An Examination of Revisit Intention Based on Perceived Smart Tourism Technology Experience
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Intentionality in Kant and Wittgensetin
Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato Volume 6 Article 5 2006 Intentionality in Kant and Wittgensetin Ryan Feldbrugge Minnesota State University, Mankato Follow this and additional works at: https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Feldbrugge, Ryan (2006) "Intentionality in Kant and Wittgensetin," Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato: Vol. 6 , Article 5. Available at: https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur/vol6/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Research Center at Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato by an authorized editor of Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato. Feldbrugge: Intentionality in Kant and Wittgensetin INTENTIONALITY IN KANT AND WITTGENSTEIN Ryan Feldbrugge (Philosophy) Dr. Richard Liebendorfer, Faculty Mentor, Philosophy How is thought about and experience of a world possible? This has been the framing question of the present work and it is generally understood as the problem of intentionality. The more specific problem dealt with has been whether or not intentionality has an internal structure that can be made explicit through science, particularly cognitive science. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant outlines an internal, mental structure that, when imposed on our sensory data, makes thought about and experience of a world possible, which can be viewed as highly anticipatory of modern cognitive science. On the other hand, there are a number of philosophers who have it that the structure of intentionality cannot be made explicit nor can it be understood within science, notably Ludwig Wittgenstein. -
David Lewis on Convention
David Lewis on Convention Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone Center for Cognitive Science Rutgers University David Lewis’s landmark Convention starts its exploration of the notion of a convention with a brilliant insight: we need a distinctive social competence to solve coordination problems. Convention, for Lewis, is the canonical form that this social competence takes when it is grounded in agents’ knowledge and experience of one another’s self-consciously flexible behavior. Lewis meant for his theory to describe a wide range of cultural devices we use to act together effectively; but he was particularly concerned in applying this notion to make sense of our knowledge of meaning. In this chapter, we give an overview of Lewis’s theory of convention, and explore its implications for linguistic theory, and especially for problems at the interface of the semantics and pragmatics of natural language. In §1, we discuss Lewis’s understanding of coordination problems, emphasizing how coordination allows for a uniform characterization of practical activity and of signaling in communication. In §2, we introduce Lewis’s account of convention and show how he uses it to make sense of the idea that a linguistic expression can come to be associated with its meaning by a convention. Lewis’s account has come in for a lot of criticism, and we close in §3 by addressing some of the key difficulties in thinking of meaning as conventional in Lewis’s sense. The critical literature on Lewis’s account of convention is much wider than we can fully survey in this chapter, and so we recommend for a discussion of convention as a more general phenomenon Rescorla (2011). -
Does Social Reality Widen the Intention-Behavior Gap?
When Intentions Go Public Does Social Reality Widen the Intention-Behavior Gap? Peter M. Gollwitzer,1,2 Paschal Sheeran,3 Verena Michalski,2 and Andrea E. Seifert2 1New York University, 2UniversitdJ Konstanz, and 3University of Sheffield ABSTRACT-Based on Lewiniangoal theory in general and countability-related features of the audience (e.g., competence, self-completion theory in particular, four experiments ex power) and the individual (e.g., identifiability, expectations of amined the implications of other people taking notice of having to explain oneself) affect the strength of public-com one~ identity-related behavioral intentions (e.g., the in mitment effects. tention to read law periodicals regularly to reach the Both of these lines of research focus on intentions in which the identity goal of becoming a lawyer). Identity-related be specified behavior is a desired outcome in and of itself. Lewin havioral intentions that had been noticed by other people (1926) and his colleagues (e.g., Mahler, 1935; Ovsiankina, were translated into action less intensively than those that 1928), however, argued that people often construe behavioral had been ignored (Studies 1-3). This effect was evident in intentions in more general terms, thus allowing substitution of the field (persistent striving over 1 week~time; Study 1) means for attainment. For instance, consider a student who has and in the laboratory (jumping on opportunities to act; started an assigned math task with the intention to successfully Studies 2 and 3), and it held among participants with solve the required addition problems. During the process, this strong but not weak commitment to the identity goal (Study student may construe the intention as being to demonstrate 3). -
Expressions of Mind/Body Dualism in Thinspiration
