report we produced was on the relationship between the EU and Russia in relation to Ukraine, and this time we are doing the European security strategy. My colleagues are drawn from all the political parties and we are not, of course, part of the United Kingdom Government. We have sent you a list of questions. They are being recorded, but if at any time you want to say something that is off the record, please make that clear and we will treat it as such.

I will ask the first question and then my colleagues will all come in. It is a very general point. Do you think there is genuine political will among the Member States to pause and undertake an exercise of this kind? My impression is that not all Member States were equally enthusiastic about starting it. What do you think are the key divisions between Member States in their approach to the exercise? Mr Marc Pierini: If I may, I will start with the end of your question. Of course, historically we have had a north-south divide between Member States, as we saw with the fall of the

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Soviet empire in 1989-90, the beginning of the EU programmes with Poland and Hungary, and then the rest of central Europe. At that time the southern Member States—the Latin Member States, if you will—were quite dismayed, and pressed for several years for a rebalancing, which happened in November 1995 with the Barcelona process, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. That has been there for quite a long time. Today, of course, the different perceptions might still be there but we are confronted with such a flurry of uncontrolled events in the east and in the south that the European Union has tended to be reactive more than organised. We are basically, at least in this city, running after the events. We see that, of course, with the refugee issue, but we have seen it for nearly five years—four and a half years—with Syria and with Libya. Going back to the more strategic level, of course a strategic review is a good thing, but in my perception—I spent 35 years in the system, from 1976 until 2012, so I am a kind of dinosaur—the key turning point within, not outside, the Union was the Lisbon Treaty and the impulse at the time that foreign policy was too important to be left to institutions and should be repatriated to capitals. At the time that meant the three large capitals—yours, Berlin and Paris. That had some basis. In the meantime, I do not think that the transition to the new foreign policy set-up in the EU institutions has been very successful. Of course we created the European External Action Service, which is next door, as you know. It had its infancy problems. Obviously, when you pool a group of people outside an institution and add to it a number of people from foreign ministries in 25 Member States at the time, 28 now, it makes for a difficult start. Right now, if we look at the past five or six weeks and the way the refugee emergency is being handled, I do not think we are very consistent as Europeans. Four or five weeks ago, Donald Tusk went to Ankara without bringing the external service with him. A week later, three Ministers—Mr Steinmeier, Mr Kurz and Mr Asselborn—were trampling on each other in Ankara on virtually the same day. The following week a high level, high official mission went, last week Mr Timmermans went, together with two other Commissioners, and this afternoon another high official mission is going. Everybody is running around. The refugee emergency is perhaps the worst-case scenario that could happen to institutions, but the expertise is here. We know how refugee patterns work. I did that myself 20 years ago and 10 years ago. We know all this and we are perfectly knowledgeable about how it works, how the traffickers’ networks operate and so on, but because there is such intense pressure on Member States—in different ways, of course; Germany has its own set-up, the rest of western Europe perhaps has a different perception of means and central Europe is altogether a different story—and because of the weakness of the institutions here, we are probably not giving a very consistent answer. In that sense, yes, a strategic review is needed, but it will also call for willingness on the part of Member States to put some order into it.

Q47 Lord Horam: You said that we have the experience here, and you personally have had a lot of experience with refugee situations in the past and so forth. This is on a bigger scale. What do you see as the right kind of co-ordinated European Union approach? Mr Marc Pierini: First of all, what strikes me at the moment—I am still taking the example of the refugee crisis—is that the impulse has come from Berlin and Paris first and foremost, or rather from Berlin, with Paris trailing, because the numbers they can handle are completely different, as are their budgetary means. In a way, what we have is foreign policy- making at the level of the European Council, which is a very small number of people, together with Heads of State and Government, and a sort of disconnect with the expertise. Because foreign policy is made more at European Council level than at Foreign Affairs Council level, we have the impression that there is never the time nor the presence of

222 of 309 Mr Marc Pierini—Oral Evidence (QQ 46-57) people to put all the expertise together. That is perhaps also the price of having created the new set-up and therefore, in a way, divided the responsibilities. In the first five years of the Lisbon Treaty implementation, the Barroso Commission basically never said anything of substance on foreign policy. Now it is a bit different, because Mrs Mogherini has moved her office to the other building and is playing a role as Vice-President of the Commission, and you have the other function of Vice-President Timmermans. I do not know whether it simplifies matters, because there are a lot of people at the top level—Juncker, Tusk, Timmermans, Mogherini and a few other Commissioners—but I would see it as putting an end to the dispersion of responsibilities. Perhaps that is too much to ask because people have portfolios and so on, but I do not see anybody saying, “Now the policy proposal is going to be this. Let’s ask the European Council”. Everybody goes for something. If you remember, we are now talking of €3 billion. It remains to be seen how that is going to be done, but never mind. At one point, two and a half or three weeks ago, one Commissioner suddenly came out of a room and said €1 billion without asking anybody. That was €1 billion that he had calculated from the pre-accession funds for Turkey, which of course the Turks would not accept being diverted to refugee issues. Maybe it is the effect of the political panic around the refugee issue, but there is no consistency in the system at the moment.

Q48 Lord Dubs: I would like to ask two questions, if I may. Are you saying that the difficulties you have described are a function of the newness of the whole idea and that it is early days, or do you think there are permanent difficulties in what we have set up? Mr Marc Pierini: The permanent difficulty is that you have many cooks in the kitchen. That is obvious. That is not the case in any of the Member State Governments. My last posting was Turkey and I still travel to Turkey, including this afternoon, very often. I know them well and they are rejoicing at this complete mess. They have seen six, seven or eight top officials coming to ask for a solution and none of them has actually dealt with the Turks as you should deal with the Turks, which is in a rather firm way. Everybody has gone there begging. I think the dispersion of responsibilities is the first problem. We knew that the first five years of the Lisbon Treaty would be difficult because you were mixing together national diplomats and people from the institutions, so it was not going to be easy. Lord Dubs: Do you think it is going to get better, or is this a problem inherent in having 28 countries trying to do it? Mr Marc Pierini: To a large extent it is inherent in having 28 countries, but in fact the vast majority of the 28 countries, not having the means for their own autonomous diplomacy other than at regional level, would be pretty happy to see the system functioning on their behalf. The problem is rather, in my view, the way in which the larger Member States, especially the big three, let the system operate or not. Mr Marc Pierini continued off the record. Germany is a bit different. Germany is such an economic power and has such specific problems to handle that they just go forward.

Q49 Baroness Coussins: You referred to the need for better co-ordination to deal with the refugee crisis, but looking at the other side of the coin, at the causes of it, do you think there are any specific useful steps that the EU collectively could be taking to address the causes of that crisis, looking at the countries of origin of the refugees? Mr Marc Pierini: Yes, of course, but if we look at the current crisis, the main issue is Syria, and there Europe does not have the means to operate independently of the United States. As long as President Obama was reluctant to do anything for his own reasons—in

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2012-13— which are all linked to Iraq and Afghanistan, as we know, and to his personal approach to foreign policy and risk-taking, we were not autonomous. Now it is even more complicated, with the Russian intervention over the past month. We can hope for a more consistent approach, and that the approach with Syria, which obviously still has to be resolved, is the diplomatic one of trying to convince the Russians that new meetings of the Geneva process should be held, and so on and so forth. It is typically the kind of problem where collectively Member States do not have strong military means, so they are complementary to the US, but on the diplomatic side they have more means, and perhaps a set-up such as we used for Iran, the P5+1, will give Europe its role in this.

Q50 Lord Risby: You very tellingly put forward the difficulties of having a co-ordinated approach, because in the European Council you have dominant countries and all that sort of thing, but at least what they are trying to identify in the process that is under way is some strategic vision. You are an expert on Turkey. This is something that for years has been completely ignored. Some people have had a slightly different view, that it was a bridge, but the opportunities to give some sort of role to Turkey have been ignored. We have a situation where, yes, there is a sudden dramatic reaction because of the refugee crisis, but it has been obvious for years that there was going to be some difficulty. The absence of any strategic thinking, which I think is what this process is at least trying to address, however haltingly, is something the crisis underlines dramatically. What do you think, particularly in the context of Turkey? Mr Marc Pierini: I would say that with Turkey, for years, if not decades, we have been trapped into accession or the rest, and the Turks themselves were trapped. Since the late 1960s, when Turkey and Greece were in the same category in the annex to the Rome treaty, we have all struggled with whether Turkey is really going to be a Member State. That was the main approach for both the EU, in its successive versions, and for the Turks, and it was detrimental to a strategic approach. I remember, even at the beginning of my time in Turkey in 2006, that you could not discuss certain subjects because they said, “Oh, no, if we discuss this, it is going to be used as an excuse by the EU not to go forward with the accession process”. Then came the time of President Sarkozy in France, who for his own domestic political reasons was harshly against Turkey’s accession. The lack of pragmatism there did a lot of damage, because I consider the accession negotiation a very safe negotiation in the sense that you have conditionality in the negotiation itself, political criteria, all the “chapters”, and then you have ratification. Ratification today with Turkey is 30 ratifications—28 Member States, the European Parliament and the Turkish Parliament—so we are quite safe there. I am not even convinced that the Turks would vote yes in the end if they got everything they wanted. It is not totally clear. In the meantime, if we had been conducting those negotiations, in fairness we would have had an influence on the shape of Turkish reforms, both economic and political. I will give you an anecdote. Mr Marc Pierini continued off the record.

Q51 The Chairman: Could I come back to something you said earlier? You were talking about the lack of cohesion and the general chaos of the situation, and then you drew attention to the Iran negotiations. Would I be right in assuming that you believe that the only way one is going to find any coherent policy is through small ad hoc groups who share an objective? In the case of Iran it was the big three countries, and they all had the same objective: they did not want Iran to have nuclear weapons. But basically the external policy is going to be conducted by ad hoc groups of countries.

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Mr Marc Pierini: I do not know if there have to be unique methods, but certainly on the very acute cases where we are confronted with a very stern Russian and Chinese position— such as Russia and China in the Security Council about supporting Assad—it is a vehicle of choice. It may be entirely different for a country like Tunisia, where the problems are rather smaller and where you have the very strong interest of Italy and Spain and other countries, but certainly in the case of Syria, and perhaps Libya again, it is a methodology that I think is beneficial. The Chairman: This is a question, not a statement. Would you feel that, whatever the composition of an ad hoc group, Germany has to be a member? Mr Marc Pierini: They certainly feel so. I would say it is almost unavoidable, at least when we consider the financial implications of any action, because we have certain budget rules for the EU budget and that is going to remain so. I do not need to explain that to you. Therefore, you need ad hoc solutions. Right now we are talking of €3 billion for the refugees in Turkey. There is no way you can find €3 billion over three years in the EU budget. You are going to find three times €300 million maximum, and the rest is à la carte. You are not going to get that from central Europe, so it is going to be Germany and a couple of other Member States. Certainly the German Chancellor will insist that we have a sort of balance, and that everybody chips in. Going back to the case of Tunisia, which is one of your questions—I am sorry to jump the gun—you have a fairly simple set of issues, economic reform and security sector reform. Everybody knows what is to be done. The Tunisians are in deadlock because they have still not digested their revolution four and a half years later. They have not yet found the methodology, except for their constitution, but they will come to it. Basically, they need a very strong financial impulse, because their economy is deadlocked because of terrorism; 70 or 100 hotels have closed and it is a complete disaster. If they do not have that impulse in the form of a large financial package—large for Tunisia is not large for the EU, obviously— they will not get off the ground. That can only be in the form of an EU trust fund where you have a certain amount of money from the EU budget, which is not too difficult because at the moment we just do not know where to spend the money allocated to the Mediterranean because it is such a chaotic region; and from interested Member States. There you do not need a P5+1 methodology. You just need a concerted ad hoc EU effort, and that is it, which I am not sure is going to happen, because it is so small and looks so peaceful that perhaps we will leave it for tomorrow, except that it is not, potentially, going to resolve itself by a miracle.

Q52 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: Carrying on with the same theme of strategic engagement and the P5+1, the EU3+3, or whatever, and your remarks on inconsistency and mess, would you say that there are areas, as in Tunisia or in trade agreements, where EU institutions can operate very strongly but where there is a requirement for really quite fundamental strategic negotiation, where EU institutions are weak and therefore the kind of models that were used for Iran are going to be progressively more useful? After all, Turkey is not just refugees; it is Syria and borders and a whole lot of change. Radical policies have to be changed there. It is the same with Russia. Russia traditionally dislikes dealing with EU institutions, and prefers dealing with national capitals or a combination of national capitals. Do you see that as a model that will be taken forward, and, if so, is it the European Council more than the EEAS that would determine the composition of those groupings? Mr Marc Pierini: Maybe the dividing line is whether an issue is being dealt with at the Security Council or not, because there you need to confront Russia and China. That is going

225 of 309 Mr Marc Pierini—Oral Evidence (QQ 46-57) to be the case with Syria, and with Libya if we come back to the issue at some point, which is not clear at this stage. If we take the Iran deal, everybody knew that, although the steering was done by Lady Ashton, at one point the core negotiation would be between the US and Iran. We knew that from the beginning, but at least she was able to keep consistency in the Member States’ positions by chairing the Foreign Affairs Council and sort of managing it all, and that is what Mrs Mogherini does now—the implementation phase. That is a rather good methodology, but it does not need to apply everywhere. Certainly it is not the case in Tunisia and in most of the other Mediterranean countries. We do not know where Turkey is going. We will see on 1 November, because it could be a huge catastrophe if Mr Erdogan—or his party under his impulsion—steals the election. That would be a real disaster. In any case, if they do not and they have a repeat election and a repeat result, we are in a crisis anyway. We do not know what he is going to do, but we should at least find a way, as Europeans, to deal with Turkey more strategically, and that has not been done at all. Right now quite a number of Member States are unhappy with the accession process, and of course for the past two years the rule of law in Turkey has been going down so severely that it is a miracle—not a miracle; it is understood—that the yearly progress report of the Commission will not say that Turkey does not sufficiently fulfil the political conditions, because we have other interests, but actually they do not. If you look at freedom of the press, independence of the judiciary and even the role of the President, which is now outside the constitution, none of it is what we believe in. The whole thing about whether we are going to accelerate the accession negotiations—we understand the tactical game there and the way the German Chancellor stretched that position a couple of days ago—just does not work, so we need to find another way to approach Turkey. Lord Dubs: What would that be? Mr Marc Pierini: We wrote a paper on this almost 10 months ago. A host of issues need to be dealt with, like modernising the customs union. Turkey is the only country with which the EU has a customs union, which is very beneficial for both sides but is limited to industry. When our automotive industry, for example, produces in Turkey, it is exactly like producing in the EU, which is very good, but it needs to be extended to services. If you go down the streets of any large Turkish city, to give only British names you have Vodafone, HSBC and everybody else—Marks & Spencer and so on—so it is a big market for our service industries, and we are now handling it properly. Turkish Airlines, for example, has undue advantages because services are not included in the customs union. That is one issue. Counterterrorism is another one, and now the refugees, but there are many more: energy and so on. The Turks, as I said earlier, traditionally always want to say, “No, we are not discussing this separately because of the accession negotiations”, and of course the customs union, as initially conceived, was an intermediate step towards accession. It makes less sense today if you do not have accession, so you need to revise it in certain aspects.

Q53 Lord Horam: Turning to Syria and your experience there as a former ambassador and so forth, do you think there is a role for the European Union or the Member States, or the High Representative in the Syrian conflict? Mr Marc Pierini: There is no role today, quite obviously, but there has to be a role because we cannot leave the US and the Russians to handle it on their own. We have a major divide between Russia and the West. Russia intervened to rescue Assad on the cliff really, because the regime was about to lose key intermediate positions between Latakia and Damascus. They did not want to see that because they had a bad memory of Libya. Then they did it in a pretty efficient way; they are now enlarging their bases, air force and navy. Tartus was never a naval base; it was a maintenance facility for their navy. They are going to enlarge it. They

226 of 309 Mr Marc Pierini—Oral Evidence (QQ 46-57) are extending the airport with a large runway, and it will be their strong military foothold in the Middle East. That is not just for the sake of Assad; it is for the sake of Russia in the region. The third reason, as we saw at the General Assembly when Putin made his speech, is the willingness of the Russian President to say, “As of now, the world order is managed with me in the room”. That is the Libyan syndrome, if I may say so. The Russians will tell you better than me that they were abused in the Security Council with the resolution on Libya, because they said that it was to save the Libyan people and then it turned out to be a NATO operation and it ended in disaster. I am not sure that the Russians are totally fond of Mr Assad, but they do not want him to go down like Mr Gaddafi did. Lord Horam: How do you see the way forward, if there is a way forward? Mr Marc Pierini: One, you have a fait accompli, which is that Russia transforms what I call Assad-land, the western part of Syria, into a Russian protectorate. You are not going to change that any time soon. But that is not Syria as we knew it. The rest of Syria is divided into so many pieces—Syrian Kurds, Islamic State, al-Nusra and other groups. At some point, if we are still intent on stopping the hostilities, we have to get around a table the Russians, the West, the regime and the opponents, which is not going to be easy because Russia has a view of the opposition that is a bit different from ours. Then the fundamental flaw is that they are saying that you cannot dispose of the Syrian President just in the Security Council or anywhere; it has to be an election for the Syrian people. Mind you, in contemporary Syria under the Assads they have never had a free election. I myself attended one of their referendums. I went to a polling station next to the delegation. It was very simple: you entered the room, you had all the assessors there and the box, but the bulletin—the ballot paper—had a huge circle for yes and a tiny, tiny circle for no. There was a policeman standing next to the stack of bulletins and there was no booth. Simple. But that is not all. You do not even have a voters’ register. You give your identity card and the main thing is that if the policeman nods you can put your paper in the box. I knew somebody—an opponent—who started the day in Aleppo and had voted eight times by the time he arrived in Damascus, because there is no register. That gives you an idea. The Russians are clinging on to an entire fantasy, and it makes no sense, but you have to remember that this is the Middle East and that therefore they can survive with Assad-land in the west and all sorts of different chiefdoms elsewhere and it will work. It worked during the Lebanese civil war for 15 years. Every checkpoint was a money machine. That is what we may end up with.

Q54 Baroness Suttie: If I could turn to the strategic review, we have heard from other witnesses that they believe that an ideal outcome would involve a list of practical political priorities as well as it being an operational document. With all your experience over many years, what do you believe to be the current administrative and other blocks to having an effective EU strategy? Do you think they can be resolved in an EU of 28? Mr Marc Pierini: I hope so. The main flaw today is that the Lisbon Treaty was crafted in a way that assumes foreign policy is a novel thing happening in quiet rooms between specialists. That was the idea when it was crafted: “Let’s do away with all these Commissioners and things. They don’t know very much”. The problem is that if you look at the crisis that we have gone through since the beginning of the Lisbon Treaty—the Arab Spring and Ukraine—many of our foreign policy instruments are managed here in institutions. One is trade and sanctions and another is development assistance. Another is humanitarian assistance. You name it, they are all in there. The disconnect between “foreign policy proper” and the instruments is the main flaw for me. It has partially been fixed now by

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Federica Mogherini working both in the External Action Service and in the Commission. That is okay—it is an improvement—but I was hoping for more than that, as I wrote last year. The triangle is: Tusk, President of the European Council; Juncker, President of the Commission; and Mogherini, because she has a position which is both in the Commission and outside. That triangle does not always work in harmony. To me, it was totally flabbergasting that a month ago Donald Tusk should go to Ankara to discuss the whole thing, without one single person, let alone Mogherini, from the External Action Service. It makes no sense, in my opinion. Of course it serves the purposes of Erdogan, because if you have somebody who handles only part of the issue you can tell him stories. The Chairman: I have the impression from what you are saying that you are not very hopeful that this exercise of the European security strategy is going to change very much in that regard. Mr Marc Pierini: I would say it is a question of political will from a number of personalities in the system here, in the institutions and in the capitals. I do not have this dream of a consistent EU foreign policy as a neat piece of legislation on foreign policy. That is not going to happen, because, one, we have many traditions and, two, we have a flurry of crises on our hands. Remember that the month the Lisbon Treaty started to be implemented was the start of the Arab Spring. That is very telling. Not only do you start a new thing, which is difficult in itself, but then you have a major upheaval at your door diversifying into many different crises. The strategic review could bring the benefit of showing a more consistent and clearer view of where we are going, but if it is not accompanied by a move to make the three parts of the triangle work better together, it is just going to be a piece of paper. The Chairman: The three parts of the triangle are three individuals and, again, I have the impression that you feel that the relationship is driven by personalities rather than by institutional rules. Mr Marc Pierini: Yes. That is my fear. The other fear is that this institutional set-up is often ignored by Member States. I am not really talking about the United Kingdom now, because in the past year we have not heard much, if I may say so, from the United Kingdom in the foreign policy arena, but certainly Berlin would go ahead happily. They have, of course, lots of money, big ambitions and very brilliant people, but that is not a reason. Take again the example of the refugees. In the spring, the Juncker Commission issued a paper on refugees and asylum policy that for the first time in many years was a comprehensive paper; everything was there. I am not saying everything had to be adopted, but it covered the whole ground. It was brushed off the table by the Council. Then in the summer there was this massive emergency, as if we had not seen it coming, and Germany and France saying, “We have a proposal”. What is the proposal? It is just a rehash of the Commission paper in a smaller version. Then everybody ran like headless chickens to extract an agreement from Turkey. This is madness, frankly. We look like fools to the Turkish liberals. In Turkey now you have a whole debate about why in the world all these Europeans, including Merkel, are getting down on their knees to convince Erdogan.

Q55 The Chairman: One of the things we are interested in, of course, is the position of the United Kingdom. You were saying that you had not heard very much in this area from the United Kingdom in the last year. Let me ask you two questions. First, is it your impression that the shadow of the negotiations and the referendum is hanging very heavily over the United Kingdom in terms of its participation in this exercise? Secondly, what about the United Kingdom’s contribution in terms of the Iran negotiations and the sanctions on

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Russia? Did you feel that the United Kingdom played a role commensurate with its stature in those areas or that it was less than its stature? Mr Marc Pierini: I would say that it is at least coincidental that we have heard a lot less from the United Kingdom in the foreign policy area in the EU since the debate on the referendum started. Who am I to establish a link there? I am not sure. Foreign policy is linked, to a large extent, to public statements, and there were a lot of public statements and media presence from William Hague and a lot less from his successor. I would not make a judgment on whether that is linked to the internal debate, but there is a lot less. On Iran, I think they were present all the way, perhaps with a willingness not to appear too much in the discussions, contrary to France. You heard Mr Fabius at odds with the US a number of times. The UK was more discreet, but I think it played a role. The Chairman: What about the whole sanctions operation with Russia? Mr Marc Pierini: I am not really an expert on Russia, so I would not make a judgment. That is off limits.

Q56 Lord Risby: Could I take you back to the Middle East for a moment? Just south of Syria we have quite a difficult situation, to say the least, developing between the Palestinians and the Israelis. I do not want to get into a discussion about the merits or demerits of it, but I am curious as to your assessment of any European influence at all in the sense that Israel trades substantially with the European single market and a lot of money is given to the Palestinians, and so on. But there is sometimes an impression in editorials, if you read them, asking where the Europeans are in trying to move the process on: that, to the extent that there is any possible influence, it is exclusively America. In general terms, what is your view as to whether there is any role at all or any credibility within Israel for a European strategy that is part of the Mediterranean strategy? I am curious as to your view. Mr Marc Pierini: I would say first that Israel does not have an interest in seeing the EU, as such, intervening. It is much more convenient for them to deal with Member States individually and play the differences. They have always done that. They are extremely well equipped, diplomatically speaking, to handle the differences between Member States and extremely well co-ordinated with their missions to the EU. That has been their strategy from the beginning. Obviously there is another factor, which is peace process fatigue. A lot of people are so desperate to achieve anything that they do not even try. The third factor is simply that for the past four and a half years we have had so many other crises that this one has been left alone in its corner, with all the dangers of leaving it where it is because it is disintegrating by the day.

