New Evidence on Sino-DPRK Relations, 1955-1984
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NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT DOCUMENT READER Limits of the “Lips and Teeth” Alliance: New Evidence on Sino-DPRK Relations, 1955-1984 -Edited by James Person March 2009 NEW EVIDENCE ON SINO-DPRK RELATIONS NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT DOCUMENT READER #2 Prepared for the conference: NORTH KOREAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA: A HISTORICAL VIEW OF CONTEMPORARY DIFFICULTIES April 6, 2009 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Washington, DC Organized by The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ North Korea International Documentation Project and United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention in cooperation with The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Kissinger Institute on China and the United States Dear Participant, The North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP) is pleased to present you with this “document reader,” which is intended to facilitate and enrich the discussion at the April 6, 2009 conference “North Korean Attitudes Toward China: A Historical View of Contemporary Difficulties,” held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. The volume consists of select Russian, Albanian, (East) German, and Hungarian archival documents that we hope will provide context for discussion on the history of Sino-DPRK relations and the limits of China’s political leverage over North Korea today. The collection, compiled by NKIDP, is by no means comprehensive, however, in selecting the materials, the editors sought to include some of the most important materials available and made a substantial effort to mine relevant official archives. The document reader is organized chronologically, starting with April 1955 and ending with May 1984. In compiling these documents, the editors received much appreciated cooperation and assistance from scholars from several countries, reflecting the multinational scope of this project. NKIDP is particularly grateful to Bernd Schaefer for contributing (East) German materials, Sergey Radchenko for Russian documents, and Balazs Szalontai for Hungarian materials. The document reader would not have been ready for distribution had it not been for the diligence of NKIDP Project Assistant Timothy McDonnell. For their sage advice, the editors would also like to thank Robert Litwak, Amb. J. Roy Stapleton, Douglas Spellman, Shin Jongdae, John Park, Charles Armstrong, and Gregg Brazinsky. The editors are especially grateful to the Korea Foundation, whose support made the translation of many of the documents contained in this reader possible. Last but not least, the editors would like to thank the Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, President and Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and Dr. Michael Van Dusen, Deputy Director, for providing Center resources for additional document translations. NKIDP is part of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program, directed by Christian F. Ostermann. The Project was launched in 2006 in cooperation with the University of North Korean Studies (Seoul). James F. Person Coordinator, NKIDP Christian F. Ostermann Director, History and Public Policy Program 1 * * * DOCUMENT No. 1 [Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314, listi 34-59. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person and translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]. Secret Copy Nº 5 CPSU CC In connection with the forthcoming consultations with senior officials of the KWP CC, we are sending "Information on the Situation in the DPRK" which has been corrected and supplemented on the basis of recent informational materials, and also a draft note "The Main Questions for Discussion with the Korean comrades" April 1955 Nº _______ [left blank] ***************************** […] 5. Sino-Korean Relations During the war close military, political, economic, and cultural relations were established between the DPRK and PRC which were also successfully developed in the postwar period. However, there are some individual abnormal phenomena in the relations between the Korean and Chinese comrades which are reflected to a certain degree in the course of Sino-Korean cooperation. According to information received from our military advisers in Korea, the Korean comrades have not been able to establish firm, constant contact with the command of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Korean leaders visit the headquarters of the Chinese volunteers located several dozen kilometers from Pyongyang very rarely, and even then only for ceremonial visits. In turn, members of the Chinese Volunteer command also do not communicate with the Korean comrades. Cases have occurred where some Korean leaders have expressed dissatisfaction amongst themselves that the Chinese command allegedly did not wish to take advantage of the defeat of the interventionists at the beginning of 1951 for the final liberation of Korea. Cases of a certain contrasting of the USSR to China by the Koreans are also being