The German Army's "Judenzahlung" of igi6 Genesis - Consequences - Significance
BY WERNER T. ANGRESS Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 "... Geht doch und zahlt sie. Zahlt auch die begraben Und die verkriippelt dieser grause Krieg. Geht hin und zahlt. Sollt unsre Hilfe haben Zum Zahlen auch der jiid'schen milden Gaben Und jiid'schen Streiter fur den innern Sieg . . .
Nun zahlt ihr uns. Wir wollen's nicht ertragen. Was taten wir, dass man uns das getan? Wie durftet ihr nach dem Bekenntnis fragen ? Wir fragten nicht in jenen hohen Tagen: Furs Vaterland ward's ungefragt getan ..." From Henriette Fiirth, 'Judenzahlung'. On 11th October 1916l an order (Erlass) signed by the Prussian War Minister Adolf Wild von Hohenborn2 was sent to all German military commands at the front, behind the front, in German-occupied territory, and in the homeland (Heimat) to determine, by means of a census to be taken on 1st November 1916, how many Jews subject to military duty were serving on that date in every unit of the German armies. The relevant passages read as follows: "The War Ministry is continually receiving complaints from the population that large numbers of men of the Israelitic faith who are fit for military service are either exempt from military duties or are evading their obligation to serve under every conceivable pretext. According to these reports, large numbers of Jews in military service are also said to have obtained assignments in administrative or clerical posts far away from the front lines, either with the rear echelon or in the homeland. "In order to examine these complaints and, should they prove unwarranted, to be able to refute them, the War Ministry respectfully requests that the pertinent information be supplied in accordance with the two attached forms [ersucht . . . ergebenst urn gefdllige Aufstellung einer Nachweisung nach dem anliegenden Muster 1 und 2] ... and returned to the War Ministry by 1st December 1916 . . ."3 xThe major findings discussed in this essay were originally published in my introduction to 'Dokumentation. Das deutsche Militar und die Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg', in Militargeschicht- liche Mitteilungen, 19 (1/76), pp. 77-88 (hereafter MGM 19). I wish to thank Dr. Wilhelm Deist, Wissenschaftlicher Direktor, Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Freiburg, for his consent to the publication of this English essay on the subject, which is a revised and expanded version of a lecture delivered by the author at the Leo Baeck Institute, New York, on 21st October 1976. I also want to thank Grysta E. Casey who read the proofs of the manuscript and made valuable suggestions and corrections. ^Generalleutnant Adolf Wild von Hohenborn was Deputy Prussian War Minister from August 1914 until January 1915, and from 25th January 1915 until 29th October 1916 Prussian War Minister. 3Bundesarchiv Koblenz. Reichskanzlei. Film 2197, No. 160 (hereafter: BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, No. ...) • The document is published as No. 7 in my Dokumentation (see n. 1). Subsequently, documents referred to from this particular publication will be cited as follows: Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. ..., p 118 Werner T. Angress The questionnaires {Muster 1 [see Appendix] and 2) asked for figures on how many Jewish officers, administrative army officials or enlisted men were serving as volunteers, had died in battle or had been decorated while serving at the front; how many were serving behind the lines although fit for combat service; and how many of these were volunteers or had been decorated while serving 4 behind the lines. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 The Erlass of 11th October raises several questions. Who had initiated the Judenzdhlung ? Why had it been initiated, and why at that particular time, at a juncture in the war when Germany's military and civilian leadership faced far graver problems than that of how many Jews were serving in the army ? Had the War Ministry's decision to issue the census order been exclusively an anti- semitic move, or had other considerations entered in as well ? As most of the documents that might have thrown light on these questions perished during the Second World War, the answers will have to be tentative, although on the basis of the scattered evidence available a few suggestions can at least be offered as to the genesis of this peculiar research project upon which Prussia's War Ministry embarked in the autumn of 1916. As is well known by now, the outbreak of the First World War was greeted by Germany's Jews with the same frantic patriotism that affected the majority of the nation. Alongside their Christian fellow citizens they joined up as volunteers in large numbers, and the Jewish press urged over and over again to spare no sacrifice but to give Blut and Gut for the fatherland.5 After the Emperor's proclamation of the Burgfrieden on 4th August 1914, many of the heretofore practised discriminations against Jews, especially those pertaining to positions in state service, disappeared - at least for the moment. Qualified Jewish non-commissioned officers were promoted to officer's rank throughout the various military contingents of the Empire. Jewish businessmen, scientists and academicians were invited to serve their country in positions of responsi- bility and trust within a number of governmental offices and agencies, notably the hastily created Kriegsgesellschqften.6 Yet this happy state of affairs did not
4BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, No. 161 (Muster 1); and ibid., No. 161 a (Muster 2), 'Nachweisung uber noch nicht zur Einstellung gelangte, auf Reklamation zuriickgestellte und als kr.u. [kriegsuntauglich] befundene Juden'. No. 161 was printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 8, pp. 97- 98. 5Peter Pulzer, 'Die judische Beteiligung an der Politik', in Juden im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890-1914. Ein Sammelband herausgegeben von Werner E. Mosse unter Mitwirkung von Arnold Paucker, Tubingen 1976 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 33), pp. 232-233; Arnold Paucker, 'Zur Problematik einer jiidischen Abwehr- strategie in der deutschen Gesellschaft', in ibid., pp. 545-547. This euphoric display of national unity, known as the "Spirit of 1914", cut across all the various religious and ideological groupings of German Jewry, including the Zionists. For a few typical examples of this Jewish display of patriotism see Deutsche Israelitische £eitung, XXXI (6th August 1914), No. 3, p. 3 (hereafter DIZ); Allgemeine Z^itung des Judentums, 78 (7th August 1914), No. 32, pp. 374-375 (hereafter AZdJ); ibid. (21st August 1914), No. 34, p. 406; K. C. Blatter, V, Kriegsausgabe vol. I (Septem- ber-October 1914), No. 1, p. 263; and Im deutschen Reich, XX (September 1914), No. 9, pp. 339 ff. (hereafter IdR). 6On the Kriegsgesellschaften see Otto Goebel, Deutschlands Rohstoffwirtschaft im Weltkrieg, Stuttgart 1930; August Skalweit, Die deutsche Kriegserndhrungswirtschaft, Berlin-Leipzig-Stuttgart 1927; Alfred Miiller, Die Kriegsrohstoffbevuirtschaftung 1914-1918 im Dienste des deutschen Monopolkapitals, The German Army's " Juden zdhlung" 119 last very long. By the late autumn of 1914 Jewish newspapers began to complain about antisemitic slanders published by the press of the Reichshammerbund and other volkisch organisations.7 During the following year, the right-wing Pan- German League and the Farmers' League dropped whatever restraints they had hitherto practised and engaged in unbridled antisemitism.8 The principal charges, raised indiscriminately and extensively, were that Jews shirked their Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 military obligations and were engaged in large-scale profiteering.9 As the inflammatory language of these accusations violated the letter and spirit of the Burgfrieden, the military censorship tended to intervene in cases of particularly flagrant virulence by temporarily banning the offending publications.10 Despite these measures, enough poisonous allegations were printed to cause concern among the Jews. Yet for the first two years of the war they refrained from appealing to the government for redress and restricted themselves to rebuttals of the antisemitic charges in their press. Although the reasons for this mounting antisemitic campaign were complex, all that can be done within the limits of this essay is to refer briefly to some of the most significant ones.11 One of the basic preconditions for a revival of intensive antisemitism was undoubtedly the general deterioration of living conditions for the majority of the civilian population. As the war dragged on
