ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS

“OPCW: success in disarmament – its future challenges”

ADDRESS BY

AMBASSADOR GRACE ASIRWATHAM DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL

27 th May 2013

Introduction

1. It is indeed an honour for me to have this opportunity to speak at the University of Cyprus.

2. The University of Cyprus is the first public university established in Cyprus which represents a dynamic community of scholars engaged in the promotion and dissemination of knowledge. The University has earned the respect of the international academic community and the appreciation of Cypriot society. Your university is well placed to fulfil the growing educational needs of the people, and to contribute further to the promotion of research and education in your country and the region.

3. Over the years, Cyprus has been providing substantial and consistent support to the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Its dedication to the goals of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction reflects its national commitment and support to the promotion of peace and security world-wide through multilateralism and diplomacy .

4. Today, I am pleased to discuss with you some of the main features of the Convention, and to illustrate how this unique treaty has been successfully contributing to global disarmament and non- proliferation efforts for over 16 years. I also wish to share a few thoughts on how we plan to build further on this important progress that has been achieved thanks to the dedication of our Member States.

5. We will spare no effort to ensure continued implementation of the Convention and its relevance and validity for the future generations, as we strive for a peaceful world free of chemical weapons.

1

CWC History

1. In order to fully grasp the meaning and purpose of the Chemical Weapons Convention, it is important to briefly recall the historical background that has inspired and led the international community to negotiate a total ban on an entire category of WMD.

2. The conclusion of the CWC in 1992 was a result of dedicated work spanning nearly the entire twentieth century . The earliest initiatives to control or prohibit the use of poisonous weapons were the St. Petersburg Declaration in 1868 and The Hague Declaration in 1899 . The objectives of these legal instruments, however, remained unfulfilled .

3. The emergence of chemical weapons as weapons of mass destruction during the First World War led to the adoption of the Geneva Protocol in 1925 . While prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons, the Geneva Protocol did not prohibit their production, development or stockpiling. This loophole allowed countries to stockpile huge quantities of chemical weapons. And unfortunately these weapons continued to be used in the following decades. The most visible use of chemical weapons in recent memory was perpetrated by the former regime in Iraq in its war against Iran and against its own people in Halabja.

Characteristics of the Convention

1. Against this tragic backdrop , the conclusion of the CWC and its entry into force in 1997 was hailed as a watershed . The international community’s long-standing efforts to comprehensively ban chemical weapons had finally become a reality . The Convention was negotiated within a multilateral framework and is the first multilateral treaty that bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

2

2. The Convention establishes rights and obligations of far-reaching scope to ensure that chemical weapons are effectively eliminated and never re-emerge. The Convention is comprehensive and non- discriminatory . It prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, retention and use of chemical weapons by States Parties, under conditions of strict international verification.

3. Compared with the main legal instruments covering other weapons of mass destruction, the Convention unlike the Non-Proliferation Treaty , makes no exceptions in prohibiting the possession of chemical weapons . All States Parties have equal rights and obligations , and those who possess chemical weapons must destroy their stockpiles according to given deadlines . States Parties are also required to ensure that, within their jurisdiction, chemistry is only used for peaceful purposes .

4. For non-proliferation purposes , industries in States Parties which produce chemicals and precursors that could be used to make chemical weapons are subject to inspections . The purpose of these inspections is to verify that the production or consumption of relevant chemicals is only for legitimate purposes.

5. In addition, States Parties also undertake to provide assistance to other members should chemical weapons ever be used, or threatened to be used, against them.

6. We also note that chemistry is one of the key sectors of global economic development. In this regard, the Convention seeks to promote cooperation at the international level by encouraging exchange of knowledge and expertise in this field.

3 7. To ensure the implementation of its provisions, and to promote and verify States’ compliance with their treaty obligations, the Convention established the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons- the OPCW with the Technical Secretariat in The Hague . This is a key difference compared to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). While the BWC also bans biological weapons in a comprehensive manner, this treaty has no verification component or intergovernmental body for monitoring its implementation.

8. On the whole, there is no other legal instrument such as the Convention , relating to weapons of mass destruction that demonstrates such a comprehensive approach and one which is accepted on a near universal basis.

Main achievements to date

1. The progress achieved in the implementation of the Convention has been indeed remarkable in pace and scope . As we mark 16 years of operation of this unique treaty and the OPCW, we recognise that 188 countries have now subscribed to the norms of the Convention representing 98% of the world’s population and chemical industry.

2. Total and complete chemical disarmament is one of the core objectives of the Convention. Within 30 days of joining the Convention, every State Party that possesses chemical weapons must provide a detailed declaration of its chemical weapons stockpiles to the OPCW. The Technical Secretariat verifies the declared stockpiles and then monitors their destruction until the process is completed. A large share of our inspection effort has been dedicated to this verification task .