Q57 The Chairman: We are nearing the end, but could I put a question to you that has arisen from other conversations we have had? When you look back to the Solana period, there was a very strong message inherent in his paper and in the mood of the time that one of the objects of the European Union was to spread democracy and human rights and so forth, that we were, in the jargon, a transformational power and we were seeking to create a better world. Now the emphasis is much more transactional, that we are seeking modi vivendi with our neighbouring states; we are concerned with establishing workable relationships, but we are not so concerned with altering their internal arrangements or setting an example. Indeed, Turkey is a very good example of that. Mr Marc Pierini: I, too, remember the good old days of Solana. When he visited Syria you felt that even Hafez al-Assad listened. They did not do much with it, but at least they were listening intently to him. Maybe that kind of personal influence has vanished, but at the same

229 of 309 Mr Marc Pierini—Oral Evidence (QQ 46-57) time we are in completely different times. If we look south, the transformation has been, first, 9/11 and, secondly, the Arab Spring, and in between the rise of political Islam all along. I am one of three people who wrote the Barcelona process initially, early in 1995. If you read it again, everything is there in terms of the transformational aspect of the European Union, and this was a document from 20 years ago, minus one month, that was shared and adopted by consensus by all the southern countries except Libya. We felt it was there, but when 9/11 happened we started co-operating with the Mubaraks, the Ben Alis, the Gaddafis and the Assads on anti-terrorism. I will give you one example. This is not even off the record, because it is in many articles and books. I arrived in Tunisia to take up my post one year after 9/11, at the end of September 2002. At that time I noticed, when doing my visits, that the French ambassador, who became a friend later, was very busy with a French anti- terrorist judge who was making repeated visits, so I asked him what was going on. If you remember, in the spring of 2002 there was a massive bombing in the Djerba synagogue. The Tunisians were struggling with the inquiry, and the terrorist, who was obviously an amateur, had left his satellite telephone at home, which you do not do if you are a bright guy. The Tunisians were unable to decipher the SIM card on his satellite telephone, so the French did it for them. They found that an hour before the bombing there was a call from Islamabad. Who was that? It was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. That name is familiar to you. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was No. 4 for al-Qaeda in those days and was arrested a few months later. You probably remember that image, the guy in the T-shirt who was arrested by US and Pakistani forces early one morning. The man is still in Guantanamo and who is he? He is the engineer who planned 9/11. To pedal back to Ben Ali, what did Ben Ali use that for? He said, “Well, you have the No. 4 in al-Qaeda. Now you leave me alone with his human rights”. We did the same with all the others. In terms of projecting values, that was the effect of 9/11. In a visit to Tunisia, the French President at the time, Chirac, said this memorable sentence: “Human rights are first and foremost the right to housing, food and healthcare.” And that is it. The projects I was running for the EU with civil society and the Human Rights League were all fine on paper—everybody would applaud and so on—and then the bank account would not work or the lease of the NGO would be cancelled at the last minute, and all sorts of things. I was nearly kicked out of Tunisia after three years—if it had not been for the British ambassador—because I was talking too much to the Tunisian Human Rights League. That was a huge turning point. Meanwhile, of course, under the surface political Islam kept rising, and there the values are entirely different. Remember the debate in Tunisia three years ago about the article in the constitution dealing with women. Suddenly Ennahda proposed an article saying that the woman is the complement of the man. Thank God we have a very strong civil society in Tunisia and strong women’s organisations, and they reversed that. We are not in an era where people will readily accept EU values. If you talk to civil society in Egypt or in Tunisia, let alone Syria, they will tell you, “Yes, EU values are all fine. This is what we want, but where were you when we were tortured?” We have to avoid the false impression that we had at the beginning of the Arab Spring—take Tahrir Square and Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis: if people were chanting in the streets, we would say, “My God, they are reading the Barcelona declaration”. Yes, fine, they all want accountability, independent justice, freedom of the media and so on—of course they do—but they do not necessarily see us as the pioneers, because we were co-operating with their oppressors. The Chairman: Mr Pierini, thank you very much indeed. It has been most helpful and the length of your memory is very helpful in these matters. Mr Marc Pierini: It is my pleasure. I am only a recycled ambassador. The Chairman: But a real ambassador. Thank you.

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Quaker Council for European Affairs—Written Evidence (FSP0017)

1. Introduction 1.1 The Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) is an international non- governmental organisation that advocates for the values of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) at the institutions of the European Union and the Council of Europe. We represent Quaker communities and other supporters in more than twenty EU Member States. Britain is home to the largest community of Quakers in Europe. 1.2 Security is something to which all aspire, but there are vastly different opinions about how it can be realised. The EU is increasingly failing to meet external challenges due to the inadequacy of its policy instruments. QCEA would therefore like to thank the Sub- Committee for conducting this inquiry. We encourage the Sub-Committee to consider how a safer world can be achieved with the contribution of an EU that rejects violence in favour of evidence-based peacebuilding approaches. 1.3 European integration was originally a peace project, but today the EU is increasingly being used as a platform for costly and ineffective forms of militarism. EU institutions are less constrained by the democratic reach of citizens than national governments and are subject to significant lobbying by representatives of the arms trade.

2. The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 2.1 The EU's functions and decision-making processes are set out in treaties agreed by all of the EU's Member States. The most recent treaty, agreed in Lisbon in 2009, maintained the dominant role of Member State national governments in EU external policy, although it also gave some additional scrutiny and funding powers to the European Parliament. 2.2 For the most part, European citizens are unaware that the EU has its own security and defence policy. Under what is known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU is active in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The wide range of CSDP activities include unarmed monitoring of ceasefire lines, police and judicial reform, military training, and even military operations (such as the EU naval missions around the Horn of Africa or in the Mediterranean Sea). A small proportion of EU funding enables local non-governmental organisations to undertake grass-roots peacebuilding in an effort to prevent conflict. 2.3 In December 2013, the European Council met to agree priorities for the CSDP. The priorities that were agreed included:  Development of military drones.  Economic support for the arms trade.  Air-to-air refuelling to support aerial bombing.  Military responses to attacks on cyber and maritime infrastructure. 2.4 The UK government is amongst the most militaristic members of the EU, perhaps second only to France because British eurosceptism prevents the UK government from supporting some aspects of EU militarism, such as a standing EU military headquarters.

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3. Militarised cyberspace 3.1 The EU has recognised an increasing risk of malicious attacks on computer information systems that are central to many public and private services. Cyber-attacks can be started from anywhere in the world through the internet. EU policy-makers are currently exploring militaristic responses to these threats, rather than taking steps to build a peaceful cyberspace. 3.2 In December 2013, EU Heads of Government requested an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework. This has now been agreed: it outlines that protection from cyber-attacks is considered a military responsibility, and it promises that military-style cyber capabilities will be developed and made available to EU Member States. 3.3 The aims of this new EU framework are to strengthen the European arms trade (specifically the European defence technological and industrial base) and to align EU action with NATO's so-called 'cyber-defence' activity. 3.4 This approach is an example of the 'Fortress Europe' approach being taken by the EU on issues ranging from the refugee crisis to countering violent extremism. As an alternative, the EU should be developing international structures that would provide timely and accurate information in the event of a cyber-attack. This will reduce the risk of panic and escalation of conflict through retaliatory action. It will also provide an investigative capability that can support international legal redress.

4. Armed drones 4.1 In December 2013, the European Council expressed its support for EU collaboration on the development of drones for military use. A drone is a remote-controlled flying robot. 4.2 While drones can be used for various purposes — surveillance, for example — they are increasingly being used to carry and fire weapons (missiles and bombs). Currently, the main users of armed drones are the governments of the US, the UK, and Israel. However, this technology is proliferating, and over the next few years many more governments are likely to acquire it. 4.3 The EU is playing a part in this proliferation process, as there are two EU bodies that, for more than a decade, have been actively promoting the development of drones as a military technology. One of these bodies is the European Commission, which has been using EU research grants to fund arms manufacturers' drone development projects. The other is the European Defence Agency, which was established to encourage military cooperation within the EU. 4.4 Armed drones raise serious concerns, which have been pointed out by non- governmental organisations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Three major transnational institutions have also expressed concerns about armed drones:  The European Parliament, in February 2014.  The United Nations Human Rights Council, in March 2014.  The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in April 2015. 4.5 A government with armed drones can launch aerial attacks without risking lives on its own side. An armed drone flying over Iraq, for example, may be under the control of an operator sitting in front of a computer screen in an air base in the UK. This lack of risk makes resorting to violence easier, and therefore more attractive to governments. Moreover, drone operators depend on intelligence to tell them where to fire their weapons, and this intelligence is often incomplete or inaccurate — resulting in a large number of civilian casualties.

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4.6 With killing having become so easy, there is an alarming tendency for armed-drone- using governments to disregard the rules of international law that are intended to place limits on violence. The US government, in particular, has regularly used armed drones to assassinate suspected Islamist militants outside war zones — in clear violation of international law. 4.7 In a frightening recent development, the UK government has used an armed drone for the assassination of Reyaad Khan. This was against international law, as it was an assassination, rather than a killing on the battlefield. In the past, the UK government has only been willing to use armed drones in a battlefield context. Now, it seems that the UK government has joined the US government in using armed drones for illegal assassinations.

5. Military support for conflict-affected countries 5.1 Since the first EU civilian police operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2002, thirty EU missions have been launched in conflict-affected countries. Some are civilian in nature, but others are military missions. For example, military training missions began in Somalia in 2010 and in Mali in 2013. These missions have a stated purpose of strengthening the capacity of third governments to fight organised crime and terrorism, as well as contributing to a more secure energy supply for Europe. This includes providing training and equipment. 5.2 In conflict-affected countries, it can be hard to predict what actions military forces may take. The violence is often not amenable to civilian control, and soldiers may exhibit a limited appreciation of human rights. Where the EU helps to increase military capabilities, it may also increase the harm these military groups can cause. The almost complete exclusion of women from EU operations reinforces gender roles that associate masculinity with power, violence, and control. Instead, the EU should focus on preventing conflict through peacebuilding. It can do this by prioritising investment toward mechanisms for dialogue and civil peace services, as well as by promoting equality and effective government.

6. The militarisation of refugee policy 6.1 On 18 May 2015, the EU's Foreign Affairs Council approved a military response to the refugee crisis. 6.2 Many refugees are crossing the Mediterranean in boats, coming from the Libyan coast to the EU. The EU is responding to this with a military operation, originally called EUNAVFOR MED, European Union Naval Force — Mediterranean. EUNAVFOR MED is being carried out by a small fleet of warships from various EU Member States, including a ship contributed by the Royal Navy (the HMS Enterprise). 6.3 The plans for EUNAVFOR MED divide the operation into three phases:  Phase 1 (now completed) involved gathering intelligence.  Phase 2 (to go ahead shortly) will involve intercepting, boarding, and seizing the boats used by refugees. Initially, phase 2 will be restricted to international waters, but there are plans to extend it into Libyan territorial waters.  Phase 3, if it goes ahead, would involve destroying or otherwise incapacitating boats, including boats that are in harbour or on shore in Libya. 6.4 EU national governments regard it as appropriate to use military force to prevent refugees from coming to the EU? The official line, as stated by Federica Mogherini, is that EUNAVFOR MED is an operation against people smugglers, and not against refugees. Yet were EUNAVFOR MED to succeed, the effect would be to cut refugees

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off from the protection that they desperately need. Military intervention in Libya, or provocative actions in Libyan territorial waters, could derail peace efforts and lead to increased violence. In October 2015, the EUNAVFOR MED will be renamed Operation Sophia, which may help to disguise its aggressive character.

7. Economic support for the arms trade 7.1 EU Member States produce arms, such as submarines built in Germany, handguns from Belgium, and fighter planes from the United Kingdom. Like many industries, profit relies on export. European-made weapons have been used recently against civilian populations in the Middle East and North Africa, for example during the political unrest since 2011, and also further afield, such as in Sri Lanka and Colombia. 7.2 In December 2013, the European Council agreed measures to help to expand their arms industries, including ensuring the development of skills needed for the arms industry. The written conclusions from the meeting predicted that this would “bring benefits in terms of growth, jobs and innovation to the broader European industrial sector”. This argument is familiar: it is often made by arms trade lobbyists. Prioritising jobs and growth over human well-being repeats the economic mistakes of the past. Focussing only on jobs, as if arms manufacture is an industry like any other and not one that creates tools of violence, is inconsistent with the notion of the EU as a peace project.

8. Transforming effectiveness and value for money 8.1 Military spending is often referred to as 'defence spending', but this spending in fact increases the risks of violent conflict and makes the world more dangerous. Europe relies too heavily on its investment in military power, which is often counter- productive. One example is when military force contributes to the growth of the violent movements it purports to oppose. Another example is when EU military training missions in Europe's neighbourhood reinforce the association of masculinity with violence and power. 8.2 Aspects of EU foreign and security policy promote cooperative solutions to global challenges, but there is much that wastes human and financial resources on military CSDP operations and programmes that do not deliver results. EU countries now spend 255 billion euro on the military every year, whilst even the larger international peacebuilding organisations operate on budgets in the low millions. 8.3 Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya have demonstrated the failure of military intervention. Ukraine and Syria have revealed our failure to invest in non-violent alternatives. Given this recent experience, now is the time to transition away from militarism. This will require us to multiply our investment in civilian peacebuilding and diplomacy. In April 2015, QCEA was joined by 17 other European peace groups to call for a reduction in military spending in Europe, and for investment in civilian peacebuilding tools.

9. Non-violent and peacebuilding alternatives to militarism 9.1 The EU should expand its use of civilian peacemakers. This would build on three forms of civilian peacemaking, with which the EU is already involved. Firstly, the EU has deployed civilian peacemakers successfully in Georgia. For the last seven years, unarmed monitors have been building the confidence of communities living on either side of the frozen conflict line between South Ossetia and Georgia proper. 9.2 Secondly, the EU contributes some funding to international non-governmental organisations who engage directly with the causes of conflict in order to achieve a

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sustainable peace. Some of QCEA's partners in the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) network do this, including Search for Common Ground and Nonviolent Peaceforce. They employ mainly local civilians to promote dialogue to find shared solutions to conflict, as well as providing an unarmed protective presence for civilians. 9.3 Thirdly, the EU does a limited amount to encourage the peace activists who are already present within society, for example by ensuring that EU officials meet independently with civil society in conflict-affected countries. However, much more could be done to build the peace constituency. These groups take many forms, such as local women’s groups that find ways to resist violence, or conscientious objectors to military service. Those within the potential peace constituency often have the quietest voices and can be amongst the most vulnerable during conflict. Their goal is to achieve peace, in contrast to militaries, arms dealers, organised criminals, and other social, economic or political elites who often benefit from continued war.

10. Conclusion 10.1 QCEA calls upon all EU member states to make a strategic shift away from the failed policies of militarism. Resources should be refocused toward addressing the roots causes of conflict, including through mediation, support for local civil society and civil peace services. The refugee crisis should be met with compassion, not with military force. Arms export should not be promoted, and especially not for reasons of economic growth. European integration should be restored to its original purpose: building a more peaceful world. 10.2 In the context of insufficient efforts to prevent climate change, the EU needs to be ready to address the resulting conflicts so that violence can be avoided. If European governments rely on existing approaches, they will try to control conflict without the appropriate tools. Member states provide military CSDP with many hammers, but fewer and fewer problems are in fact nails. 10.3 Many Quaker organisations argue that safer societies are only possible if the whole world is less violent and more just. In North America, Quaker agencies are developing principles for a new approach to foreign policy, known as Shared Security. In 2014, a group of experienced peacebuilders, including Quakers, who advocate for similar approaches, launched the Ammerdown Invitation. This invitation seeks to encourage public discussion of the nature of security and how it can be most effectively achieved by all people.

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Mr Matthew Rojansky—Oral Evidence (QQ 150-160)

Evidence Session No. 13 Heard in Public Questions 150 - 160

THURSDAY 5 NOVEMBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Lord Balfe Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Lord Stirrup Baroness Suttie Lord Triesman Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

______

Examination of Witness Mr Matthew Rojansky, Director of the Kennan Institute, Wilson Centre

Q150 The Chairman: Good morning, can you hear me? Mr Matthew Rojansky: Good morning. Yes, I can.

The Chairman: Marvellous. First, thank you very much indeed for getting up so early in the morning and for agreeing to meet us at such an ungodly hour, from your point of view. We really are very grateful indeed.

I think you are aware of this, but for the sake of formality I make the point that we are a sub-committee of the European Union Select Committee of the House of Lords and we are conducting an inquiry into the European security strategy. This is a formal meeting and it is on the record, so what you say will be taken down, but if, on reflection at the end, there is something that you would like to excise or like to make non-attributable, do tell us. If there is anything you want to elaborate on and develop further, again, please send us further elucidation.

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You have been sent a number of questions. I am sure that you will be asked those questions, but I am also sure that you will be asked other questions as well. I shall kick off with a very simple question: could you please give us a brief update of your view of the situation in eastern Ukraine, Russia actions there and what is happening to the Minsk process? Mr Matthew Rojansky: I would be happy to. First, let me thank you, Lord Chairman, and all of you for this invitation. It is a bit early here in Washington, but a unique privilege, so I am quite grateful to you. As far as the situation in eastern Ukraine goes, this is a rare opportunity to be able to say that we are looking at some relatively good news right now. The situation has quieted relative to what it was. What we are not seeing now that we had otherwise seen over the past year, since the intense phases of conflict last February, and previous to that over the summer of 2014, are the intermittent artillery barrages, with a handful of casualties being reported on a weekly basis. Rather, we are seeing relative quiet as the sides settle into something that looks like a sustainable line of contact or line of separation. That is more or less in compliance with the terms of Minsk II, which came out this past February. The goal, of course, was to impose a larger political framework settlement. The situation on the ground is almost 100% dependent on the political framework. There, we have some problems. You will recall that several months ago, when the Ukrainian Parliament, the Rada, attempted to implement the elements to do with special status for Donbass, for the separatist entities, it encountered massive resistance, not only from within the Rada but public protest. There was in fact violence and someone was killed in a grenade attack. So thus far, the political terms that would enable this period of quiet on the ground to continue have really not been implemented. However, it does appear to me, particularly from the meeting that was held last month in Paris, that the political leadership on all sides is prepared to let the nominal deadline of the end of this year slip into next year, given the relative quiet, and the fact that we now see some apparent evacuation of heavy and medium weaponry from the line of contact suggests that the combatant parties themselves are prepared to allow that deadline to slip and to continue to respect the ceasefire. All in all, I consider that to be pretty good news. The Chairman: It is certainly better than it has been in the past, I agree.

Q151 Lord Horam: There has obviously been the migration crisis in Europe in the past few months and all the events in Syria, and so forth. That has been a huge distraction from the problems in Ukraine. Judging by what you say, in many ways that may have been a good thing, in the sense that it has allowed things to quieten down in Ukraine and get some semblance of stability.

How do you see things moving forward from here in Ukraine? Will Europe continue to be distracted, and what effect will that have on relations between the European Member States and Russia? Mr Matthew Rojansky: That has been a very important factor. You are correct about that. The fundamental politics of Europe’s position on Ukraine have not altered dramatically. It has always been with some reluctance that the European Union, Germany in particular, has recognised the reality that Russia is playing an unproductive role in Ukraine. It has responded with considerable economic pressure, political and diplomatic isolation and other steps that have been implemented via NATO, obviously, not only through EU structures. That reluctance remains. What we have not seen, however, is a return to an attitude of business as usual.

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When you raise the issue of the refugee crisis, I am immediately reminded of discussions I had on a recent trip to Moscow, where, quite frankly, the view is a little more blunt. It is that Europe is now seeing the crumbling of its own social fabric and a geopolitical catastrophe brought to its shores and its doorstep, as a result of which it must now pivot and recognise the indispensable role of its partnership with Russia in dealing with problems such as terrorism, migration and global stability, and that therefore it must reverse course on its isolation over the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. It will not surprise you to learn that I do not think that has happened; I hope you would agree. You could say that what has happened is at best a bit of a distraction effect. It is also perhaps one of these moments of introspection for Europe itself to ask, “What capacities do we need to deal not only with what we were expecting—relatively high-level, sophisticated political, economic and trade negotiations along the lines of the Eastern Partnership—but a real security and humanitarian crisis on our doorstep?” There I think the EU has been caught, relatively speaking, unprepared. The Chairman: Thank you. I think “relatively” is kind.

Q152 Lord Risby: May I just build on your answer? If you look at the relationship of Russia with the former Soviet countries—Belarus to Moldova, Ukraine, which we have been talking about, Armenia, et cetera—they are all somewhat different. Nevertheless, the very clear view coming out of Moscow for some time is that Russia has a sphere of influence. That is very clear in their mind and they have made it very much part of their policy statement. How could the EU interface with a country that believes it has a sphere of influence in that way and acts on it? How could the EU interface with Russia, if possible, considering the security and economic interests of the country, yet where some sort of modus vivendi is obviously desirable? Mr Matthew Rojansky: This is an exceptionally important question and a subject that is politically uncomfortable to discuss in Washington. To have the conversation in the first instance, you have to recognise the drivers of what you rightly described as Russia’s expectation that it has a sphere of influence. Those drivers stem from a different sense of reality than we tend to have either on this side of the Atlantic or in western Europe. We tend to think about sovereignty as an absolute. We often speak of our European allies, including smaller European nations that are EU and NATO members or aspire to that status, as having absolute sovereign rights to make choices. There is a very different understanding of sovereignty in Russia. I do not intend to make a moral judgment; it is based on Russia’s history and the reality with which Russians have lived for a thousand years—and that is that sovereignty is always attenuated by the political, military, economic and other circumstances that reflect the power of the country in question. Therefore, there is no such thing as Georgia’s, Ukraine’s or, for that matter, the Baltic states’ sovereign choices to do whatever they want in their neighbourhood, when that neighbourhood includes Russia, whose power is so much greater than any of them taken individually and, in some cases, even collectively, in limited instances. The message is very simple: Russians think about choices made by neighbouring countries as being not entirely their choices but choices that need to be made with Russian interests taken into account, and sometimes with Russian interests coming first, in the form of a veto. Again, I do not mean to portray this as a kind of neo-imperium. It is a misreading of Russia to say that Russia seeks to recreate the Soviet Union. Setting aside the ideological factor, which has not been there thus far, my read of the Kremlin is that it is not looking for the

238 of 309 Mr Matthew Rojansky—Oral Evidence (QQ 150-160) level of responsibility, obligation and cost that comes with imperium. Russia is looking for that consideration; for that veto and that attenuation of sovereignty, as we would think of it, of their neighbours. Conceptually, it is critical to internalise that they are not coming from the same place in their understanding of sovereignty to begin with. The Russians have talked for the last decade and a half about a pluralistic or multipolar world order. What they mean by that is not a world order of some 190 sovereign nations coming together to make decisions through a rules-based framework such as the United Nations, though there is a superficial element of that. What they really mean is that there is a handful of nations—maybe two or three or five—that are the truly sovereign and independent actors on the global stage: Russia, as a right, being one of them; the United States being another; perhaps the United States and Europe in some collective form; and China. They say this very clearly. That gives you a sense of what they mean by sovereignty, which is very different from what we mean.

Q153 Lord Dubs: Can I say how much I enjoyed reading your article on the geopolitics of European security and co-operation? Thank you for that. My question follows on very closely from what you have said. You said that Russia has become more assertive and brought power politics back into play—those are my words, not yours. Would you agree that that is a good characterisation of the state of the European neighbourhood? Specifically, do you see any evidence that EU member states are responding strategically to this new situation? Mr Matthew Rojansky: Thank you for the question. It would fly in the face of the reality that is laid bare before all of us if I said that power politics was now not the norm in Europe; it has become the norm. This is particularly troubling for me. I came of age politically after the end of the Cold War. I remember that for a decade or more there was an expectation, particularly from my European colleagues, that we had entered a new era. I will not say that we thought it was the “end of history”, but a new era in which values and a way of life in an ever-expanding sphere of stability and prosperity would simply be the rule of the day. This was not a particular policy, it was just the new reality. It was as if you walk outside and it is either raining or it is not raining. It was the weather; it was a fact of nature. What we are seeing is that human beings, particularly political leaders, have very real tools with which to utterly change that condition. That is what Vladimir Putin has reminded Europeans of, and also Americans. Power politics comes in many forms—for instance, the Russian use of hard power and military tools, wherein Russia enjoys some considerable advantages, at least in localised contexts. Russia also has the advantage of preparedness; of being genuinely ready as a matter of doctrine, investment and infrastructure, and with the political psychology of the people, who have been prepared for conflict by the media discourse in the country. Russia enjoys many advantages in the use of hard military power, and so it has been used. It only makes sense that you would use the strongest tool in your toolkit when that can be used. To come to your question, I would also describe as power politics some of the responses from Europe and the United States. For instance, the response of levying very significant sanctions against the Russian economy. I do not see this as dramatically different from the use of hard power. In other words, if we were to establish some kind of bright-line difference between destroying physical infrastructure through bombing versus destroying physical infrastructure through the denial of access to finance, credit, technology and any of the things that you need global markets for today, the Russians would call that an archaic and artificial distinction. Their feeling has been that we are engaged in a war. It may not be a full-

239 of 309 Mr Matthew Rojansky—Oral Evidence (QQ 150-160) blown war, or a war that creeps over the nuclear threshold—we pray that it does not—but it is a war none the less. So some of the power politics, if you want to call it that, being deployed on the western side are not kinetic military tools but they are acts of war; you can call them acts of economic war if you want. Then, of course, kinetic military actions are being taken. Some of them would be open to the criticism of being merely symbolic. But the deployment of heavy NATO equipment in countries that are close to the border of Russia, particularly in the Baltic states and Poland, and the repositioning of American units from Germany to Hungary via central Europe, are intended as signals. This is all power projection and power politics and a response to the new reality as we have come to understand it. The question I would ask is whether it is a comprehensive and adequate response. Is the new reality that we find ourselves in one in which we are prepared to secure and advance our own interests? My answer is unfortunately no, for a simple reason but one that I hope we can talk about a little more: we do not know what this period looks like. We knew during the Cold War what controlled escalation looked like. We had various scenarios and we were clear about those with the Soviets. Therefore, they knew that, if they did A, we would do B; if they proceeded to respond with C, we would respond with D; but that D would not automatically lead to global nuclear holocaust. It is a very unpleasant thing to talk about but there was a ladder of escalation. It was real, it was understood and it helped us to relatively keep our confrontation within bounds. I think we lack that today entirely. We are beginning to climb up that ladder without having any sense of what the next rung is. To me, that is very concerning.