Berlin (East) 1955; and James T. Shotwell, Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkriegs, 11 vols., Stuttgart 1927-1932, esp. vol. 1. On the Burgfrieden, see Germany, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Stenographische Berichte, 13. Legislaturperiode, 2. Session, vol. 306 (4th August 1914), p. 2 (here- after: Reichstag, Sten. Ber., vol., date and p.). A few of the most prominent names of Jews called into government service are given in: Pulzer, loc. cit., p. 233. See also Ernest Hamburger, Juden im qffentlichen Leben Deutschlands. Regierungsmitglieder, Beamte und Parlamentarier in der mo- narchischen Ze^ 1848-1918, Tubingen 1968 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 19), pp. 101-102 and ff., passim. WIZ, XXXI (29th October 1914), No. 43, pp. 1-3; ibid. (12th November 1914), No. 45, pp. 1-4; and ibid. (26th November 1914), No. 47, pp. 1-3. AZdJ, 78 (23rd October 1914), No. 43, p. 509; ibid. (6th November 1914), No. 45, pp. 531-532; ibid. (20th November 1914), No. 47, p. 455; ibid. (27th November 1914), No. 48, p. 467; ibid. (1 lth December 1914), No. 50, p. 491; andibid. (18th December 1914), No. 51, p. 503. (Due to a printer's error, which was not corrected for the balance of the year 1914, the pagination in the newspaper's issues Nos. 47 to 52 is off by one hundred pages.) See also Walter Preuss, Ein Ring schliesst sich. Von der Assimilation zur Chaluziuth, Tel Aviv n.d., p. 93. 8Werner Jochmann, 'Die Ausbreitung des Antisemitismus', in Deutsches Judentum in Krieg und Revolution 1916-1923. Ein Sammelband herausgegeben von Werner E. Mosse unter Mitwirkung von Arnold Paucker, Tubingen 1971 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 25), pp. 412-417, esp. p. 416, notes 19 and 20. "See, for instance, DIZ, XXXII (4th November 1915), No. 44, pp. 15-16; Mitteilungen aus dem Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus, XXV (3rd November 1915), No. 22, p. 116 (hereafter Mitteilungen); ibid. (1st December 1915), No. 24, pp. 125-127; Jiirgen Kocka, Klassengesellschqft im Krieg. Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914-1918, Gottineen 1973 (Kritische Studien zur Geschichts- wissenschaft8),pp. 103-104. "Wilhelm Deist, ed., Militdr und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914-1918, 2 vols., DUsseldorf 1970 (Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Reihe 2, Bd. I/I, II), I/I, pp. 63-181, on the handling of censorship by the military. See also Egmont Zechlin, Die deutsche Politik und die Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg (unter Mitarbeit von Hans Joachim Bieber), Gottingen 1969, p. 93; but cf. the much more sceptical assessment of the effects of military censorship by Jochmann, loc. cit., p. 420. 11For this and the following I have based myself especially on the analysis of Jochmann, loc. cit., pp. 412-425. See also Kocka, op. cit., pp. 103-104, and Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 521 and ff., passim. 120 Werner T. Angress without an early end in sight, and as hardships such as food shortages and other privations increased from month to month, growing segments of the Ger- man people who had ignored antisemitic propaganda before the war now be- came susceptible to it. The antisemitic wartime campaign, in turn, was the result of a deliberate and concerted effort on the part of the traditional right-wing enemies of the Jews already mentioned - Reichshammerbund, Pan-Germans, the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 Farmers' League et al. - to steer the mounting discontent with prevailing condi- tions towards a readily recognisable culprit, namely the alleged Jewish profiteer and shirker. In addition, a wide spectrum of conservative political and economic interests comprising Germany's ruling elites used antisemitism to defend the existing political and social structure of the Empire by attributing the demands of the political Left - the Progressives and Social Democrats - for a negotiated peace, constitutional reforms and related issues to the poisonous and zersetzende influence of the Jews. Finally, antisemitism served still another, albeit related, purpose, for it was used by the forces of the Right as a weapon against the government of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. The Chancellor, so the charges went, was schlapp, wanted a "peace of renunciation", wanted to reform Prussia's antiquated and highly undemocratic electoral law and was opposed to Ger- many's use of unrestricted submarine warfare.12 In order to discredit Bethmann and, if possible, compel him to resign, the entire phalanx of "patriots" ranging from the Deutschkonservative Party to the Pan-German League frequently imputed, explicitly and by innuendo, that the Chancellor and his government were acting under Jewish influence.13 1JThe literature on the domestic situation and the intrigues against Bethmann Hollweg in particular is extensive, and the following titles are merely a selection of some of the more im- portant recent publications on these issues: Deist, op. cit., I, pp. 383-386, 392-393, 402-414, 421-424, and passim; and ibid., II, pp. 651-802; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, 'Bethmann Hollweg und die offentliche Meinung 1914-1917', in Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, XVII (April 1969), No. 2, pp. 117-159 (hereafter VJHfZ), esp. p. 146; Eberhard von Vietsch, Bethmann Hollweg. Staatsmann zwischen Macht und Ethos, Boppard am Rhein 1969, pp. 223 ff.; Konrad H. Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany, New Haven and London 1973, pp. 353-380; and by the same author, 'Die Alldeutschen und die Regierung Bethmann Hollweg. Eine Denkschrift Kurt Riezlers vom Herbst 1916. Dokumenta- tion', in VJHfZ, XXI (October 1973), No. 4, pp. 435-468; Karl Dietrich Erdmann, ed., Kurt Riezler. Tagebucher, Aufsdtze, Dokumente, Gottingen 1972 (Deutsche Geschichtsquellen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts 48), pp. 331 ff.; Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des "Militarisms" in Deutschland, III: Die Tragodie der Staatskunst. Bethmann Hollweg als Kriegskanzler (1914-1917), Munich 1964, p. 219 and. passim; Dirk Stegmann, Die Erben Bis- marcks. Parteien und Verbdnde in der Spdtphase des Wilhelminischen Deutschlands. Sammlungspolitik 1897-1918, Cologne and Berlin 1970, pp. 458-497. Still of interest: Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, The War and German Society. The Testament of a Liberal, New York 1971 (reprinted edn.),pp. 162,210-211. "Jochmann, loc. cit., pp. 429-431; Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 518-523. For examples see Mitteilungen, XXVI (23rd February 1916), No. 4, pp. 30-31; ibid. (5th April 1916), No. 7, pp. 54-55; ibid. (14th June 1916), No. 12, pp. 89-91; ibid. (4th October 1916), No. 20, pp. 145-146; ibid. (18th October 1916), No. 21, pp. 153-155. On 14th October 1916 the Chief of the Emperor's Naval Cabinet, Admiral Georg von Miiller, wrote the following revealing comments into his diary: "... Der Kaiser schickte mir einen Brief des Kronprinzen an Se. Majestat mit der dringenden Bitte, den Kanzler zu entlassen, der sich nur auf Juden und . . . Sozialdemokraten stiitze: 'Schmeiss doch den Kerl raus!' ..." Walter Gorlitz, ed., Regierte der Kaiser? Aus den Kriegstagebuchern des Chefs des Marinekabinetts im ersten Weltkrieg Admiral Georg Alexander von Miiller, Gottingen-Berlin-Frankfurt 1959, p. 230. The German Army's "Juden zdhlung" 121 Antisemitic denunciations increased and grew more virulent in 1916. Throughout the spring and summer of that year, a deluge of letters, mostly unsigned, flooded the Prussian War Ministry which had jurisdiction over the military contingents of all German states and was responsible for the control and coordination of manpower, munitions and supplies.14 During the first two war years its administrative duties were not handled by the War Minister (until Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 11th January 1915, Erich von Falkenhayn, then Adolf Wild von Hohenborn), but by the War Minister's deputy, General Franz Gustav von Wandel. Wild, in agreement with Falkenhayn, who in the autumn of 1914 had been appointed Chief of the German General Staff,15 preferred to stay at General Head- quarters and left the business of the War Ministry to his deputy.16 Being a rather fair-minded and mildly "liberal" man, Wandel chose to ignore the predominantly anonymous denunciations about Jewish shirking which he received every day; and on the few occasions when he received specific com- plaints from subordinate army units he treated these in a dilatory manner and ultimately sent evasive replies.17 The reasons for his restraint can only be surmised. As a gentleman he may have regarded the antisemitic agitation as unseemly, repugnant and harmful to the war effort. Two years earlier, in September 1914, when a Jewish delega- tion had approached him in the matter of promotions to officer's rank, he had shown himself to be helpful and understanding. He was also known to have dealt fairly with German labour, including Social Democracy.18 But even more decisive for his attitude may have been Germany's military and domestic situation in the summer and early autumn of 1916, a time when the antisemitic denunciations reached massive proportions. During the preceding months Germany had suffered a number of severe military reverses. Early in June the Russian Brussilov offensive had been launched on the eastern front where it endangered especially the sectors held by Germany's ally Austria-Hungary. At the end of that month the costly battle of the Somme began on the western front where simultaneously the struggle for Verdun continued inconclusively until German attacks against the French fortress were called off early in September. And on 27th August Romania entered the war against the Central Powers, threatening the south-eastern front. It was this last event which led to Falkenhayn's replacement as Chief of the General Staff by General Paul von Hindenburg, whose First Quartermaster General appointed at the same time, uOn the Prussian War Ministry see Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, New York 1964, pp. 223-224, and passim; and Gerald D. Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918, Princeton 1966, pp. 41-42, and passim. "Falkenhayn was both Prussian War Minister and Chief of the General Staff, holding the two posts simultaneously, until 11th January 1915, when his First Quartermaster General, Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, was appointed Prussian War Minister, thereby relieving Falkenhayn from his dual responsibility. "Feldman, op. cit., pp. 42-45. 17Otto Armin, Die Juden im Heere. Eine statistische Untersuchung nach amtlichen Quellen, Munich 1919. On "Otto Armin" see below, n. 28. 18Feldman, op. cit., pp. 86, 91, 95, and^wwui; Deist, op. cit., I, p. L, andpassim; Walter Breslauer, 'Der Verband der Deutschen Juden (1904-1922)', in Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts, VII (1964), No. 28, p. 365. 122 Werner T. Angress Erich Ludendorff, soon proved to be the real force and brain behind the Third Supreme Army Command (Oberste Heeresleitung, or O.H.L.).19 The situation at the home front was equally precarious and gloomy. Riots and strikes had taken place during the summer months throughout the country, largely in reaction to food shortages.20 Simultaneously, the ultra-nationalist right-wing agitation against Bethmann Hollweg had been stepped up with Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 demands that the government grant free debate on the war aims question, and that the Chancellor drop his opposition to unrestricted submarine warfare.21 Given the combination of all these problems - and one could easily add to them - it is at least conceivable that Wandel was not particularly eager to burden himself and his staff with the additional unpleasant task of dealing with time-consuming denunciations against Germany's Jewish citizens. Had Wandel stayed at his post, the infamous Judenzdhlung may have never occurred. But he did not stay. On 27th September 1916 he stepped down as Deputy War Minister.22 Why did he relinquish his post? In the absence of conclusive documentary evidence we can only guess. One contributing factor may well have been Wild von Hohenborn's sudden return to his duties in Berlin. Wild had done so upon the urgent demand of Hindenburg and Luden- dorff, the new O.H.L., who did not want him at General Headquarters and insisted that he resume his post at the War Ministry. Wild's return, however, cramped Wandel's style, which led to altercations. Furthermore, Wandel had been annoyed and offended by the rude tone which notably Ludendorff employed whenever he was dealing with the War Ministry. For the third O.H.L. kept bombarding Berlin with constant demands, especially in connection with the manpower problem which was as pressing as it was complex. On the one hand, the O.H.L. insisted, on 14th September, that every available man capable of bearing arms be inducted into the army, which had suffered severe losses during the past few months on all fronts. But at the same time the O.H.L. had launched the so-called Hindenburg Programme which was intended to step up production of munitions and war materials, and in order to breathe life into that programme had insisted on releasing skilled workers from front- line service and sending them back home into the factories. Ludendorff, the power behind these projects, which Hindenburg then covered by his signature, let it be known that he expected the War Ministry to square the manpower "On the military situation see Peter Graf Kielmansegg, Deutschland und derErste Weltkrieg, Frank- furt a. Main 1968, pp. 301-329; Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918. Die militdrischen Operationen zu Lande, X: Die Operationen im Jahre 1916, ed. Forschungsanstalt fur Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte, Berlin 1936, pp. 338-406, 439-567; ibid., XI: Die Kriegsfiihrung im Herbst 1916 und im Winter 1916/1917, ed. Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres, Berlin 1938, pp. 53-186 (hereafter Der Weltkrieg). For the change in the O.H.L. see Kielmansegg, op. cit., pp. 330-338; Karl-Heinz Janssen, 'Der Wechsel in der Obersten Heeresleitung 1916', in VHJfZ, VII (October 1959), No. 4, pp. 337-371; and by the same author, Der Kanzler und der General. Die Fiihrungskrise urn Bethmann Hollweg und Falkenhayn (1914—1916), Gottingen-Berlin-Frankfurt a. Main-Zurich 1967, pp. 210-252. 20Deist, op. cit., I, pp. 378-382, 387, 392-393, 399-106, 420-421, 425-427, 457-458; Feldman, op. cit., p. 108, and passim; Kocka, op. cit., pp. 40-49, and passim. 21Deist, op. cit., I, pp. 406-414, and 431-456, passim. Z2Ibid., I, p. 498, n. 2, and ibid., II, p. 1521. I have accepted the date given on p. 1521; that given on p. 498 is 29th September 1916. The German Army's "Judenzdhlung" 123 circle, and to this effect kept on sending urgent and often insultingly worded memoranda to Berlin.23 It is in this context - Wandel's resignation and the acute manpower shortage - that one must look for the answer to the question why the Judenzdhlung was initiated early in October 1916. Although up to now no documents on exactly what transpired have been discovered - and it is exceedingly doubtful that such documents, if they ever Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 existed, ever found their way into the files - we may assume that Wild was informed upon his return to Berlin that the War Ministry was being swamped by letters of complaint about Jewish shirkers. In contrast to Wandel, Wild was not prepared to treat the matter lightly. Here he was, harried by Ludendorff to solve the manpower shortage, and the War Ministry was being informed by patriotic, albeit mostly anonymous citizens that many able-bodied Jews fit for service were evading their obligations to the fatherland. Could the War Ministry afford to follow Wandel's example by treating the matter in a dilatory fashion ? Wild was under pressure and, moreover, on the worst possible terms with the third O.H.L., a powerful new factor on the military scene. What if he and his Ministry were to be accused of favouring the Jews by continuing to ignore the many complaints from an outraged home front, not to mention those which came from military quarters as well ? 24 If we add to these possible con- siderations that the War Ministry had noted with grave misgivings the efforts made by several Jewish organisations to compile lists of Jews serving at the front, Jews killed and wounded in action, Jews decorated and promoted, and all for the purpose - as the Ministry (wrongly) assumed - of presenting the col- lected material after the war as a claim to have the hitherto restricted and sacrosanct regular army officer corps opened to Jews, then the rationale for the Judenzdhlung becomes plausible.25 It would demonstrate on the one hand that the War Ministry knew how to deal with shirkers, thereby showing that every- thing was being done to help solve the manpower problem. On the other hand, a statistic which might well present the Jewish contribution to the war effort in an unfavourable light could be used after the war to counter any possible 23Feldman, op. cit., pp. 149-168; Der Weltkrieg, XI, pp. 30-44. 21For examples of complaints from military quarters see Deist, op. cit., I, p. 476, n. 3; and Armin, op. cit., pp. 11-12. 25Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. Denkschriften-Sammlung M 730, 'Judenstatistik aus dem Jahre 1916' (Fotographische Wiedergabe aus den Geheimakten des preussischen Kriegsministeriums). Denkschriften Band 213, Nos. 33-34 ("Vorgeschichte der Judenstatistik", 20th January 1917), hereafter: HStA Stuttgart, No. ...; Zechlin, op. cit., p. 528. An initial appeal to collect relevant data was issued by the V.d.d.J. as early as 14th August 1914 (AZdJ, 78 (14th August 1914), No. 33, pp. 388-389). By February 1915 a "Bum fur Statistik der Jfuden" had been established and had begun to collect statistical data on Jews serving in the armed forces. Out of this Biiro, which was essentially run by the V.d.d.J., developed by the autumn of 1916 the more formally organised "Ausschuss fur Kriegsstatistik", altogether twelve organisations, including the V.d.d.J., C.V., Abwehrverein, Deutsch-Israelitischer Gemeinde- bund, Zionistische Vereinigung fur Deutschland and others. The purpose of the Ausschuss was to col- lect material on the war service of Jewish citizens in order to be able after the war to rebut any charges about Jewish shirkers. See Mitteilungen, XXV (10th February 1915), No. 3, p. 12; ibid. XXVI (6th September 1916), No. 18, p. 132; Jacob Segall, Die deutschen Juden als Soldaten im Kriege 1914-1918. Eine statistische Studie, Berlin 1921, pp. 2, 5-7; Armin, op. cit., pp. 12-14; Felix A. Theilhaber, 'Judenzahlung im Weltkrieg', in Judisches Lexikon, 3, Berlin 1927-1930, pp. 460-461. 124 Werner T. Angress Jewish demands for equal treatment in the matter of admission to the officer corps. Finally - and I suggest this with a measure of hesitation - Wild's personal attitude towards Jews may well have influenced his decision to issue the census order. Wild was from Hesse, the cradle of pre-war antisemitism; and he worked closely with Falkenhayn whose dislike of Jews was notorious.26 This, admittedly, assumes guilt by association, but the assumption may not be Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 altogether unreasonable. But was the Judenzahlung really Wild's idea, or did somebody else suggest it to him ? Here, too, we can only guess. Given the fact that Wild had been away from Berlin throughout most of his tenure as War Minister, somebody must have briefed him on the complaints about Jewish shirkers. This could have been anybody, including Wandel. But it is much more likely that the briefing came from the man who was the immediate recipient of the poison pen letters, the Director of the General War Department within the Ministry, Colonel Ernst von Wrisberg, another officer of well-known antisemitic leanings.27 It was he who immediately after the war made the classified statistic on the Jews available to Alfred Roth, alias Otto Armin, chairman of the Reichshammerbund,28 and then published excerpts in his own memoirs.29 Moreover, when he had presided in June 1916 as Wandel's official representative at a high-level staff meeting attended by officers from the various stellvertretende Generalkommandos (approx.: deputy army corps commanders), Wrisberg had found himself in the unenviable position of having to rebut charges that disproportionately large numbers of Jews were shirking their military duties.30 If one proceeds from the question: cui bono?, Wrisberg may well have been the spiritual father of the Erlass of 1 lth October 1916.31 At this point, admittedly somewhat inconclusively, the story of the genesis of 26Martin Kitchen, The German Officer Corps 1890-1914, Oxford 1968, p. 45 (on Falkenhayn's antisemitism). 