Rules and Rule-Following

K. Cahill, A. Pichler: Introduction to Wittgenstein

8th lecture 12.10.2020: Grammar; Rules; Rule-following [Some slides make re-use of slides by S. Säätelä]

1 AloisPichler Grammar

2 AloisPichler Übersichtliche Darstellung of / Focus on grammar and language rather than “phenomena”

PI §90: We feel as if we had to see right into phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena. What that means is that we call to mind the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena. […] Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one. PI §116: When philosophers use a word —"knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" — and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home? — What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. PI §371: Essence is expressed in grammar. PI §373: Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.) PI §383: We do not analyse a phenomenon (for example, thinking) but a concept (for example, that of thinking), and hence the application of a word.

3 AloisPichler Rules Grammar has to do with rules

4 AloisPichler “What is a rule?”

5 AloisPichler What is a rule?

➢ … – asks the philosopher☺. Remember1, LW says: If you in philosophy have a question such as «What is …?», then … ➢ Language game method!

➢ Remember2: Introduction to the PI (§§1-88) under 7 headings ➢ Mistakes of the «Augustinian picture» ➢ Acting ➢ Language game ➢ There is no philosophical language game («einfach», «Bedeutung», «Satz» …) ➢ Form of life ➢ Family resemblances ➢ Übersichtliche Darstellung

6 AloisPichler «What is a rule?» Hence, in treating this question we should try to 1) avoid the mistakes of the «Augustinian picture» 2) keep in mind the importance of a focus on human acting 3) treat the question in terms of «language game» 4) avoid introducing language and concepts that transcend ordinary language 5) imagine the form(s) of life (the «phenomena») that belong with the notions of rule that we develop 6) be prepared that «rule» is a «family resemblance concept» 7) aspire at an übersichtliche Darstellung of the uses of the words «rule» and «rule following» (rather than of the «phenomena» of «rule» and «rule following»)

7 AloisPichler There are very different kinds of rules! (“Do all rules have something characteristic in common which makes them rules?”) See, in addition to Wittgenstein, also F. Waismann: The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy (1965) and Logik, Sprache, Philosophie (1976).

8 AloisPichler Regularity?

“Rules describe regularities.” ➢Also the movements of planets can be described as being regular – but do planets follow rules?

9 AloisPichler Regularity of human acting?

“Rules describe regularities in human acting (acting!); rules of language, for example, describe regularities in words use.” • Sometimes we say that some particular phrase is not correct language (e.g., in Norwegian, “Ikke glem og lukke vinduet”). We say so not on the basis of regularities in linguistic practice (most Norwegians talk in this way!), but on the basis of norms of language. Those rules that we invoke in order to correct actual usage are normative, not descriptive. • Rules don’t need to agree with regularities existing in actual usage. I can introduce new rules precisely in order to change the actual usage, thus, in order to be normative. • Rules are not like factual statements about regularities: The latter can be true or false, while rules are normative and tell us whether human behavior is correct or incorrect. ➢ Thus, regularity cannot be the characteristic of rules?

10 AloisPichler Rules are normative: Used as justification? “A great many things in human life are normative; what makes rules special is that I can refer to them as justification for my acting, e.g. for saying ‘Hunden er snill’ rather than ‘Hundet er snill’ (grammatical rule).” ➢Also orders are used as justification!

11 AloisPichler Rules are normative: Like orders?

“What makes rules specific, is that they are orders or function like orders.” ➢Orders have people who give the order – who are the “ordereres” of rules, their “rulers”?

12 AloisPichler Rules are normative: Like ideals?

“What makes rules specific, is that they are ideals or function like ideals.” ➢ If someone makes an illegal move in Chess and I say to him: “Chess is played by such and such rules”, I do not mean: “OK, you play chess, but not how it ideally should be played”. – If I say to someone “Cod is cooked in such and such a way” I can mean “OK, you cook cod, but not how it ideally should be done”. (Constitutive vs. Regulative rules)

13 AloisPichler The cause for doing something?

“What makes my behavior into following a rule, is that I am caused to act in this way by a rule.” ➢A rule is not a cause, but a reason for acting – intentionality is involved.

14 AloisPichler The reason for doing something?

“What makes my behavior into following a rule, is that I do it for a particular reason.” ➢Most of rule-following is “blind”.

15 AloisPichler Rules are normative: Like conventions?

“Rules are introduced by convention; they are conventional (“willkürlich”)? • The rules of everyday language are not generally arbitrary in the sense that they would result from explicit convention – rather, they are “überliefert”, passed on, part of a “tradition” (see Gadamer). Sure, some of the rules of grammar or games are open to being arbitrarily changed and can thus become the subject of convention!

