Kupec, Kerri (OPA)
From: Kupec, Kerri (OPA) Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2019 2:08 PM To: Moran, John {OAG) Subject: Transcript
REPORTER: mr.attorneygeneral. we do not have th ereport in hand, so can youexplain the special counsel's articulated reasons for not reaching a decision on obstru ction ofjustice, and ifit had anyth ingto do with th edepartment's long standing guidance on not indicting a setting president?
AG BARR: i would leave it to his description in the report, the special counsel's own articulation of why he did not want to make a determination a-s to whether or not th ere was an obstructionoffense. i will say when we met with him, deputy attorneygeneral rosensteinand i met withhim along with ed o'callaghan, the principal associate deputy, on march 5 and asked about the opinion, and whether or not he was taking the positionthat he would have found acrime but for the existence of the olc opinion.he made it very clearseveral ti mes thatthatwas not his position. he was not saying but for the olc opinion, he would have found a crim e. he maoe it cl ear he hao not made the determination there was acrime.
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REPORTER: what did you disagree with himon?given th at. why-0 id youfeel the need to take itto the next step to conclude there was no crime, especially givendoj policy?
AG BARR the prosecutorial fun ction on all ofour powers as prosecutors, includ ingth e power to convene grand jury's and th ecompulsory process involved, is for one purpose. it is determineo, yes or no, was alleged conduct criminalor not criminal? th at is our responsibility and that is whywe have the tools we have.we doni go through this process just to collect information and throw it out to the public.we collect this informationand use that compulsory process for the purpose of making that decision. because the special counsel did not make th at decision,we felt the department had to. that was a decision by me and the deputy attorneygeneral.
Ke rri Kupec Direct or Office of Public Affairs U.S. Department of J u stice [email protected] (b) (6)
Document ID: 0.7.24420.24818 Rabbitt, Brian (OAG)
From: Rabbitt, Brian (OAG) Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2019 2:15 PM To: Moran, John (OAG); Kupec, Kerri (OPA) Subject: RE: OLC Issue
(b) ( 5)
From: Moran, John {OAG)
Kerri,
To follow up on our discussion, (b) (5) - -
Document ID: 0.7.24420.24826 (b) (5)
Happy to follow up if helpful.
John
John S. Moran Deputy Chief ofStaff & Counselor to the Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice ~ {W) ~ :{C) [email protected]
Document ID: 0.7.24420.24826 Gramley, Shannon (OAG)
From: Gramley, Shannon (OAG) Sent: Friday, May 3, 2019 5:17 PM To: Rabbitt, Brian (OAG) Subject: 3/5 Meeting Notes Attachments: 3.5 Meeting 5.3.2019 5.16 SMG.docx
Document ID: 0.7.24420.29841 3/5 Meeting 2:40 (b) (5)
Document ID: 0.7.24420.29841-000001 Kupec, Kerri (OPA)
From: Kupec, Kerri (OPA) Sent: Wednesday, May 1, 2019 4:11 PM To: Boyd, Stephen E. {OLA); Rabbitt, Brian {OAG); Moran, John {OAG); Burnham, James {OAG} Subject: Fwd: Transcript: AG Barr Hearing atSenate Judiciary (5.1) Attachments: AG Barr Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing transcript.docx; ATT00001.htm
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From: "Sutton, Sarah E. (OPA)"
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Sarah Sutton Department ofJustice Office ofPoblic Affaits (b) (6)
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401 – AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.LindseyGrahamOp ening Statement
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SEN.LINDSEYGRAHAM:Thefirstorderofbusinessistotrytocooltheroomdown.Sowe'll seeifwecandothat.TheAttorneyGeneralwillbetestifyinghereinabitabouttheMueller Report.Iwanttothankhimforcomingtothecommitteeandgivingusanexplanationastothe actionshetookandwhyhetookthemregardingtheMueller report.Here’sthegoodnews. Here’sthe Mueller report.Youcanreaditforyourself.It’sabout400andsomethingp AGes.I can'tsayI’vereaditallbutI’vereadmostofit.There'sanunredactedversionoverinthe classifiedsectionoftheSenate,aroomwhereyoucangolookattheunredactedversion,andI didthatandIfounditnottochangeanythingintermsofanoutcome.ButabitabouttheMueller report.WhoisMueller?Forthosewhomaynotknow,Idon'tknowwhereyou'vebeen,butyou maywantknowthatBobMuellerhasareputationinthistownandthroughoutthecountryas beinganoutstandinglawyerandamanofthelaw,whowastheFBIDirector,whowasthe DeputyAttorneyGeneral,whowasinchargeoftheCriminalDivisionattheDepartmentof Justice,was a UnitedStatesMarineandhehasservedhiscountryin avarietyofcircumstances longandforthosewhotooktimetoreadthereport,Ithinkitwaswellwritten,verythorough.
Letmetellyouwhatwentintothisreport.Therewere19lawyersemployed,approximately40 FBIAGents,intelanalysts,forensicaccountantsandotherstaff,2800subpoenasissued,500 witnessesinterviewed.500searchwarrantsexecuted,morethan230ordersforcommunication, recordssotherecordscouldbeobtained.13requeststoforeigngovernmentsforevidence,over $25millionspentovertwoyears.
WemaynotAGreeonmuch,butIhopewecanAGreethathehadampleresources,tookalotof timeandtalkedtoalotofpeople.Andyoucanreadforyourselfwhathefound.TheAttorney Generalwilltellusabitaboutwhathisopinionofthereportis.Intermsofinteractingwiththe WhiteHouse,theWhiteHouseturnedovertoMr.Mueller1.4milliondocumentsandrecords, neverassertedexecutiveprivilegeonetime,over20WhiteHousestaffersincludingeightfrom theWhiteHousecounsel'sofficewereinterviewedvoluntarily.DonMcGahn,chiefcounselfor theWhiteHouse,wasinterviewedforover30hours.Everybodythattheywantedtotalktofrom theTrumpcampaignontheground,theywereabletotalkto.ThePresidentsubmittedhimselfto writtensototheAmericanpeople,Mr.Muellerwastherightguytodothisjob.Ialwaysbelieve thatAttorneyGeneralSessionswasconflictedoutbecausehewaspartofthecampaign.Hewas therightguywithampleresourcesandthecooperationheneededtofindoutwhathappenedwas given,inmyview.Butthereweretwocampaignsin2016andwe'lltalkaboutthesecondonein aminute.
Sowhathavewelearnedfromthisreport?Afterallthistimeandallthismoney,Mr.Muellerand histeamconcludedtherewasnocollusion.Ididn'tknow,likemanyofyouhere,onthe Republicanside,weallAGreedthatMr.Muellershouldbeallowedtodohisjobwithout
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 interference.IjoinedwithsomecolleAGuesontheothersidetointRoducelegislationtoprotect theSpecialCounselthathecouldonlyberemovedforcause.Hewasneverremoved.Hewas allowedtodohisjob.
Sonocollusion,nocoordination,noconspIRAcybetweentheTrumpcampaignandtheRussian governmentregardingthe2016election.Astoobstructionofjustice,Mr.MuellerleftittoMr. Barrtodecideaftertwoyearsandallthistime,hesaid,Mr.Barr,youdecide.Mr.Barrdid. ThereareabunchoflawyersonthiscommitteeandIwilltellyouthefollowing.Youhaveto havespecificintenttoobstructjustice.ThePresidentneverdidanythingtostopMuellerfrom doinghisjob.SoIguesstheorygoesnowokay,hedidn'tcolludewiththeRussiansandhedidn't specificallydoanythingtostopMueller,butattemptsobstructionofjusticeofacrimethatnever occurred.Iguessissortofthenewstandardaroundhere. We’ll seeifthatmakesanysense.To meitdoesn't.
Therewasanothercampaign.ItwastheClintoncampaign.Whathavewelearnedfromthis report?TheRussiansinterferedinourelection.Socansomebipartisanshipcomeoutofthis?I hopeso.IintendtoworkwithmycolleAGuesontheothersidetointRoducethedeteractandto intRoducelegislationtodefendtheintegrityofthevotingsystem.SenatorDurbinandIhave legislationthatwoulddenyanyoneadmittanceintotheUnitedStatesavisaintheimmigration systemiftheywereinvolvedininterferinginanAmericanelection.WorkingwithSenators WhitehouseandBlumenthaltomakesureifyouhackintoastateelectionsystem,eventhough it'snottiedtotheinternet,that'sacrime.Iwouldliketodomoretohardenourinfrastructure becausetheRussiansdidit.Itwasn'tsome400poundguysittingonabedsomewhere.
ItwastheRussians.Andthey'restilldoingit.ItcouldbetheChinese,itcouldbesomebodynext. Somytake-awayfromthisreportisthatwe'vegotalotofworktodotodefenddemocracy AGainsttheRussiansandotherbadactors.Ipromisethecommitteewewillgetonwiththat work,hopefullyinabipartisanfashion.
Theothercampaign.TheothercampaignwasinvestigatednotbyMr.Mueller,bypeoplewithin theDepartmentofJustice.TheaccusationAGainstSecretaryClintonwasthatsheprivateserver upsomewhereinherhouseandclassifiedinformationwasonittoavoidthedisclosure requirementsandtransparencyrequirementsrequiredofbeingSecretaryofState.Sothatwas investigated.Whatdoyouknow?Weknowthatthepersoninchargeofinvestigatinghated Trump'sguts.Idon'tknowhowMr.MuellerfeltaboutTrump,butIdon'tthinkanybodyonour sidebelievesthathehadapersonalanimositytowardthePresidenttothepointthathecouldn't dohisjob.
ThisiswhatStrzoksaidonFebruary12th,2016. He’s inchargeofthee-mailinvestigation:Oh he’s (Trump's)abysmal.Ikeephopingthecharadewillendandpeoplewilljustdumphim.
February12th,2016:PAGeistheDepartmentofJusticelawyerassignedtothiscase.
March3rd,2016:godTrumpisaloathsomehumanbeing.Strzok:godHillaryshouldwin.
ComparethosetwopeopletoMueller.
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March16,2016:IcannotbelieveTrumpislikelytobeanactualseriouscandidateforPresident.
July21,2016,Trumpisadisaster.Ihavenoideahowdestabilizinghispresidencywouldbe.
August28th,2016,threedaysbeforeStrzokwasmadeDeputyactinginchargeofthecounter intelligencedivisionoftheFBI:he'snevergoingtobecomePresident,right?PAGetoStrzok: no,no,hewon't. We’ll stophim.
ThesearethepeopleinvestigatingtheClintone-mailsituationandstartcounterintelligence investigationoftheTrumpcampaign.ComparethemtoMueller.
Augustthe15th,2016,Strzok:Iwanttobelievethepathyouthrewoutforconsiderationin Andy’s officethatthere'snowayhegetselected,but I’m afraidwecan'ttakethatrisk. It’s like aninsurancepolicyintheunlikelyeventyoudiebeforeyou're40.
August26th,2016:JustwenttothesouthernVirginiaWalmart.IcouldsmelltheTrumpsupport.
Octoberthe19th,2016:Trumpisafuckingidiot. He’s unabletoprovideacoherentanswer.
Sorrytothekidsoutthere.ThesearethepeoplethatmadeadecisionthatClintondidn'tdo anythingwrongandthatcounterintelligenceinvestigationoftheTrumpcampaignwas warranted.We ’re goingtoinabipartisanway,Ihope,dealwithRussia.ButwhentheMueller reportisputtobedanditsoonwillbe,thiscommitteeisgoingtolooklongandhardathowthis allstarted. We’re goingtolookattheFISAwarrantprocess.DidRussiaprovideChristopher SteeltheinformationaboutTrumpthatwasusedtogetawarrantonanAmericancitizenandif so,howdidthesystemfail.WastherearealeffortbetweenPapadopoulosandanybodyinRussia tousetheClintone-mailsstolenbytheRussians,oristhatthoughtplantedinhismind?
Idon'tknow,butwe'regoingtolook.AndIcantellyouthis,ifyouchangethenames,y'all wouldwanttolooktoo.EverythingIjustsaid,justsubstituteClintonforTrump.Seewhatthese peoplewithcameraswouldbesayingouthereaboutthis.AstocooperationintheClinton investigation,ItoldyouwhattheTrumppeopledid.TellyoualittlebitaboutwhattheClinton peopledid.Therewasaprotectiveorderfortheserverissuedbythehouseandtherewasa requestbytheStateDepartmenttopreservealltheinformationontheserver.PaulCambetta afterhavingtheprotectiveorderusedasoftwareprogramcalledbleachbittowipethise-mail serverclean.HasanybodyeverheardofPaulCambetta? No.U nderaprotectiveorderfromthe housetopreservetheinformation,underarequestfromtheStateDepartmenttopreservethe informationontheserver,heusedableachbitprogramtowipeitclean.Whathappenedtohim? Nothing.18devicespossessedbySecretaryClintonsheusedtodobusinessassecretary.How
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 manyofthemwereturnedovertotheFBI?None.Twoofthemcouldn'tbeturnedoffbecause JudithCaspertookahammeranddestroyedtwoofthem.Whathappenedtoher?Nothing.the bottomlineiswe'reabouttohearfromMr.Barrtheresultsofatwo-yearinvestigationintothe Trumpcampaign,allthingsRussia,theactionsthePresidenttookbeforeandafterthecampaign, $25million,40FBIAGents.IappreciateverymuchwhatMr.Muellerdidforthecountry.ihave readmostofthereport.Forme,itisover.SenatorFeinstein.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(C-SPAN3) Sen.DianneFeinstein OpeningStatement
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SEN.DIANNEFEINSTEIN:Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.Welcome,AttorneyGeneral.OnMarch 24thyousentalettertoChairmanGrahamandtherankingmemberofthiscommitteeproviding yoursummaryoftheprincipalconclusionssetoutinSpecialCounselMueller'sreport.This reportwaswidelycharacterizedasawinforthePresidentandwasconfirmingtherewasno collusion.FollowingthislettertheWhiteHouseputoutastatementdeclaring,andIquote, “the SpecialCounseldidnotfindanycollusionanddidnotfindanyobstruction ”,endquote,andthat thereport,quote, “wasatotalandcompleteexoneration, ” endquote,ofthePresident.However, lastnighttheWashingtonPostreportedthatSpecialCounselMuellersentyoualetterinlate MarchwherehesaidyourlettertoCongressfailedto,quote,fullycapturethecontext,natureand substanceofhisoffice'sworkandconclusions,endquote.Andthathespokewithyouaboutthe concernthattheletterthreatenedtounderminethepublicconfidenceintheoutcomeofthe investigations. That’s inquotesaswell.ThenonApril18th,youheldapressconferencewhere youannouncedrepeatedlythattheMuellerreportfoundnocollusionandnoevidenceofacrime. Anhourlater,acopyoftheMuellerreportwasprovidedtothepublicandtheCongress,andwe sawwhyMuellerwasconcerned.
Contrarytothedeclarationsofthetotalandcompleteexoneration,theSpecialCounsel'sreport containedsubstantialevidenceofmisconduct.First,SpecialCounselMueller'sreportconfirms thattheRussiangovernmentimplementedasocialmediacampaigntomisleadmillionsof AmericansandthatRussianintelligenceserviceshackedintothedncandthedccccomputers, stolee-mailsandmemosandsystemicallyreleasedthemtoimPACtthePresidentialelection. yourmarchletterstatedthattherewasnoevidencethattheTrumpcampaign,quote,conspiredor coordinatedwithRussia,endquote.However,thereportoutlinedsubstantialevidencethatthe Trumpcampaignwelcomed,encourAGedandexpectedtobenefitelectorallyfromRussia's interferenceintheelection.TheMuellerreportalsodetailshowtimeandtimeAGaintheTrump campaigntookstepstogainadvantAGefromRussia'sunlawfulinterference.Forexample, PresidentTrump'scampaignmanAGerPaulManafortpassedinternalcampaignpollingdata, messAGingandstrategyupdatestoKonstantinKilimnik,aRussiannationalwithtiestoRussian intelligence.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 TheMuellerreportexplainshowPaulManafortbriefedKilimnikinearlyAugustof2016on, andIquote, “thestateoftheTrumpcampaignandManafort'splantowintheelection,quote, includingthecampaign'sfocusonthebattlegroundstatesofMichigan,Wisconsin,Pennsylvania and Minnesota”.next,theMuellerreportdocumentstheTrumpcampaign'scommunications regardingsecretaryClinton'sandtheDNC'sstolene-mails,specificallythereportstates,andI quote,withinapproximatelyfivehoursofPresidentTrumpcallingonRussiatofindsecretary Clinton'se-mails,RussianintelligenceAGencyofficers,quote, “targetedforthefirsttime Clinton'spersonaloffice ,” endquote.TheMuellerreportalsorevealedthatPresidentTrump repeatedlyaskedindividualsaffiliatedwithhiscampaign,includingMichaelFlynn,quote,to “findthedeletedClintone-mails ”,endquote.Theseeffortsincludedsuggestionstocontact foreignintelligenceservices,Russianhackersandindividualsonthedarkweb.Thereport confirmsthatTrumpknewofWikiLeaksreleasesofthestolene-mailsandreceivedstatus updatesaboutupcomingreleaseswhilehiscampaignpromotedcoverAGeoftheleaks.Donald TrumpJr.communicateddirectlywithWikiLeaksandatitsrequestpubliclytweetedalinktoe - mailsstolenfromClinton'scampaignmanAGer.
Second,inyourMarchlettertoCongressyouconcluded,andIquote,thattheevidenceisnot sufficienttoestablishthatthePresidentcommittedanobstructionofjusticeoffense,endquote. However,SpecialCounselMuellermethodicallyoutlinedtenepisodes,somecontinuingmultiple actionsbythePresidenttomisleadtheAmericanpeopleandinterferewiththeinvestigationsinto Russianinterferenceandobstruction.InoneexamplethePresidentrepeatedlycalledWhite HousecounselDonMcGahnathomeanddirectedhimtofireMuellersaying,quote,Muellerhas togo,callmebackwhenyoudoit.ThenlaterthePresidentrepeatedlyordersMcGahntorelease apressstatementandwritealettersayingthePresidentdidintheorderMuellerfired.The MuellerreportalsooutlineseffortsbyPresidentTrumptoinfluencewitnessDemocratanddeter cooperationwithlawenforcement.Forexample,thePresident'steamcommunicatedtowitnesses thatpardonswouldbeavailableifthey,quote,stayedonmessAGe,endquoteandremained, quote,ontheteam,endquote.Inonecase,thePresidentsentmessAGesthroughhispersonal lawyerstoPaulManafortthathewouldbetakencareofandjust,quote,sittight,endquote.
ThePresidentthenpubliclyaffirmedthiscommunicationbystatingthatManafortwas,quote,a braveman,endquote,forrefusingtobreak.Similarly,theMuellerreportstatedthePresident usedinducementsintheformofpositivemessAGesinanefforttogetMichaelCohennotto cooperateandthenturnedtoattackstheandintimidationtodetertheprovisionofinformationor undermine Cohen’s credibility.Finally,whilethelettertoCongressandtheAprilpress conferencelefttheimpressiontherewerenoremainingquestionstoexamine,thisreportnotes severallimitationsMuellerfacedwhilegatheringthefactsthatCongressneededtoexamine. Morethanoncethereportdocumentsthatlegalconclusionswerenotdrawnbecausewitnesses refusedtoanswerquestionsorfailedtorecalltheevents.Inaddition,numerouswitnesses includingbutnotlimitedto JaredKushner,SarahSanders,RudyGIU liani,MichaelFlynn,Steve BannonandJohnKellyallstatedtheycouldnotrecallevents.ThePresidenthimselfsaidmore than30timesthathecouldnotrecallorrememberenoughtobeabletoanswerwrittenquestions fromtheSpecialCounsel.TheSpecialCounselalsorecountedthat,quote,someassociatedwith theTrumpcampaigndeletedrelevantcommunicationsorcommunicatedduringtherelevant periodusingapplicationsthatfeaturedencryptionordonotprovideforlong-termretentionof data,endquote.
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BasedonthesegapstheMuellerreportconcluded,andIquoteAGain,theofficecannotruleout thepossibilitythattheunavailableinformationwouldhaveshedadditionallightonorcastanew lightoneventsdescribedinthereport,endquote.andcontrarytotheconclusionthattheSpecial Counsel'sreportdidnotfindevidenceofcommunicationorcoordinationbetweentheTrump campaignandRussia,theMuellerreportexplicitlystates,andIquote,astatementthatthe investigationdidnotestablishparticularfactsdoesnotmeantherewasnoevidenceofthose facts.Volume2,pAGe2.
Letmeconcludewiththis.Congresshasboththeconstitutionaldutyandtheauthorityto investigatetheseriousfindingscontainedintheMuellerreport.Istronglybelievethatthis committeeneedtoheardirectlyfromSpecialCounselMuellerabouthisviewsonthereportin hisMarchletter.IalsobelieveSenatorsshouldhavetheopportunitytoaskhimaboutthese subjectsinquestionsdirectly.IhaverequestedthistoourChairmantoauthorizeahearingwith SpecialCounselMuellerandIhopethatwillhappensoon.Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) AttorneyGeneralWilliam BarrOp eningStatement
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SEN.LINDSEYGRAHAM:Thankyou.Beforewereceiveyourtestimony,Mr.Barr,wehave theletterthatMr.MuellersenttoyouonMarch27th,2019. I’ll putthatinthereportnow.The floorisyours.
Gottoswearyouin.Sorry.Doyousolemnlyswearthetestimonyyou'reabouttogivethis committeeisthetruth,thewholetruthandnothingbutthetruthsohelpyougod?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:sorryaboutthat.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:thankyou,Mr.ChairmanandRankingMemberFeinstein,membersofthe committee.Duringmyconfirmationprocess,thereweretwoconcernsthatdominated,asIthink youwillallagree.ThefirstwaswhetherIwouldinanywayimpedeorcurtailSpecialCounsel Mueller'sinvestigationandthesecond,whetherIwouldmakepublichisfinalreport.Asyousee, BobMuellerwasallowedtocompletehisworkashesawfit.andastothereport,eventhough theapplicableregulationsrequirethatthereportistobemadetotheAGandistoremain confidentialandnotbemadepublic,ItoldthiscommitteethatIintendedtoexercisewhatever discretionIhadtomakeasmuchofthereportavailabletothepublicandtoCongressional leadersasIcouldconsistentwiththelaw.Thishasbeendone.Iarrivedatthedepartmenton February14thandshortlythereafterIaskedittobecommunicatedtoBobMueller'steamthatin preparingthereportwerequestedthattheymakeitsowecouldreadyidentify6ematerialsowe couldquicklyprocessthereport.
SEN.GRAHAM:couldyoutellthepublicwhat6eis?
AGBARR:6eisgrandjurymaterialthatcannotbemadepublic. It’s prohibitedbystatute.I wantedthatidentifiedsowecouldredactthatmaterialandpreparethereportforpublicrelease asquicklyaswecould.WhenIarrivedatthedepartmentIfoundandwaseventuallybriefedin ontheinvestigation.IfoundthattheDeputyAttorneyGeneralandhisPrincipalAssociate Deputyathaddiscussionsaboutthetimingofthereportandthenatureofthereport.OnMarch 5th,ImetwithBobatthesuggestionoftheDeputyandthePrincipalAssociateDeputy.Imet withBobMuellertogetaread-outonwhathisconclusionswouldbe.OnMarch25th--andat thatmeetingIreiteratedtoSpecialCounselMuellerthatinordertohavetheshortestpossible timebeforeIwasinapositiontoreleasethereport,Iaskedthattheyidentify6ematerial.WhenI receivedthereportonMarch22ndandwewerehopingtohavethateasilyidentified,the6e material,unfortunatelyitdidnotcomeinthatform.Itquicklybecameapparentthatitwouldtake aboutthreeorfourweekstoidentifythatmaterialandothermaterialthathadtoberedacted.So therewasnecessarilygoingtobeagapbetweenthereceiptofthereportandgettingthefull reportoutpublicly.TheDeputyandIidentifiedfourcategoriesofinformationthatwebelieve requireredaction.Ithinkyouallknowofthem,buttheywerethegrandjurymaterial, informationthattheintelligencecommunityadvisedwouldrevealsensitivesourcesandmethods, informationthatifrevealedatthisstagewouldimpingeontheinvestigationorprosecutionof relatedcasesandinformationthatwouldunfairlyaffecttheprivacyandreputationalinterestsof peripheralthirdparties.
WewentaboutredactingthismaterialinconcertwiththeSpecialCounsel'soffice.Weneeded theirassistancetoidentifythe6ematerialinparticular.Theredactionswereallcarriedoutby DOJlawyerswithSpecialCounsellawyersinconsultationwithintelligencecommunity.the reportcontainedasubstantialamountofmaterialoverwhichthePresidentcouldhaveasserted executiveprivilegebutthePresidentmadethedecisionnottoassertexecutiveprivilegeand
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 makepublicasmuchofthereportaswecould,subjecttotheredactionswethoughtrequired. Now,asyousee,thereporthasbeenlightlyredacted.Thepublicversionhasbeenestimatedto haveonly10%redactions.Thevastbulkofthoseredactionsareinvolumeonewhichisthe volumethatdealswithcollusionanditrelatestoexistingongoingcases.Volumetwohadonly about2%redactionsforthepublicversion.So98%ofvolumetwodealingwithobstructionis availabletothepublic.WehavemadeaversionofthereportavailabletoCongressionalleaders thatonlycontainsredactionsofgrandjurymaterial.Forthisversion,overallredactionsareless than2%forthewholereportandforvolumetwodealingwithobstructiontheyarelessthan.1of 1%.GiventhelimitednatureofredactionsIbelievethatthepubliclyreleasedreportwillallow everyAmericantounderstandtheresultsoftheSpecialCounsel'swork.Bynoweveryoneis familiarwiththeSpecialCounsel'sbottomlineconclusionsabouttheRussianattemptsto interfereintheelection.InvolumeonetheSpecialCounselfoundthattheRussiansengagedin twodistinctschemes.
Firsttheinternetresearchagency,aRussianentitywithclosetiestotheRussiangovernment conducteddisinformationandsocialmediaoperationtosowdiscordamongstAmericans.Second theGRURussianmilitaryintelligence,hackedintocomputersandstolee-mailsfrom , individualsaffiliatedwiththeDemocraticPartyandHillaryClinton'scampaign.TheSpecial CounselinvestigatedwhetheranyoneaffiliatedwithPresidentTrump'scampaignconspiredor coordinatedwiththesecriminalschemes.Theyconcludedthattherewasnotsufficientevidence toestablishthattherehadbeenanyconspIRAcyorcoordinationwiththeRussiangovernmentor theI.R.A.asyouknowvolumetwoofhisreportdealtwithobstructionandtheSpecialCounsel consideredwhethercertainactionsofthePresidentcouldamounttoobstruction.Hedecidednot toreachaconclusion.Insteadthereportrecountstenepisodesanddiscussespotentiallegal theoriesforconnectingthePresident'sactionstoelementsofobstructionoffenses.now,wefirst heardthattheSpecialCounsel'sdecisionnottodecidetheobstructionissueatthemarch5th meetingwhenhecameovertothedepartmentandwewerefranklysurprisedthattheywerenot goingtoreachadecisiononobstruction.Andweaskedthemalotaboutthereasoningbehind thisandthebasisforthis.SpecialCounselMuellerstatedthreetimestousinthatmeetingin responsetoourquestioningthatheemphaticallywasnotsayingthatbutfortheolpopinionhe wouldhavefoundobstruction.HesaidthatinthefuturethefactsofacaseAGainstaPresident mightbesuchthataSpecialCounselwouldrecommendabandoningtheOLCopinionbutthisis notsuchacase.WedidnotunderstandexactlywhytheSpecialCounselwasnotreachinga decision.Andwhenwepressedhimonit,hesaidthathisteamwasstillformulatingthe explanation.
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OnceweheardthattheSpecialCounselwasnotreachingaconclusiononobstruction,the DeputyandIdiscussedandagreedthatthedepartmenthadreachadecision.Wehadthe responsibilitytoassesstheevidenceassetforthinthereportandtomakethejudgment.Isaythis
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 becausetheSpecialCounselwasappointedtocarryouttheinvestigativeandprosecutorial functionsofthedepartmentandtodoitaspartoftheDepartmentofJustice.Thepowershewas usingincludingthepowerofusingagrandjuryandusingcompulsoryprocessexistforthat purpose,thefunctionoftheDepartmentofJusticeinthisarena,whichistodeterminewhetheror nottherehasbeencriminalconduct. It’s abinarydecision.Isthereenoughevidencetoshowa crimeanddowebelieveacrimehasbeencommitted?Wedon'tconductcriminalinvestigations justtocollectinformationandputitouttothepublic.Wedosotomakeadecision.andherewe thoughttherewasanadditionalreason,whichwasthiswasaverypublicinvestigationandwe hadmadeclearthattheresultsoftheinvestigationweregoingtobemadepublicandtheDeputy andIfeltthattheevidencedevelopedbytheSpecialCounselwasnotsufficienttoestablishthat thePresidentcommittedacrimeandthereforeitwouldbeirresponsibleandunfairforthe departmenttoreleaseareportwithoutstatingthedepartment'sconclusionsandthusleaveit hangingastowhetherthedepartmentconsideredtherehadbeencriminalconduct.SotheDeputy AttorneyGeneralandIconductedacarefulreviewofthereportwithourstaffsandlegal advisors.
Andwhilewedisagreedwithsomeofthelegaltheoriesandfeltthatmanyoftheepisodes discussedinthereportwouldnotconstituteobstructionasamatteroflaw,wedidn'trestour decisiononthat.Wetookeachofthetenepisodesandweassessedthemagainsttheanalytical frameworkthathadbeensetforthbytheSpecialCounselandweconcludedthattheevidence developedduringtheSpecialCounsel'sinvestigationwasnotsufficienttoestablishthatthe Presidentcommittedanobstructionofjusticeoffense.LetmetakealittlebitaboutthisMarch 24thletterandBobMueller'sletterwhichIreceivedonthe28th.whenIreportcameinonthe 22ndandwesawitwasgoingtotakeagreatdealoftimetogetitouttothepublic,Imadethe determinationthatwehadtoputoutsomeinformationaboutthebottomline.Thebodypolitic wasinahighstateofagitation.Thiswasmassiveinterestinlearningwhatthebottomlineresults ofBobMueller'sinvestigationwas,particularlyastocollusion.Formergovernmentofficials wereconfidentlypredictingthatthePresidentandmembersofhisfamilyweregoingtobe indicted.Therewerepeoplesuggestingthatifittookanytimetoturnaroundthereportandgetit out,itwouldmeanthatthePresidentwasinlegaljeopardy.soIdidn'tfeelthatitwasinthe publicinteresttoallowthistogoonforseveralweekswithoutsayinganythingsoIdecidedto simplystatewhatthebottomlineconclusionswere,whichiswhatthedepartmentnormallydoes, makeabinarydeterminationisthereacrimeorisn'tthereacrime.Wepreparedtheletterforthat purposetostatethebottomlineconclusions.Weusedthelanguagefromthereporttostatethose bottomlineconclusions.
Ianalogizeittoannouncingafteranextendedtrialwhattheverdictofthetrialispendingrelease ofthefulltranscript. That’s whatweweretryingtodo,notifythepeopleastothebottomline conclusion.Wewerenottryingtosummarizethe410-pagereport.SoIofferedBobMuellerthe chancetoreviewthatletterbeforeitwentoutandhedeclined.OnThursdaymorningIreceived - -probablyitwasreceivedatthedepartmentWednesdaynightorevening.ButonThursday morningIreceivedaletterfromBob,theletterthat'sjustbeenputintotherecord.AndIcalled Bobandsaid,youknow,what'stheissuehere?AndIaskedhimifhewassuggestingthatthe March24thletterwasinaccurateandhesaidno,butthatthepressreportinghadbeeninaccurate andthatthepresswasreadingtoomuchintoit.Iaskedhimspecificallywhathisconcernwas. Andhesaidthathisconcernfocusedonhisexplanationofwhyhedidnotreachaconclusionon
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 obstruction.Andhewantedmoreputoutonthatissue.Hearguedforputtingoutsummariesof eachvolume,theexecutivesummariesthathadbeenwrittenbyhisoffice.Andifnotthat,then othermaterialthatfocusedontheissueofwhyhedidn'treachtheobstructionquestionbuthe wasveryclearwithmethathewasnotsuggestingthatwehadmisrepresentedhisreport.Itold BobthatIwasnotinterestedinputtingoutsummariesandIwasn'tgoingtoputoutthereport piecemeal.IwantedtogetthewholereportoutandIthoughtsummariesbyverydefinition regardlessofwhopreparedthemwouldbeunderinclusiveandwe'dhaveaseriesofdifferent debatesandpublicdiscordovereachlaunchofinformationthatwentoutandIwantedtoget everythingoutatonceandweshouldstartworkingonthat.sothefollowingdayIputoutaletter explainingtheprocesswewerefollowingandstressingthatthemarch24thletterwasnota summaryofthereportbutastatementoftheprincipalconclusionsandthatpeoplewouldbeable toseeBobMueller'sentirethinkingwhenthereportwasmadepublic. I’ll endmystatement there,Mr.Chairman.gladtotakeanyquestions.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.LindseyGraham Questioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+10%3A45%3A18&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.LIDSEYGRAHAM:thankyouverymuch.Astotheactualreportitself,wasthereeveran occasionwheresomethingwasredactedfromthereportthatMr.Muellerobjectedto?
AGWILLIAMBARR:Iwouldn'tsayobjectedto.Hisunderstandingisthecategorieswere definedbymeandtheDeputy.Idon'tbelieve -
SEN.GRAHAM:didyouworkwithhimtoredactthereport?
AGBARR:right.ThosecategorieswereexecutedbyDOJlawyersworkingwithhislawyers.I thinkthereweremaybeafewjudgmentcalls,veryfew,astowhetherornotasaprudential mattershouldbetreatedasareputationalinterestorsomething.Sotheremayhavebeensome occasionsofthat.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.GRAHAM:asiunderstandityoudidnotwantittohurtsomebody'sreputationunlessit affectedtheoutcome.
AGBARR:right.
SEN.GRAHAM:wasthereanydisagreementabout6ematerial?
AGBARR:notthat I’m awareof.
SEN.GRAHAM:anydisagreementaboutclassifiedinformation?
AGBARR:notthat I’m awareof.
SEN.GRAHAM:sotheconclusionsinyourfour-pagesummaryyouthinkaccuratelyreflecthis bottomlineoncollusion,isthatcorrect?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:youcanreaditforyourselfifyou'vegotanydoubt.Astoobstructionof justice,wereyousurprisedhewasgoingtoletyoudecide?
AGBARR:yes,iwassurprised.ithinkthefunctionhewascarryingout,theinvestigativeand procesecutivefunction- -
SEN.GRAHAM:howmanypeopledidheactuallyindict?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:ican'trememberoffthetopofmyhead.
SEN.GRAHAM:itwasalot.sohehastheabilitytoindictifhewantsto,heusedthatpower duringtheinvestigation,isthatcorrect?
AGBARR:thatiscorrect.theotherthingthatwasconfusingtomewasthattheinvestigation carriedoutforawhileasadditionalepisodeswerelookedinto,episodesinvolvingthePresident. somyquestionisorwaswhywerethoseinvestigatedifattheendofthedayyouweren'tgoing toreachadecisiononthem?
SEN.GRAHAM:sodidyouconsultDeputyAttorneyGeneralRosensteinabouttheobstruction matter?
AGBARR:constantly.
SEN.GRAHAM:washeinagreementwithyourdecisionnottoproceedforward?
AGBARR:yes. I’m sorry,theagreementwhat?
SEN.GRAHAM:nottoproceedforwardwiththeobstruction.
AGBARR:right.
SEN.GRAHAM:soveryquicklygiveusyourreasoningwhyyouthinkitwouldbe inappropriatetoproceedforwardonobstructionofjusticeinthiscase.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:well,generallyspeakinganobstructioncasetypicallyhastwoaspectstoit.one, there'susuallyanunderlyingcriminality.
SEN.GRAHAM:let'sstoprightthere.wasthereanunderlyingcrimehere?
AGBARR:no.
SEN.GRAHAM:sousuallythereis?
AGBARR:usually.butit'snotnecessary.butsortoftheparadigmaticcaseisthere'san underlyingcrimeandthepersonorpeopleimplicatedareconcernedaboutthatcriminalitybeing discovered,takeaninherentlymalignantactasthesupremecourthassaidtoobstructthat investigationsuchasdestroyingdocuments.
SEN.GRAHAM:peoplewereworriedaboutthathefiredComeytostoptheRussia investigation.that'soneoftheconcernspeoplehad.letmetellyoualittlebitaboutComey.ido nothaveconfidenceinhim,Comey,anylonger.Thatwaschuckschumer,November2nd,2016. ithinkhe,Comey,shouldtakeahardlookatwhathehasdoneandithinkitwouldnotbeabad thingfortheAmericanpeopleifhedidstepdown,BernieSanders,January15th,2017.the PresidentoughttofireComeyimmediately.andheoughttoinitiateaninvestigation.thatis CongressmanNadler,November14th,2016.didyouhaveaproblemwiththewaycomey handledtheClintone-mailinvestigation?