MIND OVER MATTER: EXPRESSIONS OF MIND/BODY DUALISM IN THINSPIRATION Annamarie O’Brien A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS August 2013 Committee: Dr. Marilyn Motz, Advisor Dr. Rebecca Kinney Dr. Jeremy Wallach © 2013 Annamarie O’Brien All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Dr. Marilyn Motz, Advisor Thinspiration images, meant to inspire weight-loss, proliferate online through platforms that encourage the circulation of user-generated content. Despite numerous alarmist critiques in mass media about thinspiration and various academic studies investigating ‘pro-anorexia’ sites, surprisingly little attention has been given to the processes of creation and the symbolic potential of thinspiration. This thesis analyzes the formal hybridity of thinspiration, and its use as an expressive medium. The particularities of thinspiration (including its visual characteristics, creative processes, and exhibition) may be considered carefully constructed instances of self- representation, hinging on the expression of beliefs regarding the mind and body. While these beliefs are deeply entrenched in popular body management discourse, they also tend to rely on traditional dualist ideologies. Rather than simply emphasizing slenderness or reiterating standard assumptions about beauty, thinspiration often evokes pain and sadness, and employs truisms about the transcendence of flesh and rebellion against social constraints. By harnessing individualist discourse and the values of mind/body dualism, thinspiration becomes a space in which people struggling with disordered eating and body image issues may cast themselves as active agents—contrary to the image of eating disorders proffered by popular and medical discourse. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First, I would like to thank my thesis committee chair, Dr. -
Understanding Travelers' Behavior for Sustainable Smart Tourism: a Technology Readiness Perspective
sustainability Article Understanding Travelers’ Behavior for Sustainable Smart Tourism: A Technology Readiness Perspective Meena Kumari Pradhan 1, Jungjoo Oh 2 and Hwansoo Lee 3,* 1 Royal Institute for Tourism and Hospitality, Tourism Council of Bhutan, 1147 Kawang, Dajo (Upper Motithang), 1147 Thimphu, Bhutan; [email protected] 2 Interdisciplinary Graduate Program in IT Law, Dankook University, 152 Jukjeon-ro, Suji-gu, 16890 Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do 448-701, Korea; [email protected] 3 Department of Convergent Security, Dankook University, 152 Jukjeon-ro, Suji-gu, 16890 Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do 448-701, Korea * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +82-31-8005-3959 Received: 23 October 2018; Accepted: 15 November 2018; Published: 18 November 2018 Abstract: Smart tourism has contributed to making people’s travels easier and more enjoyable, but sometimes has a negative impact on their travel experience. The challenges travelers face while using smart devices have not been researched in detail and are relatively unknown. While most studies have considered the usefulness of smart devices in tourism, negative perceptions of smart tourism have rarely been discussed. Thus, this study investigates travelers’ risk perceptions of smart tourism from a technology readiness perspective. It examines the impact of optimism, innovativeness, insecurity, and discomfort on travelers’ usage intentions of smart devices through their perceived risks and benefits. To test the proposed model and corresponding hypotheses, a partial least squares analysis was performed on data collected from 250 survey respondents. The results showed that the perceived benefits of smart devices had a significant effect on usage intentions of smart devices while traveling. It was also confirmed that the influence of perceived risks depends on the characteristics of travelers. -
Smart Tourism City: Developments and Transformations
sustainability Concept Paper Smart Tourism City: Developments and Transformations Pam Lee 1, William Cannon Hunter 2 and Namho Chung 2,* 1 College of Hotel & Tourism Management, Kyung Hee University, 26 Kyungheedae-ro, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul 02447, Korea; [email protected] 2 Smart Tourism Education Platform, Kyung Hee University, 26 Kyungheedae-ro, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul 02447, Korea; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +82-2-961-2353; Fax: +82-2-961-9557 Received: 13 April 2020; Accepted: 10 May 2020; Published: 12 May 2020 Abstract: Cities and tourism entities invest massive resources into smart system initiatives as information technologies are a key factor for a city’s destination competitiveness. Moreover cities around the world are increasingly recognizing the smart tourism city concept and related strategies as means of optimizing sustainable environments. Particularly for cities facing emerging issues of residents’ negative perceptions towards tourism, smart tourism city empowers a city to rise to this challenge by creating urban spaces that residents and visitors can enjoy together. However, smart tourism city research initiatives still fail to address the full spectrum of related and potential developments. This study presents a conceptual approach to defining smart tourism city: the smart city and its components are defined and contrasted with smart tourism and its components. The resulting convergence—smart tourism city—is then examined in light of a number of pioneering examples of smart tourism cities and its vital roles in the age of sustainable development. The main purpose of this study is to show the interests of locals and tourists context and the roles of ‘smart’ government leadership to researchers and practitioners. -
