DOCSLIB.ORG

Efficiency and Equity of Public Spending in Brazil

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Efficiency and Equity of Public Spending in Brazil Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized 1 2 A Fair Adjustment: Efficiency and Equity of Public Spending in Brazil BRAZIL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW Volume I: Overview November, 2017 3 4 Preface After a period of economic stability, high growth rates and a substantial poverty reduction, Brazil now faces major challenges to deal with its public spending. The growth of primary spending outpaced that of GDP even during the favorable phase of the commodity super-cycle. Spending has become increasingly inflexible due to constitutional rigidity in categories such as payroll and social security, leaving almost no room for discretionary and investment spending. Considering the change in the economic environment, this expenditure review was requested by the Brazilian government with the objective to conduct an in-depth analysis of government spending, to develop options for Brazil to reduce its fiscal deficit to a sustainable level while consolidating the social gains achieved over previous decades. The main finding of our analysis is that some government programs benefit the rich more than the poor, in addition to not achieving their goals effectively. As a result, it would be possible to save part of the budget without reducing access to or the quality of public services that benefit the poorest sections of the population. The analysis is based on the best international practices and evaluation of the efficiency of spending by different entities and government programs. The report pretends to encourage the debate about the allocation of public resources and the principles that guide public spending, with a view to promote greater equity and efficiency. Designing and enacting a “just adjustment” which puts Brazil’s fiscal accounts back on a sustainable trajectory, while protecting the poor and making public spending more equitable, is a great challenge. It will span more than one government and will require an extensive dialogue far beyond the federal government, including subnational governments, social movements, labor unions, business associations and many other groups. We believe that the sooner the country begins this debate and faces its problems, the sooner it will be possible to transform its current reality and return to the path towards shared prosperity for all. 1 2 Acknowledgements This report was prepared by a World Bank team led by Antonio Nucifora (Lead Economist for Brazil, World Bank), Cornelius Fleischhaker (Economist, Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice, World Bank), and Fritzi Koehler-Geib (Program Leader and Lead Economist for Central America, World Bank), under the guidance of Martin Raiser (Country Director for Brazil, World Bank) and Pablo Saavedra (Manager for Latin America and the Caribbean, Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice, World Bank). The core team included: Fernando Andres Blanco Cossio (Fiscal Policy); Rafael Amaral Ornelas and Fabiano Colbano (Wage Bill); Alexandre Borges de Oliveira (Public Procurement); Heinz P. Rudolph and Asta Zviniene (Pension); Pedro Olinto, Andre Loureiro and Vivian De Fatima Amorim (Education); Kathy A. Lindert (Social Assistance Programs); Edson Correia Araujo (Health); Truman G. Packard and Matteo Morgandi (Labor Market Programs); Emmanuel Skoufias and Renata Mayer Gukovas (Incidence Analysis); Mark Dutz (Business Support Programs); and Flavia Nahmias da Silva Gomes (Team Coordination). Other experts from the World Bank Group also participated in several aspects of the study: Candyce Da Cruz Rocha, Claudia Baddini, Dandan Chen, Daniela Pena de Lima, David Oliveira De Souza, Andres Estrada, Ezau Pontes, Fabiano Colbano, Fabio Sola Bittar, Frode Davanger, Hans Anand Beck, Igor Andre Carneiro, Joao Bevilaqua Teixeira Basto, Juliana Braga Machado, Julio Velasco, Leandro Costa, Lorena Vinuela, Maria Concepcion Steta Gandara, Mariana Vijil, Maria Elisa Diniz Costa, Mariana Vijil, Massimo Mastruzzi, Michael Drabble, Michael Weber, Miguel-Santiago da Silva Oliveira, Monica Porcidonio, Paul Procee, Rafael Barroso, Rafael Munoz Moreno, Raquel Tsukada Lehmann, Roland N. Clarke, Rong Qian, Rovane Battaglin Schwengber, Thiago Scott, Tomas Damerau, Uriel Kejsefman, Vanessa Moreira da Silva, Vivian Malta and Xavier Cirera. A number of experts and academics from Brazil and beyond also participated in the study: Andre Portela, Daniel Santin, Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro, Gabriel Ulyssea, Justin Barnes, Leonardo Lima Chagas, Stephen O'Connell, Ricardo Pais de Barros, Sergio Perelman, Stella Lobo and Tim Sturgeon. Although each of them has contributed to specific parts of the report, they do not necessarily agree with the entire study and its conclusions, and of course they hold no responsibility for any errors or omissions, which remain the authors’ own. Invaluable comments and guidance