AGBARR:yes.isaidsoatthetime.
SEN.GRAHAM:okay.sogiventhefactthatalotofpeoplethoughtComeyshouldbefired,did youfindthattobeapersuasiveactofobstructingjustice?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:no.ithinkeventhereportattheendofthedaycametotheconclusionifyouread theanalysisthatareasonthatloomedlargethereforhisterminationwashisrefusaltotellthe publicwhathewasprivatelytellingthePresident,whichwasthatthePresidentwasnotunder investigation.
SEN.GRAHAM:astohowgoforward,wouldyourecommendthatthiscommitteeandevery committeeinCongressdoourbesttohardenourinterestsagainstfutureRussianattacks?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:doyouthinkthey'restilluptoit?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:doyouthinkothercountrieswillbeinvolvedingettinginvolvedinour electionin2020?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:isthatatakeawayfromtheMuellerreport?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:doyousharemyconcernsabouttheFISAwarrantprocess?
AGBARR:yes.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.GRAHAM:doyousharemyconcernsabouttheinvestigationhowandwhyitwasopened?
AGBARR:yes
SEN.GRAHAM:doyousharemyconcernsthatthelackofprofessionalisminthee-mail investigationissomethingweshouldlookat?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:doyouexpecttochangeyourmindaboutthebottomlineconclusionsofthe Muellerreport?
AGBARR:no.
SEN.GRAHAM:doyouknowBobMueller?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:doyoutrusthim?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:howlonghaveyouknownhim?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:30years,roughly.
SEN.GRAHAM:doyouthinkhehadthetimeandmoneyheneeded?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:theresourcesheneeded?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:doyouthinkhedidathoroughjob?
AGBARR:yes,andithinkhefeelshedidathoroughjobandhadadequateevidencetomake thecalls.
SENGRAHAM:doyouthinkthePresident'scampaignin2016wasthoroughlylookedatasto whetherornottheycolludedwiththeRussians?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:andtheanswerisnoaccordingtoBobMueller?
AGBARR:that'sright.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.GRAHAM:hecouldnotdecideaboutobstructionandyoudid,isthatright?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:doyoufeelgoodaboutyourdecision?
AGBARR:absolutely.
SEN.GRAHAM:thankyouverymuch.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.DianneFeinstein Questioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+10%3A52%3A18&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.DIANNEFEINSTEIN:Chairman,Mr.AttorneyGeneral,theSpecialCounsel'sreport describeshowthePresidentdirectsDonMcGahntofireSpecialCounselMuellerandlatertold McGahntowritealetterforourrecordstatingthatthePresidenthadnotorderedhimtofire Mueller.italsorecountshowthePresidentmaderepeatedeffortstogetMcGahntochangehis story.knowingthatthePresidentbelievesMcGahn'srecollectionoftheresultswerefalse,that thePresidenttriedtochangeMcGahn'saccounttopreventfurtherscrutinyofthePresident forwardtheinvestigation.SpecialCounselalsofoundthatMcGahnisanincrediblewitnessthat canlieandexaggerategiventhepositionhehadintheWhiteHouse.Doesexistinglawprohibit effortstogetawitnesstolie,tosaysomethingthewitnessbelievesisfalse?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:yes.Lietothegovernment,yes.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.FEINSTEIN:andwhatlawisthat?
AGBARR:theobstructionstatutes.
SEN.FEINSTEIN:theobstructionstatutes.iassumeyoudon'thaveitbeforeyou?
AGBARR:itwasprobably1512c2.
SEN.FEINSTEIN:sothesethingsineffectconstituteobstruction.
AGBARR:you'retalkingingeneralterms.
SEN.FEINSTEIN:what I’m talkingaboutspecifically,yes,you'recorrectinasensethatitisthe SpecialCounselinhisreportfoundsubstantialevidencethatthePresidenttriedtochange McGahn'saccountinordertopreventfurtherscrutinyofthePresidentforwardtheinvestigation. AndtheyfoundthatMcGahnwasacrediblewitnesswithnomotivetolieorexaggerate.
AGBARR:wefeltwiththatepisodethegovernmentwouldnotbeabletoestablishobstruction. ifyoulookattheepisodewhereMcGahn--thePresidentgaveMcGahnaninstruction, McGahn'sversionofthatisquiteclearineachtimethathegaveitandthatwasthatthe instructionsaidgotoRosenstein.Raisetheinterestofconflictofinterest,andMuellerhastogo becauseofhisconflictofinterest.Sothereisnodebatethat,thatwhateverinstructionwasgiven toMcGahnhadtodowithMueller'sconflictofinterest.ThePresidentlatersaidthatwhathe meantisthattheconflictofinterestshouldberaisedwithRosenstein,butthedecisionshouldbe leftwithRosenstein.ontheotherendofthespectrum,McGahnfeltitwasmoredirectedandthe PresidentwassayingpushRosensteintoinvokeaconflictofinteresttopushMuellerout. Whereveritfellonthatspectrumofinterest,theNewYorkTimesstorywasverydifficult.The NewYorkTimesstorysaidthePresidentdirectedthefiringofMueller,toldMcGahnMueller. ThereissomethingverydifferentbetweenfiringaSpecialCounseloutright,whichsuggests endingtheinvestigation,andhavingaSpecialCounselremovedforconflictthatsuggestsyou're goingtohaveanotherSpecialCounsel.sothefactisthatevenunderMcGahn's--andthereport saysandrecognizesthereisevidencethatthePresidenttrulyfeltthatthetime'sarticlewas
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 inaccurateandhewantedMcGahntocorrectit.webelieve it’s impossibleforthegovernmentto establishbeyondareasonabledoubtthatthePresidentunderstoodthathewasinstructing McGahntosaysomethingfalsebecauseitwasn'tnecessarilyfalse.Moreover,McGahnhad, weeksbefore,giventestimonytotheSpecialCounselandthePresidentwasawareofthat.andas thereportindicates,itcouldbethecasethathewasprimarilyconcernedaboutpressreportsand makingitclearthatheneveroutrightdirectedthefiringofMueller.sointermsof--sointerms oftherequesttoaskMcGahntomemorializethatfact,wedonotthink,inthiscase,thatthe governmentcouldshowcorruptintentbeyondareasonabledoubt.
SEN.FEINSTEIN:justtofinishthisyouhaveasituationwhereaPresidentessentiallytriesto changethelawyer'saccountinordertopreventfurthercriticismofhimself.
AGBARR:wellthat'snotacrime.
SEN.FEINSTEIN:soyoucan,inthissituationinstructsomeonetolie?
AGBARR:no,ithastobe.tobeobstructionofjustice,tobeobstructionofjusticeithastobea lieforaparticularproceeding.McGahnhadalreadygivenhisandithinkitwouldbeplausible thatthepurposeofMcGahnmemorializingwhathewasaskingistomakearecordthathewas neverfired.thereisadistinctionbetweengofireMuellerandhavehimremovedbasedon conflict.
SEN.FEINSTEIN:whatwouldthatconflictbe?
AGBARR:thedifferencebetweenthemisifyouremovesomeoneforaconflictofinterest,then therewouldbeanotherpresumablypersonappointed.
SEN.FEINSTEIN:yeah,butwouldn'tyouhavetohaveanidentifiableconflictthatmadesense orelsedoesn'titjustbecomeafabrication?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:nowwe'reshiftingfromtheissueofwritingthememoorsomehowputtingoutlater onandtheissueofthedirectiontoMcGahn.therewasanumberofdifferentlevelstoit.firstasa matteroflaw,ithinkthedepartment'spositionwouldbethatthePresidentcandirect determinationforthereplacementofaSpecialCounsel.asamatteroflaw,theobstruction statutedoesnotreachthatconduct.puttingthataside,thenextquestionwouldbeifitreachedthe conduct,couldyouhearestablishcorruptintentbeyondareasonabledoubt.whenyoutakeaway thereisnocriminalconduct,nomalignedactthatthePresidentwascarryingouthis constitutionalduties,thequestioniswhatistheimPACtoftakingawaytheunderlyingcrime? anditisnot,thereportsuggeststhatoneimPACtisthatwehavetofindanotherreasonthatthe Presidentwouldobstructtheinvestigation,butifthePresidentisbeingfalselyaccused,butthe Presidentsuggeststheaccusationsagainsthimwerefalse,andheknewtheywerefalse,andhe feltthisinvestigationwasunfair,propelledbyhispoliticalopponents,andwashamperinghis abilitytogovern,thatisnotacorruptmotiveforreplacinganindependentcouncil.thatisanother reasonwewouldsaythatwewouldhavedifficultyprovingthisbeyondareasonabledoubt.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.ChuckGrassley Questioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+11%3A01%3A26&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.CHUCKGRASSLEY:SenatorJohnsonandiwroteyouabouttextmessagesbetween PeterStrok,thattheymayhaveusedthecommunicationsasevidencegathering.ihopeyouwill providetherequestedbriefing.thatismyquestion.
AGBARR:yes,Senator.
SEN.GRASSLEY:haveyoualreadytaskedanystafftolookintowhetherornotspyingwas properlypredicatedandcanCongressexpectaformalreportonyourfindings?
AGBARR:yes,ihavepeopleinthedepartmenthelpingmereviewtheactivitiesoverthe summerof2016.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.GRASSLEY:isupposeitdependsonwhatconclusionsyoucometo,butisthereany reasonthatCongresswouldnotbebriefedonyourconclusions.
AGBARR:itisalittleearlyformetocommitcompletely,butiexpectareportatthis.
SEN.GRASSLEY:theDemocraticnationalcampaignhiredfusionGPStodoopposition researchagainstcandidateTrump.thentheyhiredChristopherSteeltocompilewhatweknowas thesteeldossier.thesteeldossierwasessentialtothenowdebunkedcollusionnarrative.the MuellerreportspentmillionsinvestigatingandfoundnocollusionbetweenTrumpcampaignand Russia,buttheDemocratspaidforadocumentcreatedbyaforeignnationalwithreported foreigngovernmentsources.notTrump,butthedetectives.theMuellerreportfailedtoanalyze whetherornotthedossierwasfilledwithmisinformation.myquestion,inorderforafull accountingofRussianinterferenceattempts,shouldn'ttheSpecialCounselhaveconsideredon whetherornotthesteeldossierwaspartofaRussiandisinformationandinterferencecampaign?
AGBARR:SpecialCounselMuellerhasgonethroughthefullscopeoftheinvestigationto determinewhetherornotheaddressedlookedintothoseissues.oneofthethingsthat I’m doing inmyreviewistotrytoestablishalloftheinformationoutthereaboutit.alsotoseewhatthe SpecialCounsellookedinto.soican'tsaywhatheactuallylookedinto.
SEN.GRASSLEY:butyouthink,inotherwordsifyoulookedatallofthatinformationright nowyou'retellingmeyoucouldnottellmeyesornotothatquestionsdplp.
AGBARR:ifilookedatit.
SEN.GRASSLEY:andyou'regoingtotrytofindsomeofthisinformation.similarlyshouldn't theSpecialCounselhavelookedintotheoriginsbetweentheTrumpcampaignandRussia.
AGBARR:theoriginsofthatnarrative?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.GRASSLEY:yes.
AGBARR:idon'tknowifheviewedhischarterthatbroadly.thatissomethingthat I’m reviewingandiilookatwhatevertheSpecialCounselfoundonthat.
SEN.GRASSLEY:theSpecialCounsellaidout200orsopagesrelatingtoapotential obstructionanalysisandthendumpedthatonyourdesk.YousaidyouaskedtheSpecialCounsel whetherornothewouldhavemadeachargingdecisionorrecommendedchargesonobstruction, butfortheofficeoflegal counsel’s decision,andthattheSpecialCounselmadeclearthatwas notthecase.SoMr.Barr,isthatanaccuratedescription?
AGBARR:yes,hereiteratedseveraltimesinthegroupmeetingthathewasnotsayingthatbutt fortheOLCopinionheavefoundobstruction.
SEN.GRASSLEY:iftheyfoundfactssufficientforobstructionofjustice,wouldhehavestated thatfinding?
AGBARR:Ithinkso,yes.
SEN.GRASSLEY:wasitSpecialCounselMueller'sresponsibilitytomakeafinding?
AGBARR:ithinktheDeputyAttorneyGeneralandIthoughtitwas,butnotjustcharging,but todeterminewhetherornottheconductwascriminal.ThePresidentcouldnotbechargedas longasheinformsoffice.
SEN.GRASSLEY:doyouagreethatthereasonsforhimnotmakingadecisioninvolumetwo ofthereportandwhyorwhynot?
AGBARR: I’m notreallysureofhisreasoning.icouldnotrecapitulatehisanalysis,whichis oneofthereasonsinmymarch24thletteristatedthathedidnotreachaconclusionandididnot
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 putwordsinhismouth.ithinkifhefeltthatheshouldnotgodownthepathofmakinga traditionalprosecutivedecision.
SEN.GRASSLEY:therehasbeenanumberofleaks,duringthedepartment'sinvestigationof HillaryClintonformishandlingsensitiveinformation,therewasacultureofunauthorized speaking.FurtherleakingtoCongress'squestionstothedepartmentgounansweredis unacceptable.why,whatareyoudoingtoinvestigateunauthorizedmediacontacts.
AGBARR:wehavemultiplecriminalleakinvestigationsunderway.
SEN.GRASSLEY:thankyou.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen. PatrickLeahy Questioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+11%3A09%3A19&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.PATRICKLEAHY:AttorneyGeneral, I’m somewhattroubledbyyourtestimonyhereand intheotherbody.youappearedbeforethehouseappropriationsonApril9th.youwereasked aboutamediareportthattheSpecialCounsel'steamisfrustratedthatyourmarch24thletterdid notadequatelyportraythereport'sfindings.youtestifiedinresponse"no,idon't."youthensaid yoususpectedtheywouldhavepreferredmoreinformationbereleasedwiththeletter.nowwe knowthatcontrarytowhatyousaidonApril9th,thatonmarchthe27th,RobertMuellerwrote toyouandexpressedveryspecificconcernsthatyourmarch24thletterfailedtocapture,to quoteMr.Mueller,thecontext,substance,andnatureofhisreport.andwhatStrzokmeishe wrotethatyourletterthreatenedtounderminetheSpecialCounsel.andassuringfullpublic confidenceintheoutcomeoftheinvestigation.whydidyoutestifyonApril9ththatyoudidnot knowtheconcernsexpressedbyMueller'steambutifyouheardthosedirectlybeforeMr. Muellertwoweeksbefore?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:asisaid,italkeddirectlytoBobMuellerabouthis lettertomanespecificallyaskedhimwhatimPACtwillareyourconcerns?areyouconcerned thatthemarch24thletterwasmisleadingorinaccurate?andhesaidthathewasnot.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.LEAHY:thatwasn'tmyquestion.
AGBARR: I’m gettingtothequestionwhichisthequestionfromChris,whichwasreportshave emergedrecently,pressreports,thatmembersoftheSpecialCounsel'steamarefrustratedat somelevelwithinformationincludedinyourletterandtheydon'tportraythe counsel’s findings.
SEN.LEAHY:youseemtohavelearnedthefilibusterrulesbetterthanSenators.whydidyou sayyou'renotawareofconcernswhenweeksbeforeyourtemperatureMr.Muellerexpressed concernstoyou.thatisfairlysimple.
AGBARR:thequestionwasrelatingtounidentifiedmembersexpressingfrustrationoverthe accuracyrelatingtofindings.idon'tknowwhatthatreferstoatall.italkeddirectlytoBob Mueller,notmembersofhisteam.andeventhoughididnotknowwhatwasbeingreferredto, andMuellernevertoldmethattheexpressionofthefindingsasinaccurate,butididthen volunteerthatithoughttheyweretalkingaboutthedesiretohavemoreinformationputout,but itwasnotmypurposetoputoutmoreinformation.
SEN.LEAHY:ifeelyouranswerispurposelymisleading.andithinkothersdotoo.letmeask youanotherquestion.yousaidthatthePresidentisfullycooperatingwiththeinvestigation,but hisattorneytoldadefendantthathewouldbetakencareofifhedidn'tcooperate,isthereisa conflictinthat?
AGBARR:canyourepeatthat?
SEN.LEAHY:theyweretoldtheywouldbetakencareofiftheydidnotscooprate.istherea conflictthere?yesorno.
AGBARR:no.youthinkisfullycooperatingtotellaformeraidetorescueshimself,shutdown theinvestigation,anddeclarethePresidentdidnothingwrong?idon'tthink--wellobviously sinceididn'tfindobstruction,ifelttheevidencecouldnotsupport- -
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.LEAHY: I’m askingifthatisfullycooperating. I’m notaskingifthatisobstruction,isthat fullycooperating?
AGBARR:hefullycooperated.
SEN.LEAHY:sobyinstructingaformeraidetorescusehimself,shutdowntheinvestigation, andthatisnotacrime?
AGBARR:why?whereisthatinthereport?
SEN.LEAHY:volumetwo.TheinvestigationwasimpairedtotheextentandthePresidenthad donenothingwrong.
AGBARR:well,firstlyaskingSessionstounrecusehimselfwedidnotfeelwaswrong.
SEN.LEAHY:idon'tknowifthatdeclareshedidnothingwrong,butcollusion--isthatfully cooperating?tosaythat?
AGBARR:well,idon'tseeanyconflictweanthatandfullycooperatingwiththeinvestigation.
SEN.LEAHY:thePresident,ofcourse,declaredmanytimespubliclyintweetsandcampaign ralliesthathewouldtestify,butheneverdid,didhe?
AGBARR:notasfarasiknow.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.LEAHY:ithinkyouknowwhetherornothetestifiedornot.Asfarasiknowhedidn't. AndMuellerfoundhisanswerstobeinaccurate,isthatcorrect?
AGBARR:ithinkhewantsadditionalbutheneversoughtit.
SEN.LEAHY:andthePresidentnevertestified?
AGBARR:thePresidentnevertestified.DoesthefactthatMr.MuellerfoundtheTrump campaignreceptivewithoffersofassistancefromRussia,andtheyneverreportedittotheFBI.
AGBARR:whatwouldtheyreporttotheFBI.
SEN.LEAHY:thattheywerereceptivetooffersofhelpfromRussia.
AGBARR:thereportsaysthattheywereexpectingtobenefitfromwhatever- -
SEN.LEAHY:page173,volumeone,theinvestigationhadmultiplelinksbetweentheTrump campaignofficialsandindividualstiedtotheRussiangovernment.thoselinksincludedRussian offersofassistancetothecampaign,andthecampaignwasreceptivetotheofferandotherswere not.
AGBARR:ihavetounderstandwhatthatdoesn'tbotheryouatall.thatrefersto.
SEN.LEAHY:ihavetogiveyouapagefromthereport.iknowmytimeisup. I’m makingthe Chairmannervous.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 – AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.JohnCornynQuestioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+11%3A17%3A10&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.JOHNCORNYN:theChairmanpointedoutthataftertheHillaryClintone-mail investigationtherewasanumberof--andMr. Comey’s presscomepresence,--conference, therewasanumberofmembersoftheSenatethatsaidthatComeyshouldresign.orbefired.i believeyousaidthatyouconcludedasamatteroflawthatthePresidenthastherighttofire executivebranchemployees,isthatcorrect?
AGBARR:that'sright.
SEN.CORNYN:inthisplacethePresidentwasrelying,atleastinpart,byarecommendationby RodRosensteinarisingoutoftherecritiqueofMr.Comey'spressconference.releasing informationaboutsecretaryClinton,andannouncingthatnoreasonableprosecutorwouldbring chargesagainsther,isthatright?
AGBARR:that'sright.
SEN.CORNYN:youstartedyourcareer,ibelieve,inthenegligencecommunityandthen movedontotheDepartmentofJustice.andthankyouforagreeingtoserveagainasAttorney Generaltohelprestorethedepartmentasanimpartialarbiterofthelaw.ithinkthatisvery,very importantthatyouandDirectorraycontinueyoureffortsinthatregard. I’m gratefultoyoufor that.butibelievethatweneedtoaskthequestionwhydidn'ttheObamaadministrationdomore asearlyas2014ininvestigatingRussianeffortstopreparetoundermineandsewdissensionin the2016election?Mr.Mueller'sreportdoesaccumulatethattheRussiangovernmentthrough theintelligenceAgenciesandtheirinternetresearch,orIRAithinkitiscalled,beganasearlyas 2014.Begantheireffortstodoso,andweknowtheymetwithsomesuccess.isitanysurpriseto youbasedonyourexperiencethattheRussianswouldtrytodoeverythingtheycantosowdis dissensioninAmericanpoliticallife?
AGBARR:no,ithinktheinternetcreatesalotmoreopportunitiestohavea,youknow,tohave thatkindofcoverteffect.itisgettingmoreandmoredangerous.ButtheRussianshavebeenat
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 thisforalonganytimevariousdifferentways,butthepointthatyoumadeaboutBobMueller's effortsonIRA,thatisoneofthethingsthatStrzokmeaboutthereport.ithinkitisvery impressiveworktheydidinmovingquicklytogetintotheIRA,andalsotheGRUfolks,andi wasthinkingtomyself,ifthathadbeendoneinthebeginningof2016,wewouldhavebeenalot furtheralong.
SEN.CORNYN:forexample,weheardlotaboutthesteeldossier,Mr.steelofcourseaformer BritishintelligenceofficerhiredtodooppositionresearchbytheHillaryClintoncampaignon herpoliticaladdheradversariesincludingPresidentTrump,orcandidateTrump,atthattime. howdoweknowthatthesteeldossierisnot,etcetera,evidenceofRussiandisinformation campaign.knowingwhatweknownowthattheallegationsareunverified?canwestatewith confidencethatthesteeldossierwasnotpartoftheRussiandisinformationcampaign?
AGBARR:no,ican'tstatethatwithconfidenceandthatisoneoftheareasthat I’m reviewing. I’m concernedaboutit,andidon'tthinkitisentirelyspeculative.
SEN.CORNYN:weknowthatfrompublishedreportsthattheheadoftheCIA,Mr.Brennen, wenttoPresidentObamaandbroughthisconcernsaboutinitialindicationswithRussian involvementinthecampaignasearlyaslateJuly2016,andinsteadofdoingmoreduringthe ObamaadministrationtolookintothattodeterRussianactivitiesthatthreatenedthevalidityof ourcampaignin2016,itappearstomethattheObamaadministration,theJusticeDepartment, andtheFBIdecidedtoplacetheirbetsonHillaryClintonandfocustheireffortsoninvestigating theDonaldTrumpcampaign.asyouhavepointedoutthankstotheSpecialCounsel,wenow haveconfidencethatnoAmericanscolludedwiththeRussiansintheireffortstounderminethe personpeople.wenowneedtoknow I’m gladtohearwhatyou'retellingusaboutyourinquiries, research,andinvestigation.weneedtoknowwhatstepsObama,theFBI,theDepartmentof Justice,whatstepstheytooktounderminethepoliticalprocessandputathumbonthescalein favorofonepoliticalcandidateovertheother,andthatwouldbebeforeandafterthe2016 election.whatisadefensivebriefingthatinacounterintelligenceinvestigation?
AGBARR:youcouldhavedefinitekindsofbriefings.ifyoulearnthatsomebodyisbeing targetedbyahostileintelligenceservice,thanoneformofdefensivebriefingistogoandalert thatpersontotherisks.
SEN.CORNYN:ithinkAttorneyGeneralLynchsaiditisroutineincounterintelligence investigations,wouldyouagreewithher?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:yes.
SEN.CORNYN:doyouknowwhetherornotadefensivebriefingwasevergiventotheTrump campaignbytheFBIbasedontheircounter-intelligenceinvestigation.didtheytellthePresident beforeJanuary2017whattheRussiansweretryingtodoandadvisehimtotellpeopleaffiliated withhiscampaigntobeontheirguardandvigilantaboutRussianeffortstounderminepublic confidenceintheelection.
AGBARR:myunderstandingisthatdidn'thappen.
SEN.CORNYN:thatfailuretoprovideadefensivebriefingtotheTrumpcampaignwouldbean extraordinaryornotablefailure,wouldyouagreemany.
AGBARR:ithinkoneofthethingsthatican'tfathomwhyitdidnothappen,ifyou're concernedaboutinterferenceintheelection,andyousubstantialpeopleinvolvedinthe campaign,thatwere formerU SAttorneys,youhadformerU SAttorneysthereinthecampaign,i don'tunderstandwhytheBureauwouldnothavedoneandgivenadefensivebriefing.
SEN.CORNYN:Thankyou.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.DickDurbinQuestioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+11%3A25%3A12&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.DICKDU RBIN:thankyou,Mr.ChairmanandGeneralBarr.Ihavebeenlistening carefullytomyRepublicancolleagues,anditseemsthey'regoingtocoordinatealockherup defense.ThisisnotabouttheMuellerinvestigation,theRussianinvolvement,theTrump campaignandsoforth,itisreallyaboutHillaryClinton'se-mails.Finallyquestiongetdownto thebottomline.HillaryClinton'se-mails,questionshavetobeaskedaboutBenghazialongthe
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 way,travelgate,whiteswatwater,alotofmaterialtheyshouldbegoingthroughforthisnapis unresponsivetotherealitythattheAmericanpeoplewanttoknow.Theypaid$25millionforthe report.IrespectMr.Muellerandbelievehecameupwithasoundreport.Idon'tagreewithallof it,butIfindgeneralBarrthatsomeofthethingsyouengagedinreallyleavemewonderingwhat youbelieveyourroleiswhenitcomestosomethinglikethis.listentowhat,sinceitisinthe record,letmereaditandlistentowhatyoureceivedinaletteronmarch27thfromBobMueller, theletterdidnotfullycapturethecontext,nature,andsubstanceoftheofficer'sworkand conclusions.Thereisnowpublicconfusionaboutcriticalaspectsabouttheresultsofour investigation.Thisthreatenstounderminetheessentialpurposeforwhichthedepartmentwas appointedtheSpecialCounsel.Icannotimaginethatyougotthatletterandcouldnotanswera Congressmandirectlyaboutwhetherornottherewasconcernsonttherepresentationsand findings,yousaidno,Idon'tknow,whatamImissing?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:asIexplainedtoSenatorLeahy -
SEN.DURBIN:attorneysdon'tputanythinginwritingunlesshereallymeansit.Youcouldnot recallthatwhenCongressmanChrisaskedyouthatafewmonthslater.
AGBARR:theMarch24thletterstatedthatBobMuellerdidnotreachaconclusionon obstruction.AndithadlanguageaboutnotexoneratingthePresident.Myviewofeventsisthat therewasalotofcriticismoftheSpecialCounselfortheensuingfewdays,andonThursday,I gotthisletter.AndwhenItalkedtotheSpecialCounselabouttheletter,myunderstandingwas thathisconcernwasnottheaccuracyofthestatementofthefindingsinmyletter,butthathe wantedmoreouttheretoprovideadditionalcontexttoexplainhisreasoningandwhyhedidn't reachadecisiononobstruction.
SEN.DU RBIN:Iwilljustsaythis,Mr.Barr,ifyougot a letterfrom Mr.Muellerafewdays afterhisletteritwasclearhehadsomeconcerns.Afteramonth'strial,theysaywelltheverdict doesn'treallycapturemyfullcayorwork.Thisdoesn'tcaptureeverything, I’m nottryingto captureeverything,you'reusingthewordsummarize.Theofficeoflegal counsel’s decision,you hadsomestrongfeelingsaboutthatandtheywerereflectedinyourTrumpdefenseteam.
AGBARR:didIdiscussthat?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.DURBIN:youcertainlydiscussedwhetherornotaPresidentshouldcooperatewithan investigation.Yousaidatonepoint,insumsummarizingthefindingsthatthePresidentfully cooperated.AndyousaidthePresidentneversubmittedhimselftoavitalinterview,asitdown interviewunderoath,notonce,andthatthequestions,theywereansweredsome30timeshis memoryfailedhim.SotosaytheWhiteHousefullycooperatedisgenerous.Whetherornothe wasrestrictedandwhathecouldconcludebecauseoftheoutstandingofficeoflegalcounsel opinionontheliabilityofasittingPresident.Youdismissedthat.Howdoyouexplainonthe firstpageofvolumetwo,yousaidtherewasalottodowithit.Hecouldnotreachaconclusion onobstructionofjustice.
AGBARR:itwasareason,oneofthebackdropfactorsthathecitedasinfluencinghis prudentialjudgementthatheshouldnotreachadecisionwhichisdifferentthancitingtheOLC sayingthatbutfortheOLCopinion,Iwouldindict.
SEN.DURBIN: I’m goingtostandbywhathehaswritten.Thelastpointtheywanttomakeas wellasisaboutdonMcGahn.Ifyoureadthissectionhereonhisexperience,thePresident wantedhimtodatepublictheyhewasnotaskedtofirehim.Andifyouaresuggestingthiswasa dancewithRodRosenstein,IthinkthePresidentmadeitclear.HetoldLesterHoltthatthe reasontogetridofComeyistheRussianinvestigation.OverandoveragainthisPresidentwas veryexplicit.andexpositoryinstyle,letmeaskyouthisinconclusion,mytimeisup,doyou haveanyobjections,canyouthinkofanobjectiontowhydonMcGahnshouldnotcometestify?
AGBARR:heisacloseadvisortothePresident.
SEN.DU RBIN:[MISSINGTRANSCRIPT]
AGBARR:wehavenotwaivedtheexecutiveprivilege?
SEN.DURBIN:areyousaying,whataboutBobMueller,shouldhebeallowedtopublicly testify?
AGBARR:ialreadysaididon'tseeaproblemwithRobertMueller.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.DU RBIN:whataboutdonMcGahn.
AGBARR:Ithinkhewouldbetestifyingonprivilegedmatters.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.MikeLeeQuestioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+11%3A34%3A00&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.MIKELEE:inclassicdecent,JusticeScaliaremarkedthatnothingissopolitically effectiveastheabilitytochargethatone'sopponentandhisassociatesarecrooks.Nothingso effectivelygivesanappearanceofvaliditytothosechargesasaJusticeDepartment investigation.Thatobservationhas,Ithink,beenbornouttimeandtimeagaininthepasttwo years.TimeandtimeagainthePresident'spoliticaladversarieshaveexploitedtheMuellerprobe. It’s mereexistencetospreadbaselessinnuendoinanefforttounderminethelegitimacyofthe 2016election,andtheeffectivenessofthisadministration.ForexampleonJanuary25th2019, speakerNancyPelosiaskedwhatdoesPutinhaveonthePresident,politically,personally,or financially.Mr.AttorneyGeneralisthereanyevidencetosuggestthatVladimirPutin"has something"onPresidentTrump?
AGBARR:notthat I’m awareof.
SEN.LEE:in2019,formerFBIDeputyDirectorAndrewMcCabesaidonnationaltelevision,to theentirenation,thathethinkit'sispossiblethatDonaldTrumpisaRussianAgent.Mr . AttorneyGeneral,isthereanyevidencethatyou'reawareofsuggestingevenremotelythat PresidentTrumpisaRussianagent?
AGBARR:notthat I’m awareof.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.LEE:EricSwalwellsaidthatheroutinelyactsonRussia'sbehalf,doyouanythingtoback thatup?
AGBARR:notthat I’m awareof
SEN.LEE:wehaveheardthatoverandoveragain.Inthemedia,weheardaboutthePresident's allegedcollusionwithRussia.ButwhatwehaveheardisasbaselessasanyconspIRAcytheory thatwehaveseeninpolitics.AnythingthatIcanthinkof,butthepurveyorsofthisconspIRAcy theoryweremembersoftheoppositionparty.Thatisconcerning.Fromthebeginningtherewas indicationsthattheinvestigationwasnotalwayspRoductivewiththeimpartiality.Especially giventhetrackrecordofexcellence.TheinvestigationintotheTrumpcampaignbeganonJuly 31st2016afteraforeigngovernmentcontactedtheFBIaboutcommentsmadebyGeorge Papadopoulos.Isthataccurateorwasthereothereventsthathelpedleadtothis?
AGBARR:thatistheaccountthathasbeengiveninthepastastohowitgotgoing.
SEN.LEE:youpreviouslysaidthatyouthinkitispossiblethattheTrumpinvestigation improperlyspiedontheTrumpinvestigation.Isthatwhatyouinmind?Orarethereother circumstancesyouinmindthere?
AGBARR:manypeopleseemtoassumethattheonlyintelligencecollectionthatoccurreda singleconfidentialinformantandaFISAwarrant.Iwouldliketoknowthatistrue,thatseems fairlyanemicifthatwasacounterintelligenceeffort.
SEN.LEE:wascarterpageundersurveillancewhilehewasworkingwiththeTrump administration?
AGBARR:Idon'tknow.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.LEE:wasanyotherTrumpcampaignofficialundersurveillancethattimeperiodtoyour knowledge?
AGBARR:thesearethethingsthatIneedtolookat.andIhavetosaythatasIsaidbefore,you knowtheextentthattherewasanyoverreach,Ibelieve,itwasafewpeopleintheupper echelonsoftheBureauandthedepartment,butthosepeoplearenolongerthere,and I’m workingcloselywithChriswhoIthinkhasdoneasuperbjobattheBureau,andwe'reworking togetherontryingtoreconstructexactlywhatwentdown.Onethingthatpeopleshouldsnow thattheBureauitselfhasbeenhandicappedlookingbackbecauseoftheOIGinvestigation.
SEN.LEE:asweknow,theFISAwarrantforcarterpagewasbasedlargelyonthesocalledsteel dossier.InparticularonatriptoMoscowtodriveraspeech.firstaccordingtothewarrant,he hadasecretmeeting,doestheMuellerreportconfirmthatPagemetwithhim?
AGBARR:withmeor?
SEN.LEE:GeneralSessions.
AGBARR:IwanttosayawayfromtheFISAissue.
SEN.LEE:thewarrantalsosaysthatpagemetwithegorinordertodiscusswhatisreferredtoas complaintagainstHillaryClinton.DoestheMuellerreportconfirmthat?
AGBARR:Idon'tthinkso.
SEN.LEE:doesitsaythatanyonespokewithhimaboutHillaryClinton?
AGBARR:Idon'tthinkso.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.LEE:sincetheMuellerreportisthegoldstandardofwhatwe'rediscussinghere, I’m glad you'relookingintoit,IencourageyoutolookintowhytheFBIusedthisfalseinformation.The publichasarightto knowwhathappenedhere.TheU SDepartmentofJustice,thefederal Bureauofinvestigationhavealonghistoryofsuccess.Theoutcomeofaninvestigationcan dependonthewhimsofwhomightbeassignedtoit.Theyhavearightnottobelievethata particularinvestigationmightbeStrzok,mightnotbeinfluencedbyapoliticalconsideration, politicallyorotherwise.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.SheldonWhitehouse Questioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+11%3A40%3A59&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.SHELDONWHITEHOU SE:thankyou,Chairman,youhadChairmanGraham,and you usedthewordshardeningourelectoralinfrastructureagainstforeignelectioninterference.Is anonymouselectionfundinganavenuenewpossibleforeignelectioninfluenceandinterference?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:yes.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:let'sturntothemarch27thlaterthatyoureceivedandreadMarch28th, correct?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:whendid youhavetheconversationwithBobMuelleraboutthatlater thatyouhavereferenced?
AGBARR:ithinkonthe28th?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.WHITEHOUSE:thesamedayyoureadit?WhendidyoureadtheNewYorkTimes storiesthatmadethisevident?
AGBARR:ithinkitwouldhavebeenyesterday,but I’m notsure.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:whentheyasked you to askforcomment?
AGBARR:theydidn'tcontactme.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:contactedDOJforcomment?
AGBARR:Ican'trememberhowitcameupbutsomeonementionedit.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:soyouknewtheletterwouldbecomepublicandthatwasprobably yesterday?
AGBARR:Ithinkso.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:whendid youdecide tomakethatletteravailable to usin Congress?
AGBARR:thismorning.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:couldyouconcedethatyouhadanopportunitytomakethisletterpublic onApril4thwhenRep.Cristaskedyouaveryrelatedquestion?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:idon'tknowwhatyoumeanbyrelated,Ithinkitisaverydifferentquestion.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:theletterreferencesencloseddocumentsandenclosedmaterials,right? arethosethesameaswhatyoucalledtheexecutivesummariesthatMuellerprovidedyou?With thisletter?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:itisallthesamedocument?Whenyoutalkabouttheexecutive summariesthatMuellerprovidedyou,theyweretheencloseddocumentswiththatletterwith whichwehavenotbeenprovided?
AGBARR:Ithinktheywere. Youhavebeenprovidedthem. They’re inthereport. They’re the summariesinthereport.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:it'sthelanguageofthereportinthereport.Thereisnothingelsethathe providedyouthere?
AGBARR:ithinkthat'swhatheprovided.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:ifthereisanythingelsewillyouprovideittous,itisoddtobegivena letterwithnoattachmentsthatsaysithasattachments.Canwegetthat?