PHI 110 Lecture 2 1 Welcome to Our Second Lecture on Personhood and Identity
PHI 110 Lecture 2 1 Welcome to our second lecture on personhood and identity. We’re going to begin today what will be two lectures on Rene Descartes’ thoughts on this subject. The position that is attributed to him is known as mind/body dualism. Sometimes it’s simply called the dualism for short. We need to be careful, however, because the word dualism covers a number of different philosophical positions, not always dualisms of mind and body. In other words, there are other forms of dualism that historically have been expressed. And so I will refer to his position as mind/body dualism or as Cartesian dualism as it’s sometimes also called. I said last time that Descartes is not going to talk primarily about persons. He’s going to talk about minds as opposed to bodies. But I think that as we start getting into his view, you will see where his notion of personhood arises. Clearly, Descartes is going to identify the person, the self, with the mind as opposed to with the body. This is something that I hoped you picked up in your reading and certainly that you will pick up once you read the material again after the lecture. Since I’ve already introduced Descartes’ position, let’s define it and then I’ll say a few things about Descartes himself to give you a little bit of a sense of the man and of his times. The position mind/body that’s known as mind/body dualism is defined as follows: It’s the view that the body is a physical substance — a machine, if you will — while the mind is a non-physical thinking entity which inhabits the body and is responsible for its voluntary movements. -
Ludwig.Wittgenstein.-.Philosophical.Investigations.Pdf
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS By LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN Translated by G. E. M. ANSCOMBE BASIL BLACKWELL TRANSLATOR'S NOTE Copyright © Basil Blackwell Ltd 1958 MY acknowledgments are due to the following, who either checked First published 1953 Second edition 1958 the translation or allowed me to consult them about German and Reprint of English text alone 1963 Austrian usage or read the translation through and helped me to Third edition of English and German text with index 1967 improve the English: Mr. R. Rhees, Professor G. H. von Wright, Reprint of English text with index 1968, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, Mr. P. Geach, Mr. G. Kreisel, Miss L. Labowsky, Mr. D. Paul, Miss I. 1981, 1986 Murdoch. Basil Blackwell Ltd 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be NOTE TO SECOND EDITION reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or THE text has been revised for the new edition. A large number of otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. small changes have been made in the English text. The following passages have been significantly altered: Except in the United States of America, this book is sold to the In Part I: §§ 108, 109, 116, 189, 193, 251, 284, 352, 360, 393,418, condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re- 426, 442, 456, 493, 520, 556, 582, 591, 644, 690, 692. -
The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness
entropy Article The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness Matthew Owen 1,2 1 Yakima Valley College, Yakima, WA 98902, USA; [email protected] 2 Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA Received: 10 June 2020; Accepted: 17 July 2020; Published: 28 July 2020 Abstract: Mental causation is vitally important to the integrated information theory (IIT), which says consciousness exists since it is causally efficacious. While it might not be directly apparent, metaphysical commitments have consequential entailments concerning the causal efficacy of consciousness. Commitments regarding the ontology of consciousness and the nature of causation determine which problem(s) a view of consciousness faces with respect to mental causation. Analysis of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind has brought several problems to the fore: the alleged lack of psychophysical laws, the causal exclusion problem, and the causal pairing problem. This article surveys the threat each problem poses to IIT based on the different metaphysical commitments IIT theorists might make. Distinctions are made between what I call reductive IIT, non-reductive IIT, and non-physicalist IIT, each of which make differing metaphysical commitments regarding the ontology of consciousness and nature of causation. Subsequently, each problem pertaining to mental causation is presented and its threat, or lack thereof, to each version of IIT is considered. While the lack of psychophysical laws appears unthreatening for all versions, reductive IIT and non-reductive IIT are seriously threatened by the exclusion problem, and it is difficult to see how they could overcome it while maintaining a commitment to the causal closure principle. -
Smart City and Smart Tourism: a Case of Dubai
