NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT Document Reader
Limits of the “Lips and Teeth” Alliance: New Evidence on Sino-DPRK Relations, 1955-1984
-Edited by James Person March 2009
NEW EVIDENCE ON SINO-DPRK RELATIONS
NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT DOCUMENT READER #2
Prepared for the conference:
NORTH KOREAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA: A HISTORICAL VIEW OF CONTEMPORARY DIFFICULTIES
April 6, 2009 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Washington, DC
Organized by The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ North Korea International Documentation Project and United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention in cooperation with The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Kissinger Institute on China and the United States
Dear Participant,
The North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP) is pleased to present you with this “document reader,” which is intended to facilitate and enrich the discussion at the April 6, 2009 conference “North Korean Attitudes Toward China: A Historical View of Contemporary Difficulties,” held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. The volume consists of select Russian, Albanian, (East) German, and Hungarian archival documents that we hope will provide context for discussion on the history of Sino-DPRK relations and the limits of China’s political leverage over North Korea today.
The collection, compiled by NKIDP, is by no means comprehensive, however, in selecting the materials, the editors sought to include some of the most important materials available and made a substantial effort to mine relevant official archives. The document reader is organized chronologically, starting with April 1955 and ending with May 1984.
In compiling these documents, the editors received much appreciated cooperation and assistance from scholars from several countries, reflecting the multinational scope of this project. NKIDP is particularly grateful to Bernd Schaefer for contributing (East) German materials, Sergey Radchenko for Russian documents, and Balazs Szalontai for Hungarian materials. The document reader would not have been ready for distribution had it not been for the diligence of NKIDP Project Assistant Timothy McDonnell. For their sage advice, the editors would also like to thank Robert Litwak, Amb. J. Roy Stapleton, Douglas Spellman, Shin Jongdae, John Park, Charles Armstrong, and Gregg Brazinsky.
The editors are especially grateful to the Korea Foundation, whose support made the translation of many of the documents contained in this reader possible. Last but not least, the editors would like to thank the Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, President and Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and Dr. Michael Van Dusen, Deputy Director, for providing Center resources for additional document translations.
NKIDP is part of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program, directed by Christian F. Ostermann. The Project was launched in 2006 in cooperation with the University of North Korean Studies (Seoul).
James F. Person Coordinator, NKIDP
Christian F. Ostermann Director, History and Public Policy Program
1 * * *
DOCUMENT No. 1
[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314, listi 34-59. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person and translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg].
Secret Copy Nº 5
CPSU CC
In connection with the forthcoming consultations with senior officials of the KWP CC, we are sending "Information on the Situation in the DPRK" which has been corrected and supplemented on the basis of recent informational materials, and also a draft note "The Main Questions for Discussion with the Korean comrades"
April 1955
Nº ______[left blank] *****************************
[…]
5. Sino-Korean Relations
During the war close military, political, economic, and cultural relations were established between the DPRK and PRC which were also successfully developed in the postwar period.
However, there are some individual abnormal phenomena in the relations between the Korean and Chinese comrades which are reflected to a certain degree in the course of Sino-Korean cooperation.
According to information received from our military advisers in Korea, the Korean comrades have not been able to establish firm, constant contact with the command of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Korean leaders visit the headquarters of the Chinese volunteers located several dozen kilometers from Pyongyang very rarely, and even then only for ceremonial visits. In turn, members of the Chinese Volunteer command also do not communicate with the Korean comrades.
Cases have occurred where some Korean leaders have expressed dissatisfaction amongst themselves that the Chinese command allegedly did not wish to take advantage of the defeat of the interventionists at the beginning of 1951 for the final liberation of Korea. Cases of a certain contrasting of the USSR to China by the Koreans are also being noted. For example, during military talks in Moscow in February of this year, Pak Chang Ok, a
2 Deputy Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, said in effect that he did not want to deal with the Chinese comrades about issues connected with the repair of military equipment.
The experience of working in Korea shows that the Korean comrades underrate the role and importance of Chinese aid to Korea and, in particular, downplay the role of the Chinese volunteers in the fight against the American intervention. This is evident if only from the fact that at an exhibit in Pyongyang devoted to the war with the interventionists, only one of the 12 pavilions was devoted to the Chinese volunteers but the remaining pavilions described the combat operations of the Korean Peoples Army, ignoring the operations of the Chinese volunteers. The role of the Chinese volunteers was clearly downplayed at the exhibit. For their part, the Chinese command in Korea organized an exhibit in which the Chinese guides created their own explanations in the sense that Chinese volunteers were given the credit for the defeat of the interventionists and the liberation of North Korea.
There is a group of senior officials in Korea made up of former CCP members who served at one time in the ranks of the Peoples Liberation Army. Unhealthy relations have developed between this group of officials and Soviet-Koreans who occupy senior positions in the DPRK. It is not excluded that the Soviet-Koreans are influencing Kim Il Sung with the object of removing the Koreans who came from China from senior positions. One of the most prominent DPRK leaders, Bak Ilu, who is closely associated with the Chinese command, was removed from the post of Minister of Internal Affairs in 1952 without adequate reason and then appointed Minister of Communications. Ban [Heosan], also associated with the Chinese command, was removed from the post of rector of the DPRK Military Academy. According to assertions by Soviet-Koreans, these people allegedly expressed dissatisfaction that the posts of command in the DPRK Army and government apparatus are occupied by Soviet-Koreans and that Kim Il Sung relies completely on Soviet military and other advisers.
According to Embassy information, Kim Il Sung intends to gradually dismiss the officials who arrived from China from senior posts in the Party and government, which might have a negative impact on Sino-Korean relations.
There is reason to believe that the Chinese comrades are not satisfied with the behavior of the Koreans (although they do not say this openly) and for their part treat the Koreans reservedly. The fact stands out that in February 1952, after the recall of its ambassador from Korea, the PRC government did not appoint a new ambassador until January of this year. Those present at receptions held by the Korean Embassy in Beijing cannot help but notice that Cde. Zhou Enlai barely talks to the Korean representatives.
[...]
6. It would be proper to recommend to the Korean comrades that they improve work in the organization of the United Front (KDUF) [Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland] in order to more fully involve all the patriots of the country in a
3 movement for the peaceful unification of the country, getting this organization to renew its ties with the mass organizations of South Korea.
Recommend that the Korean comrades direct the efforts of the KWP at creating support bases in the South in trade unions, peasant, youth, women's, and other organizations that exist there and the use of all legal opportunities to fight the Syngman Rhee regime. The revival of the illegal organizations of the KWP in South Korea should also be sought.
Propaganda in South Korea ought to be carried on more skillfully, abandoning the unfounded indiscriminate deprecation of all South Korean figures, skillfully support progressive and opposition elements in South Korea capable of supporting the unification of the country and the creation of an independent democratic government, and extensively use the differences in the ruling hierarchy of South Korea, the bourgeois parties, and other organizations for these purposes.
It would also be advisable to discuss with the Korean comrades the issue of the possibility of creating a legal patriotic organization of a neutral nature in the South which might advocate the establishment of cooperation between South and North Korea and a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem through the efforts of the Koreans themselves. Such an organization, while expressing its openly negative attitude toward the Syngman Rhee regime, might use the conditions of legal activity to split off progressive elements of the national bourgeoisie from Syngman Rhee and to enlist them in the struggle to unify Korea on democratic principles.
At the present time the Korean comrades are developing a draft KWP platform which it intends to adopt at a forthcoming Party Congress. The platform sets the tasks of building socialism in North Korea and the liberation of South Korea. In our opinion, given the present situation in Korea it is inadvisable to propose such a platform and disclose the ultimate aims of the KWP. Instead, it seems more important to develop a new platform for the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, which is in accord with the main tasks of the KWP in postwar conditions (the peaceful unification of Korea, the revival and development of the DPRK economy, raising the material welfare of the population, etc.). Such a platform should have as its goal the uniting of all patriotic forces of the nation to fight against the American occupation of South Korea and for the creation of a united independent democratic Korean state.
/N. FEDORENKO/ /B. PONOMAREV/
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 2
[Source: RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, Listy 367-369. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by James F. Person, first published in CWIHP Working Paper 52]
4
Memorandum of Conversation with the Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK, Qiao Xiao Guang
From the diary of the ambassador of the USSR In the DPRK, Comrade Ivanov V.I. for the period From 30 October to 14 November 1956.
“5” November 1956
I received the ambassador of the PRC, Qiao Xiao Guang at his request. After a brief procedural conversation, Qiao asked if I knew anything new about measures of the Korean friends to carry out the decision of the September Plenum. According to Qiao, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party shows great interest in this question.
I explained that since my conversation with the charge d’affaires of the PRC embassy in the DPRK, Chao Ke Xian, I have not learned anything substantial about the measures of the friends on the stated question. According to the existing communications of the unofficial order it is known that the Korean leadership intends to make Choe Chang-ik director of the state committee on preserving monuments of material culture and Pak Chang-ok the director of construction at a cement factory in Madong. From the same communication it is also known that a meeting of the Presidium of the CC KWP was held not long ago where it was decided to release Bak Ilu from imprisonment.
As to Qiao’s request that I say something about how the Korean friends viewed the visit of Comrades Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai to the DPRK, I responded that to judge by the course of the September Plenum, then the reaction of the friends should be considered positive, however, to confirm this categorically would be premature.
In turn I was interested in the opinion of Qiao Xiao Guang in this regard. He answered that so far he has not reached a specific conclusion regarding the reaction of the friends to the visit of comrades Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai.
I asked Qiao if Yun Gongheum, Li Pilgyu, Seo Hwi, and Kim Changil, located in China, knew about their rehabilitation to the KWP and if they intended to return to the DPRK.
Qiao said that they were aware of that decision. Not wishing to return to the DPRK, they want to ask the government of the DPRK to allow their families to depart to China since they know also that the Korean government was not pressing for their return to the DPRK. Qiao further told me that in a letter from Yun Kongheum, Seo Hwi, Kim Changil and Li Pilgyu addressed to the CC CCP and CC CPSU, they blamed the Korean leadership for destroying a number of notable party officials in the period after liberation and during the war; for leading the country and party with anti-democratic methods; for incorrectly appointing and cultivating leading cadres. In connection with this, they considered Bak Jeongae, Bak Geumcheol, Kim Changman, and Han Seongdo individuals not qualified to occupy leading posts in the party; finally, they charged that the leadership
5 did not carry out the struggle with Kim Il Sung’s personality cult.
Qiao added that without having any materials confirming these statements, the CC CCP displayed understandable caution with regard to the indicated letter.
I informed Qiao Xiao Guang that the Korean leadership released Li Sangjo from his duties as ambassador of the DPRK in Moscow and requested that the Soviet government agree to Li Sungpal, working nowadays as the director of the educational department of the CC KWP. According to the Korean friends, Li Sangjo refuses to return to the DPRK and in all likelihood will remain in the PRC.
In response to my question if the Chinese embassy had the decree of the August Plenum of the CC KWP on organizational matters, Qiao answered that they did not have it, but the delegation of the KWP to the VIII Congress of the CCP delivered the above decree to Mao Zedong.
Present at the meeting was the first secretary of the embassy, Samsanov G.E. The meeting was translated by the translator of the Chinese embassy, Won Bao-min.
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 3
[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 8. doboz, 5/f, 0029/RT/1960. Obtained for NKIDP by Csaba Bekes and translated for NKIDP by József Litkei]
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry
2 July 1960
On the morning of 1 July, Czechoslovak Ambassador Kohousek invited me for a friendly conversation during which we exchanged views on several issues concerning the DPRK’s foreign and domestic policies and the general line of policy of the fraternal countries in the Far East.
On my part, I informed the Comrade Ambassador of the DPRK’s Seven-year Plan and certain economic issues related to Kim Il Sung’s visit to Moscow in June (see my other related reports). Concerning the latter issue, the Ambassador confidentially told me that according to the information received from Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, Comrade Khrushchev is going to visit Korea around 8-10 September. Concerning the Seven-year Plan, he referred to Comrade Kim Il Sung and informed me that the objectives of that plan will naturally be higher than that of the five year plan to have a greater greater effect among the South Korean masses.
6 During the informal and friendly conversation which lasted for several hours, the Ambassador expressed the following:
Lately, there has been a certain palpable hidden difference between the views of the Chinese and the Soviet comrades, especially concerning the interpretation of the slogan of peaceful coexistence and the issue of people’s communes. To his knowledge, in the past, the Chinese Communist Party CC had already pointed out some excesses and deficiencies in relation to the organization of communes. Despite this—according to the information he received—there has been no changes in the question of the communes and, for example, the principle of egalitarianism still prevails in the system of distribution practiced in the communes. According to the opinion of Comrade Kohousek, the idea of peaceful coexistence is somewhat unpopular among the people’s democracies of the Far East, and this idea indeed has a real basis. After all, this principle means peaceful coexistence with US imperialism, which for any Chinese, Korean or Vietnamese is at least difficult to understand, given that for them the US represents their fiercest national enemy, which they are not willing to tolerate in either Taiwan or South Korea, etc. (I would like to mention that to our knowledge, when it comes to the Korean party’s education method when dealing with the material of the 20th and 21st [CPSU] Congress, the question of the two systems’ peaceful coexistence is, so to say, hardly dealt with.) In addition to this, both China and Korea are so much occupied with their “own” international issues (Taiwan and South Korea, respectively), that it is difficult and awkward for them to accept the German question as the central problem of international life. In order to demonstrate this, Comrade Kohousek referred to the behavior of the Chinese at the June session of the Supreme Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Beijing and to the articles published in China for the 90th anniversary of Lenin’s birth. He [Kohousek] also mentioned that in the speech of the Chinese Ambassador doyen in Pyongyang, given on the occasion of the New Year’s reception, he did not even mention the slogan of peaceful coexistence and—contrary to custom—did not send his draft speech in advance to the ambassadors.
This [attitude] in the DPRK was evident on several occasions during the last year, most strikingly in the appeal of the DPRK’s Supreme People’s Assembly last autumn and in the letter addressing the parliaments of the world, in which they presented the Korean question as the most burning international problem. In the last months, according to the opinion of Comrade Kohousek, the Korean comrades became more reserved concerning this issue.
According to his observations, China’s influence in the DPRK has increased significantly during the last year—especially after Comrade Khrushchev’s visit to Korea was again canceled. (In the course of the conversation, Comrade Kohousek disapprovingly alluded several times to the Chinese Ambassador to P’yongyang, who uses his position as doyen to his own benefit in a very skillful way, and tries his best to please the Korean comrades.)
Comrade Kohousek nevertheless emphasized that in spite of China’s great influence in Korea, the Korean comrades have never tried to copy the Chinese experiences. He
7 referred to the example of communes, which, according to his knowledge, were the subjects of experiments but in the end the idea of their introduction to Korea was firmly rejected. Moreover, recently the Korean comrades have emphatically urged that the income distribution in agriculture be based on the quantity and quality of the work performed.
Concerning other political issues, it is undeniable that the Korean comrades are committing some mistakes along the way. We both agreed, for example, that the evaluations made during the South Korean events had some weak sides (see my report No. 77). Despite this, the practical steps taken by the Workers’ Party and the government were correct. The pursuit of autarky is still strong. Comrade Kohousek pointed out that in his view the Chinese influence is decreasing (understanding by this the above-mentioned political issues), and the Korean comrades stress more often and with more emphasis the peaceful [emphasis in the original] unification of the country, and there are signs that they no longer seek to place the Korean question a the forefront of international relations.
I informed Comrade Kohousek of my conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Yu Chang-sik concerning the visit of Kim Il Sung in Moscow (see my report No. 90). In the opinion of the Comrade Ambassador, it was not without reason for Comrade Yu Chang- sik to emphasize the complete agreement of views between the Soviet and Korean parties, since in his [Kohousek’s] opinion the main focus of the negotiations was after all not so much on economic but political questions, and the deputy foreign minister presumably alluded to this. According to the Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister, it cannot be ruled out that Kim Il Sung also visited China prior to his visit to Moscow, but he does not have any data concerning this. He stressed, however, that in his views, the Moscow talks meant a turning point in the political and party life of the DPRK. The agreement of views emphasized by the Foreign Minister means that in domestic and foreign political questions, the DPRK completely shares the position of the Soviet Union.
Károly Práth Ambassador
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 4
[Source: AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 21, papka 106, delo 20, listy 14-27. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko]
Some New Aspects of Korean-Chinese Relations in the First Half of 1965
4 June 1965
At the end of 1964 and in the beginning of 1965 certain new aspects emerged in Korean-
8 Chinese relations, which in general could be characterized as an attempt by the Korean leadership to abandon a one-sided orientation towards China.
This process began after the October CC CPSU Plenum, after the trip of the Korean delegation headed by comrade Kim Il to Moscow for the celebrations of the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution, and particularly after the February 1965 visit to Korea by the Soviet delegation headed by comrade A[leksei] N[ikolaevich] Kosygin.
As is known, in mid-1964 propaganda of the views of the Chinese leadership in the DPRK was in full swing. Despite all the efforts by the KWP leadership to present their propaganda as the manifestation of an “independent line” with regard to the parties of the international communist movement, as an aspiration to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp, in reality it [the Korean propaganda] was based on the so-called “general line” of the CCP, the anti-Marxist views of the Chinese leadership. All the attacks were directed against the CPSU, against its domestic and foreign policies.