noted. For example, during military talks in Moscow in February of this year, Pak Chang Ok, a 2 Deputy Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, said in effect that he did not want to deal with the Chinese comrades about issues connected with the repair of military equipment. The experience of working in Korea shows that the Korean comrades underrate the role and importance of Chinese aid to Korea and, in particular, downplay the role of the Chinese volunteers in the fight against the American intervention. This is evident if only from the fact that at an exhibit in Pyongyang devoted to the war with the interventionists, only one of the 12 pavilions was devoted to the Chinese volunteers but the remaining pavilions described the combat operations of the Korean Peoples Army, ignoring the operations of the Chinese volunteers. The role of the Chinese volunteers was clearly downplayed at the exhibit. For their part, the Chinese command in Korea organized an exhibit in which the Chinese guides created their own explanations in the sense that Chinese volunteers were given the credit for the defeat of the interventionists and the liberation of North Korea. There is a group of senior officials in Korea made up of former CCP members who served at one time in the ranks of the Peoples Liberation Army. Unhealthy relations have developed between this group of officials and Soviet-Koreans who occupy senior positions in the DPRK. It is not excluded that the Soviet-Koreans are influencing Kim Il Sung with the object of removing the Koreans who came from China from senior positions. One of the most prominent DPRK leaders, Bak Ilu, who is closely associated with the Chinese command, was removed from the post of Minister of Internal Affairs in 1952 without adequate reason and then appointed Minister of Communications. Ban [Heosan], also associated with the Chinese command, was removed from the post of rector of the DPRK Military Academy. According to assertions by Soviet-Koreans, these people allegedly expressed dissatisfaction that the posts of command in the DPRK Army and government apparatus are occupied by Soviet-Koreans and that Kim Il Sung relies completely on Soviet military and other advisers. According to Embassy information, Kim Il Sung intends to gradually dismiss the officials who arrived from China from senior posts in the Party and government, which might have a negative impact on Sino-Korean relations. There is reason to believe that the Chinese comrades are not satisfied with the behavior of the Koreans (although they do not say this openly) and for their part treat the Koreans reservedly. The fact stands out that in February 1952, after the recall of its ambassador from Korea, the PRC government did not appoint a new ambassador until January of this year. Those present at receptions held by the Korean Embassy in Beijing cannot help but notice that Cde. Zhou Enlai barely talks to the Korean representatives. [...] 6. It would be proper to recommend to the Korean comrades that they improve work in the organization of the United Front (KDUF) [Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland] in order to more fully involve all the patriots of the country in a 3 movement for the peaceful unification of the country, getting this organization to renew its ties with the mass organizations of South Korea. Recommend that the Korean comrades direct the efforts of the KWP at creating support bases in the South in trade unions, peasant, youth, women's, and other organizations that exist there and the use of all legal opportunities to fight the Syngman Rhee regime. The revival of the illegal organizations of the KWP in South Korea should also be sought. Propaganda in South Korea ought to be carried on more skillfully, abandoning the unfounded indiscriminate deprecation of all South Korean figures, skillfully support progressive and opposition elements in South Korea capable of supporting the unification of the country and the creation of an independent democratic government, and extensively use the differences in the ruling hierarchy of South Korea, the bourgeois parties, and other organizations for these purposes. It would also be advisable to discuss with the Korean comrades the issue of the possibility of creating a legal patriotic organization of a neutral nature in the South which might advocate the establishment of cooperation between South and North Korea and a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem through the efforts of the Koreans themselves. Such an organization, while expressing its openly negative attitude toward the Syngman Rhee regime, might use the conditions of legal activity to split off progressive elements of the national bourgeoisie from Syngman Rhee and to enlist them in the struggle to unify Korea on democratic principles. At the present time the Korean comrades are developing a draft KWP platform which it intends to adopt at a forthcoming Party Congress. The platform sets the tasks of building socialism in North Korea and the liberation of South Korea. In our opinion, given the present situation in Korea it is inadvisable to propose such a platform and disclose the ultimate aims of the KWP.