were provided by Ana Paula Vescovi (National Treasury Secretary, Ministry of Finance), Mansueto Almeida (SEAE Secretary, Ministry of Finance), João Manoel Pinho de Mello (Secretary for Microeconomic Reforms, Ministry of Finance), Fabio Kanczuk (Secretary of Economic Policy, Ministry of Finance), Marcelo Caetano (Secretary of Social Security, Ministry of Finance), Marcos Mendes (Chief Economic Adviser to the Minister, Ministry of Finance), Otavio Ladeira de Medeiros (Deputy Secretary of the National Treasury, Ministry of Finance), Waldery Rodrigues Júnior (General Coordinator for Special Affairs, Ministry of Finance), Pedro Calhman de Miranda (Under Secretary for Infrastructure and Regulation, SEAE, Ministry of Finance), Alexandre Manoel Angelo da Silva (Under Secretary for International Competition, SEAE, Ministry of Finance), Angelo José Mont Alverne Duarte (Under Secretary of Economic Analysis and Competition Law, SEAE, Ministry of Finance) Felipe Bittencourt (Coordinator-General, General Coordination of Economic-Fiscal Studies, National Treasury, Ministry of Finance), Pedro Jucá Maciel (Under Secretary 3 of Strategic Planning for Fiscal Policy, National Treasury, Ministry of Finance), Felipe Palmeira Bardella (General Coordinator of Fiscal and Economic Studies, National Treasury, Ministry of Finance), Jefferson Bittencourt (Under Secretary of Fiscal and Tax Policy, Secretariat of Economic Policy, Ministry of Finance), Rafael Cavalcanti de Araújo (Under Secretary of Economic Policy, Secretariat of Economic Policy, Ministry of Finance), Rodrigo Cota (Deputy Executive Secretary, Ministry of Planning), Jorge Arbache (Secretary of SEAIN, Ministry of Planning), Arnaldo Lima (Chief Economic Adviser to the Minister, Ministry of Planning), Wilsimara Maciel Rocha (General Coordination of Social Policies, Ministry of Planning), Lorena Ferreira (Special Adviser to the Minister, Ministry of Planning), Martha Seillier (Head of Special Advisory Unit, Office of the Chief of Staff of the President), Bruno Silva Dalcolmo (Special Adviser, Office of the Chief of Staff of the President), Marcelo Pacheco dos Guaranys (Deputy Chief, Analysis and Monitoring Department of Government Policies, Office of the Chief of Staff of the President), Fabiana Magalhães Almeida Rodopoulos (Deputy Chief of Public Finance, Office of the Chief of Staff of the President), Janete Duarte (Deputy for Analysis and Monitoring Department of Government Policies, Office of the Chief of Staff of the President), Rogerio Boueri Miranda (Director of Institutional Development, IPEA) Alexandre Ywata (Director of Policies and Regional, Urban and Environmental Studies, IPEA), Lucas Ferreira Mation (Chief of Technical Assistance, IPEA), Ricardo Alberto Volpe (Director of the Budget Consulting and Financial Inspection, Chamber of Deputies) and Helio Martins Tollini (Budget and Financial Inspection Consultant, Chamber of Deputies). We are also grateful for the comments by Carlos Alberto Vegh Gramont (Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean, World Bank), Daniel Lederman (Deputy Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean, World Bank), Deborah Wetzel (Senior Director, Governance Global Practice, World Bank), Ceyla Pazarbasioglu (Senior Director, Finance and Markets Global Practice, World Bank), Carlos Felipe Jaramillo (Senior Director, Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice, World Bank), Paloma Anos Casero (Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and Africa, Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice, World Bank), Marialisa Motta (Manager for Latin America and the Caribbean, Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice, World Bank), Reema Nayar (Manager for Latin America and the Caribbean, Education Global Practice, World Bank), Margaret Ellen Grosh (Senior Advisor, Social Protection and Labor Global Practice, World Bank), Pablo Gottret (Manager for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Protection and Labor Global Practice, World Bank), Daniel Dulitzky (Manager for Latin America and the Caribbean, Health and Nutrition Global Practice, World Bank), Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez (Manager for Latin America and the Caribbean, Poverty Global Practice, World Bank). Special thanks to the peer reviewers: Teresa Ter Minassian (Consultant, former Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF), Jesko Hentschel (Country Director for Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, World Bank), Jorge A. of Thompson R. Araujo (Economic Advisor to the Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean, World Bank), José Guilherme Reis (Manager, Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice, World Bank) and Emily Sinnott (Program Leader, Human
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Keeping the Government Whole: the Impact of a Cap-And-Dividend