16 AloisPichler Normative only? What should “normative” mean?

“Rules in language tell us how words are to be used, they are normative.” • Some linguistic rules simply describe how words actually are used (“bruksmåtebeskrivende” vs. “regelgivende definisjoner”); they are descriptive. • Btw.: What does “are to be used” mean? There are many different uses of “ought” (“sollen”). – One ought to say “Thank you” when one receives a present. Is this a rule in language? Are we here still speaking about grammar?

17 AloisPichler Rule vs. Application?

“Rules are what is fixed before the application (of the rule).” ➢ There is no sharp dividing line between what is fixed / defined / introduced / agreed upon before the application, and the actual application of the rule. – See for example the case of learning language, both first and second language: Where do you draw the dividing line between learning the rule and learning its application? – In cases of learning by doing we might say that we first learn the application, and only afterwards the rule.

18 AloisPichler Eternal fixation?

“Rules are what is a sort of fixed once for all – while the application of the rule varies case for case.” ➢Rules are not fixed forever, but can be changed.

19 AloisPichler Learned explicitly?

“Rules are an essential, explicit ingredient in learning a game.” • Often the rules of games are not explicitly learned, but read off from the actual game practice. • “Red and green exclude each other”, “The external world exists” are rules of (depth) grammar, but not learned explicitly.

20 AloisPichler Rules: «I’ll teach you differences» • “Constitutive” vs. “Regulative” rules • Instructions that together make up an exact and coherent calculus (expert system) vs. Rules in an open ended / vague / evolving / multiperspectival / sometimes even incoherent and inconsistent domain • «Knowing that»-rules, conscious, explicable and verbalizable by rule follower vs. «Knowing that»-rules, hidden, but explicable and verbalizable by expert vs. «Tacit» rules, «knowing how», maybe not verbalizable and with «imponderable evidence» • Descriptive rules vs. Normative rules and rules for ethical behaviour

21 AloisPichler Rules: «I’ll teach you differences» (cont.) • Rules that involve the living body (incl. emotion and expression) vs. Rules that involve language, logic and physics only • Rules that can / should be followed by humans only vs. Rules that can also be followed by machines • Rules that one can learn on one’s own (by observation …) vs. Rules that one can learn only through instruction by others • Rules that are learned in practice vs. Rules that are learned by explicit instruction • Rules inherited by tradition («Vorwissen») vs. Rules in a human life’s time or a short period only

22 AloisPichler “… sure, rules can be changed!”

23 AloisPichler How easy is it to change …

• Basic laws in logic • Basic laws in mathematics • Laws of nature • Regularities in nature and anthropological constants (human biology, birth, death …) • Patterns and regularities in human behaviour (expression of sadness, joy …) • “Hinge” certainties • Depth grammar («I understand» is partly similar to «I can continue»; «I have pain» is dissimilar to «I have a car» …) • Mere conventions: traffic rules, orthography, contracts in politics and economy, games like chess, sign posts, work routines … • …

24 AloisPichler Reflection

• Have we in this session throughout paid sufficient attention to our «seven guides» …? • Were we in this session focused on analysing the use of «rule» only, thus sticking to grammar – or were we also looking to the phenomena of rule and rule-following? – Cf. PI §383: We do not analyse a phenomenon (for example, thinking) but a concept (for example, that of thinking), and hence the application of a word.

25 AloisPichler Rule following

26 AloisPichler A rule stands there like a sign-post. —Does the sign-post leave no doubt about the way I have to go? … [W]here is it said which way I am to follow it … (PI §85) • A rule stands there like a sign-post. — Does the sign-post leave no doubt about the way I have to go? … [W]here is it said which way I am to follow it … (PI §85) • Reflection: “A rule stands there like a sign- post …”: What sort of rule are we talking about here?

28 AloisPichler How does the rule guide me?

«How do we get from the rule to rule- following? How do I make the transition from the rule to its application? Which is the mediating step between the two? What is to count as following the rule correctly?»

29 AloisPichler Proposed answers

⚫ Determinism

⚫ Platonism

⚫ Interpretationalism

⚫ Decisionism

⚫ Skepticism

See H. Glock: Wittgenstein Dictionary, pp. 323 ff Determinism

The application of the rule is already pre-determined by the rule, much like the movement of a train is determined by the tracks (also think of two gear wheels meshing). PI §193: If we know the machine, everything else—that is the movements it will make—seem to be already completely determined.

31 AloisPichler Are the movements of the machine determined?

• If we should think of our mind and of rule- following as working like a machine – is it really so that the machine already a sort of contains its further movements? When does one have the thought that a machine already contains its possible movements in some mysterious way?— Well, when one is doing philosophy. And what lures us into thinking that? The kind of way in which we talk about the machine ... (PI § 194)

32 AloisPichler Is the rule the cause for its application?

• Confusion of causes and reasons – The mechanistic view turns reasons into causes, understands the relation between a rule and the action it guides as external. (Cf. W. Child on causal theories of intentionality, pp. 111-114)

33 AloisPichler PI §81: Rule-following is like operating a calculus?

All this […] can appear in the right light only when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning something, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what may mislead us (and did mislead me) into thinking that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it, he is thereby operating a calculus according to definite rules. Platonism

All applications of the rule are somehow pre-contained in the rule and give themselves «naturally» / «intuitively» / «logically». PI §218: Whence the idea that the beginning of a series is a visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity? Well, we might imagine rails instead of a rule. And infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a rule.