4 3. To date, seven States Parties have declared possession of chemical weapons, namely: Albania, India, Libya, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and A State Party that has requested anonymity. In addition, Iraq has also made a declaration which actually relates to weapons on its territory that were rendered unusable by United Nations inspectors.

4. The total quantity of chemical warfare agents declared was over 71,000 tonnes . Over 80 % of these weapons have already been destroyed under international verification by the OPCW. This is an unprecedented achievement in the history of disarmament.

5. The stockpiles include large quantities of highly lethal nerve agents like VX , a mere drop of which is enough to kill dozens of people. Destroying these chemical weapons is, therefore, a dangerous, time- consuming and expensive exercise .

6. Albania, India and another State Party have already completed the destruction of their chemical weapons.

7. The focus is now understandably on the two largest possessor States, namely Russia and the United States , which are both progressing steadily towards the end goal of complete destruction of their stockpiles. The Russian Federation has to date destroyed over 70% of its chemical weapons while the United States has eliminated nearly 90% of its declared stockpiles.

8. Under the Convention, States Parties also have an obligation to declare and destroy Facilities that have produced chemical weapons. Out of the 70 such facilities declared by 13 States Parties, 43 have already been destroyed and 21 have been converted for peaceful purposes . As a result, chemical weapons production capacity has been completely eliminated for 90% of all declared production facilities.

5 9. Non-proliferation is the next fundamental and long-term core objective of the Convention. For that purpose, together with its disarmament activities, the OPCW conducts year-round inspections of industrial facilities that produce toxic chemicals and precursors. These are grouped by the Convention into three Schedules of priority according to the risk they pose. The OPCW is also required to inspect what we call Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF). These are facilities that produce commercial chemicals of lesser concern but are capable of quickly and easily being re-converted to make chemical weapons.

10. The Convention also establishes a challenge-inspection mechanism which is of great significance as a deterrent and a verification measure . The Secretariat has steadily enhanced its readiness to conduct such an inspection should a State Party request it.

11. Every year the Organisation conducts over 200 industry inspections in around 80 countries . On any given day, somewhere in the world the chemical industry is likely being inspected by the OPCW.

12. In addition to fulfilling its mandate for disarmament and non- proliferation, the OPCW has made major contributions to strengthening the capacity for providing assistance and protection against chemical weapons. The Technical Secretariat organises training programmes for first responders and other relevant government experts to develop national and regional capabilities and emergency response systems against the use , or threat of use, of chemical weapons.

13. [To date, over 3500 participants have benefitted from these programmes and support for them has been strong. Forty-four States Parties have made unilateral offers of assistance , 47 have contributed to our Voluntary Fund for Assistance , and 154 have provided information on national programmes related to protective purposes].

6

14. Further the Technical Secretariat has been advised to establish an International Support Network for the Victims of Chemical Weapons in accordance by a decision by the Conference of the States Parties. The network to establish links to appropriate sources of information relevant to the victims of chemical weapons , and establish and administer a subpage on the OPCW official website to contain information on the history of use of chemical weapons from a victims perspective , details of relevant international and regional organisation s, and of NGOs mandated to provide assistance to victims of chemical weapons, and information on international events to promote the Convention, at which victims of chemical weapons and representatives from relevant NGOs could participate.

15. The OPCW also helps to build national and regional capacities that have a beneficial economic impact for recipient countries. For instance, the OPCW trains chemists and engineers in industrial best practice to safely manage chemicals in a complex industrial environment . We have programmes designed to enhance analytical skills in chemistry . Other programmes provide funding for research projects and organise internships for qualified people at recognised research institutions. These activities have promoted a sense of ownership and solidarity among our States Parties, especially among developing countries and those with economies in transition.

7

Third Review Conference

1. Last month the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Third Review Conference) successfully concluded in The Hague.

2. The Conference was an outstanding success on account of the nature of the process and the quality of the result . The process leading to the conclusion of the recommendations by the Conference remained inclusive, transparent, and fully participatory . Collective ownership and support for the outcome , which is substantive and forward looking has considerably strengthened the OPCW and its future mission .

3. The credit for this collective success belongs to all Member States. The final report adopted by the Conference and the important deliberations that resulted from the review process , are indicators of the crucial importance this treaty continues to bear as a universally recognized norm against chemical weapons.

4. Strong support for the Convention has also been reiterated by the United Nations Secretary-General Mr Ban Ki-moon during his opening remarks at the Conference. His presence, as the first Secretary-General that participated in an OPCW Conference of the States Parties, symbolised the spirit of international cooperation and the true multilateral nature of this treaty .