AGBARR:sure.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.WHITEHOU SE:youagreeit wasnotgrandjury6eorpresentedarisktointelligence sourcesormethodsorwouldinterferenceongoinginvestigationsorwereaffectedbyexecutive privilege.
AGBARR:therewasredactionsintheexecutivesummaries.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:thisisanotherhairsplitting event.
AGBARR:Iwasn'tinterestedinsummarizingthewholereport,Iwantedtostatethebottomline conclusions.Describethereportmeaningvolumeone- -
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:youhadfourpagesfora400pagereport.
AGBARR:Istateintheletterthat I’m statingitisprincipalconclusions.Letmealsosaythat BobMuelleristheequivalentofa U SAttorney.He was exercisingthepowersoftheAttorney GeneralsubsequenttothesupervisionoftheAttorneyGeneral.Hisworkconcludedwhenhe senthisreporttotheAttorneyGeneral.Atthatpointitwasmybaby,andIwasmakinga decisionastowhetherornottomakeitpublic.AndIeffectivelyoverRodetheregulations,used discretion,tomeanasfarforwardasIcouldtomakethatpublicanditwasmydecisionhowand whentomakeitpublic,notBobMueller's.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:withrespecttotheOLCopinionthatinformedBobMueller'sdecision, doyouagreethatismerelyanexecutiveopinionandthisunderourconstitutionthedecisionof whatthelawismadebythejudicialbranchoftheU nitedStatesgovernment.
AGBARR: I’m sorrycouldyou- -
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:withrespecttotheOLC'sopinion,andthedecisionnottomakea recommendationonobstruction,doyouseethatthelawgetsdecidedbythejudicialbranchof government?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:yes.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:isthereanywayfortheOLCdecision tobetestedtoseeifitiscorrector not.
AGBARR:nonethatcomestomind.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:itcouldbewrong,coulditnot?
AGBARR:hypotheticallyitcouldbewrong.ThereareRep.legalmindsthatdisagreewiththat. Excuseme?
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:thereareexpertlegalcommentatorsandlawyersthatdisagreewiththat.
AGBARR:itishardtofindlawyersthatwillagreewithanything.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:becauseoftheOLCopinionwehavetogivethePresidentanextra benefitofthedoubtbecauseheisdeniedhisdayincourtwherehecouldhimself.Thatseems likefallacytome.Ifyouare thePresidentoftheU nitedStates,youcaneitherwaiveorreadily overridetheOLCopinionandsay I’m readytogototrial.Iwanttoexoneratemyself,let'sgo.
AGBARR:howisthisrelevanttomydiagnoses?
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:decisions?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:itisrelevant--IassumedtherewasnoOLCdecision.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:wehaveareportinfrontofusthatsaysitinfluencingtheoutcome,and thatitinfluencedtheoutcomebecauseitdeprivedthePresidentofhisabilitytohavehisdayin courtandmypointtoyouisthathecouldeasilyhavehisdayincourtbywaivingoroverriding thisOLCopinionthathasnojudicialbasis.Correct?
AGBARR:wellIdon'tthinkthattherewasanythingtohaveadayincourton.ithinkthatthe governmentdidnothaveaprosecutablecase.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:butpartof--Muellerdidn'tagreebecauseheleftthatuptoyou.Hesaid thathecouldneitherconfirmnordenythattherewasaprosecutablecasehere.Heleftthattoyou andyousaidthatyouagreethattheOLCopinionbearsonitanditwouldunfairtoputthe Presidentontheprocessofbeingindictedwithoutprosecution.
AGBARR:you'renotcharacterizinghisthoughtprocess,it'sinthereport.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE: canIhaveaminute,Ijustwanttonaildown,youusedthewordspying aboutauthorizedDOJinvestigativeopportunities.
AGBARR:areyoutalkingaboutmytestimonyinfrontofthehouseappropriations?
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:yes.Inyourentirecarehaveyoueverreferredtoauthorizeddepartment investigativeactivities,officiallyorpublicly,asspying? I’m notaskingforprivateconversations.
AGBARR: I’m notgoingtochangetheuseofthewordspying.Idon'tthinkhasanyconnotation atall.tomethequestionisalwayswhetherornotitisauthorizedandadequatelypredicated, spying,andIthinkspyingisagoodEnglishwordthatinfactdoesn'thavesynonymsbecauseit isthebroadestwordtoincorporateallformsofcovertintelligencecollections.Iwillnotbackoff ofthewordspying,but I’m notsuggesting--Iuseitfrequentlyasdoesthemedia.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.WHITEHOUSE:whendidyoudecidetouseit?Didyouuseitoffofthecuff,ordidyou gointothehearingintendingtouseit?
AGBARR:WhentheCongressmanasked,doyouwanttochangeyourlanguage,Iwasactually thinking,like,what'stheissue?Idon'tconsideritapejorative.Frankly,wewentbackandlooked atpressusage.U puntilalltheoutrage acoupleweeksago,it'scommonlyusedinthepressto refertoauthorizedactivities,suchasreferringto- -
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:butitisnotcommonlyusedbythedepartment.Mytimeisup.
AGBARR:commonlyusedbyme.
SEN.LINDSEYGRAHAM:thankyouverymuch. We’ll comebackattentill1:00.Thankyou.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.JohnKennedy
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+12%3A57%3A38&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.LINDSEYGRAHAM:Senator Feinstein,I’vebeentold,isontheway.We’llgoahead andstart,Ithink.ThenextquestionerisaRepublican,SenatorKennedy.Oh,yeah,isthere somethingyouwantedtosay,Mr.AttorneyGeneral,aboutoneofyourstatements?
AGBARR:justbriefly,Mr.Chairman.SenatorCornynaskedmeaboutdefensivebriefings before,andasIsaid,thereweredifferentkindsofthem,andIwasreferringtothekindwhere youaretoldofaspecifictarget.AndIhavebeentoldatthebreakthatalesserkindofbriefing,a securitybriefingthatgenerallydiscusses,youknow,generalthreatsapparentlywasgiventothe campaigninAugust.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.LINDSEYGRAHAM:SenatorKennedy.
SEN.KENNEDY:thankyou,Mr.Chairman,andthankstomycolleaguesforlettingmegoout oforder.Ipromisetobeasbriefaspossible.Mr.Chairman,AttorneyGeneral,thanksforcoming today.Humanshaveauniversalneed,Ithink,tobelistenedto,tobeunderstoodandtobe validated.Ithinkweallsharethat.IhavelistenedtotheMuellerteam,Ivalidatethem,butI wanttobesureIunderstandthem.HasMr.Muellerorhisteamchangedtheirconclusions?
AGBARR:youmeanduringthecourseoftheinvestigation?
SEN.KENNEDY :no.today.It’sclear,atleastaccordingtothepressreports --excuseme, general--thatatonepointtheMuellerteamwasunhappy.Ithinkithadtodowithletter.What matterstome,andI’llgettothisinamoment,Iwanttoknowfirst,hasthe Muellerteam changeditsmindonitsconclusions?
AGBARR:itsconclusionsastowhat?
SEN.KENNEDY:astotheconclusionofconspIRAcy.
AGBARR:notthat I’m awareof.
SEN.KENNEDY:sothedecisionnottobringanindictmentagainstthePresidentforcollusion conspIRAcywithRussiahasnotchanged?
AGBARR:no,ithasn't.
SEN.KENNEDY:andtheconclusionnottobringanindictmentagainstthePresidentfor obstructionofjusticehasnotchanged?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:no.
SEN.KENNEDY:ItakeitfromyourtestimonythattheMuellerteamwasunhappywhenyou receivedtheletterfromMr.Mueller.
AGBARR:Ican'tspeaktotheteamasawhole- -
SEN.KENNEDY:Mr.Mueller,then.
AGBARR:whenItalkedtoBobMueller,heindicatedhewasconcernedaboutthepress coveragethathadgoneonthepreviousfewdays,andhefeltthatwastoberemediedbyputting outmoreinformation.
SEN.KENNEDY:okay.Iunderstoodyoutosay--thesearemywords,notyours--thefirst concernMr.Muellerhad,hefeltlikeyourletterwasn'tnuancedenough.
AGBARR:correct.
SEN.KENNEDY:thatproblemhasbeensolved,hasitnot?
AGBARR:itwassortofsolvedbyputtingoutthewholereport.
SENKENNEDY:exactly.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:that'swhyIthinkthiswholethingissortofmind-bendinglybizarre,becauseImade clearfromthebeginningthatIwasputtingoutthereport,asmuchofthereportasIcould,andit wasclearitwasgoingtotakethreeweeksorso,maybefour,todothat,andthequestionis what'stheplaceholder?Andtheplaceholder,inmyjudgment,wasthesimplestatementofwhat thebottomlineconclusionswere.AndIwasn'tgoingtobeinthebusinessoffeedingoutmore andmoreinformationastimewentontoadjusttowhatthepresswassaying.
SEN.KENNEDY:andthat'syourcallasAttorneyGeneral.
AGBARR:absolutely.
SEN.KENNEDY:thatwouldn'tbethecallofa U Sattorney or aSpecialCounsel?
AGBARR:no,notatall.
SEN.KENNEDY:okay.Now,thesecondreason,Imentionedthenuanceconcern.Thesecond reasonthatMr.Muellerwasconcerned--Idon'twanttosayunhappybecause I’m nottryingto bepejorative--Isayconcerned.Hewasconcernedaboutpresscoverage.
AGBARR:heindicated--hefeltthatwhatwasinaccuratewasthepresscoverageandwhatthey wereinterpretingtheMarch24thlettertosay.
SEN.KENNEDY:andwhatwereyousupposedtodoaboutthat?
AG:BARR:hewantedtoputoutthefullexecutivesummariesthatareincorporatedinthe report,andIsaidtohimIwasn't--andbytheway,thosesummaries,evenwhenhesentthem, apparently,theyactuallyrequiredlatermoreredactionbecauseoftheintelligencecommunity.So thefactis,wedidn'thavereadilyavailablesummariesthathadbeenfullyvetted.ButImadeit cleartohimthatIwasnotinthebusinessofputtingoutperiodicsummariesbecauseasummary
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 wouldstartawholepublicdebate. It’sbyd efinitionunderinclusive,andIthoughtwhatwe shoulddoisfocusongettingthefullreportoutasquicklyaspossible,whichwedid.
SEN.KENNEDY:andthat'syourcallasAttorneyGeneral.
AGBARR:ofcourse.
SEN.KENNEDY:okay.Andthenewscoverageissue--well,noneofuscancontrolwhatthe newspublishesorprints,exceptthemedia.Buttotheextentthatanargumentwasmadethey didn'thavethefullreport,that'samootissue,too,now,isn'tit?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.KENNEDY:canyoubrieflygooverwithmeonemoretime,Ifinditcuriousthatthe Muellerteamspentallthistimeinvestigatingobstructionofjusticeandthenreachedno conclusion.TellmeagainbrieflywhyMr.Muellertoldyoureachednoconclusion,orhe couldn'tmakeuphismindorwhatever-- I’m nottryingtoputwordsinyourmouth.
AGBARR:Ireallycouldn'trecapitulateit.WefirstdiscusseditMarch5th.EdwardCallaghan, theassociatedeputy,waswithme,andwedidn'treallygetaclearunderstandingofthe reasoning.Thereport, I’m notsureexactlywhatthefulllineofreasoningis,andthat'soneofthe reasonsIdidn'twanttotrytoputwordsinBobMueller ’smouth.
SEN.KENNEDY:buthedidnotchoosetobringanindictmentdespitethereason?
AGBARR:right.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.KENNEDY:Iwanttorepeatwhatwetalkedaboutthelasttimeyouwerehere.Thisisone person'sopinion.AsItoldyoubefore,IthinktheFBIisthepremierlawenforcementagencyin allofhumanhistory,andIbelievethat.Idothinktherewereahandfulofpeople,maybesome arestillthere,whodecidedin2016toactontheirpoliticalbeliefs.Thereweretwoinvestigations here.OnewasaninvestigationofDonaldTrump.TherewasanotherinvestigationofHillary Clinton.I ’d liketoknowhowthatonestarted,too.Anditwouldseemtomethatweallhavea duty,ifnottotheAmericanpeople,totheFBI,tofindoutwhytheseinvestigationswerestarted, whostartedthemandtheevidenceonwhichtheywerestarted.Iwouldhopeyouwilldothatand getbacktous.Andthere'sanothershortwayhomehereaswell.Allyougottodoisrelease,the Presidentcan,releaseallthedocumentsthattheFBIandtheJusticeDepartmenthaspertainingto the2016election.Justreleasetheminsteadofusgoingthroughthisspinandinnuendoand rumors. Let’s justlettheAmericanpeopleseethem.Andthefinalpoint I’ll make,whenyou're investigatingleaksattheDepartmentofJusticeandtheFBI,IhopeyouwillincludetheMueller teamaswell.Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.BenSasseQuestioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+13%3A16%3A50&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.BENSASSE:Iwouldliketogobacktoyouropeningstatementatyourconfirmation, layingoutwhatmilitaryintelligencehaddoneintermsofhacking.Iwouldalsoliketolookat someoligarchssoclosetoPutin.Volume2,pages129to144,islargelyaboutalipaska.Canyou tellmewhoheisandwhathismotivesare?
AGBARR:Iwouldrathernotgetintothatinapublicsetting.
SEN.SASSE:OligarchAlipaskapossessesRussiandiplomaticpassport,heisanaluminumand metalsbillionaireandhe'sbeeninvestigatedbythegovernmentandotheralliesformoney laundering,he'sbeenaccusedofthreateninghisbusinessallies,he'sbeeninbriberyschemes,and hehasmanylinkstoRussiaorganizedcrime.Wecan,inanopensetting,atleastagreethathe'sa baddude.Thisisabottom-feedingscumsucker,andhehasabsolutelyno-- I’ll takeyourlaugh asagreement--hehasabsolutelynoalignmentwiththeinterestsoftheUpeopleand S our public.Sothesectionofvolume1thatdealswithnominallyPaulManafortbutisreally Alipaska,IwouldlikeyoutohelpushaveanAmericanpublic101understandingofwhatisand isn'tallowed.SoPaulManafortishiredbyalipaskaostensiblyforthingsinU kraine.Butheis on thepayrollofaRussianoligarchthathasinterestsinlinewiththeAmericangovernmentandthe AmericanpeopleandinterestsofNATO. He’s onthepayroll.Isitpermissibleforsomeonetobe
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 paidbysomeonewhoisbasicallyan enemyoftheU nitedStates,andthencouldthatindividual justvolunteerandstarttodonatetheirtimeandtalentandexpertisetoa campaignintheU S?and oneofthethingspainfullytragicaboutahearinglikethis,Ithinkthevastmajorityofthe Americanpeoplewilltuneitout,andthosewhotakeattentionwillthinkallyouneedtoknowis abunchofpeoplewerepro-TrumpbeforehebecamePresidentandtheystayedpro-Trump,anda bunchofpeoplewereanti-Trump.Ithinkthese444pagessaya lotabouttheU nitedStatesand ourgovernmentandourpublictrust.Ithinkit'snotjustabout2016.Thereareimportant questionsabout2016.ChairmanGrahamsummarizedatthebeginninghowmuchmoneyand timewasavailabletotheSpecialCounselandhisteamtodotheirwork,sothereareabunchof factualmattersabout2016thatmatter,butifoneofthemostimportantthingswetakeawayfrom thisneedstobethatwe'regoingtobeunderattackagainin2020anditisn'tjustgoingtobe Russiawhoisprettydangclunkyaboutthisstuff,butitmorethanlikelywillbeChinathatis moresophisticatedaboutthisstuff.Canyoutelluswhatislegalandillegalaboutforeign servicesbeinginvolvedinAmericanelections,andwhatshouldoperativesknowwhat'sproper totakeashelpfromforeignintelligenceagencies?
AGBARR:that'saverybroadtopic,whatislegalandillegal.Couldyourefineitalittlebit?Are youtalkingaboutwhatkindofpropaganda,thatkindofthing,comingintothecountry?
SEN.SASSE:makeupacountry.
AGBARR:youcan'tputforeignmoney,obviously,intoacampaign.
SEN.SASSE:couldyou--couldRussia-China, I’m makingupacountry,decidetocometothe UnitedStates,makeadatabase,bytheway,theopioidhackof2014tellsustheycanmake databasesagainstAmericancitizens.Morethan20peoplearealreadyinthedatabaseofthe communistpartyofChina.Couldtheycomeinandbuildadatabaseofallcampaignoperatives intheUSandsomeforeignentityjustdecidedtohireallofthemandsay,whydon'tyougoask volunteerforthiscampaignandyougoandvolunteerforthatcampaign?Canwehaveforeign agenciesjustvolunteeringoncampaignsgoingforward?Isthatlegal?
AGBARR:iftheirtimeispaidforthepurposeofparticipatinginacampaign,Iwouldn'tthink it'slegal.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.SASSE:Butgivenhowsleazysomuchofthiscityisandsomanypeopleliveonretainers of$20,$30and$40amonth,someRussianoligarchjustdecidestoputAmericancampaign personnelonpaymentsandsay,wemayneedyoutolobbyaboutsomethinginthefuture. They’ve gotviewsaboutpipelinesandnationalgaspipepipelines,andbytheway,you're someonewholikestoadvocateforcertaincampaignsandparties,goaheadanddowhatyou want.IsthatallowedunderU Slawtoday?
AGBARR:itdependsonthespecificcircumstances,thenateagreement,whothepersonis representing,aretheyrepresentingtheinterestsofaforeigngovernment?Aretheyaforeign agent?Aretheyregistered?Youknow,Imean,wecould--it'saslipperyareaandwecouldsit herealldayandwithoutspecifics- -
SEN.SASSE:Ionlyhavesevenminutes.Idon'tgetallday,butyou'rethechieflawenforcement officeroftheUnitedStatesgovernment,andIthinkitwouldbehelpfulforustohaveashared understandingasweheadtowardthe2020electionofwhatcampaignoperativesshouldwell understandisbeyondthepale.SoiftheChinesegovernmentdecidestohackinto2020 campaigns,IwouldhopethereisclarityfromtheDepartmentofJusticeaboutwhetherornot DemocraticPresidentialcampaignsandwhetherornottheTrumpreelectioncampaignare allowedtosay,hey,we'reinterestedinthishackedmaterialgoingforward.ithinkweneedto haveclarityaboutaquestionlikethatandsomeoneonthejudiciarycommittee,ithinktherearea bunchofcounterintelligenceinvestigationshappeningrightnow intheU nitedStateswhere campaignsdon'treallyunderstandwhatthelawsare,andithinkweneedalotmoreclarityabout it,because I’m nearlyoutoftime.Letmegiveittoyouinthisversionasaprecisequestion. underthePresidentialtransitionsact,onceyouhaveaDemocraticnomineeforPresidentanda RepublicannomineeforPresident,oneofthethingswedoiswestarttobriefthemintheevent youwouldbecomethePresident-elect,youwillneedtoknowwhereweareindifferentnational securityissues.ShouldwebeaddingtothePresidentialtransitionactcounterintelligence briefingsforcampaignsastheybecomethenomineeinamuchmoredetailedwaythanthe responseyouhadabouttheBureau'seffortswhenSenatorCornynaskedifdefensivebriefings weregiven?Shouldwe,theCongress,bethinkingveryintentionallyaboutauthorizingtheability oftheBureauinasharedbroaderICcontextbutwiththeBureauofsecurityprobablybeingthe interfaceentity?Shouldnomineesforthehighestofficeinthelandin2020bereceivingregular counterintelligencebriefingsaboutthefactthatintelligenceagencieswillbesurroundingthe peoplewiththegovernment,shouldtheywin?
AGBARR:absolutely,IthinkthedangerfromChina,Russiaandsoforthisfarmoreinsidious thanithasbeeninthepastbecauseofnon-traditionalcollectorsthattheyhaveoperatinginthe UnitedStates.Ithink most people areunawareofhowpervasiveitisandwhattherisklevelis, andIthinkitactuallyshouldgofarbeyondevencampaigns.Morepeopleinvolvedin governmenthavetobeeducatedonthis.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.SASSE:thankyou. I’m attime,butIwouldlovetoworkwithyouandthebroader intelligencecommunityonthatmore.Ithinkthereareanumberofmembersoftheintelligence committeewhoknowwhatyou'resayingparticularlyabouttheChinesegovernmentandtheir intenttoencirclelotsofpeoplewhoaregoingtohaveinfluenceinthefuture,andithinkwe,not justasawholeofgovernmenteffortbutawholeofsocietyeffort,havetobecomemuchmore sophisticatedaboutwhatintelligenceagenciesareplanningforthefuture.
AGBARR:thepatterniswheneverthereisanelection,foreigngovernmentsandtheiroperatives frequentlydescendonthepeopletheythinkcouldhaveashotatwinning.It’scommonandthe mosttypicalscenarioistheydotrytomakecontactsandsoforth.
SEN.SASSE:andinadigitalcyberera,youdon'tneedahookeranymore,barandahooker,and weneeduptoourgame.Thankyouverymuch.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.AmyKlobuchar Questioning
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SEN.AMYKLOBUCHAR:thankyou,Mr.Chairman.Mr.AttorneyGeneral, I’m goingtotake usoutoftheweedsherebecauseIthinktheAmericanpeopledeservetoknowwhathappenedin theelectionforthehighestofficeoftheland.And I’ll justgivemyviewsveryquicklyandnot askyouaboutthesetopics.Ithinkyourfour-pageletterwasclearlyasummaryandthat'swhy DirectorMuellercalleditasummary.IthinkwhenSenatorVanHollandandRep.Cristasked youiftheSpecialCounselagreedwithyouunderoath,youhadtogooutofyourwaynottoat leastmentionthefactthathehadsentyouthisletter,thatyoudidn'tmentionit.Andthenfinally IwouldsaythatwemusthearfromDirectorMueller,becauseinresponsetosomeofmy colleagues'questions,youhavesaidthatyoudidn'tknowwhathemeantorwhyhesaidit,andI believeweneedtohearfromhim.IwanttostartfirstwithRussia.SpecialCounselMueller's reportfoundthattheRussiangovernmentinterferedinthe2016Presidentialelectionina sweepingandsystematicfashion.LaterDirectorWrayhasinformedusthat2013wasadress rehearsalforthebigshowin2020.DirectorCoates,thePresident'sintelligenceadviser,hastold usthattheRussiansaregettingbolder.Yetforthelasttwoyears,SenatorLangfordandI,anda bipartisanbillwithsupportfortherankingintelligencecommittee,havebeentryingtogetthe secureelectionsactpassed.Thiswouldrequirebackuppaperballots.Ifanyonegetsfederal
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 fundingforanelection,itwouldrequireaudits,anditwouldrequirebettercooperation.Yetthe WhiteHouse,justaswewereonthevergeofgettingamarkupintherulescommitteegettingit tothefloorwhereIthinkwewouldgetthevastmajorityofSenators,theWhiteHousemade callstostopthis.Wereyouawareofthat?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:no.
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:okay,well,thathappened.WhatIwouldliketoknowfromyouasour nation'schieflawenforcementofficerifyouwillworkwithSenatorLangfordandItogetthis billdone.Otherwisewewillnothaveanyclouttogetbackuppaperballotsifsomethinggoes wronginthiselection.
AGBARR:Iwillworkwithyoutoenhancethesecurityofourelection,and I’ll takealookat whatyou'reproposing. I’m notfamiliarwithit.
SEN.KLOBU CHAR:okay,well,itisthebipartisanbill.IthasSenatorBurrandSenator Warner,supportfromSenatorGrahamwasonthebill,andtheleadsareLangfordandmyself. Andithadsignificantsupportinthehouseas well.TheGRUtheRussianintelligenceagency, , targetedthestateandlocalagenciesalongwithprivatefirmsthatareresponsibleforelectronic pollingandvoterregistration.TheGRUaccessedvoterinformationandinstalledmalmalware onavotertechnology'snetwork.IunderstandtheywillbriefSenatorDeSantistogainaccessto Floridaelectiondata.WillyoucommittotheFBIprovidingabriefingtoallSenatorsonthis?
AGBARR:justontheFloridasituation?
SEN.KLOBU CHAR: on theentireRussiasituation. IncludingtheFlorida-
AGBARR:sure.Situation.Sure.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.KLOBU CHAR:thatwillbehelpful.Again,SenatorLangfordandI are trying togetour billpassed.AndIthinkifeveryonehearsaboutthis,itmayhelp.Alsoaccordingtothereport, theIRApurchasedover3500adsonFacebooktoundermineourdemocracy.astheChairman haspointout,contrarytowhatweheardfromahighrankingfinotjustafewFacebookads.Iam pleasedthattheChairmanwillvoteforthehonestadsact.Willyouhelpustrytoatleastchange ourelectionlawssowecanshowwherethemoneyiscomingfromandwhoispayingforthese adssopeoplehaveaccesstotheseads?
AGBARR:inconcept,yes.
SEN.KLOBU CHAR:verygood.Thank you.Weneedthatsupport.Nowlet'sgo to somethingi notedintheopening.Youtalkedabouthowthetwomajorconcernsatyournominationhearing wereaboutthereportandaboutmakingthereportpublic.Therewasathirdconcern,anditwas somethingiraised,andthatwasyourviewsonobstruction.IaskedyouifaPresidentorany personconvincingawitnesstochangetestimonywouldbeobstructionofjustice,andyousaid yes.ThereportfoundthatMichael Cohen’s testimonytothehousebeforeitthatthePresident repeatedlyimpliedthat Cohen’s familymembershadcommittedcrimes.Doyouconsiderthat evidencetobeanattempttoconvinceawitnesstochangetestimony?
AGBARR:no.Idon'tthinkthatthatcouldpassmuster.Thosepublicstatementshewasmaking couldpassmusterassubordinationofperjury.
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:butthisisamaninthehighestoffice,inthemostpowerfuljobinour country,andheisbasically-- I’m tryingtothinkhowsomeonewouldreact,anyofmy colleagueshere,ifthePresidentoftheU nitedStatesisimplyinggetting out therethat your familymembershavecommittedacrime.Soyoudon'tconsiderthatanyattempttochange testimony?
AGBARR:well,youhavetwodifferentthings.Youhavethequestionofwhetherit'san obstructiveact,andthenalsowhetherornotitisacorruptintent.Idon'tthinkgeneralpublic statementslikethathave--wecouldshowthattheywouldhavesufficientlyprobableeffectto constitution- -
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.KLOBU CHAR:let'sgo to some privatestatements.ThereportfoundthatthePresident's personalcounseltoldPaulManafortthathewouldbe,quote,takencareof.Thisisinvolume2at pages122to124.Thatyoudon'tconsiderobstructionofjustice?
AGBARR:no,notstandingalone.Onboththesamereasons,no.
SEN.KLOBU CHAR:Ithinkthatismypointhere.
AGBARR:what?
SEN.KLOBU CHAR:youlook at thetotalityoftheevidence,that'swhat IlearnedwhenIwasin lawschool.Youlookatthetotalityoftheevidenceandthepatternhere.Lookatthis.Thereport foundthatthePresident'spersonalcounseltoldMichaelCohenthatifhestayedonmessage abouttheTrumpTowerMoscowproject,thePresidenthadhisback. That’s volume2,page140.
AGBARR:right,butIthinkthecounselacknowledgedthatit'sunclearwhetherhewas reflectingthePresident'sstatementsonthat.
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:thereportfoundthatafterManafortwasconvicted,thePresidenthimself calledhimabravemanforrefusingtobreak.
AGBARR:yes.andthatisnotobstructionbecausethePresident's--theevidence--Ithinkwhat thePresident'slawyerswouldsayifthiswereeveractuallyjoined,isthatthePresident's statementsaboutflippingarequiteclearandexpressedanduniformlythesame,whichisby flipping,hemeantsuccumbingtopressureonunrelatedcasestolieandcomposeinordertoget lenienttreatmentonothercases.Thatisnot--it'sadiscouragingflippinginthatsenseisnot obstruction.
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:lookatthepatternhere.Thereportfoundthatafter Cohen’s residenceand officeweresearchedbytheFBI,thePresidenttoldCohentohanginthereandstaystrong.The
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 courtfoundthatafternationalsecurityadviserMichaelFlynnresigned,thePresidentmade publicpositivecommentsabouthim,andthenwhenhecooperated,hechangedhistune.During yourconfirmationhearing,IaskedyouwhetheraPresidentdeliberatelyimpairingtheintegrity oravailabilityofevidencewouldbeobstruction,andyourespondedyes.Andthisisadifferent takeonSenator Feinstein’s question.WouldcausingMcGahn,theWhiteHousecounsel,to createafalserecordwhenthePresidentasked--orderedhimto--whenMcGahn,hetoldhimto denyreports,right?HetellsMcGahn,denyreportsthatthePresidentorderedhimtohavethe counselfired.Ifyoudon'tseethatasobstructionindirectinghimtochangetestimony,doyou thinkthatwouldcreateafalserecordtoimpairtheintegrityofevidence?
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AGBARR:theevidencewouldnotbesufficienttoestablishanyofthethreeelementsthere. First,it'snotsufficienttoshowanobstructiveactbecauseitisunclearwhetherthePresident knewthattobefalse.Infact,thePresident'sfocusonthefactthatInevertoldyoutofire McGahn--didIeversay"fire"?InevertoldyoutofireMcGahn.
SEN.KLOBUCHAR: I’m gettingtosomethingthatit'saboutimpairingtheevidence.Iseeitas different.
AGBARR:it'shardtoestablishthenexustotheproceeding,becausehealreadyhadtestifiedto theSpecialCounsel.Hehadgivenhisevidence.Asthereportitselfsays,thereisevidencethat thePresidentactuallythoughtandbelievedthat"thetimes"articlewaswrong.Tha t’s evidence onthePresident'ssideoftheledgerthatheactuallythoughtitwaswrongandwasaskingforits correction.Itisalsopossible,thereportsays,thatthePresident'sintentwasdirectedatthe publicityandthepress.Thegovernmenthastoprovethingsbeyondareasonabledoubt,andas thereportshows,thereisampleevidenceontheothersideoftheledgerthatwouldpreventthe governmentfromestablishingthat.
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:again,Ilookatthetotalityoftheevidence,andwhenyoulookatit,itisa pattern,andthatisdifferentthanhavingoneincident.Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.ChrisCoonsQuestioning
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+13%3A25%3A31&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.CHRISCOONS:thankyou,Mr.Chairman.TheSpecialCounselwasappointedfirstto investigateRussia'sattackonour20electionandpotentialcoordinationwiththeTrump campaign,and I’m gladtheChairmanstartedthishearingbyrecognizingweneededtofocuson thatdemonstrableassaultonourdemocracytoandtoprotectourgovernmentgoingforward,and Ilookforwardtoworkingwithyouonthebills,butweneedtoworkwithyou,Mr.Attorney General,andthePresidenttomakesurethereisnothackingintoour2020election.WhatIthink isunacceptableactiononthepartofthePresidentistryingtofiretheSpecialCounselwithout cause.IthinkabillprotectingtheSpecialCounselissomethingworthdoingforfutureSpecial Counsels.Weweretoldbyourcolleaguestherewasnothingtoworryaboutbecausethe Presidentwasn'tgoingtofiretheSpecialCounsel,butIwasparticularlyStrzokbysomereports inthesecondvolumethatthePresidentattemptedtodoexactlythat.andIfrankly,Mr.Attorney General,haveconcernsthatyourmarch24letterobscuredthatconduct,andasaresultworkedto protectthePresidentforseveralweeksratherthangivethefulltruthtotheAmericanpeopleasI nowbelieveSpecialCounselMuellerwasurgingyoutodoasreflectedintheletterwejust receivedtoday.So I’m goingtoaskyousomequestionsaboutthereport,butthebottomlineisI thinkweneedtohearmoreabouttheSpecialCounsel'sworkfromtheSpecialCounsel. AccordingtoSpecialCounselMueller'sreport,inJuneof2017,PresidentTrumpcalledWhite HousecounselMcGahnanddirectedhimtohavetheSpecialCounselremoved.AndIquote,and thisisaboutpage85,86.McGahncalledthePresidentathometwiceandonbothoccasions directedhimtocallRosensteinandsaythatMuellerhadconflictsandcouldnolongerserveas SpecialCounsel.Therewerenocredibleconflicts.McGahntestifiedthathehadsharedthatthese conflictsweresilly,werenotrealandChrisChristyadvisedthattherewasnogoodbasistofire theSpecialCounsel.InonecallthePresidentsaid,callRod.TellRodthereareconflictswiththe SpecialCounsel.Quote,Muellerhastogo.AndIassumehedidn'tmeangotoClevelandorgoto Seattle,hemeantgo,befired.Callmebackwhenyoudoit.IthinkthePresident'sdemandsto fireMuellerwithoutcausearealarmingandunacceptable.AndMr.AttorneyGeneral,notonebit ofwhatijustdescribedwasinyourMarch24thlettertothiscommittee,wasit?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:no.
SEN.COONS:butitwasinthesummariesthatwereofferedtoyoubySpecialCounselMueller andhisteamwhichyouchosenottorelease,isthatcorrect?
AGBARR:theywereincompleteforminthefinalreportwhichiwasstrivingtomakepublic andwhichIdidmakepublic.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.COONS:whichIrespectandappreciate.Butacriticalthreeweekspassedbetweenwhen youdeliveredtheletterwiththefocusontheprincipalconclusionsandwhenweultimatelygot theredactedreport.AndwhatItakefromthelettertoyou- -
AGBARR:whyaretheycritical?
SEN.COONS:Iwouldthinkthevolume2summarywouldhaverevealedtothegeneralpublica wholerangeofinappropriateactionsofthePresidentandhiscoreteam. I’ll gotoasecond episodethatIthinkisimportant.OnFebruary5of2018,afteraweekwhenthestorybroke publicly,theSpecialCounselinvestigatingthePresident,thePresidentdemandthatMcGahn createafalserecordsayingthePresidentneverelectedtofiretheSpecialCounsel.ThePresident wasn'tlookingforapressstatementhere,hewasn'tlookingtocorrecttherecord,andhewanted afraudulentrecordforWhiteHouserecords,aletterthatwasn'ttrue.McGahnrefusedtodoit. Again,thereisnothingaboutthePresident'srequesttocreateafalserecordinyourMarch24th letter,isthere?
AGBARR:well,that'syourcharacterizationofit,and I’ve beenthroughitacoupleoftimes.i thinkitwouldbedifficultforthegovernmenttoprovethatbeyondreasonabledoubt.ithink thereareveryplausiblealternativeexplanations.ButwhatIwastryingtogetoutwasthefinal reportandhaveoneissuanceofthecompletereport.ImadeitclearintheMarch24thletterthat BobMuellerdidn'tmakeadecisionbutthathefelthecouldn'texoneratethePresident.
SEN.COONS:that'sright.
AGBARR:Iwasn'thidingthatMuellerwaspresentingbothsidesofalltheevidence,buthewas notmakingacallbuthefelthecouldnotexoneratethePresident.ThenIbrieflydescribedthe processwewentthroughtomakeajudgmentinternalandtotheDepartmentofJustice.AsIsay, fromthepublicintereststandpoint,Ifeltthereshouldbeonlyonethingissuedanditshouldbe thecompletereport,ascompleteasitcouldbe.
SEN.COONS:andIknowwedifferinourconclusionsaboutwhatthatmeant,butmyconcern isthatthatgavePresidentTrumpandhisfolksmorethanthreeweeksofanopenfieldtosay,I
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 wascompletelyexonerated,whenhadyoureleasedthesummariesofthefirstandsecond volume,wewouldhavebeenmoremotivatedthaneverbasedonthefirstvolumetowork cooperativelytoprotectournextelectionandmoreconcernedthaneveraboutmisdeeds,about inappropriateactionsbythePresidentandbysomeofhiscoreteamasaresultofthesummaryof thesecondvolume.Andattheendoftheday,you'vehadanumberofexchangeswithcolleagues whereyou'vesaid,Ican'ttellyouwhyMuellerchosenottocharge.IwanttohearthatfromBob Mueller.IthinkweshouldhearfromSpecialCounselMueller.Letmemoveontoapointthat SenatorSassewasjustaskingbutwhatIthinkisworthrevisiting,abouttheintelligencerolein ourelections.RussianshaddirtonHillaryClinton,theRussianshadadirectcontacttoDonald TrumpJr.andofferedtogivedirtabouthisfather'sopponent.DonaldTrumpJr.said,Iloveit, andinvitedthecampaignChairmanandthePresident'sson-in-lawcampaignChairmantogetit.
AGBARR:whodidyousayofferedit?
SEN.COONS:inthesecondinstanceRussiansmadeanoffertoDonaldTrump.Ihave30 seconds.LetmegettoaquestionifIcould.Goingforward,whatifaforeignadversary,let'snow sayNorthKorea,offersaPresidentialcandidatedirtonacompetitorin2020?Doyouagreewith methecampaignshouldimmediatelycontacttheFBI?Ifaforeignintelligenceservice,aRep.of aforeigngovernmentsayswehavedirtonyouropponent,shouldtheysay,Iloveit,let'smeetor contacttheFBI?
AGBARR:ifaforeignintelligenceservicedoes,yes.
