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IFES Working Paper Series Institut für Europastudien der Europa-Universität Viadrina No. 1

Ambivalences of Europeanization. and in Perspective

Timm Beichelt, Clara Frysztacka, Claudia Weber, Susann Worschech IFES Working Paper 1/2019-I June 2019

Beichelt, Timm; Frysztacka, Clara; Weber, Claudia; Worschech, Susann. Ambivalences of Europeanization. Modernity and Europe in Perspective

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Beichelt, Timm; Frysztacka, Clara; Weber, Claudia; Worschech, Susann. Ambivalences of Europeanization. Modernity and Europe in Perspective. IFES Working Paper Series 1/2019-I Frankfurt (Oder). Viadrina Institute for European Studies, European University Viadrina, doi.org/10.11584/ifes.1

The IFES Working Papers represent the views of the respective author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or the institute as a whole. The Viadrina Institute for European Studies and the European University Viadrina are not responsible for the authors’ opinions and cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this Working Paper. Ambivalences of Europeanization. Modernity and Europe in Perspective Beichelt, Timm; Frysztacka, Clara; Weber, Claudia; Worschech, Susann.

Abstract

This working paper aims to reformulate the teleological concepts of Europeanization by relating them to modernity’s ambivalences, which seems necessary for two reasons. First, both the number and the scope of “crises” in European and have increased considerably in the last two decades. Second, and more importantly, the project of European integration has changed its status from being a potential problem solver to being a part of the problem. The paper establishes a broader historical perspective than is usual in most projects on Europeanization. It argues that crises and drawbacks have been a part of European societal and political development during most periods of European history. One reason has been the purely European strategy of , which was used as a mechanism to outsource the negative consequences of modernity to places outside of Europe and to peripheral locations within Europe. By including historical and postcolonial perspectives on contemporary Europeanization, we argue that Europe and modernity are not characterized by teleological progress but rather engender ambivalent and entangled developments.

Keywords: Europe; Modernity; Europeanization; EU; Ambivalences

Zusammenfassung

Die Autor*innen verfolgen das Ziel, teleologische Konzepte der Europäisierung zu reformulieren, indem sie die Ambivalenz der Moderne als Bestandteil von Europäisierung berücksichtigen. Dies erscheint zum einen notwendig, weil die Zahl und Tiefe der europäischen „Krisen“ in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten deutlich zugenommen hat. Zum anderen hat sich dabei der Status europäische Integration von einer potentiellen Lösung von Problemen zu einem Verursacher von Problemen gewandelt. Die Autor*innen nehmen eine breitere historische Perspektive ein als in den meisten sonstigen Projekten zur Europäisierung der Fall ist. Sie argumentieren, dass Krisen und Rückschritte in der europäischen Geschichte eher der Regelfall als die Ausnahme waren. Diese Krisen fanden allerdings nicht immer allein auf europäischem Territorium statt, sondern die negativen Konsequenzen der Moderne wurden über die europäische Strategie des Kolonialismus nach außen verlagert: in außereuropäische Gebiete und innerhalb Europas in periphere Regionen. Durch die Hereinnahme historischer sowie postkolonialer Perspektiven schärfen wir den Blick auf gegenwärtige Prozesse der Europäisierung, indem wir argumentieren, dass Europa und Moderne nicht durch teleologischen Fortschritt charakterisiert sind, sondern durch verflochtene und ambivalente Entwicklungen.

Schlagworte: Europa; Moderne; Europäisierung; EU; Ambivalenzen Table of contents

1. Introduction 05

2. Modernization, Europeanization, and ambivalence: existing definitions, missing parts and the potential of interdisciplinary approaches 07 Modernity/modernization Europeanization Ambivalences

3. Teleology, modernity, and Europe: from historic to postcolonial studies of Europeanization 13

4. Conclusion 17

5. Bibliography 18 1. Introduction

“Trajectorism”, as (2012: 26) has connected to the moral expectations of freedom, put it, “is the great narrative trap of the West and is equality, welfare, and – has been inher- also, like all great myths, the secret of its successes ently linked to the ideas of Europe, Europeaniza- in industry, empire and world conquest”. Trajector- tion, and (later) European integration. However, ism entails the idea that a telos can be found in all neither the process of Europeanization nor the re- patterns of , process and history – an spective results are unidirectional. In contrast, the idea that is inherent to Europeanization and stud- creation of (economic) welfare and modernization ies on Europeanization as well. On the one hand, has often depended on the dynamics of destruction, the trajectorist has helped scholars con- with societal progress or integration proceeding at ceive of Europeanization as a larger unfolding of the expense of societal alienation. Democratic prog- the European story of modernization and cosmo- ress may flourish in key places but may leave out politanism. On the other hand, it has also impeded geographical or social peripheries. On a closer and the detection of alternative sources and paths of non-trajectorist look, these ambivalences of mod- Europeanization. Consequently, rethinking Euro- ernization are equally mirrored in Europeanization peanization and European modernity beyond tra- processes. jectorism remains a challenging yet necessary task. Accordingly, we define Europeanization as histori- The question that we will address in this paper is cal and current processes of negotiating modernity. as follows: How can Europeanization be conceptu- In this sense, Europeanization means fluid, con- alized beyond trajectorism and which particular tentious and often violent confrontation. Conflicts insights does a nonteleological perspective on the have been triggers for contingent processes of Euro- Europeanization processes offer? peanization throughout all of European history and Trajectorism has been an axiomatic part of the have intensified with social, economic, and political social science of Europeanization. In line with transformations since the 18th century. Appaduraj, Reinhart Koselleck (2000) has pointed Why is it necessary to reformulate Europeaniza- out that teleology has been the way in which Euro- tion and to relate it to modernity’s ambivalences at pean history and development have been concep- this very moment? We offer two answers. The first tualized between about 1750 and 1850 when the is related to the various societal and political crises French and early industrial revolutions laid (inter in contemporary Europe: for example, with regard alia) the normative ground for modernity. Only to the Eurozone, the war in Eastern , or the since this period, which is called Sattelzeit (saddle EU’s migration policy. We argue that these crises time) by Koselleck, time is imagined as an arrow are mainly perceived against a shortened time ho- pointing in a precise direction. Since the Enlight- rizon that compares today’s Europe with that of a enment and the Sattelzeit, the concepts of Europe, perceived golden period of the postwar era. Crises progressive modernity, and trajectorism have be- in Europe and loss of confidence in the promises of come increasingly interwoven, forming a triad of an the European modernity project are by far not new emerging “European teleological modernity”. phenomena. Even if we concentrate on the 20th It is both necessary and adequate to ask which con- century only, it becomes clear that European his- cepts and ideas of Europe, Europeanization and tory has always been marked by tidal waves. The modernity arise once we try to break up this triad. multiple political, social, and economic crises in the The Western idea of modern progress – which is 1930s were preceded by the cultural pessimism of

