Sovereignty, Devolution, and the Future of Tribal-State Relations

Sovereignty, Devolution, and the Future of Tribal-state Relations

Stephen Cornell and Jonathan Taylor

National Congress of American Indians Mid-Year Session Juneau, Alaska, June 26, 2000

We are grateful for the invitation from the sovereignty—than they used to, and they are National Congress of American Indians to at- using it to rethink public policies and tailor tend the mid-year session in Juneau and offer them to local circumstances. It is too soon to some observations and thoughts on the state of know how far this trend will go—a great deal tribal-state relations. Our remarks stand back a hinges on how well the states perform as they bit from the particular circumstances of any one assume greater authority and launch new pro- state-tribal relationship to examine the overall grams of their own—but the basic trend is clear. state of those relations, the changes that are Relative to federal power, state sovereignty is reshaping them, and the implications of those growing and will continue to grow. changes for Indian nations. Of course devolution has a history in Indian Three Trends and the Uncertain Future of Country as well. For the last 25 years, federal Tribal-State Relations policy toward tribes, formally at least, has been devolutionary. Self-determination—which is a At the start of the 21st century, three broad devolutionary policy—ideally places power in political developments or trends are reshaping tribal hands, reducing federal controls over tribal-state relations. The future of those rela- tribal affairs, resources, and decisions. Indeed, tions is unclear, but the interaction among these one might see the self-determination policy to- trends and the relative influence of each will do ward Indian nations as a precursor of the more a great deal to determine not only the shape of general devolutionary tendency in the United those relations but the future of Indian nations. States.

The first of these political developments is Combined with vigorous tribal political as- devolution: the effort to shift decisionmaking sertions over that same period, this has pro- power downward in the political structure from duced the second political development that is central to local governments. Devolution is based reshaping tribal-state relations as we start the on the reasonable proposition that policy is best new century: the resurgence of tribal power. made at the smallest level of government capa- Across the country, albeit to varying degrees, ble of doing so. With this in mind, over the last Indian nations have been taking greater control decade and around the globe, central govern- of their own affairs, implementing practical self- ments have been devolving power down to local rule. The evidence is everywhere, from 638 con- levels. The United States has been an eager tracting to 472 compacting, from the gaming participant in this trend. The New Federalism, industry to wildlife management and land use, the Seminole decision, the Contract with Amer- from foster care to TANF programs. Tribal con- ica, and welfare reform are all facets of Ameri- trol is nowhere absolute, but as a practical mat- can devolution. Together with other court and ter it has grown enormously since the 1960s as legislative developments, they constitute a sig- more and more Indian nations have moved ag- nificant transfer of decisionmaking power from gressively to exercise substantive decision- the federal government to the states. As a re- making power across a wide range of issues sult, the states have more discretion, more critical to tribal futures. flexibility, more authority, and more control over federal dollars—in short, more practical