SEN.COONS:here'smycoreconcern.ThePresidentorderedtheWhiteHousecounseltohave SpecialCounselMuellerfired.Hefabricatedevidencetocoveritup.Andwhetherornotyou couldmakeacriminalchargeofthis,itisunacceptable.Andeveryonewhosaidwedidn'thave toworryaboutPresidentTrumpfiringtheSpecialCounselwasflatoutwrong.TheRussians offeredtheTrumpcampaigndirtonHillaryClintonandtheTrumpcampaignneverreportedthat totheFBI.InsteadtheytriedtoconcealthemeetingandmisledtheAmericanpeople.Ithinkwe havetoworkonabipartisanbasisgoingforwardtoprotectourelectionsfromarepeatonthis andweneedleadershipfromourPresident.YouannouncedyouhadclearedthePresident25 daysbeforethepubliccouldreadtheMuellerreportforthemselves.Ithinkit'snowonder SpecialCounselMuellerthoughtyourfour-pagelettercreatedpublicconfusionaboutcritical aspectsoftheresultsoftheinvestigationandthatthatthreatenedtounderminethecentral purposeforwhichhewasappointed.IthinkweneedtohearfromSpecialCounselMueller,I thinkweneedtohearfromBobMcGahn,andIthinkweneedtofigureoutwhyyouare supervisingcasesthathavecomefromtheMuellerinvestigationandwhyyouhavebeen
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 referred.ThisbodyhasacentralroleinoversightthatIbelieveweneedtoexercisegivenyour recentrecord.Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.JoshHawleyQuestioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+13%3A34%3A50&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.JOSHHAWLEY:thankyou,Mr.Chairman.Iappreciateyourcandorcallingwhat happenedin2016whatitis,whichisspyingontheTrumpcampaignandspyingonthePresident oftheUnitedStates. Let’s talkalittlemoreaboutspying.Counterintelligenceinvestigationslike theonewenowknowtheFBIlaunchedagainstcandidateTrumpandPresidentTrump,thoseare designedtothwartspyingandsabotage,isthatcorrect?
AGBARR:that'scorrect.
SEN.HAWLEY:toyourknowledgehastheFBIeverlaunchaidcounterintelligence investigationofanotherPresidentthatyou'reawareof?
AGBARR:nottomyknowledge.
SEN.HAWLEY:soit'ssafetosaythattoyourknowledgethismovewascompletely unprecedented?
AGBARR:tomyknowledge.
SEN.HAWLEY:woulditbeunusualinyourexperienceandtoyourknowledgeforFBIagents tohidetheexistenceandresultsofaninvestigation,suchaninvestigation,fromtheirsuperiors?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:didyousay,woulditbetypical?
SEN.HAWLEY:no,woulditbeunusual?
AGBARR:veryunusual.
SEN.HAWLEY:andthatindeedwhatpressreportssuggesthappenedhere.WhenFBIofficials hideinvestigationsfromsuperiors,isthereanybodytoholdthemaccountable?Whathappensin thatinstance?
AGBARR:thereisnoaccountability.
SEN.HAWLEY:haveyoulookedintothedecisionbytheFBItowhyhavetheylauncheda counterintelligenceinvestigation?
AGBARR:IamlookingintoitandIhavelookedintoit.
SEN.HAWLEY:andyouwill--willyoucommittotellinguswhatyoufindasaresultofyour ownreviewandinvestigation?
AGBARR:well,attheendofthedaywhenIformconclusions,Iintendtoshareit.
SEN.HAWLEY: I’ll takethatasayes.Letmeaskyouaboutthe25thamendment,ifImight,for justamoment.WeknowthatformeractingDirectoroftheFBI,AndyMcCabe,hepublicly confirmedthathecontemplatedforcingthePresidentfromofficeusingthe25thamendment.To yourknowledgehaveFBIofficialsevercontemplatedforcinganyotherPresidentfromoffice againsttheirwillusingthatprovision?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:nottomyknowledge.
SEN.HAWLEY:the25thamendmentcontemplatestheVicePresidenttakingoverforthe PresidentwhenthePresidentisunabletoact.Wouldyouagreethatthattextcontemplates physicalailmentslikeincaPACitations?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.HAWLEY:wouldyouagreethatdiscussionswithintheFBIofforcingthePresidentoutof officeforpoliticalreasonsgivesthepublicatbestreasontoquestionwhattheFBIisdoingand tofearthattheremaybeabusesofpowerinthatorganization?
AGBARR:Ithinkitgivesreasontobeconcernedaboutthoseparticularindividualsthatwere involved.Idon'tattributeittotheorganization.
SEN.HAWLEY:speakingofparticularindividualswhowereinvolved,Ihavetosay I’ve listenedtothistestimonyalldaytoday,andtomemaybethemostshockingthing I’ve heardis this.TheChairmanreaditearlier.August26,2016--thisisatextmessagefromPeterStrzok,a topcounterintelligenceinvestigator,whowe knowstartedthisagainstthePresidentoftheU nited States.PeterStrzoksaid,IjustwenttoasouthernVirginiaWalmart.IcouldsmelltheTrump support.Inmyview,doyouwanttoknowwhat'sreallygoingonhere?Doyouwanttoknow whythecounterintelligenceinvestigationreallyhappened?Doyouwanttoknowwhywe'reall sittingheretoday?that'swhy,rightthere'sbecauseanunelectedbureaucrat,anunelectedofficial inthisgovernmentwhoclearlyhasopendisdain,ifnotoutrighthatredforTrumpvoterslikethe peopleofmystate,forinstance.IcouldsmelltheTrumpsupport?Thentriedtooverturnthe resultsofa Democraticelection. That’s what'sreallygone on here. That’s thestory. T hat’s why we'reheretoday.Icannotbelievethatatopofficialofthisgovernmentwiththekindofpower thatthesepeoplehadwouldtrytoexercisetheirownprejudices,andthat'swhatthisis,it'sopen, blatantprejudice,wouldtrytousethatinordertooverturnaDemocraticelection.Andtomy mind,that'stherealcrisishere,anditisacrisis.Ifthereisnotaccountability,ifthiscangoonin theUnitedStatesofAmerica,mygoodness,wedon'thaveademocracyanymore.ilookforward tohearingtheresultsofyourinvestigationandIlookforwardtothiscommitteecontinuingits constitutionalresponsibilitytofindoutwhatisgoingonhereandmakingsurethewillofthe peopleisvindicatedandestablished.Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 – AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.JoniErnstQuestioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+13%3A50%3A00&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.JONIERNST:thankyou,Mr.Chairman,andthankyou,AttorneyGeneralBarrforbeing heretodayandvisitingwithallofus.TheSpecialCounsel'sinvestigationandalloftheripples thatcamefromthe2016Presidentialelectionhavereallypermeatedthecountry.Thereisgreat interestinthis.As I’m touringthe99countiesofIowa,Iamaskedaboutthisattownhallsand otherinteractionswithmyconstituentsjustasmuchasanyotherissueathand.And I’m sure manyoftheotherSenatorsherehavehadthissameexperience. I’d liketostarttodaybyvisiting withyouabouttheactionsofRussiaduringthe2016Presidentialelection.ithinkthat'swherea lotofuswouldliketoseethefocusgo.Weneedtofocusonwhathappenedinthe2016election. Andthenlookaheadandmakesurewearesafeguardingourpractices.Ithinkitisnaturalto thinkofactsofaggressionbyaforeignstateintermsofbullets,intermsofbombs,that'swhat wetypicallythoughtof,asactsofaggression.Afterall,upuntiljustrecentday,actsof aggression,orwarfarehasbeenasymmetricaloperationbyaforeignadversary.Inthepast,it hasbeenpracticedbybootsonthegroundorvariousbombingcampaigns.Butthat'snotwhatwe arefacingtoday.AndIdobelievewhatwesawfromRussiawasanactofaggression.other adversarialforeignstates,notjustRussia,butIthinkanumberofcolleagueshavementioned Chinaaswell,perhapsNorthKorea,IRAn,wecouldgoonandon,andnotonlydotheypractice directhostilemilitaryaction,justas RussiadidinU kraine,withitsillegalannexationofCrimea, butaswasdetailedintheSpecialCounsel'sreport,theyseektoinfluencetheelectionsofour freestatesthroughcybermeans.AnditisanobjectivethoughtthatRussiaattemptedtoinfluence ourelection.Weknowthat,folks.Allofusadmittothat.WeseetheevidencethatRussiatried toinfluenceourelection.Thehacks,thedisinformation,andsocialmediacyber-attacksby RussiaweredonewiththeintenttosowdiscordamongtheAmericanpeople.Russiawillshow nohesitation.theyhaven'tinthepastandtheywon'tinthefutureinusingthesetypesofactsof aggressioninanattempttoundermineourelectionsprocessandourwayoflife,anditdoesn't matteriftheattackiscomingfromtheendofaBarrelofagunortheclickofamouse.Wehave togettothebottomofit.AndsoGeneralBarr,thepasttwoyears,we'vebeentalkingaboutthis investigation,intermsofwhathappened,andnow,wehavetheopportunitytodecidehowtodo better.SotheSpecialCounsel'sreportistheendoftheroad,Ithinkmanyhavestatedthat,the endoftheroad,whenitcomestothequestionoftheTrumpadministration'sintent,butitisjust thebeginningoftheconversationonhowwecounterRussiaandotherforeignadversaries,in theirattemptstoundermineourrepublic.soifwecantalkaboutthat2016Presidentialelection, doyouseevulnerabilitiesorweaknessesthatexistedatthattimethatleftusopentoforeign aggression,foreigninfluence,intheelectionsystem,andthenhowdowemoveforwardthrough theDepartmentofJustice,inmakingsurewe'reshoringupsomeofthoseavenuesofapproachof ourforeignadversaries?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:yes,theFBIhasaveryrobustprogram,theforeigninfluencetaskforce,whichis focusedonthisproblem.Andisworkingtocounter-actandprepareforthekindsofinterference thatwesaw,haveseen.Anditisaverydynamicprogram. I’ve beenbriefedonitbyChrisWray and I’m veryimpressedwithwhatthey'reupto.IthinkthatthewayIviewthisgeneralproblem istherehasalwaysbeeneffortsbyRussiaandotherhostilecountriestoinfluenceAmerican electionsandpublicopinion,butitwasmoreeasilydetectableanditwassortofacruder operationinthepast,andwhatwehavenowiswithtechnologyandtheDemocratizationof information,thedangerisfarmoreinsidious.anditenablesnotonlythemgettinginto effectivelyour wholecommunicationssystemhereintheU nitedStates,and I’m just,Imeanjust thewaywecommunicatewitheachother,andtoourbusinesssystemsandourinfrastructure,but italsoallowsthemtodoexactlywhatwe'veseen,whichis,becauseofourrobustfirst amendmentfreedoms,they'reabletocomein,andpretendthey'reAmericans,andaffectthe dialogueandthesocialdynamicsintheUnitedStatesinawaythatthey'veneverbeenabletodo before.Andit'sahugechallengetodealwithit.ButIthinktheintelligencecommunityis respondingtothechallengeandthethreat.Ithink,IhadthisdiscussionwithBobMuelleron March5,whenhewasbriefingmeonhiswork,anddiscussinglessonslearned,whathehasseen inanddismantlingthethreatsthathewasabletodetectandhowwecanstartusingthatapproach acrosstheboard.
SEN.ERNST:soIseewe'veaccomplishedalotthroughourfederalagenciesandthroughthe DepartmentofJusticethen.Areweabletoworkwithdifferentsocialmediagiants,otherprivate organizationstohelpcountersomeofthis?doyouseethatthey'reactuallysteppinguptothis challenge,takingthison,andthattheyarepushingbackaswellagainstwhattheymight determineasaforeignadversary?
AGBARR:yes,Ithinktheprivatecompaniesaresteppinguptheirgame,andbeingmore responsibleinaddressingit.
SEN.ERNST:Ithinkthat'simportant. I’m sorry,goahead,please.Ithinkit'simportantthatwe reallyfocusonwhywe'reheretodayandthatisbecausewedidseeRussianinfluenceinour 2016Presidentialelection.Whatweneedtomakesureismanyofyourothercolleagueshave notedisthatthisdoesn'thappentousagain.Andthatweareaware.andasapublic,weare awareofwhathasbeenhappening,notjustinourown electionsprocesshereintheU nited States,buttomanyofouralliesaroundtheglobeaswell,inmakingsurethatweareadequately pushingbackagainstthat,andevenovermatchinginmakingsurethatwekeepthattypeof influenceoutofourelectioncycle.SoIappreciateyourtimetoday.Thankyouverymuch, GeneralBarr.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 – AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.RichardBlumenthal Questioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+13%3A38%3A54&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.RICHARDBLU MENTHAL:thank you,Mr.Chairman.Thankyou,AttorneyGeneralBarr forbeingheretoday. You’ve beenveryadroitandagileinyourresponsetoquestionshere,butI thinkhistorywilljudgeyouharshlyandmaybeabitunfairlybecauseyouseemtohavebeenthe designatedfallguyforthisreport.Andthinkthatconclusionisinescapableinlightofthefour - pagesummaryandthepressconferenceyoudidonthedayitwasreleasedknowingthatyouhad inhandaletterfromtheSpecialCounselsayingthathefeltthatyoumischaracterizedhisreport. andyouwereaskedbyoneofmycolleagues,SenatorVanHolland,whetheryouknow- - whetheryouknewthatBobMuellersupportedyourconclusion,andyousaid,Idon'tknow whetherBobMuellersupportedmyconclusion.YouwereaskedbyRep.Crist- -
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:excuseme,Senator.Thatconclusionwasnot relatedtomydescriptionofthefindingsintheMarch24thletter.Thatconclusionreferstomy conclusionontheobstructioncases.Soit'sadifferentconclusion.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:itwasexactlythesameword,conclusions,thatwasusedbySpecial CounselMueller.ontheobstructionissue,onpage8and182ofthereport,Idon'tknowifyou haveitinfrontofyou,theSpecialCounselspecificallysaid,atthesametime, I’m quoting,ifwe hadconfidenceafterathoroughinvestigationofthefactsthatthePresidentclearlydidnot commitobstructionofjusticewewouldsostate.Hesaiditagainatpage182,andyetinyour summaryandinthepressconferencethatyoudid,you,ineffect,clearedthePresidentonboth so-calledcollusion- -
AGBARR:thedifferenceisIusedtheproperstandard.Thatstatementyoujustreadisactuallya verystrangestatementforaprosecutor- -
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:forfourofthespecificobstructionepisodes,RobertMuellerconcluded thattherewassubstantialevidenceonthethreenecessaryelementsofobstruction,on- -
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:you'reaprosecutor- -
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:Ihavetofinishmyquestion.
AGBARR:youhaven'tletmefinishmyanswer.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:well,letmejustfinishthequestion.
SEN.LINDSEYGRAHAM:wecandoboth.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:youignoredinthatpressconferenceandinthesummarythat Robert Muellerfoundsubstantialevidence,andit'sinthereport,andwehaveachartthatshowsthe elementofthatcrime.Intent,interferencewithanongoinginvestigation,andtheobstructiveact. soithinkthatyourcredibilityisunderminedwithinthedepartment,inthiscommittee,andwith theAmericanpeople,andIwanttoaskyouwhetheronthoseremaininginvestigations,the12to 14investigations,whetheryouhavehadanycommunicationwithanyoneintheWhiteHouse.
AGBARR:no.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:andwillyougiveusanironcladcommitmentthatyouwillinnoway- -
AGBARR: I’m notsureofthelaundrylistofinvestigations,butIcertainlyhaven'ttalkedthe substanceorbeendirectedtodoanythingonanyofthecases.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:well,let megiveyouanopportunitytoclarify.Haveyouhadany conversationswithanyoneintheWhiteHouseaboutthoseongoinginvestigationsthatwere spawnedorspunoffby--?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:Idon'trecallhavinganysubstantivediscussionontheinvestigation.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:haveyouhadanynon-substantivediscussion?
AGBARR:it'spossibleanameofacasewasmentioned.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:andhave youprovidedinformationaboutanyofthoseongoing investigations?Anyinformationwhatsoever.
AGBARR:Idon'trecall,no.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:youdon'trecall?
AGBARR:Idon'trecallprovidingany.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:wouldn'tyourecallwhetheryougaveinformationtosomebodyinthe WhiteHouseaboutanongoingcriminalinvestigationintheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkor theEasternDistrictofNewYorkortheEasternDistrictofVirginiaortheDepartmentofJustice?
AGBARR:Ijustdon'trecallgivingsubstanceofacase.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:isthereanythingthatwouldrefresh yourrecollection?
AGBARR:possiblylookingoveralistofcases.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.BLUMENTHAL:youknowwhatthosediscussionsare.Wediscussedthematyour confirmationhearing,correct?
AGBARR:Ithinktherewere12or18cases,right?
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:youdon'tknowwhatthoseinvestigationsare?
AGBARR:Idogenerally,butIcan'tremembereach- -
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:letmeaskyouonelasttime.Youcan'trecallwhetheryouhave discussedthosecases withanyoneintheWhiteHouse,includingthePresidentoftheU nited States.
AGBARR:myrecollectionisIhavenotdiscussedthose.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:butyoudon'tknowfor sure.
AGBARR:verysurethatIdidnotdiscussthesubstanceofany.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:haveyourecused yourselffromthoseinvestigations?
AGBARR:no.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.BLUMENTHAL:letmeaskyouaboutacoupleofquotesfromthePresident.sincea numberofmycolleagueshaveraisedtheRussiainvestigation,andthesearefromthereport, untruthsrecitedbythereportfromthePresidentinDecemberof2016whenPresidentTrump wasaskedabouttheintelligencecommunity'sconclusionthatRussiainterferedinourelectionto boostTrump'schances.Hesaidhehad,quote,noideaifit'sRussia,Chinaorsomebody.Itcould besomebodysittinginabedsomeplace.
SEN.GRAHAM:a400-poundperson.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:Mr.Chairman?
SEN.GRAHAM:a400-poundpersonsittingonabed.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:thatisn'twhatthePresidentsaid.Hereferred to itassomebody.Healso, athelsinke,deniedRussianattacksin2016onourelection.Anotherlie.TwodaysafterTrump waselected,theRussianofficialstoldthepressthattheRussiangovernmenthadmaintained contactswithTrump's,quote,immediateentourage,endquote,duringthecampaign.When PresidentTrumpwasaskedaboutit,hesaid,quote,therewasnocommunicationbetweenthe campaignandanyforeignentityduringthecampaign. That’s atpage21ofvolume2.Thefirst quoteigaveyouwasfrompage21ofvolume2.ThePresidentinitiallydeniedplayinganyrole inshapinghisson'sstatementtothepressaboutthenow-infamousJune9meeting.TheMueller reportestablishedthatthePresidentdictatedamisleadingstatementaboutthatmeetingthrough hiscommunicationsDirector,hopehicks. That’s at page101and102ofvolume2.After news organizationsreportedthatthePresidentorderedMcGahn,Mr.McGahn,tohavetheSpecial Counselremoved,thePresidentpubliclydisputedtheseaccounts.TheMuellerreportestablishes that,quote,substantialevidencesupportstheconclusionthatthePresident,infact,directed McGahntocallRosensteinto havetheSpecialCounselremoved. That’s atvolume2,page88.In yourviewdidPresidentTrumponthoseoccasionsandothersreciteisinthereport,lietothe Americanpeople?
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+13%3A47%3A39&market=m1&StationID=1115
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR: I’m notinthebusinessofdeterminingwhenliesaretoldtotheAmericanpeople. I’m inthebusinessofdeterminingwhetheracrimehasbeencommitted.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL: so hemayhavelied, --
AGBARR :butI’d likeanopportunitytoanswersomeofthesequestions,okay?Youstartedby citingthisthinginvolume2abouthowthereportsaysthattheycouldnotbesurethattheycould clearlysaythathedidnotviolatethelaw.Asyouknow,that'snotthestandardweuseinthe criminaljusticesystem. It’s presumedthatsomeoneisinnocentandthegovernmenthastoprove thattheyclearlyviolatedthelaw. We’re notinthebusinessofexoneration,we'renotinthe businessofprovingtheydidn'tviolatethelaw.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:Ifoundthatwholethingthatyouexoneratedhiminyourpress conferenceandinthefour-pagesummary.
AGBARR:howdidthatstart?Ididn'thearthebeginningofthatquestion.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:youineffectexonerated or clearedthePresident --
AGBARR:no,Ididn'texonerate.Isaidwedidnotbelievetherewassufficientevidenceto establishanobstruction,adefensewhichisthejoboftheJusticeDepartment.Andthejobofthe JusticeDepartmentisnowover.Thatdetermineswhetherornotthereisacrime.Thereportis nowinthehandsoftheAmericanpeople.Everyonecandecideforthemselves.Thereisan electionin18months. That’s averyDemocraticprocess.Butwe'reoutofit.Wehavetostop usingthecriminaljusticeprocessasapoliticalweapon.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:mytimehasexpired.Iapologize,Mr.Chairman,butIwouldjustsay thatthefour-pageletterandthepressconferencethatyoudidlefttheclearimpression,andit's beenrepeatedagainandagain,thatyouclearedthePresident.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 – AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.MazieHirono Questioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+13%3A57%3A00&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.MAZIEHIRONO:thankyou,Mr.Chairman.Mr.Barr,theAmericanpeopleknowyouare nodifferentfromRudyGiulianiorKellyanneConway,oranyoftheotherpeoplewhosacrifice theironcedecentreputationfortheliarwhositsintheovaloffice.Youonceturneddownajob offerfromDonaldTrumptorepresenthimashisprivateattorney.Atyourconfirmationhearing youtoldSenatorFeinstein,quote,thejobofAttorneyGeneralisnotthesameasrepresenting quotethePresidentsoyouknowthedifferencebutyou'vechosentobethePresident'slawyer andsidewithhimovertheinterestoftheAmericanpeople.
Tostartwith,youshouldneverhavebeeninvolvedinsupervisingtheRobertMueller investigation.Youwrotea19-pageunsolicitedmemo,whichyouadmitwasnotbasedonany fact,attackingthepremiseofhalfoftheinvestigation.AndyoualsoshouldhaveDeputy AttorneyGeneralRodRosensteinrecusehimself.Hewasnotjustawitnesstosomeofthe President'sobstructivebehavior,wenowknowhewasinfrequentpersonalcontactofthe President,asubjectoftheinvestigation.Youshouldhaveleftittothen,oncethereportwas careerofficials.DeliveredbytheSpecialCounsel,youdelayeditsreleaseformorethantwo weeksandletthePresident'spersonallawyerslookatitbeforeyouagreedtoletpublicorthe Congressseeit.DuringthetimeyousubstitutedyourownpoliticaljudgmentfortheSpecial Counsel'slegalconclusionsinafourpagelettertoCongressandnowweknowthankstoafree pressthatMr.Muellerwroteyourletter,objectingtoyourso-calledsummary.Whenyoucalled Muellertodiscusshisletter,thereportsarethathethoughtyoursummarywasgivingthepress, Congress,andthepublicamisleadingimpressionofhiswork.Heaskedyoutoreleasethereport summariestocorrectthemisimpressionyoucreatedbutyourefused.Whenyoufinallydid decidetoreleasethereportoveraCongressionalrecessandontheeveoftwomajorreligious holidays,youcalledapressconference,toonceagaintrytoclearDonaldTrumpbeforeanyone hadachancetoreadtheSpecialCounsel'sreport,andcometotheirownconclusions.Butwhen wereadthereport,weknewRobertMueller'sconcernswerevalid.Andthatyourversionof eventswasfalse.
YouusedeveryadvantageofyourofficetocreatetheimpressionthatthePresidentwascleared ofmisconduct.YouselectivelyquotedfragmentsfromtheSpecialCounsel'sreport,takingsome ofthemostimportantstatementsoutofcontext,andignoringtherest.Youputthepowerand authorityoftheofficeoftheAttorneyGeneralandtheDepartmentofJustice,behindapublic relationsefforttohelpDonaldTrumpprotecthimself.Finally,youliedtoCongress.Youtold RepresentativeCharlieCristthatyoudidn'tknowwhatobjectivesMueller'steammighttobethe Marchso-calledsummary.YoutoldSenatorChrisVanHollandthatyoudidn'tknowifSenator Muellersupportedyourconclusionsbutyouknewyouliedandnow,weknow.Alotofrespect tononpartisanlegalexpertsandelectedofficialsweresurprisedbyyoureffortstoprotectthe President.ButIwasn'tsurprised.YoudidexactlywhatIthoughtyou'ddo,that'swhyIvoted
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 againstyourconfirmation.IexpectedyouwouldtrytoprotectthePresident.Andindeed,you did.In1989,thisisn'tsomethingyouhadn'tdonebefore.in1989,whenyourefusedtoshow CongressanOLCopinionthatledtothearrestofManualAnothera,in1993,whenyou recommendedpardonsforthesubjectsoftheIran-contrascandalandlastyearwhenyouwrote the19-pagememosayingDonaldTrump,asPresident,can'tbeguiltyofobstructionofjustice, andthendidn'trecuseyourselffromthematter.Fromthebeginning,you'readdressingan audienceofone.ThatpersonbeingDonaldTrump.that'swhybeforethebombshellnewsof yesterdayevening,11ofmySenatecolleaguesandIcalledontheDepartmentofJustice inspectorgeneral,andofficeofprofessionalresponsibility,toinvestigatethewayyouhave handledtheMuellerreport.Iwantedthemtodeterminewhetheryouractionscompliedwiththe department'spoliciesandpractices,andwhetheryouhavedemonstratedsufficientimpartialityto continuetooverseethe14othercriminalmattersthattheSpecialCounselreferredtoinother part,tootherpartsoftheDepartmentofJustice.Butnow,weknowmoreaboutyourdeep involvementintryingto cover upforDonaldTrump.BeingAttorneyGeneraloftheU nited Statesisasacredtrust.Youhavebetrayedthattrust.Americadeservesbetter.SoIhavesome questionsforyou.IstheWhiteHouseexertsanyinfluenceonyourdecision,whethertoallow SpecialCounselMuellertotestifyinCongressandwhen?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:no.
SEN.HIRONO:now,you'vebeencleartodaythatyoudon'tthinkthatanyofthetenepisodesof possibleobstructionthattheSpecialCounseloutlinedisacrime.Idisagree.Butyouseemto thinkthatifit'snotacrime,thenthere'snoproblem.Nothingtoseehere.Nothingtoworry about.SowithapologiestoAdamSchiff,doyouthinkallofthethingsthatPresidentTrumpdid areokay?AretheywhatthePresidentoftheU nitedStatesshouldbedoing?Forexample,do you thinkit'sokayforaPresidenttofireanFBIdirectortostophimfrominvestigatinglinksbetween hiscampaignandRussia?Itmaynotbeacrime,butdoyouthinkit'sokay?
AGBARR:well,Ithinkthereportisclear,that- -
SEN.HIRONO:no I’m nottalkingaboutthereport.
AGBARR:well I’m talkingabout- -
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.HIRONO: I’m askingyou.Thisisnotacrime.ButdoyouthinkitisokayforthePresident todowhathedid,tofiretheSpecialCounsel--ifyouthinkit'sokay- -
AGBARR:Idon'tthinktheevidencesupportstheproposition.
SEN.HIRONO:soIguessyouthinkit'sokay.
AGBARR:tostoptheinvestigation.
SEN.HIRONO:doyouthinkitisokayforaPresidenttoaskhisWhiteHousecounseltolie?
AGBARR:well, I’m willingtotalkaboutwhat'scriminal.
SEN.HIRONO:no,we'vealreadyacknowledgedthatyouthinkitwasnotacrime. I’m just askingwhetheryouthinkitisokay.Evenifitisnotacrime,doyouthinkit'sokayforthe PresidenttoaskhisWhiteHousecounseltolie?
AGBARR:which- -
SEN.HIRONO:ifyou'regoingtogobackto--you'retellingmeitisokay.Letmeaskyouthe lastquestionthatIhavein17seconds.DoyouthinkitisokayforaPresidenttoofferpardonsto peoplewhodon'ttestifyagainsthim,tothreatenthefamilyofsomeonewhodoes?Isthatokay?
AGBARR:whendidhe,well,pardon- -
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.HIRONO:Ithinkyouknowwhat I’m talkingabout.Please,please,Mr.AttorneyGeneral, youknow,giveussomecreditforknowingwhatthehellisgoingonaroundherewithyou.
SEN.LINDSEYGRAHAM:notreally.Tothislineofquestioning.Listen,you'veslanderedthis man.
AGBARR:whatIsortofwanttoknow,howdidwegettothispoint?
SEN.HIRONO:Idonotthinkthat I’m slanderinganyone.AllIcansay,Mr.Chairman,Iam done,thankyouverymuch.
SEN.GRAHAM:andyouslanderedthisman,fromtoptobottom,soifyouwantmoreofthis, you'renotgoingtogetit,ifyouwanttoaskhimquestions,youcan.
SEN.HIRONO:youcertainlyhaveyouropinionandIhavemine.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.CoryBookerQuestioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+14%3A12%3A30&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.CORYBOOKER:thankyou,Mr.Chairman.Mr.Barr,asItakeastepbackatthis,Ijust reallythinkwe'reataverysoberingmomentinAmericanhistory,thatthereisaconsiderable amountgoingonwhenyouactuallytaketimeandreadthiswholereport,thatshowsthatwe're sortofatacrossroad,andIfearthatwe'redescendnaganewnormalthatisdangerousforour democracyonanumberoflevels.andIfearunfortunatelyandIhopewehaveachanceto discussthis,thatyouhavenotonlyputyourowncredibilityintoquestion,butseemtobegiving sanctiontobehaviorthroughthelanguageyouusedinthatpressconferenceyouheld,the languageyouusedinyoursummarythatstimulatedMuellertowritesuchastrongrebuking letter,ifearthatyouareaddingnormalcytoapointwhereweshouldbesoundingalarms,as opposedtosayingthatthereisnothingtoseehere.andsoone,this448-pagereportthathasa deeplitanyofliesanddeceitandmisconduct,ofthePresidentoftheU nitedStatesinstructing
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 peopletoliearoundtobedeceitful,evidenceofpeopletryingtocoverupbehaviorthatonits faceismorallywrong,whateverthelegalstandardis,Ifoundit,numberone,to,bysayingthat thiskindofobstructiveconductwasacceptable,notonlyacceptablebutyoursentenceliterally sayingthattheAmericanpeopleshouldbegratefulforit,thatisthebeginningofnormalization thatIwanttoexplore.ButthesecondthingIwanttoexplore,we'llexplorethis,butIwantto makemytwostatementsatthetop.Onethatisproblematic.andgeneral,thesecondproblemI haveisyouseemtobeexcusingacampaignthatliterallyhadhundredsofcontactswithaforeign adversarythatIthinkthere'saconclusionamongstonabipartisanconclusion,thattherewasa failuretoevenreportthosecontacts,thatweengagedinbehaviorsthatfolksknewthatwere wrong,thattheytriedtoactivelyhide,theyseemtocapitalize,seemedtocapitalizeonthis foreigninterference,Imeaninourcountry,weknowitisillegalforacampaignandwrongfora campaigntosharepollingdatawithanAmericansuper-PAC,butwehaveheredocumenteda levelofcoordinationwithaforeignadversarysharingpollingdata.Andwe'reseemingtobe,and yourconductseemstobetryingtonormalizethatbehaviorandthat'swhyIthinkwe'reinsucha seriousmomentthatiserodingtheculturesofthisdemocracy,andthesecurityofthis democracy,solet'sjustgetintosomeofthisspecifically.Yousaid,quote,weknowthatthe RussianoperativeswhoperpetratedtheseschemesdidnothavethecooperationofPresident TrumportheTrumpcampaign.ThatissomethingthatallAmericanscanandshouldbegrateful tohaveconfirmed.ThethingsIjustmentioned,awillingnesstomeetwithRussianoperativesin ordertocapitalizeoninformation,Idon'tthinkthatissomethingthatshouldbegrateful.Ifind yourchoiceofwordsalarming.Ithinkitcallsintoquestionyourobjectivity.Whenyoulookat theactualcontextofthereport.AndsoshouldtheAmericanpeoplereallybegratefulthata candidateforPresidentsoughttobenefitfrommaterialandinformationthatwasstolenbya foreignpowerinanefforttoinfluenceanelection?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:well, I’m notsurewhatyoumeanbyseekto benefit. There’s noindicationthattheyengagedineithertheconspiracytoact,orthatthey engagedinanyactionwithrespecttothedisseminationthatwascriminal.
SEN.BOOKER:well,again,sir,you'reusingthewordconspiracywhichisalegalterm,andat thepressconference,youusedPresidentTrump'swordobstruction,overandoveragain- -
AGBARR:whatisalegalterm- -
SEN.BOOKER:youpulledintohiswords.And I’m askingyouspecifically, I’m sorry,collusion wasthewordIwaslookingfor.Youusedthewordnocollusionoverandoveragain.Andyou saidtheAmericanpeopleshouldbegratefulthatthePresidentsoughttobenefitfrommaterial andinformation.Butyouknowthathedidseektobenefitfromthatmaterial.DonaldTrumpJr.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 inhisownemailseemedtocelebratethathemighthaveaccesstoinformationfromaforeign adversary.Isthatcorrect?IsthatsomethingtheAmericanpeopleshouldbegratefulfor?
AGBARR:apparentlyaccordingtothereporthewas,yes,apparently,hewasinterestedin seeingwhatthisRussianwomanhadinthewayofquote- -
SEN.BOOKER:anddidnotreportitasIthinkeverythingwhoisinpoliticsknowsitis somethingyoushoulddo.ShouldtheAmericanpeoplebegratefulinthefaceofanattackofour democracybya foreignadversarythatthePresidentoftheU nitedStatesmadeseveral documentedattemptstothwartaninvestigationintothelinksofhiscampaignandRussia?And youusedthatwordgratefulagain.ThattheAmericanpeopleshouldbegrateful.Isthat somethingshouldbegratefulfor?
AGBARR: I’m notsurewhatyou'retalkingabout.
SEN.BOOKER:sir, I’m talkingabouttheattemptsthisPresidentmade,thatMuellerpointedto atleasttenattemptstothwartaninvestigationintothelinksbetweenhiscampaignandRussia. Begratefulforthosetenwell-documentedattemptsbyMueller?
AGBARR:youaretalkingabouttheobstructionpartofthereport?
SEN.BOOKER: I’m talkingaboutthesecondvolume.Letmecontinue,shouldtheAmerican peoplebegratefulthatTrumphadmorethan215documentedcontactsbetweenRussian-linked operativesandthenliedaboutthemandtriedtohidethem.IsthatsomethingtheAmerican peopleshouldbegratefulfor?AnyPresident.Thisoneoranydowntheroad?
AGBARR:asImentionedearlier,duringacampaign,foreigngovernmentsmake,andforeign citizens,frequentlymakealotofattemptstocontactdifferentcampaigns.Ifwewererightnow, togoandlookatforexample,Hillary Clinton’s campaignduringthesametimeframe- -
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.BOOKER:sir,Idid.
AGBARR:youwouldseealotofforeigngovernmentsliketheChinesetryingtoestablish- -
SEN.BOOKER:andthat'sIguesswhat I’m tryingtosaytoyou,werightnowhaveanewnorm untilourcountry.Wehaveadocumentthatshowsover200attempts,connectionsbetweena Presidentialcampaignandaforeignadversary,sharinginformationthatwouldbeillegalifyou diditwithasuper-PAC,weknowthat- -
AGBARR:whatinformationwasshared?
SEN.BOOKER:pollingdatawassharedhere.Itisinthereport.Icanciteyouthepage.
AGBARR:withwho?
SEN.BOOKER:andIguessmypointisyourwillingnesstoseemtobrushoverthisandusing wordsliketheAmericanpeopleshouldbegratefulwithwhatisinthereport,nobodyshouldbe grateful,misleading,inappropriateactionafterinappropriateactionthatisclear,andthenontop ofthat,atatimeweallrecognizethatwehadaforeignpowertryingtoundermineourelection, youthechieflawenforcementofficer,notonlyunderminesyourowncredibilityasan independentactor,whenthere'songoinginvestigationsstill,usingtheword,thePresident'sown words,havingbeencriticizedbyMuellerhimself,butthechallengewenowhaveisthatweare goingintoanareawhereyoucan’t evenbewillingtobeintheleastbitcriticalinyour summarizations.Ibelieveitcallsintoquestionyourcredibilityandagain,mytimeisup.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.MarshaBlackburn Questioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+14%3A05%3A35&market=m1&StationID=1115
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.MARSHABLACKBU RN:thankyou,Mr.Chairman.Andthank you,GeneralBarr,for beingheretoday.Wereallyappreciateyourtime.Iwanttotalkwithyoujustalittlebitabout someofyourbottomlineconclusionsbecauseIthinkthere'sonethatweneedtokindofcircle backto.Alittlebit.andas I’ve listenedtoalotoftheconversationheretoday,oneofthethings we'venotdiscussediswhatseemstobethecultureatDOJandtheFBI,andIknowtherearea lotofgoodpeoplethatworkthere,andwe'regratefulfortheirservice,buteveryorganizationhas aculture,andwhetherit'sacorporateculture,orachurch,oraschool,orwhatever,andwhat seemstohavehappened,attheFBI,isthereisaseedycynicalpoliticalculturewithinagroup thatdeveloped.Andtheseindividualscollectivelyseemtothinkthattheycouldworkwithinthe poweroftheirjoshes,andtheirroles,withthefederalgovernment,therewasanelitismandan arrogancethere,anditspeakstoaveryunhealthyworkculturewithinthatagency.AndIwilltell youthis.WhenItalktoTennesseans,theytalkalotaboutwhattheywanttoseewiththe DepartmentofJusticeandtheFBIpostallofthis.Andrestorationoftrustintheintegrity.And accountability.AndreallyinTennessee,theywilltalktomeaboutfourthings.Theytalkalot abouthealthcare,jobsintheeconomy,theyaregoingtotalkaboutgettingfederaljudges confirmed,andaboutreigningingovernmentandholdingitaccountable.Andtherehasbeena lotofhysteria.ThisissomethingthatgrewwithintheranksoftheFBI.Whatareyoudoing,and whatisyourplanforrebuildingthattrustandintegritysothattheAmericanpeoplecansay, whentheFBIdoesitsjob,whentheDOJdoesitsjob,weknowthatisajobdoneright?
