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Supreme Court of the United States ______DISTRICT of COLUMBIA, ANDRE PARKER

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Supreme Court of the United States ______DISTRICT of COLUMBIA, ANDRE PARKER No. 15-1485 In the Supreme Court of the United States ___________________ DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ANDRE PARKER, AND ANTHONY CAMPANALE, Petitioners, v. THEODORE WESBY, et al., Respondents. ____________________ ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ____________________ BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS ____________________ RYAN F. MONAHAN PAUL QUINCY Counsel of Record 3501 Sansom Street Philadelphia PA, 19104 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Respondents November 3, 2017 i QUESTIONS PRESENTED A host invited several friends to a party, informing them that she just moved to a house on Anacostia Avenue in Washington, D.C. The friends invited a few friends of their own, and they all arrived expecting to enjoy an evening together. Instead, those attendees were arrested for unlawful entry, despite uncontroverted evidence that the attendees were invited by the host who represented herself as the tenant of the home. After spending an evening in prison, the unlawful entry charge was changed to disorderly conduct. All charges were subsequently dropped. The questions presented are: 1. Does an officer fail to establish probable cause to arrest when faced with uncontroverted evidence of the suspect’s innocent mental state? 2. Does an arrest violate a clearly established right when there is uncontroverted exculpatory evidence of the suspect’s innocent mental state? ii PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING The District of Columbia, Officer Andre Parker, and Officer Anthony Campanale were defendants in the district court and appellants in the court of appeals. Theodore Wesby, Alissa Cole, Anthony Maurice Hood, Brittany C. Stribling, Clarence Baldwin, Ethelbert Louis, Gary Gordon, James Davis, Joseph Mayfield, Jr., Juan C. Willis, Lynn Warwick Taylor, Natasha Chittams, Owen Gayle, Shanjah Hunt, Sidney A. Banks, Jr., and Stanley Richardson were plaintiffs in the district court and appellees in the court of appeals. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................... ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................... iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... v INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 1 STATEMENT ............................................................. 2 I. FACTS PRESENTED ...................................... 2 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY............................... 4 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 6 ARGUMENT .............................................................. 8 I. OFFICERS FAILED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST ATTENDEES. 8 A. Officers must consider uncontroverted exculpatory evidence when assessing the totality of circumstances. ................................................. 8 B. Officers’ proposal that no “direct evidence” of a mental state is necessary to establish probable cause runs counter to this Court’s articulation of totality of the circumstances. ........................... 10 C. Officers failed to establish probable cause for an unlawful entry arrest. .................................. 13 II. OFFICERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY BECAUSE THEY VIOLATED THE ATTENDEES’ CLEARLY ESTABLISHED RIGHTS BY ARRESTING THEM WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE. ........................ 19 A. An officer cannot receive qualified immunity when (1) the law defining the right is well established and (2) any reasonable officer would believe that the conduct would violate the victim’s protected rights. .................................. 21 iv B. In the District of Columbia, the law was well established that a lack of knowledge was exculpatory for unlawful entry at the time of the 2008 arrest. ....................................................... 23 C. Any reasonable officer would believe that an arrest violates the suspect’s rights if there is uncontroverted exculpatory evidence. .............. 28 D. Officers are liable for damages for arresting Attendees without probable cause because there was uncontroverted exculpatory evidence of the Attendees’ innocent mental states. .................. 31 CONCLUSION ......................................................... 33 v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Supreme Court Cases Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) ......... 6, 12, 13, 28 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).................................. 8, 29 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) ...... passim Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004)........................ 21 Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013) ............................ 29 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) ............... 21, 24 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014) ................ 29 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) ................... 8, 9 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) ..................... 21, 22, 24 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). ............. 8, 10, 17, 18 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) ....... 6, 11, 12, 16 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) .... 19, 22, 29 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) ................. 21, 24 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) ............. 19, 24 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) ............................... 21 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) .......................... 16 Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861 (2014) ............................ 24 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) .............. 12, 13 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) ..................... 8 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) .............................. 24 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843 (2017). .............. 19, 21, 22 Court of Appeals Cases BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1986) .......... 10, 30 Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2003) .............. 19 Carr v. District of Columbia, 587 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ....................................................................... 23, 27 Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007 (6th Cir. 1999) ............................................................................. 25 Harte v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Cty. of Johnson, Kans., 864 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 2017) ....................................... 9, 29 Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1989) ............... 28 Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 1999) ................... 9 Logsdon v. Hains, 492 F.3d 334 (6th Cir. 2007) ................ 9 McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1997) ............... 24 Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2013) ........... 9 United States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1999) .......................................................................... 12, 23, 27 United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2013) ..... 28 vi United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2007) 9, 28 United States v. McKenzie-Gude, 671 F.3d 452 (4th Cir. 2011) ............................................................................... 9 United States v. Thomas, 444 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 25 United States v. Two Parcels of Real Property located in Russell Cty., Ala., 92 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 1996) .. 28, 30 Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ..................................................................... passim Wesby v. District of Columbia, 816 F.3d 96 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) ............................................................... 5 Williams v. Alexander, Ark., 772 F.3d 1307 (8th Cir. 2014) ....................................................................... 19, 28 Womack v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 193 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 1999) ................................................................ 9 District Court Cases Ronkin v. Vhin, 71 F. Supp. 3d 124 (D.D.C 2014) ........... 14 United States v. Vinton, 2007 WL 495799 (D.D.C., Feb. 12, 2007) ....................................................................... 27 Wesby v. District of Columbia, 841 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2012) ............................................................................... 4 State Court Cases Culp v. United States, 486 A.2d 1174 (D.C. 1985). ......... 14 Darab v. United States, 623 A.2d 127 (D.C. 1993) .......... 25 McGloin v. United States, 232 A.2d 90 (D.C. 1967) ........ 25 Ortberg v. United States, 81 A.3d 303 (D.C. 2013) .... 14, 25 Smith v. United States, 281 A.2d 438 (D.C. 1971) .......... 14 Constitutional Provisions Amendment IV ............................................................. 8, 23 Statutes D.C. Act 20-565 (2015) ..................................................... 17 D.C. CODE § 22-3302 (2008) ............................................. 13 1 INTRODUCTION The Fourth Amendment balances a person’s interest in being free from government intrusion and a police officer’s duty to enforce the laws. To strike this balance, the Fourth Amendment requires officers to establish probable cause prior to a search or an arrest. Understanding that these decisions are made in real-time, courts provide broad discretion to officers: they are not required to conduct a mini-trial when investigating an arrest, they can operate without a jurist’s knowledge of every nuance of the law, and they are released from the standard of perfection in conduct. Officers must act only as a reasonably competent person would when assessing whether a crime is being or has been committed. But probable cause must still provide some meaningful protection from police intervention. That protection is violated when an officer makes
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