Q154 Baroness Suttie: Good morning. Can I say how much I enjoyed and appreciated your explanation of the Russian view of sovereignty? It was a very accurate description of the different views of the world that we currently have. Political divisions and tensions between the EU and Russia have the potential to remain for a very long time, but do you see any evidence that Member States are perhaps softening their stance, perhaps particularly because of what is happening in Syria and maybe even because of what is happening in Egypt? We will see whether that was an ISIS-related bomb in Egypt. Mr Matthew Rojansky: Thank you for the question. I see some very recent evidence of softening. It has come in the form of statements from several European leaders who have talked about the inevitability of a return to economic normalcy with Russia. So far, none of that has been reflected in votes in the Commission or in any actual concrete steps to change Russia’s relative economic isolation from Europe. I am not sure at this moment that it serves the interests of either side to do that, if I can be a bit cynical. On the European side and the US side, since we are very much part of the sanctions regime, we are engaged in an experiment right now. It is an interesting and important experiment. This is the first time that we have collectively imposed such significant sanctions on one of the top 10 global economies—not only that, but an economy with a considerable level of integration with the global economy to begin with. If you compare this to Iran, Cuba, North Korea or Iraq, or to any number of countries that we have previously sanctioned, it is truly an entirely different ball game. It has therefore opened up a conversation, particularly here in Washington, with my friends in the White House and the Treasury Department, where many of them are enjoying a moment of triumph. They feel that they have invented a whole new weapon and toolkit; it is a sort of miraculous laser beam that we can use with relative impunity. Well, we shall see—but certainly it is an important experiment and an important question. The effects on some European economies have been very real. Finland, for example, and even Germany—as robust as its economy is—have felt some effects.

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Then there is the experiment seen from the Russian side; the Russians talk about “import substitution”, and the retooling of their economy to be, if not autarky, at least less dependent on the European vector, which has been the absolutely dominant vector for trade, financing, technology and everything else in their economy for the last 25 years. They see that as advantageous. Again, if I can be cynical, I am not entirely sure that the scenario we are in now and the rhetoric matches the real incentives on either side for some time to come. The Russian economy has not collapsed; it is hurting—it is absolutely hurting—but right now this political experiment may be very much in Vladimir Putin’s interest. Similarly, in the West, establishing this precedent that we have this powerful tool, with which we can have our way and come away from it relatively unscathed, may be in our interests as well— but I personally would not recommend it, because I think that it is too high risk. What I mean by that is in the long term I think we are hastening the atrophy or complete obsolescence of the Bretton Woods international financial system, in which we in the United States and Europe play such a dominant role and enjoy what you could call seigniorage rights. We are hastening the end of that, and I think that the Chinese will help bring that about, convinced to do so by the Russians, and others may join them. That is longer term; in the meantime, the experiment will continue. On your question of causation—you asked whether this was all because of Syria and refugees—no, I do not think that it is, or only on the level of rhetoric. You hear some occasionally appreciative or positive noises from the French about Russia’s role in Syria. I think that that is confined to the Syrian question. It is simply that the French are frustrated that no one else has been able to accomplish anything, and the Russians are putting at least something on the line and some real assets on the ground, which may have a chance of changing the situation. We know that the Russian intervention has been aimed primarily not at ISIS but at enemies of the Assad regime, which is not necessarily something that the French or anyone else in Europe would like to see. But the positive noises about Russia more recently are not about the geopolitical problem that we in Europe have with Russia; I think that they are limited to the situation in Syria. The Russians would be the first to tell you that everything is linked and that you cannot simply divide it up and say, “We’ll co- operate on Iran nuclear issues and on Syria but then we’ll go to war with each other over Ukraine”. But for the moment, that seems to be the situation that we are in.

Q155 The Chairman: Before I turn to Lady Armstrong, can I ask a supplementary question? If it turns out that the plane crash in Sinai is the result of some kind of terrorist activity—a bomb or whatever—as the United Kingdom appears to believe, do you think it will have a significant impact on Russian public opinion and therefore on Putin’s freedom of action in dealing with these matters? Mr Matthew Rojansky: You are correct to say that we do not know yet what the cause was. Part of that may be some intentional obfuscation by Russian authorities—my understanding is that the Egyptians have actually been quite forthcoming but that the Russian authorities have intentionally questioned any information coming out and then introduced new information to try to cast doubt on it. You can understand why that might be the case, if they in fact do not know what the cause is—or they know exactly what it is and they fear the consequences of that, as the question suggests. My sense right now is that, if this was a terrorist attack, it is more likely than not to redound to the reinforcement of Putin’s decision to have intervened in Syria. There are people who disagree with me strenuously. The victims are not just Russian citizens but civilians of a very sympathetic, common sort: the kind of people who book a cheap charter vacation to Sharm

241 of 309 Mr Matthew Rojansky—Oral Evidence (QQ 150-160) el-Sheikh are the kind of people with whom many Russians can identify. These are not elite, super-wealthy Russians, and that is important. So the argument is credibly made that the deaths, or the tragic murders, of these people, is blood on Putin’s hands and that this will lead to anger against Putin. I do not dismiss that argument—I recite it here for you—but I think a little differently. Every bit of evidence that we have had so far about Putin’s activist and almost pre-emptive national security strategy for Russia has shown that the Russian people prefer that type of approach to a clear and present danger from international or domestic terrorism or what they refer to as neo-fascism in Ukraine. Shooting first and asking questions later against any such threat, even if it comes with costs, so far has only proven to be very popular in Russia. So if this turns out to have been an act of terrorism and there turns out to be a link either to a domestic Russian group or to a central Asian or Caucasus Islamist group—or even if it is just international Islamist terrorism—the Kremlin will very easily and credibly make the argument that this threat has always existed. After all, they can say that with Beslan and the Nord-Ost theatre hostage taking and the blowing up of apartment buildings and metro cars, they have taken the fight to the terrorists. For the foreseeable future, at least for several years, that is a very plausible and popular argument. Every time a Russian aircraft does a bombing run and destroys an ammunition depot—it does not matter whether it belongs to Nusra or ISIS, or the Free Syrian Army—that will be seen as a victory for the Russian people against the terrorists who have murdered these innocents. So my argument would be that, more likely than not, the latter interpretation will prevail and that this will redound to Putin’s benefit.

Q156 Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: Good morning. We all enjoyed your article, in which you suggest that the way out of the impasse between Russia and the West may well be regional dialogue on security, based on the principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Could you develop and explain the parameters of that and say how that might bring about a new state of relations with Russia? What do you think the role for European Union countries would be within that? Mr Matthew Rojansky: Thank you for the question. I hope that in the last 20 minutes I have sufficiently impressed you with my realism and hard-nosedness about Russia, so that when I proceed to become idealistic and optimistic I am still taken at least a little bit seriously. I have encountered plenty of scepticism about this argument. Maybe the problem is that it is premature; at this point, the motives politically and even in a security sense are just not there yet. Maybe that is the problem—and I talk about that in the article. The key thing to understand about the Helsinki process is that it did not come from nowhere; it did not simply come from the good will of all sides thinking, “Gosh, wouldn’t it be nice if we had a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security architecture, so shouldn’t we just get together and talk about that?”. No, it came from the fact that we saw repeated and extremely dangerous crises centred in Europe for a period of a quarter of a century from the end of World War II until the beginning of what we now call the détente era. It was precisely because of the seriousness of those crises, from the Berlin crisis all the way on, including the Cuban missile crisis, which we now know was one telegram or letter away from possibly bringing nuclear war, that both sides—the Soviet bloc and the western bloc—recognised the inevitability of finding ways to change and constrain the path of escalation. That is what détente was about, and it was in that context that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which we now call the Helsinki conference, took place over a period of three or four years, which gave rise to the Helsinki Final Act. Now, the Helsinki Final Act is not black magic; there is no special button that it creates that allows us to plug up the muzzles of Russian tanks or defuel ICBMs in their silos. But it

242 of 309 Mr Matthew Rojansky—Oral Evidence (QQ 150-160) introduces a comprehensive conception of European security, which is absolutely critical. The Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE principles that we recognise today come in three baskets. Political and military security for the Soviets at the time was about what one of you rightly called their sphere of influence in the region. It was about recognising and enshrining the borders that the Soviet Union created by force after World War II. That was part of the bargain. We have to be very honest about that, because we are going to have to be honest about it today. It looks different—the borders are smaller, they are pushed back, but they are still there. Recognition of the political and military aspect of security has to be part of the deal. The second piece of it was economic and environmental. It was very forward-looking of them to think in those terms then. That is much more important today, obviously; I talked earlier about economic tools as economic warfare. We are going to have to have an integrated concept of economic security in Europe, which would probably include labour migration, which many fear in western Europe and which the Russians have great concerns about as well. By the way, few people recognise that Russia is the second destination in the world for migrants after the United States—it is simply that those migrants come from places such as central Asia and the Caucasus, which we do not pay much attention to. But they number in the millions. The third element or so-called basket from Helsinki is human security, which is the human rights equation. The basic message there—and if you want to call it a quid pro quo, it was— was that we in the West recognised the Soviet Union’s predominance in its sphere of influence in the political-military dimension, in exchange for which they formally recognised that the human rights of their citizens in the Soviet Union and in all the other signatory states to the Helsinki Final Act was a concern of the European community as a whole—it was not merely a “domestic” or “sovereign” question, and you have to leave us alone. That was a critical evolution in thinking about European security. So I offer this as a comprehensive understanding of European security; if we tried to reinvent it today, there is no chance that we would do any better, so let us use what we have. The real question that matters is how we get back to a dialogue in which the goal is to constrain escalation and achieve perhaps a new détente—I am not super-comfortable with that term, but I use it for lack of a better one. The question there is not about what it looks like; we know what it looks like because we have it. The question is really about motivation. My concern is that we have had just enough time to forget the important lessons of the Cold War, such as fear, and just how bad things can get. I talked earlier about forgetting the lesson of what controlled escalation looks like, so that each step does not have the risk of leading to infinite conflict. Yet we have not come up with anything new. What we have is the same old dangerous ways of waging war, but no new tools and none of the old tools for constraining them. So I think that it is mostly about politics and motivation. The role of Europe, which you asked about, would have to be to supply that motivation. I do not think that the United States will do it from the western side; I certainly do not think that the Russians will do it from their side. What they expect is a kind of genuflection or apology and a recognition that they were right all along and that we were the ones who upset the applecart by expanding NATO, and so forth. So Europe is properly positioned in the middle to supply the existential rationale and say, “Look, guys, this is a mess, and if we keep getting it wrong in this way, Europe is going to pay the costs, first and foremost”. So the political will and political capital will have to be mostly supplied by Europe. I tell my fellow Americans—and I think that I included this in the article—that we are going to have to be prepared to swallow that. We are very bad at doing that in the United States; we are very

243 of 309 Mr Matthew Rojansky—Oral Evidence (QQ 150-160) bad at letting Europeans lead. We always talk about how much we want Europe to lead; mostly we want them to pay for things and not do anything different from the way we would do it. Well, we are going to have to accept that if we want real European leadership.

Q157 Lord Triesman: Good morning. Like everybody else, I am going to return to your excellent article, in which you argue that Germany remains committed to multilateral structures despite the talk that there is growing German hegemony. Can you give us an assessment of how you think the German leadership has performed during the crisis over Ukraine compared to the way it is playing its role in the refugee and migration crisis? Is that evidence that Germany will take on an enlarged foreign and security policy role outside Europe and the EU framework?

Let me add a small addendum. I remember that during the discussions before the United Nations millennium conference, when we talked about whether there could be enlargement of the Security Council and changes to the permanent membership of it, the most senior German political leaders and diplomats said that they thought that it would be seen as hubris if they tried to claim any of those international roles. Now we see the argument for them taking a greater international role and stepping up on these kinds of issues. I make that comment because that is a very significant change over a period of just 10 years. Mr Matthew Rojansky: I agree with the framing of the question. The best antidote to fear of hubris is to act by acclamation of the public at large. In other words, if all of Europe or the whole of the world—even Washington—looks to Germany for leadership and action, well, there are no worries about hubris there. We have seen that over the past year or year and a half. There is even talk about the Chancellor herself, as though hers is at long last the phone number for Europe that Henry Kissinger sought many decades ago. You know, whom do you call when you want to call Europe? Well, now you call “Mutti.” It goes without saying that Germany has capacities that no other individual European country has. The question of how Germany has handled Ukraine versus the refugees is a really interesting one. I see a distinction from my vantage point, but I am not inside the German decision- making apparatus, so it may be entirely artificial. I see that on Ukraine, the Germans were extremely reluctant, and in almost all respects are still reluctant, to respond in a decisive fashion. I think that that is for two reasons. One is mostly calculated and the other is mostly moral. The calculated reason is that Ukraine is a mess. I know Ukraine very well and it is an absolute mess. Picking the “Ukrainian side” in what is emerging as a war between Russia and Ukraine—the Ukrainians certainly call it that—is not a no-brainer. It is not an easy choice because then you end up owning what you broke and being responsible for Ukraine’s future after the conflict. That is not going to be an easy task and I do not think that the Germans are to be blamed for not particularly wanting that responsibility. The moral calculus will be familiar to all of us: how can Germany, politically, morally and in every other way, choose to fight against Russia given its history? That was the underlying dynamic that drove Russian- German rapprochement and the Neue Ostpolitik, going back many decades. That is still very present in German politics and morality. So it is a reluctant leadership role on Ukraine. You raised very importantly the issue of the common foreign and security policy and the implications of the situation in Ukraine and the refugee situation on the existence of such. Although it may sound counterintuitive, Ukraine has in a way undermined the notion of a common foreign and security policy, not because Europe has been so divided but because institutional Europe—the EU—has punted to NATO the security response of Europe to the notion of possible Russian challenges to sovereignty and territorial integrity in the post- Soviet space. We see that now with the development of some attempts at NATO-led

244 of 309 Mr Matthew Rojansky—Oral Evidence (QQ 150-160) deterrence. But there is no EU deterrent strategy. There is nothing resembling an EU security strategy in response to the threat. That is because the threat, as it has been understood, is of a magnitude beyond the EU; maybe in 20 or 30 years it might have those capacities, but it is not even close. The EU Member States that are also NATO Member States and take that threat seriously—the Baltics, the Poles, the Romanians and others—are not particularly interested in addressing this threat through the EU. On the refugee side, Germany’s response has been very different. It has been led by a moral impulse. I am not blessing or concurring with this impulse but it is a largely moral impulse that says, “We are a nation that has treated stateless people and refugees horribly in our past; we have an obligation to do better as we face this humanitarian crisis”. Obviously the consequences for the rest of Europe are clear. Most of Europe seems to resent Germany’s decision. The implication for Europe’s common foreign and security policy on refugees to me seems to point in the opposite direction of Ukraine. Perhaps being forced to address and assimilate this new reality in Europe comes closer to an area where Europe has decent capacity and capability and might be brought round. The thing about integrating refugees is that, at the end of the day, this is a basic human question; these are people and families. Not only that, this is to the benefit of every country that ultimately does it and does it well. We are a nation of immigrants. The United Kingdom is increasingly a nation of immigrants. You all know this as well as I do. These people are going to work and they are going to work hard for their country. Most of the politics around it is just fantasy and political rhetoric. These are just my personal views, but that is different from the Ukraine crisis, for which there are really not a lot of good short and middle-term futures, whereas on refugees there are a lot of good short and middle-term outcomes and that could be good for a common foreign and security policy. Europe enjoys good tools for integrating and settling people and providing them with social welfare. That is what Europe does well.

Q158 Lord Stirrup: Thank you. Listening to your characterisation of Russia’s approach to sovereignty and some of your subsequent answers makes me feel that this is, in some ways, a recasting of the Athenians saying to the Melians that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. The European Union has a number of strengths but it has also been described as an herbivorous power, one that lacks its own military capabilities. We have heard in evidence that the Berlin Plus arrangements are dead in the water, effectively leaving the EU without access to any hard military capacity. In your answer to the previous question, you said that the EU essentially does not have the tools or power to address seriously the security issues coming out of Russia and Ukraine but that it might in the future. Do you see any practical steps that the security review can take, or anything that it could put in place, that might contribute to improving the EU hard power capabilities in the medium and longer term? Mr Matthew Rojansky: That is the most important question, not just for the EU but for NATO. It is also the important question for the United States when we look at our future commitments in Europe in an environment where our new Speaker of the House is a fiscal hawk who previously chaired the Committee on Ways and Means. Very obviously Europe will have to up its financial investment in security. What matters when you talk about spending on defence and security is not just how much you spend. This 2% thing is something of a chimera; I do not quite get it. I know that we have to pick a number, so we picked a number. But what matters is the capabilities that each of the European states is bringing to the table. It seems as though the main capability that, for example, the Baltic states bring to the table, in addition to some definite value on cyber-warfare and technology,

245 of 309 Mr Matthew Rojansky—Oral Evidence (QQ 150-160) is their alarm-sounding. They are the canary in the coalmine. They let us know when we all have to rush in. That is a fine political strategy, but people in the Baltic states working with the their European colleagues might ask, “What are the actual conflict scenarios that we are likely to face and what are the capabilities that we need to respond to those scenarios?” I would suggest that, for the Nordic countries or northern European countries in general, they might want to help them to do that and they might want to have NATO’s blessing in so doing. There may be other elements to that, but I am the first to admit that I do not know. In three days’ time, I am headed to the NATO Defense College to do a fellowship, where I will probably learn that everything I have just said is completely wrong. But my sense so far is that if you think of a national security and defence strategy as a five or six-step plan, step two in the plan right now is “call Washington”. Of course the United States is there; we are there because of our presence of troops and materiel in Europe already. However, there are some steps that should come before that. That entails the comparative advantages of individual European countries. Think, for example, about the Black Sea theatre. Russia was in Sevastopol all along, but thanks to its complete occupation of Crimea, Russia now has the enhanced capability of making the Black Sea into what we call an area denial zone. That is similar to what the Chinese have done to notionally keep the United States out of the South China Sea and the East China Sea. The Russians can do the same in the Black Sea. Whose concern is that, first and foremost? I would think that it is Turkey’s concern; it is Bulgaria’s concern; it is Romania’s concern. We need to work on a strategy with NATO, with the United States, because of our naval assets, and with the United Kingdom, because of your naval assets. We need to think about a strategy that, on an immediate and ongoing basis, challenges that and demonstrates to the Russians that they will not be able to deny free navigation of the Black Sea and will not be able to shut down the Black Sea in case of a conflict somewhere in the post-Soviet periphery. It is always going to be about specifics: what are the specific capabilities that we need to respond on a precise, measured and controlled level to the kinds of provocations that we are likely to see? It has to be about that rather than overarching rhetoric, such as, “Gee, we wish Europe would spend more”. You can spend 2% of your GDP on defence and have absolutely no defensive capability. When I go to NATO Defense College in the next week or so, the thing that I would like to work on is defining what those steps of controlled escalation, of action and reaction, might look like in different theatres and how to do that in ways that do not open up this slippery slope toward general nuclear exchange, which obviously we do not want to see.

Q159 Lord Balfe: In recent years, we have seen a shift in European public opinion, which is much less willing to get engaged in military action. Perhaps this question should be asked to you after you come back from NATO rather than before you go. Do you see this as posture-shifting or do you think that there is any hope of a more engaged role being taken by European Member States in defence? You mentioned the Baltics. I have had conversations recently with people in Sweden and Finland. It is ludicrous that we talk about defending the Baltics, yet two of the major powers in the region will not contemplate joining NATO to help defend the other three, which are in NATO, and Norway, which is the furthest away but also one of the powers. Would you like to speculate as to how the role of Europe in international affairs in its own neighbourhood could be strengthened?

246 of 309 Mr Matthew Rojansky—Oral Evidence (QQ 150-160)

Mr Matthew Rojansky: That is a fair question and I hope that my insight into this will increase after next month. First, I would observe that this is not unique to Europe. We in the United States are experiencing the same phenomenon. I read an editorial piece in Time magazine this morning making the case that the reason why Putin has had such a relative public relations success in the Middle East in his interventions is because Americans are simply exhausted from our interventions; Americans are unwilling to mobilise to engage in conflicts anywhere in the world because we are exhausted. After all, President Obama, although he has become somewhat more activist than we thought he would be originally, ran on a platform of getting us out of our entanglements. Here is the thing about those kind of political moods: they are pretty fickle. Usually, not only do they change and evolve in cycles over time, they come in response to world events. We are still dealing with a kind of hangover from the past 25 years, when most of the perception in Europe and the United States has been that we prevailed in the big conflict that mattered—the conflict with the Soviet Union—and that there is not a direct threat to our territorial sovereignty and security. The kinds of threats that we deal with are gooey, amorphous, international and transnational in character, and those sorts of things can be dealt with, if not by international organisations, at least by capabilities that do not look like old-fashioned hard power, going to war or sending the boys overseas. That hangover still exists in the United States and Europe. You asked what can be done to change the mood. Unfortunately, the only realistic answer is that the mood will trail the real world events—the threat—probably by several months or several years. When there is a really clear and present danger of a Russian or other invasion of Baltic countries—I mean by that more than just the Estonians telling us that they are nervous about Narva; I mean the Finns really feeling that a replay of the Winter War might happen—and when that feeling is real, I think you are going to see the Finns clamouring to get into NATO. I am not saying that I wish for that to happen, I am simply saying that we cannot artificially conjure up political will for defence spending and military interventions or deployments without there being a real, clear and present danger. As the Hollywood movies have taught us, you can manufacture it to some extent—the tail can wag the dog—but only to a limited degree, and you always pay the costs for that later, as we did, frankly, in the United States over the Iraq war. I think that the Baltic states are moving in that direction right now, but the Russian threat is still relatively limited, amorphous and ambiguous. The Kremlin may be sincere when it says, “You would have to be insane to contemplate attacking a NATO country”. As long as your biggest potential adversary says that it would be insanity to challenge you, you have pretty good reason to feel secure, so the motives are not quite there yet politically.

Q160 The Chairman: Mr Rojansky, you have been wonderfully incisive, penetrating and frank. Perhaps I could impose on your good will with one last question. We began by talking about Germany, and I should like to end by talking about the United Kingdom, or asking you to talk about it. How do you see the British role as it has been over Ukraine and the other issues which Europe is facing and what the British role might and should be? Perhaps you could say just a few words about how you look at us from across the Atlantic. Mr Matthew Rojansky: You invite me to spoil any good will that I may have created with my previous remarks. No, I will not do that. This may be typical American exceptionalism, but I view the UK as quite different from much of Europe. That is not because of any great profound mission or some kind of Anglo cultural hubris; it is because of the UK’s capabilities.

247 of 309 Mr Matthew Rojansky—Oral Evidence (QQ 150-160)

You are talking about a nuclear-armed power, a considerable conventional power, including naval and air power, and a Security Council permanent member with a veto. As a consequence of all of those things, the UK plays an outsized role in the geopolitical component of dealing with the Russians, the Iran nuclear question or any other question. Has the UK lived up to that or taken advantage of that special role and those unique capabilities in response to the Ukraine crisis? The answer is no, I do not think it has. I think that the UK has largely muddled around as part of a European consensus, occasionally as a critical voice in it, but mostly sowing confusion rather than increasing clarity. My personal view is that, in Washington, we feel a tug from our British and Canadian allies to be tougher on Russia without very much in the way of improved tools or capabilities for responding to Russia coming from them. As an American who tries to advise our Government about how to deal with Russia, I find that very frustrating. If we want a special relationship UK-US dialogue on Russia, let us have it. If we want a three-way dialogue with Canada, let us have that, and if we want a transatlantic dialogue with all of Europe, let us have that. Let us not have what I feel we have had too much of in the last decade or so, which is NATO allies or important European trading partners of ours attempting to wag the dog of American policy towards the region by raising the temperature and volume of your statements without following them with any action or introducing capabilities that can be helpful to us, simply in hopes that you will sway American actions or the American view. It is unlikely to happen, because the main driver for US policy will be our domestic politics, which are going to be very vividly on display for the next year and a half, unfortunately. That means that anyone who wants any hope of influencing the US approach to Russia, Ukraine and the region will have to be prepared to have a serious conversation with the next Administration starting some time around mid-2017, which actually gives us a nice runway. It gives us about 18 months to develop some strong European capabilities and something resembling a European strategy for the long haul with Russia which, I hope, will get beyond economic sanctions and isolation and wishful thinking that the Putin regime will simply disappear or transform within its own petri dish of economic isolation, which is not going to happen. Then you will have a fantastic opportunity to engage with a new American President to say, “Will you join us in this strategy? Oh, by the way, we are prepared to take the lead on this”. Whether that leads to something like a new Helsinki order or is more confrontational—confrontation may be justified; that is fine—the leadership would then come from the European side with the capabilities and investments to match it. That would be very compelling to a new American Administration, but wading into American politics, alarmist statements and moral guilt-tripping? That is not going to play well, not going to work and not going to get any results that you want, in my view. I hope that that is not too frank or insulting. The Chairman: Not to put words in your mouth, but when Douglas Hurd was Foreign Secretary, he used to talk about Britain punching above its weight. There are people in this country who feel that over Ukraine and some of the other issues facing Europe, we have been punching somewhat below our weight. Do you think that that is a fair assessment? Mr Matthew Rojansky: Yes, I would agree with that. The Chairman: Mr Rojansky, you have been very kind. You talked about idealism and realism. I am reading Niall Ferguson’s biography of Henry Kissinger at the moment, and he makes a very good case that Kissinger was the ultimate idealist, which is not the way we had previously thought of him, but is very germane to this debate. Thank you very much indeed. Mr Matthew Rojansky: Thank you so much.

248 of 309 Mr Chris Sainty, Head of EU External Department, Europe Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office—Written Evidence (FSP0025)

Mr Chris Sainty, Head of EU External Department, Europe Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office—Written Evidence (FSP0025)

I promised to provide additional information to your Committee on EU engagement with Russia on the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in the context of the Ukraine crisis, during the formal evidence session on 17 September.