AGBARR:Idon'tthinkthereisabadcultureintheFBI,andidon'tthinktheproblemsthat manifestedthemselvesduringthe2016electionareendemictotheinstitution.ithinktheFBIis doingitsjob.ImeanjustthisrecentcaseoutinCalifornia,wheretheyinterdictedthiswould-be bomber,theydogreatworkandthecountryeveryday,andIagreewithSenatorKennedywho said,youknow,it'sthepremierelawenforcementinstitutionintheworld.Ibelievethat,andI saytotheextenttherewasoverreach,Idon'twanttojudgepeople'smotivesandcometoa conclusiononthat,buttotheextenttherewasoverreach,whatwehavetobeconcernedaboutis, youknow,afewpeopleattop,gettingitintotheirheadsthattheyknowbetterthantheAmerican people.
SEN.BLACKBURN:andthatistheproblem.Andthatiswhatwehopethatyouareaddressing. let'sgobackto,thisbecausetorepeat,tothereport,toproduceit,IthinkthatMr.Mueller assembledwhatwouldbecalledadreamteam,19all-starlawyers,aWatergateprosecutor,a deputysolicitorgeneral,afluentRussianspeaker,whoclerkedfortwosupremecourtjustices, formerheadoftheEnroninvestigativetaskforce,chiefofthepubliccorruptionunitinthe ManhattanU Sattorney'soffice,federalprosecutorswhohavetakendownmobbosses,the mafia,andISISterrorists.Doyouconsidertheselawyerstobethebestandthebrightestinthe field?
AGBARR:notnecessarily.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.BLACKBURN:aretheythewarriorsyouwouldwantonyoursideinthecourtroom?
AGBARR:Imean,youknow,therearealotofgreatlawyersintheDepartmentofJustice.He assembledaverycompetentteam.
SEN.BLACKBU RN: are theymeticulousinvestigators? Whowillhuntdowneverywitnessand everypieceofevidence?
AGBARR:Ithinktheyaretenaciousinvestigators.
SEN.BLACKBURN:aretheydevotedtofindingthetruth?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.BLACKBU RN: are they mastersattakingdownhardenedcriminals,foreignand domestic?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.BLACKBURN:iftherewereevidencetowarnarecommendationforcollusioncharges againstthePresident,doyoubelievetheSpecialCounselteamwouldhavefoundit?
AGBARR:yes.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.BLACKBU RN:andifthere wereevidencetowarrantyourrecommendationfor obstructionofjusticechargesagainstthePresident,doubletheMuellerteam,doyoubelievethe Muellerteamwouldhavefoundit?
AGBARR:Ithinktheyhadanexhausted,theycanvassedtheevidenceexhaustively,theydidn't reachadecisiononit,butthequestionjustbeenasking,raisesapointIwantedtosaywhen SenatorHironowastalkingishowdidwegettothepointherewheretheevidenceisnowthat thePresidentwasfalselyaccusedofcolludingwiththeRussians,andaccusedofbeingtreasonist, andaccusedofbeingaRussianagent,andtheevidencenowthatwaswithoutabasis,andtwo yearsofhisadministrationhavebeendominatedbytheallegationsthathavenowbeenproven false,andyouknow,tolistentosomeoftherhetoric,youwouldthinkthattheMuellerreport hadfoundtheopposite.
SEN.BLACKBU RN:andyouknow,Mr.AttorneyGeneral,Iwilltellyouthatiswhat Tennesseanssay,theysayhowdidwegethere?Howistherethisallowance,andacceptedness ofsayingthat'sokay?Becauseit'snot.Andpeoplewanttoseegovernmentheldaccountable. Theywantagenciestoactwithaccountability.TotheAmericanpeople.Andtheydon'twantto everseethishappenagain.Itdoesn'tmatterifacandidateisaDemocrat,aRepublican,oran independent.Theyneverwanttoseethishappenagain.Becausetheyknowthatthiswaspointed atusingthepowerthattheyhadtotrytotiltanelection,ortoachieveadifferentoutcome,and theAmericanpeoplewantequaljustice,theywantrespectfortheruleoflaw,andtheywant fairnessfromthesystem.ihaveoneotherquestion,dealingwithsocialmedia.Tennessee RepublicanPartyhadatenunderscoredGOPaccountsetupbytheRussians.Ithinkaswelook atsocialmedia,eithertheywerewillingtoturnablindeyeandallowtheseaccountstogoup, becausetheyknewtheywerebeingpaidinrubles,oftheseaccounts,and/ortherewasjust negligence.Somyhopeisthatwithallofthebadactorstate,whetheritisRussiaorIranor NorthKorea,orChina,thatyouallhaveagameplanfordealingwiththeseplatformsinaway thatyou'rewillingtoreintheminforthe2020election.Iyieldback.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.TomTillisQuestioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+14%3A21%3A00&market=m1&StationID=1115
SENTOMTILLIS:thankyou,Mr.Chairman.GeneralBarr,thankyouforbeinghere.inthelast sentenceonpageoneofyourfour-pagememo,itstatesthattheSpecialCounselissuedmore than2800subpoena,executednearly500searchwarrants,obtainedmorethan230ordersfor communicationrecords,issuedalmost50ordersauthorizingtheuseofpenregisters,made13
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 requestsofforeignghostsforevidence,andinterviewedapproximately500people.Thatseems likeaprettyextensiveinvestigationtome.Ittookabout22months,right?
AGBARR:right.
SEN.TILLIS:anditwassummarizedinalittleover400-pagedocument,volumetwowasjust undertwo200pages,asIrecall,Ihavereadvolumetwowordforwordand I’ve readmostof volumeone.thenewnormalthatseemstobecreatedhereevenafterallofthisinvestigationand youhaven'tfoundanyconductworthyofindictment,thatyoucanjustbouncebackforpolitical reasonsandindictmentsomebody. That’s arhetoricalstatement,orquestion,notastatement. now,IwanttogobacktotheotherpartthatIfindinterestinghere,theNewYorkTimesalready issuedaheadlinethatsaysMuellerpushedinletterforBarrtoreleasethereport'ssummary.So nowthenarrative,because I’ve hadalotofpeopleinthepresscomingoutandthenarrativeis, welldoesn'tthisunderminetheAttorneyGeneralbecauseMuellerwantedtheexecutive summariesissued?Now,Iwanttogobacktowhatyousaidinyouropeningstatement.yousaid that,Ibelieve,usingyourwords,thebodypoliticwas,itwasunrestful,youhadgottenthereport, youdidn'tgetthe6einformation,youhadtodotheredacting,youintoitwouldtaketime,it wouldhavebeenhelpfulifyouhadgottenthatwhenthereportwastransmittedtoyouandit tookhoweverlongittook.Issuedthesummary,youusedtheanalogyofannouncingtheverdict, andwaitingforthetranscript.Didyoueveratanypointsay,youknowwhatIreallywanttodo isissuethisletterandletthenewsmediaplaywithitforthreeorfourweeksandthenwe'llget theredactedversionout?Didthatevercrossyourmind?
AGBARR:no,wewerepushingto- -
SENTILLIS:togetthereportoutassoonaspossible.
AGBARR:assoonaspossible.
SEN.TILLIS:atanypointintimewhenthePresidenthadtheopportunitytoissuetheirown adviceonredactionsorassertexecutiveprivilege,overthecourseoftheweeksthatyouwere doingthereviewofthereport,didyouevergetadvicefromthePresident,orfromanybodyin theWhiteHouse,toassertexecutiveprivilege,ortoredactanyportionofthedocument?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:no.
SEN.TILLIS:none.Andsothenarrativebetweentheletterandtheredactionprocesswas,we're goingtogetareportthat's80%redacted.Now,wouldyougivemethenumbersagain,onthe versionthat'savailabletotheleadershipofCongress,thenumbersagain?Ithinkyousaidone - tenthof1%.We’reskippingovervolumeon eandwe'respendingtimeonvolumetwo.DidI hearyousaythatthelegislativeleadershaveaccesstoallbutone-tenthof1%oftheentire report?
AGBARR:approximately,yes.
SEN.TILLIS:soguys,youcangooutandspinthisanywayyouwanttobutthedataisthere. Therewasnounderlyingcrime.AndtherewasinsufficientevidencetoindictthePresidenton obstructionofjustice.Yousaidsomethingelsethat'sinterestingtomeinthereportaboutthatwe foundnoevidencethatwassufficienttoindict.Butthentheywentontosaynorcanwe exoneratehim.WhenistheSpecialCounselinthebusinessofexoneratingasubjectinan investigation?
AGBARR:they'renot.
SEN.TILLIS:whywouldsomebodyputthatsomethinglikethatinthereport?
AGBARR:Idon'tknow.
SEN.TILLIS:itwouldfollowthatthat'suncommon,andyouwouldhavenothaveputthatinthe contextofthereportyouproduced.Isthatastatement?
AGBARR:that'safairstatementbutididputinasenseaboutnotexoneration.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.TILLIS:Ithinkthethingthatfrustratesme,numberoneIshouldhavestartedbysaying thisthevastmajorityofpeopleintheJusticeDepartmentandtheFBIareextraordinarypeople. Thechairiswith,startingwithStrzokandPageandeverybodyelseleadinguptothe investigation,Ihopethey'rebeinginvestigated.Ihaveaquestionforyou.ThescopeoftheOIG, wheredoes,doyouunderstandordoyouknowwhatthescopeofthatreportwillbe?Willitbe purelyonthisinvestigation?Orwoulditextendalsotootheractsitmayhaveinsomeway influencedthisinvestigation?
AGBARR:wellIdon'twanttobetoospecific.ItalkedtoMikeHorowitzafewweeksago aboutitanditisfocusedontheFISAandthebasisoftheFISAandthehandlingoftheFISA applications,butbynecessityitlooksbackalittlebitearlierthanthat.ThepeopleIhavehelping mewithmyreviewwillbeworkingverycloselywithMr.Horowitz.
SEN.TILLIS:now,Iwanttogobackagain,becausewehaveotherpeopletalking, I’m sureitis goingtocomeupagain,Iamclearinthisreporttherewasnounderlyingcrime.Isthatcorrect?
AGBARR:yes.Ithinkthat'stheconclusionofthereport.
SEN.TILLIS:anditwasinsufficientevidence,orinsufficientevidencetoassertthatthe Presidentobstructedjustice.Andalotofthatevidencewasinthepubliceyebecausewetalked abouttweetsandpublicstatementsandanumberofotherthingsthatweretryingtousetoassert asevidenceforobstructionofjustice.itseemsoddtomethatpeopleonthiscommitteethat poundandpoundoverandoveragainthatyou'reinnocentuntilprovenguilty,withtheextentof thisreport,withthenumberofresource,nearly$30million,whenthefactsdon'tleadtothe outcomethatyouwant,theonethatthemarketingdepartmentwantedtousethisasapolitical toolforthenext20months,itseemsoddtomethatwegodownthepathofsayingthat,well,in spiteofallofthework,we'regoingtoindicthimanyway,andifwecan'tindicthim,thenwe're goingtoimpugnyourintegrityandcallyoualiar.Ifindthatbehavioronthiscommittee despicable.Thankyou.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.MikeCrapQuestioning o
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+14%3A35%3A04&market=m1&StationID=1115
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.MIKECRAPO:thankyou.AttorneyGeneralBarr,Iknowyou'vegonethroughalmost everythingthatcouldhavebeenaskedsofartodayandIwillgooverafewthingsthatyouhave alreadytalkedaboutbutIappreciateyourwillingnesstogetintoitwithme.firstIwanttotalk abouttheletterofmarch27thathasbeentalkedalotaboutfromMr.Mueller,first,canyoutell me,whoreleasedthatlettertothepublic?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:whoreleasedittowhom?
SEN.CRAPO:yes.Howdiditgetreleased?Wasthatadecisionyoumadetoreleasethatletter?
AGBARR:Ithinkthedepartmentprovideditthismorning.
SEN.CRAPO:excuseme,ImeantotheWashingtonPosthowdidtheWashingtonPostgetthe letter?
AGBARR:Idon'tknow.
SEN.CRAPO:that'swhatIthought.Solet'stalkabouttheletterforamoment.Youindicated that- -
AGBARR:IassumetheWashingtonPostgotitfromtheDepartmentofJustice.
SEN.CRAPO:well,Ithinkweneededthatout.Butwecangetintothatlater.Ifyou'renot aware,thenlet'smoveontootheraspectsoftheissue.youindicatedthat,youdidnotfeelyou neededtoreleaseasmuchasMr.Muellerthoughtyouneededtoreleaseattheoutset,yougavea sumrifftheconclusions,andheapparentlywantedtoseea,thesummariesofeachsessionthat hehadputtogetherreleased,correct?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:yes.
SEN.CRAPO:couldyougooveragainthereasonwhyyourespondedtohimwhenheasked youtoreleaseportionsofthereport,beforeyoureleasedit,initsentirety?
AGBARR:yes.thiswasontheconversationonThursday,thedayIgothisletter,andIsaidthat Ididn'twanttoputout,itwasalreadyseveraldaysafterwehadreceivedthereport,andIhadput outthefour-pageletteronSunday,andIsaidIdon'twanttoputoutsummariesofthereport. Thatwouldtriggerallkindsoffrenzyaboutwhatwassaidinthesummaries,andthenwhen moreinformationcomesout,itwouldrecalibrateto,thatandIsaidIjustwanttoputitoutone time,everythingtogether.AndItoldhimthatwasthegameplan.AndIjustthinkitisimportant - -
SEN.CRAPO:allright.Topointthatoutagain.Becausetherehasbeenalotofspinaboutthe letterandwhatitwasthatwasbeingrequestedandwhatyourresponsetothatwas.
AGBARR:right.
SEN.CRAPO:Ithinkitwasimportanttohelpthatgetoutagainandgetclarified.ThereasonI askwhoreleasedtheletterisbecausetherehavebeenalotofreleasesofdocumentsfromthe FBIthatwerebasicallyleaks,andIwasjustcuriousastowhetherthatletterwasaleak. I’m not askingyouto--
AGBARR:Ithinkwhathappened, I’ll havemypeoplejumpmeif I’m wrongonthis,butIthink thefact,ImeantheinformationaboutMueller'swereleakedandIthinksomenews organizationswerestartingtoaskaboutthat.
SEN.CRAPO:andsothentheletter- -
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:andinthatcontext,Ithinktheletterwasprovided.Isthataccurate?
SEN.CRAPO:sotherewereleaksatleastabouttheconcerns,andtheconversationsthatyou hadhad?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.CRAPO:thatgetsbacktothebroaderquestionofleaksthatIwanttogetintonowandyou havehadanumberofpeople,Senatorshaveaskedyouabout,theperceivedbiasoftheFBI,and Iheardyourresponsesearlier,thatyoubelievethecultureattheFBIisstrongandsolid.AndI agreewiththat.idobelieve,however,thatit'sbeenprettyclearlyshowninanumberofdifferent waysthattherearesomeindividualsattheFBI,athighlevels,who,inthepastfewyears,have notbeenholdingupthestandardsoftheFBIthattheAmericanpeopleexpectofthem. I’m sure you'refamiliarwiththereportoftheDOJ'sinspectorgeneral,MichaelHorowitz,wherehe lookedatbiasintheFBI.Andinfact,hefoundit.Andheindicatedinahearinginthisroom, beforeus,thathedidinfact,findit.TherewasbiasattheFBI.buthesaidthathewasn'tableto provethatthebiasaffectedtheemployees'workproduct,because,inquestionsthatIaskedhim, hesaidifoundthattherewasclearlybias,butinordertoprovewhetherthataffectedthework outputofthosewhowerebiased,Ihadtoaskthemwhetheritimpactedit,andtheyofcourse saidno,andididn'thaveotherevidencetoproveotherwise.Thisgetsbacktoaconversationyou hadearlieraboutwhethertheFBI'sbusiness,orwhetherhisbusinesswastoproveanegative,or whetheritwastofindsomeactionableconduct.Myreasoningoingthroughthiswithyouisthat iwanttogetatwhatwecando,well,firstofall,whetheryouagreethatthereisaproblemof biasintheFBI,insomeparts,orinsomeindividualsattheFBI,andwhetheryouare undertakingactivitiestoaddressthat.
AGBARR:well,youknow,I,youmeanpoliticalbias?
SEN.CRAPO:yes.Whetherthereispoliticalbias,whichisresultinginbiasedconductbyFBI agents- -
AGBARR:Ihaven'tseenthatsince I’ve beenthere.IthinkthatChrisWray,thenewdirector, haschangedoutthepeoplewhoweretherebefore,andbroughtin,notbroughtinfromoutside, butpromoted,anddevelopednewleadershipteamthatIthinkisdoingagreatjob,andIthink
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 he'sfocusedonensuringthatthebureauisn'tbiasedandthatanyoftheproblemsfrombeforeare addressed.
SEN.CRAPO:doyoubelieveitisinappropriateconductforanFBIemployeetoleakpolitically sensitiveinformationtothepublicforpurposesofimpactingpolitical- -
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.CRAPO:--discussion.
AGBARR:yes.AndIthinksomeleaks,someleaksaremaybeforpoliticalpurposes,ithink probablymoreleaksarebecausepeoplehandlingacasedon'tlikewhattheirsuperiorsor supervisorsaredoing,andtheyleakitinordertocontrolpeopleupthechain.
SEN.CRAPO:andIunderstandyouhavetypeofconductunderway.Someinvestigationsinto that
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.CRAPO:justanothercoupleofquickquestions.whendidtheDOJandtheFBI,ifyou know,whendidtheDOJandtheFBIknowthatthedemocraticpartypaidforChristopher Steele’s dossier,whichthenservedasthefoundationforthecarterpageFISAapplication?
AGBARR:idon'tknowtheanswertothat.
SEN.CRAPO:areyoutodeterminethat?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:yes.
SEN.CRAPO:andthenlastly,didtheDepartmentofJustice,theFBI,andotherfederalagencies engageininvestigativeactivitiesbeforeanofficialinvestigationwaslaunchedinJuly,2016?
AGBARR:Idon'tknowtheanswertothat,butthat'soneofthe- -
SEN.CRAPO:you'realsoinvestigatingthat?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.CRAPO:allright,thankyouverymuch,AttorneyGeneral.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.TedCruzQuestioning
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+14%3A42%3A35&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.TEDCRU Z:thank youMr.Chairman.General Barr,thank youforyourtestimony.Andlet mestartbyjustsayingthankyou. You’ve hadanextraordinarilysuccessfullegalcareer,you didn'thavetotakethisjob.andyousteppedforwardandansweredthecallyetagain,knowing fullwellthatyouwouldbesubjecttothekindofslanderoustreatment,theKavanaghtreatment thatwehaveseen,ofSenatorsimpugningyourintegrity,andIforoneamgratefulthatyou answeredthatcall,andareleadingtheDepartmentofJustice,bothwithintegrityandfidelityto thelaw,thatiswhatthenationrightlyexpectsofourAttorneyGeneral,andIbelieveyouare performingthatveryably.Ithinkthishearingtodayhasbeenquiterevealingtoanyonewatching it.AlthoughperhapsnotforthereasonssomeofthedemocraticSenatorsintended.Onething that'srevealedininthediscussionandquestionsthatcameup,awordthatoccurredalmostnone atallisthewordRussia.FortwoandahalfyearswehearddemocraticSenatorsgoingonandon andonaboutRussiacollusion,weheardjournalists,goingonandonandonaboutRussia collusion.Allegingamongotherthings,someusingextremerhetoric,callingthePresidenta traitor,weheardverylittleofthatinthishearingtoday.Instead,theprincipalattackthatthe
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 democraticSenatorshavemarshalleduponyou,concernsthismarch27thletterfromRobert Mueller,andit'sanattackthatIwantpeopletounderstandjusthowrevealingitis.Ifthisistheir wholeargument,they ain’t gotnothing.Sotheirargumentisasfollows.LetmeseeifI understanditcorrectly.Youinitially,whenyoureceivedtheMuellerreport,releasedtocongress andthepublicafour-pagesummaryoftheconclusions.Then,onMarch27,Mr.Muellerasked youtoreleaseanadditional19pages.Theintroductionandsummarythathehaddrafted.And indeed,intheletter,whathesaysis,quote,Iamrequestingthatyouprovidethesematerialsto congress,andauthorizetheirpublicreleaseatthistime.Andthereasonhesaysisthatitisto fullycapturethecontext,natureandsubstanceoftheoffice'sworkandconclusion.Soyoudid notreleasethose19pagesatthattime.Instead,acoupleofweekslater,youreleased448pages, theentirereport,whichincludesthose19pages,doIhavethattimelinecorrect?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:that'sright.
SEN.CRU Z: so theirentireargumentis,generalBarr,yousuppressedthe19pagesthat are entirelypublic,thatwehave,thatwecanread,thattheyknoweverywordofit,andtheir complaintisitwasdelayedafewweeks.Andthatwasbecauseofyourdecisionnottorelease thereportpiecemealbutrathertoreleasethose19pages,alongwiththeentire448pages producedbytheSpecialCounsel.
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.CRU Z:ifthatistheirargument, Ihave tosaythatisanexceptionallyweakargument. becauseifyou'rehidingsomething, I’ll tellyourightnow,generalBarr,you'redoingavery lousyjobofhiding,itbecausethethingtheyaresuggestingyouhid,youreleasedtocongress andtheAmericanpeople,andsoifanyonewantstoknowwhatisinthose19pagesthatare beingsobreathlessly,BobMuellersaidreleasethe19pages,youdid,youdiditacoupleof weekslater,butwecanreadeverywordofthe19page,alongwiththefullreport.Inyour judgment,wastheMuellerreportthorough?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.CRUZ:didtheyexpandenormoustime,energy,andresources,investigatingand producingthatreport?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:yes.
SEN.CRUZ:andtheMuellerreportconcludedflatout,onthequestionofRussiancollusion,the evidencedoesnotsupportcriminalcharges.
AGBARR:that's- -
[MISSINGTRANSCRIPT]
SEN.CRUZ:andahalfyearshavemagicallydisappeared,insteadthecomplaintisthe19pages thatwecanallreadthatisentirelypubliccouldhavebeenreleasedafewweeksearlier,oh,the calamity.Letmeshifttoadifferenttopic,atopicthathasbeenaddressedalreadyquiteabit.I believetheDepartmentofJustice,undertheObamaadministration,wasprofoundlypoliticized. AndwasweaponizedtogoafterpoliticalopponentsofthePresident.Ifthatisthecase,would youagreethatpoliticizingtheDepartmentofJusticeandweaponizingittogoafteryourpolitical opponentsisanabuseofpower?
AGBARR:Ithinkitisanabuseofpowerregardlessofwhodoesit.
SEN.CRU Z:of course.
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.CRU Z: to thebestofyourknowledge,whendidsurveillanceofthe Trumpcampaign begin?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:thepositiontodayappearstobeitbeganinJuly,butIdonotknowtheanswertothe question.
SEN.CRU Z:itis an unusualthing,isitnot,fortheDepartmentofJustice tobeinvestigatinga candidateforPresident,particularlyacandidatefromtheopposingpartyofthepartyinpower?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.CRUZ:doweknowiftheObamaadministrationinvestigatedanyothercandidatesrunning forPresident?
AGBARR:Idon'tknow.
SEN.CRU Z:do we knowiftheywiretapped --
AGBARR:well,IguesstheywereinvestigatingHillaryClintonfortheemail,theemail- -
SEN.CRUZ:doweknowiftherewerewiretaps?
AGBARR:Idon'tknow.
SEN.CRUZ:doweknowiftherewereeffortstosendinvestigatorsinwearingawire?
AGBARR:Idon'tknow.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.CRUZ:sogeneralBarr,Iwouldurge,youhavehadremarkabletransparency,you promisedthiscommitteeyouwouldwithregardtotheMuellerreport,youpromisedthis committeesandtheAmericanpeopleyouwouldreleasetheMuellerreportpublicly,youhave releasedit,anyonecanread,itit'srightthere.Iappreciatethattransparency.Iwouldaskyouto bringthatsametransparencytothislineofquestioningaboutwhetherandtheextenttowhichthe previousadministrationpoliticizedtheDepartmentofJustice,targetedtheirpoliticalrivalsand usedlawenforcementandintelligenceassetssurveilthem
SEN.LINDSEYGRAHAM:thankyou.Sothat'stheendofthefirstround.Wehavevotes,I think,at3:00.WhatIwouldliketodoisjust--canyougoforafewmoreminuteshere? You’re okay?
AGBARR:uh-huh.
SEN.GRAHAM:you'reallright?
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.GRAHAM:good.SenatorLeahy,you'renext. We’ll dothree-minutesecondrounds.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen. PatrickLeahy Questioning(Round2)
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+14%3A50%3A37&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.PATRICKLEAHY:SenatorFeinsteinnotedshefelttheFBIwouldbederelictindutyifit didnotinvestigateafterhearingfromAustralia.NottheTrumpadministration,butAustralia. TheTrumpcampaignknewaboutthedemocratice-mailsbeforethevictimsdo.andtheywere toldtheRussianscouldassistinacampaignwiththestolene-mails.TheFBIwasrighttolook intoit.Thatresulted,ofcourse,in37indictments.Letmeaskyou,Mr.Barr.Inyourletter,you claimthatthelackofevidenceoftheunderlyingcrimebearsonwhetherthePresidenthadthe
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 requisiteintenttocommitobstructionofjustice.Well,therearenumerousreasons.One, somebodymightinterferewithinvestigations.Mostcritically,aninterferencemaypreventthe discoveryofanunderlyingcrime.Sointerfering,youmightnotknowifthereisacrime.Butthe SpecialCounseldiduncoverevidenceofunderlyingcrimeshere,includingonethatdirectly implicatedthePresident.didn'twelearn,duetotheSpecialCounsel'sinvestigation,thatDonald TrumpisknownasindividualoneintheSouthernDistrictofNewYork,directinghush paymentsaspartofacriminalschemetoviolatecampaignfinancelaws?Thatmatterwas discoveredbytheSpecialCounsel,referredtotheSouthernDistrictofNewYork,isthatcorrect?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:yes.
SEN.LEAHY:thankyou.AndwehavetheMuellerreportreferencingadozenongoing investigationsstemmingfromtheSpecialCounsel'sinvestigation.Willyoucommitthatyouwill notinterferewiththoseinvestigations?
AGBARR:canyousay- -
SEN.LEAHY:willyoucommitthatyouwillnotinterferewiththedozenongoing investigations?
AGBARR:IwillsupervisethoseinvestigationsasAttorneyGeneral.
SEN.LEAHY:willyouletthemreachnaturalconclusionswithoutinterferencefromthewhite house?Letmeputitthatway.
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.LEAHY:thankyou.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:asIsaidwhenIwasupforconfirmation,partofmyresponsibilityistomakesure thereisnopoliticalinterferenceincases.
SEN.LEAHY:well,andyouidentifiedanumberofthings.Andthat'swhy I’m doublechecking. IntheappropriationscommitteeIaskedyouwhetherMr.Muellerexpressedanyexpectationor interestinleavingtheobstructiondecisiontocongress.Andyoutestifiedhedidn'tsaythatto you.Actually,yousaidhedidn'tsaythattome.
AGBARR:right.
SEN.LEAHY:butthenhehasnumerousreferencesinhisreporttocongressplayingarolein decidingwhetherthePresidentcommittedobstructionofjustice.SoIknowyoutestifiedmany times,butthat- -
AGBARR:well- -
SEN.LEAHY:itwasnotcorrect.
AGBARR:that'snotcorrect--Ithinkitiscorrect.Idon't--hehasnotsaidthatheconducted theinvestigationinordertoturnitoverto congress.Thatwouldbeveryinappropriate. That’s not whattheJusticeDepartmentdoes.
SEN.LEAHY: heincludednumerousreferenceswiththereporttoplayingaroleindeciding whetherthePresidentcommittedobstructionofjustice.SoIknowyoutestifiedmanytimes,but that- -
AGBARR:well- -
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.LEAHY: itwasnotcorrect.
AGBARR:that'snotcorrect--Ithinkitiscorrect.Idon't--hehasnotsaidthatheconducted theinvestigationinordertoturnitoverto congress.Thatwouldbeveryinappropriate. That’s not whattheJusticeDepartmentdoes.
SEN.LEAHY:heincludednumerousreferenceswiththereporttocongressplayingaroleinit. Volume2,page8includescongressmayapplyobstructionlawswiththePresident'scorrupt exerciseofoffofficeinaccordancewithourconstitutionalsystemofjustice.
AGBARR:yeah,Idon'tthinkBobMuellerwassuggestingthatthenextstepherewasforhimto turnthisstuffoverfor--toCongresstoactupon. That’s notwhywe conductgrandjury investigations.
SEN.LEAHY:andPresidentTrump,amIcorrect,inmyearlystatements,neverallowed anybodytointerviewhimdirectlyunderoath,isthatcorrect?
AGBARR:Ithinkthat'scorrect.
SEN.LEAHY:eventhoughhesaidhewasreadytotestify.Thankyou.
AGBARR:well--couldI- -
SEN.LINDSEYGRAHAM:sure.
AGBARR:apointyouraisedabouttheabsenceofan--underlyingcrime.OnepointIwas tryingtomakeearlieris,theabsenceofanunderlyingcrimedoesn'tnecessarilymeanthatthere wouldbeothermotivesforobstruction.Althoughitgetsalittlebithardertoproveandmore
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 speculativeastowhatthosemotivesmightbe.butthepointiwastryingtomakeearlieristhatin thissituationofthePresidentwhohasconstitutionalauthoritytosuperviseproceedings,if,in fact,aproceedingwasnotwell-founded,ifitwasagroundlessproceeding,ifitwasbasedon falseallegations,thePresidentdoesnothavetositthereconstitutionallyandallowittorunits course.ThePresidentcouldterminatethatproceedinganditwouldnotbeacorruptintent, becausehewasbeingfalselyaccused.Andhewouldbeworriedabouttheimpactonhis administration. That’s important,becausemostoftheobstructionclaimsthatarebeingmade hereorepisodesdoinvolvetheexerciseofthePresident'sconstitutionalauthority.Andwenow knowthathewasbeingfalselyaccused.
SEN.LEAHY:idon'tagreewiththat.butthat'sokay.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.DickDurbinQuestioning (Round2)
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+14%3A56%3A18&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.DICKDU RBIN:generalMueller,Ihave two questions.Ifyoudon'tmind.TheMueller -- pardonme.GeneralBarr.Ihavetwoquestions.TheMuellerreportdescribesthereasonswhythe FBIopenedacounterintelligenceinvestigationinJuly2016intoRussianelectioninterference. Therehavebeenmanyreferencesastowhytheywoulddosuchathing.butthatdate,the democraticnationalcommitteeserverhadbeenhackedandRussiansdeemedresponsible.Some ofthestolene-mailshadbeenreleasedbyWikiLeaks.Aforeigngovernment,theAustralian government,hadtoldourFBIthatTrumpforeignpolicyaideGeorgePapadopoulossaidhehad beencontactedbyapersononRussia'sbehalfbyreleasinginformationdamagingtoHillary Clinton.ThatwasallintheMuellerreport.Doyoubelievethatitwasanappropriatepredicate foropeningacounterintelligenceinvestigationtodeterminewhetherRussiahadtargetedpeople intheTrumpcampaigntoofferhackedinformationthatmightimpactaPresidentialelection?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:Iwouldhavetoseeexactlywhatthereportwas fromdowner,theAustraliandowner,andexactlywhathequotedPapadopoulosassaying.but fromwhatyoujustread, I’m notsurewhatthecorrelationwasbetweentheRussianshavingdirt andjumpingtotheconclusionthatthatsuggestedforeknowledgeofthehacking.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.DURBIN:accordingtoMr.Muellerandhisreport,thisinvolvementofTrumpforeign policyaidesGeorgePapadopouloshadsomethingtodowiththeirconclusion. I’d liketoaskyou aseparateissue. It’s beenreportedthatonApril16th,youreceivedawaivertoparticipateinthe investigationandlitigationoftheso-called1mdbmatter.Thisisaninvestigationintoa Malaysiancompanyforallegedmoneylaundering.Accordingtonewsreportsaspartofthis investigation,U S attorney’sofficefortheEasternDistrictofN ew Yorkisinvestigatingwhether aMalaysiannationalillegallydonatedtotheTrumpinauguralcommitteewithmoney1MDB. Yousoughtawaivertoparticipateinthismatter,eventhoughyourformerlawfirm,Kirkland andEllis,representsanentityinvolvedintheinvestigation.NamelyGoldmanSachs.Howmany waivershaveyoureceivedtoallowyoutoparticipateinmattersorinvestigationsinvolving Trumpbusinesses,theTrumpcampaignortheTrumpinauguralcommittee?
AGBARR:none.
SEN.DURBIN:youdidseekawaiverinthiscase?
AGBARR:actually,theimpetus,asIrecall,andpeopleshouldjumpmeif I’m wrong.Butit didn'tcomefromme.Iwasaskedtoseekawaiverinthiscase.
SEN.DU RBIN:do youseetheproblemiftheissueiswhetherornotamoneylaundering operationinMalaysiaissendingmoneytotheTrumpinauguralcommittee.ThatasAttorney GeneraloftheUnitedStates,youmaynotwanttoinvolveyourselfinthis?
AGBARR:well,no,Idon't.Idon't.BecauseIwasnotinvolvedwiththeinaugural- -
SEN.DURBIN:whywouldyouseekawaiver,then,toparticipateinthis?
AGBARR:thewaiverwas--IguesstheconflictwasnotbecauseofanyrelationshipIhadtothe inauguralcommittee,whichIdidn't.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.DURBIN:no,it'stoGoldmanSachs.Yourformerclient.
AGBARR:no,it's--KirklandEllis,thelawfirm.
SEN.DU RBIN:right.Andtheirclient,GoldmanSachs.Ijustdon'tunderstandwhyyouwould touchthathotstove.
AGBARR:well--that'sagood- -
SEN.DURBIN:yousoughtthewaiver. That’s why I’m askingthequestion.
AGBARR:thecriminaldivisionactuallyaskedmetogetawaiverbecauseoftheimportanceof thisinvestigationoverall.Iwasrequestedbythecriminaldivision.ididn'tseekit--theimpetus didnotcomefromme.
SEN.DURBIN:andwhowouldthatbethatmadethatrecommendationtoyou?
AGBARR:Iamtolditwasthecriminaldivision.
SEN.DU RBIN:Mr.Bencowski?
AGBARR:right.Yeah.Hewastheheadofthecriminaldivision,butbefore--apparentlythey discusseditwiththecareerethicsofficial,andtheymadetherecommendation.
SEN.DU RBIN:thank you.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.LINDSEYGRAHAM:SenatorWhitehouse.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.SheldonWhitehouse Questioning(Round2)
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+15%3A00%3A24&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.SHELDONWHITEHOUSE:Mr.Chairman,Mr.Barr,acoupleoftimingquestions.You saidthatonMarch5th,Mr.Muellercametoyouandsaidthathewasgoingtonotmakea decisiononobstruction,leavethattoyou.
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:hedidn'tsayhewasleavingittome.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:thathe wasnotgoingtomakeanobstruction.
AGBARR:right.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:onMarch24th,yousentoutaletterdescribingyourdecision. SomewherebetweenMarch5thandMarch24th,youmadethatdecision.Whenwasthat?
AGBARR:westartedtalkingaboutitonMarch5th.Andtherehadalreadybeenalotof discussionspriortoMarch5thinvolvingthedeputy,theprincipleassociatedeputyandtheoffice oflegalcounselthathaddealingswiththeSpecialCounsel'soffice.Sotheyhadknowledgeofa numberoftheepisodesandsomeofthethinkingoftheSpecialCounsel'soffice.Sorightafter march5th,westarteddiscussingwhattheimplicationsofthiswere,andhowwewould- -
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:andyoumadethedecisionwhen?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:probablyonSunday,the24th.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:that'sthedaythelettercameout.
