Velina Tchakarova, Livia Benko

FOKUS | 11/2021

The Three Seas Initiative as a Geopolitical Approach and ’s role

Introduction exceeds all previous projects of the 12 scale transport projects, including the 103 signatory states and has a great potential km Helsinki–Tallinn undersea rail tunnel, The “Three Seas Initiative” (TSI) was laun- for the future connectivity in Europe.8 , and the North Sea– ched in 2015 and builds a framework for a corridor. This tunnel could be important pragmatic collaboration aimed at creating The Economic Pillar of the Three Seas for trade with Asia through the future a network of cooperation possibilities Initiative Arctic Northern Sea Route, a shipping line for twelve countries of the Central and between the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Eastern European region (CEE).1 It seeks Altogether, the current members of the TSI Ocean.15 to promote large-scale infrastructural, represent roughly a third of the EU’s territo- digital, and energy-related investments ry, a quarter of its population, and one fifth The Security Pillar of the Three Seas Initia- that are highly needed in this geographic of its GDP.9 It is one of the fastest growing re- tive and the Role of the US area,2 as the region still faces underde- gions in the world, taking into account that velopment challenges mainly in the field the level of development of some of the The TSI countries also want to strengthen of infrastructure and interconnectedness states (e.g. ) was similar to the “Asian European security in the context of region­ following 45 years of socialist rule and its tigers” before the Covid-19 pandemic.10 al threats and risks, such as the growing lasting negative setbacks after the collapse influence of Russia, by increasingly coope- of the Soviet Union.3 The TSI has been Prior to the Covid-19 crisis, these states rating with the US.16 By investing in the conducting a supportive role in relation experienced the highest economic growth TSI, the US is not only setting its foot in the to the efforts of the (EU), in the EU, approaching 3.5% compared to neighborhood but also hopes to lure the which has been playing a key role in gra- the bloc average of 2.1% at the beginning region to its side and make it more strate- dually building better infrastructure and of 2020.11 According to the latest projec- gically predictable. In order to do so, the interconnectedness in the CEE countries tions by the IMF published in a study by US provides liquified natural gas (LNG) to and aiming to overcome the present gap Bruegel12, this geographic area will witness allow CEE to diversify their energy sources between the West and the East of Europe. the most significant post-Covid economic and thus become less reliant on Russian oil Regarding the CEF (Connecting Europe growth, which will help the countries and gas.17 Facility) Transport program, €23.4 billion catch up with Western Europe in econo- has been made available for grants from mic terms. The Three Seas Initiative could The US has been supporting the TSI from the EU’s 2014-2020 budget in order to co- reinforce the area’s economic momentum its very beginning. This could be seen fund TEN-T projects in the EU. Since 2014, by attracting more private investors, as at the TSI summit in in 2017, several calls for project proposals have without the engagement of the private at which then President been launched supporting 935 projects sector and private capital the develop- expressed his support towards the initia- and a total amount of €23.1 billion in the ment gap between the Three Seas region tive.18 Further, US Secretary of State Mike transport sector.4 and the rest of Europe in most of the Pompeo pledged $1 billion (€850 million) sectors cannot be overcome.13 for the TSI fund as well.19 In October 2020, The CEE aims to achieve the infrastructural before the presidential elections, Joe standards of Western Europe and over- The TSI does not only play a role in Biden also showed interest in the TSI. The come the leftovers of the communist era, achieving gas supply independence from latter was confirmed after Biden´s victory, the outdated technology and unsustaina- Russia, but also enables a higher level of when the American Congress issued ble energy supply systems and neglected infrastructural interconnectedness. One resolution n. 672 supporting projects transport roads.5 The European integration of the flagship projects of the TSI is the under the TSI and the strategic concept of led to key investments in connectivity re- Via Carpatia highway that is planned to this initiative.20 In 2021, the Biden Admi- garding the East-West axis, which resulted lead through , Slovakia, , nistration plans to continue to nourish in the North-South axis being much less and to . This new highway the TSI as a central component of U.S. connected.6 By launching a North-South would be the main integration element for policy in Europe.21 The TSI presents also infrastructural axis, the Three Seas Initia- the less developed regions of east Poland, a great opportunity for the US to pursue tive aims to create an interconnected and east Slovakia, and east Hungary.14 its own economic interests in the region more self-sufficient Europe with greater and use it as an instrument in the fight diversification of supply chains and infra- and signed a memoran- against China’s influence in the CEE.22 The structure.7 The TSI with its ambitious goals dum of understanding (MoU) on large- TSI enables the US to achieve economic