The argument has been made in Germany and elsewhere that the EU should re-engage with Russia at a political level regarding the EEU in order to help ease the crisis in Ukraine. Our current view is:  High-level talks with the EEU will not incentivise Russia to deliver Minsk. Russia has done very little to implement its Minsk obligations and would manipulate any engagement on EEU to depict the EU as having moved on, weakening EU leverage.  We should not engage before Russia makes considerable progress on Minsk, before economic sanctions are removed, and before Russia implements its WTO commitments. And the EU should carefully avoid undermining the sovereignty of other EEU members and our trade partners in the region.  We support DG Trade’s view that technical-level contacts should continue for the time being. Russia has not been engaging constructively at this level, but there is real potential to enhance our understanding of the EEU and to resolve trade irritants.  We expect DG Trade to produce comprehensive analysis of the EEU in the near future: we will be ready to discuss this with other Member States.

249 of 309 Mr Chris Sainty and Mr Richard Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34)

Mr Chris Sainty and Mr Richard Lindsay—Oral Evidence (QQ 21-34) Transcript to be found under Mr Richard Lindsay and Mr Chris Sainty

250 of 309 Dr Alistair Shepherd, Senior Lecturer in European Security, Aberystwyth University— Written Evidence (FSP0007)

Dr Alistair Shepherd, Senior Lecturer in European Security, Aberystwyth University—Written Evidence (FSP0007)

1. The High Representative’s (HR) June 2015 report on the ‘changing global environment’ sets out a ‘radically’ changed strategic context within a more ‘connected’, ‘contested’ and ‘complex’ world. This report is a strong basis on which to draft a new security strategy. The report is good at combining broad trends and specific threats in the external environment, it is more self-reflective about the EU’s strengths and weaknesses, it identifies several key challenges facing the EU’s external capabilities, and it is correct to emphasise the need for greater synergies between policies and capabilities. In particular, next year’s strategy must build on the report’s references to the linkages between internal and external security. However, to become a fully-fledged foreign and security strategy the report must transition from its all-encompassing style to a targeted set of specific priorities and approaches.

2. These priorities must reflect the EU’s strategic interests, which lie in its neighbourhood (Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean littoral) and the ‘neighbours of its neighbours’ (Russia, Levant and Sahel). Numerous, interconnected security challenges reside in and emanate from these regions, including: violent conflict, radicalisation and terrorism, resource scarcity, transnational organised crime, climate change, and poverty. Within these regions, and linking these threats, is the overarching challenge posed by fragile states, and what the HR calls ‘ungoverned spaces’. This phrase neatly encapsulates a range of circumstances where the absence or limitations in state authority enables other state and non-state actors to exploit that space to their own ends; often to the detriment of European security. These ungoverned spaces stretch from Eastern Ukraine in the East to Mali in the south, and are conflict prone. Therefore a key strategic interest for the EU continues to be preventing, managing, resolving, and transforming conflict in its wider neighbourhood and helping to restore some form of (democratic) political stability and economic development. Through this focus the inter-related challenges of radicalisation, terrorism, organised crime, and refugee flows, may also be better mitigated.

3. Beyond these geographically and temporarily immediate security concerns the EU’s strategic interests include cyber, energy and maritime security. In the EU’s wider global engagement close trade relations with the growing economies of Asia and Latin America is a strategic economic interest. Finally, the transatlantic relationship is still the most important strategic partnership the EU has politically, economically and militarily, but its future strength depends to a large extent on the EU becoming a more effective foreign and security policy actor.

4. These strategic interests, whether security, politics or economics, whether immediate or longer-term broadly coincide with the UK’s strategic interests. Importantly, the UK is more likely to be able to secure its strategic interests by working with its European partners. Even more fundamentally, the UK’s primary strategic interest is a stable, prosperous and secure Europe. Therefore, the UK needs to engage with and lead on the shaping and implementation of a new foreign and security strategy for the EU.

251 of 309 Dr Alistair Shepherd, Senior Lecturer in European Security, Aberystwyth University— Written Evidence (FSP0007)

5. The EU is, on paper, ready and capable of responding to the evolving security environment. It still requires specific civilian and military conflict management capabilities, greater political will to share in the burdens of implementing a foreign and security strategy, enhanced coordination between EU institutions and between the EU and its member states, and clearer leadership. Nevertheless, its much vaunted, but as yet still under-developed, Comprehensive Approach (CA), which has the potential to utilise the full range of EU capabilities from humanitarian aid and development assistance to military operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), provides the EU with the opportunity to provide genuine ‘added-value’ beyond what its member states can provide individually.

6. Beyond the issues of capabilities, coordination and leadership, but related to problem of political will, the EU has a more profound challenge in responding to the new security environment; declining solidarity. The financial and economic crisis, the refugee crisis and the deteriorating security environment in the EU’s neighbourhood have highlighted and deepened divisions within the EU rather than enhanced solidarity. European unity is challenged by a mix of protectionism, populism, nationalism, and growing external pressures and insecurities, creating tensions between and within states and peoples, and undermining the attractiveness and leverage of Europe as an actor, partner or model in world politics. Credible, coherent and creative leadership is crucial to transcending these divisions.

7. The decline in solidarity will make the transition from the HR’s report to a security strategy agreeable to all 28 EU member states a politically fraught process. Divisions are evident in prioritising and addressing Europe’s security challenges, despite broad consensus on what they are (terrorism and radicalisation, regional conflict, failing states, cybersecurity, organised crime, proliferation of WMDs, climate change, borders, poverty, energy, health, resource scarcity, maritime security and natural disasters). This makes the EU less ready and less capable of meeting the challenges of the evolving security environment.

8. The multidimensional and transnational nature of these security challenges suggests the emergence of a security continuum, where geographic (domestic and foreign) and/or bureaucratic (civilian and military) distinctions increasingly erode.60 The internal-external security nexus creates challenges for EU (and national) institutional architectures and capability profiles, which are rooted in the traditional separation of internal and external security. While the Lisbon Treaty sought to improve both horizontal and vertical cooperation and coordination within the EU, bureaucratic turf wars and stove piping (between and within institutions) coupled with tensions between civilian and military actors are substantial hurdles to dealing with the emerging internal-external security continuum. Similarly, specific initiatives to enhance coordination between internal and external security institutions, such as joint meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Standing Committee for Internal Security (COSI), as well as quarterly meetings between

60 Shepherd, A (2015), ‘‘The European Security Continuum and the EU as an International Security Provider’, Global Society, Vol. 29(2), pp. 156-174, DOI: 10.1080/13600826.2015.1018146

252 of 309 Dr Alistair Shepherd, Senior Lecturer in European Security, Aberystwyth University— Written Evidence (FSP0007) relevant directorates of the EEAS, Council and Commission, have done little to transcend the EU’s bureaucratic silos.

9. More recent strategies on cyber-security and maritime security and the introduction of the EEAS’ Crisis Platform show the EU is capable of bringing together internal and external security actors within the EU and bridging the bureaucratic divides. However, the culture of coordination is in its infancy and the legal and bureaucratic framework of the EU is undermining the EU’s capability to respond to the security environment in the ‘joined-up’ approach advocated in the HR’s report.

10. Finally, the emerging security continuum and the EU’s responses to the increasing interconnections between internal and external security problematizes perceptions of the EU as a distinctive normative or civilian power pursuing ‘milieu goals’. These conceptualisations construct the EU as a security provider seeking to act as an exemplar and a ‘force for good’ in the international system based on promoting shared norms and values such as liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights, utilising different capabilities, and being driven by more benign motivations, which focus on goals that others, indeed all, can benefit from (milieu goals) rather than pursuing goals that benefit only itself (possession goals). As the security agenda widens and the EU’s responses tend toward protecting its own interests first, coercively if necessary, its distinctiveness begins to erode. In parallel, as the lack of solidarity and unity within the EU erodes its attractiveness and leverage as a global power declines.

11. The EU is a global power but it is not a global security actor; arguably, it cannot, nor should it, become one. It is global in its economic reach and standing (despite the Eurozone crisis) and to a lesser extent in its political and diplomatic actions. In the security realm it is more regionally focused and capable, and hence should be more strategic with its partnerships, policies and actions in the wider neighbourhood.

12. Therefore, geographically, the new security strategy should prioritise the wider neighbourhood and within that arena focus thematically on ungoverned spaces and conflict in particular. Managing these will help mitigate other security challenges that reside in and emanate from those regions. The strategy also needs to set out an agreed range of approaches to tackling these priorities. To achieve this prioritisation of issues and approaches requires the rebuilding of solidarity among the states and the peoples of the EU. Lessons need to be learnt from the divisions over Russia’s actions in Ukraine and the refugee crisis. The most important lesson is the need for leadership within the EU’s structures, but also from the member states. Here the differing priorities across EU states can work to its advantage as different states lead on different issues. The change that is needed is for the other EU states need to support that state or group of states that takes the lead; i.e. show solidarity. Finally, when it comes to security the strategy needs to be clear that there is no longer a neat distinction between external and internal security, there is a security continuum. This in turn will require the EU to build on some of its tentative initiatives to enhance coordination between internal and external security institutions. There needs to be greater institutional flexibility and innovation, such as a European Security Council, to transcend the institutional silos of external and internal security.

253 of 309 General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE—Oral Evidence (QQ 109-123)

General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE—Oral Evidence (QQ 109-123)

Evidence Session No. 10 Heard in Public Questions 109 - 123

THURSDAY 29 OCTOBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Billingham Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Lord Stirrup Baroness Suttie Lord Triesman Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

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Examination of Witness (via videolink) General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO

Q109 The Chairman: Thank you very much for agreeing to come before us. I gather you are trying to finish a book. I know how time spent away from trying to finish a book is time out of life, so we are very grateful to you. This is a formal session as part of our inquiry into the emerging EU strategic review. Therefore, what you say is being recorded. If at the end of the meeting there is anything you want to nuance, remove and so forth, do tell us. Equally, if there is anything that on second thoughts you would like to add or clarify, again please let us know. We have worked out a number of questions, of which I think you have already had sight, but colleagues will ask supplementaries, and we will ask other questions as well. I will mention them by name before they put their question so you know to whom you are talking.

The first question is quite straightforward. In response to Russian action, NATO and Member States have been taking steps to strengthen their defence capacities and support the Baltic states. Do you think these are meaningful? Have they strengthened the capacity of the

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EU and of NATO to respond, and are they likely to prove a deterrent to Russian action in the Baltic states? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: Before I answer that question, can I clear up one thing? Is this evidence session open to the media and the public? The Chairman: Yes, it is. I do not see anybody here from the media, but it is open to the media. General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: The answer I give to the question is that the steps NATO and the EU are taking—sanctions—are certainly meaningful. The sanctions are probably the only decisive steps that can be taken that Russia will sit up and take notice of. Of course, the impact of sanctions is hurting the Russian economy. I am cognisant of the fact that sanctions can be a double-edged weapon, but generally, given the situation, it would appear that they are the only effective means right now. As far as defence is concerned—this is principally an issue for NATO—some meaningful actions have been taken. We have to give credit to NATO for that, particularly some of the measures taken as a result of the NATO summit last year, but there is a gap between much of the rhetoric that came out of the summit last year and the reality on the ground. In order genuinely to deter Russia from any attempt on the Baltic states, however unlikely it may seem, my view is that NATO needs some form of permanently stationed forces there. It could be on a rotational basis; it does not necessarily need to replicate the old days of the British Army of the Rhine with those sorts of massive infrastructure issues, but it needs in-place forces. NATO needs the ability to respond really quickly and the means to sustain that. I think that at the moment there is a gap between what is required and the reality. The Chairman: I note your reference to the British Army of the Rhine, of which at one time I was a minute cog.

Q110 Lord Horam: Member States of the European Union have pledged to increase their defence spending. As you know, the UK has committed to spending 2% of its GDP on defence. What is your judgment about how likely it is that those defence increases will be realised? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: I go back to the NATO summit. Where it fell down was the statement that, “We promise to try to reach 2% of defence spending in NATO within the next 10 years”, which to me smacked of the 1930s and the 10-year rule. I do not think that is very credible. Yes, Britain has pledged 2% of GDP and that is good news, but we need to look within that at the extent to which there has been an element of creative accounting by bringing in budgets from, for example, the intelligence agencies and the like. Broadly, Europe still has a very long way to go as far as defence spending is concerned. For example, if you compare it with 25 years ago, the split in NATO defence spending between Europe and Canada and the United States was 50:50, whereas now it is 75:25, with America picking up the burden. A number of European nations have pledged to increase defence spending, but many others are still way below the 2% limit. Even for those that have increased defence spending, or ha ve pledged 2% defence spending, we have to recognise that the last decade and a half, if not the last two decades, has seen a progressive demilitarisation in Europe and in European nations as a result of the operations that have been the priority. If the European nations really want to deliver an effective deterrent capability, there is a very strong case that they need to increase defence spending quite a lot more than 2% of GDP.

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Lord Horam: Some of the evidence we have had, particularly from the US ambassador to NATO, is that, “Europe’s problem is not that it lacks an army. It is that it lacks a serious commitment to defence—national, European or transatlantic”. Do you think the real issue is that there is a lack of political will in defence? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: I think that hits the nail absolutely on the head. It is an issue that sits in a moral component; it is an issue of mind. The reality in Europe is that, either by default or design, pretty well all western European nations have got themselves into a position where higher defence spending at the expense of social welfare spending is unacceptable to electorates and therefore unacceptable to politicians.

Q111 Lord Dubs: I would like to turn to the question of Britain’s influence, or lack of it, on foreign policy. In February of this year you were quoted in the Financial Times as saying that the Prime Minister’s failure to be more active over the Ukraine crisis had turned him into “a foreign policy irrelevance”. Apart from Ukraine, how do you see British leadership? Is it really absent on foreign policy discussions in Europe? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: It is 18 months since I sat on the Political and Security Committee in the European Union. I am absolutely certain that Britain continues to play a part in discussions about foreign policy within Europe and of course in NATO. I did say those words, and they were quoted in the Times. My point is about British leadership. The issue there is that, particularly over Ukraine, Britain as one of the top-flight economies in the world, a United Nations Security Council member, still a leading European military power and capability, as well as a strong economy, and a signatory to the Budapest memorandum of 1994, is not seen to be taking a leading role. As a NATO and EU officer sitting across the water in Belgium and travelling widely within the Alliance, I pick up very strongly from colleagues from other nations a sense of surprise, disappointment almost, that Britain appears to be taking a back seat and not stepping up to the mark as a leader, because people expect some form of leadership from Britain. The Chairman: I remember that interview very well. I think it was in connection with the report this Committee had produced about EU, Russia and Ukraine, which had been rather critical of the Government.

Q112 Lord Risby: You mentioned the fundamental importance of NATO in practice in any kind of defence architecture for Europe, and the extraordinary statistic you gave— 75:25—says a great deal. Can you give us a sense of the view in the United States in general terms? You have already touched on that, but perhaps you would like to elaborate on it a bit. Very specifically, in the various crises facing the European Union at the moment, namely the relationship with Russia given the Ukraine situation, and the migrant crisis, do you have a sense of the view being expressed by the United States and its relevance to our discussion? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: My contacts in the United States are based principally on the time spent in my last post, and I am pretty out of date; I will be absolutely honest about that. But I think there is no doubt, anecdotally from my previous experience, that there is a sense of frustration in the United States about Europe’s apparent inability to be decisive in matters of defence and foreign security policy. It may be a misunderstanding of Europe and the nature of decision-making, particularly in the EU, which makes it difficult to be agile and decisive, but I would certainly say that in the United States there is a pervading sense of frustration with Europe. That is manifested by the comments of successive US Secretaries of State for Defence highlighting the failure of Europe and European nations

256 of 309 General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE—Oral Evidence (QQ 109-123) to step up to the mark in defence spending. As to your question on the specifics of the migrant crisis, I am afraid I cannot help you. The Chairman: I think Lord Stirrup has a question linked to this, of which you have not had notice.

Q113 Lord Stirrup: Based upon your experience, do you think NATO-EU military co-operation, specifically the Berlin Plus arrangements, remains fit for task? You will have seen this at close hand. How well are they working these days? Is there a need to review those particular arrangements and put more in place? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: The fact of life is that Berlin Plus is dead in the water. Berlin Plus is a useful and important mechanism, as you will know better than anybody, having served under George Robertson when he was NATO’s Secretary-General. It works really well, but the reality is that the only extant Berlin Plus operation is the small EU operation in Bosnia—Operation Althea. There you see the European Union calling upon NATO for planning capabilities and technical support. The operation commander is the Deputy SACEUR, which is the way Berlin Plus was meant to operate. It is a very effective operation and a very effective arrangement, but the reality is that because of the politics of the eastern Mediterranean—Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and so on—there will be no more Berlin Plus operations until the issues in the eastern Mediterranean are resolved. I would go further, given the challenges we face in security in the 21st century. The obvious example is the security challenge presented by the Middle Eastern refugee crisis. That needs not only an effective Berlin Plus in which the EU can call upon NATO but a form of reverse Berlin Plus in which NATO can call upon the EU for some of the soft power capabilities the EU can bring to the party, as well as finance and funding.

Q114 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: Germany has announced that it is going to be conducting a strategic review of its foreign defence policy. The German Defence Minister, Ursula von der Leyen, has announced that German defence spending will increase by about 6% over four years—by €8 billion. Whether or not that is significant in military spending, she said the new review should reflect on Germany’s ambitions in foreign policy. Do you think that Germany will take a more ambitious view? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: I am not a crystal ball gazer and I do not know what the outcome of that will be. Within Europe, Germany already plays quite a major role in defence and security: for example, in its commitment to troop levels for NATO operations. When I left NATO, Germany was quite some way ahead of the United Kingdom in that sense. Germany within Europe has certainly picked up the battle in the Balkans, particularly in Kosovo, in a most impressive way, and has underwritten that capability. With German defence and security, the issue is not so much about security as about defence. The Bundeswehr has changed dramatically over recent years, particularly as a result of Afghanistan, but the notion of Germany being prepared to step up and support, for example, an Article 5 commitment under collective defence must be open to question because of the almost pacifist nature of German society. The notion of the use of armed force by the state for legal reasons is still an issue, for very obvious reasons, so the question is not whether Germany will play a major role in CSDP, which I think it will, but whether it will fight? That is the question I would have. The Chairman: At the moment I am reading Niall Ferguson’s biography of Kissinger. It deals with the 1950s and 1960s. A running theme at that time was German unease—one might almost say fear—that in the end the Americans would not be willing to fight for Berlin,

257 of 309 General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE—Oral Evidence (QQ 109-123) or perhaps even for West Germany. You have analysed the German position on Article 5, but do you think that would apply even to countries very close to Germany. In other words, if the Baltics were threatened, do you think that the German inhibitions to which you referred would apply, or do you think they apply only to threats rather further afield that would not actually threaten the German homeland? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: I think those inhibitions would apply in an Article 5 collective defence context even if the Baltic states were threatened. I do not think that Germany is alone there; those inhibitions would apply to other NATO countries as well: for example, the United Kingdom. There would be real difficulties. Really difficult questions would be asked about the notion of British soldiers fighting, and if necessary dying, for Latvian, Estonian or Lithuanian freedom. We live in a world where there is an expectation that peace remains the default setting, and the notion of actually having to step up and fight for our freedoms is seen almost as something from another era.

Q115 Baroness Billingham: How would you assess the effectiveness of the CSDP as a tool of crisis management? What priorities would you highlight in order to improve the effectiveness of the CSDP, and what can the High Representative’s strategic review contribute in that regard? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: In answer to the first aspect—the effectiveness—it is almost axiomatic that 28 nations working together are going to be more effective than smaller groups of nations or individual nations. Even the strongest nation will be more effective on foreign and security policy if it is part of a grouping of 28, but it needs an effective decision-making mechanism. The second point would be the critical importance of an effective decision-making mechanism, and I am not sure that the Political and Security Committee of the EU has that. Take for example the question of deploying the European Union battle group: it is a tiny organisation, but it would require the agreement of every one of the 28 member nations to deploy it, which does not fill me with much hope that it is a particularly agile organisation. I would add to any wish list for what would come out of the review, first, the need for an agile decision-making mechanism. Going back to Lord Stirrup’s point, No. 2 would be the importance of the NATO-EU relationship. Building on that point, at the moment the only issue that the North Atlantic Council and the PSC discuss is Bosnia; everything else is off limits because of the politics of the eastern Mediterranean. The third area is meeting the strategic challenge of the age, which is the whole notion of building stability in fragile states on Europe’s periphery. The failure to do that is the refugee crisis. Of course, the horse has now left the stable, but how much better and cost-effective to build stability through capacity-building. I do not mean just military capacity building. That is part of it. Building professional armed forces to stabilise the state is a really important aspect, but it is wider than that; it is law and order, governance, education, health, tackling corruption, and having effective administrators in civil ministries. Europe has to come to grips with that and think it through to prevent the sorts of crises in the Middle East and Africa that are now impacting directly on Europe’s security. It is the business of tackling things upstream rather than trying to deal with the consequences, which are always messy, and very expensive and difficult to deal with.

Q116 Baroness Coussins: In your last answer you gave a very good, detailed definition of what the EU has always called its desire to produce a comprehensive approach to crisis management, combining military and civilian instruments. That has often been seen as a particular strength of the EU when it comes to foreign affairs. Do you agree with that

258 of 309 General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE—Oral Evidence (QQ 109-123) assessment? Could you say something about what the strategic review could do to improve the co-ordination of military and civilian EU tools, especially bearing in mind the very disparate positions, policies and priorities within the 28 Member States? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: I think it is a strength, but at the moment it is on a pretty minuscule basis. In order to tackle the challenges, there needs to be a gear shift in ambition and readiness to take on a much greater role. For example, the EU operation in the Horn of Africa has been very successful; it certainly was when I was still in harness. It was very effective in combining, under an effective High Representative, a very small military capacity-building mission in Somalia with economic and other reconstruction efforts in the Horn of Africa, as well as the EU counterpiracy mission. That is a good example of the EU’s comprehensive approach. When targeted, the EU has been effective in a number of relatively small areas, but the challenge is wider now. Given the scale and size of the European Union, how better to build military-civil co-operation? I come back to the great issue of NATO and the EU. NATO has the military capability. We do not need a major parallel EU military structure. It is a complete waste of time, money and effort. If we were able to revive Berlin Plus, all the mechanisms are there to build precisely that linkage between the EU and NATO and deliver more effective civil-military co-operation. If you add to that the point I made earlier about a reverse Berlin Plus, you have what is needed to meet the challenges.

Q117 Baroness Suttie: If the United Kingdom votes in the referendum to leave the European Union, what do you believe will be the likely consequences for the CSDP and the broader EU defence capacity? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: It will be much weaker, because one of the strongest nations of Europe will be out. I think it is worth highlighting that one area where it has been effective, and we are benefiting strategically from it, is the impact of the EU on security in the western Balkans. Without the magnet and the clout of the European Union, I do not think there is the slightest chance that, for example, the comprehensive agreement between Kosovo and Serbia would have been signed. That was thanks to Baroness Ashton’s very impressive negotiating and diplomatic skill, and she deserves a real plaudit for that. Why is Serbia looking to behave better? Why did Serbia sign? Because ultimately Serbia wants to join the European Union. That is a good example of the stabilising impact of the European Union in one specific security area. If Britain is out of that, I go back to my point that 28 nations are better than one, and 27 nations are not as good as 28 nations. Lord Dubs: If Britain were to leave the EU—I certainly hope we will not—would that not automatically put more onus on NATO to make up for the weaker position of the CSDP? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: NATO is there to defend the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation area. NATO is the critical defence mechanism that underpins European security. The CSDP has been effective in specific areas or on specific missions where NATO has not wanted to be involved, probably because the Americans did not want to get involved—in a number of the missions in Africa, for example. Turning my argument around, if Britain comes out of the European Union, does that affect Britain’s position in NATO? In nuts and bolts terms, probably not a great deal, because North America, Canada and Norway are not part of the European Union, but they are very important members of NATO. Does it affect attitudes to Britain? Does it affect Britain’s ability to leverage power in Brussels—the corridors of power? Does it affect attitudes to Britain? It probably does.

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Q118 The Chairman: We were in Brussels last week. One of the points made to us was that although foreign policy in its broadest sense is a matter for Governments rather than being within the EU framework, the instruments by which foreign policy is exercised are increasingly in the hands of the Commission, so rather than it being the External Action Service that implements decisions, those decisions require the active participation of the Commission. I was very struck by that point, because, to come back to Lord Dubs, if we were not in the European Union it would be more difficult for us, even mechanically, to make our influence felt. General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: You are going into a technical area that is beyond my competence, but I think the logic of that makes great sense.

Q119 Lord Stirrup: Can I go back to the point about EU co-operation with others? You made some key points about the relationship with NATO, but the EU has been trying to upgrade its relationship with the United Nations and other regional actors, such as the OSCE, the African Union and so forth. Have you seen any evidence of success in that? Are they building relationships that will serve EU foreign policy better in future? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: Have I seen evidence of that? No, I have not, but I have been out of harness for a bit. Do I think it is important? Absolutely important. The stronger the relationships between international organisations, the better. For example, to go back to the example of Libya, one saw the increasing importance of regional organisations such as the African Union and the Arab League in building legitimacy for operations and taking on tasks. Going back to the business of building stability in fragile states, it can only be a good thing if the EU builds relationships with the AU and other regional organisations, but the proof of it will be what comes out of those relationships.