The Chinese propaganda materials were widely distributed among the Korean populace. The Korean press published all major polemical editorials of the newspaper “Renmin Ribao” and the journal “Hongqi.” […]
Propaganda for the first time began to stress the thesis that the Korean-Chinese friendship became stronger as a result of the joint struggle against “modern revisionists,” that the basis for the friendship is the “ideological unity” of the revolutionary peoples.
However, by the end of 1964 the Korean leadership, apparently began to understand more clearly all the negative consequences of their orientation only towards China.
As a result of extensive contacts that took place between the KWP and the CCP in 1964, it became more obvious to the Korean leadership what kind of role the Chinese leaders prepared for them in their plans for splitting the international communist movement and creating a pro-Chinese bloc of parties with headquarters in Beijing. The Korean leadership, like the Chinese leaders, recognized the splitter groups as “independent Marxist-Leninist parties.” The leaders of these parties, when they arrive from Beijing to Pyongyang are received at the highest level. But at the same time the Korean leadership is beginning to understand that, despite the huge efforts of the Chinese leaders and their large financial aid, the splitter groups expose themselves more and more. The Korean leadership, seemingly, is becoming more and more convinced that “close contacts” with these groups do not add to the authority of the KWP in the international communist movement.
Also, the Korean leadership could not help but grow alarmed over the obvious great Han nationalism and political adventurism of the Chinese leaders, and the possibility of ending up alone with only the Chinese caused anxiety for the Koreans.
The Korean leadership also took into consideration the fact that the enormous propaganda campaign of the Chinese leaders [and their efforts] to put together a bloc inside the
9 communist movement did not produce the expected results. Moreover, the rude attacks that the Chinese leaders continued to stage against the CPSU after the October CC CPSU Plenum put the CCP leadership into even greater isolation. Thus, in a conversation with the Sov[iet] Ambassador in May 1965, Kim Il Sung admitted that only the communist parties of Japan and Indonesia follow the Chinese leadership in supporting open polemics.
The one-sided orientation towards China led to the worsening of the DPRK’s political and economic ties with the USSR and the socialist countries of Europe. And this, in turn, became one of the reasons for the serious economic difficulties of the DPRK.
Among the reasons that forced the Korean leadership to make certain corrections in their policy in general and in the Korean-Chinese relations in particular, a very important one is the worsening situation in Vietnam in connection with the escalating American aggression, the possibility of serious conflicts along the 38th parallel of the Korean peninsula, and also the consequences of such course of development for the DPRK.
[…] while continuing to speak out in favor of strengthening Korean-Chinese friendship, the Korean leadership undertook measures to limit somewhat the possibilities for propagating the views of the Chinese leadership in the DPRK.
Once again the thesis of the KWP’s independent policy is being stressed with particular emphasis.
At the same time, the independence thesis in the statements of the Korean leadership already sounds like an attempt to recognize some of their policy mistakes. In this connection, the explanation given by Kim Il Sung in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador on 3 May of this year appears particularly interesting. Complaining about the difficulties with which the DPRK is faced in the pursuit of its independent policy, Kim Il Sung said that one has to carry out this policy under the circumstances of open polemics between the CPSU and the CCP, taking into account that the DPRK borders two socialist countries – the USSR and China, and a capitalist country-Japan.
The Korean leadership took a different position, in comparison with the Chinese leaders, with regard to the March consultative meeting of fraternal parties. The leadership of the KWP, like the Chinese, did not agree to take part in the work of the meeting, but unlike the Chinese, did not attack the results of the work of that meeting.
Recently, the leaders of the KWP even began to make critical remarks addressed to the Chinese leadership, which continues to carry out its wild anti-Soviet campaign.
In a conversation with the Soviet ambassador on 3 May of this year, Kim Il Sung said: “we do not share the point of view of some people, who continue open polemics at the present time.”
In the statements of the Korean leaders, calls for strengthening the unity and cohesion of
10 the international communist movement and the socialist camp now sound somewhat different. Whereas before, this unity was understood by the Korean leadership as the unconditional recognition of the Chinese “general line,” at the present time, in light of removal in Korean propaganda of the slogan of struggle against “modern revisionism,” the unity is based on the struggle against American imperialism and support of the national liberation movement. […]
The Korean leadership in the past unequivocally supported China’s measures in putting together a race-based bloc and, with the help of the Chinese, tried to widen their connections in the liberated African countries. […]
However, at the present time the Korean leadership does not always come out in support of the Chinese on the questions of Afro-Asian solidarity. They come out in favor of united actions by all anti-imperialist forces, including the USSR, all socialist countries, countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
On questions of attitudes toward the events in Vietnam, toward the support of the DRV in the struggle against American imperialism, the Korean leadership has now more skeptically appraised the actions of the Chinese leadership. The Korean leadership cannot help but understand that a further deterioration of the situation in Vietnam (what the Chinese leaders are trying to accomplish) may cause complications along the line of demarcation between the DPRK and South Korea. […]
Judging from the statements of KWP leaders, the Chinese leaders disparage the Soviet Union’s aid to the struggling people of Vietnam. “Some people are trying to downplay [Soviet] aid to Vietnam” – said Kim Il Sung in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador – “but we do not believe such propaganda.”
The Korean leadership instructed its delegation to the extraordinary session of the World Peace Council in Stockholm, which discussed measures to provide aid to Vietnam, not to support the Chinese draft resolution.
Recalling this episode, Kim Il Sung told the Soviet ambassador: “the Chinese wanted to impose their draft resolution on us, but we did not agree.” […]
Continuing to follow the Chinese in speaking out against the “great power tendency of holding back independent, all-rounded development of other countries under the pretext of economic cooperation and the international division of labor,” seeing in economic cooperation the attempt of the “revisionists to put the economies of socialist countries under their control,” the Korean leadership in reality is taking steps to widen cooperation, using criticism in this case as a measure of “independence” and as a lever for political pressure in favor of more profitable conditions of economic aid. […]
The questions of Korean-Chinese military cooperation, the extent of which is kept in strict secrecy by both countries, had, it seems, the decisive role in the rapprochement between the DPRK and China on other questions as well.
11
As events have shown, following the return of the DPRK military delegation […] from Moscow, the Chinese leadership seized the opportunity and undertook to widen military cooperation with the DPRK.
One could make a judgment as to the extent of this cooperation by reference to many Chinese military delegations that visited the DPRK in the past 2 years, to joint Korean- Chinese maneuvers, to training of Korean military personnel in Chinese military academies, and to supplies of Chinese weapons.
All of this gave the leadership of the KWP an opportunity to become thoroughly acquainted with the condition of the defense industry of the PRC. […]
At the same time, the Korean leadership continued to jealously watch Soviet military aid to Cuba, Indonesia, the DRV, and other countries. Visits of the military representatives of the DPRK to these countries in 1964 showed, it seems, the advantages of Soviet aid in comparison with Chinese, the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia, insistent attempts of the USA to prompt the normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea, their efforts to put together a new aggressive bloc in the East, the volume of American military aid to the South Korean army – all of this could not help but make the Korean leadership (while still widening cooperation with China) look for pretexts for resumption of military aid from the USSR. […]
New aspects that appeared in the recent period in Korean-Chinese relations have in general a positive character. They create objective preconditions for improvement of Soviet-Korean relations on the state-to-state level. The intensity of this process is, evidently, in direct proportion to the volume of all kinds of aid to the DPRK from the Soviet Union.
At the same time, the Korean leadership, it seems, will continue to demonstrate their special friendship with China, will avoid doing anything that might influence the character and volume of aid they receive from the PRC.
FIRST SECRETARY OF THE EMBASSY OF THE USSR IN THE DPRK (A. Borunkov)
ATTACHE OF THE EMBASSY OF THE USSR IN THE DPRK (V. Gorovoi)
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 5
[Source: AQPPSH, MPP Korese, D 10, V. 1966. Translated for NKIDP by Enkel Daljani]
12
INFORMATION ON THE KOREAN WORKERS’ PARTY
In 1925, the Communist Party of Korea was created. But due to the anti-Marxist activity of factionalists and opportunists, and the prosecution of the Japanese militarists, the party could not hold its ranks and in 1928 it ceased being an organized force.
The anti Japanese movement from 1930 up until the liberation of the country was not led by an organized party, but only by separate communists with comrade [General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP)] Kim Il Sung at their helm. This is the reason why the liberation found the country without a leading party.
In October 1945, in the favorable conditions that were created after the liberation of the country, the Orgburo of the North Korean Communist Party was created. This comprises the founding of the Korean Workers’ Party.
The factionalist groups that brought about the destruction of the party in 1928 reappeared again later, especially after the end of the war in 1953. At the Plenum of April 1955, comrade Kim Il Sung, while speaking about the possibility of the rebirth of factionalist elements and groups, showed that one of the facilitators for the reappearance of such a possibility is the lack of a working class party for a long time until the liberation of the country, and another reason was the arrival from abroad – from the Soviet Union, China, and the southern part of the country – of various people, which was exploited by the factional elements for their own factional intentions. These people, who after liberation filled important position within the party, became carriers of dogmatism. In the speech that comrade Kim Il Sung delivered to propaganda and agitation workers in December of 1955 about the liquidation of dogmatism and formalism in Marxist ideological work, he said that “the people who came from the Soviet Union wanted to develop the ideological work in the military according to the Soviet method, while those that had come from China wanted it based on the Chinese [method].” The signs of dogmatism have also appeared in other sectors of life, especially during the period of the collectivization of agriculture, etc.
The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party that was held in August of 1956 and the Party Conference in March of 1958 uncovered and unmasked a group of anti-party factionalists who, it is said, had revisionist points of view and links to the Soviet revisionists. Notable among them are Bak Jeongae, Nam Il, etc. officials in the leadership who had links to this matter. They were left in the leadership afterwards, but only in governmental positions and not in important managerial posts.
With the birth and development of the divergences at the heart of the communist movement, the Korean Workers’ Party commenced changing its positions. It has tried to keep a neutral position, justifying this through the issue of the division of Korea and the need for her reunification. In other words, on this issue, it has proceeded based on narrow
13 national interests. The seemingly uncompromising anti-revisionist stance that it kept for some time, especially during 1963 and 1964, was more a product of the pressure exerted on it by the revisionists that wanted to force it to openly join their ranks, than it was of a true Marxist – Leninist position. In fact, this position can be better described as simply an anti-Khrushchevian position.
At the beginning of 1962, a series of articles by Lenin on the struggle against revisionism and opportunism were published in the Korean press. Through this, they were trying to achieve several specific objectives: First, they were trying to prepare the masses within the country for any eventuality that could happen with the revisionists; secondly, they were trying to exert some pressure on the revisionists that, arguably, they were ready to proclaim their opposition to them; and thirdly, to show that they were in the ranks of those parties that were fighting revisionism. In the public speeches of the leaders as well as in other important articles, both revisionism and dogmatism were considered as falling in the same category. Their famous slogan read, “Fight against revisionism and dogmatism for the preservation of the purity of Marxism – Leninism.”
In 1962, it appeared that the stance against revisionism was becoming stricter. This continued until before the removal of N. Khrushchev. During this time, they published around 12 articles on important issues of the time in which they criticized the activities of the modern revisionists, but without mentioning any names.
If one looks at this process within the frame of the relations with N. Khrushchev, it is apparent that it has progressed continually depending on the Koreans’ aggravations or softening of relations with him.
The Korean comrades, in various talks, have declared that they are at war with modern revisionism and they have held that their position toward N. Khrushchev has always been correct. According to them, the only difference between the Albanian Party of Labor and the Korean Workers’ Party has been the methods used for the waging of this war, which differ from the specific situation of each country, but which are the same at the principle level.
After the softening of relations with the Soviet revisionists, they started replacing the phrase “modern revisionism” with the word “revisionism.” They started once again placing revisionism and dogmatism in the same category and, sometimes, the latter started receiving a higher importance and appearing as worse. Here are some examples:
1. In the communiqué of the Plenum of the CC of the Korean Workers’ Party published on June 2, 1965 in the newspaper “Rodong Sinmun,” it is said that, “… the resolute struggle of our party against dogmatism and revisionism for the preservation of the purity of Marxism – Leninism … became a vital guarantee …” 2. In another article titled “The Korean Revolution and the Idea of the Antecedence of Our Party,” published on September 20, 1965,
14 dogmatism is mentioned ten times, while revisionism is mentioned only two times. 3. In the cover article dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the party, published on October 5, 1965 in the party magazine “Kulloja,” revisionism is never mentioned, but dogmatism and servility are denounced.
In the report that comrade Kim Il Sung presented at a conference of the Korean Workers’ Party, which was held at the beginning of October, the position of the Korean comrades on many issues is presented:
1) On the position to imperialism
The position of every communist and workers’ party in the present situation is valued on a grand scale by the position it holds against American imperialism. … The socialist countries, even when they keep diplomatic relations with the imperialists, must never cease their struggle or weaken it as a result. … It is also a mistake to only scream out against imperialism instead of actually taking steps to stop its aggression. In particular, each should not cause difficulties for the anti- imperialist forces in taking common practical measures to deliver blows to the American imperialist aggressors.
2) On the Vietnamese issue
The position on the issue of Vietnam is the trial by fire that makes the distinction between a revolutionary position and an opportunistic one, between proletarian internationalism and nationalistic egoism […] The fraternal parties are not allowed to simply engage in polemics over the Vietnam issue […] only the Vietnamese Workers’ Party can and must be the one to solve the Vietnamese issue […] As to the assistance that is given to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by the fraternal countries […] there can be no one else, besides the Vietnamese Workers’ Party, who can draw the correct conclusions from it and the fraternal parties must pay attention to these conclusions. […] We are prepared to send our volunteers there … whenever this is requested by the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
3) On the unity of action
It is important that a unified anti-imperialist course of action on an international scale and a unified anti-imperialist front is achieved. […] This is the most pressing issue before the international communist movement. This would, at the same time, assure the conditions for the gradual elimination of the divergences between the fraternal parties and for the reintroduction of the unity of the socialist camp and the solidarity of the international communist movement. […] Keeping this in mind, we think that, despite the existence of the divergences in relation to some issues, there exists a starting point for a unified anti-imperialist course of
15 action for withstanding the American imperialist aggression against Vietnam and for assisting the Vietnamese people.
The refusal of the achievement of a unified anti-imperialist course of action does not help the true defense of Marxism–Leninism against revisionism and in the strengthening of the unity of the socialist camp […] and it cannot be considered a position that opposes American imperialism and assists the struggle of the Vietnamese people. […] The sending of volunteers to Vietnam by the socialist countries will be the first step toward the achievement of a unified course of action against imperialism.
4) On the right and “left” opportunism
For as long as imperialism continues to exist and the class struggle persists, there is room for the birth of both the right and the “left” opportunism. We must fight in two fronts against both the right and the “left” opportunism.
Modern revisionism still remains a great threat to the international communist movement. It finds its support above all in the weakening of the struggle against imperialism and in the passive stance toward the revolutionary struggle of the peoples.
We must fight “left” opportunism as well as modern revisionism. “Left” opportunism does not take into account the changed reality of the present and dogmatically recites singular theses of Marxism–Leninism, while leading the peoples into extremist actions under super-revolutionary slogans.
5) On the solving of the divergences
The divergences between the parties must not be turned into organizational schisms, but must be solved in every situation through the use of ideological struggle, with the desire for unity as a starting point.
It is our party’s opinion that should there be divergences, one should not hasten to reach conclusions about the fraternal parties or the fraternal countries, but they should be reached through careful reasoning and the passage of time. […] No one should make dramatic or skewed evaluations about any fraternal countries or fraternal parties. […] Our opinion is that a very mature position should be taken in the evaluation of the leadership of a fraternal country or party.
[…] We must gradually narrow down the divergences and create an atmosphere that contributes to continued contacts. And when the sufficient conditions are finally created, the fraternal parties could hold a conference and discuss the issues of the unified anti-imperialist course of action in a concrete manner.
6) On the relations between parties
16
The respect for privacy is a precursory and fundamental condition for the unity and cooperation between fraternal parties. […] There does not exist a single international organization within the international communist movement that can create a unified direction for the activity of the parties of all the countries. After the dissolution of the Third International there is no “center” or “side” in the international communist movement anymore. That is why it is impossible that the “center” of the revolution be transferred from one country to another. It is impossible for a country to become “the center of the world revolution” or for a party to become “the leader party” of the international communist movement.
But, until now, there have been cases in the international communist movement when some parties have imposed their points of view, their courses of action on other parties, or have exerted pressure on the latter and have interfered in their internal affairs because they have not agreed with them.
* * *
A reorganization of the leadership organs of the party was undertaken at the Party Conference.
After the 4th Congress of the Party, which was held in September 1961, the Politburo had 11 members and 4 candidates. The chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party CC was comrade Kim Il Sung, and there were 4 Vice Chairmen as well. In June 1964 four more candidates to the Politburo were also elected.
During 1965 it appears that 2 members of the Politburo (which had changed its name to the Political Committee) were expelled from the Politburo, of which one was a Vice Chairman of the CC of the Party, Kim Changman, and the other was a candidate to the Politburo, former rector of Kim Il Sung University, and chairman of the China–Korea Friendship Council. But he was removed from the latter post around the end of 1964.
Now, within the Political Committee, which is comprised of 14 members and candidates, there has also been created a Presidium comprised of 6 members.