27Jochmann, loc. cit., pp. 423, 468-469; Zechlin, op. cit., p. 531; Franz Oppenheimer, Die Jfudenstatistik des preussischen Kriegsministeriums, Munich 1922, passim. Oppenheimer published this brochure in response to Wrisberg's exceedingly biased interpretation of the statistics on Jewish soldiers in his memoirs (see n. 29). 28"Otto Armin" was the pseudonum of Alfred Roth, chairman of the Reichshammerbund since its founding in 1912, and subsequently the principal organiser of the Deutschvolkische Schutz- und Trutz-Bund. Uwe Lohalm, Volkischer Radikalismus. Die Geschichte des Deutschvolkischen Schutz- und Trutz-Bundes 1919-1923, Hamburg 1970 (Hamburger Beitrage zur Zeitgeschichte 6), pp. 56- 58, and passim; Jochmann, loc. cit., p. 411, incl. n. 5, and passim. 29Ernst von Wrisberg, Erinnerungen an die Kriegsjahre im Koniglich-Preussischen Kriegsministerium, II: Heer und Heimat 1914-1918, Leipzig 1921, pp. 93-95. 80Deist, op. cit., I, p. 476, n. 3; see also ibid., pp. XL—XLIV for the stellvertretende Generalkommandos and their role in the First World War. 31Professor Franz Oppenheimer, who had been for several years one of Wrisberg's subordinates in the War Ministry, stated in his memoirs (Erlebtes, Erstrebtes, Erreichtes. Lebenserinnerungen, Diisseldorf 1964, p. 224) that Wrisberg had been the "author" of the infamous statistics on the Jews. However, Oppenheimer did not make it clear what exactly he meant by the word "author". Did he mean that Wrisberg had been the initiator of the census, or merely the officer entrusted with its supervision and execution? Or did the word perhaps refer to Wrisberg's interpretation of the census figures in his memoirs (n. 29) ? In his rebuttal to Wrisberg's memoirs, published shortly after the war, Oppenheimer disputed Wrisberg's figures incisively and convincingly, but he did not indicate whether or not he considered Wrisberg the initiator of the Judenzahlung. Oppenheimer, Judenstatistik, passim. The German Army's "Judenzahlung^ 125 the Judenzahlung ends. Most of the documents have perished.32 The persons involved in initiating the census are dead. The whole truth will probably never be known.
Fortunately, the consequences of the Judenzahlung are much clearer than its genesis. As the order of 1 lth October to prepare statistical data on Jews serving Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 in the army had not been disseminated outside the military, the general public remained initially unaware of its existence. Yet not for long. The ultimate revelation was triggered by a meeting of the Reichstag budget commission on 19th October when Matthias Erzberger in the name of the Centrum (the Catholic Centre Party), introduced a motion to petition the Chancellor that a survey be taken of all persons serving in the various war agencies {Kriegs- gesellschaften) , and to list them by sex, age (subject to military service?), salary and - religious denomination.33 Erzberger, always well informed, had learned about the War Ministry's Erlass of 11 th October, and as he was never loath to shrink from the limelight got into the act by suggesting that the Jews in the Kriegsgesellschaften be counted as well.34 Though this particular proposal never got beyond the talking stage, news of Erzberger's motion, which had also won National Liberal support, became known and immediately caused anger and apprehension in Jewish circles.35 The shock became even greater, however, when the War Ministry's Judenzahlung was revealed on the floor of the Reichstag on 3rd November. During the preceding day a Social Democratic speaker had stated, in connection with the army's policy never to promote avowed agnostics (Dissidenten) to officer's rank, that Jews were likewise subject to discrimination and, in this context, had mentioned Erzberger's motion in the budget commis- sion.36 On the following day, speaking as the War Ministry's representative, the hapless Wrisberg rose to comment on the Social Democratic remarks made the day before, and then added: "I am using the opportunity ... to clear up some misapprehensions which have arisen as a result of an order [Verfugung] by the War Ministry. The War Minister has issued an order to ascertain how many Jews serve in the army, and where they are assigned. It has been the sole purpose of the order to gather statistical data in order to examine the charges which have been raised against the Jews. Antisemitic designs have not, of course, prompted this order in any way. The order was issued before the matter [i.e., Erzberger's motion of 19th October] has been raised here in the plenum."37 32The bulk of the documentary material was destroyed when the Heeresarchiv at Potsdam perished during a bombing raid in the spring of 1945. 33Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 525-527; Georg Gothein, 'Die Judenzahlung in den Kriegsgesellschaften', in Mitteilungen, XXVI (1st November 1916), No. 22, pp. 161-164; Adolf Grabowsky, 'Die Frage nach dem Bekenntnis', in Wege ins neue Deutschland, Gotha 1919, pp. 131-132 (the article appeared originally on 15th November 1916, in Das neue Deutschland); Jochmann, loc. cit., pp. 424-425, and Hamburger, op. cit., p. 117. 34Zechlin, op. cit., p. 525. 35See, for instance, A£dJ, 80 (27th October 1916), No. 43, pp. 508-509. An interesting although later reaction is a letter which Senator Dr. Meyer from Hanover wrote to Dr. Peter Spahn, chairman of the Reichstag delegation of the Centrum (Centre Party), on 21st December 1916 (see below, n. 64). In it Meyer, whose brother had just been killed in action, castigated the Centrum for the motion of 19th October in the budget commission. 3«Reichstag. Sten. Ber., vol. 308 (2nd November 1916), pp. 2008-2011. "Ibid. (3rd November 1916), p. 2038. 126 Werner T. Angress Now the fat was in the fire! Three speakers, two Social Democrats and one Progressive, the (Jewish) delegate Ludwig Haas, interpellated Wrisberg and voiced scepticism about the alleged absence of antisemitic designs.38 The debate became immediately public knowledge and prompted the firstJewis h response to the matter which, although it and subsequent steps ultimately failed to undo the damage, at least drove home to the War Ministry that Wild's Judenzahlung Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 had been an immense blunder. By that time, though, Wild was no longer War Minister. After ruthless intrigues against him on the part of the O.H.L., and especially Ludendorff who did not get along with him, Wild had been replaced on 29th October by General Hermann von Stein, and General Wilhelm Groener39 became his deputy. Both men, but Stein in particular, now inherited Wild's census order and its consequences. The historian Gerhard Ritter has characterised Stein as a snappy (schneidiger) general-staff officer, inexperienced in administrative duties and devoid of skill and tact in his contacts with the Reichstag.*0 This assessment may well be valid, but it should be stated here that in his subsequent dealings with the Jews Stein, up to a certain limit, was more civilised and also more reasonable than his predecessor. Faced as they were by a public affront to their honour, Germany's Jews could not possibly accept the War Ministry's humiliating census in silence. But who was to speak for them? Lacking a unified, all-embracing organisation41 they had to rely on one of three associations to present their case to the authori-