Q120 Lord Horam: What is your view of the Russian action in Syria? Some people would say that it is a very clever move by Putin; it will enhance his influence in the Middle East, and that is what it is all about. Others say that militarily he is walking into a quagmire; there is no end to it and he will be bogged down, just as NATO was bogged down in Afghanistan. Do you have a view on that? If so, I would be interested in it. General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: Arguably, both points are right. He could well be walking into a quagmire, but he has also increased his influence in a key area. What he is doing demonstrates that, without partnership with Russia, the ghastly hell of the Syrian saga cannot be resolved by the international community. He has demonstrated rapid and ruthless decision-making, and in doing so he has highlighted the lack of any credible western strategy towards Syria.

Q121 Lord Horam: What should be the reaction of the European Union to this action? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: I think the European Union and the West have to be pretty ruthless and pragmatic and recognise that we may have to talk to bad people. We have to prioritise. Selection and maintenance of the aim is the first principle of war. What is the aim? Is the aim to get rid of ISIS, ISIL or Daesh—whatever you want to call it? Is it to get rid of Assad? The two are probably incompatible. If it is to get rid of Daesh, we may well have to talk to Assad and work alongside the Russians in order to do so, but that is going to be a really difficult political question for western leaders, who have already nailed their colours to the mast over Assad’s previous use of chemical weapons.

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Q122 The Chairman: While we are on Syria, do you think there is any scope in that area particularly for subgroups of EU and NATO states? I was going to ask you about the potential role of subgroups anyway, but it perhaps arises naturally in the context of Syria. General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: The notion of groups of nations operating together under the aegis or banner of NATO and/or the EU makes eminent sense, particularly in the business of trying to build defence capability; the British-French agreement makes a lot of sense. Whether you call it the entente frugale or not, it is building capabilities, and the northern group of nations do things similarly. There may be scope for working together with other like-minded nations to build consensus over the strategies that need to be adopted to deal with the problem of Syria.

Q123 Lord Triesman: In an earlier answer to the Chairman you made the point—I do not want to put words into your mouth, so if I have got it wrong please tell me—that there was perhaps an unwillingness for electoral and political reasons to embrace some of the obligations under Article 5, and that that would create an ongoing weakness and maybe a drift towards looking at a number of problems with regard to Article 4, because that seems less difficult. I know you did not make the latter point; it is one that perhaps I would make. I assume that if that reading of it is one we might come to, it is very likely that Russia and President Putin are coming to the same reading. In those circumstances, would he, in your view, be more inclined in picking his policy options to feel very much less constrained, and should we be looking at the risks of a very much less constrained Russia than we have seen even in the last couple of years? What might the counterplays be to that, if it is the correct reading? General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: Yes is the answer to that question. Deterrence depends on capability and on being able to communicate that capability, and ultimately it depends on credibility. At the moment, I think that NATO fails on all three counts. That will not have been lost on President Putin. There is no 100% guarantee, but the best way to guarantee that the dynamic started by President Putin in Crimea and Ukraine is stopped is to hold up a very large stop sign based on a genuinely credible defensive capability and a belief in the determination that we are prepared to use it. Until that happens, with a leader like Putin there will always be the chance that he will think, “I might be able to get away with that”. To go back to Syria, there is a strategic linkage between what Putin observes of western inability to come up with a coherent strategy on Syria and the assessment that he might make about whether the alliance is prepared to step up to the mark: for example, to defend the Baltic states. It comes back to credible defensive capability. Smoke and mirrors and pretending we have capabilities when we do not have genuinely capable forces will only make matters worse, because he will see through all that. The Chairman: Sir Richard, thank you very much indeed. We have been through the list of questions. It has been very crisp. We have got through more quickly than I anticipated, but I think we have achieved everything we wished to achieve. I wish you luck with your writing. General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE: Thank you very much indeed. It has been a pleasure.

261 of 309 Professor Karen Smith, Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti and Dr Spyros Economides, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006)

Professor Karen Smith, Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti and Dr Spyros Economides, London School of Economics and Political Science—Written Evidence (FSP0006)

Evidence to be found under Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith

262 of 309 Professor Karen Smith and Mr Henry Wilkinson—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-10)

Professor Karen Smith and Mr Henry Wilkinson—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-10)

Evidence Session No. 1 Heard in Public Questions 1 - 10

THURSDAY 10 SEPTEMBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Lord Balfe Baroness Billingham Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Triesman Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

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Examination of Witnesses Professor Karen Smith, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, and Mr Henry Wilkinson, Head of Intelligence and Analysis, The Risk Advisory Group

Q1 The Chairman: First, thank you very much, Professor Smith and Mr Wilkinson, for being here so much ahead of time. As we are short of our first witness, it is possible to hear evidence from you now, which is a very great convenience. As I think you are aware, this is the first meeting of the sub-committee in its new inquiry. It is a public meeting, it is recorded, and what you say is on the record. We will ask you the questions that you have been warned about, but I am sure there will be others as well. Please try to keep your answers quite brief so that we can get through a lot. On the other hand, I do not want you to go away feeling that you wish you had said something that you did not say. If there should be, you can submit it in written evidence later. If you both happen to totally agree, there is no need for both to speak. On the other hand, please do both speak if you wish to. Let me ask the first question, and then my colleagues will come in on the others.

It has been suggested that the Union does not have a very good record of drawing up EU foreign policy strategies, that the documents can be too lofty, unrealistic and not sufficiently strategic. How would you assess the EU’s record in this field, and what lessons do you feel can be learnt?

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Professor Karen Smith: Thank you for giving me the opportunity to give evidence to this Committee. A critical requirement of a strategy in general is that you know what you are trying to achieve and you know what resources you need to achieve it. There is some prioritisation of objectives: we know what it is most important that we achieve. The problem for the European Union is that an intergovernmental union—and in the field of foreign policy it is an intergovernmental framework; it is essentially all 28 member states deciding—that prioritisation of objectives is extremely difficult. You can have a long list of ideas and broad aims, but reaching detailed understanding of what is most important has been extraordinarily difficult. Strategies tend to end up being kind of motherhood and apple pie-type things: everybody could agree with them, everybody has agreed with them, but no hard choices have been made. That is where they become relatively unimportant and “un- useful” in policy-making. The lesson that the EU will have to learn, and hopefully will learn, is that it needs to focus and establish clear priorities. Hard choices have to be made. Whether 28 member states are capable of doing that is another matter, but the EU needs to subtract from lists of objectives rather than adding to them. The EU does not have to do everything; it cannot do everything, it does not have the resources to do everything, so choices have to be made. That is the number one lesson that I hope the EU would learn going into this process. Mr Henry Wilkinson: Thank you very much for having me. It is a privilege and a pleasure to be here. I agree completely with what Karen has just said. Looking at the record of EU strategy documents, they seem to get a bit less lofty as they go on—you see the success of the 2003 strategy document, the 2009 and so forth—but they also become a lot more complicated. Frankly, when you read some of the more recent iterations of EU strategy documents they become bewilderingly complex, with a multitude of threats and risks that are being confronted. I think what Professor Smith has been saying is that what is absolutely important is that for a strategy to work it cannot be a list of aspirations, which is how I see a lot of these documents; they are very aspirational. They need to be very clear about what exactly they are trying to achieve. Goals and strategy are not the same thing. Strategy is a plan of action that takes capabilities and limitations into account, but it also takes risks into account, such as: what are the adverse consequences of our actions? There are certain cases in point with, for example, EU enlargement and how Russia has been responding to the perceived encroachment upon its sphere of influence. These sorts of factors need to be taken into account, into a strategy, so that whatever is delivered is attainable and doable and does not create more problems than it solves. That is a very important consideration with some of these plans. Some of the strategy is also a bit vague in terms of what it wants to achieve. A lot of the threats and risks that the progressive documents discuss are quite abstract, I would say. Terrorism is a threat, but you have to get much more into the weeds and understand where it is actually coming from and what kind of problems need to be confronted. If I was contributing to some of the thinking about what kind of strategy there should be, I would say that it would need to start prioritising much more specifically what needs to be done to realise the outcomes that it wants, such as what to do about Russian foreign policy and the situation in Syria, in much more concrete terms.

Q2 Baroness Coussins: Given what you have just said about the weaknesses in EU strategy and all the loftiness and motherhood and apple pie-ness, what can you tell us about what actually happens to the strategies once they have been published? Are they ever translated into action either in the member-state capitals or in EU institutions? Is there any evidence that they have ever actually been used as guidance for action?

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Professor Karen Smith: No— Baroness Coussins: I thought that might be the short answer. Professor Karen Smith: —because they are so vague. Many years ago I was involved in a large EU-funded research network on foreign policy across the member states. One of the questions that we repeatedly asked in yearly surveys was, “To what extent has your Government been using the European security strategy to guide foreign policy?”. Many of the responses that we got back were, “The Government agree with the strategy”, full stop, although I must say that the language of some of the goals in the strategy is repeatedly used. For example, one of the three strategic objectives of the 2003 strategy was to pursue effective multilateralism. That fed through into policy documents, but what it actually meant and whether it actually meant a change in action is questionable. That was at the EU level. At the member-state level I have seen no evidence that it has guided policy choices. Mr Henry Wilkinson: I concur. The Chairman: That is straightforward enough.

Q3 Baroness Billingham: Should the new foreign policy strategy not just consider the strategic goals that you have already spoken about but set out how we get there? Should the strategy address questions of resources? Those resources are possibly human resources. Have we got the right people in place who are setting out these strategies? Following the answer you gave to my colleague, it seems that they are not.

Professor Karen Smith: Absolutely. This is where resources have to be included in future strategies, because that is going to force discussion of hard choices. Resources are aid, trade, diplomatic, military, CSDP and so on. In other words, we need to take an holistic view of all the resources available to the EU and how they could be used. Looking at how the EU as a whole uses its resources, there is considerable room for refocusing if flexibility can be brought into the process of refocusing our resources. For example, the development aid budget is spread very widely as 148 countries received development aid in 2013. There is a process that is trying to graduate middle-income countries away from it, but 148 countries is a huge spread in the disbursement of resources. The 2015-19 EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy lists lots of objectives with no indication of where those objectives are going to be pursued. Again, resources could be refocused. The EU has dialogues with practically every country on earth. Does it need to have so many structured dialogues every year or every six months? There are statements on everything. With regard to the External Action Service, almost nothing that happens in the world on which there is not a statement. Is that necessary? Human resources have to be devoted to drawing up the statements, and frequently co-ordination meetings have to be held in which all 28 member states have to cross the “t”s and dot the “i”s. Is that necessary? There needs to be a tough discussion about priorities and where resources should and should not be devoted. Mr Henry Wilkinson: Resources is a horse and cart issue, because without a strategy you do not know what resources you are going to have to ask for. Part of this in some ways is whether sufficient resources have been dedicated to the strategy and to formulating it. In the field that I look at, if the EU is really going to engage in a more robust external affairs approach, does it have adequate assessment capability to understand what is going on around it and to configure and adjust the strategy as it goes along? As it stands, we seem to get periodic downloads of thinking around the various issues, and every time they change they get more complex. A more sustainable path might be that if the EU is really committed

265 of 309 Professor Karen Smith and Mr Henry Wilkinson—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-10) to that, it should dedicate resources to understanding better the world in which it is operating. I sense that that is a very disjointed issue. The other question about resources involves wealth. If the European Union is going to become more of a singular actor on the international stage, bearing in mind that it is not a nation state, what sort of resources is it going to dedicate to taking much more singular actions around things? That is a very difficult question, because the nation states that are its members will retain sovereign defence and security as primary tenets of their own legitimacy as Governments, and where does the European Union belong in that equation? Is it worth putting resources into that if it is never going to shape defence policies in a meaningful way?

Q4 Lord Balfe: The High Representative notes that the security context is radically different from 2003 and describes an arc of instability around the European Union and a world that is more complex and connected. Do you think this is a useful framework for understanding the security context facing the EU, and what in your view are the key external and internal trends that a new foreign policy should take into account? On my extensive travels within the EU, I have been struck by the way in which small states, which of course are not well represented around the globe, see CSDP as an adjunct to their own security concerns, for instance as in the Baltic states, and in another context for making other people aware of their security concerns, for instance as in Portugal. In other words, they see it as much as an adjunct to their own foreign policy as they do forming a common foreign policy.

Professor Karen Smith: It is a useful starting point in the current context. In some ways it could be even bleaker in that we are surrounded by an arc of crisis, and as I will indicate later the neighbourhood is extremely challenging right now. On the key external trend, the diffusion of power internationally means that we are not in a world of two superpowers or one superpower but in a much more multipolar world, which completely changes the context for how an actor such as the EU or its member states can think about interacting in international affairs. Essentially, third countries are no longer going to be as dependent on the EU as they have been, because they have other options and alternatives, which means that the EU has to think carefully about how it can persuade or encourage them to join its policy objectives. It also means that EU member states need to wake up to the fact that unity will become ever more important, given a more multipolar world. The key external trend is the diffusion of power, which is in the document. The internal trend, which is perhaps also as worrying, is the increase in contestation of the European Union from within. That makes it more difficult for EU member states to achieve unity to deal with the diffusion of international power. Decreased internal support, both public and governmental, for the EU also deprives it of legitimacy and ultimately decreases its soft power, which I can say something about later. Small member states have traditionally seen the EU as a good power multiplier. It is extremely useful to them. There are trade- offs. In other words, they have to accept a certain understanding that they are not always going to get their way, but they are not going to in international relations in general. That is the plight of small states. In a way, all member states are small states with this diffusion of power internationally. Some small states have been the most supportive of a strong CSFP; others have been much less so. The key external trend is the increasing diffusion of power internationally. Mr Henry Wilkinson: I find the document published in June a very thorough exposition of the trends and threats that the European Union is definitely facing. It covers most of the issues that I can think of. The question in the study is: what areas require the most

266 of 309 Professor Karen Smith and Mr Henry Wilkinson—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-10) weighting in prioritisation? On that point, it is a little less clear, because there is a cacophony of risks out there and there are so many complexities that you almost get to the point where, as there is so much complexity, you have to ask where one starts. When things are so interconnected, what is the knock-on effect of doing one thing? Can you tackle things piece by piece, or do you have to take a much more complete approach to deal with them? These are very challenging questions that I do not think this document has really shed light on yet, although it may be a bit premature to criticise it on that point. In terms of the threats as I see them, I think they are broadly right, but the document has to be a lot more explicit about certain points. Externally, a couple of issues are very important. It is very clear looking at, for example, the current refugee crisis, that domestic civil conflicts are a real issue in the international order. They are by far and away the most prevalent form of conflict. EU strategic policy needs to recognise that, to look at what it can do to stop conflicts breaking out, to develop a list of countries that are most at risk and to take much more robust action to help them. As we know, it takes an awful lot longer to end a war than to prevent one. That kind of strategy would be very important. Corruption is another major source of insecurity and risk which I do not think is given enough priority. Corruption has undermined democratic revolutionary movements and various other movements that we should be looking favourably upon if we believe in the spread of democracy, because corruption erodes civil liberties and does all kinds of other things when you look at how states are trying to develop and pull themselves out of conflict cycles and various other things. Corruption is prolific. What can the EU do about it? Its greatest power is its economic clout, its access to markets and to various other things. Taking a much more robust approach to dealing with high-level corruption and poor governance is a top priority and where the EU can really make a difference. External affairs is another. There are a couple of questions. We need to think very carefully about what is happening in the eastern neighbourhood, as we call it. Calling it a neighbourhood might be oversimplifying the issues. The EU needs to think very carefully about how it views Russia. It needs to think much more carefully about great power conflicts. With a lot of these issues there are the transnational risks that we have been talking about, and in the multipolar—if that is the right term; I do not know if it is any more—world order that we are now facing, where you have a lot of rising powers and some falling powers, we need to start thinking about the possibility of the return of great power conflicts and various other risks around that. I do not think that is given enough weight. Perhaps that is because that sort of conflict is becoming unthinkable, I do not know, but to my mind that is exactly the point that you need to start thinking about. It is a risk. Internally, again I agree with Professor Smith and broadly with the document. One additional factor that might be worth thinking about is whether the EU is in a position right now politically to take on some of these challenges, which frankly require unity, or whether it is better to preserve the Union and to defer some of these issues if it is not quite ready for them yet. We are talking about how the smaller states see the European Union as a force multiplier, but we need to be worrying about what the larger powers’ role will be. If Britain decides to withdraw, how will that affect strategy, given that Britain is one of the most active and capable military actors in the Union. There are questions about the appropriateness of policy and whether certain things should be taken on or whether they should be phased depending on how the political situation, the economic situation and so forth progress.

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Q5 Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: This might seem a strange question after all you have been saying, but the High Representative has been mandated by the European Council to draft a global foreign policy strategy. I would be grateful if you could give us your views on this and your assessment of such an approach. Given what you have said already, can you say a little more about whether you see the EU as having a global rather than a mainly regional role? Does it have the political will and the capacity so to do? If not, where is it overextended, and where should it focus its foreign policy?

Professor Karen Smith: I am going to be very academic in my terminology here, but I think it could be useful to distinguish between a global actor and having a global foreign policy. The EU is a global actor—that is, its resources are huge and it is a major trading power— particularly where there are strong supranational internal decision-making procedures such as trade policy or even to a certain extent environmental policy. In other words, it deserves a seat at the table. It might not always be influential at the table but it deserves a seat at it; it could not be absent. So in that sense it is a global actor, but that does not necessarily mean, particularly given the challenges around us, that it should have a global foreign policy. I would argue that it is now time to say that we must focus on the neighbourhood, which I would define much more widely than is indicated in a lot of policy documents coming out of the EU right now. The neighbourhood includes: the accession countries of the western Balkans, which have been ignored for far too long; countries that are in the European Neighbourhood Policy; Russia, which is not in the Neighbourhood Policy; and neighbours of the neighbours—the Sahel region, Iran and Iraq. In other words, it is this extremely unsettled neighbourhood that we currently live in. So I would argue very much that we need to sort out the multifaceted, multiple conflicts and crises in the region. If the EU does not attempt to sort out its neighbourhood, it will not have the credibility to have a more global foreign policy. In other words, thinking about how we might contribute to security in the East Asian theatre is not particularly relevant, given the security threats and the security situation in the neighbourhood. It is time to focus much more clearly on this. That is the priority. One way of dealing with this is to work much more closely with other international actors— the UN, NATO, EU member states, other states, NGOs and so on—to build those networks, so that the EU itself does not have to do everything. It can do some things with other actors, but the priority for the next five to 10 years simply has to be the neighbourhood. It cannot be global. Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: I forgot to declare my interests. I am a trustee of Voluntary Services Overseas, which may bid for European funds. I should have said that at the beginning, sorry. Mr Henry Wilkinson: I agree. The point about being a global actor and having a global foreign policy is a particularly astute point. We have talked about resources and various other things. If the European Union is really going to advance a strategy, the question really is about what it can do. There is a whole raft of threats, and when we talk about security what we are really talking about in an interdependent world is risk management. The principles of risk management are essentially that you try to lower the risks by mitigating them. You lower the probability of them occurring where you can, and if you cannot you do as much as you can to reduce the impact. That is the basic principle. If one were to draw up a risk matrix of what the EU is facing, it is very clear that its immediate neighbourhoods are the most pressing problem. Therefore it seems logical that, with limited resources, that should be the area of priority. I fully understand the logic of why the European Union should aspire to be a global bloc, but again there is the question of whether this is premature. If the

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European Union is going to start acting like that and becoming a much more significant geopolitical actor in its own right, it also has to recognise that other rising powers are going to start seeing it as such. There is also the potential there of taking on more than it can chew with competitors and even adversaries. So my personal view, which I think I share with Professor Smith, is that focusing on what is immediately pressing is the most important issue, and that is the immediate periphery and the things that are spilling over, and dealing with them. The other aspect of global power and working with multilateral institutions is getting people to commit to common interests and pursuing common policy goals. A lot more effort could be made on that. One of the things that is particularly interesting in this context is that it is quite easy to look at the world at the moment and perceive it to be an increasingly dangerous place, which the report makes fairly clear. I am not sure that I entirely agree with that assessment. If you look at where the conflicts are in the world, what we are really seeing is that some parts of the world are getting an awful lot worse, but an awful lot of places are getting better. Actually, there is greater polarity between the stable countries and the unstable ones. As it happens, the countries that are in the worst shape are much closer to us than other regions. That is worth bearing in mind as well.

Q6 Lord Triesman: Good morning. You may feel that you have answered the question that I shall ask in response to the last question, but I would like to check that. If you were given what I suppose would be the opportunity but that might be the curse of writing this foreign policy, what would you prioritise? If you had to limit yourselves to the top two or three things that ought to be prioritised, what would they be? I have one further thought. You both said that attention needs to be given to doing the things that you can do. What triaging system would you have in order to identify the things you cannot and should not do, even if they look sufficiently dramatic on the world stage that there appears to be a demand to do them?

Professor Karen Smith: I repeat that the focus should be on the neighbourhood and the wider periphery. There are two top issues. One is the conflicts that have security implications for the EU with the risk of terrorism and the massive refugee movements that we are seeing. So the first is dealing with conflicts, engaging with peace processes or whatever—in other words, there are multiple conflicts here—and post-conflict situations, such as in Libya, which deserve attention. Conflicts pose risks to the EU, so there is clear self-interest in dealing with them. The second issue is a less self-interested goal, and that is dealing with the risks of gross human rights violations and mass atrocities in our neighbourhood. In other words, if you go down the lists of areas where the population is most at risk, an awful lot of them are in the neighbourhood. Some are obvious, such as Syria, while others are not quite as dramatic, for example the Central African Republic, but addressing the presence of ongoing mass atrocities is the number two objective that I would put. Part of the problem in the EU is that because there is no prioritisation of objectives, the latest crisis can crowd out any preventive action. In other words, everybody focuses on the latest crisis and attention and resources are diverted. Yet the EU’s greatest strength and comparative advantage is its longer-term policy. In other words, in the long term its trade, aid and structured relationships with third countries could allow it to have more impact on preventing conflicts, atrocities and gross human rights violations. Again, that requires a steely-eyed focus on the neighbourhood/periphery. A strategy implies that you are making

269 of 309 Professor Karen Smith and Mr Henry Wilkinson—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-10) hard choices, so those would be the top two things that, if I were President of the EU or whatever, I would recommend. Mr Henry Wilkinson: The first priority, to my mind, should be a back-to-basics approach. Looking at everything that is going on, it is quite easy to lose sight of the EU’s purpose and why it is a good thing. It may be because I was a student of history, but I see the European Union as something that came about to prevent conflict within Europe, so the first strategic objective of the European Union must surely be to preserve that European order, to preserve the integrity of the Union in so far as it is the best mechanism that we have found in the history of Europe to prevent conflict within Europe. Everything that we do should surely be oriented around making sure that that is happening. That includes making sure that we do not take on policies that could create schisms within the Europe, or invite adversaries to adopt a divide-and-rule approach, or do things that might pick the alliance apart. As part of that, we need to be very cautious about the implications of the rise of extremist parties and movements within Europe. This is potentially the most pressing security threat into the longer term. Whatever strategy we have in place must have first and foremost preserving security within the European Union. For the second issue, I would look at the most pressing issues. Terrorism, as we currently see it, is a very important issue. There are a lot of reasons why terrorism exists; it is a very complex problem. If we are going to grasp the nettle and deal with the problem, we need to think very carefully about policy towards Syria and about dealing with the group that calls itself Islamic State and its offshoots in places such as Libya, which is essentially a completely anarchic conflict zone right on our borders. These are the clear and present dangers, so if I were doing this I would probably say, “Let’s see if we can deliver some results in these areas first before we start pushing things”. If we are going to talk about dealing with human rights, which are very important in preventing genocide, at what point are we going to declare the things that we see as war crimes as acts of genocide that compel us to act? If you are going to do that, you have to be able to intervene, which is another element. Probably a third element is having a serious conversation between member states about intervention. If we are going to start talking about hard policy and hard power, we need to be talking about making hard decisions and doing things that might hurt but which in the longer term improve our security. Lord Triesman: I think we have a very strong sense of how you would order priorities and for what reason. Does that imply that Cathy Ashton should not have been sent to spend so much time dealing with the prospect of nuclear armaments developing in Iran? Would that have been inside or outside that set? Professor Karen Smith: I would classify Iran as part of the periphery. In other words, it is the neighbour of the neighbours. There was a lot of discussion about how wide the European neighbourhood policy should be. For example, lots of the Persian Gulf countries are not included, yet the security context is obviously interlinked. I would have counselled not chasing strategic partners. The EU has a bizarre list of strategic partners. It is almost randomly selected. I would not have gone down that route.

Q7 Lord Dubs: I shall stay with the eastern and southern neighbourhood and press you a little further. It has been suggested that the EU has been quite ineffective, that it is not a strategic player and that its support for democracy is inconsistent and especially ineffective in the southern neighbourhood. What is your assessment of EU action in the neighbourhood? What do you think the weaknesses are? Is there a tendency to say that a lot of these things

270 of 309 Professor Karen Smith and Mr Henry Wilkinson—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-10) should go into the “too difficult” box and be left aside while we do the easier things? Is that a fair criticism?