ifes_wp 01 5 the fin de siècle (Beck and Grande 2010; Assmann crises, but also transnational movements – of 2013b). The Holocaust triggered the deepest doubts people within, outside, and across European about the connection between reason and modern borders, and of goods and risks, ideas and his- thinking. After 1945, the occasions for pessimistic tories, extending from the ‘periphery‘ to the thinking were numerous, as demonstrated for in- ‘center‘ – are putting the national, but also the stance by the broad political and societal debates Europeanized, will to political control under of the 1970s on the oil crisis and the feared end of pressure” (Heinlein et al. 2014: 14). political steering (Esposito 2017; Assmann 2013a). In our project, we try to understand this shift as an Neglecting to deal with the Holocaust and collabo- epistemological one by drawing parallels with the ration was one of the main reasons that led to the field of postcolonial studies. We follow authors such 1968 protests. The self-declared modern regimes in as Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), Arjun Appadurai a socialist guise had a hard time coping with inter- and many of the contributions in two pertinent nal protests. Regular uprisings in East-Berlin (1953), volumes edited by Sebastian Conrad (2002) and Budapest (1956), Prague (1968), and Warsaw (1981) by Sandra Ponzanesi and Bolette Blaagaard (2013). were also a consequence of the criticism of socialist These authors argue that Europe serves as a major modernization. battleground for the contradictions of modernity. Second, we detect a difference in the past under- Historical insight shows that it has not (only) been standing of a crisis from today’s understanding. In Europe, but also its colonized regions around the all the abovementioned cases, scientific and intel- world that have been places where the dark sides of lectual discourses concentrated on the drawbacks European modernity have been more present than of modernity, which were usually perceived as hap- in Europe itself. pening within national contexts. Europe, in particu- The imperial colonial politics of Europe during re- lar Western Europe, in contrast, figured as a blue- cent centuries have also represented a strategy to print for overcoming national drawbacks. In past roll out certain competing narratives of Europe – for ‘European crises’, ‘Europe’ itself was not addressed example, the conflict between the state and the as a problem, whereas the specific constellation of church, between private and collective property, the nation state that had built its wealth on mar- between the politics of the masses and the rule of ket appeared to constitute a dilemma. (Appadurai 2012: 29-30). However, the narrative Nationalism and the side effects of capitalism were of progress has been mirrored to a much lesser ex- framed as the major pathologies of modernization, tent in the colonized parts of the world. Here, cleri- not of Europeanization. cal power usually did not accept local rule, private Today, this perspective on Europe has changed con- European property did not care much about the siderably. In recent years, the characterization of collective non-European good, and Western rule of the European idea has shifted from a salutary to a law rarely fed back into local regimes of power and highly questionable character: justice. Thus, the postcolonial perspective discloses ”The Europe of today has become the major the nonparallelism of Europeanization and pro- arena in which the hegemony of a Western gress – and hence, ambivalences and fractures as modernity and its economic, political, and inherent to the very concept of Europeanization. cultural claims to global dominance are be- This review of the interlinkage of the concepts of ing fundamentally contested. Not only global Europe, modernity and crises reveals that this triad

06 ifes_wp 01 has been interpreted very differently at different basis of our nonteleological approach to Europeani- points in time and from different geographical zation. First, we will discuss the concepts of moder- viewpoints. The recent conjunction of crises and cri- nity and modernization with respect to their tele- ses in the understandings of Europe – ranging from ological and nonteleological components. Second, the financial and so-called ‘refugee’ crises to the we will present an overview of contemporary con- rise of populism and authoritarianism – represents ceptions of Europeanization both in the social sci- an auspicious moment for analyzing Europeaniza- ences and in history and search for the entry points tion beyond trajectorism. We argue that Europe for nontrajectorist approaches. Third, we will dis- and modernity are not characterized by teleological cuss the concept of ambivalence as part of social sci- progress but bring along ambivalent and entangled entific reasoning. In chapter 3, we will elaborate on developments instead. The processes of Europeani- our concept of ambivalent Europeanization by tak- zation are complex with regard to their causes, di- ing into account ambivalences that can be found in rections, and consequences. the internal and external dimensions of Europeani- Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next part, we zation. will outline the three central concepts that form the