3SIbid., pp. 2048-2050 (Heine, SPD); 2051-2053 (Hass, FVP); and 2053 (Quarck, SPD). Although the comments of these speakers - all of whom were well informed on developments - indicate that they were familiar with Wild's Erlass, the comment of Haas that it had caused widespread unrest among German Jewry seems exaggerated, at least at this particular stage, and was probably made rhetorically and for effect. Both the reaction of the Jewish press and the fact that Gassel's first intervention came only after the Reichstag debate which, indeed, first publicised the Judenzahlung, would indicate that until then only scattered news of the Erlass had reached the civilian Jewish population. See A£dJ, 80 (10th November 1916), No. 45, p. 531, and Mitteilungen, 26 (15th November 1916), No. 23, p. 170. 39Wilhelm Groener: Lebenserinnerungen. Jugend Generalstab Weltkrieg, ed. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, Gottingen 1957 (Deutsche Geschichtsquellen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, 41), pp. 342-343; Feldman, op. cit., pp. 177-186. Magdeburg's rabbi, Dr. Bruno Lange, who during the war was the Jewish chaplain for the I Vth Army Corps, has claimed after the war that Wild's dismissal was prompted by his decision to conduct the census ofJewis h servicemen. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth. See Bruno Lange, Juden, Weltkrieg, Revolu- tion. Eine Aufkldrungsschrift, 2nd edn., Essen 1919, p. 24. See also Armin, op. cit., p. 11. 40Ritter, op. cit., p. 422. Hermann von Stein was born and brought up in the region of the Harz Mountains. Both his parents were commoners, and his father was a pastor. He also married a commoner, a Frdulein Meyer. He was ennobled in June 1913 after he had served for four years as General Helmuth von Moltke's (the younger) official deputy (Oberquartiermeister I), i.e., from 1908 to 1912. At the time of his ennoblement he was commanding the 41st Prussian Division in Deutsch-Eylau. Stein remained War Minister until 9th October 1918. (I want to express my sincere appreciation to Professor Ulrich Trumpener who kindly provided the biographical data of Stein's career.) Stein has put down an assessment of his tenure as War Minister in his memoirs, Erlebnisse und Betrachtungen aus der £eit des Weltkrieges, Leipzig 1919, esp. pp. 81-127. 41Marjorie Lamberti, 'The Attempt to Form a Jewish Block: Jewish Notables and Politics in Wilhelmian Germany', in Central European History, III (March/June 1970), No. 1/2, pp. 73-93; and Jacob Toury, 'Organizational Problems of German Jewry. Steps Towards the Establish- ment of a Central Organization (1893-1920)', in LBI Year Book XIII (1968), pp. 57-90. The German Armfs "'Judenz&hlung" 127 ties: the Centralverein deutscher Staatsburger judischen Glaubens (C.V.);42 the Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus (Abwehrverein), a non-denominational organisation with close ties to the Fortschrittliche Volkspartei (Progressive Party) which since pre-war times was the traditional (and principal) political supporter of Jewish rights;43 and, since 1904, the Verband der Deutschen Juden (V.d.d.J.).* We do not know when and how it was decided which of these three associations was Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 to speak for German Jewry, but the choice fell to the V.d.d.J. This was a logical decision for two reasons. The V.d.d.J. had been founded with the objective of becoming the principal, if not the only, organisation to present Jewish concerns and demands to the government, especially in questions affecting discriminatory practices on the part of public officials.44 Thus the Judenzahlung fell clearly within its province. But there may have been an additional reason. Both C.V. and Abwehrverein were generally identified in the public mind with their defence activities against antisemitism, and as the War Ministry's representative had explicitly stated in the Reichstag that the census of the Jews had nothing whatever to do with antisemitism, it would have been highly impolitic to involve either C.V. or Abwehrverein in the pending negotiations with the authorities. In the end, therefore, it was the V.d.d.J. who had to take the bull by the horns, specifically its third (soon its first) chairman, the Geheime Justizrat Oskar Cassel.45 An irascible, long-winded and humourless gentleman of sixty-seven, Cassel had often spoken in defence of Jewish rights in the lower house of the Prussian Landtag where he had already sat for thirteen years as a delegate of the Pro- gressive Party. On 4th November, a day after the Reichstag session during which the Judenzahlung had first been publicly mentioned, Cassel paid his first visit to the War Ministry where he presented his views on the matter to the Head of the War Ministry's £entraldepartement, Colonel Ulrich Hoffmann.46 Three
42Paucker, loc. cit., pp. 479-548, is the most judicious account of the G.V. during the last three decades of the empire. For a brief, but incisive account in English see Ismar Schorsch, Jewish Reactions to German Anti-Semitism, 1870-1914, New York and London 1972, pp. 117-148; see also Reiner Bernstein, J^wischen Emanzipation und Antisemitismus. Die Publizistik der deutschen Juden am Beispiel der "C.V. £eitung", Organ des Centralvereins deutscher Staatsburger judischen Glaubens, 1924-1933, Berlin 1969 (publ. Ph.D. Diss., Freie Universitat Berlin), pp. 49 ff. for the forma- tive stages of the C.V. 43On the Abwehrverein see Schorsch, op. cit., pp. 79-101; Pulzer, loc. cit., pp. 160-163; and Paucker, loc. cit., pp. 486, 541-542. On the ties between Jews and the Progressive Party see Jacob Toury, Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden in Deutschland. Von Jena bis Weimar, Tubingen 1966 (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 15), pp. 177-212; Pulzer, loc. cit., pp. 178-181, 183, 196, andpassim; Paucker, loc. cit., pp. 500-501, 503, 515, 516. Since the first decade of the twentieth century, the German Social Democratic Party had at times stood up in the Reichstag for Jewish rights as well. *On the Verband see the preceding essay by Marjorie Lamberti, 'The Jewish Struggle for the Legal Equality of Religions in Imperial Germany', in this volume of the Year Book - Ed. "Schorsch, op. cit., pp. 149-177; Walter Breslauer, loc. cit., pp. 345-379. 45An excellent biographical sketch of Cassel, on which the following comments are based, is in Hamburger, op. cit., pp. 368-369. "This date is based on Armin, op. cit., pp. 79-80; see also "Cassel to Hoffmann", 7th November 1916, BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, No. 93-98. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 11, pp. 99-102. Colonel Hoffmann was since 1912 head of the Ministerial-Abteilung (Z-l) in the Prussian War Ministry before he became Director of the £entraldepartement, in both cases succeeding General 128 Werner T. Angress days later he followed up his visit with a lengthy letter to Hoffmann in which he recapitulated the major points previously discussed with the colonel.47 Cassel began by stressing the grave injustice which the War Ministry's Erlass of 11th October had done to Germany's Jews among whom it had created un- easiness and indignation, sentiments which the V.d.d.J. was making every effort to keep from being publicly voiced. He then pointed to specific instances, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 reported to the V.d.d.J. from several army units, where certain troop com- manders had reacted to the Erlass of 1 lth October by having initiated steps for transferring Jews in clerical or other non-combatant positions to the front.48 Cassel suggested that all unit commanders be informed that Wild von Hohen- born's Erlass did not authorise them to reassign Jews indiscriminately to the front lines simply because they were Jews. He then asked the War Ministry for a public clarification to the effect that the statistical data called for by the census order were solely intended to refute false charges which had been raised against Jewish servicemen. Hoffmann seems to have received Cassel's appeal sympathetically, for on 11 th November the new War Minister, von Stein, issued a supplementary order to all troops which stated categorically that the Erlass of 11th October had merely been intended to obtain statistical data for examining charges raised against Jewish soldiers, and was not to serve as an authorisation for removing Jews from their currently held assignments.49 It was a first, although not very far-reaching achievement on Gassel's part to soften the impact of Wild's original order, and for the following eight weeks neither Cassel nor any other representa- tive of the V.d.d.J. undertook any further steps in this matter. A few weeks after Cassel had made his initial approach to the War Ministry on the issue of the Judenzdhlung, a prominent German Jew decided to intervene on his own initiative - the Hamburg banker Max M. Warburg.50 Forty-nine years old at the time, Warburg represented no Jewish organisation but acted entirely on his own, although he was later to be, on and off, in touch with Cassel. As one of Germany's leading merchant bankers with close family connections in the United States, where his brother Paul sat on the board of
Heinrich Scheiich, who in turn was to succeed von Stein as War Minister on 9th October 1918. (I am obligated to Professor Trumpener for the data on Hoffmann.) According to Armin, op. cit., p. 80, Hoffmann had a Jewish wife, the daughter of the "Essigjude" Stern. *7See n. 46. 48See, for example, the report on the 23rd Infantry Brigade at Gleiwitz, appended to Cassel's letter of 7th November 1916 to Colonel Hoffmann (see above, n. 46). Printed in MGM 19, p. 102; and also the excerpt from an Order of the Day issued by the Etappen-Inspektion of the 4th Army. BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, No. 117. Printed in ibid, as Doc. No. 10. p. 99. 49BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, No. 162. Printed in ibid, as Doc. No. 12, p. 103. 