Professor Karen Smith: The key weakness with the southern neighbourhood was to attribute stability to the lack of democracy, and therefore to support authoritarian regimes. I fear that we are going back to that, so I think that is a key weakness. On the eastern neighbourhood, the debates that we have tended to have about whether to offer the prospect of accession to the eastern neighbours are a diversion. First, any such issue is far in the future, given the state of those countries, yet I have been somewhat dismayed to see, for example, lots of the discussion about Ukraine being that if only there had been a promise of enlargement, we would not be in this situation. I do not think that the promise of enlargement is a panacea, a magic wand that you wave and suddenly everybody steps into line. That is a bit of a diversion of diplomatic attention and perhaps public debate. There has not been enough attention because there is a kind of block—if we get too close, maybe they will think they should become EU members—and that is affecting an internal EU debate. I would remove the question and say that we are not going to deal with it. Having said that, what is not included here is the question of the western Balkans, which have been ignored far too much. It is a mystery to me that we have almost walked away, in a sense, from the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because it is apparently too difficult for us to manage. We need to refocus on getting all the western Balkans, which means solving certain issues with Macedonia, Bosnia and so on, into the EU. There was a loss of attention; attention drained away from key areas in the neighbourhood there, so those are the weaknesses that remain. Mr Henry Wilkinson: The record on the southern neighbourhood is pretty dismal. The question about the Arab spring is whether it was a fantastic opportunity that was squandered or wasted. In reality, it was a failure not just of the EU but of its member states, the US and pretty much everybody else. There was an opportunity for change, and now there are civil wars across the region and the terrorist threat. Now in Europe and US there is pretty unanimous agreement among officials that the terrorism threat has never been higher. People are tying this very much to the emergence of organisations such as Islamic State, which have energised radicalisation across the region. We are now dealing with a very complex problem. Our record on the Arab spring was not particularly great, so the questions are: what we are going to do about it now, and what can be done about it now? At the core of this debate—I am speaking specifically about north Africa and the Middle East, and particularly the countries that you could call Arab spring countries—is the very challenging issue of the need for security and the need to promote liberal democratic values. It is a very difficult debate, because which comes first, and are they mutually exclusive in certain contexts? In my experience, looking at conflict zones, liberal democratic values very rarely exist in practice, because without security nothing else really functions. We have to think about our record on promoting democracy and liberalism, because what really needs to come first? Can we promote them while there is ongoing conflict, severe terrorism threats and so forth emanating from the region? On the question of the record and how the EU needs to proceed, these sorts of questions need to be asked. How does the European Union deal with issues of this kind? How does it reconcile its liberal democratic, humanitarian mandates with a slightly more realist approach? The Chairman: Within the context of the questions that you have just been asked on the Middle East, how would you assess the record of the EU in relation to the Israel/Palestine dispute, and what would be your recommendation about what the policy should be going forward?

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Mr Henry Wilkinson: I think the record is pretty poor. You can measure that just by the fact that we do not seem to be any further down the line. In fact, if anything, at least when it comes to the Israel/Palestine conflict, we seem to be further back than where we were. More robust action needs to be taken to incentivise both parties to find a resolution. I do not know the answer to that. The record so far has been pretty dismal, and it needs to be rethought. The Chairman: What do you mean by robust? Mr Henry Wilkinson: The question is: why does the conflict matter so much? The 2003 document argues that it is one of the most pivotal issues that need to be dealt with, and we have to ask ourselves why it is so important. Central to that is that it is used as a source of grievance. It is exploited by undemocratic Governments and others in the Middle East. Secondly, there is a profound sense of injustice around how the Palestinians are treated that resonates very widely. There are double standards about Israeli actions and other actions when looking at the conflict and various UN Security Council resolutions and their enforcement. There needs to be a more consistent approach in dealing with it. As the saying goes, if you have always done what you have done, you always get what you have. That is the policy that we have with Israel and the Palestinians. Professor Karen Smith: Effectively, we know that the answer is a two-state solution. We have known that for some time. There are even parties on the ground that have agreed this in separate negotiations in Europe. In other words, there is large-scale agreement on this. We all know where it is. The EU needs to be firmer about that being the future and where we want to go, so action that undermines that should not be tolerated as it currently is. Mr Henry Wilkinson: It is a matter of mediation. European countries have certainly played a role in that, and that is important and should be kept going. The question is: who is the most credible interlocutor between the Israelis and the Palestinians? To my mind, that is the United States, so the question is: what is the EU doing to ensure that the United States maintains that position and moves things forwards?

Q8 The Chairman: Moving away from that area, the European security strategy 2003 said that in order for the Union to play an active role in international affairs and meet the threats facing it, it should be more active, more coherent and more capable. Do you see any progress towards those desirable attributes during the period since 2003? What in your view are the key structural and operational factors that inhibit an EU foreign policy?

Professor Karen Smith: There has been progress, particularly because of the reforms that were implemented under the Lisbon treaty. There is considerable awareness of the fact that there needs to be more coherence between policy areas, that there should be a comprehensive approach and so on. There has been progress. However, the key factors that inhibit effective EU foreign policy are the ones that have already been mentioned: the lack of priorities and therefore the lack of hard choices by member states, which in turn indicates a lack of unity about what should be done and what the focus should be; attention being easily diverted; the disbursal of resources; and the lack of resources. If we were talking about corruption, for example, one striking example is that the EU mission to Ukraine, which is supposed to help with the rule of law, has less than 200 people. Given the scale of corruption in Ukraine, that seems like a drop in a bucket. There does not appear to have been much enthusiasm for foreign policy in general in the past few years. The euro crisis has been incredibly diverting of the attention of key players for the past few

272 of 309 Professor Karen Smith and Mr Henry Wilkinson—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-10) years. There appears to have been a lack of appetite for engaging in hard discussions about foreign policy. The euro crisis has been very damaging in that respect. Mr Henry Wilkinson: I would not add to that.

Q9 Baroness Coussins: Professor Smith, in one of your earlier answers when you talked about external and internal trends, I think you said that you thought there had been a decline in soft power in the EU. Certainly other people have commented that EU soft power has not been particularly effective or had much value. Could you say a bit more about that? What are, or should be, the EU’s strongest soft-power tools, and how should they be more effectively exercised?

Professor Karen Smith: I am afraid I am going to be very academic here and stick to the original concept of soft power as put forward by Joseph Nye over the past decade or so. That is, soft power is the power of attraction. In other words, you cannot manufacture it; it just comes out of a country’s or an organisation’s culture and values and the extent to which external policies coincide with that culture and those values. Soft power cannot be created, but a closer alignment of external policies with the values which the entity—the EU or a state—claims to follow augments soft power. Likewise, a failure to do that—hypocrisy, double standards and whatnot—force a decline in soft power. Soft power can be squandered. Soft power is very important for the EU. It has been an incredibly inspiring model. We have already heard about its record of reconciliation and preventing conflict within Europe. It deserved the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize for that. In fact, it should arguably have earned it much earlier for that. It is an inspiring model overall of how states can interact with each other in international affairs. For that, its soft-power resources are very high. The important thing is that for an entity that is highly dependent on voluntary action, firstly the voluntary consent of the member states to engage in this, and secondly because it does not have huge command-power resources—that is, the power to coerce other states to do what it wants—it is going to get other actors to do what it wants largely through persuasion, and what will help there is soft power. Soft power could even obviate the need for command power in certain circumstances. At least, that was Nye’s understanding of it: that with enough soft power, people want to follow you; they do not want to go against you. In that respect, the EU needs to be particularly concerned not to deprive itself of its enormous reservoir of soft-power resources. Mr Henry Wilkinson: Again, I agree. To my mind, soft power is really what the EU has been about. I wonder whether the question of strategy is the EU contemplating moving into a more hard-power—I was going to say neighbourhood, but the word seems to be used for other things in the context of the EU. Soft power is immensely important. It helps to deal with conflicts, it helps to prevent them, it incentivises people. We were talking about whether the EU should play a global role. In many ways, it can play a very important role. We also need to contemplate the fact that with the emergence of rising powers and the decline of others, they might find that the EU is very valuable in the international system in certain aspects: mediation, representation, setting standards, teaching people how we have done it here.

Q10 The Chairman: Could I ask you one final question? At the moment, the agenda is dominated by the refugee crisis, which is proving extremely divisive between the member states. In your opinion, will it be possible for this exercise even to get off the ground while the member states are at loggerheads on how to deal with the refugees?

273 of 309 Professor Karen Smith and Mr Henry Wilkinson—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-10)

Professor Karen Smith: I think it is crucial that the member states talk about longer-term strategy, otherwise we have yet another crisis knocking long-term strategic thinking off the agenda. It is absolutely crucial for them to sit down and have hard discussions about this. Ultimately, lots of very sensible suggestions have been put forward about how Europe could approach the refugee crisis. It would involve a fundamental rethink of European asylum policies, but the direction is fairly clear and events are going to force the rethink. But that does not mean that this should be an opportunity for EU member states to avoid having hard discussions about longer-term strategy. Mr Henry Wilkinson: I agree. The refugee crisis highlights why this is such an important area of policy. Going back to our initial points about what strategy is, if strategy is a road map and a plan of action, what the refugee crisis highlights is that whatever it is, it needs to include how it will be sold back to the electorates of the European countries. There have always been questions about how representative the European Union really is. We talked about these kinds of policies being too lofty. The European countries really need to start selling these and being very clear so that there is genuine buy-in, and to explain to people how the policy will work, that it will deliver results, and that these sorts of crises can be dealt with better or even pre-empted. It should be an integral part of the plan, whatever form it takes when it is presented. The Chairman: I said that that would be the final question, but I overlooked Lady Armstrong, who had wanted to come in. I am sorry about that. Thank you very much indeed.

274 of 309 Dr Anna Katharina Stahl, Research Fellow, EU-China Research Centre, College of Europe— Written Evidence (FSP0016)

Dr Anna Katharina Stahl, Research Fellow, EU-China Research Centre, College of Europe—Written Evidence (FSP0016)

Changing Global Environment 1. In June 2015, the European Council mandated the High Representative Federica Mogherini to draft an “EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy”. The current process is aimed at revisiting the “European Security Strategy” (ESS) adopted in 2003. The need for new strategy to guide the EU's global action has been justified by the fact that in the past twelve years the international environment underwent major shifts. Thus, the EU needs to adapt its foreign and security policy to the rapidly changing global environment. As part of the reflection process leading to the formulation of a new EU strategy for foreign and security policy by 2016, the High Representative presented a “Strategic Review” in June 2015. Although the policy document offers a good basis for the formulation a new global strategy, it also presents some shortcomings 2. The rise of emerging powers – in particular China – is a key feature of the changing global environment. The Strategic Review accurately reflects this new reality. It refers to China’s growing international influence immediately at the beginning, underlining that China is “prime amongst the ‘new’ powers”. 3. However, the EU’s policy document underestimates the international influence played by China and other so-called “emerging/rising powers”, and their impact on the EU’s strategic interests. According to the Strategic Review, “profound divergences” and the lack of “a common system of values or interests”, prevent emerging powers to act as a “cohesive force”. Yet, the establishment of the new BRICS Development Bank, as well as the negotiations of the post-2015 development agenda show that the emerging powers are gradually joining forces to defend their interests on the international stage. 4. Emerging powers are increasingly challenging the EU’s interests and its ability to put forward a common European approach. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a good example for a China-led initiative challenging the dominance of traditional international financial institutions and resulting in diverging responses from European Member States. The UK, together with Luxembourg, was among the first Member States to join the AIIB in March 2015. Contrary to the position adopted by the US, the EU should engage with emerging powers and support the reform of the current global governance system. The support by some EU member states for the new financial institution is a first step in this direction. As a founding member of the AIIB, the UK should therefore closely cooperate with the EU in the formulation of a coordinated European position within the AIIB.

European Neighbourhood 5. The EU is increasingly challenged in its own neighbourhood by rising powers such as China and Russia. The “16+1 Framework” of 2012 was a first sign of China’s intentions to foster its cooperation with countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). More recently, China launched the so-called “One Belt, One Road Initiative” (OBOR) or “New Silk Road Initiative” to reach out to countries in Central Asia and connect Asia to Europe. This long-term policy strategy encompasses two elements: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. China’s grand strategy will

275 of 309 Dr Anna Katharina Stahl, Research Fellow, EU-China Research Centre, College of Europe— Written Evidence (FSP0016) have important implications for the EU. So far, however, an EU response to China’s new foreign policy initiative is lacking. Some reflections have started in Brussels on how to respond to the OBOR.61 For instance, synergies between the OBOR and the EU’s Investment Plan for Europe (so-called Juncker Plan) have been explored. Further work needs to be done in this direction both at the level of the EU and in single Member States to explore how China’s New Silk Road initiative can serve European interests.

Africa 6. Africa will serve as a test case for the EU’s ability to adapt to a changing international environment. Due to the colonial history of some Member States, the EU traditionally considered the African continent as its “own backyard”. However, in recent years the African region has started to emancipate itself from Europe both in economic and political terms. The increase of trade and investment relations with emerging economies (in particular China) has contributed to economic growth in Africa. Moreover, African countries have started to formulate their own political and development agenda through the African Union (AU). The EU therefore needs to replace the donor-recipient relationship by an win-win partnership among equals. In this context, the future of the ACP-EU partnership beyond 2020 is of crucial importance. The ACP group is generally considered as a symbol of colonial legacy. In view of the review of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, a debate62 has been launched to find out if the ACP-EU Partnership can be adjusted to the new international environment or if it is deemed to disappear.

Asia 7. Considering the US pivot to Asia and China’s growing influence in the region, the EU needs to go beyond its engagement with China and formulate a regional foreign policy towards Asia. Unlike the US, the EU’s rebalancing towards Asia should be driven by economic rather than security/military considerations. The EU is particularly well suited to share its experiences and support regional integration in Asia. The recent Joint Communication63 by the High Representative and the European Commission calling for a “partnership with strategic purpose” with ASEAN can be considered as an important landmark. The EU’s proposal of a “Connectivity” dialogue with ASEAN is particularly promising. The EU’s proposal goes beyond China’s infrastructure based OBOR initiative, as it is aimed at sharing European experiences on soft infrastructures such as the single market.

External Action Instruments 8. In order to respond effectively to the new global challenges, the EU needs to revise its external action instruments. In particular, the EU’s toolbox in the field of development cooperation needs to be adjusted to the transition of Middle Income Countries (MICs). MICs - such as China - have been major recipients of EU aid and are now increasingly acting as so-called “emerging donors” in developing countries in

61 See conference organised by the EU-China Research Centre on “European Perspectives on China’s New Silk Road Initiative”: https://www.coleurope.eu/events/european-perspectives-chinas-new-silk-road 62 The EU is in the process of publishing a Green Paper on Post Cotonou. See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/acp/dt/1057/1057513/1057513en.pdf, http://ecdpm.org/dossiers/dossier-future-acp-eu-relations-post-2020/ 63 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=JOIN:2015:22:FIN&from=EN

276 of 309 Dr Anna Katharina Stahl, Research Fellow, EU-China Research Centre, College of Europe— Written Evidence (FSP0016) Africa. In the past years, the EU has therefore made different attempts in reforming its development cooperation instruments. 9. A prominent example of the EU’s efforts to engage with emerging donors has been the EU’s proposal of trilateral cooperation with China and Africa.64 Through its 2008 initiative, the EU has been at the forefront of the debate regarding the instrument of trilateral/triangular cooperation. Yet, the EU has been unable to find a consensus with its African and Chinese partners.65 10. There are also positive examples of reforms of the EU’s external action instruments. Through the recent establishment of the new Partnership Instrument (PI)66 the EU successfully broaden the scope of its development cooperation and increased the flexibility of its external action instruments. Moreover, the PI is specifically designed to promote the EU strategic interests worldwide.

The Reflection Process 11. To conclude, the process of strategic reflection on a new EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy needs to pay more attention to the cooperation between the EU and rising powers. More specifically, the EU needs to address the broader implications of the emergence of China in Africa, Asia and the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood.

64 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0654&from=EN 65 http://www.e-ir.info/2014/09/16/eu-china-africa-trilateral-relations-a-new-trend-in-international-relations ; http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Discussion-Paper_AnnaStahl_FINAL.pdf 66 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/pi_official_journal_lex.europa_20150422_en.pdf

277 of 309 Mr Ueli Staeger and Professor Stephanie Hofmann, Associate Professor, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies—Written Evidence (FSP0020)

Mr Ueli Staeger and Professor Stephanie Hofmann, Associate Professor, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies—Written Evidence (FSP0020) Evidence to be found under Professor Stephanie Hofmann and Mr Ueli Staeger

278 of 309 Professor Charles Tripp FBA, Mr Imad Mesdoua and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45)

Professor Charles Tripp FBA, Mr Imad Mesdoua and Mr James Watt CVO—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) Transcript to be found under Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO

279 of 309 University Of Leeds—Written Evidence (FSP0001)

University Of Leeds—Written Evidence (FSP0001)

Where the EU is now in its foreign and security policy: 1. The European Union (EU) is in need of a strategy for modern times. The now dated European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 needs updating. The Union needs a joined up sense of security that goes beyond the confines of the current stove-piped arrangements of the post-Lisbon treaty period where different areas of foreign and security policy are hived off into functional areas of interest that are driven as much by procedure as they are by substance. 2. At present it would be fair to say that the EU is a niche marketing foreign and security policy actor which provides a framework for member states to discuss areas of co-operation in their external policies. The EU is a civilian power (especially espousing economic power) and has deficits in the military field beyond regional crisis management in Europe’s Near Abroad. 3. As such in practice the EU has mainly a regional focus in its foreign and security policy via the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), whilst the Union has a global diplomatic presence via its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which has been in existence since 1970 (formerly called European Political Co-operation of EPC). 4. As an actor the EU has most power in its foreign external trade policy. Arguably, one of the most powerful political offices in the world is that of the Commissioner for External Trade in the European Commission. The Commission is the determining factor in the implementation of EU bilateral and multilateral trade agreements forged in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) framework. This is where EU power makes a difference to the presence of the Union in world affairs and is less dependent on the agency of member state governments. 5. There is a debate in the EU as to whether the Union should do beyond what already exists towards creating a global European Union with a concomitant strategy to boot. This would mean perhaps going beyond Europe’s normative power différence in the wider world (which is civilian, multilateral and mainly economic).

Prospects for Mogherini in her 2016 review: 6. In terms of pursuing a global EU strategy, the member states attenuate the extent to which the Union is able to operate at this level. European foreign and security policy is heavily influenced by Britain, France and Germany in an informal directoire. (However, since enlargement this arrangement has been watered down to a lesser than a greater degree by the likes of Poland). One way to attenuate member state influence is to push for even greater degrees of EU autonomy in external policies through the European Commission (in trade, aid and development) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) (in diplomacy). This would imply that the Commission and EEAS work together in tandem to achieve broader EU external policy action goals. This is unlikely given the bureaucratic politics between and within these institutions. This competitive co-operation is further exacerbated by Part V of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) which refers to trade and technical issues as being the domaines resérvés of the Commission and foreign policy being the purview of the EEAS. In fact, there is intense competition between the two institutions across all areas of EU external action.

280 of 309 University Of Leeds—Written Evidence (FSP0001)

7. With regard to global security policy the EU has pursued a normative and civilian power approach to key issues such as counter-terrorism (CT) which has mainly focused on internal security on the continent of Europe and its immediate Near Abroad. This is where the security threats lie for Europe. The EU approach has been one that is driven by law enforcement, intelligence and not by the use of force. A few years ago America’s mini wars within larger wars strategy in the Middle East to solving security issues did not translate well for the Europeans. On the one hand, this led to the United States (US) wishing to turn the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) into a global policy tool to fight terrorism, insurgencies and fight global movements that are against US national security interests. This would presumably also imply American hegemony over European security and the Europeans paying more towards their defence to become worthy partners of the US. On the other hand, EU member states in the main have balked at the American idea of a “global NATO” in favour of a more traditional North Atlantic focus for the Atlantic Alliance that would predominantly focus on the US protecting Europe. This also indicates that Europe still has a regional as opposed to global conception of its role in the world (trade accepted). 8. The problem with such an analysis is that this leaves the EU and its member states still dependent on NATO for their defence thereby undermining the scope for EU and wider European independence from Washington’s security umbrella. This in facts leads to dependence and free riding on the US. Europe is willing the sacrifice policy autonomy in NATO for security guarantees from America. The EU is not developing a defence component beyond the CSDP military operations which are in the EU’s Near Abroad anyway and work according to civilian/humanitarian crisis management premises anyway. In the final analysis, defence is still the purview of the member states of the EU. 9. Probably over 80-90% of all EU initiatives in the foreign and security policy fields focus on the European homeland. Reactions to foreign policy events (such as the Arab Spring) are conceived in terms of their impact on Europe. EU foreign policy is less developed in terms of shaping the broader milieu of international interactions at the global level. To develop such capabilities the member states of the EU will need to give more powers to the Commission and EEAS in external policy areas. This is unlikely though given the jealously of national foreign ministries of giving the Brussels institutions more powers and thereby attenuating their own powers. Some view this in terms of the road to political union in the EU creating a state-like polity within Europe. Foreign policy is part of such a political union and the member governments do not want to go beyond what already exists in order not to bestow legitimacy on such federal EU arrangements. 10. The diplomatic service of the EEAS is one of the largest in the world with over 140 embassies worldwide. These are valuable conduits for the CSFP and should not be underestimated. The EEAS embassies increasingly replace and represent member state interests in the wider world. The embassies are also excellent vehicles for gathering intelligence. The intelligence is gathered but the EU has no proper institution to analyse the intelligence in real time and its impact is therefore lessened. 11. Likewise, the EU has global powers via its trade policy. There is an attempt to bring this under the External Action Heading (in the Treaty of Lisbon Part V), but there is bureaucratic politics between the Commission and EEAS. Nevertheless, the EU still has global reach through its trade policy and uses this to leverage concessions from states in the broader areas of international security. This is an old trick and gives the EU a presence in the world via political and economic conditionality’s tied to trade

281 of 309 University Of Leeds—Written Evidence (FSP0001)

deals. Conversely, evidence highlights that compliance with EU policies is minimal in authoritarian states where European states have trade deals. Therefore, EU impacts on post Arab Spring states have been minimal and even aspirational in focus. 12. In summary, the EU is a niche marketing crisis manager that focuses on security issues in Europe and the Near Abroad. The transatlantic aspect of European security is still important and this undermines the prospects for a European vision for EU security both within Europe and further afield. The security threats at the global level ranging from nuclear weapons to “interdisciplinary” threats such as terrorism and even cyber security are often dealt with by EU member states themselves. A beefing up of the powers of the EEAS, the development of an EU intelligence capability and the movement towards using force beyond crisis management (when absolutely necessary) would help Europe to have a more developed sense of itself in the wider world and a greater presence. Critics argue that the EU is a modern reflexive actor that emphasises a different type of power in the wider world that is much more normative and deliberative. They further argue that the EU is an honest broker because of this normative power. This approach is undoubtedly important in guiding EU external action and is sui generis, but one also wonders the extent to which this gives the EU real power and influence in the wider world as opposed to the ability to influence others.

Dr Neil Winn

282 of 309 Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76)

Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76)

Evidence Session No. 7 Heard in Public Questions 67 - 76

TUESDAY 20 OCTOBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Baroness Suttie Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

______

Examination of Witness Mr Pierre Vimont, Senior Associate, Carnegie Europe and former Executive Secretary- General, European External Action Service

Q67 The Chairman: Monsieur Vimont, thank you very much for coming before us. I remember vividly the last time we met. You were very helpful to the Committee when we were doing our EU/Russia report. You will notice that it is a different cast of characters now. We have a rotation system in the House of Lords and almost everybody else rotated off. I will rotate off very shortly, but I am delighted to be here with you today. I do not, I think, need to explain that we are doing an inquiry into the emerging European security strategy. There is a gentleman there recording what you say, but, if you want to say anything completely off the record, please do so. All of us have received, and I am sure read, your Carnegie paper, which I thought was very helpful. We sent you a list of questions, but no doubt colleagues will ask you others as well.

If I could begin, I was particularly struck by two points you made here. In one, you were talking about the expertise of the Commission and the momentum it has gathered. The other was towards the end of the paper when you said that the EU must therefore target its action on those issues and regions where it can have the strongest impact. The lesson I draw from this is that you are thinking not so much in terms of a global strategy as of identifying those areas in which there is a clear European Union interest, and where the EU can make a

283 of 309 Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76) difference. It is a matter of identifying those areas, not a matter of first and second-order issues. Perhaps you could speak to that. Mr Pierre Vimont: Thank you for inviting me. I am quite impressed. It reminds me of the days when I tried to get into the National School of Administration. A very good example is what we are witnessing at the moment in the way that Europe has to deal with the migration pressure. We all agree that we do not have unlimited resources, financial or human. We have witnessed recent meetings of our heads of state and government to address financial support to Turkey and, at the same time, financial support to Africa. They have to give human resources to some of the EU agencies—FRONTEX and EASO—and are having great difficulty and struggling to provide seconded experts from national Member States to EASO and other agencies. One detects that we are reaching a limit where we need to set priorities. We cannot be everywhere in the world, even if we want to remain a Union capable of having universal diplomacy or foreign policy, which to some extent we need to keep in mind. At the end of the day, even if we want to be present in Latin America, Asia or other places, we still have priorities to tackle, which are very much linked to our neighbourhood—eastern Europe, the Mediterranean region, the Sahel and some other places—because this is where the threats are at the moment with regard to our own security and stability and to some of our major economic partnerships. At the end of the day, if we want to be honest with ourselves and not deny reality, we need to set up priorities. When I was preparing this paper, and discussed it with lots of colleagues in Carnegie and elsewhere, they rightly underlined the fact that defining priorities was one of the most difficult challenges for Europeans. Every Member State has its own priorities and therefore this is quite often difficult, but I am quite struck by the fact that today, as we try to move along, we are to a large extent constrained by events to set priorities. That is very important. On your first question, we also have to go back to something that has struck me from the beginning about our foreign policy. If you look at the way the whole European Union started, when it was still called the European Community, the founding fathers built up this idea on what they thought was the failure of classical diplomacy in the first and second world wars. The whole idea behind the European Union was to try to set up a new kind of external action based on institutions here in Brussels, the rule of law and treaties that would have a permanent base; in other words, the whole diplomacy of the 19th century was thrown out of the window. The interesting thing is that Member States have not gone along with that and have remained with the traditional, classical view—certainly Britain, France and a few others—of what diplomacy is all about. What we have witnessed since 1958 is a permanent struggle between Member States on one side and the Commission on the other. If you look at the way foreign policy has been built in Europe, Member States have retained much of their powers. It is still unanimity; it is still very much intergovernmental. The Commission on its side has slowly invented its own diplomacy, which we call "external action" in Brussels. It has developed a whole set of expertise and network in its fields of competence: development, assistance, human rights, humanitarian assistance, trade and a few others. It is quite interesting that the Lisbon Treaty has been trying to bridge the gap. To some extent, it has succeeded here and there, but we are still very far away from a cohesive, comprehensive foreign policy. You just cannot dispel 50 years of what I would call bad habits, even confrontation, in a stroke, in a second. This is where we are the moment.