There has been a change in the titles of the Chairman and the Vice Chairmen of the CC of the party. Now there is one General Secretary of the CC of the Korean Workers’ Party, who is comrade Kim Il Sung, and 10 Secretaries of the CC, who all together comprise the Secretariat of the CC of the party.
Aside from those expelled previously, 6 more people from the previous leadership have not been appointed to these posts, among which are Bak Jeongae and Nam Il.
As for Korea’s relations with the Soviet Union, starting since the appearance of the disagreements in the midst of the international communist movement after the 22nd Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union and continuing today, they have developed in a
17 sort of up and down motion. There was a period when they were chilly (1963 – 1964), but after N. Khrushchev was deposed, a turn toward amelioration commenced.
The Koreans have consistently decided to not sever their relations with the Soviet Union. In the goodbye meeting that comrade Hasan Alimerko had with comrade Kim Il Sung at the end of 1962, he had said that “due to the fact that we have to face the imperialism of the USA, we want to maintain and do not want to sever the relations with the Soviet Union at the governmental and party level, because should the war restart, we will fight alongside the Soviet Union, and especially alongside the People’s Republic of China.” Two months later, in the meeting that he had with comrade Siri Çarçani, comrade Kim Il Sung said, “You fought against N. Khrushchev; you delivered your blows and have passed the hardest phase. Now we are preparing to fight N. Khrushchev. For us, the hardest part will come from now on.”
The events that took place after this period showed that the fight never took place. At most, this was more or less a period of a chill in the relations between the Korean Workers’ Party and the Soviet revisionists. As a result, the Korean press rarely gave any information on the Soviet Union, while the exchanges in different fields fell to a minimum. But the fact is that this chill in the relations was not due to principles, because during this time the Korean Workers’ Party did not wage any open struggle in the ideological, political, or organizational sense against the revisionists and N. Khrushchev. The following facts attest to this:
1) People like Bak Jeongae and Nam Il, who were known to be N. Khrushchev’s people, were allowed to remain in the Politburo. 2) In Korea there were still some Soviet specialists, though in small numbers, despite the fact that the Koreans were saying they, specifically, were engaging in sabotage. 3) Despite the fact that the volume of relations and work between the two countries had decreased during this time, the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang kept a very large number of employees, of which 20 were diplomats.
The removal of N. Khrushchev was received and popularized by the Korean comrades as the beginning of the possible changes within the Soviet Union, because, allegedly, signs of a very correct course, of an anti-imperialist course, etc. could be seen in the new Soviet leaders. It was not by chance that comrade Kim Il Sung said to our ambassador in Pyongyang on the occasion of November 29, 1964 that “the revisionists (of other countries) are exerting pressure to the Soviet Union to follow the course of N. Khrushchev.” With this he was trying to convey that the new Soviet leadership was not revisionist.
This position was followed later by continuous initiatives by the Koreans for a further closeness with the Soviet Union. On the occasion of the holiday on November 7, 1964, a delegation of the party and government led by comrade Kim Il, Vice Chairman of the CC and the First Deputy of the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, went to the Soviet
18 Union. Despite the fact that no preparations had been made in Korea on the occasion of November 7, two days before it, measures were taken and all strings were pulled that it be celebrated solemnly. In the daily Korean press and in the public speeches the mentioning of the phrase “modern revisionism” started to gradually be removed and information about the Soviet Union, as well as the publishing of the abstracts of the speeches by the Soviet leaders, started to increase.
During the period 1965–1966, two important delegations led by Kosygin and Shelepin went to Korea. At the same time, the exchange of delegations of other levels has become even more frequent.
The Korean Workers’ Party sent to the 23rd Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union a delegation headed by comrade Choe Yonggeon, Vice Chairman of the CC of the party. In the meeting that the Chinese ambassador had with comrade Bak Geumcheol, Vice Chairman of the CC of the Korean Workers’ Party, to present to him the copy of the letter that the CP of China sent to the Soviets, through which they refused their invitation to take part in the Congress, comrade Bak Geumcheol told him that “the Korean Workers’ Party, in the struggle against revisionism, has at its essence a similar position with the CP of China. The only difference is the approach, which is determined by the specific situation of each party. This is related to the needs of the struggle for the reunification of Korea…” Nevertheless, the greeting that the delegation delivered to the Congress was cool. The Korean press has given regular updates on the development of the Congress’s proceedings. The newspaper “Rodong Sinmun” published one page from the report by Brezhnev and a part of the report by Kosygin.
Last year, an important military delegation went to the Soviet Union where it concluded an agreement on the military assistance that the Soviet Union agreed to give to Korea. According to the conversation that Siri Çarçani had with the Chinese ambassador in May of this year, relations between Korea and the Soviet Union are widening rapidly; there is an exchange of declared and undeclared delegations. The armaments that the Soviet Union is giving to Korea are not transported through China, but by a different route. In June of this year, a three year (1967 – 1970) trade agreement between the two countries was concluded. According to the published communiqué the circulation of the goods for this period will increase immensely. The Soviet Union, amongst other things, will also assist Korea on the construction of a petrol refinery. It is quite likely that this is the refinery, foreseen in the 7 year plan, with a capacity of 2 million tons of petrol and which from 1967 would refine 1 million tons of petrol. Until now, the work for its construction has yet to start. It seems that after the cooling of the relations, the Soviets had withdrawn from this.
The relations of the Koreans with the other revisionist countries, which had also receded previously, are now improving continually. This is apparent from the scale of exchanges in many fields, especially in the economic and cultural fields. Their best relations are with the Romanians and the Cubans. This is also apparent in the similarity of the positions they have in many different important issues. In an interview that the Korean ambassador gave in Havana before his departure, he said, “The relations between Korea
19 and Cuba are at their highest. This is thanks to the correct positions of both parties.” He delivered many praises to Castro, presenting him as an exceptional leader. A symposium of Fidel Castro’s speeches of the period of 1963–1965 has been published in the Korean language.
In the report that comrade Kim Il Sung gave at the beginning of October at the Party conference, while speaking about the Cuban Revolution, amongst other things, he said “the Communist Party of Cuba knows the Cuban issues better than anyone else and it is the CP of Cuba, and no one else, who can create the correct position for dealing with the practical conditions in Cuba. […] There should be no other attempts at exerting pressure on the CP of Cuba and for the division of the revolutionary forces in Latin America.”
The relations with the Communist Party of Japan have been and remain good. Both sides support each other’s positions. This is apparent, amongst other things, also in the simultaneous publishing of various important materials. In the article of the newspaper “Rodong Sinmun,” dated August 12, 1966, it is written, “We have fully supported and continue to support the correct position of the CP of Japan, which, by taking a stance against the interference in internal affairs and by insistently defending independence, leads with correctness the revolutionary movement in its country and gives a contribution to the issue of solidarity within the international communist movement.”
On the issue of the relations between the Korean Workers’ Party and the CP of China, it must be noted that during the period of 1963–1964 they were developing and increasing. This was apparent in the widening and strengthening of economic, cultural, and military cooperation between the two countries, and in the frequent exchange of delegations of all fields, etc.
But even in these conditions it seems that the relations were not what they appeared on all issues and that there have been some reservations:
1) The Korean Foreign Affairs Minister himself told comrade Siri Çarçani that, “[…] we have not carried out or supported the theses of the 20th Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union even at a time when the Chinese comrades had yet to come out against them.” 2) On the conversations that comrade Liu Shaoqi has had with the Korean leadership on the occasion of his visit to Korea in September 1963, the Chinese ambassador said that “in the conversations and the meetings we have had with comrades in the Korean leadership, our points of view on the major issues are in full unity,” leading us to believe that there have also been opposing points of view on other issues. 3) The Koreans have shown much reservation on the publishing of Chinese articles. They have only published one of them. The others are broadcast in the bulletins of the telegraphic agency. 4) The Koreans have done very little to mention and publicize the Chinese Peoples Volunteers that fought in Korea.
20 After the amelioration of the relations between the Koreans and the Soviets, there seems to be a deterioration of the ones between the Koreans and the Chinese. This could be gradually seen in the exchange of the delegations in all the fields. It is conceivable that an issue that has served as a pretext and has hastened the cooling of the relations has been the fact that the Koreans have asked for the secret of the atomic bomb from the Chinese.
There is now indication that the Korean comrades are taking these relations toward further cooling:
1) In the university circles of Pyongyang, students and the professors circulate anti-Chinese and pro-Soviet slogans. They are saying that assistance to Vietnam is being hindered by the Chinese, etc. 2) The Chinese ambassador has told comrade Siri Çarçani that the Koreans are increasing their anti-Chinese, anti-Albanian, and anti- communist activities with the pretext that the Chinese are following an incorrect course and are also trying to impose this course on the Koreans. The slander that the Western press agencies are spewing against China and Albania is being published in their internal bulletins and is then commented by them as being true. The members of the Korean Workers’ Party of Chinese ethnicity are being expelled from the party for no apparent reason. 3) In the article, “Protecting Our Independence,” published in the main newspaper “Rodong Sinmun” on August 12, 1966, while speaking about the intervention of the great powers in their internal affairs in support of the factionalists, the Koreans make open allusion to the Chinese as well. In another article about the anti-revolutionary theories of the “leftist” opportunists published around the middle of September, they take an openly oppositional stance against the Cultural Revolution under development in China today. On this issue, in his speech at the Party Conference, comrade Kim Il Sung also said, “…“left” opportunism does not take into account the changed reality of the present and dogmatically recites singular theses of Marxism–Leninism, while leading the people into extremist actions under super- revolutionary slogans.”
Our relations with Korea have been relatively good. In every case of a meeting between our comrades and the Korean leaders, they have supported the position of the APL in its struggle against the modern revisionism. “We know that the Albanian people, under the leadership of the party with comrade Enver Hoxha at its helm,” declared comrade Kim Il Sung at a meeting with our ambassador in December of 1962, “fights bravely against the capitalist and revisionist enemy…” Furthermore, Comrade Bak Geumcheol, Vice Chairman of the CC of the Korean Workers’ Party, in a conversation he had with comrade Aranit Çela when he went for a vacation in Korea on October 1963, said that “We are in full agreement with the whole position of the APL.” He reiterated that as to the method of the struggle against revisionism, there may be differences between us according to the differing conditions of one country or the other. He said that, “for
21 example, the APL method of the struggle differs from that of the Korean Workers’ Party, but the main thing is that on all the primary issues we have a unified stance.”
Despite these things they have said, the Koreans have had and continue to have reservations toward our party. This is apparent in the concrete stance and relations that they have kept with us. When the APL was attacked at the 22nd Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union, they did not rise in its defense, even though comrade Kim Il Sung said to comrade Hasan Alimerko that “when they (the Soviets) openly attacked Albania, we were not in solidarity with them.”
The Korean comrades have not published the Soviets’ materials where they attack our country. For this reason they also censured the Moscow Radio program that was broadcast through Radio Pyongyang. At the same time they also censured the distribution of our ideological brochures in Korea. So, since the time when it seemed that relations between us were better, they had us equated with the revisionists.
No important article of the “Voice of the People” [APL newspaper] has ever been published in the Korean press. Only during 1963 and partly during 1964, when the relations with the Soviets were cool, were some of these articles being published in the bulletins of the telegraphic agencies. During this period, on the occasion of our anniversaries, there were articles written about Albania, which would mainly talk about our successes in the economic field. They would also point out the struggle of the APL against the modern revisionism.
When the Korean press has published articles where the revisionist and antisocialist positions and the signs big-power chauvinism toward some other countries have been criticized, it has never spoken openly about these positions toward Albania, but always with allusions.
The process of the position of the Koreans toward our country has in general developed depending on their relations with the revisionists. Though they always try to leave the impression that their position has not changed, this has been apparent in many cases.
1) In the past, in the order of publishing telegrams – an order, which in the protocol custom of the country is an indication of the level of the relations–we used to occupy the fourth place and now have been lowered down to eighth place. 2) Presently, in public speeches or in published articles where the issue of the struggle against revisionism is mentioned, the struggle of the APL is either completely removed from mention or it is replaced with a watered down version. 3) From the information we have from some of our missions, such as the ones in China, Cuba, Warsaw, etc. the comrades of the Korean missions in these places keep a cool stance toward the comrades of our missions. 4) According to the information that we are getting from our embassy in Pyongyang, a Korean student told one of our students that she had been
22 criticized for not having learned one word of Albanian. She also told her that she had been instructed to spy on what the Albanians were doing.
During the period of 1963–1964 four comrades went to vacation in Korea and four Korean comrades came to our country. During the period of 1965 to 1966 we did not extend any invitations and the Koreans did not extend any either.
During the present year we have sent to the Korean Workers’ Party CC a copy of the letter we sent to the Polish, as well as the open letter of the APL CC.
Our press has written during the past as well as this year several editorial and opinion articles on various issues in support of the DPR of Korea. We have also published a declaration of the Government of the Peoples’ Republic of Albania that denounces the ratification of the Japanese-South Korean Treaty.
October 1966
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 6
[Source: AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 22, p. 109, d. 22, pp. 38-49. Obtained for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko and translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg].
Soviet Embassy in the DPRK SECRET 2 December 1966 Copy Nº 2 Nº 312
Memorandum on Sino-Korean Relations in 1966
Sino-Korean Relations have recently undergone some significant changes […].
The period of close Sino-Korean rapprochement did not lead to the strengthening of the authority of the KWP in the international Communist movement. The Chinese government was not able to give significant aid to the DPRK in the international arena […].
[…] The October (1964) CPSU CC plenum opened up prospects to the Korean leadership to restore friendly relations with the Soviet Union [...].
The restoration of ties between the DPRK and the Soviet Union…provoked dissatisfaction on the part of Beijing. Attempts were made by the Chinese leaders to
23 pressure the Korean leadership. This forced it to make changes to relations with China. They have become increasingly cooler during the last year and a half. […].
(Points of view of Sino-Korean relations[)]. The report of Kim Il Sung at the KWP conference (October 1966) was characterized by displaying the process of liberating the Korean leadership from some mistaken, pro-Chinese views…and a return to more correct positions on such issues as the role of the world socialist system in the development of the revolutionary process and ways for people to struggle against the aggression of American imperialism.
It is interesting to compare two documents: the article, "They Defended the Socialist Camp" (11/1963) and Kim Il Sung's report at the KWP conference (10/1966). When this is done the evident difference in the position of the Korean leadership which has occurred in three years becomes especially clear.
In 11/1963 in the article, "They Defended the Socialist Camp" (the article was allegedly corrected by Kim Il Sung personally), the Korean leadership broadly supported the policy of the Chinese leaders. The article was directed against the CPSU and the decisions of the XX and XXII Congresses of our Party from beginning to end and contained crude fabrications and anti-Soviet slander.
In particular, the article said, "Some people, passing themselves off as Communists, together with the imperialists unjustly condemn and slander the CCP and PRC and frantically attack them. This is a shameful and very dangerous matter.”
In a report at the KWP conference in October 1966, Kim Il Sung criticized the many anti- Marxist attitudes of the Chinese leaders. This was the first public statement of KWP leaders against the policy of the Chinese ruling group. The report had critical allusions to the CPSU, silently overlooking many important issues (the defense of peace, disarmament, the KWP attitude toward the proposal convene an international conference of fraternal Parties). However, the report had an anti-Chinese orientation on the whole.
What were the primary reasons that caused the Korean leadership to change its attitude toward the ruling group of China?
1. As events progressed in Vietnam, the KWP leadership became increasingly convinced that the Chinese ruling group was hiding behind high-sounding phrases about the battle against imperialism, but is in fact being obstructive in this battle. Meetings and conversations between Soviet leaders and Kim Il Sung, the participation of the KWP in the work of the XIII [SIC] CPSU Party Congress, and the practical measures by the CPSU and Soviet government to give comprehensive assistance to the Vietnamese people have had great importance in this. The desire of Mao Zedong and his circle to use the Vietnamese situation for their own great power national purposes became increasingly clear to the Korean leadership.
24 The possibility of military provocations against the DPRK from American and South Korean authorities not being excluded, the Korean leaders now regard doubtfully previous Chinese assurances that China "will always share both sorrow and joy" with the Korean people.
2. The Korean leadership fears that in the event the Chinese leaders carry out plans for an organizational and political split in the international Communist movement and the socialist camp, it will end up alone with the Chinese leaders, in a campaign with pro- Chinese splitters. This would undermine the prestige of the KWP and increase the pressure on its leaders from the Chinese leaders.
3. The failure of Chinese leaders in domestic and foreign policy exerted a great sobering influence on the Korean leadership. In a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in November of this year as confirmation of the left opportunism of the Chinese leaders Kim Il Sung spoke of their wavering from one extreme to the other in questions of building Communism in China. […]
As the KWP conference showed, on the question of creating a united anti-imperialist front, the Korean leadership acted in defiance of the opinion of the Chinese leaders. The evolution of the views of the KWP leadership on the actions of the Chinese leaders has become more noticeable.
As the situation in Vietnam became more complicated, at the beginning of 1966, the Korean leaders spoke of their disagreement with the positions of the ruling group of China on the issue of Vietnam only in confidential conversations. In October 1966 in a report to a Party conference, Kim Il Sung was obviously talking to the Chinese leaders about those who "just talk about being against American imperialism but in fact do not take any specific steps to curb aggression.”