5. The success of the Conference has allowed to renew every aspect of OPCW’s mission as well as to lift the OPCW to a higher level of recognition and importance which it truly deserves.

8 6. The Conference was held at an important time for the Organisation, a time of transition and adaptation to evolving conditions and new challenges. By delivering a crucial success at a critical time, States Parties have demonstrated once again their commitment and resolve to achieve the goals of the Convention .

7. The outcome of the Third Review Conference reflects a robust review of the past and a clear direction for the future . It has reaffirmed the key norms of the Convention. Upholding the validity of the basic precepts gives an outlook to the work of the Organisation. This is followed by a detailed assessment of the various mandated programmes, together with guidance as to their continuation, improvement or strengthening.

Future challenges

1. I have shared with you some highlights from OPCW’s history and touched upon the achievements made to date . I also wish to discuss some important elements that are related to our future endeavours and the challenges that are ahead of us.

2. As I have mentioned, a core objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention is the complete elimination of chemical weapons . The weapons to be eliminated are some of the most toxic substances ever created , and the actual work of destroying them has proven to be more difficult than the drafters of the Convention might have anticipated. High levels of financial and technological resources are needed to ensure that they can be safely destroyed while also protecting the environment .

3. The fact that 80 % of the declared stockpiles have been destroyed to date is a notable achievement . However, our mission will not be accomplished until complete destruction of the declared stockpiles is achieved and all other objectives are fully implemented.

9

4. Having missed the destruction deadline of April 2012, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, being two of the biggest possessor states have been demonstrating the necessary commitment on their part to destroy the remaining stockpiles at the earliest. Based on their achievements so far, I am confident that both countries will continue to do their utmost to eliminate their remaining stockpiles within shortest time possible .

5. It is my hope that with the commitment and support from our Member States, the desired milestone of destroying all chemical weapons will be reached in a constructive spirit and with greater transparency and close monitoring of progress.

6. As a natural evolutionary process , once the destruction of existing chemical weapons has been completed , the majority of the verification activities of the Organisation will be focused on the long- term objective of non-proliferation.

7. Given the large number of industrial facilities that have been declared to the OPCW, the foremost challenge in this regard will be to ensure refinement and adequacy of the industry verification regime . It will also be necessary to maintain and enhance the knowledge and expertise of the organisation in the field of verification as there are continuous advancements in science and technology . For example, we must be able to detect new chemicals and the impact they can have on the Convention. Similarly, we need to reach a deeper understanding of the growing interaction between chemistry and biology as this is often mentioned as a development which is relevant to the effectiveness of the Convention’s verification regime . The potential impact of micro- reactors and nanotechnology also needs to be well understood.

10 8. The threat from non-State actors , particularly terrorists , seeking to produce or acquire chemical weapons is another challenge . It is an issue that Japan fully understands having actually suffered from chemical terrorism at the hands of the Aum Shinrikyu cult . The most effective defence against such threats are measures to deny non- State actors access to chemicals of concern and the means to produce them.

9. This is best done through effective national implementation of the Convention. All States Parties must establish and reinforce administrative and legislative measures so that key provisions of the Convention are in force within their jurisdictions . These include the requirement for systematic declarations , industry monitoring, controls on transfers of chemicals, and regulatory measures to identify and track toxic chemicals.

10. It is also vital for States Parties to be able to detect, pursue, and prosecute any breach of the Convention by their nationals, in any area under their jurisdiction or control. For these reasons, the OPCW Technical Secretariat invests significant resources in assisting States Parties with establishing a National Authority for coordinating implementation of the Convention.

11. Our work also focuses on assisting States Parties, at their request , with their domestic legislation that is meant to criminalise activities that are prohibited under the Convention. Nearly half of our States Parties have adopted legislation that covers all key areas of the Convention . Clearly there is a need to progress further on this matter given its importance. At the same time, it should be noted that the implementation of the CWC fares better than the national implementation of other comparable disarmament instruments and obligations.

11 12. In the field of international cooperation and assistance , we must ensure our continued ability to deliver in accordance with the increasing expectations of States Parties to their assistance-and- protection needs.

13. Our Member States have been contributing through detailed accounting, assessment, and suggestions pertaining to programmes under Articles X and XI , thus indicating that these two pillars of the Convention will continue to remain vital to our progress as an Organisation. There is growing interest amongst our Member States in this area particularly in the light of their ongoing concerns about the possible use of toxic chemicals by terrorists .

14. Indeed, the possibility that terrorists may use chemical weapons has enhanced the interest in the OPCW’s ability to coordinate delivery of emergency assistance in the event of an attack, or the threat of such an attack. The ease with which some commonly available toxic chemical compounds can be used for nefarious purposes, using rudimentary but widely available knowledge to weaponise them, makes it incumbent on States Parties to be aware of and address the existing dangers . Full implementation of the Convention by all States Parties, working together in all regions and with all stakeholders, is an essential means to address the threat.