1 The Three Seas Initiative

FOKUS | 11/2021

and technological influence in the region Interconnection Projects” was agreed recovery. The TSI, with the support of the and is at the same time seen as part of its at the 2018 TSI Summit in .34 US, and despite Covid-19, continued to influence projection towards Asia.23 The Among these are many gas projects that gain success over the past year.42 It can be US has a good chance of success, as the are of pivotal importance for the Visegrad viewed as an investment in both collective suspicion of Chinese ambitions is growing 4 countries and for other countries of and national defense as well as in eco- within the CEE countries, amplified by the CEE and their supply diversification: nomic growth, and as an initiative with the coronavirus crisis which revealed how “The GIPL gas pipeline (Poland-), further potential.43 unstable global supply chains are due to BRUA gas connection (-Romania- dependencies on China.24 The US is also Hungary-Austria, and Eastring gas pipeline Austria’s bridge-building approach to TSI trying to slow down China’s influence on (Slovakia-Hungary-Romania-Bulgaria), mobile phone technologies with its “5G Romania-Hungary interconnector, Baltic Austria occupies a unique position within Clean Network Security” plan.25 The 5G Pipe (Norway-Denmark-Poland, Poland- the TSI because it sees itself as a bridge network is essential for the interests of the Slovakia, and Poland-Ukraine gas intercon- between Western Europe and the former US because it enables the control of data nections)”.35 Soviet bloc of countries in Central and Eas- in regions where it is maintained.26 tern Europe. The Alpine republic is the only The Financial Pillar of TSI member that was not part of the Warsaw The stance of the TSI member states to- Pact or Yugoslavia during the Cold War. In wards the role of foreign state actors in the TSI can play a supportive role in the post- this context, Austria could become both region varies. Poland, Romania, and the pandemic recovery, as investments and a spoiler and a multiplier of the TSI. On Baltic States represent the so called “Ameri­ new projects under the TSI will be highly the one hand, Vienna sees no incentive to can block”, fearing Russia’s expansionism needed in post-Covid Europe.36 Recently, participate in the TSI as a way of reducing the most.27 On the contrary, Hungary and the European Commissioner for Energy, the dependency of EU members on Russi- Austria tend to pursue a friendly relation- Kadri Simson, highlighted the pivotal an oil and gas imports, since the country ship with Russia.28 The still role of the Three Seas Initiative in helping itself plays an important role as an energy represents one of the most loyal customers Central and Eastern European countries hub for Russian supplies to the European of the Russian gas company Gazprom.29 to recover from the economic backsliding market. On the other hand, Austria could However, these differences are not grave caused by the pandemic and in supporting make a significant contribution to the enough to interfere in the planned LNG Europe’s Green Deal.37 development of the transport and digital cooperation, so this is in fact a promising North-South infrastructure.44 area where the Three Seas can play a large The EU agreed to provide funding for supportive role.30 about half of the planned projects under Austria has a great potential to play a the TSI.38 However, more money is needed, spoiling role as it does not always share The Energy Pillar of TSI given that the financial means required to the same geo-economic interests with modernize the CEE region are enormous the other member states, especially on A highly discussed issue in the TSI region is and up to date present approximately 600 key energy and infrastructure issues. energy security, given the states’ depen­ billion euro.39 For example, many Eastern European dence on Russian gas supplies. Even countries, which were under Moscow’s though the CEE countries are taking steps There is also a TSI Investment Fund, pro- domination for decades, fear Russia’s gro- to diversify their energy sources, their viding economic support to the initiative wing influence in the region and oppose over­all dependency on Russian gas is still in developing the region’s infrastructure. the completion of the Nord Stream 2 70 percent (2019).31 Russia is destabilizing The Fund was registered on 29 May 2019, gas pipeline. Incidentally, they also favor its direct neighborhood by its hybrid in Luxembourg. Its initiators were Poland’s liquefied natural gas imports, including war in Ukraine, as well as conducting development bank Gospodarstwa Krajo- those from the U.S., which are increasingly disinformation campaigns.32 The Polish wego (BGK) and Romania’s national Exim- expected to reach Europe via Poland’s government therefore seeks to cut its Bank, which were also the first investors. Baltic coast. Austria, on the other hand, dependency on Russian gas and replace On 16 April 2020, Estonia became the third sees the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which it with American supplies instead. By country to join the Three Seas Initiative In- OMV is also involved in financing, primarily achieving increased energy diversification, vestment Fund, contributing €20 million.40 as a “commercial project.” The diversifica- also higher energy security and market Poland contributed with $875 million and tion of energy sources and likewise the competitiveness could be reached, as with $28 million. Bulgaria, , diversification of energy routes are of great Russia would not be able to “blackmail” Hungary, , Lithuania, and Romania importance for Austrian interests. There is the countries in the CEE region anymo- have also contributed with large sums.41 a large gas pipeline project from Romania re. Not only Poland, but also the Baltic These investments will hopefully help to Austria, the so-called BRUA project, in states are aiming for LNG installations, as the positive progress of the TSI projects which Austria is very interested. This pipe- is Croatia.33 The realization of 48 “Priority and will also support the post-pandemic line is to supply natural gas to customers