50There exists as yet no adequate biography of Warburg (5th June 1867 to 26th December 1946). Reliable but brief are Eduard Rosenbaum, 'M. M. Warburg and Co. Merchant Bankers of Hamburg', in LBI Tear Book VII (1962), pp. 121-149; Hans Tramer, 'Die Hamburger Kaiser- juden', in Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts, III (1960), No. 11, pp. 177-189; and Alfred Vagts, 'M. M. Warburg & Co. Ein Bankhaus in der deutschen Weltpolitik 1905-1933', in Vierteljahrs- schrift fur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, XLV (1958), pp. 289-388. Max M. Warburg, Aus meinen Aufzeichnungen (Privatdruck), New York 1952, is very sketchy, and the chapters on Max M. Warburg in David Farrer, The Warburgs. The Story of a Family, New York 1975, are as unreliable as they are superficial. The German Army's "Judenz&hlung" 129 the Federal Reserve Bank, Max Warburg was not only well known in certain governmental circles, but was also respected and appreciated there. This was due in part to his efforts in wartime to negotiate foreign loans for Germany from neutral countries. Yet at least as important was the knowledge of his personal and business ties to the U.S.A., a factor which in the winter of 1916/1917 was of special significance to a government eager to exploit every avenue by Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 which America might be persuaded from joining Germany's enemies.51 Warburg had raised the "Jewish Question" with government officials earlier in the war. He had done so the first time in November 1914 when he had visited the then Under-secretary of State {Unterstaatssekretar) Arthur Zimmer- mann and had told him that German Jewry confidently expected that all past discriminatory practices employed against them in public service, including the army, would henceforth cease.52 When this did not happen after the "Spirit of 1914", with its frenetic display of patriotism and national unity had faded away, Warburg's disappointment mounted, and in the summer of 1916 he wrote a lengthy expose on The Jewish Question in Relation to Overall German Policy. This he had printed privately, and in November had copies of it sent to various high-ranking government officials, including Chancellor von Beth- mann Hollweg and the Director of the Chancellery, Unterstaatssekretar Arnold Wahnschaffe.53 Shortly thereafter, early in December, Warburg then contacted Wahnschaffe first by writing, and subsequently by a number of personal visits.54 By working through the Chancellery and specifically Wahnschaffe, with whom he was on particularly good terms, Warburg hoped to obtain an unequivocal public statement, preferably from the War Ministry, that the German Jews were fulfilling their patriotic duty to the same extent as their Christian comrades in arms.65 He pressed this demand, in which he was soon to be supported by Cassel, for the next few months. blWarburg Akten. Warburg Institute, London. Folder 196a (1922), "Lebensbeschreibung" (Enclosure 17 to "Jahresbericht 1922"), hereafter: Warburg Akten. Vagts, op. cit., p. 354; Warburg, Aufzeichnungen, pp. 40-41. 62"Max M. Warburg to Jacob H. Schiff", 11th November 1914. American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio (hereafter AJA), Jacob H. Schiff Collection, Box 440. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 3, pp. 93-94. On practices of discrimination against Jews in all civilian and military branches of state service see Hamburger, op. cit., pp. 31-66, and passim; on discrimination specifically in the army see Werner T. Angress, 'Prussia's Army and the Jewish Reserve Officer Controversy before World War I', in LBI Tear Book XVII (1972), pp. 19-42. By coincidence, a letter from Schiff to Zimmermann pertaining to the same subject Warburg had come to discuss with the Unterstaatssekretar had just arrived from New York prior to War- burg's visit at the Wilhelmstrasse. See Warburg's letter to Schiff, cited above this note. For Schiff's letter to Zimmermann, see AJA, Jacob H. SchifF Collection, Box 438. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 2, pp. 92-93. 53Die Judenfrage im Rahmen der deutschen Gesamtpolitik, BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, No. 110. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 15, pp. 106-110. Copies went to, among others, War Minister von Stein and Admiral Henning von HoltzendorfF. See Warburg Akten, Folder 152, Enclosure 16 to "Jahresbericht 1916". "Warburg communicated with Wahnschaffe on 2nd, 11th, 16th, 18th and 20th December 1916; and on 2nd, 19th, 23rd and 25th January 1917. BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, Nos. 113, 116, 119, 120, 122, 131, 156 and 157; HStA Stuttgart, No. 55. On 12th December 1916 he also wrote to Bethmann Hollweg. BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, Nos. 104-105. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 16, pp. 110-111. "Warburg to Wahnschaffe, 2nd December 1916. BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, No. 113. 130 Werner T. Angress At the Chancellery, Warburg's endeavours met with considerable sympathy and understanding. Wahnschaffe and his chief, Bethmann Hollweg, were obviously embarrassed by the War Ministry's Judenzdhlung, particularly after the Chancellor had received a lengthy letter of grievances from the Grossherzog- liche Oberrat der Israeliten Badens.56 The letter was addressed, and had been originally sent, to Baden's Ministry of Culture and Education which promptly Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 forwarded it to Berlin with a covering note which clearly indicated that the Ministry was in full agreement with Baden's indignant Jewish citizens.57 But the Chancellery's freedom of action was limited. A number of crucial issues, notably those of unrestricted submarine warfare, the creation of a "Kingdom of Poland" and plans for a projected offer to the Entente about opening peace negotiations, to name but some of the most crucial developments which became acute during the winter of 1916/1917, caused constant friction with both the O.H.L. and the War Ministry.58 No wonder, then, that the Chancellery was careful not to expose itself too much vis-d-vis the military. When Warburg came to realise this he became impatient and annoyed. "We are doing whatever can be done to assuage the embittered feelings of the Jews," he wrote to Wahn- schaffe on 2nd January 1917. "But I am still of the opinion that something along the lines which I indicated to you [i.e., a public statement by the govern- ment] will have to be done . . ."59 Two weeks later, on 19th January, he wrote again to Wahnschaffe, mainly in order to pass on excerpts from letters written by a young Jewish soldier, an acquaintance of Warburg, whose promotion to officer's rank was blocked by an antisemitic superior, and a copy of a critique of the statistics of the Jews in the army. Obviously exasperated, Warburg concluded his accompanying letter with the statement: "I simply cannot grasp how it is possible that at a moment when we need very badly the utmost exertion from every individual, no supreme effort is being made, in the interest of state, to spur on that individual to do his utmost."60 That Warburg's patience was clearly exhausted emerges from the fact that on that same day, 19th January, he also wrote to a highly placed Reichsbank official, Oskar Schmiedecke, and warned him that the War Ministry's Juden- zdhlung might well have unfortunate consequences for the impending sixth war-loan drive because the Jews, and in particular the bankers among them who had given very generously in the past, were now bound to be less inclined to exert themselves.61 It was a well-founded warning, for the government had
S6BA Koblenz, R 43 1/2192, No. L 381783-5. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 13, pp. 103-105. 57BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, No. 100. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 14, pp. 105-106. See also Bethmann's letter of 4th January 1917 to the head of the Baden State Ministry, Alexander von Dusch, in connection with the complaints of Baden's Jews. BA Koblenz, R 43 1/2192, No. L 381786. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 25, p. 118. 58For the military and political developments see Ritter, op. cit., chs. 7 and 8, and Kielmansegg, op. cit., pp. 385-393, 412-431. 59Warburg to Wahnschaffe, 2nd January 1917. BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, No. 131. 60HStA Stuttgart, Nos. 55-58. The critique, entitled 'Denkschrift zur Statistik iiber die Juden im Heere. Grundsatzliche Unrichtigkeit der Fragestellung', was not written by Warburg, but apparently by a trained sociologist. Ibid., Nos. 61-65. 61Mitteilungen des Syndikus des Central-Vereins deutscher Staatsburger jildischen Glaubeiis, II (5th May 1920), No. 5, pp. 71-72. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 29, p. 120. The German Army's "Judenzdhlung" 131 only very recently been informed by Frankfurt a. Main's Chief of Police that the Jewish bankers of that city were up in arms about the Judenzdhlung, a resent- ment which could have adverse effects upon the coming war-loan drive.62 This report hit a raw nerve in the Chancellery which at once instructed the State Secretary of the Reich Treasury, Count von Roedern, to approach the War
Ministry about this threat to the Reich's finances and to suggest that some con- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 ciliatory gesture be made to the Jews. Roedern, acting for the Chancellor, did so, but the financial worries of the civilian officials left the War Minister cold. Stein informed Bethmann on 22nd January 1917 that he considered the issue of the Judenzdhlung closed and would undertake no further steps in connection with it. And that was that.63 What had meanwhile transpired to bring about the War Minister's categori- cal refusal to make any further conciliatory gesture ? At the end of December 1916 the V.d.d.J. had followed up Cassel's initial approach of early November with a long and detailed letter of grievances to the War Minister. It emphasised the demoralising effect of the Judenzdhlung on Germany's Jewish community and also listed additional instances of "misinterpretations" of the original census order by various unit commanders who continued to transfer Jews arbitrarily from desk jobs to the front. Attached to the letter were excerpted reports from rabbis who served as army chaplains, all of them testifying to the anger, disgust and embitterment among Jewish soldiers about the statistical survey. Then, echoing Warburg's demand, the letter asked for an official statement by which the War Ministry should attest to the fact that Jews were fulfilling their military obligations just as patriotically and faithfully as did non-Jews.64 Cassel, one of the three signatories of the V.d.d.J. letter, wrote