In the words of Kim Il Sung, the KWP leadership has unsuccessfully tried to use the visit of a Japanese CP delegation to China and the DPRK headed by Miyamoto to convince the Chinese leaders of the necessity of creating a united anti-imperialist front. […]
The Korean leaders condemn the Chinese leaders for their big-power chauvinism, dogmatism, and "left" opportunism. According to statements of the Korean comrades, the Chinese do not take changed reality into account, dogmatically repeat individual Marxist- Leninist positions, and drive people to extreme actions under [illegible] and revolutionary slogans.
The Korean leadership is closely following events associated with the conduct of the so- called "Cultural Revolution" in China. In a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in November of this year, Kim Il Sung said, "The Chinese want to conduct a cultural revolution at one stroke. Is this not an example of left opportunism on the part of the CPC and its leaders?.”
25 Explanations were given in Korean press articles, speeches by Kim Il Sung at Party conferences, and by Kim Il at the VI session of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly that a genuine cultural revolution is a long and complex process requiring an increase in the cultural and overall educational level of the entire people. Speaking of the forms and methods of conducting a cultural revolution in the DPRK, Kim Il, in particular, stressed in [his] report at the VI session of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly in November of this year that the KWP "opposes any subjective haste which contradicts the principles of Marxism-Leninism" and is against "a nihilistic attitude toward national cultural heritage.”
[…] Soon after the start of the "Cultural Revolution" in China the frequency band on which Chinese radio was broadcast in Korean was changed at the initiative of the Korean comrades. The rebroadcast hours were changed and they became less convenient for listeners. […]
A sharp rebuke was given by the Korean leadership about accusations from the CCP and APL [Albanian Party of Labor] that the KWP allegedly "is fencesitting.” In a report to a KWP conference, Kim Il Sung said, "Those who slander us are themselves sitting on a wobbly fence.”
[…] DPRK economic ties with China are exerting a great influence on the position of the Korean leadership and the policy it pursues.
The Korean leadership has been forced to take into account the possible economic sanctions to which the Chinese leaders might resort and which would bring serious economic consequences to the DPRK.
[…] The military doctrine of the Korean leadership was based on Chinese idea of so- called "people's war" until recently. The importance of modern types of weapons, including nuclear [weapons] and missiles, was belittled, and the military economic potential of the main enemy, the United States and its allies, was not taken into consideration.
At the present time, the Korean comrades are making certain changes in their attitudes toward questions of the strategy and tactics of waging war and training troops.
The delivery of Soviet military equipment has played a great role in this. Based on the observations of Soviet military specialists, the Korean military is beginning to understand its importance in modern warfare during the process of training to master the new equipment.
This is one of the main reasons for sending Korean servicemen to train in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, all the Korean servicemen studying in Chinese military schools are being recalled. There is information that the Chinese leadership has allegedly repeatedly suggested to the Koreans that they again send their military specialists for training but the Korean leadership is refraining from this.
26
Some frictions have also appeared between Korea and China in connection with the sending of Korean military volunteers to Vietnam (right now this is a group of more than 100 men). According to unofficial information, Chinese leaders have convinced the Korean leadership that the best assistance to Vietnam from the DPRK is to unleash military operations against the Americans on the Korean peninsula. The Chinese leadership has promised to give comprehensive assistance to the DPRK for the sake of this. The Korean comrades have rejected this option in spite of pressure from the Chinese, promoting their own counterplan-sending volunteers to Vietnam.
[…] The Korean leadership will evidently try and continue to demonstrate their "independence" in approaching a solution to the important problems of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement.
It might evidently be viewed as a concession to the Chinese to consider the position of the Korean leadership with regard to Yugoslavia and India. Although the Koreans are also not criticizing the Soviet government right now for expanding Soviet-Indian cooperation, however as before they lay the blame for complications on the Indo-Chinese border to the "reactionary forces of India.”
Meanwhile, in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, Kim Il Sung said, "Instead of finding a correct solution to this conflict the Chinese have complicated it and thereby slowed the progress of the revolution not only in India but also in all of Asia"…
The Korean leadership views the immediate prospects for achieving unity in the socialist camp and the international Communist movement skeptically. Knowing the Chinese leaders well, the Korean leadership evidently thinks that no criticism, either open or disguised, will have an effect on them. The Korean leadership sees the solution to the situation which has developed, as Kim Il Sung said in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, "leave the Chinese alone," then "they will fight among themselves and find the correct solution.”
First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy to the DPRK (A. Borunkov)
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 7
[Source: AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 22, p. 109, d. 22, pp. 50-56. Obtained for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko and translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]
30 December 1966 Memorandum of the Soviet Embassy in the DPRK (A. Borunkov) about Embassy measures against Chinese Anti-Soviet Propaganda in the DPRK
27
"The Korean leadership has recently taken a number of steps to keep the country's population from being influenced by Chinese propaganda. Sino-Korean cultural exchanges have been reduced to zero. The exchanges of other delegations have been sharply reduced. Almost no materials from China are published in the Korean press. The 30-minute Korean language program of news from China on the radio rebroadcasting network has been halted.
The main feature of the anti-Chinese propaganda in the DPRK is that it is done in a restricted manner and evidently primarily among cadres. The Korean leaders do not permit open criticism of events in China,”
"The impression is formed from observations by Embassy officials that it is not recommend for officials of Korean institutions who have contact with members of the diplomatic corps to enter into conversations with foreigners on the topic of Sino-Korean relations and events in China. So far, only Cde. Kim Il Sung has discussed the actions of the Chinese leaders in conversations with the Ambassador."
"The Korean leadership, on the one hand, refrains from open condemnation of the actions of the Chinese ruling group and, on the other, does not permit the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang to wage propaganda denouncing Mao Zedong and his group.”
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 8
[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1967, 61. doboz, 1, 001200/1967. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balázs Szalontai]
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 22 January 1967.
As a result of the most recent developments of the events in China under the aegis of the „Cultural Revolution,” new phenomena related to the Korean-Chinese relationship have recently surfaced. We would like to summarize the information we have about the aforesaid issues in the following:
1) On the situation of the Koreans living in China According to the information we received from the Cuban ambassador, the situation of the Koreans living in China has worsened in the course of the „Cultural Revolution.” (An official of the Consular Department of the [North Korean] F[oreign] M[inistry] recently told us that they kept a record of approx. 1 million Koreans living in China, most of whom lived in Manchuria.) Referring to a Korean source, Comrade Vigoa stated that the „Red Guards” forced individuals of Korean nationality as well to participate in their
28 actions, to join in the organization of mass meetings, and so on. This naturally elicits aversion and dissatisfaction from the great majority of Koreans and the leadership of the DPRK respectively. The rights of the people of Korean nationality, such as the right of assembly, are violated by some measures that were taken during the „Cultural Revolution.” These phenomena aggravate the tensions that exists in the Korean-Chinese relationship. The Koreans, on their part, do their best to avoid an open confrontation with the Chinese leadership, the Korean comrades strive not to give [the Chinese] an opportunity to aggravate the situation, which is tense anyway, even further. This is why the Korean comrades preferred to criticize the Chinese events in an indirect way, the Cuban ambassador said, for otherwise the DPRK would face serious consequences. Nowadays the Korean comrades face an extremely difficult situation because of neighboring China. [Cuban Ambassador] Comrade Vigoa cited as an example the fact that the Korean daily press did not report on the „Cultural Revolution,” because [such news] should be accompanied by open criticism, which was also impossible in the present situation.
2) As I already mentioned, the daily press does not report on the Chinese events, but, in accordance with previous practice, it continues publishing articles that indirectly criticize the Chinese line. Lately, the January 19th copy of Nodong Sinmun published a long theoretical article entitled „The Fostering of National Cultural Heritage and the Education for Socialist Patriotism” by Doctor of Philology Kim Hamyeong, which–without directly referring to China–also challenged well-known Chinese propositions. It is a remarkable new phenomenon that the KCNA’s confidential bulletin–which had not reported on the „Cultural Revolution” until recently–lately published the reports of two Western news agencies, which dealt with the movement of the „Red Guards.”
It is also related to the aforesaid issues that the number of the news that the central dailies publish about China is still minimal […].
3) On the exchange of New Year greetings between the Korean and Chinese leaders It is interesting to inspect the Korean communiqué issued about the exchange of New Year greetings cards between the Korean and Chinese leaders, which reads as follows: „On the occasion of the 1967 New Year, Comrade Kim Il Sung exchanged greetings cards with Comrades Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai of the People’s Republic of China. In addition, Comrade Choe Yonggeon exchanged cards with[Chairman of the National People’s Congress] Comrades Zhu De and Zhou Enlai of the People’s Republic of China.” To our knowledge, the Korean press has not published any similarly worded communiqué, which did not contain the rank and function of the partner, in the years past. (It is remarkable that the Korean leaders did not exchange cards with [Chairman of the People’s Republic of China] Liu Shaoqi!)
The exchange of telegrams of New Year greetings between the Korean and Albanian leaders is also indicative of Korean-Chinese relations, that is, in an indirect way [emphasis in the original]: while the Albanian telegram of last year sent the warmest fraternal greetings to the Korean leaders and the fraternal Korean people in the name of the Albanian Party of Labor as well, in the one of this year it was the Albanian people
29 and the signatories of the telegram in whose name the greetings were sent to the addressees and the Korean people. The 1966 Albanian telegram of New Year greetings makes mention of the development of the indissoluble [emphasis in the original] friendship between the two peoples, whereas the one of this year already speaks [only] about the faith in the development of the friendly contact between the two peoples, without using the epithet „indissoluble.”
[…]
4) According to the information we received from our embassy to Beijing, the Chinese have concentrated troops on the Chinese-Korean border, the concrete aim of which is unknown to us for the time being.
5) During conversations, the Korean comrades usually do not refer to the Korean-Chinese relationship; they evade evaluating the events related to China. Despite that, a few Korean comrades who were competent [in international relations] did make comments that openly or indirectly criticized the Chinese line. On an occasion an official of the F[oreign] M[inistry] told us at our embassy that „…we hope that sooner or later China will overcome the present difficulties through its own efforts, but it is a fact that this issue causes problems to every [emphasis in the original] socialist country, the imperialists do their best to take advantage of it … Otherwise Comrade Kim Il Sung gave an answer to China in the account he gave at the party conference, he declared that we did not sit on anyone’s stool.” In an obvious reference to China, a competent official of the Sports Commission said that now the DPRK was in a situation similar to that of a little child who „began to see clearly,” rejected his earlier isolation, and sought contacts. 6) Finally, I mention that on the basis of our visit in a few bookstores, it is our impression that the works of Mao Zedong, which had a very wide circulation before, have disappeared from the stores. […]
István Kádas
(ambassador)
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 9
[Source: AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 5-12. Obtained for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko and translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg.]
7 March 1967 DVO [Far East Department] Memorandum about Sino-Korean Relations
30 Current relations between the DPRK and PRC are characterized by a gradual retreat by the Korean leadership from the previous unilateral orientation toward China.
The period from 1958 to 1963 was marked by a rapprochement between the DPRK and PRC. Ties between the PRC and DPRK in that period were extensively developed in all areas-trade, economic, and military cooperation.
The figures below show a serious economic dependence on China.
[...]
The Chinese leaders have tried to expand Sino-Korean military cooperation in order to increase their influence on the DPRK. Ties between China and the DPRK through military channels have been especially intensified since the end of 1962, when the USSR did not grant the Koreans' request to grant additional free military aid. In March 1963 Pyongyang was unofficially visited by a Chinese military delegation, which signed an agreement to grant the DPRK military aid. According to some information in the event of a military conflict in Korea, the Chinese promised to send more than 1 million of their soldiers there.
However, changes soon occurred in the Korean position.
"Events in Vietnam have exerted a great sobering influence on the Korean leadership: as an example of this, the Koreans were convinced that Mao Zedong and his group were ready to support not only the interests of the Vietnamese, but also of the Korean people for the sake of their great power, nationalistic purposes. The Chinese side has repeatedly tried to push the Koreans to aggravate the situation in South Korea 'to help Vietnam', without taking into account the real situation and the consequences."
"The improvement of Soviet-Korean relations has provoked dissatisfaction on the part of the Beijing leaders, who tried to slow the process of the DPRK's retreat, which was unwelcome to them, from a pro-Chinese policy. During Shehu's visit to Beijing in April 1966 accusations of 'revisionism' and 'centrism' were offered by the Chinese against the Parties which participated in the work of the XXIII Congress. Kim Il Sung assessed these attacks as an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the KWP."
Soon after the conclusion of a Soviet-Korean economic agreement (June 1966) in response, the Chinese began to complicate relations with the DPRK and put economic and political pressure on it. Chinese foreign trade organizations began to make various complaints about the quality of Korean goods, demanded the delivery of products in short supply, and refused to deliver individual goods of vital importance to the DPRK. In 1966 China sharply reduced deliveries to the DPRK of vegetable oil and soybeans, and in January 1967 sulfur and some types of industrial raw commodities. The Chinese authorities have prohibited Korean fishermen from catching fish along the Chinese coast."
31 The KWP leadership is displeased that the Chinese object to sending volunteers to Vietnam from the socialist countries and, despite the difficulties caused by Beijing, have sent about 100 of their own pilots to the DRV posing as specialists to take part in military operations."
"In Pyongyang they have condemned the events connected with the so-called 'Cultural Revolution' in China. Without speaking directly about the Chinese, the DPRK press printed a number of articles against Trotskyism and 'left opportunism.' It was remarked in a report at a KWP conference by Kim Il Sung that Communists should not permit leftist excesses and artificially foment class warfare" […]
"In a confidential conversation, Kim Il Sung called the 'Cultural Revolution' in China 'incredible madness.' Kim Il also spoke of the 'Cultural Revolution' in the PRC in approximately the same negative terms when he was in Moscow…According to available information, the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution' was sharply criticized at closed meetings in KWP Party organizations. Evidently with the same goal, in 1966 the Korean leadership swept away from [their] posts KWP CC Politburo member Kim Changman, candidate member of the Political Committee [Ha Angcheon], and several other Korean leaders who had become the primary champions of Chinese ideological influence in the KWP.
A number of items of information have recently appeared in China through the Hongweibing [Red Guard] newspaper channel in which slanderous fabrications were spread with regard to the domestic situation in the DPRK and the KWP leadership. The term 'Korean revisionism' was put into circulation. In meetings with the Red Guards Chinese leaders declare that 'the DPRK will also soon slide into revisionism' and the northeastern regions of China are 'the forefront which is encircled from three sides: by Soviet, Mongolian, and Korean revisionism."
Fabrications which appeared in Red Guards newspapers and handbills about a coup d'etat which had allegedly occurred in the DPRK provoked deep resentment among the Korean leaders. In an official statement published on 26 January of this year the DPRK Central Telegraph Agency condemned the slanderous fabrication of the Red Guards in sharp tones as an attempt to mislead world public opinion…Twice, in December 1966 and February 1967, the DPRK public security agencies prohibited anti-Soviet demonstrations by Chinese students at the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang prepared by the Chinese Embassy."
"The KWP retreat from the positions of Beijing is irritating the Chinese leaders, who are now already taking extreme measures. According to information of the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, the Chinese have begun to fortify their border with the DPRK, artificially create border incidents, violate the agreement about peaceful settlement of issues about defectors, renew the dispute over the issue of Sino-Korean border at Baekdu-san (Baitoushan) Mountain, etc."
"Meanwhile, the retreat of the KWP leadership from unquestioning support of the divisive adventurous policy of Beijing does not mean that it has completely taken the
32 stand of the majority of Marxist-Leninist Parties. The views of the KWP leadership do not agree with the policy of the CPSU and other fraternal Parties on a number of important issues. The Korean leaders regard the CPSU with a certain wariness and permit themselves unfounded critical comments regarding its policy, and are often insincere. In confidential conversations, Kim Il Sung and other KWP leaders basically support all the foreign and domestic measures of our Party, including their praise of the December (1966) CPSU CC plenum. However, the broad KWP Party masses were not informed about it and not a word about the CPSU CC plenum was published in the Korean press.
The October (1966) KWP conference officially proclaimed a policy of fighting on two fronts, both against 'contemporary revisionism' and 'left opportunism' as the main task of the Party. At the Party conference Kim Il Sung stressed that the KWP will never 'dance to someone else's tune' and 'advised' all fraternal Parties to strictly follow an independent policy. He forcefully stressed the independence of his positions; the Korean leadership thereby demonstrates its noninvolvement with any of the sides in the disagreements which exist in the international Communist movement, and strives to maintain normal relations with both the PRC and the USSR." [12]
The Far East Department
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 10
[Source: AVPRF f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 13-23. Obtained for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko and translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]
7 March 1967 Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy in the DPRK (A. Borunkov)
"The DPRK Attitude Toward the So-called 'Cultural Revolution' in China"
"Events in China associated with the so-called 'Cultural Revolution' have seriously alarmed the Korean leadership, which has reason to fear its negative influence on the DPRK"
"During the period of the Korean-Chinese rapprochement people came to leadership at various levels of the Party and government apparatus who completely approved of the Korean leadership policy of rapprochement with China and weakening ties with the USSR"
"After the Korean leadership began to retreat from a unilateral orientation toward China it made several corrections to its ideological work with the population. It began to criticize both the CPSU and the CCP, trying to show that only the KWP policy took the correct position."
33 "The so-called 'Cultural Revolution' in China has forced the Korean leadership to take steps to strengthen Party and government personnel both at HQ and at the grass roots."
Steps were taken at the end of 1966 to reorganize the highest echelon of the Party apparatus, apparently not ignoring the possible negative consequences for the DPRK of the so-called "Cultural Revolution."