2 The Three Seas Initiative

FOKUS | 11/2021

in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria of common objectives of the countries of Facilitating the geo-economic nexus bet- in the future. In the construction of the the CEE region, which will continue to be ween the North (the Arctic region), where pipeline, the Three Seas Initiative could be of strategic importance for its geopolitical the northern transport route is expected of decisive help.45 and geo-economic interests. to significantly shorten the global flow of goods, and the South in the Mediterrane- As far as possible multiplier effects are con- Geo-economic and geopolitical implica- an region, where member states are see- cerned, the Alpine republic also has a geo- tions of the Three Seas Initiative king new connectivity opportunities with political agenda. If there is a geopolitical North Africa, is of strategic importance role that fits Austria’s ambitions in Europe This initiative is by far one of the boldest to the EU, the Franco-German engine of to a great extent, it is the role of a “bridge and most ambitious geopolitical projects European integration, and the US. Be- builder,” which Vienna has been eagerly of modern times, aimed at radically chan- cause of these realities, TSI members also exercising since the EU enlargement waves ging the destiny of Central and Eastern emphasize the need for better commu- of 2004 and 2007. The EU accession of the Europe. TSI is geostrategic in nature be- nication by strengthening political and CEE countries moved Austria from the cause it promises to further integrate and economic cooperation within the region periphery to the center of the EU’s borders, connect this region to Europe’s major ener- and within the framework of the EU itself. combined with a great potential to benefit gy, transportation, and communications The TSI could help erase the traditional economically from the new markets in the networks. This will ultimately create new division of Europe into West and East East. The $80 billion high-capacity rail and opportunities for the EU to act as a coher- and overcome this stigma, which would road corridor will link the ports of Gdansk ent geo-economic actor in the region and also benefit EU integration and cohesion and Swinoujscie with those of Trieste, Ra- to promote its further modernization. The toward a unified CEE.52 Increasing integra- venna and Ancona, after crossing heavily objectives of the Three Seas Initiative are tion could also improve the overlapping industrialized areas such as Warsaw, the fully in line with the EU’s priorities in areas interests of these countries, which in the Upper Silesian coal basin, Vienna and the such as digital transformation, improved long run will strengthen their position in Po Valley. Austria still has to decide how to connectivity, and the rebuilding of eco- the EU itself.53 define its role in the Three Seas Initiative in nomies after the Covid-19 crisis.48 The U.S. order not to become a free-rider in terms will also benefit from the TSI because it can Despite the various common intentions, of investment gaps and infrastructure sell liquefied natural gas to most members the members of the Three Seas Initiative requirements compared to the other CEE of the initiative and help them build the are politically divided. The political posi- countries.46 necessary pipeline distribution system tions, especially toward Russia, are very from North to South, unlike the current different. Therefore, it is not yet possible In general, Austria takes a positive view of gas supply system from Russia to to speak with one voice vis-à-vis the rest the U.S.-led TSI for closer cooperation in (Nord Stream 2).49 of the EU. Joint economic projects are the Central and Eastern Europe, but neverthe­ best long-term possibility for cooperation less opposes possible “duplication” due to In this context, the TSI reveals the over- - and remain an “attractive tool” for the U.S. other EU-funded projects and insists on lapping of geo-economic interests bet- and the EU to exert positive influence in the EU’s leading role in this framework. ween Brussels, Washington, and Berlin.50 this part of Europe.54 Austria wants to avoid an overlapping of Their interests overlap not only in terms European structures, funding instruments of coinciding geopolitical calculations, Countries from the Anglosphere55, the and approaches based on EU participation. but also in terms of building a solid coun- Quad56, and Three Seas Initiative coun- From Vienna’s perspective, the initiative terweight to China’s own Belt and Road tries have pushed in parallel for infra- offers a good opportunity to support infrastructure initiative and the 17+1 structure projects, supply chain recon- EU efforts to strengthen cohesion and initiative in CEE. The China-Europe Land- figuration, and military interoperability, reduce existing regional disparities, for Sea Express Route includes Hungary, in contrast to China’s global Belt and example by expanding infrastructure and Serbia, northern Macedonia, and Greece, Road Initiative and the 17+1 Initiative in improving connectivity. Austria sees the and connects to the Chinese-owned port Central and Eastern Europe. In this con- added value mainly in contributing to of Piraeus. This is a key project of China’s text, the Three Seas Initiative should be the implementation of already existing infrastructure connectivity in Southeast seen as a geopolitical and geo-economic plans in the EU, for example in the areas of Europe. Meanwhile, Lithuania was the project of the EU and the U.S. aimed infrastructure, energy, and digital connec- first country to leave the China-led 17+1 at creating North-South connectivity tivity. In addition, Austria expects the TSI format, calling on the EU to “move from corridors (Baltic-Adriatic-) along to raise political awareness of this regional a divisive 17+1 format to a unifying and transportation, energy, and infrastructure dimension of European integration.47 In therefore much more efficient 27+1 routes that will be necessary for expan- conclusion, Austria will continue to sup- format. The EU is strongest when all 27 ding EU-North Africa links and containing port the TSI as a framework for the defini- member states act together with the EU the influence of the Dragon Bear (China tion, development, and implementation institutions.”51 and Russia).