62Riess von Scheurnschloss to Wahnschaffe, 16th January 1917. HStA Stuttgart, Nos. 67-68. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 27, p. 119. The sixth war-loan drive was due in the spring of 1917. 63Roedern to Stein, 17th January 1917. HStA Stuttgart, No. 66. See also Wahnschaffe to Oberstleutnant Waitz, 21st January 1917. Ibid., Nos. 69-70. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 32, p. 121; Waitz was assigned to the War Ministry. Finally, Stein to Bethmann Hollweg, 22nd January 1917. BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, No. 159. 64VddJ to Stein, 29th December 1916. HStA Stuttgart, Nos. 74-77. For the "misinterpretations" see Anlage 1 to the letter (the Anlage is not in the HStA Stuttgart but in BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, No. 147), and also Anlage 5. For reports on the morale of Jewish soldiers see Anlagen 2, 3 and 4. The letter and Anlage 4 are printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 22, pp. 113-116. For further instances of Jewish reactions to Wild's Erlass of 11th October 1916 see also Georg Meyer's letter to his wife (excerpts only), 29th October and 8th November 1916. Leo Baeck Institute, New York, AR 506, no number. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 9, p. 99; Senator Dr. Meyer [Georg M's older brother] to Bethmann Hollweg, 21st December 1916. BA Kob- lenz, Rk Film 2197, No. 127; the same to War Minister von Stein. Ibid., No. 128; and to Dr. Peter Spahn, M.d.R. Ibid., No. 129 (see above, n. 35). The letters to Stein and Spahn are printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 19 and 20 respectively, pp. 111-112. Equally revealing are Ernst Simon, 'Unser Kriegserlebnis', in Jiidische Jugend, ed. Kartell Jiidischer Verbindungen und von der Jiidischen Turnerschaft, Berlin 1919, No. 1, p. 43; and Julius Marx, Kriegstagebuch eines Juden, Zurich 1939, p. 138 and passim. A good incisive summary of the impact of the Judenzdhlung on German Jewry is in Eva G. Reichmann, 'Der Bewusstseinswandel der deutschen Juden', in Deutsches Judentum in Krieg und Revolution, op. cit., pp. 516-518. Finally, Martin Buber's terse commentary deserves being quoted. In a brief statement under the title 'Judenzahlung', and simply signed "B", he wrote: "Man sagt mir, 'wir' miissten protestieren. Das ist meine Meinung nicht. An den aufrechten Deutschen ist es zu protestieren: an alien, die sich ihr 132 Werner T. Angress separately to Colonel Hoffmann on the same day and asked him to put in a good word with the War Minister in support of the V.d.d.J.'s entreaties. He stressed in particular that he would appreciate a "reply . . . which we can publish" and thereby help to soothe the outraged sentiments of German Jewry.65
Stein replied on 3rd January 1917. The letter was courteous, but the War Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 Minister did not yield one inch on any of the essential points. The Erlass of 11 th October, he stated, had not been intended to offend or harm Jewish servicemen, and he indicated that many of them were in full agreement with him on that point. Stein then promised to investigate all reports about un- authorised measures taken by individual troop commanders who had "mis- interpreted" the letter and spirit of the original Erlass \ but at the same time he stressed that most of the complaints about such incidents which had so far been received from the Jewish side had proved to be unjustified. Finally, he rejected as superfluous any official statement of recognition concerning the Jewish contribution to the war effort because "whoever does his duty from a feeling of patriotism and obligation cannot be overly concerned with external recognition". Besides, the War Minister added, he did not think that he was authorised in the first place to issue such a statement.66 Despite its ingenious passages Stein's letter was an altogether "proper" communication - businesslike, even civil - but it failed to reveal even the slightest trace of understanding on Stein's part as to why the Judenzahlung had aroused such deep resentment among Germany's Jews. Cassel was aware of this, as he intimated in a letter to Wahnschaffe on 9th January, a day prior to a meeting with the Unterstaatssekretar.67 Shortly thereafter, most probably on 12th January, Cassel had an audience with the War Minister.68 In the course of their conversation Stein refused once again to issue any formal announcement about Jewish soldiers doing their duty as faithfully as non-Jews because, as he put it, it was inappropriate to single out one particular religious denomination for separate and special praise. Stein's attitude generously overlooked the minor fact that this particular religious denomination had just been singled out for special and humiliating public attention. Yet the War Minister did make one conciliatory gesture: he promised Cassel that he would write him a
Deutschland nicht durch den Ungeist, der sich mit diesen Antragen und Prozeduren ankiindigt, verschandeln lassen wollen. An den aufrechten Juden nicht. Wohl ist es eine diirftige Art von Wahrheit, die man auf dem Wege soldier Statistik findet; aber was ficht es uns an, dass sie auch hier 'festgestellt' werden soil ? Man stelle sie fest! Man zahle! Wir sind das Gezahltwerden gewohnt . . . Zahlt!" Der Jude, I (November 1916), No. 8, p. 564. 65Cassel to Colonel Hoffmann, 29th December 1916. HStA Stuttgart, Nos. 74-77. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 23, pp. 116-117. 66Stein to Gassel, 3rd January 1917. BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, Nos. 137-138. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 24, p. 117. 67Cassel to Wahnschaffe, 9th January 1917. BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, Nos. 135-136. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 26, pp. 118-119. The meeting may have been conceivably arranged by Warburg. 68The exact date of this meeting cannot be established with any degree of certainty. See Cassel to Stein, 10th January 1917. HStA Stuttgart, No. 35. See also Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen 19, 1/76, pp. 135-136, n. 104; and p. 143, n. 299. Herr Felix Struck, bei rlcr Milleldemscheii Kreditbatik, Hauplkasse BurRSirsilc, Oder auf desscn Ausschuss fiir Kriegsstatistik. Postsrheckkonto S78-1 I'.erHts, mit dtm Vermeik .Statistik" zu tiborwetsen. Bine Zahlkarte ftigei wir bci. Mil voRiiglidier Ilorbadilung
Ausschuss fiir Kriegsstatistik
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From the Archives of the Leo Baeck Institute, New York The German Army's "Judenzahlung" 133 letter containing one passage which would refer to the Jews: this passage Cassel would then be allowed to publish.69 And thus it was done. On 20th January 1917 Stein wrote a letter to Cassel in which he justified once again his predecessor's decision to have the Jews in the army counted, rejecting in the process as unsubstantiated most of the specific complaints sent to him by the V.d.d.J. about unauthorised transfers of Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 Jewish soldiers to the front ordered by a number of unit commanders. And yet, the gruff military style of the letter did not completely succeed in concealing a slight apologetic note, and in the concluding sentence Stein then fulfilled his promise to Gassel:
"In any event, I have ascertained that the conduct of the Jewish soldiers and fellow citizens during the war has not been the cause that prompted the order [Anordnung] of my predecessors, and therefore cannot be associated with it."70 This brief passage, grudgingly conceded, yet conceded nevertheless, proved to be the sole tangible result which Cassel and, for that matter, Warburg too, were able to achieve in their respective attempts to clear the good name and uphold the honour of German Jews serving in the army during the First World War. But whereas Warburg considered the War Minister's lukewarm statement essentially unsatisfactory and thus continued - albeit in vain - to press for a more far-reaching pronouncement,71 Cassel informed Stein in a rather obsequi- ous-sounding letter of 2nd February that he, for his part, was satisfied.72 And so he was, indeed. On the same day that he wrote to Stein, Cassel drafted a statement on the Judenzahlung for publication in the Jewish press73 which gave a brief and very charitable account of the way in which the War Minister had handled the matter, and which ended with the quotation of the closing sentence of Stein's letter to Cassel.74 Two days later, on 4th February, Cassel presented the achievements of his recent negotiations with the War Ministry to a general meeting (Hauptversammlung) of the C.V. in Berlin. Attending as the official representative of the V.d.d.J., Cassel outdid himself in portraying what was in effect an unmitigated fiasco as a personal triumph. Spouting patriotic phrases,