1 Yet this resurgent tribal power is anything to a dramatic realignment of governmental but secure. And this brings us to the third politi- power, strengthening states and weakening cal development reshaping tribal-state relations: tribes? If that turns out to be the case, then the through the 1990s and continuing today, tribal political and economic future of Indian nations sovereignty has been under assault in the courts, is very much in doubt. in Congress, in the states, and now, possibly, in the presidential campaign. We need not revisit Not coincidentally, research also suggests here the potential or actual effects on tribes of that in the first scenario—a scenario of sus- the Venetie or Seminole decisions by the Su- tained tribal sovereignty—the burdens on fed- preme Court, the 638 moratorium, the Istook eral and state governments and taxpayers gen- Amendment, means-testing for TPA, or the erated by reservation poverty are likely to de- revenue-sharing compact proposals in the gam- crease. In the second scenario—a scenario of ing industry. Tribal leaders feel those impacts diminished tribal power—they almost certainly in their daily work. But we should note that will rise. there is a growing body of research showing that the assault on tribal sovereignty holds grave In what follows, we first review the argu- risks not only for the political future of Indian ments often heard against genuine, government- nations but for their economic future as well. to-government, sovereignty-based relationships Sovereignty, it turns out, is a critical economic between tribes and the states. We then review asset for Indian nations.1 The effort to reduce the arguments for such relationships. We close tribal sovereignty is perhaps the most risky and with a summary of the implications for tribal- misconceived public policy trend affecting tribes state relations and with a quick look at the since allotment. tasks facing tribal governments as they attempt to shape the outcome of these trends and build The critical question for the future of tribal- productive tribal-state relationships based on state relations and for the future of Indian na- mutual respect for sovereignty. tions themselves has to do with which of these trends—or which combination of them—pre- Arguments against Tribal-State vails. There is little doubt about devolution. It Cooperation has broad political support and seems unlikely to be reversed any time soon. The question is One consequence of devolution is already this: Will this shift in power away from the fed- apparent. We’ve been talking to tribal leaders eral government work to tribes’ advantage or around the country about the changing nature not? of tribal-state relations, and their general im- pression is summarized by one planner’s view In and of itself, devolution is not dangerous that “We never used to think about the state. to tribes. Quite the reverse: Devolution has the We just dealt with the federal government. Now potential to significantly boost tribal self-rule. we have to think about the state all the time.” But the ultimate impact of devolution depends States and tribes are involved in each other’s on what happens to the other two trends identi- business a great deal more than they used to be. fied here. Will devolution include Indian nations Whether it is the Navajo Nation’s work with and embrace the resurgence in tribal power? If Arizona on culturally appropriate definitions of so, then there are grounds for new, robust, gov- “work” under welfare reform, or the contentious ernment-to-government relationships between negotiations in many states over gasoline tax Indian nations and the states. Or will the as- collections, states and tribes are being forced to sault on sovereignty, combined with a form of deal with each other on numerous matters of devolution that refuses to recognize Indian na- policy. They have locked horns over hazardous tions as sovereign, self-governing entities, lead and nuclear waste, wildlife management, foster care, off-reservation fishing, gaming compacts, taxation of all kinds, auto licensing, policing,

and other issues—in sum, over nearly every 1 On this point, see in particular the research findings of the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic facet of tribal life. States and tribes also have Development (for example, Cornell and Kalt 1992, cooperated on most of these same issues. In 1998, and in press). short, tribes and states are in relationships that

2 are much more complex and uncertain than ever Zero-sum Tribal-state Relationships before, and their interactions have ranged from the highly contentious to the mutually respect- Governments often view their conflicts with ful and beneficial. other governments as inherently zero-sum: my gain in sovereignty or economy is your loss and Indeed, one of the puzzles of tribal-state re- vice-versa. Wildlife management is an example. lations is why in one state there is little or no Some states have taken the position that tribal cooperation in a given policy area while in a assertions of game management authority are a neighboring state, tribe and state are cooperat- direct challenge to state sovereignty. If a tribe ing with success on the same issues. In one controls game-management, the state will not state, the governor and legislature may resist be able to control its herds, flocks, and fish cooperation with tribes, relying on the courts or stocks as they migrate on and off the reserva- lobbying Congress to limit tribal sovereignty. tion, and the tribe’s actions will diminish state Right next door, the state and the tribes may regulatory effectiveness. In this view, tribes are view each other as partners, proactively negoti- seen by states as obstacles to the exercise of ating solutions to mutual challenges. Why is newly devolved state powers. that? In the economic arena, some states have Some of it has to do with history. Where taken the position that tribal economic gains are animosity characterizes tribal-state relations, costly to the states. The costs, in this argument, the core of the conflict may be deep-seated mu- generally come either in lost revenues as tribes tual distrust or even racism, built up over dec- capture dollars from non-Indian vendors, reduce ades. Nonetheless, historical animosities cannot state tax revenues, or otherwise move dollars explain everything, and states have put forward into tribal hands, or in increased state burdens a number of arguments against tribal sover- as reservations export pollution, social prob- eignty and a government-to-government rela- lems, or some other cost to the surrounding re- tionship with tribes. Several themes often ap- gion. Gaming is a common example. Some states pear in these arguments:2 argue that tribal gaming moves dollars from the state to tribes while “exporting” problem gam- i) a zero-sum view of tribal-state relation- blers to the states. This idea leads states to re- ships in which one party’s gain in sover- sist gaming compacts or to insist on taxing In- eignty or economic resources is the other dian gaming through revenue-sharing agree- party’s loss, and vice versa; ments.

ii) a view that tribal governments are not The Competence of Tribal Governments “competent” governments; and A second public policy argument that seems iii) a view that allowing tribes to have to carry force when tribes and states are tus- regulatory authority will lead to a “race sling over sovereignty is that tribal govern- to the bottom” in which states will have ments are not “competent” in the exercise of to compete with tribes by accepting ever governing powers. If states concede any author- greater risks or costs. ity to tribes or if they try to negotiate with them, the argument goes, tribes will bungle the Each of these needs some elaboration. job and the states not only will bear the brunt of repairing the damage but will end up standing in for the tribes anyway. The argument often is reinforced by resort to anecdotal evidence of tribal mismanagement, corruption, and the like.