284 of 309 Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76)

Q68 The Chairman: That gives rise to a great many questions that I would like to pursue, but let me put one question which I am really asking in order to get your answer on the record. You are making a clear distinction between those areas in which there is a security threat to members of the Union and those areas of the world which, however important, do not pose a security threat. In dealing with China or India, Britain and France, for instance, are no longer global powers. We deal with India and China largely in terms of our commercial interest, but in terms of our neighbourhood, regardless of whether you are a big or small country, our security is at stake. To quote Benjamin Franklin, if we do not hang together we will hang separately. Would that be a fair distinction? Mr Pierre Vimont: I totally agree with you. The Ukraine conflict that we discussed last time I met the Committee is a very good reminder that we still have threats even on our borders and inside the European continent. If one looks at the southern dimension, it is even more impressive, if only to note that Daesh, the Islamic State, is presently in Sirte in Libya and other parts, and is slowly moving into other parts of the Sahel or the Horn, and probably Yemen. All this brings immediately to our minds the fact that very close to our own territory, we have a major security threat. The question is: how do we answer that? Do we do it through our usual partnership inside NATO or do we do it by our own means? I think it must be a combination of both. At a time when we are wondering, for instance, whether we will ever have a Government of National Accord set up in Libya, how do we help that country get rid of its present instability and insecurity? How do we come in? We have plenty of ideas and some resources, but we still need to reflect a little more about the kind of assistance we can bring to that country, which is only a few miles away from our seashore. Whether it be Malta, Greece or Lampedusa in Italy, this is very close to our border. I do not think we have witnessed anything of that kind in recent years with regard to Europe. The whole issue of security is coming very much more to the forefront of our attention than previously.

Q69 Baroness Suttie: I would like to draw on your experience and expertise of the EEAS. How would you assess the relationship and level of trust between the EEAS and the national capitals, states and the EEAS’s relationship with the Commission? In the context of the strategic review, what measures could be taken to improve those relationships, if necessary? Mr Pierre Vimont: To come back to what I was saying earlier about the history of the European Union, the difficulty is that the EEAS is a very strange administrative body inside the European Union. Just by watching the geography of this place, on one side of the street you have the Commission and on the other side of the street the European Council. There has been a constant struggle between these two institutions. Throwing into the middle of that the EEAS and trying to achieve a balancing act between the two institutions while keeping the confidence of both is a daily struggle. The EEAS has managed so far, but it is a very delicate balance at the moment, as each institution is looking very closely at the EEAS all the time to see whether it is moving from one side to the other. In the first four years when I was in the EEAS, we managed to get a favourable opinion from the Member States, because they were surprised by the fact that we managed to hit the ground and run immediately and, therefore acted as we were asked to. Never forget that the EEAS was replacing the rotating presidency and I think we managed to do that rather well and they were pleased with that. The simple fact that the new High Representative and Vice-President, Mrs Federica Mogherini, has decided to have her office in the Commission and has done what, by the way,

285 of 309 Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76)

Member States were asking for—namely better co-ordination among Commissioners in charge of external relations—immediately created the feeling inside the Council that she is moving towards the Commission. I think it is overdoing it a little, but sometimes such feeling among Member States is there. We have to admit that, for some time, the EEAS will be in a difficult situation where, whatever it does one side or the other will think it is acting against their interests to some extent. This is not fair. I think the High Representative, like her predecessor, is managing this balance in the best way possible. I admit that it is very delicate. The task given by the Lisbon Treaty to the EEAS without the capacity of a fully-fledged institution. Therefore, the EEAS is not an institution and we have to abide by the rules of either the Commission or Council. To give you an interesting detail, when we are with the Council legal service, they want to hear only of the High Representative; they do not want to hear about the Vice President of the Commission; and when we are with the Commission it is exactly the reverse. We keep telling them that if they look at the Treaty, Mrs Mogherini, just like Lady Ashton before her, is both at the same time so how can you try to divide her? But that is the way they want to see her, each on its own side. That is why it is a bit complicated, but I think we are making progress. As time goes by, I think both institutions will get used to the fact that the EEAS belongs to both; it is part of both institutions and works for both of them. As well as the HRVP, the EEAS works for the President of the Commission and each and every one of the Commissioners; it also works for the President of the European Council and cooperates with the rotating Presidency. We gives briefs to all of them. We are ready and at their disposal whenever they need, so this will slowly percolate through the minds of everyone and I think it will be for the better. Your second question is about how the strategic review, or as we call it, the "security and foreign policy strategy" that is going to be built up, can also serve the purpose of improving this institutional framework. It is precisely what Mrs Mogherini is doing, which is to have a very open consultation, not only with both institutions but with Member States, the think- tank community and civil society organisations. It is just starting, so we will have to see how it works, but she is doing it in a very transparent way. It is quite different from the method of Javier Solana, who did it in a very swift way, in less than six months, having very quick consultation and immediately drafting something. She has done it in two stages: one took place up to June and the second one is going to be a very open and transparent consultation. I hope that at the end of the day there will be a strong sense of common ownership by all those involved, but this remains to be seen. We will have to see how it goes, but at least the goal and the way the process has been launched is rather interesting because it is a new one.

Q70 Lord Risby: In the summary of your paper you highlight one thing that is designed to improve functionality, which is perhaps formalising ad hoc groupings. You cite the example of the French and German efforts vis-à-vis Ukraine and Russia. You very correctly and properly said that there is a limit to what the structures can do in the form of finance, personnel and all these things, but this is a way of enhancing the functionality and success of this process. I would be interested to know how you think it could work, and what would be the trigger to suggest that one group of nations with a strategic, geographic or whatever interest could particularly get involved in this, and how it could come together without being dysfunctional. Mr Pierre Vimont: I make a couple of observations in answer to your question. We cannot deny the reality that a Union of 28 members today, maybe even more tomorrow, is a very difficult organisation to work with when you have to manage a crisis. We see it also with the UN. The Security Council has difficulties, even more so as people are discussing the

286 of 309 Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76) possibility of enlarging it. We have a body of 28 Member States with different positions, opinions and conceptions of what EU foreign policy should be, and this is a very striking example. For instance, the UK conception of foreign policy, because of history, size and dimension, is naturally different from what may be the conception of Latvia, Estonia or even Hungary about EU foreign policy. Because of these differences in status and position to some extent it seems reasonable to me that, if we want to be a Union that can play a role and be an active player in foreign policy, quite often when we face these kinds of crises, as we witness today in Syria, Yemen, Libya or Ukraine, we need to find another way of doing things. This is more or less what we have been doing for some time. The recent agreement in the Iran nuclear negotiation is a very good example. It started with three EU Member States: UK, Germany and France. The three Foreign Ministers decided to take an initiative. What was interesting and quite striking at that time is that when they reached an agreement by the autumn 2003 with Iran, whereby that country suspended its nuclear programme and launched into negotiation, the three Member States immediately came to the conclusion that they needed to take on board Javier Solana and that he should be the chair of the small group, in order for the other Member States—at that time we were only 15—to feel a sense of ownership of that small contact group, or whatever you call it. We did the same thing before in the western Balkans—Bosnia and elsewhere—where a group of Member States also played a major role, with the US and others coming in, as in the case of the Iranian talks. As to Ukraine, the famous Normandy format seems to be missing something. One of the reasons why some Member States had misgivings about the initiative taken by Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande is precisely that we did not have that European chair or presence on board. Several times, we said to our French and German colleagues, “Why do you not ask for a European representative, namely Mrs Mogherini, or the High Representative/Vice-President, to be on board and be part of this process?” The answer was, “We would love to, but we would get a negative answer from Russia”. We have found another way through, which is regular information and updating by the French and German Foreign Ministers to the High Representative. But it is not exactly the same. This is why, time and again, some Member States are not entirely satisfied with this way of doing things. For me, with the flexibility of small groups, you can see pretty well how this could work if, for instance, tomorrow we want to take an initiative related to a peace agreement in Colombia in Latin America, or maybe some part of Africa, such as the Great Lakes. You could put together countries who know the area well—in Latin America, Spain of course, and in Africa, maybe Belgium. They could join the two or three big Member States who are usually part of those groups. You would have small groups with flexible composition, but you would need the presence of a representative from the EU institutions, namely the High Representative or one of her officials. This could work and would be an efficient way of doing things. Many Member States admit rather easily the fact that, not being familiar with some part of the world, they should let those who know better deal with it. They can come in if they want, but otherwise they are rather happy, or at least comfortable with the fact that some Member States take the lead on this. Think about the Central African Republic. Many Member States do not know much about the Central African Republic; sometimes they do not even know where it is located. By the way, they are not the only ones. Therefore, to allow France, and maybe Britain, Belgium and a few others to take the lead and push forward a contact group that will be most active in this region, and to let them move ahead, is something that Member States can accept. What they want is to get regular information on what is going on and to have their

287 of 309 Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76) representative, namely the High Representative and the EEAS as part of that team, regularly updated. If they are being asked for a financial contribution, or a contribution, if we set up a military or civilian operation or mission, we must be sure that they are well informed on what is going on, and can give their opinion and their reaction on what is going on. The wrong way of doing things—I am sorry to say this about the country I know best—was the French way when it went into Mali on its own. To some extent it was understandable because we did not have much time. The only country able to go into Mali and stop the Tuareg infiltration from the north was the French, because they had troops stationed close by, but to do the same afterwards in Central Africa and then very quickly come to Brussels and ask Member States “Now could you help us with a financial contribution?”, did not go down very well with EU partners. They were all taken by surprise and had the impression that the French were just asking for money without further information, consultation or co-operation between us. I think the idea of a flexible Europe is one we will see more and more, even outside the realm of foreign policy, as a way of combining the number we are today—28 and maybe more tomorrow—and the need to be flexible, capable of moving quickly if need be into some of these crises and being able to manage some of them in an efficient way.

Q71 Lord Dubs: Can I say how interesting I found your paper? May I pursue the point you have just been dealing with? I find it very persuasive. Are you suggesting that ad hoc groupings of Member States could be the model for the future? Is it likely to be accepted by all 28 countries, but particularly the big ones, as a way of moving forward, because it is an interesting development on the whole process? Could you relate that to the comment you made at the beginning about the countries taking the classical view versus the others? Does that run counter to the idea of small groupings, or could it be part of it? Mr Pierre Vimont: Maybe I will sound a little cynical. I think the big countries that have a tradition of very active national diplomacy, with some sort of universal vocation, can live with this concept of small groups as long as they are part of it. To some extent, they will be a core group, or at the centre of it, to which you can add additional Member States. I think all Member States could live with it—this is what I sense when I discuss it with my former colleagues—as long as it is done in the proper way: in other words, it should not be imposed upon them without any prior notification; it should be done with regular information and complete transparency; and, if some of those who are not part of the group at some point would like to join, it should be possible for them to do so, and so on and so forth. That is very important. The countries that may resent these small groups are the middle-range countries, namely, to put it in simple terms, Italy and maybe Spain, and some others—namely, Sweden, Netherlands and a few others. Sometimes, they could resent the influence of the "big three" and sense that the way current EU foreign policy is moving it is becoming more and more influenced, and a greater role is being exerted, by the "big three", and therefore the other ones are following. This is one of the reasons why I think that, if you try to push the idea of flexible contact groups, or small groups, it would be interesting from time to time to have on board countries like Sweden or the Netherlands, which have very active national diplomacy and have a lot of input to give to these groups. Therefore, when I am talking about flexibility, I am also thinking about the flexible composition of these groups. That would also be very useful and important.

288 of 309 Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76)

Q72 Baroness Coussins: One of the recommendations you make in your paper is that the new strategy should be designed to reflect the Union’s responsibilities as a geopolitical power. Would it be right to infer from that that you support a continuation or development of the previous strategies and the description of the EU as a transformational power, or would you go along with the terminology we have heard from other witnesses who have said that what is now needed is a EU foreign policy that is transactional rather than transformational? Mr Pierre Vimont: I would go along with your second option. We Europeans need to be a little more humble than we have been in the past. If you read the first security strategy, it looked like Europe was about to become the main actor in the international community. Since then, we have seen that the situation may be more complicated and complex than we thought at the time. There was a little hubris around that strategy. From the an historical point of view, what could be called the "Solana strategy" was interesting because we were coming out of a rather difficult period in Europe when we had been pretty much divided on the Balkan and Iraq crises. We were coming out of these two major crises with a pretty strongly divided Europe. The idea that we could appear as one of the main powers in the international community seemed to me a little far-fetched, but anyway it is history and we need to look to the future. As to the role Europe could play today if it accepts it, which is far from being agreed by all 28 Member States, the idea that Europe should be a geopolitical actor and perceive itself as such is, among some Member States, still questionable to some extent. When you discuss with some EU Member States the role we should play in, say, Syria—I will come back to defining the role—the simple fact that we should try to play a role in that crisis, or the Libyan crisis, is to some Member States still questionable. Some will say, “Let’s stay out of this; we have nothing to win, so why not stay out of it and stick to our continent?” Those are usually the ones who say we have much more to do on the eastern side of Europe, because this is part of our territory or continent and Russia is a major threat—that is their point of view—and we need to deal with that first and foremost. Personally, I think that is wrong and we should do both, eastern and southern. Coming back to the role we could exert in the Syrian crisis and in other crises like Yemen, Libya or the Middle East, we have a transactional role to play. We are in a natural position to be an honest broker. I had a thought today, listening to what is being said about the recent Russian military interference in Syria and the way it is finding difficulty, and vice versa, in starting a dialogue with Washington and the regional actors—namely, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and some of the Gulf countries— I was struck by the fact that Europe as such has many cards in its hand that it could play to act as an honest broker between the different partners and play a very useful role. For that purpose, we need to be united and that is the main problem for EU foreign policy. It is still a policy that needs to be agreed by all 28 Member States. If you do not have the 28 on board, you cannot move along. For me, it is obvious that, if we are all on board, it is an extraordinary opportunity for Europe at the moment to act as someone who could have an objective view about how to bring all the different partners around the table to try to get out of that crisis. Of course, we need to do it jointly with the UN and the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, but we could be a major support to the UN initiative because of the role we have played with regard to Iran, for example, in chairing the EU3+3. Think about our role in the past with regard to some of the crises we have been going through; or the way we managed the Libyan crisis, where some of the Member States were involved in the military operation; and the way the EU High Representative, then Cathy Ashton, managed to keep the door open with the Arab League

289 of 309 Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76) and African Union. That was very interesting. We garnered there the trust and confidence of many of our partners which I think we could use today. It is a pity, to some extent, that we have great difficulty in getting all 28 Member States to agree on the way to play the role of honest broker, mediation or whatever you call it, where Europe could play a useful part.

Q73 Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: To develop what you have been saying, which is fascinating, in a sense the Commission and EEAS now have the capability or technical ability to deliver particular ways of operating, but the political will is often not there. That weakens the operations but also means lack of clarity about the way forward and where the strategy should be. It seems as if that is the position we are in. Do you see any means of persuading and working with those Member States so they do buy into the need for a strategy and involvement, because at some stage all of that comes back to us? For example, Syria and Libya are the main reasons for the crisis in migration at the moment. Mr Pierre Vimont: To come back to your assessment, what we are witnessing at the moment is a Commission with very good and strong expertise but which sometimes lacks the geopolitical vision, whereas Member States on their side quite often have that vision but lack the political will to make something of it, because either they are divided or sometimes they have some resistance to moving in. Some Member States will not want to move in; others have a contradictory position. Therefore, it is about bringing these two pieces together and having a coherent geopolitical vision, plus the instruments to implement it. If it works—I hope that one day it will—that would make the European Union a formidable actor in the international community, because no one else among the international community has the ability to use all the different tools. We have all of them the EU has at our disposal, and that would make us a formidable actor. For the moment, we do not have that common political vision. This is why, coming back to the security and foreign policy strategy, in the end it is about having all the different institutions somewhat aware of what is missing and being able to define both a strategic vision and afterwards the way to use our instruments for the implementation of that geopolitical analysis. That is why it is so important to have this moment of reflection and the ability for all of us to understand that. Look at the way we are proceeding at the moment with some of the sectoral policies related to the foreign dimension, namely the reviews of EU neighbourhood policy, of our relation with ACP countries and of development assistance in relation to the new sustainable goals set by the UN. In each and every one of those cases, we are still working very much within the old process; in other words, the Commission is doing its homework very well, and Member States are watching a little from the outside and sometimes trying to give some input. But, at the end of the day, it is very much following the usual processes, whereby we miss a coherent, comprehensive geopolitical vision of what we are looking for. The main question we should ask ourselves on the neighbourhood policy is: what are we looking for? What is the kind of partnership we are looking for in the years ahead? For me, one of the first questions is: is it still relevant to have inside our neighbourhood policy both eastern and the southern neighbourhood together in the same package? Many reasons for having these two partnerships together are well known: eastern and central European Member States being sure that their priority is on board; and southern Member States, like Italy, France or Spain, being sure that the Mediterranean neighbourhood is not forgotten. But the reality on the ground today, in what we are facing in eastern Europe—which is a whole issue about the kind of relationship we need to set up with Russia in the years ahead and, in the future what will be the new kind of "architecture" we want in our European

290 of 309 Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76) continent with regard to the security and economic relationship—is totally different from what we are witnessing in the southern Mediterranean area. It is about the kind of political and economic relationship we want to have with other much more diversified partners. I think north Africa is facing challenges that are quite different from the ones that the Gulf countries or Middle East partners are facing—Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, if one day it comes out of its crisis. Europe needs a new vision based on the geopolitical reality of this neighbourhood

Q74 The Chairman: Before Lord Horam asks his question, I would like to clarify one matter. You talked about big and small countries. That was extremely interesting. Would you agree that a big difference between the European Union now and in the past is that today it is not only much bigger but there is one country which stands out so much above the others, namely Germany? The combination of these two factors means that, if Germany feels its domestic interests are at stake, it is in a position to determine what the European position will be. You referred to the new way of doing things under the European Union compared with the past. At that time, the Community was smaller and there were a number of large countries, and no one country stood out head and shoulders above the others, but, for various reasons, Germany now stands out head and shoulders above the others, and therefore, when its own most sensitive interests are at stake, there is no question about whose will dominates. Mr Pierre Vimont: I would largely agree, with only one nuance I would bring to your assessment. In the field of foreign policy, the German dimension is a little more complicated; in other words, because of its economic and financial capacity, Germany is certainly above the others, but when you deal with foreign policy, do not forget the reality that other large countries, namely Britain and France, still represent. They are permanent members of the Security Council and still have a large diplomatic network around the world. They see themselves as major actors in the international community, which to some extent is not the case with Germany. A few years ago Germany was more modest and, as you know, somewhat self-limited its role in foreign policy for all the reasons we know. This is changing, definitely. We are seeing much more active German diplomacy, which for a long time was very much looking to the European Union as its natural playground. It now looks as if things are changing in Berlin and we are witnessing a more assertive German diplomacy that is now playing on its own or with one or two other Member States, as we saw recently in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Germany with the UK launched some new ideas to try to break the current deadlock in Sarajevo. But, largely, I would agree with you. The difference between big, medium and small Member States has a lot to do, first, with diplomatic capacity and resources and whether they have active diplomacy, or otherwise, and, secondly, with the way they perceive what should be Europe’s role in foreign policy. That goes further than only the "big three". I would put in the same group of "active diplomacy" many other countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden or Denmark, which certainly want to see a very active European Union in the field of foreign policy. Others are less interested in such a role. This is where the difference lies.

Q75 Lord Horam: Like my colleagues, I enjoyed reading your paper enormously. It is extremely lucid. I hope that Mrs Mogherini will have a copy of it. I agree with your evidence that there is an opportunity for European Union countries to play a part in Syria, for example. If we play a part as honest broker, as you describe it, in a sense that is capitalising on the strength of our values. If we generate trust and confidence in other partners, be it America, Russia, China or whatever it may be, to a degree that is transformational. In putting

291 of 309 Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76) our values forward as trustworthy people to do business with, we can play this particular role. That is important. As is said, never waste a good crisis, and maybe Syria is a good crisis not to waste from that point of view. As you also said, we have to get our act together. You point out the structural difficulties between the way the Commission is organised and the way the EEAS is organised. In particular, you say in your paper that to help with this the EU should introduce simple and specific working rules at an administrative level to overcome the practical obstacles to implementation of a global strategy. Could you elaborate on that? Are these the ideas you have to get the EEAS and Commission to work together more, and what are these administrative practical rules? Mr Pierre Vimont: There are many. I could give you a few examples. I tried to pinpoint a few of these practical rules in my paper, but it was a short one and I did not want to lose too much time. Let me give you one or two examples. One is when the EEAS is being asked by the Member States quite often, or we decide on own, to make a contribution through a strategic paper on issues like what should be the future role of the European Union in the Sahel region, or with regard to Syria and Iraq, as we have done in the past, or in the Horn of Africa. At the moment, most of these papers cannot go out to the Council if we do not have the green light of the Commission, due to the EEAS being seen and perceived as—from an institutional point of view—part of the Commission, which means getting the green light from every service inside the Commission. God knows, this can take a long time. It is called inter-service consultation. When we manage to get through that kind of internal consultation, either the crisis is over or it has become worse and we need to do another paper. My point is that, as a service that the EEAS needs to move swiftly and come up with ideas— sometimes a little like policy planning staff—we should be allowed to come out with papers that do not need to have the ownership of everybody; they can be seen very quickly. These papers should be under the EEAS's own responsibility, but they should go out quickly so Member States can take them on board and give their feedback, and that is the way we move. Imagine what it would be like if, in the Foreign Office, or French Quai d’Orsay, we needed to get inter-ministerial support and a green light before we can send papers to our Minister—we could not go on. Therefore, it is about adapting the working practices to the reality of diplomatic life. The same is true of the way the EEAS recruits and appoints “diplomats” to our EU delegations. Sometimes, we have a very good head of delegation. Could we not be allowed to keep him one more year if we want to? No. After four years he or she has to leave, and that is the rule and the Commission wants to abide by it. If you want to keep him for one more year you have to go through once again a whole consultation to be sure everybody can agree with that. It is a very cumbersome process. We need to be able to adapt working practices to the reality with which the EEAS is struggling every day. That goes for financial rules, administrative rules and the papers we come out with. This is the kind of thing where the EEAS should be given a little leeway in order to perform more efficiently.

Q76 The Chairman: Mr Vimont, thank you very much indeed. It has been a most instructive session. I am extremely grateful to you. Could I ask one last question? Since we are the British Parliament I hope you will be frank. Do you feel that over the last year the shadow of negotiation and referendum has inhibited the British contribution in this area? I am thinking not so much of the quality of British diplomats but the degree to which the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have been involved in matters which you would expect a country of our size to be involved in.

292 of 309 Mr Pierre Vimont—Oral Evidence (QQ 67-76)

Mr Pierre Vimont: I will be very honest with you. So far, I do not think so, for many reasons, one being that we have had so many crises in the last months in Europe on our hands that to some extent what I would call the British question has been somewhat left on the side here in Brussels. We have had the debt crisis, then the Greece issue and now migration. We have been very much focusing on these difficulties and allowing technical work to be done with regard to the British question. I think we are reaching the end of that limit and patience with the UK, and we really need to look into the British question very quickly and try to come out of this with not only clear answers and a clear understanding of the kinds of negotiations that the UK Prime Minister wants to have but, as much as possible, a quick outcome and result of that negotiation. Where I share the implicit concern in your question is in relation to the referendum campaign. I understand that that could be a long campaign during next year. Having gone through some of these campaigns in my own country—two, by the way, one positive and one negative at the end of the day—this is I can only say these campaigns are an uphill struggle because it is very difficult to handle a referendum campaign when public opinion or a political party comes out with new ideas and questions all the time. When you are the Government in charge of that referendum campaign you are always in a reactive position, and running after events. That makes it a very difficult campaign. A very good French political observer said that the problem with referendums is that you ask a question and people do not answer that question; they always answer another one that has to do with internal politics or whatever. Therefore, that makes it a very difficult campaign with regard to consideration of Europe. I am talking only about referendums on Europe. Europe is such a difficult concept for the average citizen to understand that they are always looking for something else. That is why I think that, if we manage to come quickly to the end of the negotiation that the British Government want to launch and get a result, the most difficult period will be the referendum campaign. The Chairman: I am sure that you are right. Looking at it from the point of view of those of us who wish to stay, perhaps one advantage of our referendum, compared with the ones that you have had in France and elsewhere, is that the referendum is about the status quo, not about changing it. In general, when one looks at the experience of referendums, the status quo often comes through, but I do not think any of us would want to put a lot of money on the outcome. Thank you very much.