2. Modernization, Europeanization, and ambivalence: existing definitions, missing parts and the potential of inter- disciplinary approaches

Modernity / modernization

In his seminal book “modernity and ambivalence”, utopia than to a frictionless order, and modernity published in 1991, the late sociologist Zygmunt represents a future that can never be reached. The Bauman responds to the debate on the construc- category of modernity therefore bears two contra- tion of orders (for example Anderson 1983) and dictory elements: the success and the simultaneous elaborates on the drive of modern societies to link failure of modernization. The result, in Bauman’s development to an explicit organization of politi- words, is “ambivalence”: cal and economic regimes. Other than in premod- ”If modernity is about the production of order ern times, modern orders are by definition distinct then ambivalence is the waste of modernity. from ‘nature’. While their archetypical task is to Both order and ambivalence are alike products dominate natural settings, modernity gains the sta- of modern practice; and neither has anything tus of a quasi-natural phenomenon by succeeding except modern practice – continuous, vigilant the unordered states of nature. At the same time, practice – to sustain it. Both share in typically the expectation horizon of modernity is closer to modern contingency, foundationlessness of

ifes_wp 01 07 being. Ambivalence is arguably the modern regime of modernity completely visible. In 1986, the era‘s most genuine worry and concern, since German sociologist wrote a book called unlike other enemies, defeated and enslaved, “risk ”, in which he tried to coin the outlook it grows in strength with every success of mod- on “another modernity” (Beck 1986). Beck also lat- ern powers. It is its own failure that the tidying- er used the terms “second” or “reflexive” moder- up activity construes as ambivalence” (Bau- nity in order to highlight not only the immanent man 1991: 16). dangers of (European) modernity – for example, nu- If order as a societal telos creates ambivalence, then clear energy or – but also the fact the results of modernization processes are in prin- that (Western) societies had become aware of these ciple different from those that were eventually in- risks. Together with the British sociologist Anthony tended. Giddens, Beck argued for strategies to regain con- It is no accident that Bauman formulated his ar- trol of the unleashed first modernity by embracing guments in the late 1980s. In empirical terms, the a Third Way to realign societal and capitalist inter- disillusionment with an economic model based on ests and (a few years later) by developing cosmopol- growth and expansion had been expressed in the itan (Giddens 1990; Beck 1991, 1997). famous report of the Club of Rome in the 1970s. The debate on second modernity exposed the precar- Many continental European countries, including iousness of modernity and brought about self-trans- the UK (where Bauman resided in Leeds, a city un- formation and self-critique. First, modernity lost its dergoing industrial restructuring), were confronted teleological touch and its premises were to a good with high rates of unemployment. In Poland (where extent discredited (Beck and Bonß 2001: 19). While Bauman was born) and other socialist European the first modernity had been engaged in dominat- countries, the promises of economic and societal ing nature, thinkers during the second modernity modernization turned out to be greatly disappoint- lost their belief that nature can be designed by the ing. In the social sciences, a lively debate on the char- human will. Instead, the dangerous consequences acter of modernity took place during that period. of modernity came into focus and allowed for the Emerging constructivism challenged the structural possibility that modernity may take different direc- functionalist approaches. In 1979, Jean-François tions: “The teleological understanding of modernity Lyotard introduced his argument on the end of that associates time and history with purposeful grand narratives in history and science (Lyotard progress is profoundly unsettled. […] The quality of 1979). This French line of thinking was heavily de- the futures of modernity consists in their (epochal?) bated in social , and it inspired the new openness […]. It is controversial, contradictory thought that modernity as a whole might have and ambivalent” (Heinlein et al. 2012: 8-9). Clearly, come to its end (Meier and Bell 1990). Other voic- Bauman referred to these writings, which put the es were less critical toward modernity as such and premises of modernity into a new perspective. pointed at the new complexity of late-modern soci- However, he did not share Giddens’ and Beck’s con- eties, which turned modernity into an “incomplete fidence in the self-healing potential of the second project” (Habermas 1985, 1992). modernity. In Bauman’s view, there is no room for While terms such as the “end” or “incompleteness” overcoming the restrictions and oppositions of mo- of modernity already make temporal allusions, dernity by introducing reflexivity – modernity is, the notion of “second modernity” made the time regardless of its phase, the harbor of ambivalence.