The increase in the number of members and candidate members of the Politburo and KWP CC secretaries and the appointment of a Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers is evidence of a desire of the Korean leadership to involve new people in running the Party and the country from among those who unquestionably approve of Kim Il Sung's current domestic and foreign policy."
"With the exception of Kim Il Sung, Korean workers avoid conversations on this subject [of the Cultural Revolution] or limit themselves to general phrases which mean nothing.
As events develop in China the KWP leadership has exhibited ever-growing concern and caution. In a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in November 1966 Kim Il Sung said, "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has seriously alarmed us." Explaining the reasons for such alarm, Kim Il Sung pointed to the fact that KWP members "still are not so experienced [zakaleny] as to correctly understand everything" (See ref. Nº 313 of 2 December 1966)
The need has arisen to conduct such explanatory work among KWP members as a result of which they would, on the one hand, as before be convinced of the correctness of the policy of the Korean leadership and, on the other, unquestionably approve of the negative attitude of the Korean leadership toward the so-called 'Cultural Revolution.'"
"According to information available to the Embassy explanatory work among KWP members in connection with the so-called 'Cultural Revolution' in China is of quite a critical [ostryy] nature."
"The leaders of the KWP speak of the so-called 'Great Cultural Revolution' as a 'great madness [obaldenie]', having nothing in common with either culture or a revolution."
In restricted propaganda the repression of intellectuals by the government, the destruction of cultural monuments, and the anti-Sovietism which has become the main substance of the policy of the ruling group of China are condemned (See our ref. Nº 49 of 21 February 1967).
"The Korean comrades speak of the 'thousands of victims during the so-called 'revolution', the 'suicides', the 'political chaos', and the 'chaos in the economy,' about Mao Zedong as 'an old fool who has gone out of his mind.' In lectures they cite instances of political and economic pressure on the DPRK from the Chinese government."
34 "Speaking at a festive meeting (dedicated to the 19th anniversary of the Korean People's Army) O Jinu, Deputy Minister of Defense, said, 'The hope of any rift in our Party and our revolutionary ranks is stupid naïveté.' This statement might be regarded as a response to the Chinese for their attempts to conduct a campaign of slander against the DPRK."
"Questions (about the Cultural Revolution) were raised in a report by Kim Il Sung at a KWP Party conference (October 1966). Although there was no direct criticism of the Chinese leadership in his speech, it was later explained to KWP members in lectures and conversations to whom the accusations of left opportunism were addressed. In a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in October 1966, Kim Il Sung said that, "They could not fail to touch on theoretical issues at the KWP conference inasmuch as right now a big uproar had developed in China around the 'Great Cultural Revolution,' which might exert a great influence on our Party (see our ref. Nº 286 of 21 October 1966).
"Among the articles of the Korean press published in the second half of 1966 in response to the so-called 'Cultural Revolution,' the most important is an editorial of the newspaper 'Nodong Sinmun' of 12 August 1966, 'In Defense of Independence.' In unofficial conversations with Soviet workers, Korean comrades have tried to stress that the article is mainly directed against the Chinese leaders."
In January 1967 a republic meeting of mechanical engineers was held with the involvement of Korean leaders and a large number of workers from around the country, and in February a Congress of cooperative workers [was held]. It is also intended to hold a meeting of construction workers, teachers, and others.
In a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, Candidate Member of the KWP CC Politburo Pak [Yongguk] said that, besides the practical tasks of improving the work of sectors of the economy, the meeting had the goal of "raising the level of consciousness of the masses" (see our ref. Nº 31 of 7 February 1967).
"Korean-Chinese relations continue to worsen, despite of the wishes of the Korean leadership."
The DPRK MFA requested that all accredited embassies in Pyongyang remove photographic showcases beginning 1 February. The Korean comrades did not conceal that this measure was directed against the Chinese government. All embassies except China's carried out this instruction. The photographic showcase propagandizing the so- called "Cultural Revolution" still hangs at the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang. Repeated statements of the DPRK MFA directed at the Chinese Embassy remain unanswered. The Korean authorities have resorted to "administrative measures," forbidding residents of the city from walking past the showcase. Also, a photographic showcase was recently reopened by the Albanian Embassy in Pyongyang. The Korean authorities regarded these actions by the Chinese and Albanians as "provocative and criminal.”
Speaking before representatives of the accredited embassies of the socialist countries in Pyongyang, Pak [Chon Sok], the Chief of the Protocol Department of the DPRK MFA,
35 said that "our people are indignant at the 'arrogant' behavior of the Chinese. The Chinese and the Albanians are behaving like hysterical people," "they are not able to avoid responsibility for the criminal actions damaging the interests of the DRPK.”
In the words Kim [Yeongnam], a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, a strong protest has been sent to the Chinese leadership in connection with the anti-Korean slander which is being spread by the Red Guards in Beijing.
Chinese students and part of the specialists have left Pyongyang.
The newly appointed DPRK Ambassador to China has not yet left for Beijing. The Korean leaders speak indignantly of attacks by the Red Guards on officials of the Korean Embassy in Beijing.
In conversations the Korean leaders sharply condemn the actions of the Mao Zedong and his group, and correctly assess the harm events in China are causing to the international Communist movement and the socialist camp. At the same time, the Korean leadership does not dare openly criticize the Chinese, trying to avoid anything that might be used by the Chinese for anti-Korean purposes.
Anti-Chinese actions [vystuplenie] in the DPRK are of a retaliatory nature. It is supposed that the Korean leaders will act that way in the future when it is a matter of DPRK prestige in the international arena.
The Korean leadership does not denounce the anti-Sovietism of the Chinese ruling group. In restricted propaganda it continues to accuse the CPSU of displaying "weakness" toward the US, of "colluding" with the US to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, of an incorrect attitude "toward Yugoslavia the reactionary forces of India, and interference in the affairs of fraternal Parties ["].
In conversations with foreigners the Korean leaders have begun to talk somewhat more freely about events in China. However, the impression is formed that the Korean leadership is taking a close watch so that the anti-Chinese sentiments which have recently intensified do not take the shape of open resentment of the people. Most of the Korean population is poorly informed about the situation in China and about the actions of Mao Zedong and his group.
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 11
[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1967, 61. doboz, 1, 002130/1967] [Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balázs Szalontai]
36 Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 9 March 1967.
As we already reported in an open telegram, Kim Il Sung–in the presence of the members of the KWP Presidium and several other high-ranking leaders–had received Cuban Ambassador Vigoa, who will leave the DPRK in the immediate future. Following the reception, Kim Il Sung gave a luncheon in honor of the Cuban ambassador. In the opinion of several fraternal ambassadors, this stressed honor was given not only to the Cuban ambassador but also reflected the close cooperative contacts between the Korean and Cuban parties.
According to the information received from Comrade Horst Brie, the ambassador of the GDR, of the conversation that took place between Comrades Kim Il Sung and Vigoa, it was the following parts that were the most significant:
Kim Il Sung praised the right policy of the KWP Presidium, which was justified by the present events as well. He considered the international situation as well as the situation of the Communist and workers’ movement extremely complicated. Speaking of the Korean- Chinese relationship, Kim Il Sung stated that it was very problematic, and he referred to the slanderous remarks of the Chinese that had become known recently. Evidently referring to the [alleged] conflict between Kim Il Sung and Kim Gwanghyeop that the Red Guards had spread reports of, Kim Il Sung jokingly remarked that Kim Gwanghyeop was also sitting there with him, he was participating in the conversation, and it was obvious what this meant. During the conversation Kim Gwanghyeop also passed anti- Chinese remarks. Among others, he declared that he had known the current Chinese ambassador to Pyongyang well, and had fought alongside him against the Japanese for a long time, and [he knew] why he [the ambassador] was now under attack. (Our comment: as we already reported, according to the information we received from Mongolian sources, the work of the current Chinese ambassador to Pyongyang, who has not been here for a long time, was criticized at home.)
Kim Il Sung spoke disapprovingly of the activities of the Chinese embassy here, pointing out that the latter carried out anti-DPRK propaganda among the ethnic Chinese living in the DPRK. The Korean comrades were indignant with the provocations committed against the Korean embassy to Beijing, Kim Il Sung said, for they [the Chinese] planted such signs in front of our embassy as „Brezhnev and Kosygin should be roasted in their own fat.” We understand what these attacks and the similar ones mean! With regard to the issue of the photo display-case [set up by the Chinese embassy to Pyongyang], Kim Il Sung stated that the behavior of the Chinese was not compatible with the principles of proletarian internationalism and one should declare it a bourgeois nationalist action instead. Speaking of the well-known behavior of the new Albanian ambassador, he stressed that the latter, though he had not spent more than a few days in the DPRK yet, once again put photos that had been removed by the Albanian chargé d’affaires ad interim into their photo display-case. This is hostile behavior, a step unworthy of a fraternal ambassador!
37 Kim Il Sung considered Korean-Cuban relations very good, and stated that a close friendly cooperation was characteristic of the latter, the views of the two parties were completely identical. The KWP fully supports the standpoint of the Cuban Communist Party. He cited as an example that the KWP supported only those Latin American revolutionary movements which the Cubans also agreed with and which they supported.
During the conversation Cuban Ambassador Vigoa asked a few questions. For instance, he inquired about the Korean-Yugoslav relationship and the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations [between Pyongyang and Belgrade]. Kim Il Sung answered the question concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations in the negative, and pointed out that the Romanians had similarly proposed the establishment of relations to them, and the Soviets also found that useful. (Our comment: A few days after the conversation between Kim Il Sung and Vigoa, the Korean press published a long anti-Yugoslav article based on Japanese sources.)
Comrade Vigoa inquired about the Korean comrades’ opinion of the Soviet standpoint concerning the agreement on nuclear non-proliferation. It became clear from the reply of Kim Il Sung that they did not agree with it but would not attack and criticize it openly.
In another part of the conversation Kim Il Sung made mention of Mao Zedong. Pointing at Choe Yonggeon, who was present, he stated that he was the same age as Mao, yet his state of health was better and his mind was also livelier. Although at that time [in 1957] Mao Zedong, as opposed to Khrushchev, had apologized for his earlier interference in the internal affairs of Korea, by now „Mao Zedong has made twice as many mistakes as Khrushchev did,” he said.
With regard to the question of the unity of the international Communist and workers’ movement, Kim Il Sung said that he saw two possibilities. One is that the small countries, on the basis of their collective action, persuade the two big ones, that is, China and the Soviet Union, to restore their unity and cooperation. The other is that the two big ones reach an agreement „by themselves,” without the help of the small ones. Of these two possibilities, it is the first one that is realistic, whereas the second one seems unrealizable.
István Kádas (ambassador)
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 12
[Source: PolA AA, MfAA, G-A 364. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer]
GDR Embassy to the DPRK Pyongyang, 16 March 1967
38
N o t e on a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Comrade Zvetkov, on 15 March 1967
I visited Comrade Zvetkov to receive the promised information about Kim Il Sung’s visit to Moscow. First I reported to Comrade Zvetkov about two other conversations of [GDR Ambassador] Comrade Brie with [Cuban Ambassador] Vigoa and [Vietnamese Ambassador] Hoang Moi.
I. […] [Replacement of Soviet Ambassador Gorchakev through Ambassador Sudarikov due to political and alcohol problems]
II. Comrade Zvetkov made the following statements on the results of Kim Il Sung’s visit to the Soviet Union in December 1966:
1. Kim Il Sung’s visit to the Soviet Union was unofficial. The Soviet comrades did not know in advance about the interruption of his stay and Kim Il Sung’s ensuing travel to Romania. He [Zvetkov] is not aware of the actual reasons and results of this visit to Romania.
2. […] [Vietnam]
3. On China Comrade Brezhnev provided Kim Il Sung with an overview of this problem. In hist statement on this subject, Comrade Kim Il Sung explained that the KWP considers the so-called Cultural Revolution in China as mass lunacy which largely impacts the DPRK as well. The DPRK is situated very close to China, and there are many problems to solve for the construction of socialism [in Korea]. Therefore the KWP does not openly criticize the CCP since it cannot simply do it. It is imperative for the KWP to think about the future since it is aware of the wickedness of the Chinese.
4. […] [European Security and Non-Proliferation]
5. On Polemics [between USSR and China] Kim Il Sung stated the KWP does not deem it necessary to conduct open polemics. Actually, the KWP is against this. Comrade Brezhnev explained that the CPSU had kept quiet for two years but the CCP did not abort polemics. Thus, the CPSU was forced to refute those accusations and explain its own positions. Yet it did so without any insults. Kim Il Sung explained that the KWP had stopped criticizing the CPSU a long time ago and will not change that.
6. On the Conference [of communist and workers parties]
39 Kim Il Sung expressed his very negative opinion on the proposals made at the Party Congresses in Hungary and Bulgaria. Comrade Brezhnev referred to the fact that already 60 fraternal parties had agreed to participate in such a conference. Kim Il Sung replied the Korean comrades think conditions have not yet matured for such a conference. The Chinese party and some others will not participate. Thus it is warranted to understand the position of the KWP. Currently the CCP has its own group in about 60 countries. Maybe it would use this opportunity to convene a separate conference. This way unity will not be achieved at all. To the contrary, the division will become deeper. For these reasons, the KWP will “neither participate with you, nor with the Chinese.”
7. […] [Japan]
8. Relations Soviet Union - DPRK Comrade Zvetkov stated that both sides recognized the positive development of relations and were pleased with the results of the talks.
9. On Economic Questions Kim Il Sung also presented some general requests about the further supply of Soviet aid. There was agreement in principle and a decision to talk about this in detail at a later opportunity.
III. On the Visit of a Government Delegation headed by Kim Il Sung to the Soviet Union between 13 February and 4 March 1967
As a result of the talks between Kim Il Sung and Brezhnev [in December 1966], the KWP had decided to send a government delegation to the Soviet Union headed by Kim Il Sung to discuss economic questions in more detail. The Korean side stated its following wishes: […] [long list of concrete aid projects]
Jarck Acting Ambassador
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 13
[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j China, 1967, 59. doboz, 1, 001136/6/1967] [Translated by Balázs Szalontai]
Report, Embassy of Hungary in China to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 11 April 1967.
40
At a luncheon given in his honor, Korean Chargé d’Affaires Kim Jaeseok had a long conversation with our counsellor. During this he fully agreed with our evaluation of the Chinese situation, repeated in his own words what had been said by our counsellor, and added some examples of his own. He agreed that the destruction of the Communist party could not be a means to construct socialism, and he particularly approved of our view that the Chinese effort to force the person of Mao and his so-called thoughts on the peoples of the world was by no means compatible with the principles of internationalism.
In the opinion of Comrade Kim, one of the serious errors of Chinese policy and a cause of the chaos created by the „Cultural Revolution” is the improper method that they [the CCP leaders] rely on the masses solely in slogans; in reality, it is the subjective will of one or two persons that decides everything. „The chaos of the events makes one feel,” Comrade Kim said, „that the Chinese leaders have no program or definite conception, and they do not steer [the country] purposefully, on the basis of principles.”
With regard to individual leaders, he mentioned that there were still many more people behind Liu Shaoqi than usually believed. For instance, to their [the North Koreans’] knowledge, the organization called „Committee for the Unity of Action” is actually a substantial armed unit with a membership of approx. 12,000, which is opposed to Mao. As for Zhou Enlai, both the attacks launched on his deputies and certain articles of Red Flag [Hongqi] and Renmin Ribao, which attack those who focus on economic issues, are actually directed against Zhou Enlai.
Comrade Kim agreed with our evaluation that the majority of the Chinese people are opposed to the policy pursued by Mao, and this was the main cause of that the Cultural Revolution was still dragging on. As an example for the manifestation of opposition and its repression, he said that in the course of the recent demonstrations against Liu Shaoqi, some 500 railroadmen hurled abuse at the internal security forces in front of the main entrance of the government district. The soldiers surrounded the group and forced them to read quotations from Mao on their knees and with their heads bowed. When a leader of the railroadmen was not willing to continue this and stood up, the soldiers pounced on him and beat him up.
As for the general evaluation of the Chinese internal situation, the Korean chargé d’affaires repeatedly emphasized that the situation was very confused and dangerous. He made [the Hungarian counsellor] feel that it was the outbreak of civil war that he meant by danger.
With regard to the economic situation, he remarked that Chinese data were unreliable and it was very difficult to form an accurate notion of [the situation]. As for crop prospects and a possible famine, he referred to a placard, according to which [Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China] Chen Yi had declared that peasants had nothing to eat. He added that to his knowledge, there were serious problems in industry as well. The main cause of all this was that there was no plan, no economic program, and the workers themselves also felt uncertain, they were afraid of the future.
41
With regard to the international effects of the Cultural Revolution, the Korean chargé d’affaires declared that the peoples of the world had no need of such a Cultural Revolution. Over there, in Korea this would be inconceivable, for their principal problem was the division of the country and the constant threats of the American imperialists.