This argument is implicit in much of the 2 Our list of themes is hardly exhaustive; a number of Congressional backlash against Indian self- arguments against tribal sovereignty have been determination as well as in state resistance to made. These are ones we frequently encounter and to the tribal exercise of sovereignty. As misin- which some of our own research speaks.

3 formed as it may be, it often prevents fruitful Positive-sum Tribal-state Relationships tribal-state cooperation. The zero-sum view of tribal-state relation- Races to the Bottom ships holds that each party in that relationship gains primarily at the other’s loss. There are Some of the critics of devolution argue that grounds for this view in certain situations. For it pits government against government in a example, a single dollar of gasoline-tax revenue “race to the bottom” to make regulations less cannot be split without one party’s gain being and less stringent in order to attract business. the other party’s loss. But this zero-sum phe- For example, the critics of the New Federalism nomenon is by no means always present in argue that as states compete with each other for tribal-state relations. business, they will move toward the least common denominator in environmental or work- The fact is that capable and sovereign tribal place regulation, welfare benefits, taxation, and governments advance state goals as well as the like, trying to capture business from or shift tribal goals. No state has an incentive to allow costs to other states. the kind of poverty and economic underdevel- opment that has characterized Indian reserva- Similarly, critics of tribal sovereignty argue tions for so long to continue to fester within its that less developed tribes will be more willing to borders. That said, 12 years of research at the accept hazardous wastes, relax worker safety Udall Center and Harvard Project emphasizes regulation, or be otherwise overeager to attract that tribal control over tribal affairs is the only businesses by lowering standards. Tribal sover- policy that works for economic development. We eignty, in this argument, means lax regulation have been unable to find a single reservation that will either (a) force the state to compete where major decisions are controlled by outsid- with the tribe by loosening its own standards, ers—the states, the federal government, or spe- eventually harming the public good, or (b) put cial interests—where successful economic devel- the state economy, state workers, or the state opment has taken root. In short, if states want environment at risk as the effects of lax tribal Indian poverty and its off-reservation conse- standards spill off the reservations into non- quences to be adequately addressed, they have Indian communities and the state as a whole. to stop insisting that their rules apply to the exclusion of tribes’ rules. The evidence is com- Adherents of these various views use them pelling that where tribes have taken advantage to argue against recognizing the inherent sover- of the federal self-determination policy to gain eignty of tribes and as justifications for assert- control of their own resources and of economic ing state jurisdiction rather than establishing and other activity within their borders, and government-to-government partnerships with have backed up that control with good govern- Indian nations. They promote a devolutionary ance, they have invigorated their economies and pattern in which state power grows relative to produced positive economic spillovers to states. tribal power, and tribal self-determination be- comes increasingly hostage to state actions. Gaming is the easiest example to point to. In 1998 we carried out the most comprehensive Arguments for Sovereignty-based, Tribal- study yet undertaken of the economic and social state Cooperation impacts—on and off reservations—of Indian gaming. It showed significant contributions to While these arguments clearly are danger- off-reservation economies.3 Some quick exam- ous to tribes, there also is ample evidence that ples: they are simply wrong. Furthermore, we believe they are potentially costly to the states. Tribes First: casino expenditures. In 1997 the Ho- and states around the country are demonstrat- Chunk nation’s casino operations in the state of ing that there are good reasons for tribal-state Wisconsin spent $31.6 million in vendor outlays. cooperation on a government-to-government basis that respects the sovereignty of each.