15. This endeavour also accords entirely with the objectives of the United Nations Security Council’s efforts under Resolution 1540 (2004). The OPCW is not an anti-terrorism agency , but the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons that falls within its remit has an important contribution to make in this area. The Organisation’s role in this context is specifically recognised in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the General Assembly in 2006.

12 16. On the whole, I believe that there is considerable scope to enhance and make more effective our programmes in the area of international cooperation and assistance and protection against chemical weapons.

17. Another important task ahead of us is to continue promoting the universality of the Convention . This means convincing the 8 remaining States to join the Convention thus making its prohibitions truly universal.

18. The overwhelming majority of countries now subscribe to the obligations established by the Convention and it is not in the interest of the international community to allow exceptions . Such a situation prevents the realisation of the goal of a chemical weapons free world. Non-adherence by some States leads to legitimate concerns about their intentions and capabilities. Some of them explain their reluctance as justified on account of unresolved regional problems. However, I believe that the international community should insist that there is no moral or strategic justification to retain the chemical weapons option .

19. The Third Review Conference has also stressed the crucial priority of promoting the universality of the Convention. It has called upon States not Party to join the Convention as a matter of urgency and without preconditions.

20. We know how important this objective is given the events in the Syrian Arab Republic. Keeping in mind the difficult nature of the issue, many States Parties have voiced there concerns with regards to the situation in Syria. On this issue, the Third Review Conference adopted a clear stance and reiterated its deep concern that chemical weapons may have been used in Syria and condemned any such use by anyone.

13 21. The OPCW will continue to monitor closely the developments in Syria, and as requested by the UN Secretary-General we have made our resources available to him in conducting an investigation of alleged use .

22. It is indeed horrendous that the threat of use of chemical weapons even today may seem quite real . It is for this purpose that we must further strengthen our joint efforts in upholding the principles of the Convention and making it a permanent barrier against chemical weapons in the future.

Strengthening support for the Convention

1. To achieve this we need to further strengthen support for the Convention globally and engage a number of stakeholders more substantially.

2. The Chemical Weapons Convention is the first arms control treaty that directly impacts and relies upon industry for its full implementation. Chemical industry participated in the negotiations leading to the Convention. Our industry verification regime has greatly benefited from consultations over the years with the industry. We must further enhance this engagement as we prepare to align the implementation of the Convention in the context of an ever growing and technologically advancing chemical industry.

3. The Convention is also a body of rules with an ethical foundation. Civil society, academics and scientists are, therefore, another major stakeholder group. Many chemists, however, have had little or no exposure during their training and professional life to the ethical norms and regulatory requirements of the CWC. Advances in the life sciences are creating significant opportunities. While their potential for benefit is undisputed, these could also be prone to abuse.

14 Education and awareness-raising about the norms and principles enshrined in the CWC are therefore becoming increasingly important.

4. We will continue to disseminate ethical norms rooted in the Convention to the general public and, especially, among scientists, engineers, and academics. Outreach, education, and public diplomacy will feature more prominently on the Organisation’s agenda, in addition to a renewed emphasis on monitoring scientific and technological developments, whose possible implications for the verification mechanisms of the Convention must be closely followed.

5. We must also remain aware of the implications of new developments in scientific research. The imperative to perpetuate the global norm against chemical weapons requires actions that will ensure the Convention’s abiding relevance.

6. It is our intention to deepen our interaction and dialogue with these important stakeholders together with relevant NGOs. The purpose is to motivate civil society institutions to play a more prominent role in propagating the important contribution of the CWC to international peace and security.

15 Conclusion

1. The OPCW’s progress and successes represent the strong international consensus against chemical weapons.

2. This united stance is informed by a tragic history leading to the firm determination of the international community to prevent its recurrence.

3. The Convention and the OPCW stand out as examples of successful multilateralism. Our States Parties have dealt with difficult challenges in a spirit of constructive cooperation and found solutions through their willingness to compromise . The success of CWC’s three Review Conferences is a proof of this culture.

4. This strong tradition of cooperation and consensus generates a positive outlook for a challenging future that will test the prohibitions and prescriptions of the Convention in an environment of continual advancements in science and technology. While celebrating human progress that this brings, there is also a need to exercise vigilance against its possible abuse.

5. We see the results of this commitment translating into progress on a daily basis.

6. The unique experience of the OPCW in creating this excellent multilateral cooperative environment promises to be our greatest asset as we look to our future challenges.

7. The success of our mission to date will no doubt further inspire the Secretariat to redouble its own efforts to serve a truly worthy cause: that of making our world completely free of chemical weapons.

Thank you.

16