As for Sino-Korean relations, he told [the Hungarian counsellor] the incident caused by the display-case at the [Chinese] embassy in P’yongyang, which had been known to us, and emphasized that unfortunately the Chinese comrades did not submit themselves to the general rules. He agreed with our evaluation that this was a manifestation of Chinese big-power chauvinism. He condemned the Red Guards’ attacks on Kim Il Sung in a very sharp tone, stressing that although Korea was only a small country and it was also in a difficult situation, they could not tolerate such attacks. He said that their ambassador to Beijing had received his approval long ago, but then the Red Guards’ attack on Kim Il Sung came up, and thus for the time being the ambassador would not come. In an indignant voice, he said that during the demonstrations against the Soviet embassy to Beijing, [the Red Guards] had torn off the flag from the car of their ambassador as well, stuck a lot of slogans on another car of theirs, and when they protested, the Chinese dismissed their protest. To characterize Sino-Korean relations, he said that the Chinese viewed the relationship between the two countries in a way similar to the [human relations] that had existed under feudalism, when a weak man, if slapped by a strong one, was required to turn the other cheek so as to get a second slap.
Trade relations between the two countries are stagnating, it happens more and more frequently that there are problems concerning the deadlines of Chinese shipments. Cultural and scientific-technological cooperation practically stands still.
According to the evaluation of Comrade Kim, one of the negative effects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution was the fact that the American imperialists, taking advantage of the faults of Chinese policies, intensified both their aggression in Vietnam and their South Korea-based provocational activity that was directed against the DPRK.
It is shown also by the aforesaid conversation how the Cultural Revolution alienates former friends from China. It was evidently because of the anti-Korean attacks of the Red Guards that the previously cautious behavior of Chargé d’Affaires Kim has become almost militantly anti-Chinese.
András Halász (ambassador) * * *
DOCUMENT No. 14 [Source: AVPRF. f.0102, op. 23. p. 112, d. 24. pp. 73-74. Obtained for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko and translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg].
42
Memo of the Soviet Embassy in the DPRK (3rd Secretary, R. Chebotarev), 5 August 1967
"Activity of the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang" (on the issue of the photo display case)
"The Chinese Embassy has used a display case set up on the outer wall which surrounds the Embassy for propagandizing the 'Cultural Revolution,' spreading anti-Soviet lies, and glorifying Mao as 'the leader of the peoples of the entire world.' Similar actions were also negatively received by the Korean side. In order not to worsen the situation with China, the DPRK MFA suggested that all diplomatic missions having photographic wall display cases remove them by 1 February of this year. All the embassies except China's and Albania's carried out this instruction of the Korean side, whereupon the Chinese told a representative of the Korean MFA that they would observe the laws of the DPRK which they like and would not observe those which they did not like…The ill-fated showcase exists to this day, but no one is able to familiarize themselves with its content since the Korean authorities have prohibited walking on the sidewalk around the Chinese Embassy.”
[...] * * *
DOCUMENT No. 15 [Source: PolA AA, MfAA, C 149/75. Obtained and Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer].
GDR Embassy to the DPRK Pyongyang, 20 October 1967
N o t e on a Conversation with the Acting Ambassador of the People’s Republic of Poland, Comrade Pudisz, on 9 October 1967 between 1000 and 1130 hours in the Polish Embassy
The visit was paid following a Polish request.
At the beginning I informed Comrade Pudisz extensively about the activities of our embassy for the 18th Anniversary of the foundation of the GDR. Then Comrade Pudisz made statements on the following issues:
1. The PR China has stopped its aid to the DPRK in the following areas: - Coke and gas coal (previously 2.5 million tons annually) - Oil and oil products (20,000 tons per month, i.e. 250,000 tons per year)
43 In addition, they do not deliver any more salt, vegetable oil and cotton. The DPRK government has been officially informed about this by the Chinese side.
2. Recently dead bodies are said to have been found in a freight train arriving into the DPRK from China via Sinuiju. They were Koreans living in Northeastern China. People are said to have gotten injured or killed in incidents between Maoist Red Guards and members from the Korean minority in the PRC. The dead bodies were placed on the freight train bound to the DPRK. The freight cars also had anti-Korean slogans written on the sides. Like for instance: “See, that’s how you will fare as well, you little revisionists!”
3. The DPRK has indicated to the Soviet side its willingness to send workers to Eastern Siberian regions to explore and mine for coal and salt.
Jarck Acting Ambassador
CC: 2x Far Eastern Department/Foreign Ministry 1x Embassy
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 16 [Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j China, 1967, 59. doboz, 1, 001187/62/1967. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balázs Szalontai]
Report, Embassy of Hungary in China to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 20 November 1967.
As an attachment, hereby I submit a news that was published in the international news column of the October 27 issue of the Red Guard newspaper named Dongfanghong.
During the Cultural Revolution, it already happened on several occasions that the [Red Guards] launched [verbal] attacks on the Korean leaders, but the utterances made in this article were the sharpest so far. The diplomats of the Korean embassy made extremely indignant declarations about the anti-Korean attack launched by the Chinese. We are of the opinion that the publication of this article played a role in that the Korean party sent a higher-level delegation to Moscow. [signature]
(ambassador)
[…]
44
In recent times the Korean revisionists have shown an anti-Chinese tendency that is becoming more and more insane. The Korean revisionists are terrified by the Cultural Revolution. They say that nearly all intellectuals were killed in the Cultural Revolution. What scroundels they are, damn it! Anxious to pursue a policy of cooperating with the Soviet Union and opposing China, the Korean revisionists wholly deny the immense distinction that our heroic volunteers gained in the course of the anti-American resistance war aimed at helping Korea. Mad with rage, the gang of Kim Il Sung is slandering us by claiming that the assistance [we] gave to Korea during the anti-American war was motivated by our „national egoism” and we did that „for our own good.” It is even more hateful that the Korean revisionists are slandering us by claiming that the Korean War was „provoked” by us. This is how low the Korean revisionists have fallen! Now they are even digging up the graves of our volunteers who heroically sacrificed their lives in the Korean War! What more will we tolerate if we tolerate that? We sternly warn Kim Il Sung and his ilk that those who cooperate with the USA and the revisionists, and pursue an anti-Chinese policy, will come to a bad end. Sooner or later, the Korean people will rise up and settle up with you.
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 17
[Source: PolA AA, MfAA, C 146/75. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer.]
GDR Embassy to the DPRK Pyongyang, 13 November 1967
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Head of Far Eastern Department Comrade Kurt Schneidewind 102 B e r l i n Marx-Engels-Platz 2
Dear Comrade Schneidewind!
Due to the Ambassador’s extended absence and the fact that he just returned to Pyongyang a few days ago, [Ambassador] Comrade Brie asked me to write the monthly information letter to you.
The most important question over recent weeks here were the festivities in the context of the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. We have already informed you about many details like exhibits and invited delegations and so on. Therefore today we will attempt to provide a first overview and summary. We will only refer to individual events and similar things when they made relevant contributions to the
45 overall character of how to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution in the DPRK.
In general we must say that preparations for the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution started in the DPRK later than in all the the other socialist countries, as far as we know about this from the Soviet and GDR press. The overall atmosphere of all the events in the DPRK was quite reserved. Here are some examples: [ …]
As far as the sending of delegations to Moscow is concerned, so have we already given extensive information earlier. The question to send a party and government delegation, in particular the question who is going to lead it, was discussed twice in the KWP politburo. Foreign Minister Pak Songcheol explained to the Soviet Ambassador the politburo’s decision not to commission Kim Il Sung with leading the delegation, as he is not in good health and has a lot of work to do. When the Soviet Ambassador informed Kim Il Sung in person about the festivities in Moscow and the foreign delegations present there, Kim Il Sung stated in this personal conversation that he cannot travel to the USSR for the following reasons according to a decision of the KWP politburo:
1. The situation at the DMZ is very tense, and in many respects it reminds him of the situation in the summer of 1950. He does not assume something very serious will happen, yet he thinks he can therefore not travel to Moscow.
2. Relations between DPRK and PRC are also tense and a source of concern for the Korean comrades. China tries to exert pressure on the DPRK. For instance, recently a Korean train was halted for several days at the border since the driver refused to accept a Mao badge. Kim Il Sung furthermore stated to the Soviet Ambassador that the DPRK has a long border with China and everything conceivable can happen. Also Kim Il Sung mentioned that he has a lot of work with the elections scheduled for the end of November. […] [more concrete evidence on North Korean indifference about, and negligence of, the historical importance of the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution; also GDR Embassy business and personnel matters]
With Socialist Greetings, Jarck 1st Secretary
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 18
[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1967, 61. doboz, 5, 002126/3/1967]
46 [Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balázs Szalontai]
Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 25 November 1967.
According to the information received from the competent department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, several signs indicate that Sino-Korean relations keep worsening. Among these signs, we mention first of all that recently new pamphlets were published in Beijing, which contained a sharp attack on the Korean Workers’ Party and the person of Kim Il Sung, threatening the leader of the Korean Workers’ Party that the Korean people would take vengeance upon him for his revisionist policy. The estrangement of relations was also indicated by, for instance, the circumstances under which the latest Chinese holiday was celebrated in the DPRK. At the reception of the Chinese embassy, the level of representation on the Koreans’ part was very low, the telegram of congratulations the Korean leaders sent to the Chinese was very cold, and no festive mass meetings took place in the country on the occasion of the Chinese national holiday. According to the information available for our [Soviet] comrades, the Chinese chargé d’affaires to Pyongyang complains that his opportunities to maintain contacts are very limited.
In the course of their contacts with the Soviet comrades, the Koreans, on their part, lay a rather great stress on the worsening of Sino-Korean relations, and they particularly emphasize that these relations have worsened in the economic field as well, for China does not supply those traditional export articles which are of primary importance for the Korean national economy, or it supplies [only] a relatively small amount of them. For example, coking coal, without which the furnaces of the DPRK would cease to work, is such an article.
Nevertheless, it is the impression of our comrades that although the Chinese side indeed tends to reduce its economic contacts with Korea, the Korean side exaggerates the extent of that [pressure] while negotiating with the Soviet comrades. The obvious reason of this is that they strive to bring the Soviet Union to increase [Soviet-North Korean] economic contacts to such an extent that would also include certain opportunities of over-insurance for the DPRK. This manifested itself quite clearly during the talks a Korean economic delegation headed by Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Trade Yi Jooyeon, a member of the Korean Workers’ Party P[olitical] C[ommittee], had in the Soviet Union.
[…]
In the course of the Moscow negotiations, which lasted approximately for a month, […] the Korean side proposed a substantial extension of the list of articles exchanged between the two countries, namely, by increasing Soviet exports through the increased supply of machinery and equipment, auto and tractor tires, rolled non-ferrous metals, and other „hard” goods, whereas it intended to increase [North Korean] exports to the Soviet Union by [supplying] goods whose exports had already been halted and of which the Soviet Union had, and has, little need. Despite that, the Soviets, on their part, showed willingness to accept, on the whole, the Korean proposal, with regard to both exports and
47 imports, and consequently in 1968 the exchange of goods between the two countries will increase, in all likelihood, by some 49 per cent in comparison with the previous year, and it will practically rise to the level planned for 1970.
[…]
Thus the economic contacts between the two countries are improving, albeit the developments are not necessarily beneficial for the Soviet Union in every respect. „Unfortunately,” [the officials of] the MID [the Soviet Foreign Ministry] point out, „this statement cannot be applied to other fields of the relationship between the two countries.” Here they concretely mention, on the one hand, those disagreements which exist between the two countries and the two parties with regard to the evaluation of the situation of the Communist and world movement and of the international situation in general, and, on the other hand, that therefore one can hardly speak of the intensification of political cooperation between the two countries. In the Soviet Foreign Ministry [officials] emphasize that despite the support the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries gave, and give, to the DPRK in the UN with regard to the Korean question, in many respects the DPRK quite rigidly refuses to express its support for the international policy of the Soviet Union.
In the course of the conversation our official [András Köves] had in the MID, […] the Soviet side made the–obviously by no means official–statement that the Koreans and a few other parties–the Cubans, the Japanese CP, and this group also regarded the Vietnamese Workers’ Party as one of their own–which increasingly consider themselves to be the vanguard parties of the international Communist movement, which, on the one hand, play the greatest role in the struggle against imperialism, and, on the other hand, have solely fought a consistent battle in the Communist movement against leftist and rightist revisionism, and in the future might also intend to provide this political standpoint with some formal base.
It is well-known that the CPSU–like the majority of the Communist parties of the world– has positions on a number of questions of the international situation and the world Communist movement that are fundamentally different from [the position] of these parties. For instance, in the view of the Korean comrades the task is to increase international tension and, on this basis, intensify the struggle against American imperialism, while in the opinion of the CPSU it is international détente that guarantees better circumstances for the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples. Perhaps this is the fundamental antagonism [between the USSR and the DPRK], and it is of relatively secondary importance how one evaluates the role Korea or, for instance, Cuba strives to play in the anti-imperialist struggle of the socialist camp and the Communist movement in general. One can hardly accept the statement that Korea and Cuba are the advanced posts of the [anti-]imperialist struggle in the east and in the west respectively, and that they alone are subjected to the greatest pressure in the struggle against imperialism. On the contrary, the truth is most probably that it is exactly in Europe where the front between the two systems is the sharpest. […]
48 As is well-known, the Korean party and government delegation headed by Comrade Choe Yonggeon that had participated in the celebrations of 7 November left [the USSR] for Cuba for a few days. Thus it returned President Dorticos’ official visit to Korea. Having returned from Cuba, the Korean side very emphatically told the Soviet comrades that this visit had been a matter of protocol, but this way they actually reinforced the impression of our comrades that negotiations aimed at the intensification of bilateral Cuban-Korean cooperation had taken place in Havana. It is well-known that precisely because of the political essence of that cooperation, our comrades are not enthusiastic about [Cuban-Korean cooperation], particularly when it is accompanied by certain gestures which are not exactly friendly toward the Soviet comrades, for example, when Comrade Kim Il Sung does not write the article for Pravda, despite having been asked (along with the leaders of a number of other Communist parties) by the central paper of the CPSU on the occasion of 7 November, but publishes an article in a journal of the Cuban party instead, and this article once again highlights those issues in which the Korean Workers’ Party adopts a unique standpoint that is opposed to [the position of] the majority of the parties of the international Communist movement.
As is well-known, Comrade Brezhnev received Comrade Choe Yonggeon during his stay here [in the USSR]. Comrade Brezhnev raised two groups of issues at this meeting. On the one hand, the problem of the international Communist meeting; on the other hand, the issue of the tension between North and South Korea along the demilitarized zone. […]
Basically, the Soviet Union does not accept the standpoint of the DPRK with regard to the cause of the tension along the demilitarized zone. It thinks–and it also gives expression to that vis-a-vis the Korean comrades–that the United States does not intend to increase tension in this region, and nothing points to [the U.S.] really aiming to start a new Korean War. It is obvious that various factors of the USA’s international situation, such as the Vietnam War, do not make the perspective of a new Asian war attractive for the United States.
On the basis of the available evidence–including the statements made by the Czechoslovak and Polish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission–the Soviet Union has concluded that it is the DPRK that initiates the majority of the incidents occuring along the demilitarized zone.
The Soviets, for their part, expound to our Korean comrades that they understand the necessity of the DPRK’s struggle for the unification of the country. They support this struggle, but they are of the opinion that one should pay due regard to the concrete Korean and international conditions of the actual period when choosing the means and methods of the struggle. Therefore the Soviet side doubts that armed struggle is an appropriate method to reunify Korea.
For instance, in a military sense it would be, in all probability, inappropriate to come to such conclusions that the numerical superiority the DPRK’s army has over the South Korean and American armies stationed in South Korea, and the essential militarization of the country, would render it possible for the DPRK to carry out successful military
49 actions. Besides, the Soviet Union also tries to caution the DPRK against possible ill- considered actions through the military assistance it gives to that country by confining assistance to the supply of defensive arms. But the Korean comrades may make the mistake of not taking the nature and character of modern warfare into consideration to a sufficient extent.
Despite the aforesaid issues, it is the impression of our comrades that at present the DPRK, for its part, does not strive to escalate military actions, but by the regularly provoking border incidents and the accompanying propaganda campaign it intends to justify the militarization of the country and the fact that they [the KWP leaders], their official standpoint notwithstanding, can not develop the defense strength and the economy of the country simultaneously but lay stress only on the increasing of military strength, [which results in] the neglect of economic development and the stagnation of living standards.
In addition to the aforementioned issues, with regard to the internal situation of the DPRK, they [the Soviets] remark that lately the personality cult of Kim Il Sung has further increased to a great extent. Recently, a number of functionaries have been removed from the posts they occupied and have disappeared from public life. During the first wave of purges it seemed that it was carried out primarily against those leaders who had adopted a more or less pro-Chinese standpoint and against those who may have opposed the shaping of the Korean Workers’ Party’s independent policy that rejected the political line of the Chinese party leadership. Later, however, there occurred a second round of the purges, whose political content has not yet become clear for our comrades. In their view, the party functionaries involved in this round hardly seem to be the representatives of some Chinese line within the Korean party. Therefore they [the Soviets] feel uneasy about the further developments of the internal political situation.
[…] József Oláh (chargé d’affaires)
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 19
[Source: PolA AA, MfAA, G-A 320. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer].
GDR Embassy to the DPRK Pyongyang, 29 July 1968
N o t e On a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the USSR Embassy to the DPRK,
50 Comrade Zvetkov, and Comrade Jarck on 26 July 1968 between 1430 and 1615 Hours in the USSR Embassy
During my last talk with Comrade Zvetkov I had asked him whether there was a meeting scheduled with top officials while a Soviet delegation was present to participate in a session of the joint Korean-Soviet consultative economic committee. Comrade Zvetkov confirmed this and promised to inform me about the substance of this meeting [with Kim Il Sung].
