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President Xi Jinping Attends G20,APEC Summit 1. Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping at the Working Lunch of the G20 Summit 4 2. Exclusive Q&A with Chinese President Xi Jinping 5 3. Xi's APEC Remarks Herald Better Future of Regional 12 S Common Development Xi-Ma Meeting 1. International Community Hails Xi-Ma Meeting as Inspiring Event 15 2. Peaceful Message from Xi-Ma Meeting Encourages Cross-Strait Travel 17 T China-India Relations 1. To Renew the Friendship Across High Mountains and Contribute 18 Asian Wisdom to World Peace and Development 2. Indian President Pranab Mukherjee Met with Li Yuanchao 20 3. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi Met with Li Yuanchao 21 N 4. Li Yuanchao Held Talks with Indian Vice President Hamid Ansari 23 5. Indian PM Wishes to Deepen Military Exchanges with China 24 6. Chinese, Indian Senior Defense Officials Call for Cooperation in 25 Fighting Terrorism 7. If You Wanna Know What China's Gonna Do, Best Pay Attention 26 to the 13.5 E External Affairs 1. Xi Jinping Delivers Speech in National University of Singapore 28 2. Li's Malaysia Trip to Initiate Upgrading of China-ASEAN 31 Cooperation at New Promising Juncture 3. Yang Jiechi Meets with Chairman of the Board of South Centre 33 and Former President of Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa T 4. Wang Yi Elaborates on Five Priorities and Three Important 34 Supports in Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation Created in China and India 1. C919 36 2. China Railway Highspeed 38 3. Paraplegic’s Mission China for Affordable Mobility to Indian Disabled 43 N Tibet Today 1. Belgian Expert Sees Willingness to Protect Tibetan Culture 44 2. Tibetan Opera Gets a Face Lift 45 3. A Life in the So-called Lifeless Zone 47 4. Air China to Launch Non-stop Mumbai-Beijing-Mumbai 50 O Flight from October Book Review – The Tencent Empire 50 Instructions for Chinese Visa Application 51 Flights Between China and India 60 CCTV 62 CRI 66 63 C President Xi Jinping Attends G20, APEC Summit President Xi Jinping Attends G20, APEC Summit REMARKS BY H.E. XI JINPING AT THE WORKING LUNCH OF THE G20 SUMMIT Colleagues, There is a Chinese saying, "Up in 2016 Summit as "Towards an heaven, there is paradise; down on I n n o v a t i v e , I n v i g o r a t e d , Let me begin by congratulating earth, there are Suzhou and Interconnected and Inclusive World President Erdogan on the full Hangzhou." It means that the cities Economy". We hope to take forward success of the Antalya Summit. It of Hangzhou and Suzhou have the preparatory work for the Summit has sent an encouraging signal of the beautiful sceneries that make them in the following four key areas. G20 working together to boost the comparable to paradise on earth. global economy and improve Hangzhou is not only a renowned First, we need to transform people's well-being all over the city of history and culture, but also a growth patterns in innovative ways world. leader in innovation. I trust that the with particular focus on pursuing 2016 Summit will present to us a reform and innovation. We must China will host the 11th G20 unique setting where history meets create and seize new opportunities Summit from September 4th to 5th modernity. to raise the potential of global next year in Hangzhou, Zhejiang economic growth. Province. I wish to take this T h r o u g h o u r p r e v i o u s opportunity to express my conversations with various G20 Second, we need to improve appreciation to countries and members, we have got a keen sense global economic and financial international organizations for their of people's expectations for next g o v e r n a n c e , i n c r e a s e t h e support. I look forward to year's Summit. Based on an representation and voice of welcoming you to the Hangzhou assessment of the current situation emerging markets and developing Summit. and the expectations of all parties, countries, and enhance the capacity we have formulated the theme of the of the global economy to ward off 4 News From China November 2015 President Xi Jinping Attends G20, APEC Summit risks. and enhanced cooperation among Second, reform of the global G20 members have both increased. Third, we need to promote economic governance in recent years We need to act in the spirit of global trade and investment to has hit a rough patch and partnership to work for the smooth generate growth and build an open international economic and trade transformation of G20 and the world economy. rules have been fast evolving. The consolidation of its role as the UN Sustainable Development premier forum for global economic Fourth, we need to promote Summit, the 10th WTO Ministerial