"Gassel transmitted a report on his audience with Stein to Wahnschaffe. BA Koblenz, Rk Film 2197, Nos. 167-168a. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 34, pp. 122-123. 70Stein to Gassel, 20th January 1917. HStA Stuttgart, Nos. 38-39. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 30, pp. 120-121. The plural form in "predecessors" refers to former War Minister Wild von Hohenborn and his deputy, General von Wandel. 71In his letter of 2nd February to Wahnschaffe (see above, n. 69) Cassel indicated that, while he was satisfied with the results, Warburg was less than enthusiastic. This prompted Cassel to lecture Warburg on the mentality of Prussian officialdom: ". . . Ich erwiderte ihm, dass nur jemand, der aus der preussischen Beamtenschule hervorgegangen ist, ganz beurteilen konnte, wie viel erreicht sei, wenn der Herr Kriegsminister trotz seines anfanglichen Verweigerns jeder Anerkennung sich noch zu dem betreffenden Schlusspassus bewogen fiihlte." For Warburg's subsequent efforts to obtain a more far-reaching statement, efforts which continued at least until April 1917, see Armin, op. cit., pp. 89-90. "Cassel to Stein, 2nd February 1917. HStA Stuttgart, Nos. 59-60. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 33, pp. 121-122. "See, for instance, AZ Germany's Jewish community, a trait not uncommon among Jewish Honora- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 tioren of that period. And while he undoubtedly had to make allowances for the mentality of the Prussian military when he negotiated with the War Minis- try, his repeated emphasis on the efforts made by the leadership of the V.d.d. J. (that is to say, Gassel himself) to persuade the Jews from voicing their anger publicly makes for embarrassing reading even in retrospect.76 This does not detract from his merits of having worked hard to wrest concessions from the War Ministry, but it differentiates his approach from that of Warburg who throughout his - equally inconclusive - negotiations with the German authori- ties never stooped to flattery or resorted to pleading. Warburg actually de- manded that justice be done. As is well known by now, justice was not done, and the ugly charge that Germany's Jews had been remiss in fulfilling their obligations to the fatherland during war-time, that they had made fewer sacrifices than non-Jews, became during the post-war years a widely debated issue. Figures were bandied about, and the numbers game involving casualties, promotions, decorations and so on was played by antisemites and Jews alike. It was a contest in which the Jews were the losers - for neither the first nor the last time - though they did demonstrate conclusively, but without convincing their detractors, that the charges raised against them were false, that they had done their duty.77 Only ™Stenographischer Benefit fiber die Hauptversammlung des Centralvereins deutscher Staatsburger jiidischen Glaubens vom 4. Februar 1917, Berlin 1917, pp. 8-20, 30. 76See, for instance, his letter of 29th December 1916 to Colonel Hoffmann (n. 65); of 2nd Febru- ary 1917 to Stein (n. 72); his letter of the same day to Wahnschaffe (n. 69), and Cassel to Stein, 6th February 1917. HStA Stuttgart, Nos. 40-44. Printed in MGM 19 as Doc. No. 36, pp. 124- 125. "The following publications shed light on the contribution which the German Jews made to the war effort: Segall, op. cit. (n. 25) and Oppenheimer, Judenstatistik (n. 27); Felix A. Theil- haber, Die Juden im Weltkriege. Mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Verhdltnisse fur Deutschland, Berlin 1916. Ernst R. May, Konfessionelle Militdrstatistik, Tubingen 1917 (Archiv fur Sozial- wissenschaft und Sozialpblitik, Erganzungsheft 13); Walter Leiser, Die Juden im Heer. Eine Kriegsstatistik, Berlin 1919. Hanns Falk, 'Die Juden in den Kriegsgesellschaften; nach amtlichem Material', in Das Licht, I (April 1920), No. 1, pp. 31 ff.; Karl Hilmar, Die deutschen Juden im Weltkriege, Berlin, n.d. [1916?]; Reichsbund jiidischer Frontsoldaten (Hrsg.), Die jiidischen Gefallenen des deutschen Heeres, der deutschen Marine und der deutschen Schutztruppen 1914-1918. Ein Gedenkbuch, 3rd edn., Berlin 1933. Little light, alas, has been shed on either the Jewish war contribution or on the Judenzdhlung in the pertinent passages of Rolf Vogel, Ein Stuck von uns. Deutsche Juden in deutschen Armeen 1813-1976. Eine Dokumentation, Mainz 1977, pp. 131-200. The author, although well intentioned in his attempts to demonstrate both the injustice of the latter and the irreproachable record of the former, has thrown together sundry materials from many, often unidentified or poorly identified sources, with complete disregard for any logical arrangement or proper documentation. The result is a confusing medley of excerpts that vary from snippets to extensive passages from, for instance, Professor Franz Oppenheimer's Juden- statistik (n. 27). The literature of the polemic debate on the Jewish war contribution is too extensive to be cited here. On the issue as such see Ruth Pierson, 'Embattled Veterans. The Reichsbund judischer Frontsoldaten', in LBI Tear Book XIX (1974), pp. 141-145. See also the The German Army's "Judenzdhlung" 135 after the collapse of Hitler's Third Reich did the Federal Republic of Germany recognise officially the sacrifices which German Jews had made for their fatherland during the First World War.78 By then most of those who had survived the First World War had perished in the Second, victims of the Final Solution. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 We may ask, in conclusion, whether the Judenzdhlung was a watershed, a milestone on the road to Auschwitz as has been occasionally maintained. For those who reject the inevitability of human events - and most historians do - the answer must be in the negative. Antisemitism had been a part of the German scene before the First World War and remained a potent force during the brief life of the Weimar Republic, though here, too, its intensity fluctuated. Granted that during the First World War antisemitism had gained new strength, and that the War Ministry's Erlass of 1 lth October 1916 was a direct outgrowth of this trend. But taken by itself, the Judenzdhlung — a tactless blunder committed by a handful of high-ranking and most probably antisemitic army officers - was a symptom, a warning sign that antisemitism in Germany was alive and well, especially in times of stress and national reverses. More than this it did not signify. If the course of German history during the post-war period had taken a different direction from that which it ultimately did take - and this possibility existed at least until 30th January 1933, if not beyond that date - the Judenzdhlung would have remained a mere episode, a humiliation like others before, remembered with distaste, but ultimately shrugged off as just another manifestation of Risches on the part of Wilhelminian Germany's military elite. recently published study of Ulrich Dunker, Der Reichsbund jiidischer Frontsoldaten 1919-1938. Geschichte eines judischen Abwehrvereins, Diisseldorf 1977, pp. 30-31, 70-80. It should be added that the statistical data collected on the Jewish war participation by the Prussian War Ministry in 1916 were never published, except for the unauthorised excerpts which appeared in the publications of Armin and Wrisberg (see above, pp. 7-8 and notes 28, 29). Armin, op. cit., p. 77; Mitteilungen des Syndikus des Centralvereins deutscher Staatsbiirger judischen Glaubens, II (1st October 1920), No. 25, pp. 326-327. "Hamburger, op. cit., p. 118; see also ibid., p. 101, n. 2. 136 Werner T. Angress APPENDIX Muster 1 The Principal Questionnaire Employed for the Judenzdhlung Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 Nachweisung der beim Heere befindlichen (einschl. der noch vorhandenen vertraglich angenommenen Arzte) wehrpflichtigen Juden Veteri- Beamte, Offi- Arzte, nare, Be- Unter- Mann- ziere Unter- Unter- amten- ofliziere schaften SummeBemerkungen arzte veteri- stell- nare vertreter A. Feldheer. Bestand am 1.11. In rot ist iiber den 1916 schwarzen Zahlen Wieviel sind hiervon anzugeben, wie- wahrend des viel davon nicht Krieges freiwillig mit der Waffe in eingetreten der Hand (im Ver- Wieviel sind seit waltungs-, Sani- Beginn des Krieges tats- usw. Dienst) an der Front verwendet werden. a) gefallen: b) mitdemE. K. I c) mit dem E. K. II ausgezeichnet worden. B. Etappe Bestand am 1.11. Zul. Inrotistuber 1916 den schwarzen I. kriegsver- Zahlen anzugeben, wendungsfahig wieviel davon nicht II. andere mit der Waffe in 1. Wieviel sind der Hand (im Ver- hiervon wah- waltungs-, Sani- rend des tats- usw. Dienst) Krieges frei- verwendet werden. willing einge- Ferner ist in blau treten iiber den roten 2. Wieviel sind Zahlen anzugeben, hiervon fur wieviel davon iiber denDienstin 3 Monate bei der der Etappe. Etappe verwendet a) mit dem sind. E.K. I b) mit dem E. K. II ausgezeichnet worden. The German Armfs "Judenz&hlung" 137 C. Besatzungsheer (einschl. General Gouvernements) (einschl. samtl. milit. Behorden und Institute). Bestand am 1.11. Zu I. In rot ist iiber 1916 denschwarzen I. kriegsver- Zahlen anzugeben, wendungsfahig wieviel davonnicht Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021 II. andere mit der Waffe in Wieviel sind der Hand (im Ver- hiervon wahrend waltungs-, Sani- des Krieges tats- usw. Dienst) freiwillig verwendet werden. eingetreten Ferner ist in blau iiber den schwarzen Zahlen anzugeben, wieviel davon sich iiber 4 Monate beim Besatzungsheer befinden. Bemerkung: Das Personal des freiwilligen Motorbootkorps, des Kaiserlichen Kraftfahrkorps und der freiwilligen Krankenpflege ist auBer Betracht zu lassen. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/leobaeck/article/23/1/117/944535 by guest on 01 October 2021