    RESEARCH INSTITUTE POLITICAL ECONOMY Keeping the Government Whole: The Impact of a Cap-and-Dividend Policy for Curbing Global Warming on Government Revenue and Expenditure James K. Boyce & Matthew Riddle November 2008 Gordon Hall 418 North Pleasant Street Amherst, MA 01002 Phone: 413.545.6355 Fax: 413.577.0261 [email protected] www.peri.umass.edu WORKINGPAPER SERIES Number 188 KEEPING THE GOVERNMEGOVERNMENTNT WHOLE: The Impact of a CapCap----andandand----DividendDividend Policy for Curbing Global Warming on Government Revenue and Expenditure James K. Boyce & Matthew Riddle Political Economy Research Institute University of Massachusetts, Amherst November 2008 ABSTRACT When the United States puts a cap on carbon sure that additional revenues to government emissions as part of the effort to address the compensate adequately for the additional costs problem of global climate change, this will in- to government as a result of the carbon cap. We crease the prices of fossil fuels, significantly compare the distributional impacts of two policy impacting not only consumers but also local, alternatives: (i) setting aside a portion of the state, and federal governments. Consumers can revenue from carbon permit auctions for gov- be “made whole,” in the sense that whatever ernment, and distributing the remainder of the amount the public pays in higher fuel prices is revenue to the public in the form of tax-free recycled to the public, by means of a cap-and- dividends; or (ii) distributing all of the carbon dividend policy: individual households will come revenue to households as taxable dividends. out ahead or behind in monetary terms depend- The policy of recycling 100% of carbon revenue ing on whether they consume above-average or to the public as taxable dividends has the below-average amounts of carbon.
    [Show full text]
  • Section 10 – Overview of the Budget Process
    SECTION 21—OVERVIEW OF SCORING LEGISLATION SECTION 21—OVERVIEW OF SCORING LEGISLATION Table of Contents 21.1 What is scoring? 21.2 When does scoring occur during the budget process? 21.3 What are the basic concepts I need to know to score legislation? (a) Overview of budget laws (b) Definition of discretionary spending (c) Definition of mandatory spending (d) Committee of jurisdiction (e) How are scoring estimates measured? (f) Economic and technical assumptions (g) Scoring timeframes 21.4 What are the budget enforcement mechanisms for discretionary and mandatory spending? (a) Caps on discretionary spending (b) Pay-as-you-go for mandatory spending (c) Congressional enforcement procedures 21.5 What resources are available to help me score legislation? 21.6 When are scores of legislation due to OMB? 21.1 What is scoring? Scoring is the process of estimating the change in Government spending and collections resulting from enacted or proposed legislation, compared to what would happen in the absence of that legislation. These estimates are prepared both to inform policy makers of the budgetary effects of proposed legislation, and to inform congressional and statutory budget enforcement procedures. 21.2 When does scoring occur during the budget process? Scoring occurs typically during budget formulation, the consideration of proposed legislation, and after a law has been enacted. Budget formulation. As part of the budget formulation process, agencies submit baseline program levels and discretionary, mandatory, and governmental receipt proposals to OMB for consideration. Agencies work with OMB to determine the effect of proposals on budget authority, collections, and outlays based on the Administration’s economic and technical assumptions.
    [Show full text]
  • Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing?
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Research Papers in Economics Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing? by Don Fullerton Department of Economics University of Texas Austin, TX 78712-1173 and NBER [email protected] and Gilbert E. Metcalf Department of Economics Tufts University Medford, MA 02155 and NBER [email protected] August 1997 This paper was prepared for a "Symposium on Second-Best Theory" to appear in the Chicago- Kent Law Review. We are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from Charles Ballard, Larry Goulder, Ian Parry and Kerry Smith. The first author is grateful for financial support from a grant of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA R824740-01-0), and the second author is grateful for financial support from a grant of the National Science Foundation to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NSF SBR-9514989). This paper is part of NBER's research program in Public Economics. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the EPA, the NSF, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing? ABSTRACT The "double-dividend hypothesis" suggests that increased taxes on polluting activities can provide two kinds of benefits. The first dividend is an improvement in the environment, and the second dividend is an improvement in economic efficiency from the use of environmental tax revenues to reduce other taxes such as income taxes that distort labor supply and saving decisions.