governance. inclusive and interconnected Conference and the Paris Climate development, strive to implement Conference are all on this year's Colleagues, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable global agenda, where new plans are Development, eliminate poverty, being made for international G20 belongs to each and every and achieve common development. development cooperation, the one of its members. In preparing for multilateral trading regime and the the Hangzhou Summit, China will Our proposal on the above global campaign against climate consistently follow an open, theme and key areas is based on the chang e. We need to make transparent and inclusive approach, following three observations. coordinated and concerted efforts to and strengthen communication and guide international economic coordination with all other members First, although the global cooperation. to jointly uphold, strengthen and economy is no longer mired in crisis, develop G20. the recovery remains weak and Third, G20 is now facing a fragile for lack of growth engines. transformation from a mechanism I look forward to seeing you at And the performances and policies of crisis response to one of long- the shore of the West Lake in of major economies continue to term governance. As its agenda Hangzhou next September. diverge. We are in an urgent need of items shift from short-term issues to new sources of growth to take the deep-seated and longer-term ones, Thank you. global economy to a new round of the necessity for and difficulty of prosperity. macroeconomic policy coordination EXCLUSIVE Q&A WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT XI JINPING Chinese President Xi Jinping according to foreign ministry Britain, and how do you intend to arrives in Britain on Monday for a officials. ensure that it is mutually beneficial? state visit at the invitation of Queen Elizabeth II, the first state visit to the The questions and answers A: I visited London, Oxford, United Kingdom by a Chinese leader follow in full. For a story on Xi’s Glasgow and Edinburgh in 1994. I since 2005. comments, click on. was deeply impressed by the visit, particularly Britain’s long history, In advance of the trip, President Q: Britain says it wants to be unique culture, friendly people and Xi conducted a written interview China’s best partner in the West, and its beautiful environment. with Reuters, providing written that its economy is wide open to answers to questions posed in Chinese investment. At the same During my upcoming state visit writing by Reuters. time, many in Britain fear China’s to the UK at the invitation of Her intentions and think the British Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, I look The answers, given in English, government is too eager to please forward to having discussions with were prepared by Chinese officials China. What are China’s aims in British leaders and engaging the but reviewed and approved by Xi, fostering a stronger relationship with British public on our bilateral ties. I News From China November 2015 5 President Xi Jinping Attends G20, APEC Summit hope this will chart the course for the people have some misgivings about In recent years, while global future growth of China-UK China-UK cooperation. What I want growth has slowed down, China-UK relations, inject new impetus in to stress is that in today’s world, no i n v e s t m e n t a n d b u s i n e s s practical cooperation between our country can afford to pursue cooperation has kept growing. The two countries in all fields and enable development with its door closed. UK has become the EU’s second us to jointly usher in a “golden time” One should open the door, warmly largest investor in China as well as for China-UK comprehensive welcome friends and be hospitable China’s second largest trading strategic partnership. to them. This is recognized partner and investment destination international practice. The UK has in the EU. China has been the UK’s Public opinion sur veys stated that it will be the Western second largest non-EU trading conducted in Britain show that views country that is most open to China. partner. In 2014, China-UK trade of China are largely favorable among This is a visionary and strategic volume for the first time exceeded the British people. Our two peoples choice that fully meets Britain’s own US$80 billion, and China’s import appreciate each other’s time- long-term interest. China looks from the UK has doubled in five honored and unique cultures. This is forward to engaging with the UK in a years. Two-way investment between an important foundation and wider range, at a higher level and in China and the UK has grown rapidly.
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