AGBARR:yes.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:youdidn'tmakethedecisionuntilthelettercameout?
AGBARR:no.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:you must havetoldsomebodyhow towritetheletter.Youcouldn't- - whendidyouactuallydecidethattherewasnoobstruction?
AGBARR:the24th.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:okay.Whendid yougetthefirstdraftoftheMuellerreport?
AGBARR:thefirst--itwasn'tadraft.Wegotthefinal.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:thefirstversionofitthatyou saw.
AGBARR:well,theonlyversionofitIsaw.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.WHITEHOU SE:okay,theonlyversion.
AGBARR:the22nd.
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:The22nd.YoutoldSenatorHarristhatyoumadeyourdecisiononthe obstructioncharge--youandRosenstein,basedontheMuellerreport.DoIcorrectlyinferyou madethatdecisionthenbetweenthe22ndandthe24th?
AGBARR:well,wehadhadalotofdiscussionsaboutitbeforethe2nd,butthefinaldecision wasmadeonthe24th.Wehad
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:untilthe22nd.
AGBARR:OLChaddonealotofthinkingabouttheseissuesevenbeforethe--wegotthe report.AndevenbeforeMarch5th.Theyhadbeeninregularcontact.TheDepartmenthadbeen inregularcontactwithMueller'speople,andunderstood,youknow- -
SEN.WHITEHOUSE:theOLCwaslookingintotheMuellerinvestigationwhileitwasgoing on,andwittingoftheevidencethattheyweregatheringonobstruction.Beforeyousawthe Mueller- -
AGBARR:myunderstanding--Iwasn'tthere.Okay?Butmyunderstandingisthatthedeputy andthe--whatwecalltheprincipleassociatedeputy,wereinregularcontactwiththeMueller's team.Andweregettingbriefingsonevidenceandsomeoftheirthinkingandsomeoftheissues.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:didtheyknowenough to know - -
AGBARR:OLCwasbroughtintosomeofthosediscussions.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.WHITEHOUSE:didtheyknowenoughtoknowitmightneedtoberedactedbeforeitthey sawthe3/22report?
AGBARR:no.theproblemwehad,wecouldnotidentifythe6ematerialwhenthereportcame over.WeneededthehelpofBobMueller's
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:youhave notyetsaiditwasmentionedatthisOLC- -
AGBARR:Idon'tthink--well,itwasnotatthebrownbaglunch,no.
SEN.WHITEHOU SE:mytimeisup.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.AmyKlobuchar Questioning(Round2)
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+15%3A05%3A09&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.AMYKLOBUCHAR:thankyou.Mr.AttorneyGeneral,onApril27th,PresidentTrump stated,Mueller,Iassume,for$35million,hecheckedmytaxesandhecheckedmyfinancials.Is thataccurate?DidtheSpecialCounselreviewthePresident'staxesandthePresidentTrump organization'sfinancialstatements?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:Idon'tknow.
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:canyoufindoutifIasklaterinawrittenquestion?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:I--yes.OryoucouldaskBobMuellerwhenhecomeshere.
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:okay.Well,I’lldothattoo.ButIthinkI’llalsoaskyou.Andthen obviouslywewouldwanttoseethemasunderlyinginformation.Duringmyearlierquestions, wewentthroughanumberofactionsbythePresidentthattheSpecialCounsellookedinto.My pointwasthatweshouldbelookingintothetotalityoftheevidenceandthepatternthatthe reportdevelops.Onpage13ofvolume2,theSpecialCounselinstructsthatwedosomething similar.Thereportsays,andthisisaquote,circumstantialevidencethatilluminatesintentmay includeapatternofpotentiallyobstructiveacts. OnthisthereportcitesthreeU Scases.Uv S Frankhowser,doyouagreethatobstructionlawallowsforintenttobeinformedbyaperpof potentiallyobstructiveacts?
AGBARR:well,intenteventuallyhastobeestablishedbyproofbeyondareasonabledoubt. Someinferencescanbedrawnfromcircumstantialevidencethatcancontributetoanoverall determinationofproofbeyonda reasonabledoubt.T hat’s one oftheproblemswiththiswhole approachthat'ssuggestedintheSpecialCounsel'sreport,whichis,itistryingtodeterminethe subjectiveintentofafaciallylawfulact,anditpermitsalotofselectivityonthepartofthe prosecutorsandit'sbeenshotdowninanumberofothercontexts.Sooneofthereasonsthatwe areveryskepticalofthisapproachisthatin- -
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:youmeanyouanddirectorMuelleroryou--theJusticeDepartment?
AGBARR:theJusticeDepartment.Isthat--inthiskindofsituationwhereyouhaveafacially innocentactand,youknow,it'sauthorizedbytheconstitution- -
SEN.KLOBU CHAR:okay.Ijust --
AGBARR:it'shardtoestablishbeyondareasonabledoubtthatit'scorrupt.
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:okay.IjustwanttogetinjustafewmorequestionslikeSenator Whitehousedid.Atyourconfirmationhearing,youtestifiedthatintheabsenceofaviolationof astatute,thePresidentwouldbeaccountablepoliticallyforabusingthepardonpower.Howdo
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 youreconcileyoursuggestionthatpoliticalaccountabilityisavailablewhentheadministrationis refusingtocomplywithsubpoenasandassertingexecutiveprivilegetostandinthewayofthat veryaccountability?
AGBARR:astoapardon?
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:no.thiswasaboutinyourconfirmationhearing,yousaid,"intheabsence ofaviolationofastatute,thePresidentwouldbe,quote,accountablepolitically,endquote,for abusingthepardonpowerifhedid."
AGBARR:butyourquestionreallyisabusingpotabusingnotjustthepardonpower,isthat whatyou'resaying?
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:it'shardtoevaluate.
AGBARR:Presidentshavebeenheldaccountablebeforeashaveotherofficeholders.
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:arethedetailsconsistentwithhisoathofofficeandtherequirementinthe constitutionthathetakecarethatthelawsbefaithfulexecuted?
AGBARR:iswhatconsistentwiththat?
SEN.KLOBUCHAR:Isaid,arethePresident'sactionsdetailedinthereportconsistentwithhis oathofofficeandtherequirementintheconstitutionthathetakecarethatthelawsbefaithfully executed?
AGBARR:well,theevidenceinthereportisconflictingandthere'sdifferentevidence.And theydon't--theydon'tcometoadeterminationastohowthey'recomingdownonit.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.KLOBUCHAR:soyoumadethatdecision.
AGBARR:yes.Andasyouknow- -
SEN.LINDSEYGRAHAM:allrigh t.We’vegot --
SEN.KLOBU CHAR:okay.
SEN.GRAHAM:twominutesleft.SenatorBlumenthal.
– AGBarrSenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearing(CSPAN3) Sen.RichardBlumenthal Questioning(Round2)
http://mms.tveyes.com/transcript.asp?PlayClip=FALSE&DTSearch=TRUE&DateTime=05%2F 01%2F2019+15%3A09%3A50&market=m1&StationID=1115
SEN.RICHARDBLU MENTHAL:thank you,Mr.Chairman.AttorneyGeneralBarr,Iwonder ifyoucouldtellusabouttheconversationbetweenyourselfandBobMuellershortlyafteryour summarywasissued.Hecalledyou?
ATTORNEYGENERALWILLIAMBARR:no,Icalledhim.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:whatpromptedyoutocallhim?
AGBARR:theletter.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.BLU MENTHAL:yourletter.Orhisletter?
AGBARR:hisletter.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:hisletter.Soyoucalledhim.
AGBARR:yeah.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:andhowlongdidtheconversationlast?
AGBARR:Idon'tknow.Maybe10,15minutes.Thereweremultiplewitnessesintheroom.It wasonaspeakerphone.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:whowasintheroom?
AGBARR:amongothers,theDeputyAttorneyGeneralwasintheroom.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:anyoneelse?
AGBARR:severalotherpeoplewhohadbeenworkingontheproject.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:membersofyourstaff?
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:yes.Andthedeputystaff.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:and as best youcanrecall,inthelanguagethat was used,who--who saidwhattowhom?
AGBARR:Isaid,bob,what'swiththeletter?Youknow?Whydon'tyoujustpickupthephone andcallmeifthere'sanissue?Andhesaidthattheywereconcernedaboutthewaythemedia wasplayingthis.Andfeltthatitwasimportanttogetoutthesummaries,whichtheyfeltwould puttheirworkinpropercontext.Andavoidsomeoftheconfusionthatwasemerging.AndI askedhimifhefeltthatmyletterwasmisleadingorinaccurate.Andhesaidno,thatthepress- - hefeltthatthepresscoveragewas--anditwas--andthatacomplete--amorecompletepicture ofhisthoughtsandthecontextandsoforthwoulddealwiththat.AndIsuggestedthatIwould ratherjustgetthewholereportoutthanjustputtingoutstuffpiecemeal.ButIsaidIwouldthink aboutitsomemore.andthenextdayIputoutaletterthatmadeitclearthatnooneshouldread themarch24thletterasasummaryoftheoverallreport,andthatafullaccountofBobMueller's thinkingwasgoingtobeinthereportandeveryonewouldhaveaccessto- -
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:butthere'snothinginRobertMueller'slettertoyouaboutthepress.His complainttoyouisaboutyourcharacterizationofthereport.Correct?
AGBARR:well,theletterspeaksforitself.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:itdoes.And,infact,inresponsetoyourquestion,whynotjustpickup thephone--thisletterwasanextraordinaryact.AcareerprosecutorrebukingtheAttorney GeneraloftheU nitedStates,memorializedinwriting,right? Iknowof no otherinstanceofthat happening.Doyou?
AGBARR :Idon'tconsiderbobatthisstageacareerprosecutor.He’shadacareerasa prosecutor.
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:well,he's a veryeminent prosecutor.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 AGBARR:hewastheheadoftheFBIfor12years.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:he'sacareer--he'salawenforcementprofessional.
AGBARR:right.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:yep.Iknowofnootherinanswerinstance--
AGBARR:buthewasalsopoliticalappointeewithmeattheDepartmentofJustice.Idon't- - youknow,theletterisabitsnittyandIthinkitwasprobablywrittenbyoneofhisstaffpeople.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:didyoumakeamemorandumofyourconversation?
AGBARR:huh?
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:didyoumakeamemorandum?
AGBARR:no,Ididn't--what?
SEN.BLU MENTHAL:didanyone,either you or anyoneonyourstaff,memorializeyour conversationwithRobertMueller?
AGBARR:yes.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.BLU MENTHAL:whodidthat?
AGBARR:therewerenotestakenofthecall.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL:maywehavethosenotes?
AGBARR:no.
SEN.BLUMENTHAL: whynot?Whyshouldyouhavethem?
SEN.LINDSEYGRAHAM: I’lltellyou.We’vegottoendthis.ButI’mgoingtowritealetter toMr.Mueller ,andI’mgoingtoaskhim,is thereanythingyousaidaboutthatconversationhe disagreeswith.Andifthereis,he'llcomeandtellus.
AGBARR:right.
SEN.GRAHAM:sothehearingisnowover.And--Mr.Blumenthal,Mr.Muellerwillhavea chancetorelayiftheconversationisaccurate.I’llgivehimachancetocorrectanythingyousaid thathefindsmisleadingorinaccurate.Andthatwillbeit.
AGBARR:okay.
SEN.GRAHAM:fiveseconds.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 SEN.MIKELEE:AttorneyGeneralBarr,Ijustwanttothankyouforyourservicetoour countryandespeciallytodayIwanttothankyouforyourcivilityandyourcomposure.Amidst whathasbeenaneedlesslyandunfairlyhostileenvironment,yourprofessionalismhasbeen remarkable.I’mg rateful.Thankyou.
AGBARR:thankyou.
SEN.GRAHAM:frommypointofview,it'sprettyinterestinganditgotoffinaditcheffortnow andthen.Butgenerallythecommitteedidprettygoodandthisiswhatdemocracyisallabout. ThankyouforbeingourAttorneyGeneral.
AGBARR:thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
Document ID: 0.7.24420.20401-000001 Rosenstein, Rod (ODAG)
From: Rosenstein, Rod (OOAG) Sent: Tuesday, June 19, 2018 11:21 AM To: O'Callaghan, Edward C. (OOAG); Schools, Scott (ODAG) Subject: FINAL MEMORANDUM.pdf Attachments: imagel.png; ATTOOOOl.txt; FINAL MEMORANOUM.pdf; ATT00002.txt
This was unsolicited. I am passing it on for any appropriate consideration:
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Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000001 MEMORANDUM 8June2018
To: DeputyAttorneyGeneralRodRosenstein AssistantAttorneyGeneralStevEngel e
From: BillBarr
Re: Mueller’s“Obstruction”Theory
______
I amwriting as aformerofficial deeplyconcerned withthe institutions ofthe Presidency and the Department ofJustice. Irealize that Iam in the dark about manyfacts, but Ihope my viewsmaybeuseful.
ItappearsMueller’steamisinvestigatingapossiblecaseof“obstruction”bythePresident predicated substantially his on expression ofhope that the Comey ev could entually “let…go” of its investigation ofFlynn andhis action in firingComey. In pursuit ofthis obstruction theory, it appears that Mueller’s team is demanding that the President submit to interrogation about these incidents, usingthethreatofsubpoenasto coercehissubmission.
MuellershouldnotbepermittedtodemandthatthePresidentsubmittointerrogationabout alleged obstruction. Apart from whether Mueller a strong enough factual basis for doing so, Mueller’sobstructiontheoryisfatallymisconceiv ed. AsIunderstandit, histheoryispremised on anov el and legally insupportable reading oftheer, law. in Moreov my iew, ifcredited v by the Department,itwouldhavegrav econsequencesfarbeyondtheimmediateconfinesofthiscaseand woulddo lastingdamage the to Presidencyandto the administrationoflawwithintheExecutiv e branch.
As things stand, obstruction laws do not criminalize just any act that can influence a “proceeding.”Rathertheyare concernedwithactsintendedtohava e particularkind ofimpact. A “proceeding” is aformalizedprocess forfinding the truth. Ingeneral, obstructionlaws are meant to protect proceedings from actions designedert subv the integrity oftheir truth-finding function throughcompromisingthehonestyofdecision-makers( e.g.,judge,jury)orimpairingtheintegrity orav ailabilityofev idence testimonial,documentary,orphysical. Thus,obstructionlawsprohibit arange of “bad acts” such as tampering with awitness or juror; or destroying, altering, or falsifying idenceev all ofwhichare inherentlywrongfulbecause, v bytheir erynature, theyare directed at depriving the proceeding ofhonest decision-makers or access to full and accurate evidence. In general, then, actus reusthe ofan obstruction offense is the inherentlyersiv subv e “bad act” ofimpairing the integrity decision-maker ofa ev or idence. mensrea The is requisite simplyintendingthewrongfulimpairmentthatinexorablyflowsfromtheact.
Obviously,thePresidentandanyotherofficialcancommitobstructioninthisclassic sense ofsabotaging aproceeding’struth-findingfunction. Thus, forexample, ifaPresidentknowingly destroysoraltersev idence,subornsperjury, orinducesawitnesstochangetestimony, orcommits
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 any act deliberatelyimpairing the integrity av or idence,ailability then ofev he, like anyone else, commitsthecrimeofobstruction. Indeed,theactsofobstructionallegedagainstPresidentsNixon andClinton in their respectivimpeachmentse were all such “badacts”olv inving the impairment ofevidence. Enforcing these laws against the President in no way infringes on the President’s plenary power er ovlaw enforcement because exercising this discretion his completesuch as authorityto startorstop alawenforcementproceeding --does inve not olvcommissionofanyof theseinherentlywrongful, subversivacts. e
The President, as faras I know, is not being accused ofengaging in any wrongful act of evidence impairment. Instead, Mueller is proposing an unprecedented expansion ofobstruction lawsso as toreachfacially-lawfulactionstakenbythePresidentinexercisingthediscretionv ested in him by the Constitution. It appears Mueller is relying on 18 U.S.C. §1512, which generally prohibits acts underminingtheintegrityofevidence orpreventingitsproduction. Section1512is relevant here because, unlike other obstruction statutes, it does not require that a proceeding be actually “pending” at the time of an obstruction, but onlye that in mind a defendant an hav anticipatedproceeding. Because there wereseeminglyno relev antproceedings pendingwhenthe Presidentallegedlyengagedintheallegedobstruction,IbelievthatMueller’steamisconsidering e the“residualclause”inSection1512 subsection(c)(2) asthepotentialbasisforanobstruction case. Subsection(c)reads:
(c) Whoever corruptly--(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals arecord, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrityailability or for av use in an official proceeding; or otherwise (2) obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so [is guilty of the crime of obstruction]. [emphasisadded].
As Iunderstand the theory, Muellerproposes givclause to (c)(2), e whichprev iouslyhas been exclusively confinedto actsofev idenceimpairment, anewunboundedinterpretation. First, byreadingclause(c)(2)inisolation,andglossingov erkeyterms,heconstruestheclauseasafree - standing, all-encompassingprov isionprohibiting anyact influencingaproceedingifdonewithan improper motive. Second, in a further unprecedented step, Mueller would apply this sweeping prohibitiontofacially-lawfulactstakenbypublicofficialsexercisingoftheirdiscretionarypowers if those acts influence a proceeding. Thus, under this theory, simply by exercising his Constitutional discretion facially-lawfulin a way for example, remov by ing or an appointing official;usinghisprosecutorialdiscretiontogiv edirectiononacase;orusinghispardoningpower aPresident can be accused ofcommitting a crime basedon solely ehis subjectivstate ofmind. As a result, any discretionary act by a President that influences a proceeding can become the subject of a criminal grand estigation, jury inv probing whether the President acted with an impropermotiv e.
IfembracedbytheDepartment,thistheorywouldhav epotentiallydisastrousimplications, not just for the Presidency, but for the Executive branch as a whole and for the Department in particular. WhileMueller’sfocusisthePresident’sdiscretionaryactions, histheorywouldapply to allexercisesofprosecutorialdiscretion by the President’s subordinates, from the Attorney Generaldownto themostjuniorlineprosecutor. Simplybygiv ingdirection ona case, orclassof
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 cases, anofficialopenshimselftothechargethathehasactedwithan“improper”motiv eandthus becomes subjectto criminalinv a estigation. er, Moreov the challenge toComey’s remov al shows thatnotjustprosecutorialdecisionsareatissue. Anypersonnelormanagementdecisionstakenby an official charged withising superv and conducting litigation and enforcement matters in the Executive branch can become grist for the criminal mill based solely one the official’s subjectiv state ofmind. All thatis neededis aclaim isoris that asupervacting with improper an purpose andanyactarguablyconstrainingacase suchas removing aU.S. Attorney--couldbecastas a crimeofobstruction.
It is inconceivable to me that the Department could accept Mueller’s interpretation of §1512(c)(2). It is untenable as a matter of lawide and a legitimatecannot prov basis for interrogatingthePresident.Iknowyouwillagreethat,ifaDOJinv estigationisgoingtotakedown ademocratically-electedPresident, itisimperativto e thehealthofoursystemandtoour national cohesion that any claim of wrongdoing is solidlyidence based of real on evcrime not aa debatable one. It is trav time to el well-worn eer paths; nov not to vinto el, unsettled or contested areasofthelaw; andnotto indulgethefanciesbyov erly-zealousprosecutors.
Aselaboratedonbelow, Mueller’stheoryshouldberejectedforthefollowingreasons:
First, the sweeping interpretation being proposedfor § 1512’s residual clause is contrary to the statute’s plain meaning and would directlyene thecontrav Department’s longstanding and consistentpositionthatgenerally-wordedstatuteslike§ 1512cannotbeappliedtothePresident’s exercise ofhis constitutionalpowers intheabsence ofa“clearstatement” inthe statute thatsuch anapplicationwasintended.
Second, Mueller’s premise that,er whenev an inv estigation touches on the President’s own conduct, it is inherently “corrupt” under § 1512 for the President to influence that matter is insupportable. In granting plenary law enforcement powers to the President, the Constitution places no suchlimiton the President’s supervisoryauthority. Moreover, such alimitationcannot be reconciledwith the Department’s longstandingposition that the “conflictofinterest” laws do not, andcannot, apply to the President, since to apply them wouldimpermissibly “disempower” the President fromising superv class a ofcases that the Constitution grants him to the authority supervise.
Third, definingfacially-lawful exercises ofExecutivdiscretionase potential crimes, basedsolely onsubjectivmotivwouldv e e, iolateArticleIIoftheConstitutionbyimpermissiblyburdeningthe exerciseofcorediscretionarypowerswithintheExecutivbranch. e
Fourth,evifone en were to indulge Mueller’s obstructiontheory, inthe particularcircumstances here, the President’s e motivin remov ingComeyand commenting on Flynncouldnothavbeen e “corrupt”unlessthePresidentandhiscampaignwereactuallyguiltyofillegalcollusion. Because the obstruction claim is entirely dependent on first finding collusion, Mueller should not be permitted to interrogate the President about obstruction untilidence has to enough establish ev collusion.
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 I. TheStatute’sPlainMeaning,and“theClearStatement”RuleLongAdheredToBythe Department, Preclude Its Application to Facially-Lawful Exercises of the President’s ConstitutionalDiscretion.
TheunboundedconstructionMuellerwouldgiv§1512’sresidualclauseiscontrarytothe e provision’s text, structure, and elegislativ history. By its terms, §1512 focusesely on exclusiv actions that ertsubv the truth-finding function ofa proceeding byav impairing or the ailability integrityofev idence testimonial, documentary, orphysical. Thus, §1512proscribes alitanyof specifically-defined acts of obstruction, including killing a witness, threatening a witness to preventoraltertestimony,destroyingoralteringdocumentaryorphysicalev idence,andharassing awitnesstohindertestimony. Alloftheseenumeratedactsare “obstructiv e”inpreciselythesame way theyinterferewithaproceeding’sabilitytogathercompleteandreliable ev idence.
The question here is whether the phrase “or corruptly otherwise obstructs” in clause (c)(2)isdiv orcedfromthelitanyofthespecificprohibitionsin§ 1512, andisthusafree-standing, all-encompassingprohibitionreaching anyactthatinfluencesaproceeding,orwhethertheclause’s prohibitionagainst“otherwise”obstructingissomehowtiedto,andlimitedby, thecharacterofall theotherformsofobstructionlistedinthestatute. Ithinkitisclearthatuseoftheword“otherwise” in the residual clause expressly links the clause to the forms ofobstruction specifically defined elsewhereintheprovision. Unlessitservesthatpurpose, theword“otherwise”doesnoworkatall andismeresurplusage. Mueller’sinterpretationoftheresidualclauseas cov eringanyandallacts thatinfluenceaproceedingreadstheword“otherwise”outofthestatutealtogether.Butanyproper interpretationoftheclausemustgiveffectto e theword“otherwise;”itmustdo some work.
As the Supreme Court has Begayv.suggested, UnitedStates, 553 U.S. 137, 142-143 (2008),whenCongressenumeratesv ariousspecificactsconstitutingacrimeandthenfollowsthat enumeration with a residual clause, introduced with the words “or otherwise,” then the more generalactionreferredtoimmediatelyaftertheword“otherwise”is mostnaturallyunderstoodto covactser that cause similarkinda ofresult as the preceding listed examples, but cause those resultsina differentmanner .Inotherwords,thespecificexamplesenumeratedpriortotheresidual clausearetypicallyreadasrefiningorlimitinginsomewaythebroadercatch-alltermusedinthe residual clause.SeealsoYatesv.UnitedStates , 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1085-87 (2015).Begay As the Courtobserved, ifCongress meanttheresidual clause to beso all-encompassing thatitsubsumes alltheprecedingenumeratedexamples, “itishardto whyitwouldhavneededtoincludethe see e examples atall.” 553 U.S. see at142; M cDonnellv. UnitedStates , 136S.Ct. 2355, 2369(2016). Anexample sufficesto makethepoint: Ifastatuteprohibits“slapping, punching, kicking, biting, gouging eyes, or otherwise hurting” another person, the word “hurting” in the residual clause would naturally be understood as referring kind to ofphysical the same injury inflicted by the enumerated acts, but inflicted in a differenti.e.,pulling way hair. It normally would not be understood as referring to any kind of“hurting,” such as hurting another’s feelings, or hurting another’seconomicinterests.
Consequently, under the statute’s plain language and structure, the most natural and plausiblereadingof1512(c)(2)isthatitcov ers actsthathavthe e samekindofobstructiveimpact as the listed forms ofobstruction i.e.,impairing theav ailability or integrityidence ofev but causethisimpairmentinadifferentwaythantheenumeratedactionsdo. Underthisconstruction,
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 then, the “catch all” language in clause (c)(2) encompasses en any conduct, evifnotspecifically describedin 1512, that is directed at undermining a proceeding’s truth-finding function through actionsimpairingtheintegrityandav ailabilityofev idence. Indeed,thisishowtheresidualclause hasbeenapplied. Fromaquickreviewofthecases, itappearsallthecases havinvedattempts e olv to interferewith, orrenderfalse, ev the idencethatwouldbecome av proceeding.ailableto a Ev en the more esoteric applications ofclause (c)(2)e havbeen directed against to preventthe attempts flow ofidence ev to a proceeding. E.g., United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d th273 Cir. (7 2014)(soliciting tipsfromcorruptcops ev to surv ade UnitedStatesv.Phillipseillance); , 583 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2009)(disclosing identity of erundercov agent to subject of grand jury drug investigation). AsfarasIcantell,nocasehasev ertreatedasan“obstruction”anofficial’sexercise ofprosecutorialdiscretionoranofficial’smanagementorpersonnel actionscollaterallyaffecting aproceeding.
Further,readingtheresidualclauseasanall-encompassingproscriptioncannotbereconciledeither withtheothersubsectionsof§1512, orwiththeotherobstructionprov isionsinTitle18 thatmust beread inparipassu withthosein§ 1512. enMueller’ssweepinginterpretation, Giv clause(c)(2) wouldrenderallthespecificterms inclause(c)(1)surplusage; moreov er, itwouldswallowup all thespecificprohibitionsintheremainderof§1512--subsections(a),(b),and(d). Morethanthat, it would subsume irtually v all other obstruction isions prov in Title 18. For example, it would supervene theomnibusclausein§1503, applicabletopendingjudicialproceedings,aswellasthe omnibus clause in § 1505, applicable to pending proceedings before agencies and Congress. Construingtheresidualclausein§1512(c)(2)as supplantingtheseprov isionswouldeliminatethe restrictions Congress built into those provisions i.e., the -- requirement that a proceeding be “pending” --and would supplant the lower penalties isions in those with prov the substantially higherpenaltiesin§1512(c). Itisnottoomuchofanexaggerationtosaythat, if§1512(c)(2)can be readas broadlyas beingproposed, irtuallyallFederal thenv obstructionlawcouldbereduced to thissingleclause.
Needlessto say, itishighlyimplausiblethatsuch arev olutioninobstructionlaw was intended, or wouldhavegone uncommented upon, when (c)(2) was enacted. On the contrary,e the legislativ history makes plain that Congress had a more focused purpose when it enacted (c)(2). That subsectionwasenactedin2002 aspartoftheSarbanes-OxleyAct. Thatstatutewaspromptedby Enron's massive accounting fraud andelations rev that the company's outside auditor, Arthur Andersen, hadsystematicallydestroyedpotentiallyincriminatingdocuments. Subsection(c) was addedto Section1512 explicitlyas a“loophole” closermeantto address thefactthatthe existing section1512(b) covers documentdestructiononlywhere adefendanthas inducedanotherperson to do itanddoesnotaddressdocumentdestructioncarriedoutbyadefendantdirectly.
As reported to the Senate, the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act was expressly designed to “clarifyandcloseloopholesintheexistingcriminallawsrelatingtothedestructionorfabrication ofev idence andthe preservation offinancial andaudit records.” S. Rep. at No. 107-146, 14-15. Section 1512(c) did not exist as part ofthe original proposal. See S. 2010, 107th Cong. (2002). Instead, it was laterintroduced as an amendment bySenator TrentLott inJuly2002. 148 Cong. Rec. S6542 (daily ed. July10, 2002). Senator Lott explained that, by adding new § 1512(c), his proposedamendment:
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 wouldenactstrongerlawsagainst documentshredding .Currentlawprohibits obstructionofjusticebyadefendantactingalone,butonlyifaproceedingis pending and a subpoena has been issuedidence for that the has ev been destroyedoraltered.... [T]hissectionwouldallowtheGov ernmenttocharge obstruction against individuals who acted evifthe alone, tamperingen took placepriortotheissuanceofagrandjurysubpoena. Ithinkthisissomething we needto make clearso we hav do not earepeat with ofwhat the we saw Enronmatterearlierthisyear.
Id. at S6545 (statement ofSen. Lott) (emphasis supplied). Senator Orrin Hatch, in support of SenatorLott'samendment,explainedthatitwould“close[][the]loophole”createdbytheav ailable obstructionstatutesandholdcriminallyliableapersonwho, actingalone,destroysdocuments. Id. at S6550 (statement ofSen. Hatch). Thee legislativhistory thus confirms that§ 1512(c) was not intended as a sweeping ision prov supplanting wide swathes ofobstruction law, as but rather a targetedgap-fillerdesignedtostrengthenprohibitionson theimpairmentofev idence.
Not only is an all-encompassing reading of§ 1512(c)(2) contrary to the language and manifestpurposeofthestatute,butitisprecludedbyafundamentalcanonofstatutoryconstruction applicable to statutes ofthis sort. Statutes mustbe construed withreference to the constitutional framework within which they E.g.,operate. Gregoryv. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). Reading § 1512(c)(2) broadly to criminalize the President’s facially-lawful exercises of his removal authorityandhis prosecutorialdiscretion, on based probinghis estate subjectiv ofmind for idenceev of an “improper” e, motiv would obv iously intrude deeply into core areas of the President’sconstitutionalpowers. Itiswell-settledthatstatutesthatdonot expressly applytothe Presidentmust be construedas notapplying the President to ifsuch application wouldinveolva possible conflict with the President's constitutional See,prerogatives. e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts , 505U.S. 788,801 (1992).OLChaslongrigorouslyenforcedthis“clearstatement” rule to limit the reach of broadly worded statutesent undue so as intrusion to prev into the President’sexerciseofhisConstitutionaldiscretion.
AsOLChasexplained, the“clearstatement”rulehastwosources. First, itarisesfromthe long-recognized"cardinalprinciple" ofstatutoryinterpretationthatstatutes be construedto av oid raisingseriousconstitutionalquestions. Second, theruleexiststoprotectthe“usualconstitutional balance”betweenthebranchescontemplatedbytheFramersby"requir[ing] anexpressstatement by Congress before assuming it intended" to impinge upon PresidentialFranklin, 505 authority. U.S. at 801;see, e.g., Applicationof28U.S.C. §458toPresidentialAppointmentsofFederal Judges, 19Op. O.L.C. 350(1995).
This clearstatementrulehas beenappliedfrequentlybytheSupremeCourtas well asthe Executive branch with respect to statutes that might otherwise, if one were to ignore the constitutional context, be susceptible of an application that would affect the President's constitutional prerogatives. For instance, Franklin in the Court was called upon to determine whether the AdministrativProceduree Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C §§ 701-706, authorized "abuse of discretion" review offinal actions by the President.en though Ev the statute rev defined iewable actioninawaythatfaciallycouldinclude the President, anddidnotlistthePresidentamong the expressexceptionstotheAPA, JusticeO'ConnorwrotefortheCourt:
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 [t]hePresidentisnot[expressly] excludedfromtheAPA'spurv iew, butheis notexplicitlyincluded,either.Outofrespectfortheseparationofpowersand theuniqueconstitutionalpositionofthePresident,wefindthattextualsilence isnotenoughtosubjectthePresidenttotheprov isionsoftheAPA.Wewould require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President's performance ofhis statutory duties iewed to befor rev abuse of discretion.
505 U.S. at800-01. To amplify, shecontinued, "[a]stheAPAdoesnotexpresslyallowrev iewof thePresident'sactions, wemustpresumethathisactionsarenotsubjecttoitsrequirements." Id. at 801.
Similarly, inPublicCitizenv. UnitedStatesDep'tofJustice , 491 U.S. 440 (1989), the CourtheldthattheFederalAdv isoryCommitteeAct("FACA"), 5U.S.C. app. §2, doesnotapply to the judicial recommendation panels ofthe American BarAssociation because interpreting the statute as applying to themwouldraise serious constitutionalquestions relating to thePresident's constitutionalappointmentpower. Byitsterms,FACAappliedtoanyadv isorycommitteeusedby an agency “in the interest ofobtainingice recommendations adv or for the President." 5 U.S.C. app. §3(2(c). While acknowledging that a"straightforward reading" ofthe statute’s language wouldseemto require its applicationto theABAcommittee, PublicCitizen , 491 U.S. at453, the Courtheldthatsuchareadingwasprecludedbythe"cardinalprinciple"thatastatutebeinterpreted to oidav serious constitutional question.” Id. at 465-67. Notably, the majority stated, "[o]ur reluctance to decide constitutional issues is especially great where, as here, they concern the relativpowerse ofcoordinate branches ofgovernment," and"[t]hatconstruingFACAto apply to the Justice Department's consultations with the ABA Committee would present formidable constitutionaldifficultiesisundeniable." Id . at466.
The Office ofLegal Counsel has consistently “adhered to aplain statement rule: statutes that do not expressly apply to the President must be construed as not applying to the President, where applying the statute to the President would pose a significant question regardingthePresident’sconstitutionalprerogativ es.” E.g, TheConstitutionalSeparation ofPowers Between the President and, Congress __ Op. O.L.C. 124, 178 (1996); Applicationof28U.S.C. §458toPresidentialAppointmentsofFederalJudges , 19 Op. O.L.C. 350(1995).
TheDepartmenthasappliedthisprincipletobroadly-wordedcriminalstatutes,liketheone atissuehere. Thus, inacloselyanalogouscontext, theDepartmenthaslongheldthattheconflict - of-interest statute, 18 U.S.C § 208, does not apply to the President. That statute prohibits any "officeror employee ofthe executivbranch"e from"participat[ing] personallyandsubstantially" in any particular matter in which he or she has a personalId. In the financial leading interest. opinion on the matter, then-Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman determined that the legislativehistorydisclosedno intentionto cov erthe Presidentanddoingso wouldraise"serious questionsastotheconstitutionality" ofthestatute,becausetheeffectofapplyingthestatutetothe President would “disempower” the President from performing his constitutionally-prescribed functionsastocertainmatters. See Memorandumf or RichardTBurress, . OfficeofthePresident,
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 fromLaurenceH.Silberman,DeputyAttorneyGeneral,Re:ConflictofInterestProblemsArising outofthePresident'sNominationofNelsonA.RockefellertobeVicePresidentundertheTwenty - FifthAmendmenttotheConstitution at2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974).
Similarly,OLCopinedthattheAnti-LobbyingAct, 18U.S.C. §1913,doesnotapplyfully against the President. SeeConstraintsImposedby18U.S.C.§1913onLobbyingEfforts , 13 Op. O.L.C. 300, 304-06 (1989). The Anti-LobbyingActprohibits anyappropriatedfunds frombeing "used directly or indirectly to pay for any personalertisement, service, telegram, adv telephone, letter, printedor writtenmatter, orotherdev ice, intendedordesignedto influence manner inany aMemberofCongress." 18U.S.C. §1913. Thestatuteprov idedanexceptionforcommunications byexecutivbranchofficersandemployeesifthecommunication e was madepursuanttoarequest by a member ofCongress or was a request to Congress for legislation or appropriations. OLC concludedthatapplyingtheActasbroadlyasitstermswouldotherwiseallowwouldraiseserious constitutionalquestionsasaninfringementofthePresident'sRecommendationsClausepower.
In addition to the “clear statement” rule, other canons ofstatutory construction preclude givingtheresidualclausein§1512(c)(2) theunboundedscopeproposedbyMueller’sobstruction theory. As elaborated on in the ensuing section, to read the residual clause as extending beyond evidence impairment, and to apply it to any that proceeding,“corruptly” wouldaffects raisea serious Due Process issues. orcedfromOnce div the concrete standard ofev idence impairment, the residual clause defines neither actusreusthe crime’s (what conductamounts to obstruction) norits mensrea (whatstateofmindis“corrupt”)“withsufficientdefinitenessthatordinarypeople canunderstandwhatconductisprohibited,”or“inamannerthatdoesnotencouragearbitraryand discriminatory enforcement.” Seee.g. M cDonnellv. UnitedStates , 136 S.Ct. at 2373. This vagueness defect becomes evmore en pronounced statute when the to isawide applied range of public officials whose normal dutiesolv inve the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the conductandmanagementofofficialproceedings. The “cardinalrule”thatastatute beinterpreted to oidseriousav constitutionalquestions mandates rejectionofthe sweeping interpretation ofthe residualclauseproposedbyMueller.