3 Cornell et al. (1998).

4 An estimated 70% of those expenditures were up the building and turned it into a productive in-state, the vast majority off the reservation in economic asset. An editorial in the local news- support of non-Indian businesses. The Oneidas, paper thanked the tribe for helping to solve a also in Wisconsin, spent $28 million in vendor city problem and investing in the future of the outlays, 88% of it in-state. In North Dakota, the town. Standing Rock Sioux’s gaming operations—not one of your bigger such operations—spent more In a second study, commissioned by the Gila than $7 million in vendor outlays. Seventy-four River Indian Community, we examined the eco- percent of that was spent in-state, almost none nomic and social impacts of Indian gaming on of it on the reservation. the state of Arizona. Among the study’s conclu- sions: “The net economic impact of Indian gam- Second: tax payments. In 1997 Ho-Chunk ing on Arizona is positive and substantial. Spe- gaming operations were responsible for nearly cifically, Indian gaming does not cause the State $16 million in gaming-related payroll tax deduc- to lose tax revenues, and a conservative esti- tions or withholdings; Oneida was responsible mate of the contribution of Indian gaming to the for more than $27 million; Standing Rock for Arizona economy is roughly $128 million annu- nearly $2 million in North Dakota and more ally.” In addition, “the one-time construction than a third of a million in South Dakota. benefit of Indian casinos to the state of Arizona [has been] nearly $700 million.”4 Third: employment. During the major reces- sion that hit California in the early 1990s, the Another recent study of ours comparing three gaming tribes in San Diego County—Sy- gaming and non-gaming U.S. communities over cuan, Barona, and Viejas—were among the few a 16-year period shows that in rural areas, In- bright spots in the county employment picture, dian gaming not only improves on-reservation employing hundreds of non-Indians and taking economic conditions; it boosts off-reservation people on as other businesses were laying people incomes, increases off-reservation employment; off. In Arizona, the small Mazatzal Casino oper- reduces off-reservation welfare dependence; and ated by the Tonto Apaches provided 280 jobs in is associated with reductions in certain types of 1998, the vast majority of which were filled by crime.5 In short, in these cases an often- non-tribal members. Mazatzal replaced the repeated state goal—rural economic develop- largest employer in town at the very time it was ment—is vigorously advanced by tribal eco- shut down because of falling lumber prices, and nomic development. many non-Indians credit the casino with maintaining stability in the local economy through Of course some of the gaming impacts are this transition. dramatic, but what about reservation economic activity that does not include gaming? Since Fourth: revenue sharing. Many gaming 1979, the Mississippi Choctaws near Philadel- tribes make significant contributions to state phia, Mississippi, have created more than 6,000 coffers from gaming revenues under the terms of jobs on their reservation in an array of indus- tribal-state compacts. The Michigan tribes, for tries, including but not limited to gaming. On example, contribute 2% of revenues to local gov- the Choctaw reservation today, there are far ernment and 8% to the State of Michigan. more jobs than there are Choctaws to fill them. The result is that the Choctaws import labor: Finally, there are the investments that In- Thousands of Black and white workers drive dian nations make with gaming profits. These onto the reservation every day to take jobs in tend to be diverse and substantial, turning some Choctaw manufacturing and service industries. Indian nations into new sources of investment The tribe is the largest employer in east central capital. Some of these investments are pretty Mississippi and one of the 10 largest in the interesting, too. In Michigan, to offer just one state, bringing to one of the poorest regions of example, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa the country a dynamic economy and a host of and Chippewa Indians used some of its gaming profits to buy up a condemned building in the off-reservation town of Traverse City. It cleaned 4 Taylor et al. (1999). 5 Taylor, Krepps, and Wang (forthcoming).