    [Show full text]
  • Uncontrollable Spending Has Been Growing Much More Rapidly Than Total Spending and Thus Accounts for an Ever-Larger Share of the Total
    How much spending is uncontrollable? Spending is generally said to be uncontrollable for political rather than legal reasons. Entitlement spending can always be controlled legally by reforming programs, but when an entitlement is extremely popular, reform may require more political courage than is readily available. The federal budget divides government spending into three categories, discretionary spending, mandatory or direct spending, and net interest. Discretionary spending, set in annual appropriations acts controlled by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, includes most defense programs as well as spending for education, transportation, environmental protection, law enforcement and border security, and international assistance. Mandatory spending, controlled by laws other than appropriations act, includes spending on entitlement programs including the big three—Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid—and many smaller programs such as supplemental nutrition assistance, federal civilian and military retirement benefits, and unemployment insurance. Government spending on mandatory programs (often called entitlement programs), and net interest on the public debt are often described as “uncontrollable.” Entitlements can be controlled legally by reforming them, but this can be highly unpopular politically. Interest costs can be controlled indirectly by curbing spending growth or raising revenues, but that is also never easy. Uncontrollable spending has been growing much more rapidly than total spending and thus accounts for an ever-larger share of the total. However, most growth has been concentrated in entitlements that serve the elderly and in health insurance. The population has been aging rapidly, and that affects both Social Security and health programs. The latter have grown doubly rapidly because health costs per beneficiary have been growing faster than incomes per capita.
    [Show full text]
  • Seigniorage and Fixed Exchange Rates: an Optimal Inflation Tax Analysis
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES SEIGNIORAGEANDFIXED EXCHANGERATES: ANOPTIMALINFLATION TAX ANALYSIS Stanley Fischer Working Paper No. 783 NATIONALBUREAUOF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge MA 02138 October 1981 The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in Economic Fluctuations and International Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER Working Paper #783 October 1981 Seigniorage and Fixed Exchange Rates: An Optimal Inflation Tax Analysis ABSTRACT A country that decides to fix its exchange rate thereby gives up control over its own inflation rate and the determination of the revenue received from seigniorage. If the country goes further and uses a foreign money, it loses all seigniorage. This paper uses an optimal inflation tax approach to analyze the consequences for optimal rates of income taxation and welfare of the alternative exchange rate and monetary arrangements. From the viewpoint of seigniorage, a system in which the country is free to determine its own rates of inflation is optimal; fixed exchange rates are second best, and the use of a foreign money is worse. The paper notes that seigniorageis only one of the factors determining the choice of op- timalexchange rate regime, but also points out that rates of seigniorage collection are high, typically accounting for five or more percent of government revenue. StanleyFischer Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 (415)497—9175 Fischer September 1981 Seigniorage and Fixed Exchange Rates: An Optimal Inflation Tax Analysis Stanley Fischer* In choosing fixed over flexible exchange rates, a country gives up the right to determine its own rate of inflation, and thus the amount of revenue collected by the inflation tax.
    [Show full text]
  • Federal Mandatory Spending for Means-Tested Programs, 2009 to 2029
    JUNE 2019 Federal Mandatory Spending for Means-Tested Programs, 2009 to 2029 Means-tested programs (which provide cash payments growth rates have been adjusted to exclude the effects of or other forms of assistance to people with relatively low shifts in the timing of certain federal payments.3 income or few assets) currently account for a little more than a quarter of all mandatory spending.1 The largest Comparing Historical and Projected means-tested mandatory programs are Medicaid, the Growth Rates earned income and child tax credits (which are refund- Historical and projected growth rates are affected by able and thus affect outlays), the Supplemental Nutrition changes in law and the economy. For example, several Assistance Program (SNAP), and the Supplemental mandatory programs have been or are scheduled to be Security Income program. The largest non–means- significantly affected by changes specified in law over the tested mandatory programs are Social Security, most of next 10 years. The 2007–2009 recession and the ensuing Medicare, and the federal civilian and military retirement recovery also have influenced growth rates. As a result, programs. important aspects of the programs may differ signifi- cantly from their past, and those differences may be the In its May 2019 baseline, the Congressional Budget Office projected that if current laws generally remained the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program), which are unchanged, mandatory spending on means-tested pro- controlled by annual appropriation acts. However, each table grams would grow more slowly than spending for non– shows discretionary spending for the Federal Pell Grant Program means-tested programs.