Even if the statute’s plain meaning, fortified by the “clear statement” rule, were not dispositive, thefactthat§1512isacriminalstatutedictatesanarrowerreadingthanMueller’sall - encompassinginterpretation. Eviftheen scope of§ 1512(c)(2) were ambiguous, underthe “rule oflenity,” thatambiguitymust be resolv ed againstthe ernment’s Gov broaderreading. See, e.g., UnitedStatesv. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (“In these circumstances --where text, structure, andhistoryfail establishthatthe to Government's positionis unambiguouslycorrect- - weapplytheruleoflenityandresolvtheambiguityin[thedefendant's] e favor.”)
In sum, the sweeping construction of§ 1512(c)’s residual clause posited by Mueller’s obstructiontheoryisnov elandextrav agant. Itiscontrarytothestatute’splainlanguage,structure, and legislative history. Such a broad reading enewould the contrav “clear statement” rule of statutory construction, which the Department has rigorously adhered to in interpreting statutes, likethisone, thatwouldotherwiseintrudeon Executivauthority. e Byitterms, §1512isintended to protect the truth-finding function ofa proceeding by prohibiting acts that would impair the availability or integrity ofev idence. Thecases applying the “residual e clause” havfallen within this scope. The clause er has before nev been applied to facially-lawful discretionary acts of
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 Executivebranchofficial. Mueller’s ov erly-aggressivuse e ofthe obstructionlaws shouldnotbe embraced by the Department and cannot support interrogation ofthe aluate President his to ev subjectivestateofmind.
II. Applying§1512(c)(2)toReviewFacially-LawfulExercisesofthePresident’sRemoval AuthorityandProsecutorialDiscretionWouldImpermissiblyInfringeonthePresident’s ConstitutionalAuthorityandtheFunctioningoftheExecutiveBranch.
This caseimplicates at least two broad discretionary v powers ested by the Constitution exclusivelyinthe President. First, inremovingComey as directorofthe FBIthereis question no that the President was exercising one ofhis core authorities under the Constitution. Because the President has Constitutional responsibility for seeing that the laws are faithfully executed, it is settledthathe has “illimitable” discretiontoremovprincipal e officers carryingouthis e Executiv functions. SeeFreeEnterpriseFundv.PublicCompanyAccountingOversightBoard , 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3152 (2010);Myers v. United States , 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Similarly, in commenting to ComeyaboutFlynn’ssituation totheextentitistaken as thePresidenthav ingplacedhisthumb on the scale or in favoflenity the President was plainly within hiser plenarydiscretion ovthe prosecution function. The Constitutionestsall Federallawenfv orcement power , and hence prosecutorial discretion, inthe President. The President’s discretion in these areas has long been considered“absolute,”andhisdecisionsexercisingthisdiscretionarepresumedtoberegularand are generally deemednon-rev iewable. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); UnitedStatesv.Nixon , 418 U.S. 683, 693seegenerally (1974); S. Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 Geo. Wash.. L. Rev521 (2005)
The central problem with Mueller’s interpretation of §1512(c)(2) is that, instead of applyingthestatutetoinherentlywrongfulactsofevidenceimpairment, hewouldnowdefinethe actusreus ofobstruction asanyact, including facially lawful acts, that influence a proceeding. However, the Constitutionests v plenary authority er ovlaw enforcement proceedings in the President, andtherefore oneofthePresident’score constitutional authorities ispreciselytomake decisions“influencing”proceedings. Inaddition,theConstitutionv estsotherdiscretionarypowers in the President that e can a havcollateral influence on proceedingsincluding the power of appointment, removal, andpardon. The crux ofMueller’spositionisthat, erthePresident whenev exercises any of these discretionary powers and thereby “influences” a proceeding, he has completed theactusreus of the crime of obstruction. To establish guilt, all that remains is evaluationofthePresident’sstate ofmindtodiv inewhetherheactedwith a“corrupt”motive.
Construed in this manner, §1512(c)(2)iolate would Article v II ofthe Constitution in at leasttworespects:
First, Mueller’spremiseappearstobethat,whenaproceedingislookingintothePresident’sown conduct, itwouldbe “corrupt” withinthe meaning of§1512(c)(2) forthe President to attempt to influencethatproceeding.Inotherwords,Muellerseemstobeclaimingthattheobstructionstatute effectivelywalls offthe Presidentfrom exercising Constitutionalpowers er ovcasesinwhichhis own conduct is being scrutinized. This premise is clearly wrong constitutionally. Nor can it be
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 reconciledwiththeDepartment’slongstandingpositionthatthe“conflictofinterest”lawsdonot, and cannot, apply to the President, since to apply them wouldimpermissibly “disempower” the President from supervising a class ofcases that the Constitution grants him the authority to supervise. Under the Constitution, the President’s er authority law enforcement ov matters is necessarilyall-encompassing, andCongressmaynotexscindcertainmattersfromthescopeofhis responsibilities. The Framers’ plan contemplates that the President’s law enforcement powers extend to all matters, including those in which he had a personal stake, and that the proper mechanism forpolicing the President’s faithful exercise ofthat discretion is the political process thatis, thePeople, actingeitherdirectly, throughtheirelectedrepresentativinCongress. or es
Second, quite apart from this misbegotten effort to “disempower” the President from acting on matters in which he has an interest, defining facially-lawful e exercises ofExecutivdiscretion as potentialcrimes, basedsolelyon thePresident’ssubjectivmotiv e e, wouldviolateArticleIIofthe Constitution by impermissibly burdening the exercise of core discretionary powers within the Executivbranch.e The prospect ofcriminal liability based on solely the official’s state ofmind, coupled with the indefinite standards of“improper e” and motiv “obstruction,” castwould pall a over a wide range ofExecutivdecision-making,e chill the exercise ofdiscretion, and expose to intrusivandfree-ranginge examination ofthe President’s (andhis subordinate’s) e subjectivstate ofmindinexercisingthatdiscretion.
A. Section1512(c)(2)MayNot“Disempower”thePresidentf rom ExercisingHisLaw EnforcementAuthorityOver a ParticularClassof Matters.
As discussedfurtherbelow, afatalflaw inMueller’s interpretationof§1512(c)(2)is that, while defining obstruction solely as acting “corruptly,” Mueller offers no definition of what “corruptly”means. Itappears, howevthatMuellerhasinmindparticularcircumstancesthatheer, feelsmaygiverisetopossible“corruptness”inthecurrentmatter. Histacitpremiseappearstobe that, whenan inv estigationislookinginto thePresident’s own conduct, itwouldbe“corrupt”for thePresidentto attempttoinfluencethatinv estigation.
On superficiala lev el, this outlook is unsurprising: first blush at it accords with the old Roman maxim that a man should not be the judge in his own- case and, because “conflict-of interest”lawsapplyto allthePresident’ssubordinates, DOJprosecutorsaresteepedinthenotion thatitisillegalforanofficialtotouchacaseinwhichhehasapersonalstake. Butconstitutionally, asappliedtothePresident, thismindsetisentirelymisconceiv ed: thereis nolegal prohibition as opposed a political constraint --against the President’s acting on a matter in which he has a personalstake.
TheConstitutionitselfplacesnolimitonthePresident’sauthoritytoactonmatterswhich concern him or his own conduct. On the contrary, the Constitution’s grant oflaw enforcement power to the President is plenary. Constitutionally, it ise ofthewrong Presidentto conceiv as simply the highest officer within thee branch Executiv hierarchy. He alone is thee Executiv branch. As such, he is the sole allExecutivepowers repository of conferredby the Constitution. Thus,thefullmeasureoflawenforcementauthorityisplacedinthePresident’shands,andnolimit is placed the on kinds of cases subject to his controlision. andWhile superv the President has subordinates --the AttorneyGeneralandDOJlawyers --who exercise prosecutorialdiscretionon
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 his behalf, they are merely “hisPonziv. hand,” Fessenden , 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922) the discretion they exercise is the President’s discretion, and their decisions are legitimate precisely because they remainunderhis ision, superv andhe is still responsible andpoliticallyaccountable forthem.
Nordoes anystatute purportto restrictthe President’s ov authority ermatters inwhichhe has an interest. Onthe contrary, in1974, the Departmentconcludedthatthe - conflict-ofinterest laws cannot be construed as applying to the President, expressing “serious doubt as to the constitutionality”ofastatutethatsought“todisempower”thePresidentfromactingov erparticular matters. LettertoHonorableHowardW.CannonfromActingAttorneyGeneralLaurenceH. Silberman, dated September 20, 1974; Memorandum and f or RichardT . Burress, Office ofthe President, from Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Conflict ofInterest ProblemsArisingoutofthePresident'sNominationofNelsonA.RockefellertobeVicePresident undertheTwenty-FifthAmendmenttotheConstitution at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974). As far as I am aware, this is the onlyinstance in which it has previously been suggested that astatute places a class oflaw enforcement cases “offlimits” to the President’sision based superv his personal on interestinthematters. TheDepartmentrejectedthatsuggestiononthegroundthatCongresscould not“disempower”thePresidentfromexercisinghissuperv isoryauthority ovsuchmatters. er For allthesame reasons, CongresscouldnotmakeitacrimeforthePresidenttoexercisesuperv isory authorityovcasesinwhichhisown er conductmightbeatissue.
TheillimitablenatureofthePresident’slawenforcementdiscretionstemsnotjustfromthe Constitution’splenarygrantofthosepowerstothePresident,butalsofromthe“unitary”character ofthe Executivbranchitselfe . Because the Presidentalone constitutes thee Executivbranch, the Presidentcannot “recuse” himself .Just as Congress couldenmasse not recuse itself, ing leav no sourceoftheLegislativpower, e thePresidentcannottakeaholidayfromhisresponsibilities. Itis in the ery v nature ofdiscretionarypower that ultimate authority for making be the choice must vested in some final decision-maker. At the end ofthe day, there truly must be a desk at which “the buck stops.” In thee, Executiv final responsibility must rest with the President. Thus, the President, “thoughable to delegateduties to others, cannotdelegate ultimateresponsibilityor the activeobligationtosupervisethatgoeswithit .” FreeEnterpriseFundv. PublicCo. Acctg. OversightBd ., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3154 quotingClintonv.Jones, (2010) ( 520 U.S. 681, 712-713 (1997)(Breyer, J., concurringinjudgment))(emphasisadded).
InframingaConstitutionthatentrustsbroaddiscretiontothePresident, theFramerschose the means theythoughtbestto police the exercise ofthatdiscretion. TheFramers’ ideawas that, byplacingalldiscretionarylawenforcementauthorityinthehandsofasingle“ChiefMagistrate” elected by all the People, and by making him politically accountable for all exercises of that discretion by himselfor his agents, prov they were iding the best way ofensuring the “faithful exercise”ofthesepowers. Everyfouryearsthepeopleasawholemakeasolemnnationaldecision as to thepersonwhomtheytrusttomake these prudentialjudgments. Intheinterim, the people’s representativesstandwatchandhav ethetoolsto ov ersee,discipline,and,iftheydeemappropriate, removthee President from office. Thus, under the Framers’ plan, the determination whether the President is making decisions based on “improper”es or motivwhether he is “faithfully” discharginghisresponsibilitiesislefttothePeople,throughtheelectionprocess,andtheCongress, throughtheImpeachmentprocess.
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 The Framers’ idea ofpolitical accountabilityhas proven remarkably successful, farmore so thanthe disastrous experimentation with an“independent” counsel statute, whichbothparties agreedtopurgefromoursystem. Byandlarge, fearofpoliticalretributionhasensuredthat, when confronted withserious allegations ofmisconductwithin Administration, an Presidents e havfelt itnecessaryto takepracticalstepstoassurethepeoplethatmatterswillbepursuedwithintegrity. Butthe measures thatPresidents havadoptede are voluntary, dictatedbypoliticalprudence, and adapted to the situation; they are not legally er,compelled. Congress Moreov has usually been quick torespond toallegations ofwrongdoing in thee Executivand has shown itselfmore than willing to conduct estigations inv into such allegations. The fact thatPresident is answerable for any abuses of discretion and is ultimately subject to the judgment of Congress through the impeachment process means that the Presidentnot the judge is in his own SeeNixonv. cause. Harlow, 457 U.S. 731, 757-58 n.41 (1982)(“ The remedy ofimpeachmentdemonstrates that the Presidentremainsaccountableunderlawforhismisdeedsinoffice.”)
Mueller’s core premise --that the Presidentacts “corruptly” ifhe attempts to influence a proceedinginwhichhisownconductisbeingscrutinized isuntenable.BecausetheConstitution, and the Department’s own rulings,ision thatenv the President may exerciseisory his superv authority erovcases dealing withhis owninterests, the Presidenttransgresses legal limitation no whenhedoesso. Forthatreason,thePresident’sexerciseofsuperv isoryauthorityov ersuchacase doesnotamountto“corruption.” Itmaybeinsomecasespoliticallyunwise;butitisnotacrime. Moreover, itcannotbe presumed thatanydecision the Presidentreaches inacase inwhichhe is interestedis“improperly”affectedbythatpersonalinterest. ImplicitintheConstitution’sgrantof authority over such cases, and in the Department’s position that the President cannot be “disempowered” fromactinginsuchcases, istherecognitionthatPresidents havethecapacityto decidesuchmattersbasedonthepublic’slong-terminterest.
In today’s world, Presidents are frequently accused of wrongdoing. Let us say that an outgoing administration say, an incumbent U.S. Attorney “inv --launches a an estigation” of incoming President. The new President knows it is bogus, is being conducted by political opponents, andis damaginghis abilityto establishhis new Administrationandto address urgent matters onbehalfofthe Nation. Itwouldneitherbe “corrupt” noracrime forthe newPresident toterminatethematterandleaveanyfurtherinv estigationtoCongress. Thereis no legalprinciple that would insulate the matter from the President’sisory authority superv and mandate that he passivelysubmitwhilea bogusinv estigation runs itscourse.
Attheendoftheday,IbelieveMueller’steamwouldhav etoconcedethataPresidentdoes not act “corruptly” simply by actingen terminating on ev matter that a relates to his own conduct. ButIsuspecttheywouldtaketheonlylogicalfallbackpositionfromthat namely, that itwouldbe“corrupt”ifthePresidenthadactuallyengagedinunlawfulconductandthenblocked an investigation to “cov er up” the wrongdoing. In other words, the notion would be that, ifan investigation was bogus, the President ultimately had legitimate grounds for exercising his supervisory powers to stop the matter.ersely, Convif the President had really engaged in wrongdoing,adecisiontostopthecasewouldhavebeenacorruptcov erup. But,inthelattercase, the predicate forfinding any corruption wouldbe firstfinding that the President had engaged in thewrongdoinghewasallegedlytryingtocovup. er Undertheparticularcircumstanceshere, the
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 issueofobstructiononlybecomesripeaftertheallegedcollusionbythePresidentorhiscampaign isestablishedfirst. Whilethedistinctcrimeofobstructioncanfrequentlybecommittedev enifthe underlying crime underinv estigationis nevestablished, er thatis true onlywhere the obstruction isanactthatiswrongfulinitself-- suchasthreateningawitness,ordestroyingev idence. Buthere, theonlybasisforascribing“wrongfulness”( i.e., an impropermotiv e)tothePresident’sactionsis the claim that he was attempting to eringblock ofthe wrongdoing uncov by or himself his campaign. Until Mueller can show that there was unlawful collusion, he cannot show that the Presidenthadan improper“cov erup” motiv e.
For reasons discussed below, I do not subscribe to this notion. But here it is largely an academicquestion. EitherthePresidentandhiscampaignengagedinillegalcollusionortheydid not. Iftheydid, then the issue of“obstruction” sideshow. is Howev aer, iftheydid not, thenthe covuper theory is untenable. And, a at practical el, in lev the absence some of act wrongful of evidence destruction, the Department woulde no hav business pursuing the President where it cannotshowanycollusion. Muellershouldgetonwiththetaskathandandreachaconclusionon collusion. Inthe meantime, pursuing nov a el obstructiontheoryagainstthe notonly Presidentis premature but because it forces resolution of numerous constitutional issues grossly irresponsible.
B. UsingObstruction Laws Review to the President’s Motives or fMaking Facially- Lawful Discretionary Decisions Impermissibly Inf ringeson President’sthe ConstitutionalPowers.
The crux ofMueller’s claim here is that, when the President performs a facially-lawful discretionaryactionthatinfluences proceeding, a he maybe criminallyinv estigatedto determine whetherheactedwithanimpropermotiv e. Itishardtoimagineamoreinv asivencroachmenton e Executivauthority.e
1. TheConstitutionVestsDiscretioninthePresidentToDecideWhetherToProsecuteCasesor ToRemovePrincipalExecutiveOfficers,andThoseDecisionsareNotReviewable.
The authority to decide whether or not to bring prosecutions, as well as the authority to appoint and remove principal Executive officers, and to grant pardons, are quintessentially Executiveincharacterandamongthediscretionarypowers vestedexclusiv elyinthePresidentby theConstitution. WhenthePresidentexercisesthesediscretionarypowers, itispresumedhedoes solawfully, andhisdecisionsaregenerally non-rev iewable.
The principle ofnon-reviewabilityinheres in ery the v reason esting for these v powers in thePresidentinthefirstplace. Ingoverninganysocietycertainchoicesmustbemadethatcannot bedeterminedbytidylegalstandardsbutrequireprudentialjudgment. Theimperativ eisthatthere must be some ultimate decision-maker who has thee final, authoritativsay whose desk --at the “buck”trulydoesstop. Anysystemwherebyotherofficials, notempoweredto makethedecision themselves,are permittedtorev iewthe“final”decisionfor“impropermotiv es”isantitheticalboth to the exercise ofdiscretionanditsfinality. evifrev And, en iewcancensoraparticularchoice, it leavesunaddressedthefactthatachoicestillremainstobemade,andtherev iewershavnopower e to makeit. Theprospectofrev iewitselfunderminesdiscretion. Wayte v.UnitedStates, 470U. S.
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 598,607-608(1985); cf. Franklin v.M assachusetts ,505U.S.at801.Butanyregimethatproposes torev iewand punish decision-makersfor“impropermotiv es”endsupdoingmoreharmthangood bychillingtheexerciseofdiscretion, “dampen[ing] theardorofallbutthemostresolute…inthe unflinching discharge of their Gregoireduties.” v . Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)(LearnedHand). Intheend, theprospectofpunishmentchillstheexerciseofdiscretionov er a far broader range of decisions than the supposedly improper decision being remedied. McDonnell, 136S.Ct. at2373.
Forthesereasons,thelawhaserectedanarrayofprotectionsdesignedtoprev ent,orstrictly limit,rev iewoftheexerciseoftheExecutiv ediscretionarypowers. See,e.g.,Nixonv. Fitzgerald , 457US731,749(1982)(thePresident’suniquediscretionarypowersrequirethathehavabsolute e immunity from il civ suit for his official acts). An especially ofrules strong has been set put in place to insulate those who exercise prosecutorial discretion from second-guessing and the possibilityofpunishment. See.e.g.,Imblerv.Pachtman ,424U.S.409(1976); Yaselliv.Goff ,275 U. S. 503 (1927), aff'g 12 F. 2d396 (2d Cir. 1926). Thus, “it is entirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject ofjudicial rev See, iew.” e.g., ICC v. BrotherhoodofLocomotive Engineers, 482U.S. 270, 283 UnitedStatesv.Cox (1987); , 342F.2d167, 171-72(5thCir. 1965) (TheU.S. Attorney’sdecisionnotto prosecute en evwherethereis probable cause is“amatterof executivdiscretione which cannot be coerced rev or iewed by see thealso courts.”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
Even when there prosecutorial is a decision to proceed with a case, the law generally precludes review or, in narrow the circumstances rev where iew is permitted, extent limits the to which the decision-makers’ subjective motiv ations may be examined. Thus, a prosecutor’s decision to bring acase is generallyprotectedfrom il liabilityby civ absolute immunity, evif en theprosecutorhadamaliciousmotiv e. Yaselli v. Goff, 275U. S. 503(1927), affg' 12F. 2d396(2d Cir. 1926).Ev enwhere some reviewispermitted,absentaclaimofselectivprosecutionbasedon e an impermissible classification, a court ordinarily will not look into the prosecutor’s real motivations for bringing the case as long as probable cause existed Seeto support prosecution. Bordenkircherv.Hayes ,434U.S.357,364(1978).Further,ev enwhenthereisaclaimofselectiv e prosecution based on an impermissible classification, courts do not permit the probing of the prosecutor’s subjectivstatee ofminduntil the plaintiffhas firstproducedobjectiv eevidence that the policy under which he has been prosecuted had a UnitedStatesv. discriminatory effect. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). The same considerations undergird the Department’s current position inHawaii v.Trump , where the Solicitor General is arguing iewing that, the in rev President’s travelban, acourtmaynotlookinto the President’s emotivations subjectiv whenthe governmenthasstated a faciallylegitimatebasisforthedecision. SG’sM ( eritsBrief at61).
In short, the President’s exercise of its Constitutional discretion iew is notfor subject to rev “improper motivations” by lesser officials by the or courts. The judiciary no has authority “to enquire howthe executivore, executiv eofficers, performduties inwhich a theyhave discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution andlaws, submitted to the executive, can nevbe er made” in the courts.Marbury v. Madison,1Cranch(5U.S.)137,170 (1803).
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 2. Threateningcriminalliabilityforfacially-lawfulexercisesofdiscretion,basedsolelyonthe subjectivemotive,wouldimpermissiblyburdentheexerciseofcoreConstitutionalpowerswithin theExecutivebranch..
Mueller is effectively proposing to use the criminal obstruction law as a means of reviewing discretionary acts taken by the President when those acts influence a proceeding. Mueller gets to this point in three steps. First, instead of confining §1512(c)(2) to inherently wrongful acts ofev idence impairment, henow would actusdefine reus ofobstruction the as any act that influences a proceeding. Second, he would include within that category the official discretionary actions taken by the President or other public officials carrying out their Constitutional duties, including their authority to control all law enforcement matters. The net effect ofthis is that, once the President or any subordinate takes any action that influences a proceeding, hehascompletedthe actusreus ofthecrimeofobstruction. Toestablishguilt, allthat remainsisev aluationofthePresident’s or official’ssubjectiv estateofmindtodivinewhetherhe actedwithan impropermotiv e.
Wielding §1512(c)(2) in this way preempts the Framers’ plan ofpolitical accountability and iolate v Article II ofthe Constitution by impermissibly burdening the exercise of the core discretionary powers within theebranch. Executiv The prospect ofcriminal prosecution based solelyonthePresident’sstateofmind,coupledwiththeindefinitestandardsof“impropermotiv e” and “obstruction,” would cast ov apall er awide rangee ofExecutivdecision-making, chill the exerciseofdiscretion,andexposetointrusivandfree-rangingexaminationthePresident’s(orhis e subordinate’s) subjectivstateofmindinexercisingthatdiscretione
Any system that threatens to punishdiscretionaryactions subjectivmotiv based on e ation naturally has a substantial chilling effect on the exercise ofdiscretion. But Mueller’s proposed regime would mount an especially onerous and unprecedentedintrusion e on Executivauthority. Thesanctionthatisbeingthreatenedforimproperly-motiv atedactionsisthemost sev ere possible personal criminal liability. itably, Inev the prospect ofbeing accused ofcriminal conduct, and possibly being investigated for such, would cause officials “to shrink” from making potentially controversial decisions and sap igor the with v which they perform their McDonnell duties. v. UnitedStates ,136S.Ct. at2372-73.
Further, the chilling effect is especially powerful where, as here, liability turns solely on the official’s subjectivestate ofmind. Because charges ofofficialmisconductbasedonimproper motiveare“easytoallegeandhardtodisprov e,” Hartman v. Moore,547U.S. 250,257-58(2006), Mueller’s regime substantially increases the likelihood ofmeritless claims, accompanied by the alltherisksofdefendingagainstthem.Moreover,therev iewcontemplatedherewouldbefarmore intrusivsincee it does notturn objectiv onan estandard such as the presence inthe record ofa reasonable basis forthedecision butratherrequires probingto determine thePresident’s actual subjectivstatee ofmind in reaching a decision. As the Supreme ed,Court Harlow has v. observ Fitzgerald,457U.S. 800,816-17(1982), ev enwhenfacedonlywithciv illiability,suchaninquiry isespeciallydisruptiv e:
[I]t now is clear that substantial attend coststhe litigation ofthee subjectiv good faith ofgovernment officials. Not are only there the general costs of
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 subjecting officials to the risks oftrial distraction ofofficials from their governmentalduties,inhibitionofdiscretionaryaction,anddeterrenceofable people from public ice. serv There arespecial coststo "subjectiv e" inquiries of this kind. …[T]he judgments surrounding discretionary action almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's alues,experiences, and v emotions. These ariables v …frame abackgroundin which there often is no clearendtotherelevantevidence. Judicialinquiryintosubjectivmotiv e ation therefore may entail broad-ranging ery discov Inquiries …. ofthis can kind bepeculiarlydisruptiveofeffectivgov e ernment.
Moreover, theencroachmentontheExecutivfunctionisespeciallybroadduetothewide e range of actors and actions potentiallyered. cov Because Mueller actus reus defines of the obstruction as any act that influences a proceeding, he is including not just exercises of prosecutorialdiscretiondirectlydecidingwhetheracasewillproceedornot, butalso exercisesof any other Presidential power that might collaterally affect a proceeding, al, such as a remov appointment,orgrantofpardon. And,whileMueller’simmediatetargetisthePresident’sexercise ofhisdiscretionarypowers, hisobstructiontheoryreachesallexercisesofprosecutorialdiscretion bythePresident’ssubordinates,fromtheAttorneyGeneral, downthemostjuniorlineprosecutor. It also necessarily applies to all personnel, management, and operational decision by those who areresponsibleforsuperv isingandconductinglitigationandenforcementmatters --il,criminal civ oradministrativ--onthePresident’sbehalf e .
AfatalflawwithMueller’s regime andonethatgreatlyexacerbates its chilling - effect- isthat,whileMuellerwouldcriminalizeanyact“corruptly”influencingaproceeding,Muellercan offer no definition of“corruptly.” What is the circumstance that would make an attempt by the Presidenttoinfluenceaproceeding“corrupt?”Muellerwouldconstrue“corruptly”asreferringto one’s purpose in seeking to influence a proceeding. ides But noMueller standard prov for determining what motives are legal and whates are motiv illegal. Is an attempt to influence a proceedingbasedon politicalmotiv ations“corrupt?” Isanattemptbasedonself-interest? Based on personal career considerations? Based on partisan considerations? On friendship or personal affinity? Dueprocessrequiresthattheelementsofacrimebedefined"withsufficientdefiniteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited," or "in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." SeeMcDonnell , 136 S.Ct. at 2373. This, Mueller’sconstructionof§1512(c)(2) utterlyfailstodo.
Itisworthpausingontheword“corruptly,”becausecourtshaveev incedalotofconfusion ovit.er It is an adv erb, modifying v the erbs “influence,” “impede,” etc. e But few courts hav deigned to analyze its preciseerbial advmission. Does it refer to “how” the influence is accomplished i.e., themeans usedtoinfluence? Ordoes itrefertothe ultimate purpose behind theattempttoinfluence? Asanoriginalmatter, Ithinkitwasclearlyusedto describedthemeans usedtoinfluence. AstheD.C. Circuitpersuasiv elysuggested, thewordwaslikelyusedinits19 th centurytransitivsense, e connotingtheturning(orcorrupting) ofsomethingfromgoodandfitfor its purpose into something bad and unfit for its purpose hence, “corrupting” a magistrate; or “corrupting” idence.ev UnitedStates v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.1991). Understood this way, the ideas behind the obstruction laws come more clearlyinto focus. The thing that is
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 corruptis the means being usedto influence the proceeding. Theyare inherentlywrongbecause theyinvolvethecorruptionofdecision-makersorev idence. Theculpableintentdoesnotrelateto the actor’s ultimate e motivforusing the means. corrupt The culpable state ofmindis merelythe intent that the corrupt means bring about their immediate purpose, which is to sabotage the proceeding’struth-findingfunction. Theactor’sultimatepurposeisirrelev antbecausethemeans, andtheirimmediatepurpose, aredishonestandmalign. Further, iftheactoruses lawfulmeans of influencing aproceeding such as asserting identiarypriv an ev ilege, or bringingpublic opinion pressuretobearontheprosecutors thenhisultimatemotiv esarelikewiseirrelev ant. SeeArthur Anderson,544U.S. at703-707. eniftheactorisguiltyofacrimeandhisonlyreasonforacting Ev is to escape justice, his use oflawful means to impede or influence a proceeding are perfectly legitimate.
Courts havgottene themselvinto es boxwhenevtheyhavsuggesteda er e that “corruptly” is notconfinedto theuse ofwrongfulmeans, butcanalso referto someone’s e ultimate motivfor usinglawful means to influence aproceeding. The problem,er, is that,howev as hav the courts e consistentlyrecognized, thereisnothinginherentlywrongwithattemptingtoinfluenceorimpede aproceeding. Boththeguiltyandinnocenthavthe e rightto use lawful means todo that. Whatis the motivethatwouldmake the use oflawfulmeans to influence aproceeding “corrupt?” Courts havebeenthrownbackonlisting “synonyms” like“deprav ed, wicked, or bad.”Butthatbegs the question. What is eddeprav the means ore? theIf themotiv latter, what makese the motiv depravedifthemeans are withinone’slegalrights?Fortunatelyforthecourts,the casesinvariably inveolvev idence impairment, andso, afterstumbling around, theygetto aworkable conclusion. Congress has also taken this Poindexter route. struckdown the omnibus clause of§1505 onthe grounds that, as the sole definition ofobstruction, the word “corruptly” was unconstitutionally vague. 951 F.2d at 377-86.Tellingly, when Congress sought to “clarify” the meaning of “corruptly” inthe wake Poindexter of ,itsettledon enevmore vague language “acting withan improper motive” and then proceeded to qualify this definition further by adding, “including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information.” 18 U.S.C. §1515(b). The fact that Congress could not define “corruptly”exceptthrougha laundrylistofactsofev idenceimpairmentstronglyconfirmsthat,in the obstruction context, the word has no intrinsic meaning aparte sense from of its transitiv compromisingthehonestyofadecision-makerorimpairingev idence.
Atthe endofthe daythen, aslong as §1512is readas itwas intendedto i.e., as beread prohibitingactionsdesignedto sabotageaproceeding’saccesstocompleteandaccurate ev idence --the term “corruptly” es deriv meaning from that context. But once the word “corruptly” is deracinatedfromthatcontext, itbecomes essentiallymeaningless as astandard. While Mueller’s failure to define “corruptly” would be aiolation Due Process in itself, v his application ofthat “shapeless” prohibitiononpublicofficials engagedinthe dischargeoftheirduties impermissibly encroach onthe Executivfunction e by “cast[ing] the pall ofpotentialprosecution” ova er broad rangeoflawfulexercisesofExecutivdiscretion. e McDonnell , 136S.Ct. at2373-74.
ThechillingeffectismagnifiedstillfurtherbecauseMueller’sapproachfailstodefinethe kindofimpactan actionmusthav eto be consideredan“obstruction.” As long as the conceptof obstructionistiedtoev idenceimpairment,thenatureoftheactionsbeingprohibitedisdiscernable. But once taken out of this context, how does one differentiate between an unobjectionable
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 “influence” and an illegal “obstruction?” The actions being alleged as obstructions in this case illustrate thepoint. Assuming arguendo thatthePresidenthadmotivsuchthat, es underMueller’s theory, anydirectorderbyhimtoterminatetheinvestigationwouldbeconsideredanobstruction, what action short ofthat wouldbe impermissible? al The ofComeyis remov presumably being investigated as “obstructiv e” due to collateral some impact it could e hav on a proceeding. But removing an agency head does havthe not natural e and foreseeable consequence ofobstructing anyproceedingbeinghandledbythatagency. Howdoes one gaugewhetherthe collateraleffects ofone’sactionscouldimpermissiblyaffectaproceeding?
The same problem exists regarding the President’s comments en about Flynn. Ev ifthe President’smotiveswere suchthat,underMueller’stheory,hecouldnothavorderedtermination e ofaninv estigation,towhatextentdocommentsshortofthatconstituteobstruction?Ontheirface, the President’s comments to Comey about Flynn seem unobjectionable. He made the accurate observation that Flynn’s call with the Russian Ambassador was perfectly proper and made the point thatFlynn, who hadnowsufferedpublic humiliationfromlosinghis job, was agoodman. Basedonthis, heexpressedthe“hope”thatComeycould“seehiswayclear”toletthemattergo. TheformulationthatComey“seehiswayclear,”explicitlyleavthedecisionwithComey. es Most normal subordinates would note found hav these comments obstructive. Would a superior’s questioning the legal merit beofa obstructiv case e? Wouldpointing out some consequences of the subordinate’s position be obstructive? Is something really an “obstruction” ifit merely is pressureactinguponaprosecutor’spsyche? Istheobstructivenessofpressuregaugedobjectiv ely orbyhow a subordinatesubjectiv elyapprehendsit?
The practical implications ofMueller’s approach, especially in light ofits “shapeless” conceptofobstruction, are astounding. DOJlawyers always are makingdecisions thatinvite the allegation that they are improperly concluding or constrainingestigation. anAnd inv these allegations are frequently accompanied by a claim that the official is acting based on some nefarious motive. Under the theory now beinganced, adv any claim that an exercise of prosecutorial discretion improperlywas motived could legitimately be presentedas a potential criminal obstruction. The claim would be made that, unlesse motiv the subjectiv ations ofthe decisionmakerarethoroughlyexploredthroughagrandjuryinv estigation,theputativ e“improper motive”couldnotberuledout.
In an increasingly partisan ironment, env these concerns are by noial. means For triv decades, the Departmenthas beenroutinelyattackedbothforits failure to pursue certainmatters andforits decisions mov to eforwardonothers. Especially house when ofCongress a is heldby an opposing party, the Department is almost constantly being accused ofdeliberately scuttling enforcement in particular a class ofcases, usuallyolv inving env the ironmental are laws. There claims that cases are not being brought, or are being brought, to appease an Administration’s politicalconstituency, orthattheDepartmentisfailingtoinv estigateamatterinorderto covup er its ownwrongdoing, orto protectthe Administration. Departmentis bombardedwithrequests to nameaspecialcounseltopursuethisorthatmatter, anditisfrequentlyclaimedthathisreluctance todoso isbasedonanimpropermotivWhenasuperv e. isorinterv enes inacase,directingacourse ofactiondifferentfromthe onepreferredbythesubordinate, notinfrequentlythereis atendency forthesubordinateto ascribe some nefariousmotivAndwhenpersonnelchanges e. are made as
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 forexample, removing aU.S. Attorney there aresometimes claims mov thatthe ewas intended to truncate some investigation.
While these controversies have heretofore been waged largely on the field ofpolitical combat, Mueller’ssweepingobstructiontheorywouldnowopenthewayforthe“criminalization”ofthese disputes.Predictably,challengestotheDepartment’sdecisionswillbeaccompaniedbyclaimsthat the Attorney General, or otherisory superv officials, are “obstructing” justice because their directions are improperly motivated. Whenever the slightest colorable claim of a possible “improper motive” is advanced, there will be calls forestigation a criminal into inv possible “obstruction.” Theprospectofbeingaccusedofcriminalconduct,andpossiblybeinginv estigated for such, would itably inev cause officials “to shrink” from making potentiallyersial controv decisions.
Document ID: 0.7.22218.241328-000003 O'Callaghan, Edward C. (ODAG)
From: O'Callaghan, Edward C. (ODAG) Sent: Monday, April 1, 2019 7:25 PM To: Rosenstein, Rod (ODAG); Weinsheimer, Bradley (ODAG); Ellis, Corey F. (ODAG); Peterson, Andrew (ODAG) Subject: FW: Letter to AG Barr Attachments: 4.1.2019 Letter to William Barr+ appendix.pdf
Edward C. O'Callaghan 202-514-2105
From: Boyd, Stephen E. (OLA)
Making everyone aware ofthis new letter. SB
From: Hiller, Aaron ,(b)(6) Sent: Monday, April 1, 2019 6:43 PM To: Boyd, Stephen E. {OLA)
FYI.
From: McElvein, Elizabeth (b) (6) Sent: Monday, April 1, 2019 6:39 PM To: '[email protected]'
Attached, please find a letter to Attorney General Barr.
Regards,
Elizabeth H. McElvein Professional Staff Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives 202-226'lflll
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757
April 1,2019
The Honorable William P. Barr Attorney General U.S. Department ofJustice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530
Dear Attorney General Barr:
On March 25, 2019, we sent you a letter requesting that you produce to Congress the full report ofSpecial Counsel Robert S. Mueller III and its underlying evidence by Tuesday, April 2, 2019. "To the extent you believe the applicable law limits your ability" to produce the entire report, we urged that you "begin the process ofconsultation with us immediately" to resolve those issues without delay. 1 On Wednesday, April 3, 2019, the House Judiciary Committee plans to begin the process ofauthorizing subpoenas for the report and underlying evidence and materials. While we hope to avoid resort to compulsory process, if the Department is unwilling to produce the report to Congress in unredacted form, then we will have little choice but to take such action.