3 The Three Seas Initiative

FOKUS | 11/2021

In summary, the CEE region has suffered 15) Arctic Bulk, “Northern Sea Route - The Shortcut between Asia tember 18, 2018, https://www.bundespraesident.at/aktuelles/ and Europe,” accessed May 28, 2021, http://www.arcticbulk.com/ detail/drei-meere-initiative-2018 (Accessed May 28, 2021). far too long from its satellite role within article/186/NORTHERN_SEA_ROUTE. 46) Gerald Schubert, “Drei-Meere-Initiative tagt in Tallinn, Öster- the Soviet Union during the Cold War 16) Lewicki, “Meet the Three Seas Initiative.” reich ist dabei,“ Der Standard, October 18, 2020, https://www. and is now in danger of becoming a 17) Ibid. derstandard.at/story/2000120987326/drei-meere-initiative-tagt- 18) Grzegorz Lewicki, “Iniciativa Trojmoří: Jaký Má Geostrate- in-tallinn-oesterreich-ist-dabei (Accessed May 28, 2021). “buffer zone”, squeezed between Western gický Význam pro Evropu a USA?,” Forum24, January 26, 2021, 47) Industriemagazin, “Drei-Meere-Initiative – Österreich pocht Europe on the one hand and assertive https://www.forum24.cz/iniciativa-trojmori-jaky-ma-geostrate- auf Führungsrolle in der EU,“ Industriemagazin, June 07, 2019, gicky-vyznam-pro-evropu-a-usa/ (Accessed May 27, 2021). https://industriemagazin.at/a/drei-meere-initiative-oesterreich- regional players such as China and Russia 19) Sieradzka, “Europe‘s ‚Three Seas Initiative‘ Aims to Curb pocht-auf-fuehrungsrolle-der-eu (Accessed May 28, 2021). on the other.57 However, the race for new Chinese Influence.” 48) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, “Meeting of government coordinators for the Three Seas Initiative”, Ministry infrastructure, transportation, and digita- 20) Lewicki, “Iniciativa Trojmoří: Jaký Má Geostrategický Význam of Foreign Affairs Press Office, February 11, 2021, https://www. lization connectivity between the main pro Evropu a USA?,” gov.pl/web/diplomacy/meeting-of-government-coordinators- competitors could lead to more incentives 21) Daniel Kochis, “The Three Seas Initiative Is a Strategic Invest- for-the-three-seas-initiative (Accessed May 28, 2021). ment that Deserves the Biden Administration’s Support,” The 49) Morris, “The Three Seas Initiative: Europe‘s Answer to the Belt for the EU and the U.S. to engage more Heritage Foundation, No. 6051, (February, 2021): 1-7, https:// and Road?”. actively, which will have a positive impact www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/IB6051.pdf. 50) Andreas Kluth, “This is how Europe can push back 22) Sieradzka, “Europe‘s ‚Three Seas Initiative‘ Aims to Curb against China and Russia,” Bloomberg Opinion, May on the balance of power in this region. Chinese Influence.” 19, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/ 23) Lewicki, “Iniciativa Trojmoří: Jaký Má Geostrategický Význam articles/2021-05-19/europe-can-fend-off-china-and- Velina Tchakarova, Director of the Austrian pro Evropu a USA?” russia-via-three-seas-initiative?cmpid%3D=socialflow-twit- 24) Sieradzka, “Europe‘s ‚Three Seas Initiative‘ Aims to Curb ter-view&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_ Institute for European and Security Policy Chinese Influence.” content=view&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic (Accessed (AIES) and Livia Benko, AIES Research Fellow. 25) Ibid. May 28, 2021). 