5 jobs.6 And being successful hasn’t stopped them A Second Look at the Competence of Tribal Gov- from being Choctaw: The tribe has one of the ernments highest rates of language retention in all of In- dian Country. The assumption of tribal government incompetence has very high costs. Not only is it In Arizona, the Sunrise ski operation run by offensive to Indian nations, but it leads states to the White Mountain Apache Tribe has become a approach tribal-state partnerships—if they con- major factor in the winter economy of the White sider them at all—with hesitation and a de- Mountains, filling motels in Show Low and mand for extra assurances or performance Pinetop, pulling in dollars and further stimu- guarantees. These in turn make it harder for lating the local recreational and tourism econ- tribes and states to come to agreement and omy. When a federal agency threatened to close handicap tribal development efforts. In some down Sunrise under the Endangered Species cases, states refuse to partner with tribes at all. Act, a busload of off-reservation business and community leaders showed up at public hear- It goes without saying that some tribal gov- ings to underscore the economic dependence of ernments are incompetent, but this hardly dis- the regional economy on the tribe’s resort—and tinguishes Indian nations from other societies. this was before the tribe built its casino. Across the universe of tribes—as across the universe of countries—we find both good and bad In Washington State, Veronica Tiller and examples of governance. Unfortunately, how- George Chase found in 1998 that 27 federally ever, the bad examples often get the publicity, recognized tribes contribute $1 billion annually but there is ample evidence on the good gov- to the economy, paid $56.6 million in federal ernment side as well. and state employment and payroll-related taxes, and employed 14,000 Washington citizens full- For example, a number of studies indicate time. Gaming played a significant role in this, that, on average, when tribes take over services but it was not the whole story.7 under PL-638, they outperform federal agencies. They create more value, operate more effi- There are numerous other examples: the ciently, introduce more services, and build more Citizen Potawatomi Nation in Oklahoma, the public infrastructure than outside operators do.8 Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Res- The reasons are simple and predictable. When ervation in Oregon, the Confederated Salish and tribes take over responsibility for a reservation Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation in program, two things happen. First, program Montana—these and many others are making administration begins to reflect their agendas significant economic contributions not only to instead of outsiders’ agendas. Second, decisions their own societies but to non-Indian communi- and their consequences are linked more closely ties as well. They illustrate the crucial point: As to each other. Tribes begin to pay the price of Indian nations move from welfare-based, trans- bad decisions and reap the benefits of good deci- fer economies to productive economies, they re- sions; as a result, over time, the quality of the duce the burden on taxpayers, are able to invest decisions improves. in their own infrastructures, contribute to regional economies, and, in many cases, bolster Perhaps more striking, tribes are increas- state programs through their own provision of ingly administering complex and innovative services. In short, state economies and popula- programs in ways that make them best-in-class tions benefit from tribal economic success. not just in Indian Country but across governing units in the United States. Some quick examples: the Jicarilla Apache wildlife management program in New Mexico is arguably the premier program in the West, with striking achieve- ments to its credit in the restoration of trophy-

6 Ferrara 1998; National Congress of American Indi- ans 1998, p. 8. 8 See, for example, Jorgensen (2000), Krepps and 7 Tiller and Chase (1998). Caves (1994), Dixon et al. (1998).

6 quality game herds and fisheries. The State of other ways exceed the levels of federal and state Minnesota has drawn attention to the Fond du service provision that prevailed before develop- Lac tribe’s foster care program not because it is ment took off. The Jicarilla Apaches have im- an outstanding Indian program but because it is proved wildlife management in the northern an outstanding foster care program. The tribal part of New Mexico; Sandia Pueblo has imposed college run by the Confederated Salish and the toughest water quality standards along a Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation in major stretch of the Rio Grande; the Grand Tra- Montana is getting applications from non- verse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians Indian students because it provides superior has improved the health of its own people by quality education. taking over management of health care; the Cabazon Band has strengthened regional fire Not only is the assumption of tribal govern- and police operations with high quality training ment incompetence out of step with a growing and links to non-Indian community services. body of contrary evidence, but its implied con- clusion—that the state response should be to Once again, the critical issue is tribal capa- resist partnerships with tribes—is logically bility. As Indian nations improve their own gov- flawed. Even in cases where tribal program op- erning capacities, they typically take the kinds eration is problematic, the solution is not for the of action that would logically reduce state risks states to walk away from these potentially bene- and concerns—and they become better partners ficial partnerships, but for the tribes and the in the effort to mitigate those risks that remain. states to jointly work out capacity-building ar- rangements that can improve tribal governance. Implications This is the clear implication of the Harvard Project research finding, noted above, that tribal Devolution has enormous potential benefits control is essential to tribal development. It is in to Indian nations. They already have benefited the interest of both states and tribes to build the from devolution in federal Indian policy. It is capacity of Indian nations to govern effectively. easy to demonstrate that the devolutionary fed- Our evidence indicates that, in doing so, states eral policy of self-determination for Indian will be lining up for eventual spillover benefits. tribes, formally adopted in the mid-1970s, is the only federal Indian policy ever to produce sus- Rethinking Races to the Bottom tainable, positive, economic results on Indian reservations. No other policy has worked to re- Finally, the fear that tribes are economically duce reservation poverty. desperate and, therefore, will cut regulatory But devolution will benefit Indian nations corners in order to attract economic develop- only if tribal sovereignty remains robust. The ment or foist costs onto the states has motivated danger today, and the greatest threat to reser- states to assert jurisdiction over tribes in some cases or walk away from productive partner- vation prosperity, lies not in devolution but in courts and legislatures that believe in devolu- ships in others. Of course there’s a paternalistic tion but do not believe in sovereign Indian na- edge to this argument, which suggests that tions. It will be a remarkable irony—and an- states are best able to determine appropriate other tragedy in a long line of Indian policy fail- policy for reservations. But it also assumes that ures—if the United States were now to turn its tribes will be willing to turn their homelands into toxic cesspools or their factories into sweat- back on the only policy that has shown any promise of lifting reservation populations out of shops. poverty and despair. Such a rejection of tribal sovereignty will have costs not only to tribes but The evidence suggests otherwise. Economic to states, the federal government, and taxpayers development on most reservations has meant generally, as Indian nations continue to lan- significant improvements in quality of life, not deterioration. Economically successful tribes guish in poverty. In backing away from mean- ingful self-determination, everybody loses. tend to provide more services, maintain newer schools, shorten fire and rescue response times, What can tribes do to insure that the impose higher environmental standards, and in trend toward devolution is accompanied not by