    [Show full text]
  • Private Enterprises As Major Source of Government Revenue
    A change of perspective Private enterprises as major source of government revenue How the private sector delivers on SDG 17 This report is a result of DEG’s evaluation work regarding development effectiveness. DEG's monitoring and evaluating team checks at regular intervals whether the transactions it co-finances help to achieve sustainable development successes and points to ways of making further improvements for DEG and its customers. To ensure the independence of evaluation results, external consultants regularly support the work of the team. This study was prepared by DEG: Dr. Clemens Domnick, Dr. Julian Frede, Leoni Kaup, Mirjam Radzat. June 2020 Title picture produced by DEG based on open source data by WorldDataBank DEG – Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH Kämmergasse 22 50676 Cologne Phone 0221 4986-0 Fax 0221 4986-1290 [email protected] www.deginvest.de A change of perspective 1 Executive Summary Sustainable Development Goal 17 (SDG) states that governments and their budgets play a crucial role in reaching the global SDG targets and to boost human development. When discussing government revenue and revenue creation, the role of the private sector is often underestimated. In this context, most discussions focus exclusively on the role of corporate income tax – a tax that is levied on a company’s profits – and often include the negative impact of tax optimizing structures on government revenues in Emerging Markets. While this discussion is important, there exist various other linkages between the private sector and government revenues that are rarely taken into account. This paper discusses how private sector contributes through different linkages to govern- ment revenue.
    [Show full text]
  • Blueprint for Balance: a FEDERAL BUDGE T F OR FY 20 18
    Blueprint for Balance: A FEDERAL BUDGET FOR FY 2018 The Heritage Foundation © 2017 by The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-0-89195-163-6 Contents Contributors .................................................................................................................................................... ix Introduction: Blueprint for Balance ........................................................................................ 1 Chapter 1: Policies for a Congressional Budget ........................................................... 5 Chapter 2: Budget Proposals ..........................................................................................................13 Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Repeal the USDA Catfish Inspection Program ........................................................................................16 Eliminate the Conservation Technical Assistance Program..................................................................17 Eliminate the Rural Business Cooperative Service.................................................................................18 Prohibit Funding for National School Meal Standards ............................................................................................ and the Community Eligibility Provision 19 Withhold Funding for Federal Fruit and Vegetable Supply Restrictions ............................................20 Repeal
    [Show full text]
  • Bolsonaro's Brazil
    Economic Research BOLSONARO’S BRAZIL WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR CORPORATES? October 2018 by Photo Elizeu DiasElizeu on Unsplash Unsplash CONTENTS 04 Heads I win, tails you lose? Bolsonaro, the least worst for corporates 04 No medium-term game changer – but probable disenchant- ment 06 What it means for corporates: Not home and dry yet Bolsonaro’s Brazil: What does it mean for corporates? by Euler Hermes Economic Research President-elect Jair Bolsonaro and his outwardly pro-business policy EXECUTIVE platform are the “least worst” choice for corporates. In the short-term, we expect quick wins with reforms that only need a simple majority in SUMMARY Congress. These reforms will appeal to a broad pro-business and conservative audience. Bolsonaro’s business environment reform could also lead to the creation of 90 000 additional companies in 2019 compared to 2018. The positive confidence shock could add roughly +0.3pp to economic growth over the next year. Yet, the relief for corporates could be short-lived. The comeback of market volatility and increase in risk premium, and hence borrowing costs, is right around the corner, for three reasons: Georges Dib, Economist for Latin America, Spain and Portugal +33 (0) 1 84 11 33 83 i) Unrealistic or vague proposals: Bolsonaro’s economic program [email protected] contains no impact assessments. This could unnerve markets should he not detail his plan before taking office. Besides, his key budget proposal (to reach primary fiscal balance in 2019) is unrealistic. It involves a huge fiscal adjustment of 2.4% of GDP. Such austerity could cut as much as -1.2pp to real GDP growth in a year, while Brazil’s yearly growth rate is currently barely above +1.3%.