293 of 309 Mr James Watt CVO, Mr Imad Mesdoua and Professor Charles Tripp FBA—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45)

Mr James Watt CVO, Mr Imad Mesdoua and Professor Charles Tripp FBA—Oral Evidence (QQ 35-45) Transcript to be found under Mr Imad Mesdoua, Professor Charles Tripp FBA and Mr James Watt CVO

294 of 309 Dr Carol Weaver, Lecturer in European Security, De Montfort University—Written Evidence (FSP0004)

Dr Carol Weaver, Lecturer in European Security, De Montfort University—Written Evidence (FSP0004)

Whether the EU is ready and capable to respond to a more threatening and complex security environment? What are the opportunities it might present for the Union?

1. The EU as a body is not currently capable of totally defending itself or its neighbours from military attack without NATO assistance or at least, depending on the threat, the close cooperation of member states such as the UK and France most likely in conjunction with the European Defence Agency (EDA). 2. The question also implies other types of security issues from migration and radicalisation to cyber security and organised crime. Europol has been set up to begin to analyse and police these issues but there are many problems including that there is very little if any cross-border policing.

Whether the EU should focus its foreign policy on its neighbourhood?

3. Yes it should. This is one of the most dangerous tinderboxes in the world both in the ‘East’ (Russia/Ukraine, Azerbaijan/Armenia) and the ‘South’ (Syria and the MENA states). There is a great need for diplomacy and hope. The US has a focus on Asia at the moment and seems to expect more from Europe. The EU has tried to export stability to its eastern and southern neighbourhood via its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) knowing the danger that it might otherwise end up importing instability (which would seem to be happening now). 4. The neighbours’ neighbours are also an important focus i.e. Russia, all of the Middle East, most of Africa.

Are the EU’s foreign policy instruments in the neighbourhood fit for purpose?

5. The EU is well aware that the ENP is failing and so it is revamping it so that there is more differentiation between neighbours that it can help and who want to be closer to the EU and those that don’t. It is also trying to work more closely with civil society rather than corrupt governments. The ENP’s self-assessment progress reports have been an exercise in collusion and need to be closer to the truth in future (according to the commissioner). 6. Much of the EU’s ENP is about donations which are often given to intermediaries to deal with. Many neighbourhood states have corrupt governments and are more interested in the EU as a donor than in the EU as a facilitator of change. However the ordinary people are often genuinely interested in democracy and an end to corruption especially the young people. They look to the EU as a role model. 7. Some of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions have been successful – both civilian and military. Many involve borders.

How should the EU and Member States respond to weak states and economic and political turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa?

295 of 309 Dr Carol Weaver, Lecturer in European Security, De Montfort University—Written Evidence (FSP0004) 8. It seems as though the more the divided UN P5 members do in a military way the worse the situation gets. The EU has tried to use soft power including diplomacy and the ENP to counteract the violence but this cannot work well with failed or corrupt states. 9. Nevertheless the EU must keep its role as a soft power and take up a more diplomatic and united role than NATO. It also needs to learn to be a better peacekeeper and use its CSDP missions wisely. Lessons must be learnt from the Bosnia safe havens. 10. The EU must not lose its ‘post-modern’, ‘peace-loving’ and altruistic values because if it does so there is no role model for the rest of the world and ensuing chaos and lack of freedom would be guaranteed.

Are the diplomatic and intelligence capacities of the Member States and the EU capable to respond to a new more complex, complicated and connected world?

11. Other people are better qualified to answer this but the answer must be no, not fully, because of the increasing challenges. The diplomatic and intelligence services must maintain the highest integrity and values rather than working in a situation of panic because there are probably no better services to replace the majority of them.

Should the review address the operational plans and resourcing to advance the EU’s foreign policy strategy?

12. The UK needs to play one of the strongest roles in the EU’s foreign policy. 13. Note: My academic work on ‘security communities’ such as the European Union points to the necessity of the UK remaining in the EU for the continued existence of the EU as a union (not state). My theory says that in order for security communities to arise and endure they need a basis of balanced multipolarity and the EU would not have that without the UK.

296 of 309 Mr Hans Wessberg and Mr Peter Eklund—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66)

Mr Hans Wessberg and Mr Peter Eklund—Oral Evidence (QQ 58-66) Transcript to be found under Mr Peter Eklund and Mr Hans Wessberg

297 of 309 Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG—Oral Evidence (QQ 92-108)

Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG—Oral Evidence (QQ 92-108)

Evidence Session No. 9 Heard in Public Questions 92 – 108

TUESDAY 20 OCTOBER 2015

Members present

Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Baroness Coussins Lord Dubs Lord Horam Earl of Oxford and Asquith Lord Risby Baroness Suttie Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)

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Examination of Witness Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG, Managing Director, Middle East and North Africa, European External Action Service

Q92 The Chairman: Dr Westcott, thank you very much for coming at what I realise is short notice, filling in and all the rest of it. I am sure you have been briefed at least on the fact that we are all members of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union. In particular, we are members of the Sub-Committee dealing with EU external affairs. We are pursuing a report on the emerging European security strategy. A record is being taken, but, if you want to go off the record, do say so. As you were not on the original list of people we were going to meet, perhaps you could explain briefly exactly what it is you do. Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: My name is Nick Westcott and I am currently managing director in the European External Action Service for Middle East and north Africa. Until about a month ago, I was managing director Africa, meaning sub-Saharan Africa. I have been with the EEAS more or less since it was founded in February 2011. I worked for four years with Cathy Ashton and, since November last year, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative, but I remain a member of Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service on temporary— we call it “supple”—leave.

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The Chairman: Are people like you and the chap who is EU Ambassador in Belgrade on secondment and you know you can go back, or have you thrown in your lot with this new enterprise? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: That is an interesting question. We have a right of return and we can do this job only as long as we continue to be a member of the British Diplomatic Service, so we go back. On the other hand, I am not on secondment because I am paid by the EU, not Her Majesty’s Government.

Q93 The Chairman: Compared with the far-off days when I was involved with the Commission, the number of senior British officials in the Commission has fallen calamitously, and we are very under-represented in the Commission. Given our weight relative to other Member States, how are we off in the External Action Service? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: Middling. We are not as badly off as we are in some other parts of the Commission, but we are still under the proportion that we would normally have. The Chairman: Why is that? Is it because people do not volunteer? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: There are two types of Brits within the EAS. There are permanent officials who will stay there throughout and there are temporary agents, as we are called, like me, who volunteered to come in, applied for a job and were selected. Relatively few of my Foreign Office colleagues have felt like volunteering to come into the EAS for a four-year period at the moment, but both the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office and I are busy trying to encourage more colleagues to apply. The Chairman: Presumably, much will depend on the referendum. Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: I did not want to say that, but yes.

Q94 The Chairman: That is very interesting and relevant to a lot of the things we are talking about. My impression is that the Mogherini exercise is focused increasingly on our neighbouring region rather than a global strategy and that the distinction is between those issues which threaten our security, by which I mean the EU in total, and those that do not. Is that a fair way of putting it? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: I would not put it exactly like that. It is a global strategy because the EU, like its Member States, has global interests. Things that happen in China can have as much of an impact on the EU as things that happen in Syria, but they are different. Two things have led to a greater focus on the near neighbourhood. Fundamentally, the physical insecurity of the region and all of the events in Ukraine, Syria and Libya have directly impacted significantly on the EU and all its Member States. Therefore, we need to address more attention to that now, but it remains a global strategy, in that threats to stability and economic viability throughout the world are relevant to the EU. The previous strategy of 2003 was billed primarily as a security strategy and this is a slightly wider-ranging one. Obviously, security is the number one preoccupation, but it is also taking more account of other political and economic impacts from the rest of the world.

Q95 The Chairman: At the outset, the Germans and French were less keen on undertaking this than some others. Is it your impression that everybody now is committed to the exercise, or would these doubts have remained? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: I think they have been assuaged, because in June Mrs Mogherini presented a background paper to the European Council, which agreed

299 of 309 Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG—Oral Evidence (QQ 92-108) unanimously that she should go ahead and produce a strategy to tackle the issues identified in that paper. It was quite a good paper, but it was background and not strategy itself. I would say that, now, the Member States recognise that the EU needs to get a coherent world view and some guidelines for its engagement, particularly on the security issues of the neighbourhood but also beyond.

Q96 The Chairman: You can, if you wish, switch off the recorder for my next question. Is it your impression that the shadow of the negotiation and referendum has been an inhibiting factor in Britain’s contribution—I do not mean just diplomats but at ministerial level—or do you feel that at least thus far Britain has contributed in a reasonable and constructive fashion? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: I think the latter. The prospect of a renegotiation has not had any significant impact on the UK’s ability to input substantively to the strategy. The next few months will be critical for identifying what the strategy should be. There are British experts on the advisory boards and British officials have had a substantive input to the drafting of the background paper, so I do not think that should reduce our ability to influence the outcome.

Q97 Lord Dubs: May I test an idea on you? I have met British ambassadors in many countries. I thought they were all high-calibre people who gave us an incredibly informed briefing on the situation in their countries. That is the sort of access that the Foreign Office has on a day-by-day basis, and yet among the 28 there are countries that do not have the benefit of that. Is there not an imbalance in regard to those countries that have top diplomatic people and get their own information, as well as getting it through the EU system? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: Big countries carry more weight in the world than small countries. That is true to some extent within the context of the EU. This is a slightly indirect answer. Small countries like the EAS and common foreign policy because it gives them more influence and information than they would otherwise have. There is a big market among smaller Member States for the information we can provide. We are represented in almost every single country. Very few Member States are. We as the EU are able to deliver on the ground information and influence. Apart from the UK, France and Germany, which are global players and have missions everywhere, we can supplement what those Member States can do for themselves. Even in the case of the UK, for some countries the EU is able to provide additional valuable influence. In particular, in my previous job in Africa, there were many countries where the UK would have a one-man mission in Bamako or Liberia and the EU would have a fully- fledged mission, with the Gates programme, with lots of political intelligence, and we would share that. Therefore, we were able to enhance the UK’s ability both to understand what is going on and influence it. In other countries, the UK is better informed than the EU delegation. Where I am now in the Middle East, the UK tends to have more Arabists, bigger missions and huge commercial engagement which the EU does not, so it varies from place to place.

Q98 The Chairman: You mentioned Dar es Salaam where in colonial times my wife was brought up. We were there not long ago. I noticed that the British mission shared accommodation with the EU and one other Member State. Is that a very rare phenomenon? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: It is relatively infrequent, but I take some pride in that because I was the British deputy high commissioner in Dar es Salaam at the point we agreed to have a joint mission with the EU, the Germans and the Dutch, so reasonably like-minded people. It has been a great success.

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Earl of Oxford and Asquith: But historically at odds, certainly the Dutch, Germans and British in the case of east Africa. Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: Reconciliation is always possible. We have replicated that in one or two other places. In Juba, there is an EU compound. Almost all the Member States are present on this compound, which is very sensible and efficient in a new country that came into existence. There are one or two other places where we share premises with one or two, but I would not say it has become a general practice.

Q99 Lord Risby: Can we turn to the countries that comprise north Africa? I was a governor of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy for nine years. We tried to do parliamentary capacity building and encourage civil society. If there is one theme that runs through these countries, it is that they are very statist in different ways. Some do not function very well. We have been talking about the balance between transformational and transactional, which is under discussion currently. Are you able to have adequate discussions, or is it part of your remit to talk to civil society, for example, or people not attached to the state in trying to formulate a view about the relationship? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: It is a very large and important part of our delegation’s engagement with any country to link into civil society. We used to say that the partnership between the EU and African countries is with the people, not just the Governments. Therefore, particularly where we had a big aid programme, it was very important to be able to see the benefits that our aid brought to individual people. A lot of that was delivered not just through the state, through government, but through NGOs, both international and local. Whenever I travelled in Africa, I would usually ensure that, among my meetings with Ministers, I would see key civil society groups, not just those we would think of as traditional NGOs but wider civil society, including churches, chiefs and often local associations of a kind that were not necessarily doing health, education, gender or whatever. It was a very important part of my engagement, as well as meeting the political opposition which was a routine part of it. As High Representative, Federica Mogherini also makes a point wherever she travels of meeting civil society as well as the Government. Sometimes, this is not very popular, but she insists that it has to be an integral part of her programme. We go to some lengths to ensure we build contacts across society as a whole through all kinds of civil society groups.

Q100 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: Carrying on with the north African countries and Middle Eastern countries, we have been hearing pretty uniform evidence from witnesses that the new security review must be more flexible and tailor-made—that is the buzzword—or there must be a more country-by-country approach. However, when you look at the countries of north Africa they are all very different. There are some like Tunisia, where it is pretty obvious what has to be done, if there is the political will. Morocco and Algeria are very different from each other. There are countries like Libya, where the UN is the driving force. When you come to develop your formulation of the security review, to what extent can you break down the review—I do not mean specific recommendations—or do you want to, into individual countries in creating greater focus for the programmes? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: There are two answers to that. In terms of the security strategy that is being looked at, there is an ongoing debate as to exactly what the format of that strategy should be. There are some of us who think that a useful strategy is a framework that identifies interests, values and priorities in terms of overall policy approach, which you then use to govern your decisions on individual situations. There are others who

301 of 309 Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG—Oral Evidence (QQ 92-108) like a strategy that is a set of objectives and a list of things to do. That is not my idea of a useful strategy. The 2003 strategy was in some ways very successful and lasted quite well because it took the former approach, and probably we will take that approach again. Earl of Oxford and Asquith: You will take the framework values and priorities for all 16 countries of the neighbourhood. I do not quite understand how it will come out. Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: This is my second answer. That is for the overall security strategy. For the review of the neighbourhood policy, we had a rather rigid structure which was a one size fits all. This was what we assumed we wanted to do; here was a spectrum, and we could go to stage 1, stage 2 or stage 3. That has not responded to the diversity of the kind of neighbours we have. The new one is looking very much at having a more flexible set of partnership instruments so that we can apply the right formula to different countries. Then we will be more diversified by individual countries. That is for the neighbourhood. Earl of Oxford and Asquith: That is very helpful to me.

Q101 Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top: The EEAS is quite a new EU institution. The Commission is very powerful and has the money. We have heard different views about the relationship between the two and how that informs the development of the strategy and how the Member States see the institutions involved. Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: You are right. The EEAS is young and to some extent is still finding its way in the world, as a five year-old might, but it did not appear out of thin air. On Africa, over the past four years, we were able to have very fruitful co-operation between the EEAS and the Commission, which held a lot of the money but which recognised, as the Member States did when they set up the EEAS, that we needed to have strategic coherence in the EU’s interaction with the country. If you are dealing with country X—Tanzania or Kenya—it does not see one set of dealings with the EEAS, one set of dealings with DEVCO and a separate set of dealings with another body. They are dealing with the EU, of which there is just one. It is our job to make sure that the package we are presenting to the third country is coherent, and what has very much underpinned Cathy Ashton’s Comprehensive Approach is that all our instruments and different bits of the institutions need to pull in the same direction. We were able to do that alongside the Member States. They shared the direction in which we wanted to pull. While there are always institutional tensions over who drafted what and where the decision-making process should sit on something, by and large we were able to build very harmonious relations at working level with the Member States and the end product was delivered to third country. I would argue that that enabled us to increase the influence of the EU and its Member States in Africa over the last five years. The Middle East is turning out to be more complicated because Member States have more different interests, and the changes in the neighbourhood policy have also led to a slightly different balance of power and interest. We are working on it to build that coherence. The EU desperately needs to exert influence where its interests are affected, for example by flows of refugees and the impact on the energy market of certain decisions. The EU has its interests to protect and therefore needs to be able to present a coherent picture. By and large, what the EAS is there to do is define that coherent strategic direction, not try to take every decision about how the money should be spent. That is correctly the job of the Commission. It takes responsibility for that and has to answer to the Court of Auditors, the Parliament and Member States. Obviously, we do the diplomatic relations as well, and it is very helpful to arrive in a country saying, “This is our set of diplomatic and political priorities, and we are also spending money to reinforce your ability to do this or that”. We

302 of 309 Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG—Oral Evidence (QQ 92-108) try to make sure it is coherent, but that is where the EAS is value added and is accepted to be within the institutions, taking its own long view and strategic approach.

Q102 The Chairman: Thinking of coherence in a different context, we had a very interesting discussion earlier about sub-groups dealing with different aspects of the neighbourhood or foreign policy generally. The big countries are likely to be involved in everything; some of the smallest ones will not be interested in a lot of things, and then you have a group of countries like Sweden, Spain and a number who fall between the two. Do you have a role in trying to ensure that those people who are interested are involved and that people are not left out in the cold, or do the Member States organise it among themselves? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: By and large, we play an active role in ensuring all those Member States who have interests are included. On some issues, a number of the big Member States may think they need to sort it out among themselves, particularly where it segues into hard security issues where the EU does not have a security function of that kind. By and large, if there are large countries with an interest, historic or economic, in a particular area of the world, it makes no sense for the EU to develop a policy without their expertise or involvement. In Africa, when you are dealing with Mali there is no point trying to do that independently of the French. Interestingly, in the discussion we have been having recently on Syria, every single Member State has spoken and wants its opinion to be weighed in that balance. That is not just an issue for the big countries; it affects the whole of the EU. Lithuania, Latvia, Croatia, Slovenia and so on all want their say on what our policy on Syria should be, so we include everybody. The Chairman: Mali and Syria are on opposite ends of the spectrum, are they not? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: Yes. For example, in Brazil, we do not have any particular crises or immediate interests, but obviously we work very closely with the Iberian countries to ensure there is a coherent policy there too, but not exclusively. The UK, Germany and France have growing economic interests in the region.

Q103 Lord Horam: You have a review being conducted by Mrs Mogherini which we hope will appear next year. We also have a separate review by the Commission on the European neighbourhood policy which may appear in December this year. I imagine that may be coincidence and that is just the way it is. How will those mesh together? How do you with your particular responsibilities take account of what is said by the Commission in its European neighbourhood policy? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: That is a very good question, and a particularly telling one when I am talking about strategic coherence. We had two separate processes. We decided we had better review ourselves and then they realised they overlapped. It is slightly bizarre that we are producing a neighbourhood policy before we have produced our grand strategy. It should be the other way round. You have a grand strategy and then neighbourhood policy within that, but we are where we are. The neighbourhood policy is being reviewed by the Commission and, probably in November, the Commission will put forward a proposal and say that is what it recommends the new neighbourhood policy should be. We are working internally to ensure that that will be consistent with the overall lines of the strategy, although that will not be completed by then, but they obviously ought to be coherent, otherwise it will be a bit glaring, but we do not want to hold up one, partly because our partners are expecting this as well. Therefore, we have to satisfy their requirement. It was written into the original regulation or proposal that

303 of 309 Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG—Oral Evidence (QQ 92-108) after 10 years, or whatever, the neighbourhood policy should be reviewed. That is fair enough, but we are a bit too far down the line to put the brakes on there. Lord Horam: It is definitely not ideal. Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: These things just happen, so we are trying to make sure they are coherent, although the timetable is not ideal.

Q104 Lord Horam: One point a witness made to us is that there is a conflict between what one might call classical diplomacy in foreign policy affairs and geopolitical strategic view on the one hand, which is the EAS’s contribution to the whole thing, and on the other hand the traditional Commission way of looking at things, which is rather more legal and looks to ways of proceeding by instruments. There is tension between the two but also the possibility of the EAS adding a bigger strategic vision to what the Commission is doing. Would you go along with that? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: I agree with that. That is more or less what we are trying to do. I think you find the same tension in an individual Member State government. The Commission has responsibility for specific areas of economic and social policy-making: trade, obviously budget, environment and some areas of social policy. Those are the areas of competence. The EAS sits between that because a significant part of competence remains with Member States on foreign affairs, as it should, but, where we can draw it together into a more coherent whole, that is what we do. Therefore, we ensure there is coherence with the Commission and the Member States. We are learning how to do that. When President Juncker came in, he wanted deliberately to strengthen coherence between external policy and the Commission, and therefore appointed working groups of commissioners chaired by a vice-president. Vice-President Mogherini chairs the external relations commissioners—for example Malmström on trade, development and humanitarian matters—and, when appropriate, other commissioners will join in, like home affairs when discussing migration. Mrs Mogherini’s role is to draw together those different elements of the Commission practical proposals on hard policy for trade and development and the foreign policy priorities reflecting also those of the Member States. We now have a rather more effective mechanism than we had under the previous Commission to draw all of those elements together.

Q105 Lord Horam: We understand there are still some practical work-a-day problems, in that the analytical papers you produce are not easily and readily circulated to other directorates in the Commission. There is a rather laborious, bureaucratic procedure they have to go through, which means that sometimes they do not get to where they would be quite useful; sometimes they do not get there at all, or maybe too late. Is that a problem? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: There is a certain degree of theology or comitology involved in this. Who has the competence? There are areas of mixed competence, and therefore you have to make sure everybody who might be involved is content with what you are going to propose. The problem comes with the practices for making formal proposals from the Commission to the Council. If it is a formal recommendation of some kind, it has to be road-tested to ensure it is robust and sensible, and that takes time. In foreign affairs, how do you respond to the crisis in Syria? You cannot say, “I will give you a proposal in six months”. It does not work, so we have to find ways of ensuring that we can get long papers, information papers, to Member States on critical current issues more swiftly than sometimes the formal processes allow. If we need a formal proposal to spend money or sign an agreement, it has to go back through the proper processes, so we are working on it.

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Q106 Baroness Suttie: You have been wonderfully clear on the outcome you would like to see for the strategic review. Are you optimistic that it can be achieved? Other witnesses have said there is a risk that it could end up as a Christmas tree. You have been quite clear about the values-based set of priorities and a framework document. What do you think are the potential blocks to this being achieved next year? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: I am optimistic; it is my nature to be, but for good reasons. First, the High Representative has quite a strong sense of ownership of this strategy and wants it to be coherent. Secondly, she has identified somebody to be, if you like, the pen holder, which is what also happened last time. If you have at least one person who is taking account of everything, you tend to get a lot more coherent product coming out of it than if it is the product of a committee which is Christmas-tree like. That is not to say it will not be uncontroversial. There will be some aspects of this that are more controversial than others. As to the difference, as some see it, between interests and values, it is likely that it will take some time to find the right balance between the two. Some say, quite rightly, that they should not be set off one against the other; indeed, our interests are very closely linked to our values. That is true. Nevertheless, there are some issues, for example how you deal with President Assad, where there might be differences of opinion among Member States. How you reflect those kinds of issues, not that specific question, in the strategy is something we will need to discuss and try to get the balance right.

Q107 The Chairman: You mentioned President Assad. I think everybody would agree that he is a bad man, but a more difficult choice is Turkey. We used to take quite a high moral tone about the way in which the Turks conducted their internal affairs and the standards they needed to meet in order to qualify and so on. I do not think Mrs Merkel is going on about those when she goes to Ankara at the moment. Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: That is a good example. You could have cited possibly Egypt as well as one where the interests and values may pull in slightly different directions. That is something we can agree only collectively among EU Member States as to where the right balance is. That is why we sometimes spend long hours in committees trying to identify the right balance in these very difficult cases. The Chairman: It is a difficult issue, but could I press you a little further? When one is dealing with Egypt, for instance, there is not the kind of immediate pressure that is present in the case of Turkey. To what extent do you think that in the case of Turkey Mrs Merkel, or any other head of government, is consulting and co-ordinating with partners, or is this so sharp and urgent that the head of government goes his or her own way? Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: Over the last two years, it has become apparent to many Member States that you cannot get what you want if you just do it on your own. That is why Mrs Merkel went to Turkey after the European Council had agreed unanimously a package to support Turkey because of the refugee situation. Therefore, there is a recognition that you have to do this together with your European partners; you cannot do it alone. We all know that within the European Council some people carry more weight than others, but it was the European Council that agreed to come up with that package to support Turkey.

Q108 The Chairman: One thing has come as a surprise to us on this visit. Last night, with Angus Lapsley but subsequently, reference has been made to the influence of the European Parliament in this sphere, of which I do not think we had taken very much account. Do you see the European Parliament as a significant player, and how does it make its influence felt? It must be rather diffuse, but how does it bring its influence to bear?

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Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: I will give you the answer off the record, if I may, because it is quite a sensitive issue. Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG continued off the record. The Chairman: You have given us a tremendous meeting. Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG: You asked some interesting questions. The Chairman: Thank you very much for coming at short notice. It has been most interesting. I am very grateful. We will certainly observe your discretion.

306 of 309 Mr Henry Wilkinson and Professor Karen Smith—Oral Evidence (QQ 1-10)

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307 of 309 Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations and Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London—Written Evidence (FSP0010)

Mr Nick Witney, European Council on Foreign Relations and Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London—Written Evidence (FSP0010) Evidence to be found under Professor Anand Menon and Mr Nick Witney

308 of 309 Ms Katharine Wright, Dr Laura Chappell and Dr Roberta Guerrina, University of Surrey— Written Evidence (FSP0015)

Ms Katharine Wright, Dr Laura Chappell and Dr Roberta Guerrina, University of Surrey—Written Evidence (FSP0015) Evidence to be found under Dr Laura Chappell, Dr Roberta Guerrina and Ms Katharine Wright

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