7 an assault on sovereignty but by renewed faith state government, the village took matters into in tribal self-governance? Three points should be its own hands and passed ordinances regulating made. First, the facts need to be made known. It camping practices on the river—even though the is not difficult to show that, in the aggregate, land was technically outside its jurisdiction. Not what’s good for tribes is good for the states. Be- surprisingly, the campers and outfitting compa- cause tribes cannot satisfy much of their own nies initially objected, arguing that the Native demand for goods and services, virtually all on- government had no power to police non-Indian reservation economic activity is accompanied by activities outside village lands. In response, the a substantial off-reservation (and often in-state) village government demonstrated the state’s purchasing multiplier. Furthermore, when inability to effectively patrol the river and the tribes get sustainable development going, they dire consequences to the health of the commu- tend to accomplish state goals by maintaining nity. Eventually, the campers and outfitters re- roads better, contributing to off-reservation lented and allowed the village, in essence, to schools, decreasing the burdens associated with take over the ranger function for the riverbed poverty, employing non-Indians, contributing to area.9 On paper, the village had very little “sov- greater state income tax withholdings, and in ereignty” over an “off-reservation” problem of other ways. And because self-determination— acute importance to village health, yet it won that is, respect for tribal sovereignty—is the authority by instituting more effective policy only policy that has led to sustained tribal implementation than the state could provide. economic development in the past century, states have a stake in it. Tribal sovereignty is a As happens more and more frequently from win-win proposition. The more decisions tribes Cabazon to Jicarilla and from Fond du Lac to make for themselves, the more likely states are Nez Perce, outsiders are being made aware that to benefit from the long-overdue invigoration of tribes may be the best-suited party to a neces- Indian reservation economies—economies that sary task of governing—on reservation or off. In have been to date the most stubbornly resistant sum, tribes that outperform U.S. agencies, state pockets of poverty in America. agencies, and local governments are a powerful argument for tribal sovereignty. They command Second, the single greatest power tribes respect at the negotiating table and provide con- have to deploy on their own behalf is their ca- fidence to the other side that when the tribe pacity for self-government. Time and time makes a deal, the tribal government will exe- again, around Indian Country, we see that the cute it effectively. demonstrated sophistication of tribal policy implementation commands respect off-reservation The Alaska story makes our third point as and wins tribes sovereignty-in-fact where sover- well. The best defense of sovereignty is its effec- eignty-in-law has been only a paper promise. tive exercise. This means that Indian nations, if they wish to retain control over their own af- A story from Alaska explains this point fairs; if they wish to develop sustainable, pro- well—particularly since the legal position of ductive economies; if they wish to build produc- tribal sovereignty has been so contentious in tive, mutually respectful relationships with the this state over the past decade. The village of states; have to back up their sovereign rights Quinhagak in southwest Alaska experienced and powers with good governance. They have to repeated visitation by non-Native sport fisher- put in place governing institutions that are ca- men and hunters who camped in the riverbed pable of exercising sovereignty effectively. This that was the main water supply for the village. means providing more governmental stability, Then, through the off-season, as the river rose de-politicizing court systems and business man- or changed course within its gravel bed, it would agement, building efficient governmental bu- pick up the human waste left by the visitors and reaucracies, and generally thickening the ca- deliver contaminated water downstream to the village.