08 ifes_wp 01 In taking this position, Bauman followed a (1991). They had argued with reference to different prominent . The first of the regions and decades that increasing levels of educa- Frankfurt School, especially Walter Benjamin, Max tion, economic freedom, and democratic rule were Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorno, referred to a preconditions for societal wealth and social peace. structural tilting of the instrumental reason of the In their view, modernization would help overcome Enlightenment. Their argument unfolded against the hardships of traditional life in any society, re- the background of European fascist dictatorships gardless of its respective cultural and/or historical during the 1930s and the Holocaust. Horkheimer context. and Adorno argued that the rationalization of the The skeptics, in turn, listed “barbarianism” as “the world separated the self from the modern forms of secret principle of modern society” (Miller and life, leading to an inescapable difference between Soeffner 1998a: 17). Again, noted the object and the subject and a subsequent need that modernity cannot be neutral with regard to to dominate both. European modernity is there- the question of violence. Bauman even inherently fore inherently connected to totalitarianism, which linked the principles of modernity and the Holo- represents its ‘most natural’ form of government caust (Bauman 1989). A decade later, Bauman re- (Horkheimer and Adorno 1971 [1944]). If thought fined his argument, systematically including vio- through and practiced to the very end, the proc- lence in the concepts of modernity and civilization: esses of modernization according to this view are In the end, modernity legitimizes itself as a process equal to modern barbarianism. of civilization (…) The process of civilization is not While the arguments of Horkheimer and Adorno about eliminating violence but about redistribut- had an enormous epistemological impact, their ing it (Bauman 1998: 39; translation back into Eng- arguments were less important for empirical so- lish by the authors). cial science. This certainly has to do with the fact Taken together, modernity and modernization are that much of the first generation of the Frankfurt based on potentially destructive elements. The School had to go into exile and remained scat- actual scope of destruction or construction may tered after 1945. Another reason seems to be the depend on the question of whether and how vio- rapid pacification that took place after the first lence and power may be distributed, transformed steps of European integration in 1951. Especially in or institutionally channeled. The becoming of Eu- , the so-called Wirtschaftswunder helped rope comprises remarkable examples in both direc- keep pessimistic diagnoses in the background. tions, thereby indicating that the ambivalences of Prominent advocates of the optimistic view were modernization translate into the ambivalences of Karl Popper (2003 [1945]), and even more explicit Europeanization. The next section will discuss the modernization theorists were Daniel Lerner (1958), theoretical and conceptual connections behind this Seymour M. Lipset (1959a, 1959b), and Manfred Zapf idea.

ifes_wp 01 09 Europeanization In the social sciences as well as in history, modernity sphere (Liebert and Trenz 2011; Risse 2010). The be- is closely linked to Europe. This is based on approach- coming of Europe is also related to European socia- es that link ideas of modernity to practices that ap- tion and identity construction without the classic peared mainly in Europe: be it the early granting of foundations of nation states (Bach 2000; Eigmüller legal autonomy to cities and the attempt to sepa- and Mau 2010). Empirically, it can be observed that rate religious and secular power (Mitterauer 2003); among most of the elites of postwar (Western) Eu- the development of capitalism and the accompa- rope, “European integration” and “Europeaniza- nying economic ethics (Weber 1988 [1904]); or the tion” have been understood as attributes of peace development of manners within the framework of and prosperity, not of critique or rejection. the European courtly society (Elias 1969). Although In turning away from the research on EU-ization, postcolonial studies have pointed out the norma- different judgements come to the fore. A major tive equivalence of cultural orders around the globe aspect concerns terminology. Whereas political (Said 1994; Gilroy 2000), we hold that the attribu- scientists still tend to reserve the notion “Europe- tion of the abovementioned processes to European anization” for the impact that the EU has on na- practices usually goes along with latent neutral or tion states, other disciplines such as history stress positive connotations. the variety and complexity of the concepts of Eu- In the mainstream understanding of political sci- rope and Europeanization. If “Europeanization” ence, scholars refer to Europeanization by its post- in a strict grammatical sense can be translated as 1945 meaning as a process of domestic change the “becoming of Europe” (Beichelt 2015), then its caused by European integration and the mecha- meaning has changed over time, although always nisms of EU policy making (Börzel and Risse 2000; on the basis of and in reference to modernity. After Vink 2003). These processes are possible because “becoming imperial”, it meant “becoming nation- of the considerable transfer of political competen- al” in the course of the ; and liberal or cies from the level of the nation state to the supra- illiberal and transnational in recent years. national EU. Because of its close connection to the Historians usually do not consider the EU as the , some authors have suggested us- main frame of reference for Europeanization proc- ing the neologism “EU-ization” in order to distin- esses. Consequently, the teleological plot and the le- guish between the supranational processes of the gitimizing potential inherent to the political rheto- EU and other forms of non-EU related Europeanness ric of Europeanization are viewed with skepticism. (Kohler-Koch 2000). Since the overidealized nation Many historians rather define Europeanization as a states were the source of the bellicose politics of (at process of cultural, social, and political convergence least) the years 1914-1945, EU-ization – even if it is implying an increase in entanglements, interac- most commonly called “Europeanization” (Ladrech tions, and limitations (Jarausch/Kleßmann 2004; 1994; Radaelli 2000) – is associated with a political Kaelble/Kirsch 2008; Hirschhausen/Patel 2010). style that is better suited to keeping war away from Taken together, the different approaches to Euro- Europe. Over time, scholars have noted the emer- peanization emphasize forms of integration and gence of a European civil society, transnational disintegration, of global reach and isolation, of communication, and a growing European public acceptance and refusal (Frevert 2003). Europe

10 ifes_wp 01 appears to be the fluid result of the historical over- Europe” (Patel and Hirschhausen 2010) is equally lapping of (shared) experiences and (common) ex- convincing as is the commonplace insight that Eu- pectations, communication, transfers and of the ropean history is an open process of unpredictable long-term establishment of European institutions, events. We will not only accept the inherent ambiv- as well as the discourse about and imagination alence of Europeanization, but we will systematize of Europe itself (Schmale 2000; Bösch et al. 2012). it in the next section. Moreover, Norman Davies’s metaphor of a “tidal