35 AloisPichler Is meaning something pregiven and preconfigured which I just need to «pick up»?

PI §219: “All the steps are really already taken” means: I no longer have any choice. The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole of space ... Interpretationalism

The application of the rule is pre-pared by derivation of the application from the rule through an act of interpretation. “But how can a rule teach me what I have to do at this point? After all, whatever I do can, on some interpretation [Deutung], be made compatible with the rule.” …

37 AloisPichler Interpretationalism

Claim: A rule in itself is nothing but sounds or ink-marks or signs. Only the application of the rule turns it into a symbol. So every action according to a rule must rely on an interpretation. • But if an interpretation is supposed to provide the missing content of the rule, then this leads to a regress: every interpretation can be further interpreted. “But how can a rule teach me what I have to do at this point? After all, whatever I do can, on some interpretation [Deutung], be made compatible with the rule.”—No, that’s not what one should say. Rather, this: every interpretation hangs in the air together with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do no determine meaning ... (PI §198) Mentalism

Claim: The understanding or grasping of a rule is (essentially) a mental state or process, like for example an interpretation. (See e.g. PI §§ 139, 146, 152-154, 205, 210) Why are we tempted by mentalism?

• §143: Let us now examine the following kind of language-game: when A gives an order, B has to write down a series of signs according to a certain formation rule ...

• §145 :... let us suppose that after some efforts on the teacher's part he continues the series correctly, that is, as we do it. So now we can say he has mastered the system.—But how far need he continue the series for us to have the right to say that? Clearly you cannot state a limit here.

• § 146: Suppose I now ask: "Has he understood the system when he continues the series to the hundredth place?" Or—if I should not speak of 'understanding' in connection with our primitive language-game: Has he got the system, if he continues the series correctly up to this point?—Perhaps you will say here: to have got the system (or, again, to understand it) can't consist in continuing the series up to this or that number: that is only applying one's understanding. The understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use … Why are we tempted by mentalism? (cont.)

• The temptation is to say that understanding does not consist in the application of, say, a formula, but is actually a mental state or process ”behind” or in addition to the rule-following, something behind the application. However, see PI §154:

… If there has to be anything 'behind the utterance of the formula' it is particular circumstances, which warrant my saying that I can go on—if the formula occurs to me. … Just for once, don't think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all!—For that is the way of talking which confuses you. Instead, ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, "Now I know how to go on"? I mean, if the formula has occurred to me?— In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process. (A pain's increasing or decreasing, listening to a tune or a sentence — mental processes.) See a simple example of rule-following, reading (§§156-183):

PI §161: … Try this experiment: say the numbers from 1 to 12. Now look at the dial of your watch and read them. – What was it you called "reading" in the latter case? That is, what did you do, to make it into reading? ➢ What is it that needs to come in addition to the act of simply reading the numbers from the watch? PI §175: Make some arbitrary doodle on a bit of paper.—And now make a copy next to it, let yourself be guided by it. […] But now notice this: while I let myself be guided, everything is quite simple, I notice nothing special; but afterwards, when I ask myself what happened, it seems to me to have been something indescribable. It’s as if I couldn’t believe I merely looked, and made such and such a face, and drew a line. … yet I feel as if there must have been something else; in particular when I say "guidance" , "influence", and other such words to myself. …

➢ What is it that here needs to come in addition to the act of simply copying the doodle? Decisionism

The application of the rule is pre-pared by derivation of the application from the rule through an act of decision, choice.

PI §186: … — But that is just what is in question: what, at any stage, does follow from that sentence. Or, again, what, at any stage we are to call “being in accordance” with it (and with how you then meant it—whatever your meaning it might have consisted in). It would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was needed at every point, but that a new decision was needed at every point.

46 AloisPichler Skepticism

The application of the rule is in no way pre-pared; there is nothing which bridges rule and application; there is no way to account for how we bridge the gap between the two. Whether you followed the rule or not, and whether you followed this rule or that rule, is post-determined by what others say / the community says if asked these questions, or what others do / the community does in the same situation.

PI §201: This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. (PI § 201) 47 AloisPichler The questions remain:

• «How do we get from the rule to rule-following? How do I make the transition from the rule to its correct application? Which is the mediating step between the two? How does a rule determine what does (and what does not) accord with it? How am I able to obey a rule that covers an indefinite amount of cases? How do I overcome the gap between the two? How shall I account for making the step from the rule to its application? How do I explain rule-following?»