At the beginning, I informed Comrade Zvetkov about my meeting with DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Songcheol (see Note VD Nr. 54/68 [not included]). Following that, Comrade Zvetkov made these remarks:
[Soviet Deputy Prime Minister] Comrade [Vladimir] Novikov was received by Kim Il Sung on 31 May 1968. Comrade N. brought the greetings of the leading comrades in the USSR and made some brief remarks about domestic developments in the Soviet Union. Then Kim Il Sung made the following statements about the domestic situation in the DPRK:
[…] [economic DPRK details for 1967 and 1968]
Regarding the DPRK’s foreign policy, Comrade Kim Il Sung stated the following:
Relations with the USSR and the European socialist countries are going well, as are those with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Yet there is a complete standstill in relations with the PR China except for in trade, which is, however, also in bad shape. Though a foreign trade protocol was signed in 1968 between the PRC and the DPRK, it is clear that PRC is not going to fulfill its obligations. In many cases, Comrade Kim Il Sung explained, the Chinese do not actually possess what they promised to deliver. Approximately 50% of obligations to deliver coke and coke coal have been realized. There are no contacts or exchanges of delegations between the KWP and CCP.
Comrade Kim Il Sung exclaimed that the DPRK’s position is clear on the “Pueblo” question. The DPRK will release the Pueblo crew when the American side issues an apology. As the U.S. is apparently in no hurry to do so, the DPRK will also not speed up the return of the crew. Comrade Kim Il Sung added that he thinks there will be no deterioration of the situation [on the Korean peninsula] because of the Pueblo incident. The remarks Kim Il Sung made about the situation in South Korea, Comrade Zvetkov stated, can be summarized in the thesis that South Korea exploited the Pueblo incident to receive extensive American military aid. At present, and in the immediate future, South Korea is going to receive modern fighter aircraft and other modern weapons and equipment. Comrade Zvetvov noted confidently that the Pueblo incident had a stake in this. But one must not overlook the events in Seoul [Blue House raid] before the Pueblo incident as the primary reason for the U.S to submit to South Korean pressure for the delivery of modern weapons and equipment.
51
[…] [Korean requests for Soviet economic aid]
Furthermore, Comrade Kim Il Sung asked Comrade Novikov to forward the following request to the leading comrades of the USSR:
The government of the DPRK is requesting the government of the USSR for permission to use an air route for special flights by members of the [North Korean] party leadership or the government, which would fly over the mainland straight from the DPRK into the USSR. This way, any contact with Chinese territory or flight over the open sea would be avoided. Explaining this request, Comrade Kim Il Sung said that a forced landing might happen on flights over Chinese territory and insults by Red Guards might occur. The flight route over the sea would be dangerous, especially after the Pueblo incident. Comrade Zvetkov stated that Comrade Kim Il Sung had further added: ‘We do not fear death, but we have to live in order to finish the revolution.’
In conclusion, Comrade Kim Il Sung affirmed that the Korean comrades are always aware that the USSR liberated the country, that Soviet people shed their blood in Korea, and that the Korean people will always want friendship with the USSR and honor its deeds. The Korean comrades are pleased that relations are developing well since 1964.
[…] [on North Korean unification strategy]
Jarck Acting Ambassador
CC 1x State Secretary Comrade Hegen [Foreign Ministry] 1x Central Committee, Department IV [International Relations], Comrade Markowski 1x Embassy, Secretariate
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 20
[Source: PolA AA, MfAA, C 1366/74. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer.]
GDR Embassy to the PR China Beijing, 30 October 1969
Note
52 on a Club Meeting of the Ambassadors and Acting Ambassadors from the GDR, USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Mongolia and Bulgaria on 24 October 1969 in the USSR Embassy
[…] [Chinese domestic policy]
On Foreign Policy:
[…] On Chinese-Korean relations Comrade Chuluunbaatar [Mongolia] reported about a meeting that a Mongolian parliamentary delegation visiting the DPRK in mid-October had with Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung said there had been a couple of issues in relations between the DPRK and the PRC. However, the DPRK had acted with patience. In South Korea there are currently one million soldiers in arms trained for a war against the North. The DPRK is prepared as well and ready to fight at any time. The socialist countries must fight jointly against imperialism. In this situation the DPRK had to under all circumstances avoid having an additional enemy at its back; thus it undertook certain steps to improve relations with China. Although the PRC did not send a delegation to the DPRK National Day [8 September], the DPRK dispatched a high-ranking delegation to Beijing for the 1st of October [Chinese National Day, Anniversary of PRC Foundation), though deliberately somewhat belatedly. […]
[Heribert] Kunz 3rd Secretary
CC 2x Foreign Ministry, Department Far East 1x Embassy
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 21
[Source: PolA AA, MfAA, C 295/78. Obtained for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer and translated for NKIDP by Karen Riechert.]
GDR Embassy to DPRK - Political Department - Pyongyang, 28 March 1973
N o t e on a Conversation with Comrade Kurbatov, 1st Secretary of the USSR Embassy, on 26 March 1973 in the USSR Embassy
53 Comrade Kurbatov informed in this conversation about his recent visit to Beijing where he exchanged opinions about PRC-DPRK relations with the comrades of the USSR Embassy in Beijing, among others with Comrade Ambassador Tolstikov.
The Soviet comrades in Beijing including Comrade Tolstikov are firmly convinced that the Chinese are not interested in Korean unification.
There are facts bolstering this opinion. Causes for the lack of Chinese interest into a unified Korea are that a unified Korea with a population of 50 million would become an important political factor and stress its independence even stronger. In addition, it would be led by a man like Kim Il Sung who would not limit his leadership ambitions to Korea.
Chinese policy aims at having small countries along its borders. Therefore, China would also be interested in the division of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
Though Chinese propaganda supports the DPRK concerning the unification of the country and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, China is only prepared to support North Korean requests as long as the DPRK supports positions and policies of the Chinese. The Chinese would support Korean unification only if they had guarantees that a unified Korea would follow a pro-Chinese course.
It is noteworthy that the PRC increases pressure on the DPRK in order to push it towards a pro-Chinese course. The DPRK currently supports the PRC, for example, on foreign policy issues like Chinese policy vis-à-vis capitalist states.
However, there are also contradictions in PRC-DPRK relations. For example, there is so far no agreement to sort out border issues. Also both countries have different positions regarding the role of the Soviet Union. Yet both countries are interested not to touch upon these questions in their bilateral talks. The Chinese pursue primarily their own interests. The DPRK does not appear to be fully pleased with the results of Ho Dam’s visit to Beijing. The PRC does not subscribe to DPRK interests in every respect, like the question of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. Apparently the DPRK expected more from the Chinese talks with Kissinger. The Chinese were said not to have insisted enough on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.
Close attention also has to be paid how future relations between PRC and South Korea might come about.
Comrade Kurbatov also reported that the division head for the USSR in the DPRK Foreign Ministry had informed him: At the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the DPRK’s foundation on 9 September there will be grand events, and there are plans to invite party and government delegations from the socialist countries.
Merten Embassy Counselor
54 CC: 1x Foreign Ministry/Far East/2 1x Foreign Ministry/Far East – China Section 1x Central Committee/Department IV 1x Embassy
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 22
[Source: PolA AA, MfAA. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer.]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department for Neighboring Countries Section People’s Republic of Poland (PRP)
To: Far Eastern Department From: Embassy Warsaw, for your information and files.
Excerpt from Warsaw Embassy Information Report 34/73 from 3 July 1973. Berlin, 16 July 1973.
On the Visit of a PRP Party and Parliamentary Delegation to the DPRK
Between 30 May and 5 June 1973, a party and parliamentary delegation of the PRP headed by Comrade Stanislaw Kania, candidate of the politburo and secretary of the PZPR central committee, visited the DPRK. As the deputy head of the PZPR International Department, Comrade Suika informed the delegation that he had no instructions to deal with concrete issues of bilateral cooperation. Instead the visit was about gathering information on positions of the DPRK on important questions of current international developments.
The visit was considered useful. It succeeded in learning about Korean positions. Yet this was not the result of official talks. Here the DPRK representatives gave only general and stereotypical answers to questions from the Polish side. For that reason, the Polish delegation decided to use its scheduled courtesy visit with Kim Il Sung to obtain more information. The conversation lasted about 3.5 hours. As Comrade Suika remarked, it was a frank talk and Kim Il Sung proved himself to be an open and rational person. Comrade Suika added that in the DPRK there exists a tightly structured system of information. Even politburo members only repeat Kim Il Sung’s statements without being able to comment on them. All statements Kim Il Sung made during our meeting were steno-graphed and distributed in the KWP central committee apparatus as actual political instructions. The day after their meeting with Kim, the Polish comrades noted changes in positions of their partners and how many issues were now commented with the same phrases Kim Il Sung had used during the meeting.
55
[…] Kim Il Sung explained that the DPRK and KWP had, and have, arguments with the PRC and the CCP. Even before the Cultural Revolution, neither the thesis “let 100 flower bloom”, nor the peoples’ communes movement, nor the labeling of the Soviet Union as an “imperialist country” were supported. The USSR is the first country of socialism, the revolution originated there. Korea has learned from the Soviet Union about Marxism- Leninism and the principles of building socialism. The PRC applied pressure on the DPRK but we did not bend. They called us revisionists. Along the border the Chinese installed loudspeakers calling on our people to abandon the revisionist regime of Kim Il Sung. The DPRK did not react to that: “That does not turn us into opportunists but just perseverant Marxist-Leninists.” In the North the DPRK has two large socialist states as neighbors. In the South there is imperialist Japan and a more than one million strong army of our enemy. If we provide hints about bad relations with our socialist neighbors in the North, it weakens our position vis-à-vis the enemy in the South. You [Poles] are far away but we have a border with the PRC.
The KWP had an invitation to the recent party congress in Albania but in the end we did not send a delegation since they anticipated attacks against the Soviet Union and also against Poland. And indeed, at the congress a [pro-Maoist exile fringe] chairman from a “Communist Party of Poland” spoke.
The KWP delegation that attended Ho Chi Minh’s funeral [in September 1969] once held talks in Beijing on its way back. On the agenda was the improvement of relations with the PRC. The Korean side had listed two basic conditions in order to achieve that. - Non-interference in the internal affairs of the DPRK – including the dismantling of the speakers along the border; - Non-interference in DPRK relations with the Soviet Union.
The PRC accepted both, and since then relations improved. The DPRK does not allow on its territory any insults against either the USSR or the PR China. The DPRK wants to do everything in its power for the unity of the communist world movement and the socialist states.
Comrade Suika asserted that the DPRK is interested in getting closer with European socialist countries in full awareness of the close alliance of these countries with the Soviet Union. The DPRK attempts, by way of this detour, to demonstrate where it stands. Such is too dangerous in its direct relations with the Soviet Union. These relations can only develop in balanced proportion to relations with the PR China. […]
* * *
DOCUMENT No. 23
56 [Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2A/2123. Obtained for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer and translated for CWIHP by Grace Leonard.]
Report on the official friendship visit to the DPRK by the Party and state delegation of the GDR, led by Com. Erich Honecker, 8-11 December 1977
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY – Internal Party Archives – From the files of: Politburo Memorandum No. 48 13 December 1977 DY30/ Sign.: J IV 2/2 A – 2123
Report on the official friendship visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by the Party and state delegation of the German Democratic Republic, led by Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, from 8 to 11 December 1977.
At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and the Council of Ministers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a Party and state delegation from the German Democratic Republic, led by Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, made an official friendship visit to the DPRK from 8 to 11 December 1977.
I. The visit was the first meeting of the highest representatives of the GDR and DPRK since Comrade Kim Il Sung’s visit to the GDR in 1956. The meetings between Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Kim Il Sung, with both delegations present, were friendly. The visit resulted in an agreement on a joint communique. A Consular Treaty and an Agreement on the Further Development of Economic and Scientific/Technical Cooperation were signed.
The Party and government of the DPRK organized an impressive reception by the people of Pyongyang for the GDR’s Party and state delegation. During its stay, the delegation toured the Kimsong tractor plant and attended the opera, “The Flower Girl,” in the Mansuda Palace. Comrades Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung spoke at a celebration of friendship, at which there were 20,000 participants and which took place in the Athletic Palace in Pyongyang.
During the official proceedings each side reported to the other about the realization of the resolutions of the IX Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party and of the V Party Congress of the Korean Workers Party. There was a comprehensive exchange of views
57 on the development of relations between the two Parties and nations, the international situation, and the Communist world movement. Willingness was expressed to expand in all respects the cooperation between the Socialist Unity Party and the Korean Workers Party, and between the GDR and the DPRK. Comrade Kim Il Sung repeatedly stressed the great importance of Comrade Erich Honecker’s visit for deepening mutual understanding and bilateral relations.
The mass media of the DPRK reported in detail about the visit by the GDR’s Party and state delegation. Press accounts of the toast by Comrade Erich Honecker at the reception by the Korean side did not report remarks on issues of European security and disarmament.
II. In his remarks, Comrade Erich Honecker praised the DPRK’s great achievements in building socialism and affirmed the GDR’s support for proposals by the DPRK for resolving problems on the Korean peninsula.
Comrade Honecker reported in detail about the domestic and foreign policy of the GDR in realizing the resolutions of the IX Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party. He stressed that the successes of the GDR in building a developed socialist society are the result of intense work and creative initiative on the part of the workers of the GDR under the leadership of their Marxist/Leninist party. The indestructible bonds to and cooperation with the Soviet Union and fraternal Socialist nations are very important for stable and dynamic development in the GDR. Preparations for the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution have turned into the greatest competition in the GDR. The Socialist Unity Party is devoting special attention to further improving social democracy, especially in terms of broad inclusion of citizens in leading the state. Political/ideological work is the heart and soul of the Party’s efforts. Its centerpiece is disseminating and popularizing the works of Marx and Lenin, educating for socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism.
The Socialist Unity Party strongly opposes the increasing ideological diversion and stepped-up agitation by FRG imperialism against the GDR. It completely rejects all appearances of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism. Comrade Honecker outlined the mutual foreign policy positions of the community of socialist states on issues of international development. He stressed that the solid alliance with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal nations is the foundation of our foreign policy. New friendship treaties entered into with the Soviet Union and other socialist nations are particularly important. They play an important role in consolidating the socialist world system as the greatest achievement of the international working class. He stressed the necessity of strengthening the Warsaw Pact in order to protect the peaceful building [of socialism] in our countries from NATO’s aggressive intentions.
Relations between the GDR and the People’s Republic of China are poor for reasons that are known. There are no Party relations. The XI Party Congress of the Communist Party of China characterized the Soviet Union as the number one enemy. Beijing is further
58 improving its reactionary interplay with imperialism. Subversive activity with regard to the international Communist movement continues. Beijing criticizes NATO for not building up enough arms for a war against the Soviet Union. This is tantamount to a challenge to wage war against the GDR. The GDR completely rejects the policies of the Chinese leaders, which run counter to the interests of Socialist countries, the international workers movement, and the national liberation movement. At the same time, it advocates normal development of state relations with the People’s Republic of China and, given proper conditions, resuming Party relations, as well. But this is not possible at the cost of compromising principle issues, such as the unbreakable bond to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to the Soviet Union itself.
Comrade Honecker addressed in detail the situation in Europe, especially in the FRG, and the status of relations between the GDR and the FRG. He spoke about the NATO military forces directly arrayed against the GDR and relations between the FRG and South Korea.
In its policies towards developing nations, the GDR concentrates on supporting nations with a socialist orientation, such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Guinea-Bissau. It supports the efforts by many Asian states to create stable relations of peaceful coexistence on this continent, and thereby to ensure important conditions required for guaranteeing security in Asia. This includes ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula.
In his statements on the communist world movement, Comrade Honecker stressed that the Socialist Unity Party maintains good relations with the overwhelming majority of fraternal parties based on Marxism/Leninism and proletarian internationalism. He stressed the mutual responsibility of the communist parties and praised the Berlin Conference as a meaningful success by the Communist movement. Comrade Kim Il Sung expressed his gratitude for the selfless aid and support of the GDR, especially during the War of Liberation of the Fatherland and during the period that followed. Even today the GDR is providing valuable support to the Korean people in the struggle to unify the country.
The Korean Workers Party considers unification of the fatherland to be its primary mission. To achieve this goal, at its V Party Congress the Party resolved to build up socialism in the north, to support the struggle of revolutionary forces in South Korea, and to consolidate solidarity with international revolutionary forces. Building Socialism in the DPRK is the foundation for establishing the new social order in the entire nation.
It is worthwhile to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist order to the south and to show the entire world that the DPRK is a sovereign, independent state. In contrast, South Korea is a base for American imperialism. After the victory over the Japanese militarists, the socialist countries, the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and the GDR as well provided great assistance to the Korean people. But this alone could not resolve every problem. So it was necessary to do everything in our power to become self reliant. Since then an independent national economy has been created. Currently the ideological, technical, and cultural revolution are the focal points, which is in accord with the resolutions of the V Party Congress.
59
The DPRK stands directly before the enemy. Since there was no bourgeois revolution in Korea, the transition period to socialism and communism is relatively long. There is residual feudalism, Confucianism, Buddhism, sectarianism. Since Korea is surrounded by large countries, toadyism before the great foreign powers was very prevalent. The ideological revolution is no less important than creating the material foundations for socialism. The experience of the Korean Workers Party demonstrates that people very actively take part in the revolution, in smashing the old social order. The higher the material standard of living climbs, the more ideologically lazy people become and the more careless their activity is. All people must be transformed according to the model of the worker class.