Ambivalences After having outlined the contradictory and am- in Heinrich Kleist’s character Michael Kohlhaas (who bivalent aspects that are inherent to both moderni- oscillates between gentleness and self-destruction) zation and Europeanization, we now turn to the or in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s The Double (where the concept of ambivalence itself. We have seen that main character appears as two different persons Zygmunt Bauman called ambivalence the waste and characters). In authors such as Marcel Proust of modernity and the inseparable byproduct of (In Search of Lost Time), Robert Louis Stevenson modernity’s attempt to establish order. However, (The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde), Franz Bauman was not the first to assign the concept of Kafka (The Process), and Robert Musil (Man Without ambivalence a central role in the processes of so- Qualities), the double- or multi-valuedness of per- ciation. Ambivalence has played a central role in at sons translates into societies that are marked by a least four epistemic . loss of predictability and generally by a loss of posi- First, starting with ancient theology, divinities have tive values. While individuals may be the carriers of been marked by double-valuedness (Lurker 1991: virtue, they are confronted with amoral conditions 30-31). Osiris was the old Egyptian god of the under- in various kinds of collectivities. world but also the god of the sky. The Canaanite Third, in 1911, the Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler god of the dead Mot was at the same time the god introduced the term ambivalence with the broader of fertility. The Greek god Apollo sent diseases but intention to bring Freud’s psychoanalytic thinking also created the art of healing. Jahwe is the source into clinical psychology. Bleuler attributed the term of light and darkness as well as salvation and disas- ambivalence to persons who suffered from schizo- ter. The symbols of Jesus Christ are the lamb and the phrenia, which is also a term that Bleuler formu- lion, and so on. While we know that all symbols bear lated (Bleuler 2014). Schizophrenia has its roots in different and contingent meanings, the abovemen- the Greek verb σχίζειν, which can be translated as tioned examples show the closeness of mutually ex- the verb to split, splinter, and cleave. Despite what clusive elements of life. Ambivalence has been con- is sometimes implied by everyday , the structed as an intrinsic element of life in moments ambivalence of schizophrenic minds is not neces- of creation and destruction. sarily linked to binary components. Ambivalence al- Second, in the prosaic literature of the 19th and ear- lows for multiple divisions within persons but also ly 20th centuries, double-valuedness was extended within collective identities. to diagnoses of society (Wilpert 1989: 23). Double- The roots of the term ambivalence in psychoana- facedness was a prominent metaphor, for example, lytic thinking lead to two aspects that cannot be

ifes_wp 01 11 disregarded (Lurker 1991: 31-32). First, the term am- colonizer´s paradigm of civilizational superiority. In bivalence is linked to code systems such as normal/ this sense, the mimicry of the colonized also unveils abnormal or healthy/ill. In order to make sense of the inner contradictions in the central values of the such distinctions, it is necessary to critically recon- Enlightenment, civilization and freedom (Castro struct the context for the attribution of sanity or Varela and Dhawan 2005: 89). Consequently, am- insanity to affirmative or noncompliant behavior bivalence does not divide, but it links subjects and (Foucault 2014, 2015). Second, the roots of ambiva- objects of the colonial discourse (Finzi 2012: 67). In lence, whether in allegedly healthy/normal or un- postcolonial studies, ambivalence therefore stands healthy/abnormal contexts, are firmly connected to for inherent contradiction as well as for polysemy. base cases such as the evolution of young personali- From these four understandings, we may distill ties, parent/child relationships, or family constella- four reference points. Ambivalences are (a) related tions. Ambivalences usually have their roots (better: to core settings of individual and collective life, (b) it is assumed that they have their roots) in core set- linked to elements of creation or, in a broader sense, tings, not in peripheral incidents. to human action, (c) associated with an asymmetry Fourth, ambivalence is also a key concept in postco- between an encompassing societal modernity and lonial studies. For Homi Bhabha, ambivalence is the fragile individual selves, and (d) marked by hybrid- main feature of the colonial discourse: the source ity through the simultaneous repetition and trans- of both its power and its instability. Ambivalence formation of power relations. In adapting these ide- manifests itself in the structure of the colonial ster- as to the subject of Europeanization, we argue that eotype, which presents its discriminatory knowl- historical, political, or societal processes in Europe edge about the colonized as something obvious and are ambivalent because they carry an inherent mo- “already known” on the one hand and as something ment of contradiction and polysemy that is imma- that has to be “anxiously repeated” (Bhabha 1994: nent in the key ideas and concepts of European mo- 66) on the other. Even the content of the colonial dernity. In this sense, ambivalent processes are not stereotype is ambivalent – stereotypes include both merely contingent, but their contingency results in admiration and fear, “desire and derision, an artic- contradictoriness and multi-directionality toward a ulation of difference contained within the fantasy teleological understanding of European modernity of origin and identity” (ibid.: 67). that is accompanied by moments of alienation due In the colonial discourse, the colonized simultane- to unequal relations of cultural, economic, and po- ously represents the eternal Other and a subject litical power. that can be reformed according to the model of the As has been demonstrated by the abovementioned colonizer-Self. This double role of the colonized as a literary authors of the 19th and early 20th century, carrier “of a difference that is almost the same, but individuals may be forced to live their lives accord- not quite” (ibid.: 86) produces deeply ambivalent ing to the confinements of modern societies, but identities on both sides. Bhabha even conceptualiz- they have their individual strategies to cope with es the colonized subject as the hybrid Doppelgänger modernity. Similarly, the colonized have adapted of the colonizer: through the mimicking and adop- the apparently fixed norms of European modernity tion of the colonizer-culture, the colonized desta- in their own ways, thus transforming them at the bilize the very same idea of originality, uniqueness same time. There is a gap between the room for and exclusive belonging that characterizes the maneuver that individuals and groups have and

12 ifes_wp 01 the seemingly iron cage of the modern society; a iii) ‘Europeanization, modernization and ambiva- gap that is open to contingent – and consequently, lences’. In rejecting trajectorism/teleology and pro- ambivalent – social action. moting an understanding of crises that conceives of Combined, our triad concept of i) ‘Europeanization, them as a constitutive element of Europeanization, modernization and trajectorism’, which we already our approach resonates with the perspective that transformed into ii) ‘Europeanization, moderniza- views ambivalence as a central aspect of Europeani- tion and crises’, is now adjusted anew into the triad zation, both as an inherent feature and an outcome.