26) Lewicki, “Iniciativa Trojmoří: Jaký Má Geostrategický Význam 51) Stuart Lau, “Lithuania pulls out of China’s ‘17+1’ bloc in pro Evropu a USA?” Eastern Europe”, Politico, May 21, 2021, https://www.politico. 27) Ignacio Urrutia, “The Three Seas Initiative,” Sistema Critico eu/article/lithuania-pulls-out-china-17-1-bloc-eastern-central- International, February 24, 2021, https://www.sistemacritico.it/ europe-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis/ (Accessed May Endnotes international/2021/02/24/the-three-seas-initiative-a-general- 28, 2021). perspective-of-the-projects-geopolitical-realm/. 52) Urrutia, “The Three Seas Initiative.” 1) Pawel Musialek, “The Three Seas Initiative: Natural Gas in 28) Kochis, “The Three Seas Initiative Is a Strategic Investment 53) Musialek, “The Three Seas Initiative: Natural Gas in Central Central European Foreign Policy,” ISPI, February 24, 2020, https:// that Deserves the Biden Administration’s Support,” 1-7. European Foreign Policy.” www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/three-seas-initiative-natural- 29) Urrutia,“The Three Seas Initiative.” 54) Monika Sieradzka, “Drei-Meere-Initiative” bekommt gas-central-european-foreign-policy-25128 (Accessed May 27, 30) Musialek, “The Three Seas Initiative: Natural Gas in Central Rückenwind aus Amerika“, Deutschland Welle, October 19, 2021). European Foreign Policy.” 2020, https://www.dw.com/de/drei-meere-initiative-bekommt- 2) Grzegorz Lewicki, “Meet the Three Seas Initiative: the Crucial 31) Sál, “Iniciativa Trojmoří: Velké ambice,” r%C3%BCckenwind-aus-amerika/a-55298517 (Accessed May International Project You Probably Know Little About,” Notes 32) Lewicki, “Meet the Three Seas Initiative: the crucial internati- 28, 2021). From Poland, January 12, 2021, https://notesfrompoland. onal project you probably know little about.” 55) Samuel Gregg, “Getting real about the Anglosphere,” Law & com/2021/01/08/meet-the-three-seas-initiative-the-crucial-in- 33) Marek Górka, “The Three Seas Initiative as a Political Challen- Liberty, February 17, 2020, https://lawliberty.org/getting-real- ternational-project-you-probably-know-little-about/ (Accessed ge for the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” Politics in about-the-anglosphere/ (Accessed May 28, 2021). May 27, 2021). , No. 14(3), (December, 2018):55-73, https://www. 56) Sumitha Narayanan Kutty and Rajesh Basrur, “The Quad: 3) Musialek, “The Three Seas Initiative.” researchgate.net/publication/331871310_The_Three_Seas_Initi- What it is – and what it is not”, The Diplomat, March 24, 2021, 4) European Commission, “European Commission Supports Ten ative_as_a_Political_Challenge_for_the_Countries_of_Central_ https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-quad-what-it-is-and- Additional Sustainable and Safe Transport Infrastructure Projects and_Eastern_Europe/link/5c90fa0da6fdcc38175e4fdf/download what-it-is-not/ (Accessed May 28, 2021). in Europe with €68.6 Million,” Innovation and Networks Execu- 34) David Morris, “The Three Seas Initiative: Europe‘s Answer 57) Morris, “The Three Seas Initiative: Europe‘s Answer to the Belt tive Agency - European Commission, January 18, 2021, https:// to the Belt and Road?” The Maritime Executive, (Accessed May and Road?”