After repeated outbreaks of gastrointestinal disease and repeatedly ineffective protests to 9 Kizzia (1997).

8 pacity of tribes to act effectively in their own Cornell, Stephen, and Joseph P. Kalt, Matthew interest.10 Krepps, and Jonathan Taylor. 1998. “Ameri- can Indian Gaming Policy and its Socio- Across Indian Country, tribes are doing just Economic Effects.” A Report to the National that: demonstrating their ability to govern effec- Gambling Impact Study Commission. Cam- tively. In doing so they are laying the founda- bridge: The Economics Resource Group, Inc. tion for new, productive, mutually respectful July 1998. relationships with the states and are giving the lie to arguments against tribal self-government. Dixon, Mim, Yvette Roubideaux, Brett Shelton, Both Indian nations and the states with which Cynthia Mala, and David Mather. 1998. they increasingly have to interact stand to bene- Tribal Perspectives on Indian Self- fit from the results. Determination and Self-Governance in Health Care Management. Denver, CO: Na- tional Indian Health Board.

Stephen Cornell is director of the Udall Center Ferrara, Peter J. 1998. The Choctaw Revolution: for Studies in Public Policy at The University Lessons for Federal Indian Policy. Washing- of Arizona, where he also is professor of ton, DC: Americans for Tax Reform Founda- sociology and of public administration and tion. policy. He co-founded and continues to co- direct the Harvard Project on American Indian Jorgensen, Miriam R. 2000. “Bringing the Back- Economic Development. Jonathan Taylor is a ground Forward: Evidence from Indian senior policy scholar with the Udall Center, a Country on the Social and Cultural Deter- research fellow at the Harvard Project, and a minants of Economic Development.” Un- senior consultant with Lexecon, Inc. published Ph.D. dissertation, John F. Ken- nedy School of Government, Harvard Uni- versity.

References Kizzia, Tom, “Indian Country: 2 Destinies, 1 Land,” Anchorage Daily News, June 29, Cornell, Stephen, and Joseph P. Kalt. 1992. 1997. “Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for Economic Development on American In- Krepps, Matthew B., and Richard E. Caves. dian Reservations.” In What Can Tribes Do? 1994. “Bureaucrats and Indians: Principal- Strategies and Institutions in American In- Agent Relations and Efficient Management dian Economic Development, ed. Stephen of Tribal Forest Resources.” Journal of Eco- Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt. Los Angeles, nomic Behavior and Organization 24, no. 2: CA: American Indian Studies Center, 133-51. UCLA. pp. 1-59. National Congress of American Indians. 1998. ______. 1998. “Sovereignty and Nation-Building: “Addressing Tribal Employment Responsi- The Development Challenge in Indian bilities under Welfare Reform: A National Country Today.” American Indian Culture Forum.” Manuscript of executive summary and Research Journal 22, no. 3: 187-214. of discussion June 14, 1998. Washington, DC: National Congress of American Indians. ______. In press. “Where’s the Glue? Institu- tional Bases of American Indian Economic Taylor, Jonathan B., Kenneth W. Grant II, Development.” Journal of Socio-Economics. Miriam R. Jorgensen, and Matthew B. Krepps. 1999. “Indian Gaming in Arizona: Social and Economic Impacts on the State of Arizona.” Cambridge, MA: The Economics 10 See the discussion of these institutional impera- Resource Group, Inc. tives in Cornell and Kalt (1992) and other Harvard Project research publications.

9 Taylor, Jonathan B., Matthew B. Krepps, and Tiller, Veronica E., and George A. Chase. 1998. Patrick Wang. Forthcoming. “The National Economic Contributions of Indian Tribes to Evidence on the Socioeconomic Impacts of the Economy of Washington State. Olympia, American Indian Gaming on Non-Indian WA: Governor’s Office of Indian Affairs. Communities.” American Behavioral Scien- tist.