The Korean Workers Party today has 2.2 million members. All of the other members of society are included in the various organizations. Organized Party life and learning occupy an important place in the ideological work. Nearly the entire population takes part in training that is conducted every Saturday. In addition, two hours of self-study are conducted daily.
The technical revolution is very important. The primary issues are reducing the differences between light and heavy physical labor, between industry and agriculture, and liberating women from heavy housework, actively drawing them into societal life.
Our cultural revolution is different from that in other countries. Its goal is to provide all people with knowledge. This is why the mandatory 11-year polytechnical school system was introduced. One million intellectuals have already been trained in the DPRK. The issue is repelling enemy attempts to infiltrate the cultural realm.
Turning to the economic situation, Comrade Kim Il Sung reported that a new 7-year plan begins in 1978. The objective of this plan is to develop modern industry, pervaded with science and based on the Juche principle. This does not mean rejecting economic cooperation with other countries. But industry must still support itself based on native raw materials.
The main points of the 7-year plan cited by Kim Il Sung provide for industrial production to increase by approximately 100 percent and are to be approved at a Central Committee meeting and thereafter at a meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly on 15 December 1977.
Comrade Kim Il Sung addressed the complicated situation in the development of the South Korean revolution. Comrade Kim Il Sung spoke out against the concept of two Korean states and rejected the US proposal for so-called cross-recognition (Soviet Union recognizes South Korea, US recognizes the DPRK). The DPRK will patiently continue its work with respect to the South, so that Park Chung Hee becomes even more isolated and the struggle for democratization can be continued. The DPRK holds fast to the three
60 principles for unifying the land, which were announced in 1972. Negotiations with the South, which began in 1972 based on this foundation, have currently been broken off because those in power in South Korea have publicly come out in favor of two Koreas.
Comrade Kim Il Sung stressed the differences in the situations of the GDR and DPRK, both in the negotiations and in his speech at the friendship celebration. He stated that the existence of the GDR was historically necessary.
In his remarks on the international situation, Comrade Kim Il Sung stressed that the Korean Workers Party advocates joining all revolutionary forces, especially those of socialist nations, “Third World” countries, the non-aligned nations, the international workers movement, and the national liberation movement.
There are difficulties in joining the forces of Socialist nations due to relations between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Seen from a historical perspective, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China are comrades-in-arms of the DPRK. The DPRK has a common border with the People’s Republic of China that is approximately 1500 kilometers in length. Although the two countries are close, the DPRK does not agree with everything China does. Relations with China were poor during the “Cultural Revolution.” China agitated against the “Korean revisionists” over loudspeakers that were set up along the entire Sino-Korean border.
But if the DPRK improves relations with China, it need not worry about the US. The DPRK cannot concentrate troops in the north and in the south simultaneously. This is why the DPRK has endeavored to improve relations since the end of the “Cultural Revolution.” It has succeeded. However, the DPRK does not accept Chinese assertions such as the characterization of the Soviet Union as “Social Imperialism.” The DPRK is not a blind follower of China.
The Soviet Union supported Korea in its war of liberation. After the war it provided political and material assistance in the amount of 2,220 billion [old denomination] rubles. The DPRK is striving for better, amicable relations, but cannot get involved in the polemics between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. In this issue, it favors maintaining strict independence and supports anything that promotes joining forces.
There are people who believe that the DPRK is more on China’s side. This is not the case. The principles of the DPRK for the joining of forces in the Communist world movement are the struggle against imperialism, for socialism and communism, for support of the international workers and democratic movements, and non-intervention in domestic matters. The DPRK maintains normal relations with the other socialist nations and has no differences of opinion with them. The DPRK participates in the non-aligned movement because it is highly anti-imperialist in character. Relations between the DPRK and the countries of the Third World are good.
61 Comrade Kim Il Sung remarked on the danger of Japanese militarism recurring. Japanese militarists are no less dangerous than those in West Germany. He opposed the stationing of US troops in Asia and the transformation of ASEAN into a military organization.
III. Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Kim Il Sung praised how well relations between the two Parties and states have developed. The results of the visit have created favorable conditions for successfully further developing cooperation between the Socialist Unity Party and the Korean Workers Party, the GDR and the DPRK. Comrade Erich Honecker addressed in detail the status of relations between the two Parties and states and passed on to Comrade Kim Il Sung written proposals for further cooperation in the political and economic arenas. The proposals he set forth for further developing scientific/technical and economic cooperation, and the written draft of a governmental agreement in this regard, were appraised by Comrade Kim Il Sung as a very useful foundation for further developing economic cooperation.
Comrade Kim Il Sung explained that a trade deficit has come about in the last five years due to certain economic difficulties in the DPRK, and the loans could not be repaid on time. The DPRK thinks it is possible to cooperate with the GDR in mining heavy metals. The GDR could supply facilities, while the DPRK has labor and raw materials. The FRG works very actively in South Korea, and this is why the DPRK and the GDR should work closely with one another. He particularly stressed developing cooperation in joint development of heavy metals and the production of sintered magnesite.
He was particularly grateful for the GDR’s willingness to intensify its scientific/technical support precisely in those areas that are of great importance for developing North Korea’s own raw material resources, such as, for instance, calcium carbide chemistry and upgrading coal. He requested that the GDR provide good support in developing microelectronics for automation.
Comrade Kim Il Sung accepted the invitation Comrade Erich Honecker extended to visit the GDR and agreed to prepare an Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation and toenter into a long-term trade agreement.
IV. In preparing for the visit, negotiations on communiqués were held that resulted in joint statements on a few issues of international development and on how relations should proceed. The communique contained positive statements on international relations, the Great October Socialist Revolution, the unity and solidarity of Socialist countries and the Communist and workers parties, developments in Europe, for peace and cooperation in Asia, and on the importance of peaceful coexistence between the GDR and the FRG.
The Korean side praised the existence of the GDR as an important contribution to strengthening the forces of socialism in the world. The negotiations resulted in an agreement that the visit would contribute to deepening the friendship and cooperation
62 between the GDR and the DPRK and would thereby strengthen the solidarity of socialist states. […]
* * * DOCUMENT No. 24
[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. Obtained for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer and translated for NKIDP by Grace Leonard.]
Memorandum of conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung, 31 May 1984.
Memorandum [stamp:] Personal Classified Information Central Committee 02 310 on the meeting between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung on 31 May 1984 ______E. Honecker used the meeting to address some issues that could not be addressed in greater detail during the official talks on 30 May 1984 due to time constraints.
He stated that the GDR is currently preoccupied with its 35th anniversary. The Party, which has 2.2 million members, is making thorough preparations for the 35th anniversary. The centerpiece is the ideological work, which has led to intense talks with practically every citizen of the GDR.
He said that, as Kim Il Sung could see for himself, the Party is bound to the masses, and there is a good trusting relationship between the Party and the masses. The alliance policy is very important, that is, cooperation with allied Parties, the role of organizations of the masses such as the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions, with 9 million members, the Free German Youth, with 2.3 million members, and the whole range of other organizations of the masses.
He said that the election results of 6 May 1984 could be considered the best in the history of the GDR, both in terms of the election itself and in terms of voter turnout, and attests to the successful policies of the Party and government in carrying out the resolutions of the X Party Congress.
He stated that the Socialist competition in honor of the 35th Anniversary of the GDR is very important. The workers have established as their goal for this to increase productivity by one percent above what is planned. Given the results thus far it can be expected that they will surpass this goal in the competition. Thus net industrial production in the first 5 months of 1984 increased by 7.9 percent. Productivity in the field
63 of industrial ministries increased by 7 percent during the same period. This demonstrates the excellent initiative of the citizens of [line cut off].
He stated that the fact that 6 million citizens received new apartments between 1971 and 1983 alone was very positive for consolidating trust between the Party and the masses. Now the goal is to improve the residential conditions of an additional 4.3 million citizens between 1984 and 1990. Then the issue of apartments in the GDR as a social problem would be resolved in 1990. In addition, there are a number of other measures in the realm of social policy, e.g., the recent resolutions on improving material conditions for families with more than 3 children and the third increase in minimum pensions since 1971.
E. Honecker detailed the activities of organizations of the masses such as the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions, the Free German Youth, the Association of Gardeners and Animal Breeders, the reinvigorated Association for Mutual Farmers Assistance, the scientific institutes of the GDR, the academies and schools of higher education, the development of the general polytechnical school, the activities of artists unions, and much more.
All of this, he said, is going on in our country under conditions that are open to the world, as he had already expressed in 1977, that is, under the immediate observation of the Western adversary’s electronic media. Naturally there are a few people who listen to these broadcasters and their daily lies, but it should not be overlooked that the vast majority of citizens of the GDR, one could even say, the people, stand fast and unalterably with the Party and government, with their republic.
E. Honecker then asked Kim Il Sung his assessment of the situation in China and of the current leadership of the Communist Party of China based on his own experience. For the USSR and also for the GDR and other socialist countries that do not have Party relations with China, China is a country about whose future course there are still many unresolved questions, for instance, as a result of the Reagan visit.
Kim Il Sung responded as follows. When Hu Yaobang visited our country in May, I also told him about my upcoming trip to the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries. He welcomed it. I had not known Hu Yaobang before this. On the other hand, I have been friends with Deng Xiaoping for a long time. As you know, he was exiled three times during the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping paid me an unofficial visit for my 70th birthday in April 1982 to introduce Hu Yaobang to me as the new Secretary General of the Communist Party of China. He made a good impression on me from the beginning.
Hu Yaobang told me that he wants to improve governmental relations with the Soviet Union. He asked me to convey this to the leadership of the Soviet Union. Hu Yaobang assured me many times during our lengthy discussion that China is truly interested in improving relations with the Soviet Union. He confirmed this to me again this year. The leadership of the Communist Party of China is of one mind on this issue. He asked me to convey my thoughts on this to our Soviet comrades.
64 During his visit to the DPRK, he received news that Comrade Arkhipov’s planned visit to the People’s Republic of China would be pushed back. Comrade Hu Yaobang told me that he had very much been looking forward to this visit. Our Chinese comrades also think highly of Comrade Arkhipov. He used to be an economic advisor in China. Comrade Hu Yaobang said that he very much regretted that Comrade Arkhipov’s trip would be pushed back.
I told Comrade Chernenko about this during my meetings with him. I told our Soviet comrades my thoughts both in a personal meeting with Comrade Chernenko and in official negotiations — that the Chinese really want to improve relations with the Soviet Union. The Chinese do not want war. Overcoming the consequences of the Cultural Revolution in the economy and in the standard of living of the population requires a lot of time and effort. All resources must be devoted to this. The Chinese are not developing relations with the US and Japan with the goal of working against another country.
Given the complex world situation, I hope that the Soviet Union and China work things out. I believe that the development of relations with the US is not targeted against the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai already told me that when they established relations with the US. They told us every time they met with Japan and the US. The only objective of these relations is to obtain developed technology and credit from Japan and the US. Deng Xiaoping is said to have stated in the US that the arms build-up in the US is good for peace. I don’t know if that’s so. This is the first time I have heard of Deng Xiaoping expressing a sentiment like that.
It is a fact that the Chinese have improved governmental relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The number of delegations exchanged has grown, as well. All of this can help to reduce the mistrust between the Soviet Union and China. Naturally, I was not able to tell Comrade Chernenko that I think it is a mistake to push back Comrade Arkhipov’s visit to China. I just told him that the Chinese regret it. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Com munist Party of China has 5 members. Two of them—Wu Xueqian and Li Xiannian— used to be friends with Comrade Arkhipov. Today they are both powerful. Comrade Arkhipov could build trust in meetings with these two men.
Hu Yaobang told me the following: We sent the Deputy Prime Minister to Comrade Andropov’s funeral. During the welcoming meeting, his escort told him that he could meet with anyone he wanted. As is customary with East Asians, he said that he would accommodate himself to whatever his host had arranged. Our Soviet comrades did not understand this correctly. There were meetings with just anyone. Only the Foreign Minister attended Brezhnev’s burial. They were sending a message to the Soviet Union by sending the deputy prime minister. But this was not understood.
Kim Il Sung said that he believed that all socialist nations should work toward creating trust between the Soviet Union and China. No new mistrust must be permitted to arise. I have told our Soviet comrades that I believe that the goal of our Chinese comrades is to put Socialism in China in order. They don’t want a conflict. I think it is important that
65 China wants to open the gate to socialist nations in the interest of socialist modernization. We should not oppose that. Why should we leave the important Chinese market to the capitalists?
The old generation of leadership in China is dying out. We should show the new generation an opening. If we leave China to the capitalists, there is the risk that China will become a quasi-colony again. We should not close the door in China’s face.
Because of our position—the length of our border with China, confrontation with the US and Japan—what we are most afraid of is that China will not stick with socialism. There are 1 billion people in China. We have to make sure that they follow the socialist path rather than some other path. We have to focus on drawing them toward us. In the past there were major anti-Soviet campaigns in China. This is not the case anymore. During the Cultural Revolution there were major propaganda actions against us on the Yalu. There were provocations in North Korea at the time of the Chinese/Soviet conflicts on the Ussuri in 1969. While I was recuperating in the country, I received a call from our Minister of State Security that Chinese troops were crossing the Tumen [River] onto our territory. I gave the order not to shoot, but to let them come ahead so that we could take them on our territory, if necessary. We sent a group of soldiers there. Then the Chinese withdrew. The Chinese have castigated the Soviet Union and even us as revisionists. It lasted about 5 years in our case, and we had to keep our peace because of our situation. We had to be patient.
China has new leadership now. They don’t want any conflict with the Soviet Union. They want peaceful co-existence with the US, Japan, India, and even the Soviet Union. There are still no Party relations between the Soviet Union and China. We should all try to use our governmental relations to create an atmosphere that promotes the restoration of Party relations, even between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. I ask that you, Comrade Honecker, recommend to our Soviet comrades that they send Comrade Arkhipov to China and furthermore that they begin exchanging delegations. I am convinced that China would never put herself on the side of the US against the Soviet Union. All socialist countries should develop economic ties to China, and should even invest in China. The Chinese wanted to speak to Comrade Arkhipov about opportunities to cooperate in modernizing the numerous plants built by the Soviet Union. I told Hu Yaobang that I would ask the Soviet Union about building a nuclear power plant. Hu Yaobang welcomed this, because it would be better than purchasing one from a capitalist country.
Regarding the incidents on the Chinese/Vietnamese border that you mentioned, which you do not approve of, which you regret, I have only the Chinese press accounts to go by. I know nothing of what actually happened. I consider it very regrettable, because these incidents help neither the Vietnamese nor the Chinese. They do damage to our common tasks, above all bringing the Chinese closer to us. All socialist countries should urge the two great powers to hold out their hands to one another.
66 Hu Yaobang has gathered a lot of new people around him. Hu Qili, who in the past was with the World Federation of Democratic Youth—he knows many people from the past, including you, Comrade Honecker. The current Foreign Minister was also involved in the youth organization in the past. There are many other people around Hu Yaobang who used to work in the youth organization. Hu Yaobang himself is still very healthy; he is smart, his theoretical knowledge is good, and he has also made a thorough study of Marxism. Deng Xiaoping works more from behind the scene, but he also believes that they have to develop relations with the Soviet Union. He is the only one of the old functionaries who is still there. I am his friend. In the past the Chinese castigated the Soviet Union as social imperialists. They don’t do that any more.
I met Comrade Chernenko for the first time [line cut off] ... I knew him well. He has been to Korea three times. He sent me a personal letter immediately after he was elected. I promised him that I would come to the Soviet Union quickly so that I could travel to the GDR immediately afterwards. But that had to be postponed due to Comrade Andropov’s illness. Since I have just gotten to known Comrade Chernenko, I did not know how far I could go with him during our talks. I ask you, Comrade Honecker, to discuss all of these issues with him when you meet. How good it would be for all of us if the Soviet Union and China would reconcile. Japanese journalists have frequently asked my opinion on Sino-Soviet relations. I always said that they are both socialist countries and they therefore belong together. Both the Soviet Union and China are our comrades-in-arms.
To E. Honecker’s inquiry about the nature of the group of Koreans living in Japan, Kim Il Sung stated that this was a group formed by the DPRK. We support relations between this group and socialist countries, including the GDR.
Hu Yaobang, Kim Il Sung continued, had me briefed in great detail on his trip to Japan. I support normalization of relations between China and Japan. There are those in Japan who aspire to reviving militarism and the alliance with the US. But Japan in general can have no interest in re-militarization for economic reasons. All of Japan’s mass organizations oppose militarization. Much depends on which people are in power. I asked Hu Yaobang about his talks with Nakasone. He told me that Nakasone said that Japan will not become cannon fodder for the Americans. It can’t dissociate itself from the US, but does not want to become a lackey of the US. We should all think about that. For the future it could be important whether Nakasone remains prime minister or whether Abe becomes prime minister. In China the Chinese have been courting Abe because they think he would be the better choice. We have to work with the Japanese in a way that ensures that militarism does not recur. I sometimes make harsh statements against Japanese militarism, but we have to work with them anyway. Above all we oppose the US/Japan/South Korea trilateral military alliance. The Japanese have promised the Chinese $2 billion in credit. This is good for the Chinese economy.
I would like to address the socialist market, but today we have no more time.
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