3. Teleology, modernity, and Europe: from historic to postcolonial studies of Europeanization

Our proposition that Europeanization and mod- of ‘’ in 1492 as a turning point – linked to im- ernization are tied to ambivalence does not allow perialism and/or colonialism (see Castro Varela and for the reverse conclusion that ambivalences are Dhawan 2015: 20-39). Both processes serve as play- solely tied to Europeanization. In particular, the ing fields that both unleashed and extended the postcolonial perspective regards ambivalences in a experience of European modernity; its global reach more structural way than modernization-oriented and purposiveness distinguish it from, for example, approaches. We will present both perspectives with Roman and Islamist expansion in earlier periods of the aim of unfolding the different functions that history (Appadurai 2012; Boatcă 2013; Frischmann ambivalence may have in the concepts of Europe 2017). European teleology and trajectorism not only and Europeanization. contains a temporal but also a spatial dimension. When Bauman attributed ambivalence to moder- However, there is another level of the asymmetrical nity, he certainly had in mind Europe and hence distribution of power in European modernity that European forms of modernity. Alluding to Krzysztof the classical authors of postcolonial studies mostly Pomian, Bauman characterized Europe as a “civili- ignore. Beyond the obvious dimension of the ex- zation of frontier crossing” that is willing to “give ploitation of colonized non-European spaces, inner- the world a better form”. This striving for a global European differences with regard to modernity order – and hence global power – needs a historic have played and still play a significant role. Most im- mission to enforce its own will throughout the aginations of history that did not contain a (Bauman 1998: 38; translation from German European component were seen as normatively in- by the authors). In Bauman’s book on the ambiva- ferior. British parliamentarism, the French Revolu- lence of modernity, the link between intra-European tion, industrialization, the building of nation states and extra-European processes of modernization is and even largely emanated from West- not spelled out with many historical examples. This ern Europe. In his lectures on the philosophy of history, should be done, however. European dominance Hegel spoke of freedom on the “march from East to throughout the world has been – with the discovery West” – not only to highlight the backwardness of

ifes_wp 01 13 or Arabia but also of the (rural) European East (Hegel core values of Enlightenment such as rationality 1986: 74, 134). The idea of progress was increasingly or freedom are not the only ones to have a positive associated with its socioeconomic components. normative connotation. Additionally, socioeconom- Marx and many others spoke of historic necessities ic accomplishments such as social differentiation, in taming a phenomenon that had acquired a West- urbanization, or a capitalist regime present prefer- ern European code (Salvadori 2008: 17-23). able characteristics – “modern” societies are in their The teleological component became ever stronger view normatively superior to “nonmodern” ones and led to the classical of and should therefore be established for the sake of the 20th century. Besides the authors that have al- societal progress. Eisenstadt and Spohn shed doubt ready been mentioned (Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959b; on the pseudouniversal evolutionary pattern of Zapf 1996), another pertinent example is Walt W. Western Europe and North America (Spohn 2010: 4), Rostow’s stages of growth (Rostow 1960), a per- but they do not reject modernity as such. spective that has also been taken up to construct Another field of criticism of modernization theory the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United in the 20th century unfolded explicitly with regard Nations. Ever since then, aspects such as seculariza- to non-Western parts of Europe. The question arose tion, social differentiation, individualization, indus- because certain parts of Central and trialization, capitalism, urbanization, nation-build- had undoubtedly belonged to the ‘modern’ sphere ing, and rationalization have been in previous times. For example, St. Petersburg of seen as the core elements of a seemingly universal the 18th and 19th centuries was a flourishing center modernity based on the model of a Western Euro- that attracted arts and knowledge as well as eco- pean development. nomic and military resources from all around Eu- Of course, many authors have tried to put this argu- rope. Another example is parts of Czechoslovakia, ment into perspective. The most prominent coun- which belonged to one of the most industrialized terarguments have referred to the terms “multiple” regions of Europe before II. or “diverse” modernities (Eisenstadt 1987; Spohn Another critical aspect of European modernity con- 2006, 2010). They were coined by historical soci- cerns state . Electrification was one of the ologists with the aim of reinstating non-European core slogans of Lenin’s economic policy in the Soviet forms of modernity; for example, in urban centers Union of the 1920s and 1930s – certainly an element around the globe or in periods and places that are of conceptions of modernity. While the myth of easily disregarded. Eisenstadt and Spohn also in- Soviet and communist modernization was strength- troduced the argument that modernity includes ened by technological and scientific innovations, sociocultural elements, for example, the capacity ambitious research and prestigious projects such for peaceful conflict resolution or cultural and sci- as space missions, the myth receded when the entific accomplishments. Eisenstadt’s and Spohn’s standards of life and levels of societal freedom were arguments rightly pointed out that modernity, or found to clearly lag way behind Western Europe. components of it, should not be reduced to Western Nevertheless, the appraisal of the political, social, Europe (and North America) alone. and economic developments beyond the Iron Cur- At the same time, Eisenstadt and Spohn placed little tain proceeded via the terminology of moderniza- emphasis on teleology as a problematic element of tion. Perhaps the best example was the monumen- the idea of European modernity. In their view, the tal “East Central Europe in the Modern World” by