As Chairman Nadler explained in his phone conversation with you on March 27, Congress requires a complete and unedited copy ofthe Special Counsel's report, as well as access to the evidence and materials underlying that report. During your confirmation hearing in January, you stated that your "goal will be to provide as much transparency as I can consistent with the law." As such, ifthe Department believes it is unable to produce any ofthese materials in full due to rules governing grand jury secrecy, it should seek leave from the district court to produce those materials to Congress-as it has done in analogous situations in the past. To the extent you believe any other types ofredactions are necessary, we again urge you to engage in an
1 Letter from Chairpersons Jerrold Nadler, H Comm. on the Judiciary, Elijah Cummings H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, Adam Schiff, H. Penn. Select. Comm. on Intelligence, Maxine Waters, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Richard Neal, House Comm. on Ways & Means, and Eliot Engel, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, to Att'y Gen. William P. Barr (Mar. 25, 2019). See also Letter from Chairpersons Jerrold Nadler, H Comm. on the Judiciary, Elijah Cummings H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, Adam Schiff, H. Perm. Select. Comm. on Intelligence, Maxine Waters, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Richard Neal, House Comm. on Ways & Means, and Eliot Engel, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, to Att'y Gen. William P. Barr, informing him oftheir expectation that he will make Special Counsel Robert Mueller's report public "without delay and to the maximum extent permitted by law" (Feb. 22, 2019).
1 PRIN TED ON RECYCLED PAPER
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757-000001 immediate consultation to address and alleviate any concerns you have about providing that information to Congress. 2
We also reiterate our request that you appear before the Judiciary Committee as soon as possible-not in a month, as you have offered, but now, so that you can explain your decisions to first provide Congress with your characterization of the Mueller report as opposed to the report itself; to initiate a redaction process that withholds critical information from Congress; and to assume for yourself final authority over matters within Congress's constitutional purview. In addition, as Chairman Nadler also requested on his call with you, we ask for your commitment to refrain from interfering with Special Counsel Mueller testifying before the Judiciary Committee- and before any other relevant committees- after the report has been released regarding his investigation and findings.
Congress is, as a matter of law, entitled to each ofthe categories ofinformation you proposed to redact from the Special Counsel's report in your March 29 letter.3 In the attached appendix we provide a more complete legal analysis ofeach ofthe potential redaction categories your letter identified. We expect the Department will take all necessary steps without further delay-including seeking leave from the court to disclose the limited portions ofthe report that may involve grand jury materials- in order to satisfy your promise oftransparency and to allow Congress to fulfill its own constitutional responsibilities.4
Full release ofthe report to Congress is consistent with both congressional intent and the interests ofthe American public. On March 14, 2019, by a vote of420-0, the House unanimously passed H. Con. Res. 24, a resolution calling for "the full release" ofthe Special Counsel's report to Congress, as well as the public release ofthe Special Counsel's report except to the extent the disclosure of"any portion thereof is expressly prohibited by law." The American people have also consistently and overwhelmingly supported release of the full report. The President himself has likewise called for its release in full.
The allegations at the center ofSpecial Counsel Mueller's investigation strike at the core ofour democracy. Congress urgently needs his full, unredacted report and its underlying evidence in order to fulfill its constitutional role, including its legislative, appropriations, and
2 Congress is authorized by law and equipped to receive and examine the U.S. government's most sensitive materials and infonnation. The Department ofJustice and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation have long provided to relevant congressional committees sensitive law enforcement and investigatory infonnation and records in complete and unredacted form, including those involving classified infonnation, that are not provided to the general public.
3 Letter from Att'y Gen. William P. Barr to Chainnan Lindsey Graham, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Chairman Jerrold Nadler, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 29, 2019). 4 At a minimum, the Department should produce a detailed log ofeach redaction and the reasons supporting it in order to facilitate the accommodation process and to provide sufficient clarity for Congress to evaluate the Department's claims.
2
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757-000001 oversight responsibilities. Congress can and has historically been provided with sensitive, unredacted, and classified material that cannot be provided to the general public. In addition, the American people deserve to be fully informed about these issues ofextraordinary public interest, and therefore need to see the report and findings in Special Counsel Mueller's own words to the fullest extent possible.
For all these reasons, we hope you will produce to Congress an unredacted report and underlying materials to avoid the need for compulsory process.
Sincerely,
~...... an House Committee on Ways and Means '1.<3 /dif& Adam Schiff I Chairman House Committee on Financial Services House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ~ E-.C4'>,.,· ~ . t Elijah.Cummings Eliot L. Engel ~ Chainnan Chairman House Committee on Oversight and Reform House Committee on Foreign Affairs
3
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757-000001 Appendix: The Department of Justice Must Produce the Full Mueller Report
Congress urgently needs the full Special Counsel's report and the underlying evidence in order to fulfill its Article I constitutional functions, including its legislative, appropriations, and oversight responsibilities. Moreover, there is no basis for withholding from Congress the four categories of information described by the Attorney General in his March 29 letter to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.1
1. Congress Urgently Requires the Full Report and the Evidence
. The Attorney General's March 24 letter indicates that the Special Counsel found that President Trump may have criminally obstructed the Department' s investigation ofRussia's interference in the 2016 election and related matters.2 The Special Counsel pointedly stated that the evidence the investigation uncovered "does not exonerate" the President ofobstruction, and includes potentially criminal acts not yet known to the public. 3 It is difficult to overstate the seriousness ofthose actions if, in the wake of an attack by a hostile nation against our democracy, President Trump's response was to seek to undermine the investigation rather than take action against the perpetrators.
The longer the delay in obtaining this information, the more harm will accrue to Congress's independent duty to investigate misconduct by the President and to assure public confidence in the integrity and independence offederal law enforcement operations. These are not only matters of addressing the harm that has occurred; they are urgent ongoing concerns. As has been publicly reported and referenced in the March 24 letter, multiple open investigations referred by the Special Counsel to other U.S. Attorneys' offices may implicate the President or bis campaign, transition, inauguration, or businesses. These critically important inquiries could be compromised ifthe President is seeking to interfere with them. Among other things, Congress has considered and continues to consider legislation to protect the integrity ofthese type ofinvestigations against precisely the sorts of interference in which the President appears to have engaged. 4
1 Letter from Att'y Gen. William P. Barr to Chainnan Lindsey Graham, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Chairman Jerrold Nadler, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 29, 2019). 2 Letter from Att'y Gen. William P. Barr to Chairman Lindsey Graham and Ranking Member Dianne Feinstein, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Chairman Jerrold Nadler and Ranking Member Doug Collins, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 24, 2019) (hereinafter "March 24 Letter''). 3 March 24 Letter at 3 (the report "addresses a number ofactions by the President-most ofwhich have been the subject ofpublic reporting") ( emphasis added). 4 See H.R. 197 and S. 71, Special Counsel Independence and Integrity Act, 116th Cong (2019); see also H.R. 1357, Special Counsel Reporting Act, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1627, Abuse ofPardon Prevention Act, I 16th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1348, Presidential Pardon Transparency Act, I 16th Cong. (2019).
I
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757-000001 Moreover, the Judiciary Committee is engaged in an ongoing investigation of whether the President has undermined the rule of law, including by compromising the integrity ofthe Justice Department. Other committees are engaged in investigations related to whether the President, his associates, or members ofhis administration have engaged in other corrupt or unethical activities or are subject to foreign influence or compromise by actors abroad. Congress's authority "to inquire into and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies ofthe Government" has been unquestioned since "the earliest times in its history."5 That interest is at its height when Congress's oversight activities pertain to potentially illegal acts by the President. As a court determined in another context involving the release ofa report about potential obstruction ofjustice by a President, "[i]t would be difficult to conceive of a more compelling need than that ofthis country for an unswervingly fair inquiry based on all the pertinent information."6
The March 24 letter also claims that the Special Counsel's decision not to reach a definitive legal conclusion about obstruction "leaves it to the Attorney General to determine whether the conduct described in the report constitutes a crime."7 That view is fundamentally flawed. As a coequal branch of government- indeed, as the only branch ofgovernment that is expressly empowered by the Constitution to hold the President accountable- Congress must be permitted to assess the President's conduct for itself. The Attorney General cannot unilaterally make himself judge and jury. That is particularly so where the Attorney General has already expressed the view-in arguing against a theory ofobstruction in this very investigation-that "there is no legal prohibition ... against the President's acting on a matter in which he has a personal stake. "8
The Attorney General's pre-confirmation memorandum on this topic also stated that "the determination ofwhether the President is making decisions based on 'improper' motives or whether he is 'faithfully' discharging his responsibilities is left to the people, through the election process, and the Congress."9 Neither the American people nor Congress, however, can make any such a determination without all ofSpecial Counsel Mueller's evidence, analysis, and findings- unfiltered and in his own words.
5 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,200 n.33 (1957) (internal quotations omitted) 6 In re Report & Rec. ofJune 5, 1972 GrandJury Concerning Transmission ofEvidence to House of Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1230 (D.D.C. 1974). 7 March 24 Letter at 3. 8 William P. Barr, Memorandum Re: Mueller's "Obstruction" Theory at IO, June 8, 2018 (emphasis omitted). Additionally, although the Attorney General's March 24 letter states that the absence ofan underlying crime bears upon the President's intent, it is black-letter law that there need not be an underlying crime for obstruction ofjustice to occur. See, e.g., United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. I 999).
9 Id at 11.
2
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757-000001 The Special Counsel's investigation also confirmed that Russia engaged in extensive efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and Congress's need for that information is no less urgent. The Special Counsel's report, according to the Attorney General, describes "crimes committed by persons associated with the Russian government in connection with these efforts," including "efforts to conduct computer hacking operations designed to gather and disseminate information to influence the election."10
These hostile acts are ongoing: The Department has indicated in at least one other case · that Russian influence efforts continued into the 2018 midterm elections. 11 The Director of National Intelligence likewise testified last year in regard to the 2018 midterm elections that Russia would continue to use "persistent and disruptive cyber operations" and would target "elections as opportunities to undermine democracy" both here and against our allies in Europe. 12 More recently, Director Coats warned that Russia and other adversaries "probably are already looking to the 2020 U.S. election" to conduct malign influence operations and that "Moscow may employ additional influence toolkits-such as spreading disinformation, conducting hack-and-leak operations, or manipulating data- in a more targeted fashion to influence U.S. policy, actions, and elections."13 It is imperative that Congress have access to the Special Counsel's full descriptions and evidence ofthese crimes and malign influence operations that the Russian government or associated actors perpetrated against our democracy.
Moreover, the Attorney General's March 24 letter acknowledges "multiple offers from Russian-affiliated individuals to assist the Trump campaign."14 The facts and circumstances uncovered by the Special Counsel's Office surrounding these and any other overtures by foreign actors, as well as the individuals associated with them and how they responded to such offers, are ofvital importance to Congress. The Foreign Affairs Committee, for example, requires access to these facts as it investigates whether the foreign and financial entanglements ofthe President and bis associates may be improperly influencing foreign policy in ways that serve their private interests rather than the national security of the United States. Moreover, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence must have access to the full facts as it evaluates counterintelligence threats and risks during and since the 2016 U.S. election, and as it considers
10 March 24 Letter at 2. 11 See Criminal Complaint~ 14, United States v. Khusyaynova, No. 1: 18-mj-464 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2018)(alleging Russian national participated in a conspiracy "to interfere with U.S. political and electoral processes, including the 2018 U.S. elections"). 12 Patricia Zengerle and Diona Chaicu, US. 2018 Elections 'Under Attack' by Russia: US. Intelligence Chief, Reuters, Feb. 13, 2018. 13 Worldwide Threats: Hearing before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (Jan. 29, 2019) (Statement ofDaniel R. Coats, Director ofNational Intelligence). 14 March 24 Letter at 2.
3
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757-000001 remedies necessary to prevent, or mitigate to the greatest extent possible, the vulnerability of campaigns, or persons associated with them, to foreign influence or compromise operations.
Congressional committees have conducted multiple hearings regar.ding foreign influence operations and the security ofour election systems and have proposed numerous legislative reforms to address vtilnerabilities.15 In an appropriations bill enacted into law last year, Congress allocated much-needed funding to support election security initiatives.16 It is critical to legislation that has or will be introduced this year to understand foreign intelligence . disinformation campaigns, risks to our election infrastructure security, evolving methods ofvoter targeting and suppression, and the manner in which foreign adversaries seek to exploit campaign vulnerabilities as well as the technology industry in our elections moving forward.
In addition, the House ofRepresentatives' appropriations process for the next fiscal year is already underway- including for funding any election security, cybersecurity, and offensive or defensive counterintelligence operations needed to combat attacks during the 2020 election with submission deadlines scheduled for April and appropriations packages expected to reach the House floor in June. 17 However, Congress cannot fully address the scope ofthese threats (whether through appropriations or other legislation) without a thorough accounting by the Special Counsel's Office ofthe attack that occurred in 2016. Indeed, it is difficult to envision any function ofCongress more important than ensuring the integrity ofour democratic elections, authorizing and appropriating funding for the relevant federal authorities, and authorizing critical national security programs.
2. The Application ofRule 6(e) is Limited and Does Not Bar Disclosures to Congress
The Attorney General has indicated that the Department is reviewing the Special Counsel's report to identify material whose disclosure may be limited by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which prohibits certain disclosures of"matter[s] occurring before the grand jury." Iri a call with Chairman Nadler, the Attorney General suggested that redactions made in accordance with Rule 6(e) will be substantial. But even assuming Rule 6(e) applies with respect to disclosures to Congress; 18 the law clearly forbids the Department from making
15 See, e.g., Secure America from Russian Interference Act, H.R. 6437, 115th Cong. (2018); Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act, H.R. 4884, 115th Cong. (2018); Bot Disclosure Accountability Act, S. 3127, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. 5011 , Election Security Act, 115th Cong. (2018); For the People Act, H.R. 1, 116th Cong (2019). 16 Pub. L. No. 115-141, Div. E, tit. V (2018). 17 See Hearings, H. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th Cong. (2019); Paul M. Krawzak, House appropriations may start markup in April, RollCall, Mar. 19, 2019. 18 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Jrrv. ofVen-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1302, 1304-08 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (holding that Congress has "an independent right" under the Constitution to obtain requested documents regardless ofwhether they are subject to Rule 6(e)); In re Proceedings o/GrandJury No. 81-1 (Miami), 669 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (S.D.
4
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757-000001 sweeping designations as to any evidence that happens to have been presented to a grand jury or was obtained through a grand jury subpoena.
Rule 6(e) "does not 'draw a veil ofsecrecy ... over all matters occurring in the world that happen to be investigated by a grand jury. "'19 "The ~ere fact that information has been presented to the grand jury does not" mean that the information is prohibited from disclosure. 20 Further, as the D.C. Circuit has made clear, the fact that evidence was obtained through a grand jury subpoena does not necessarily mean that it is barred from disclosure by Rule 6(e). 21 As a result, the Department cannot withhold documents or information simply because they were produced in response to a grand jury subpoena. Because a person receiving the documents would not know whether they were obtained through a grand jury subpoena or other means, "subpoenaed documents would not necessarily reveal a connection to a grandjury."22 Just last
~ year, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed this principal in Bartko v. Dep 't ofJustice, where it made clear that "copies ofspecific records provided to a federal grand jury" were not covered by Rule 6(e) because "'the mere fact the documents were subpoenaed fails to justify withholding under Rule 6(e)."' 23
For this reason, it is clear the Department cannot withhold portions ofthe Special Counsel's report merely because they discuss information that was presented to the grand jury or documents that were obtained through a grand jury subpoena. Likewise, the Department cannot withhold underlying evidence simply because it was presented to the grand jury or obtained through a grand jury subpoena. That is particularly so because the Special Counsel's Office obtained a great deal ofevidence by other means. The Special Counsel's team interviewed numerous witnesses on a voluntary basis and acquired voluminous records without resorting to grand jury subpoenas.24 Other evidence was obtained through different types ofmandatory legal process, such as through the issuance of nearly 500 search warrants. 25 That evidence can of course be disclosed without implicating Rule 6(e). And because so much evidence was obtained
Fla. 1987) (similar). But see In re GrandJury Investigation a/Uranium Indus., Misc. 78-173, 1979 WL 1661, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, I 979). No circuit court has squarely addressed this issue.
19 Labow v. Dep 't ofJustice, 83 l F.3d 523, 529 (D.C. Cir.2016) (quoting Senate ofthe Com. ofPuerto Rico v. Dep 't ofJustice, 823 F.2d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.)). 20 Id. at 529. 21 Id. at 529-30. 22 Id at 529. 23 898 F.3d 51, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Labow, 831 F.3d at 530). 24 See, e.g. , Philip Rucker et al., A Mueller Mystery: How Trump Dodged a Special Counsel Interview- and a Subpoena Fight, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2019 (quoting the President' s attorney, Rudolph Giuliani, who stated, "We allowed [the Special Counsel's office] to investigate everybody, and [the White House] turned over every document they were asked for: 1.4 million documents."). 25 March 24 Letter at l.
5
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757-000001 through these other means, the Department would have no basis to withhold materials or descriptions ofmaterials that it happens to have gathered by issuing grand jury subpoenas. So long as those materials do not on their face "'reveal a connection to a grand jury,"' Rule 6(e) does not bar their disclosure. 26
As to testimony or other grand jury materials that are genuinely subject to Rule 6(e), the Department can and should work with the House Judiciary Committee to obtain the permission ofthe district court overseeing the grand jury to make disclosures to Congress on a confidential basis, as it has done in the past in analogous circumstances. The Department took that precise path after the grandjury considering evidence in the Watergate affair issued a report describing potentially criminal acts by President Nixon. The Justice Department filed briefs fully supporting disclosure ofthe report to the House Judiciary Committee, and made the obvious point that "[t]he need for the House to be able to make its profoundly important judgment on the basis ofall available information is as compelling as any that could be conceived."27 Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr likewise sought the court's authorization to disclose grand jury material regarding President Clinton to the House of Representatives.28
The district court would have ample authority to permit disclosure ofrelevant materials to Congress. As ChiefJudge Howell, the judge overseeing this grand jury, explained in a recent opinion, "numerous courts have recognized [that] a district court retains an inherent authority to unseal and disclose grand jury material not otherwise falling within the enumerated exceptions to Rule 6(e). "29 Indeed, every federal court ofappeals to have considered this question has reached that conclusion.3° Congress's need for these materials is beyond compelling, and the public interest in Congress receiving these materials is at its height. President Trump, moreover, has
26 Barko, 898 F.3d at 73 (quoting Labow, 831 F.3d at 529). 27 Mem. for the United States on Behalfofthe Grand Jury at 16, In re Report & Rec. ofJune 5, 1972 Grand Jury, Misc. No. 74-21 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 1974). 28 See Order, In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Assoc., Div. No. 94-1 (D.C. Cir. Special Div. July 7, 1998). 29 In re App. to Unseal Dockets Related to the Independent Counsel's I 998 Investigation ofPresident Clinton, 308 F. Supp. 3d 314,323 (D.D.C. 2018). 30 Id. at 323-24. See Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 763 (7th Cir. 2016); In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Pet. to Inspect & Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F.2d 1261, 1268 (l l th Cir. 1984); see also Pitch v. United States, 915 F.3d 704, 708-09 (11th Cir. 2019); Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (court was "in general agreement with" the district court's decision to release the Watergate grand jury's report to Congress). The D.C. Circuit heard argument last fall in a case involving a historian who seeks the release ofgrand jury material involving an incident that occurred in the 1950s pursuant to the court's inherent authority to release materials otherwise covered by Rule 6(e). McKeever v. Barr, No. 17-5149. The facts ofthat case are obviously distinct from those presented here. As the Department explained in its brief in McKeever, "[t]he question in this appeal is whether ... a district court may order the disclosure ofsecret grand jury records solely for reasons of historical or academic interest."
6
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757-000001 expressed public support for the report's release.31 As such, the Department should immediately request that these materials be released to Congress. ·
The Attorney General has refused thus far to work with Congress in that regard. At his confirmation hearing, however, the Attorney General stated: "I .. . believe it is very important that the public and Congress be informed ofthe results ofthe special counsel's work. My goal will be to provide as much transparency as I can consistent with the law."32 The most efficacious way to honor that commitment would be to join with the House Judiciary Committee in seeking expedited disclosure ofany Rule 6(e) material to Congress, and to refer any questions about the scope ofRule 6(e)'s application to independent court review.
3. Any Potential Claim ofExecutive Privilege Has Been Waived
Although the Attorney Generdl's March 24 letter made no mention of executive privilege, his March 29 letter states that ''there are no plans to submit the report to the White House for a privilege review," because the President "intends to defer" to the Attorney General on those issues. Whatever that may mean, it would be highly improper for the Department to conceal portions ofthe report based on claims ofexecutive privilege on behalfofthe President. As an initial matter, the Department's own long-standing policy is that executive privilege "should not be invoked to conceal evidence ofwrongdoing or criminality on the part of executive officers."33
In any event, the President and the White House have waived any claims ofexecutive privilege. The White House voluntarily disclosed millions ofdocuments to the Special Counsel's office and permitted multiple senior officials to be interviewed by the Special Counsel's team, without asserting any type ofprivilege.34 Having voluntarily disclosed this evidence, the President cannot now seek to invoke executive privilege to block its release. As the D.C. Circuit has held in an analogous context, regarding waiver ofattorney-client privilege, "[t]he client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim ofconfidentiality to obstruct others."35 Moreover, the White House has similarly shared information and documents with numerous former White House
31 Liam Stack, Trump Says Mueller Report Should Be Made Public: 'Let People See It,' N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2019. 32 The Nomination ofthe Honorable William Pelham Barr to be Attorney General ofthe United States, hearing before the S. Comm. on.the Judiciary, Jan. 15, 2019 (statement ofthe Hon. William Barr). 33 Robert B. Shanks, Office ofLegal Counsel, Congressional Subpoenas ofDepartment ofJustice Investigative Files, 8 Op. O.L.C. 252,267 (1984). 34 See Rucker et al., supra note 24; Michael Schmidt and Maggie Haberman, White House Counsel, Don McGahn, Has Cooperated Extensively in Mueller Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2018 (noting that no privilege was asserted). 35 Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
7
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757-000001 officials and their private counsel.36 The D.C. Circuit has expressly held that the White House "waive[s] its claims ofprivilege in regard to [] specific documents that it voluntarily reveal[ s] to · third parties outside the White House, "37
Lastly, in the unlikely event that the White House has preserved privilege as to any ofthe evidence underlying the Mueller report, the public interest in disclosure would still overwhelmingly outweigh the President's interest in secrecy. The privilege pertaining to presidential communications is not absol~te. Just as the Supreme Court determined in United States v. Nixon, the public interest here in the "fair administration ofjustice" outweighs the President's "generalized interest in confidentiality."38
4. Ongoing Investigations, Classified Information. and Privacy and Reputational Interests ofThird Parties Should Not Prevent Release to Congress
The fact that certain investigations remain ongoing camiot justify the Department withholding critical evidence from Congress that pertains to Russia's interference in our federal elections or obstruction ofjustice by the President. Indeed, during the previous Congress, the Department produced to congressional committees ~ousands ofpages ofhighly sensitive law enforcement and classified investigatory and deliberative records.39 Many ofthese were related to this very same investigatio_n-. which ofcourse was open and ongoing at the time.
Similarly, the mere presence ofclassified information in the Mueller report or in underlying evidence cannot justify withholding evidence from Congress, which is well equipped to handle classified information and does so on a daily basis. The Department can provide any classified materials to the appropriate committees for handling in secure facilities. It can also permit the Intelligence Community to review the report on an expedited basis in order to share with Congress whatever equities the Intelligence Community feels may be implicated by the release ofspecific information contained in the report or any underlying materials. Additionally, to the extent the Special Counsel's Office is in possession of underlying evidence that is particularly sensitive, the relevant committees are in a position to work with the Department to reach an accommodation to ensure appropriate handling as Congress has in the past on numerous occasions. However, the Department should not be able to simply invoke the same reasons for redacting the report from public view as a shield against disclosure to a coequal branch of government.
36 See, e.g., Schmidt and Haberman, supra note 34. 31 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 741-42 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 38 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974). 39 See, e.g., DOJ hands over new classified documents on Russia probe to Congress, Associated Press, June 23, 2018; Charlie Savage, Carter Page FISA Released by Justice Department, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2018
8
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757-000001 Finally, the Department also should not be able to keep from Congress information related to the "reputational interests ofperipheral third parties" as referenced in the Attorney General's March 29 letter. To the extent the Special Counsel has developed information relative to President Trump's family members (including those employed by the White House) or his associates, campaign employees, consultants, advisers, and others within the scope ofthe investigation, that should not be withheld from Congress. It is precisely the type ofinfonnation that the relevant committees need to perform their oversight, legislative, and other responsibilities. There is no constitutionally recognized privilege that would apply in such instances, and there is ample precedent for provision ofsuch information, as recently as the last Congress.
9
Document ID: 0.7.22218.317757-000001 Boyd, Stephen E. (OLA)
From: Boyd, Stephen E. (OLA) Sent: Thursday, May 2, 2019 10:04 AM To: Rosenstein, Rod (ODAG) Subject: Fwd: Letter to Inspector General Horowitz and Director Amundson Attachments: 2019.04.30 Letter to OOJ OIG and OPR.pdf; ATT00001.htm
Sent from my iPhone
Begin forwarded message:
From: nWeinsheimer, Bradley (OOAG)"
FYSA. Brad.
From: Amundson, Corey {OPR)
FYI
From: Berger, Christine (Judiciary-Dem} Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2019 1:11 PM To: 'lee, Rene R. (OIG'
Dear all,
Please find attached a copy of a letter sent by mail to Inspector General Horowitz and Director Amundson from Senators Mazie K. Hirano, Richard Blumenthal, Kamala D. Harris, Ed ward J. Markey, Tom Udall, Ron Wyden, Sheldon Whitehouse, Patty Murray, Cory A. Booker, Jack Reed, Kristen Gillibrand, and Amy Klobuchar.
Best regards, Christine
Document ID: 0.7.22218.246827 Clwi.rti- Bwgnr Smior Co1111MI Office ofSenator ).£azie K I-fuono I Committee on the Judiciary 713 Hart Senate Office Bldg. \'fashington, D C 20510 (202) 224-
Document ID: 0.7.22218.246827 tinitrd ~tatrs ~rnatr WASHINGTON, DC 20510
April 30, 2019
The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz Corey R. Amundson Inspector General Director and ChiefCounsel U.S. Department ofJustice Office of Professional Responsibility 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW U.S. Department ofJustice Washington, D.C. 20530 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 3266 Washington, D.C. 20530
Dear Inspector General Horowitz and Director Amundson:
We write regarding the serious concerns that have been raised about the actions of Attorney General William Barr with respect to his handling of Special Counsel Robert Mueller's report. Attorney General Barr's actions raise significant questions about his decision not to recuse himself from overseeing the Special Counsel's investigation, whether his actions with respec1 to the release ofthe report complied with Department ofJustice policies and practices, and whether he has demonstrated sufficient impartiality to continue overseeing the fourteen criminal matters related to the Special Counsel's investigation that were referred principally to other components ofthe Department ofJustice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBD. 1 In light ofthese concerns, we respectfully request that the Office of the Inspector General and the Office of Professional Responsibility immediately begin investigations of these issues.
Six months before his nomination to be Attorney General, Mr. Barr wrote an unsolicited 19-page memo to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel Steve Engel criticizing Special Counsel Mueller's investigation ofobstruction ofjustice by Donald Trump.2 In his memo, Mr. Barr conceded that he was "in the dark about many facts," and yet he asserted that "Mueller's obstruction theory is fatally misconceived" and premised on a "legally insupportable reading of the law."3 Mr. Barr also argued that "Mueller should not be permitted to demand that the President submit to interrogation about alleged obstruction."4 Despite this memo, which presents, at the very least, an appearance of bias, Mr. Barr refused to recuse himself from directly overseeing Special Counsel Mueller's investigation when he was confirmed as Attorney General. 5 While the Justice Department stated that Attorney General Barr's decision to not recuse was consistent with the advice ofsenior ethics attorneys, it provided few details _about the nature ofthis seemingly anomalous decision. Given the Attorney General's subsequent troubling actions in handling the Special Counsel's report, further investigation ofthe process leading to his non-recusal decision is warranted.
1 Department of Justice, Report On The Investigation Into Russian fnlerference In The 2016 Presidential Election, Appendix D, https://www. iustice.gov/storagc/repo1t.pdf. 2 Memo from Bill Barr to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Assistant Attorney General Steve Engel, June 8, 201 8, available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/549-june-20 I 8-barr-memo-to-doj mue/b4c05e.'393 I 8dd2d 136b3/optimized/full.pdf#page= l. 3 id. at l. 4 Ibid. 5 See Josh Gerstein, Barr won't recuse himself.from Mueller oversight, POLITICO (March 4, 2019), hrtps://www.poJitico.com/story/20 19/03/04/barr-wonr-recuse-mueller-I 203210.
Document ID: 0.7.22218.246827-000001 Attorney General Barr's actions following the completion of Special Counsel Mueller's report raise further questions regarding his impartiality towards the Special Counsel's investigation and the appropriateness ofhis conduct as the chief law enforcement officer of the United States. After notifying Congress and the public on Friday, March 22, 2019, that he had received the Special Counsel's report,6 Attorney General Barr released a four-page letter on March 24, 2019, that purported "to summarize the principal conclusions reached by the Special Counsel."7 The letter, however, selectively quoted fragments from the Special Counsel's report. Moreover, the subsequent release of the redacted report revealed that the Attorney General's letter had presented quotations from the report out ofcontext or with key words omitted to suggest that the President had been cleared ofwrongdoing.8 Given that the Special Counsel's report included executive summaries that seem to have been readily available for public release, we found the letter particularly concerning as a possible effort to mislead the public.
We are also troubled by the Attorney General's use of his March 24 letter to summarily conclude that the "evidence developed during the Special Counsel's investigation is not sufficient to establish that the President committed an obstruction-of-justice offense."9 The letter asserts, without any justification, that the Special Counsel's decision not to reach "any legal conclusions leaves it to the Attorney General to determine whether the conduct described in the report constitutes a crime." 10 It is unclear what statute, regulation, or policy led the Attorney General to interject his own conclusion that the President's conduct did not amount to obstruction ofjustice, particularly when he had not yet released the redacted Special Counsel's report, which explicitly noted that "if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction ofjustice, we would so state." 11 The Attorney General's conduct is even more concerning given that the report itself identifies Congress's impeachment authority and future prosecution once the President leaves office as possible ways to address the obstruction ofjustice evidence. But the report does not refer to a purported role ofthe Attorney General to make legal conclusions that the Special Counsel expressly declined to make. 12
In addition, we found disturbing that Attorney General Barr provided the President's personal attorneys access to the Special Counsel's report before Congress and the public. News reports indicate that the Attorney General granted Rudy Giuliani, Jay Sekulow and two other Trump lawyers access to review the full redacted report for two days before providing the redacted report to Congress and the public. 13 While the Attorney General asserted that the President's personal attorneys' request to review the redacted report before its public release "was consistent with the practice followed under the Ethics in Government Act," we have serious concerns about
6 Letter from Attorney General William Barr (March 22, 2019), available at https://int .nvt. com/data/documen thelper/708-attomey-genera 1-wi 11 iam-barr-letter rnue Il er/b7fd3a05ab6 I 8bad8544/optimized/ fu 11.pdf#page= I . 7 Letter from Attorney General William Barr (March 24, 2019), available at littps:!/www.docu mentc loud.org/documents/S779688-AG-March-24 -2019-Letter-to-H ouse-and-Senate.html. 8 See Charlie Savage, How Barr 's Excerpts Compare lo the Mue/Jer Report's Findings, N.Y. TlMES (April 20, 2019), https://www.nytirnes.com/20 19/04/ I9/us/pol itics/muel !er-report-will iarn-barr-excerpts.html. 9 Supra note 7. IO Ibid. 11 Supra note l, at vol. 2, p. 8. 12 See, e.g., supra note I, at vol. 2, p. 8, 178. 13 See, e.g., Karen Freifeld, Trump lawyers reviewed Mue/Jer report/or IO hours before it was made public, REUTERS (April 19, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-Lrurnp•russia-lawyers-idUSKCN IRV 18M. 2
Document ID: 0.7.22218.246827-000001 the propriety ofthe Attorney General's decision to grant access to the full redacted report, particularly when he did not appear to grant other individuals named in the report similar access and he did not limit review to the portions ofthe report referencing Donald Trump. 14 This decision to purportedly act "consistent with the practice" under an expired law merits exacting review to determine whether the Attorney General's action was appropriate and justified, given that he ignored other provisions of this law, such as those requiring Congress to be provided with information necessary to enable it to conduct proper oversight. 15
We further believe that Attorney General Barr's decision to hold a press conference to assert his own views regarding the report well before releasing the redacted report and his statements at the press conference warrant serious scrutiny as to whether they were proper and consistent with Justice Department policies and practices. At the press conference, Attorney General Barr appeared to make statements that were inconsistent with the Special Counsel's findings and demonstrated a lack of impartiality. For example, the Attorney General claimed that "the White House fully cooperated with the Special Counsel's investigation," despite the Special Counsel's detailed findings ofPresident Trump's efforts to obstruct the investigation, refusal to be interviewed by the Special Counsel, and submission of "inadequate" written responses. 16 The Attorney General also repeatedly asserted that there was "no collusion," defending the President as "frustrated and angered by a sincere belief that the investigation was undermining his presidency."17
Moreover, the Attorney General's statements at the press conference compounded the misleading impression he created in his March 24 letter regarding the Special Counsel's determinations regarding the criminality of the President's conduct. ln both his March 24 letter and his statements at the press conference, Attorney General Barr gave the misimpression that the guidelines from the Justice Department's Office ofLegal Counsel (OLC) against indicting a sitting president played little to no role in the Special Counsel' s decision to not charge the President with obstruction ofjustice. 18 The redacted report, however, makes clear that the OLC's guidelines played a significant role in the Special Counsel's decision, stating that the Special Counsel's office "accepted OLC's legal conclusion for the purpose ofexercising prosecutorial jurisdiction."19 These statements and actions, along with the Attorney General's prior statements, such as his claim that the federal government's investigation ofthe Trump campaign constituted "spying," also indicate that he lacks the impartiality to continue overseeing ongoing matters stemming from the Special Counsel's investigation.20
14 Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Remarks on the Release ofthe Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, April 18, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney gencral-w i11 iarn-p-barr-del ive rs-rcmarks-release-repo1t-in vestigat ion-russian. 15 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 59S(c); 28 U.S.C. 594(h). 16 Compare ibid with supra note 1, Appendix C. 11 Supra note IS. 18 Aaron Blake, How William Barr successfully pre-spun the Mueller report/or Trump, N.Y. TIMES (April 19, 2019), https://www.washfogtonpost.com/politics/20 19/04/19/how-will iam-barr-successfu lly-pre-spun-muell er report-trump/?utm term=. 122c Ic636 2ba. 19 Supra note I, at vol. 1, p. I. 20 See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos and Adam Goldman, Barr Asserts Intelligence Agencies Spied on the Trump Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (April I0, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/1 0/ys/politics/barr-trump-campaign: spyjng.brml. 3
Document ID: 0.7.22218.246827-000001 Given these concerns, we therefore urge the Office ofthe Inspector General and the Office of Professional Responsibility to initiate immediately investigations ofthe following matters: • Whether Attorney General Barr's decision not to recuse himself from overseeing the Special Counsel's investigation was proper and consistent with ethical rules and practices within the Department ofJustice; • Whether Attorney General Barr's four-page letter dated March 24, 2019, regarding Special Counsel Mueller's report was misleading and whether it was consistent with Department ofJustice policies and practices; • Whether Attorney General Barr's actions in permitting President Trump's private attorneys to review the entire Special Counsel's report at length before sharing the report with Congress, other individuals named in the report, and the public, was appropriate and consistent with Department of Justice policies and practices; • Whether Attorney General Barr's press conference on April 18, 2019, regarding Special Counsel Mueller's report, which took place well before he released a redacted version of the report, was misleading and consistent with Department ofJustice policies and practices; • Whether Attorney General Barr has demonstrated sufficient impartiality to continue overseeing the ongoing matters related to the Special Counsel's investigation referenced in Appendix D ofthe Special Counsel's report; • Whether Attorney General Barr took any steps related to the transfers and referrals listed in Appendix D ofthe report that were contrary to the advice ofcareer prosecutors at the Justice Department or the Department's policies; and • Whether any ofAttorney General Barr's other actions or statements call into question his impartiality such that they warrant his recusal from particular matters or are relevant to the Senate Judiciary Committee's oversight into the Department ofJustice.
Thank you for your consideration of this important matter. We look forward to a prompt response.
Sincerely, ~a..~~ RICHARD BLUMENTHAL United States Senator United States Senator ~ Hq ~ ~~~ United States Senator United States Senator
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Document ID: 0.7.22218.246827-000001 RONWYDEN United States Senator United States Senator ~ United States Senator United States Senator J __...,. 0: ~ •CZ~~~~--__, CORY A. BOOKER United States Senator ~~ A ll\~ KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND A~ CHAR United States Senator United States Senator
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Document ID: 0.7.22218.246827-000001