Vicarious Shame and Guilt G P

04 Lickel (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:09 pm Page 145 Group Processes & G Intergroup Relations P 2005 Vol 8(2) 145–157 I R Vicarious Shame and Guilt Brian Lickel University of Southern California Toni Schmader The University of Arizona Mathew Curtis University of Southern California Marchelle Scarnier The University of Arizona Daniel R. Ames Columbia University Participants recalled instances when they felt vicariously ashamed or guilty for another’s wrongdoing and rated their appraisals of the event and resulting motivations. The study tested aspects of social association that uniquely predict vicarious shame and guilt. Results suggest that the experience of vicarious shame and vicarious guilt are distinguishable. Vicarious guilt was predicted by one’s perceived interdependence with the wrongdoer (e.g. high interpersonal interaction), an appraisal of control over the event, and a motivation to repair the other person’s wrongdoing. Vicarious shame was predicted by the relevance of the event to a shared social identity with the wrongdoer, an appraisal of self-image threat, and a motivation to distance from the event. Implications for intergroup behavior and emotion are discussed. keywords guilt, interdependence, shame, social identity, stereotypes I envied other students back then [in postwar Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; Eisenberg, 2000; Germany] who had dissociated themselves from Keltner & Harker, 1998; Tangney & Fischer, their parents and thus from the entire generation 1995). Although we commonly think of shame of perpetrators, voyeurs, and the willfully blind, and guilt as feelings we experience as a result of accommodators and accepters, thereby overcoming perhaps not their shame, but at least their suffering our own actions, the above quotation suggests because of the shame (p. 171). (Bernhard Schlink, The Reader) Author’s note SHAME and guilt are powerful emotions of self- Address correspondence to Brian Lickel, condemnation that are thought to regulate Department of Psychology, University of social interactions in situations where one has Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, violated a moral or social code (Baumeister, USA [email: [email protected]] Copyright © 2005 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) 8:2; 145–157; DOI: 10.1177/1368430205051064 04 Lickel (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:09 pm Page 146 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(2) that feelings of self-condemnation can some- The nature of shame and guilt times result from acts committed by others. Given that the emotional reactions that we have Traditional emotion research has often assumed to the wrongdoings of other group members that shame and guilt are more similar than are relevant to both intragroup and intergroup different (e.g. C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). relations, it is surprising that no theoretical However, more contemporary perspectives framework has been developed of the argue that these two emotions differ in terms of antecedents and consequences to distinguish the motivations they evoke and their associated vicarious shame and guilt. The importance of appraisals (e.g. Hong & Chiu, 1992; Niedenthal, drawing such distinctions is critical if one Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; R. H. Smith, assumes that each emotion will have unique Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002; Tangney, Miller, behavioral consequences: as we will describe, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Wicker, Payne, & guilt may elicit more approach related behav- Morgan, 1983). For example, guilt predicts iors designed to repair the situation, whereas approach-related responses meant to repair the shame may elicit more withdrawing behaviors damage that was caused by the guilt-eliciting designed to distance oneself from the situation. event, and in fact several studies indicate that Although the factors that distinguish vicarious guilt is particularly linked to a desire to confess, shame and guilt have not been empirically apologize, or atone for one’s own wrongdoings investigated, some theorists have suggested that (e.g. Tangney et al., 1996; Wicker et al., 1983). these emotions can be experienced for another’s Shame, on the other hand, appears to be more misdeeds (Morris, 1987; Ortony, Clore, & strongly linked to responses aimed at insulating Collins, 1988; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Weiner, oneself from negative evaluation. Thus, rather 1986). Intergroup researchers, meanwhile, have than facilitating reparative actions, feelings of examined guilt reactions to ingroup bias (e.g. shame provoke a desire to hide, disappear, or Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; escape (Tangney, 1995; Wicker et al., 1983). Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; McGarty et al., in In addition to being distinguished by their press). Doosje et al. (1998), for example, showed correspondent motivations, shame and guilt that under certain conditions, Dutch students also seem to differ with respect to how an indi- feel guilty for their country’s past history of vidual interprets a transgression with respect to colonization in Indonesia, and perhaps as a con- the self (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Feeling sequence, feel motivated to provide reparations guilty for one’s own wrongdoing is often associ- to the people of Indonesia. Furthermore, ated with a focus on the speciﬁc controllable research on the black sheep effect (e.g. behaviors that led up to the wrongful event, Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; Marques, Yzerbyt, & whereas feeling ashamed involves a more global Leyens, 1988) suggests that individuals emphasis on what that event seems to imply derogate group members who fail to comply about the dispositional qualities one possesses with the norms of the group. This past research (Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Wicker, et al., 1983). demonstrates that people have emotional and For example, individuals who recall a guilt behavioral reactions to the negative behaviors experience are more likely to have the counter- of ingroup members. However, because none factual thought, ‘If only I had acted differently’, of this research has examined both shame and whereas those who recall a shame experience guilt, the conclusions yielded about the general are more likely to think, ‘If only I were a nature of vicarious emotion are limited. The different type of person’ (Niedenthal et al., goal of the present paper was to test a model 1994). Similarly, individuals perceive that they that distinguishes between vicarious shame and have more control over situations that they guilt felt for another’s wrongdoing. Rather than recall as guilt experiences as compared to focus on one particular type of group in one shame experiences (Wicker et al., 1983). Shame, type of context, our model is intended to however, in comparison to guilt, involves a generalize to a variety of groups and situations. greater feeling of self-consciousness and a fear 146 04 Lickel (bc/s) 29/3/05 1:09 pm Page 147 Lickel et al. vicarious shame and guilt that one will be rejected by others (R. H. Smith presumes that the impact of the group on the et al., 2002; Tangney et al., 1996; Wicker et al., self will be greater to the extent that one’s 1983). association to the group is strong. In fact, there is some evidence that vicarious shame and guilt Vicarious shame and guilt reactions are stronger in China, a collectivist culture, than in the United States, an indi- Given the dominant conceptualization of shame vidualist culture (Stipek, 1998). and guilt as self-conscious emotions, it is not However, a consideration of association- surprising that existing research has focused strength alone does not lead to predictions almost exclusively on people’s experience of about the degree to which shame versus guilt is these emotions after they have committed a likely to occur. Given the appraisals that are blameworthy action themselves. Indeed, proposed to distinguish shame from guilt previous research suggests that shame and guilt experiences, we considered whether there were are unique among negative emotions in that distinct aspects of social association that might both typically involve high appraisals of be linked to appraisals of behavioral control personal responsibility for a negative event over the wrongdoer (thus evoking vicarious (Manstead & Tetlock, 1989; C. A. Smith & guilt) versus appraisals that the event is a threat Ellsworth, 1985). Our work is a departure from to one’s image (thus evoking vicarious shame). this past research in that we suggest that actual Drawing upon group theory and research (e.g. personal causality for a negative event is not Brewer, 2000; Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel, necessary to experience shame or guilt. We use 1998; Krech & Crutchﬁeld, 1948; Lewin, 1948; the terms vicarious shame and guilt to refer to Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994; Rabbie & instances in which a person who is not the Horwitz, 1988; Tönnies, 1998; Wilder & Simon, proximal agent of a wrongdoing experiences 1998), we highlight two dimensions of social these emotions. associations that might play a role in activating Our basic premise, that the emotional lives of these appraisals in response to another’s wrong- individuals are shaped by their association with doing. One dimension is the extent to which others, is a premise shared with many prior individuals are associated by a sense of shared researchers (e.g. Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 1999; identity. The second dimension is the extent to E. R. Smith, 1993). For example, social psy- which individuals are associated by being inter- chologists have examined how people ‘pick up’ personally interdependent with one another. Past and experience the same emotion of those with research, such as Prentice et al., 1994, assumed whom they are in close physical proximity (e.g. that these two dimensions might refer to distinct Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Miller, types of groups (which they contrasted as 1987), as well as how people may experience common identity versus common bond groups). positive and negative feelings as a result of their In our analysis, we assume that some degree of social identity or association with successful or interpersonal interdependence and some unsuccessful others (e.g. Cialdini & de Nicholas, degree of shared identity are present in any 1989; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tesser, 1988) or social association.

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