14 ifes_wp 01 Andrew Janos (2000), which again captured the of Europeanization is possible. While the temporal region in its different degrees of “backwardness” – idea of Europe “between tradition and modernity” always in reference to the Western European capi- reflects dichotomous concepts that in the end only talist market democracy. Nearly one decade earlier, reproduce teleology, a nonteleological approach to ’s notorious vision of the “end of Europeanization takes into account time concepts history” already underscored that no other form of of acceleration and accelerating creative destruc- political and economic organization would gain the tion (Rosa 2005; Reckwitz 2014). The temporal di- same level of legitimacy as Western mension of Europeanization points to the simul- (Fukuyama 1992). taneity or temporal arrangement of interlinked A historically more coherent concept has been pre- phenomena; their (temporal) superimposition sented by Manuela Boatcă, who distinguishes be- and dynamic; or at particular “tilting points” when tween “decadent” Southern and “epigonic” Eastern processes or mechanisms of Europeanization clash Europe, with both European subregions employed and effect neologisms or new directions of Europe- in establishing the hegemony of the one (West) an phenomena (Junge 2000; Knöbl 2007). Our focus European model of modernity (Boatcă 2010). This on temporality pays attention to “symbolic mean- model goes much further than most approaches ing-making” related to decisive ambivalent turning within the postcolonial studies paradigm, which points in Europeanization (Basta 2017). often conceptualizes Europe as a construct The second dimension concerns the spatial and instead of diversifying and pluralizing European ac- imperial construction of Europe. Many historians tors and experiences. understand the emergence of the idea of Europe as By and large, the core elements of teleological mo- a reaction to territorial experiences that are associ- dernity have remained the normative reference ated with the passage to modernity. Elements are until today, even if insightful authors have under- the confrontation with the Osman empire, Europe- taken various efforts to problematize the very no- an colonialism, religious wars, and secularization tion of modernity (Banerjee 2006: 1-7). The current (Asbach 2014 and Burke 1980). The military confron- imagination of modernity is not only established as tation with the Osmans created a consciousness of a real-world benchmark of human development but European solidarity in confrontation with the Asian this benchmark is also defined by Western actors enemy and of superiority toward the Asian-Ottoman who therefore create the epistemological standards culture. The religious wars of the 17th century de- of modernity (Boatcă 2010: 343). stroyed the role of the as guarantor What, however, was the role of modernity in the of unity on the continent and enabled the emer- notion of Europe and/or Europeanness? Not only gence of the modern idea of Europe as a system of does Western Europe seem to have a “patent” states (Burke 1980: 25-25). Colonialism created an (Boatcă 2013: 322) on the definition of modernity, awareness of being European through contact with but modernity has also played a role in the forma- the Others on other continents. Moreover, coloniza- tion of the idea of Europe. This can be discussed tion paved the way for an entangled history that along three dimensions: a temporal, a spatial and a structurally overarched Europe (Conrad 2013). normative dimension. If we accept the late appearance of the idea and The first concerns temporality, and in particular, notion of Europe and its reliance on the colonial periodization. We argue that based on the idea of experience, we have to define Europe as an impe- ambivalence, temporality without teleology as part rial construct based on the subjective feeling of

ifes_wp 01 15 superiority and as a definite result of global inter- Therefore, we put forward the question of whether actions (Asbach 2017; Conrad and Randeira 2013). the nation state has generally been overestimated Therefore, territorial placings of culture and iden- as a seemingly modern point of reference. At the tity and their interdependence form the spatial di- same time, transnational orders and regimes have mension of ambivalent Europeanization. As schol- not yet been established. Europeanization has, in ars from both and history, we have historic hindsight and from the perspective of today, noticed different epistemologies regarding the been permanently characterized by border-drawing scope of Europe. In mainstream political science, and debordering. It has ambivalent impacts on the European modernity has to a significant extent territorial attributions of political and social orders, been built on the imagination that the nation state nation states and the transnational realm. lies at the foundation of effective statehood. This The third dimension concerns the normative ex- position rests on the relative stability of certain na- pectation horizons of modernity that were and still tion states (for example Great Britain, , or the are associated with the notion of Europe. Already states in Scandinavia) and on the relatively peaceful during the Enlightenment, the establishment of a conditions of the post-1945 order that was built on peaceful order to overcome the violent conflicts of nation states. The nation state has been seen as an the 16th and 17th centuries was projected onto Eu- effective model through counterfactuals: in many rope (Delanty 2013: 156-157). In that sense, Europe places and periods where the cultural and political took the place of premodern phenomena such as nation state did not coincide, regimes were unsta- the Holy as an order of (imagined) ble and had a tendency to turn or remain nondemo- peace. When the Christian world diversified, this cratic (for example, in the Balkans). also dissolved the religious unity of the Empire. From the perspective of historical scholarship, how- The Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) was made ever, the nation state is seen neither as central nor by Ferdinand I. (the brother of Charles V.) and the as positive as in political science: large periods of estates of the empire – the secular and/or political history, for example, in the 18th and 19th centuries, forces had taken over the former empires’ function have been marked by empires rather than by nation of guaranteeing peace (Koselleck 1979: 17-37). With states. Even France and the can be the anti-Napoleonic coalition and the Congress of categorized as colonial empires until well into the Vienna, the task of European peacekeeping had ac- 1960s. Additionally, the judgement on empires has quired a new meaning. From the beginning of the changed considerably in recent decades. Many of 19th century, the major challenge did not consist in them (for example Hapsburg or the United King- containing religious conflict any more, but in fenc- dom) underwent considerable modernization and ing in military projects of conquest that aimed at were quite effective in regard to internal security or the whole continent. multiethnic administration. Additionally, there are While the European powers of the 19th century examples of nation states that took over imperial struggled with internal imperialist attempts, they practices, as can be seen from the incorporation of had fewer problems exporting the imperial model to Southern into central rule and the creation of the rest of the world. As has been outlined above, it colonies by Italy and Germany in the late 19th and became the basic form of the relationship between early 20th centuries. the European great powers and the peripheries, be