    [Show full text]
  • OECD Economic Surveys BRAZIL the COVID-19 Pandemic Has Caused Severe Human Suffering and Triggered a Deep Recession in Brazil
    OECD Economic Surveys Surveys Economic OECD BRAZIL The COVID-19 pandemic has caused severe human suffering and triggered a deep recession in Brazil. Economic policies reacted in a timely and decisive manner to the crisis, supporting millions of Brazilians. But a strong and inclusive recovery from the recession will require long-lasting improvements in economic OECD Economic Surveys policies. Improving fi scal outcomes remains one of Brazil’s principal challenges given a high debt burden, to which the pandemic has added signifi cantly. Public spending will need to become more effi cient, including by building on past progress in the fi ght against corruption and economic crimes. Social protection can be strengthened through a better focus on the most effective policies and benefi ts, which could allow signifi cant BRAZIL reductions in inequality and poverty. Stronger growth will hinge on raising productivity, which has been virtually stagnant for decades. This requires addressing underlying policy challenges, including reducing regulatory burdens, reforming taxes, strengthening judicial effi ciency and fostering a stronger integration into the global economy. Raising productivity implies reallocations and structural changes in the economy, which should be accompanied by well-designed training and education policies. Training with a strong focus on local skill demand can help workers master the transition and seize new opportunities to move into better jobs. Vol ume 2020/14 ume DECEMBER 2020 SPECIAL FEATURES: BOOSTING PRODUCTIVITY; SKILLS POLICIES TO FACILITATE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT BRAZIL PRINT ISBN 978-92-64-76814-7 PDF ISBN 978-92-64-62200-5 2020December C Volume 2020/14 ISSN 0376-6438 N H 2020 SUBSCRIPTION U 9HSTCQE*hgibeh+ A December 2020 (18 ISSUES) L N O V I E R S OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil 2020 N C H U A L N O V I E R S This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
    [Show full text]
  • Form 20-F Tim Participações S.A
    UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM 20-F ☐ REGISTRATION STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 12(b) OR (g) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 OR ☒ ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016 OR ☐ TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the transition period from ________________ to ________________ OR ☐ SHELL COMPANY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 Date of event requiring this shell company report Commission file number: 001-14491 TIM PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A. (Exact name of Registrant as specified in its charter) TIM HOLDING COMPANY THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL (Translation of Registrant’s name into English) (Jurisdiction of incorporation or organization) João Cabral de Melo Neto Avenue, 850 – North Tower – 12th floor 22775-057 Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil (Address of principal executive offices) Adrian Calaza Chief Financial Officer TIM Participações S.A. João Cabral de Melo Neto Avenue, 850 – South Tower - 12 th floor 22775-057 Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil Tel: 55 21 4009-4000 / Fax: 55 21 4009-3990 [email protected] (Name, Telephone, E-mail and/or Facsimile Number and Address of Company Contact Person) Securities registered or to be registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act: Title of each class Name of each exchange on which registered Common Shares, without par value* New York Stock Exchange American Depositary
    [Show full text]
  • “Mandatory" Knowledge: Truths About Government Spending 1
    Center Forward Budget Basics “Mandatory" Knowledge: Truths Vol. 1, No. 2 About Government Spending April 2011 (updated March 2012) Overview Key Facts The intense spotlight on government support for public radio, Planned Total federal spending for fiscal 2011: Parenthood and, until recently, earmarks, may have created the impression that $3.598 trillion most government spending goes to programs like these. In truth, 60% of government spending goes to benefit individuals—such as seniors, veterans and Amount of mandatory spending: unemployed workers—under so-called “mandatory” spending. $2.025 (56% of total) Amount of discretionary spending: What’s “mandatory” spending? $1.346 trillion (37% of total) Net interest on the national debt: “Mandatory” spending is money the government must spend because of laws $227 billion (6% of total) defining who is “entitled” to get government money and in what amount (hence, “entitlements”). For example, the Social Security Act guarantees any American Top sources of mandatory spending in over age 62 benefits according to a formula fixed by law. If more people reach age fiscal 2011: 62 and want benefits (which is in fact happening), spending automatically rises. Social Security: $725 billion The only way to stop these increases is to change who gets the money—i.e. by Medicare: $560 billion raising the retirement age—or the amount people get—i.e. by cutting benefits. Medicaid: $275 billion Other examples of mandatory spending include: Unemployment insurance: $159 Medicare (available to anyone over 65 or anyone who is disabled); billion Medicaid and food stamps (available to anyone whose income is low Top sources of discretionary spending enough to qualify); in fiscal 2011: Unemployment insurance; and National defense (including wars in Veterans’ benefits.
    [Show full text]