Determinism, Platonism, Interpretationalism, Decisionism … Skepticism!!???!!!

48 AloisPichler Skepticism Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982)

PI §201: This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. ➢ The formulation of a rule seems always to permit a way of following it that one didn’t foresee, and seems always to leave room for doubt about whether a person actually follows the rule (rules always* have loop-holes). How can under such circumstances rule-following and (stable) meaning ever come about?

*Again: Which sorts of rules are we talking about here? The parable of the “aberrant child”

PI §185: … so at the order "+ 1" [the pupil] writes down the series of natural numbers.—Let us suppose we have done exercises and given him tests up to 1000. Now we get the pupil to continue one series (say "+2") beyond 1000—and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to him: "Look what you‘re doing!"—He doesn't understand. We say, "You should have added two: look how you began the series!"—He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I had to do it."—Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I did og on in the same way."—It would now be no use to say, "But can't you see ...?"—and go over the old explanations and examples for him again. —In such a case, we might perhaps say: this person finds it natural, once given our explanations, to understand the order as we would understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000, and so on." PI §186

… How is it decided what is the right step to take at any particular point?—“The right step is the one that is in accordance with the order—as it was meant.”—So when you gave the order +2 you meant he was to write 1002 after 1000—and did you then also mean that he should write 1868 after 1866, and 100036 after 100034, and so on—an infinite number of such sentences?—“No: what I meant was, that he should write the next but one number after every number that he wrote; and from this, stage by stage, all those sentences follow.” —But that is just what is in question: what, at any stage, does follow from that sentence. Or, again, what, at any stage we are to call “being in accordance” with it (and with how you then meant it—whatever your meaning it might have consisted in). It would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was needed at every point, but that a new decision was needed at every point. Skepticism about rule-following

There is "no fact of the matter" that can determine whether I follow a rule or not. This is shown by the following: • Suppose that you have never added numbers greater than 50 before. • Further, suppose that you are asked to perform the calculation '68 + 57'. • Our natural inclination is that you will apply the addition function as you have before, and calculate that the correct answer is '125‘. • But what is it about my past usage that determines 125 as the correct answer?

Kripke: (i) There is no fact about your past usage of the addition function that determines '125' as the right answer, so: (ii) Nothing justifies you in giving the ‘125’ answer rather than another. A “skeptical solution”

Saul Kripke:

⚫ The rule following paradox in PI is the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date.

⚫ Wittgenstein presents a sceptical solution to a sceptical problem. How can “normativity” come in on Kripke’s account?

• Normativity emerges if we consider the individual in relation to a larger community of language-users. • The background of agreement in a community is the criterion by which we judge if someone has followed a rule or not. • The solution is skeptical since it is contingent agreement that decides whether something is to be accepted as following a rule or not following a rule. • Cf. PI §202 : it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’ • Truth-conditions are replaced by assertability conditions (i.e. the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions under which it can be asserted). Practice

To follow a rule is a practice.

PI §201: … It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another one standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases.

PI §202: That’s why ‘following a rule’ is a practice. …

55 AloisPichler «In the beginning was the act!»

• PI §1: … Explanations come to an end somewhere. • PI §211: No matter how you instruct him in continuing the ornamental pattern, how can he know how he is to continue it by himself?” — Well, how do I know? —– If that means “Have I reasons?”, the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons. • PI §219: I follow the rule blindly. PI §326: … the chain of reasons has an end.

56 AloisPichler Some lessons

• Both ‘rule’ and ‘rule-following’ are “family resemblance concepts” – and each of the positions above (Determinism, Platonism, Interpretationalism and Mentalism, Decisionism, Skepticism) gets something right; as general positions, however, they are wrong. • Rule-following is learned in specific language games and practiced in specific language games – which gives it order and support (pace idea of total lack of link between rule and application of the rule). • At the same time, learning to follow a rule does not pre-determine and pre-contain all upcoming cases of rule-following (pace deterministic and Platonistic ideas). • Rule-following is to be treated as a matter of practices rather than of cognition and volition (pace Mentalism, Interpretationalism, Decisionism). ➢ (Later) Wittgenstein wants to connect “rule” and “rule-following”, as he wants to do with all concepts constituting philosophical problems, with action and practice, rather than treat them in traditional epistemological and ontological terms.

57 AloisPichler PI §199

Is what we call “following a rule” something that it would be possible for only one person, only once in a lifetime, to do? — And this is, of course, a gloss on the grammar of the expression “to follow a rule”. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which only one person followed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood, and so on. — To follow a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to have mastered a technique.

58 AloisPichler The discussion goes on …

Does the practice need to be communal – or can it be individual? Does following a rule depend on there being a community following this rule, or is it sufficient that I alone follow the rule?

59 AloisPichler