16 ifes_wp 01 it at the edges of Europe or in the rest of the world overlapping, divergent or parallel processes of (Delanty 2013: 158-159). Exactly during this time, the homogenization and differentiation of norms, prac- teleological processes of rationalization, bureau- tices, or discourses. For instance, industrialization, cratization, and self-determination of (Western social differentiation, the consolidation of nation European) individuals, societies and states, as well states, economic regulation, and the creation of as industrialization and market capitalism, took welfare states have brought about lasting process- clear shape in Western Europe and formed the core es of institutional alignment and homogenization of modernization theory (Asbach 2017: 188). The in Europe. At the same time, these processes have “Westernization of Europe”, as this normative ef- also brought inequality, disparities, asymmetries figy has been called (Randeira and Römhild 2013: of knowledge or material resources, or deprivation. 20-21), culminated during the postwar period and Both integrative and disintegrative functions of did not even find its end with the end of the Cold conflict, crises and boundary drawing are constant- War, when the adoption of the EU’s rules by Eastern ly present in and related to Europe. This perspective European countries became the most prominent in- on ambivalent normative expectations in and to- terpretation of Europeanization. ward European societies helps to analyze both ho- Normative expectations such as peace, stabil- mogenization and alignment, as well as differentia- ity, rational power, democracy and wealth as rel- tion and alienation, as aspects of Europeanization. evant targets that also influence political prac- In summary, we consider these three dimensions tices can therefore be conceptualized as the third - normative expectations, and the spatial and tem- dimension of European modernization, compris- poral dimensions – as three decisive ‘arenas’ in ing the ambivalence of (re)producing patterns of which ambivalences of Europeanization can be ob- instability, inequality, mistrust and autocracy. The served, systematized and analyzed with respect to ambivalence in the dimension of normative their roots, entanglements and consequences. (societal) expectations consists of potentially

4. Conclusion

The aim of our paper was to formulate and deploy and are at the same time the coupling element that an approach to Europeanization beyond trajectorism. dovetails with Europeanization and modernization. We have tried to shed light on the link between the With the help of theories on modernity – first and Europeanization and modernization approaches, foremost, Zygmunt Bauman’s writings on ambiva- and we tried to investigate the idea of sequence lent modernity – and of postcolonial studies that that is inherent to both concepts. broaden the perspective on Europeanization be- We have argued that ambivalences, that is, the yond Europe’s territorial borders, we elaborated a inherent contradictoriness and multidirectional- concept of Europeanization that replaces teleology ity of processes, form the core of Europeanization with ambivalence and shifts the focus on the role

ifes_wp 01 17 of contradictions, crises and conflict. Taking the perspective of ambivalences takes into account that concept of ambivalences seriously leads us to place outcomes of Europeanization can be peace and contingency, not teleology, at the core of Europe- conflict, contestation and compromise, integration anization. and crisis. The reflection on Europeanization from the specific We argue that this represents the core of Europe- perspective of postcolonial studies sheds light on anization. Our approach may help to implement a the three particular dimensions of Europeanization perspective on Europeanization that conceptual- in which the inherent ambivalences become espe- izes Europe not as a kind of ‘logical outcome’ of for- cially apparent: the dimensions of time, normative mer processes, decisions, coincidences or ambitions expectations, and space and empire. We think that but as a fragile, dynamic, multifaceted societal con- our approach of ambivalent Europeanization – split struct that is situated in the particular institution- into these three dimensions – shows the applicabili- alized of the European continent. ty of the concept to empirical research. The research

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ifes_wp 01 23 Authors’ contacts: Timm Beichelt Professor, European Studies [email protected]

Clara Frysztacka Assistant Professor, Contemporary European History [email protected]

Claudia Weber Professor, Contemporary European History [email protected]

Susann Worschech Assistant Professor, European Studies [email protected]

24 ifes_wp 01 Viadrina Institute for European Studies The Viadrina Institute for European Studies (IFES) at the School for Cultural and Social Sciences of the European University Viadrina offers a platform for interdisciplinary research on social, political, and cultural figurations in a globally entangled Europe. The research interests lie on historic and present processes of Europeanisation, focusing on their inherent ambivalences and including Europe’s colonial history and its aftermath. We encourage the exploration of ruptures, contradictions, and transformation processes and aim to integrate these inquiries in the academic and public debates about Europe, , and the EU in past and present. The IFES aims at providing new impulses for a critical perspective within the field of Euro- pean Studies.

For more information, visit our website at https://www.europa-uni.de/en/forschung/institut/institut_europastudien/index.html

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ifes_wp 01 25 26 ifes_wp 01 ifes_wp 01 27 IFES Working Paper Series 1/2019-I T. Beichelt, C. Frysztacka, C. Weber, S. Worschech. Ambivalences of Europeanization. Modernity and Europe in Perspective

May 2019