sustainability Article Smart City and Smart Tourism: A Case of Dubai M. Sajid Khan 1, Mina Woo 2,*, Kichan Nam 1 and Prakash K. Chathoth 1 1 School of Business Administration, American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, UAE; [email protected] (M.S.K.); [email protected] (K.N.); [email protected] (P.K.C.) 2 School of Business, Sogang University, Seoul 121-742, Korea * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +82-10-9223-2080 Received: 31 October 2017; Accepted: 30 November 2017; Published: 8 December 2017 Abstract: Over the past decade, the advent of new technology has brought about the emergence of smart cities aiming to provide their stakeholders with technology-based solutions that are effective and efficient. Insofar as the objective of smart cities is to improve outcomes that are connected to people, systems and processes of businesses, government and other public- and private-sector entities, its main goal is to improve the quality of life of all residents. Accordingly, smart tourism has emerged over the past few years as a subset of the smart city concept, aiming to provide tourists with solutions that address specific travel related needs. Dubai is an emerging tourism destination that has implemented smart city and smart tourism platforms to engage various stakeholders. The objective of this study is to identify best practices related to Dubai’s smart city and smart tourism. In so doing, Dubai’s mission and vision along with key dimensions and pillars are identified in relation to the advancements in the literature while highlighting key resources and challenges. A Smart Tourism Dynamic Responsive System (STDRS) framework is proposed while suggesting how Dubai may able to enhance users’ involvement and their overall experience. -
An Unorthodox Husserlian Response to the Question of Transcendental Idealism
Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications Philosophy, Department of 1-1-2004 “Real-Idealism”: An Unorthodox Husserlian Response to the Question of Transcendental Idealism Sebastian Luft Marquette University, [email protected] Luft 1 Sebastian Luft Emory University – Alexander von Humboldt Foundation – Marquette University “Real-Idealism”: An Unorthodox Husserlian Response to the Question of Transcendental Idealism Introduction Current philosophical endeavors can be categorized as attempts that either do or do not endorse a strong notion of subjectivity. While those who reject a concept of subjectivity altogether might be called “realists,” the ones on the other side cannot, however, always be grasped under the traditional counter-title of “idealists.” This also has historical reasons. Some philosophers in the “analytic” tradition of philosophy have attacked a “reductionism” of the subject to physical states of affairs and have emphasized the irreducibility of the “first person perspective.” Yet, while this is a critique leveled at their own tradition, they would by no means call themselves “idealists.” After all, analytic philosophy was originally motivated by a realistic impulse opposed to traditional “idealistic,” or “metaphysical” paradigms.1 On the other side, in the so-called “continental” tradition, it is almost taken for granted that a strong concept of subjectivity, conceived as transcendental, be connected with some sort of idealism. This does not mean, however, that “idealism” is always a positive term (-isms always carry at least in part a negative connotation). It is dismissed by those who think the “self” that necessitates the step towards idealism is but one of the many fictions of modernity that should be “deconstructed.” Likewise, for most analytic philosophers, an idealism of whichever sort seems equally unacceptable. -
David Lewis's Place in Analytic Philosophy Scott Soames by The
David Lewis’s Place in Analytic Philosophy Scott Soames By the early 1970s, and continuing through 2001, David Lewis and Saul Kripke had taken over W.V.O. Quine’s leadership in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic in the English-speaking world. Quine, in turn, had inherited his position in the early 1950s from Rudolf Carnap, who had been the leading logical positivist -- first in Europe, and, after 1935, in America. A renegade positivist himself, Quine eschewed apriority, necessity, and analyticity, while (for a time) adopting a holistic version of verificationism. Like Carnap, he placed philosophical logic and the philosophy of science at the center of philosophy. While not entirely avoiding metaphysics and epistemology, he tried to “naturalize” both. By contrast, Lewis and Kripke embraced the modalities Quine rejected.1 They also had no sympathy for his early verificationism, or his twin flights from intension and intention. As for philosophy of science, it was transforming itself into specialized philosophies of the several sciences, and did not lend itself to unified treatment. Although Lewis had deep interests in scientific issues, and was commendably realist about science in general, science itself was not the center of own distinctive approach to philosophy. Despite similarities in their opposition to Quine, the differences between Lewis and Kripke were large – especially in the semantics and metaphysics of modality. They also had different philosophical styles. Whereas Lewis was a wide-ranging thinker who pieced together a systematic philosophical world view, Kripke gave little thought to system, focusing instead on a few central topics. There is, therefore, no conflict between the two on many of the issues on which Kripke was silent.