. ec.europa.eu/inea/en/news-events/newsroom/european-com- 27, 2021), https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/the-three- mission-supports-ten-additional-sustainable-and-safe-transport seas-initiative-europe-s-answer-to-the-belt-and-road. (Accessed May 27, 2021). 35) Musialek, “The Three Seas Initiative: Natural Gas in Central 5) Lewicki, “Meet the Three Seas Initiative.” European Foreign Policy.” 6) Musialek, “The Three Seas Initiative.” 36) Sál, “Iniciativa Trojmoří: Velké ambice.” 7) Matthew Thomas, “The Three Seas Initiative”, Baltic Security 37) Barska, “Three Seas Initiative Source Digest.” Foundation, March 16, 2020, https://balticsecurity.eu/three_ 38) Morris, “The Three Seas Initiative: Europe‘s Answer to the seas_initiative/ (Accessed May 27, 2021). Belt and Road?” 8) Karel Sál, “Iniciativa Trojmorí: Velké ambice,” Institut Pro Politi- 39) Lewicki, “Iniciativa Trojmoří: Jaký Má Geostrategický Význam ku A Společnost, September 2020, pro Evropu a USA?” https://www.politikaspolecnost.cz/wp-content/up- 40) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Estonia, “Three Seas loads/2020/09/Iniciativa-Trojmo%C5%99%C3%AD- Initiative (3SI),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Accessed May 27, Velk%C3%A9-ambice-IPPS.pdf (Accessed May 27, 2021). 2021), https://vm.ee/en/three-seas-initiative-3si © Austria Institut für Europa- 9) Lewicki, “Meet the Three Seas Initiative.” 41) Daniel Kochis, “US Contributions to 3 Seas Investment Fund und Sicherheitspolitik, 2021 10) SpotData, “Perspectives for infrastructural investments in are Smart, Strategic,” The Daily Signal, January 05, 2021 https:// the Three Seas region,” n.d., https://spotdata.pl/research/down- www.dailysignal.com/2021/01/05/us-contributions-to-3-seas- Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Nachdruck oder ver­ load/74 (Accessed May 27, 2021). investment-fund-are-smart-strategic/ (Accessed May 28, 2021). gleich­bare Verwendungen von Arbeiten des 11) Monika Sieradzka, “Europe‘s ‚Three Seas Initiative‘ Aims to 42) Kochis, “The Three Seas Initiative Is a Strategic Investment Austria Instituts für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik Curb Chinese Influence,” Deutsche Welle, October 18, 2020, that Deserves the Biden Administration’s Support,” 1-7. (AIES) sind auch in Auszügen nur mit vorheriger https://www.dw.com/en/europes-three-seas-initiative-aims-to- 43) Matthew Thomas, “The Three Seas Initiative,”Baltic Security Genehmigung gestattet. Die im AIES-Fokus curb-chinese-influence/a-55314607 (Accessed May 27, 2021). Foundation, March 16, 2020, https://balticsecurity.eu/three_ veröffentlichten Beiträge geben ausschließlich die 12) Grégory Claeys et al., “The Great COVID-19 Divergence: seas_initiative/ (Accessed May 28, 2021). Meinung der jeweiligen Autorinnen und Autoren Managing a Sustainable and Equitable Recovery in the 44) Grzegorz Zbinkowski, “The Three Seas Initiative and its wieder. European Union,” Bruegel, May 20, 2021, https://www.bruegel. Economic and Geopolitical Effect on the European Union and org/2021/05/the-grand-covid-19-divergence/ (Accessed May Central and Eastern Europe,” COPE Vol. 22 (2), 2019, https:// Dr. Langweg 3, 2410 Hainburg/Donau 27, 2021). czasopisma.uni.lodz.pl/CER/article/view/5276/4951 (Accessed 13) Emma Barska, “Three Seas Initiative Source Digest”, Polish May 28, 2021). Tel. +43 (1) 3583080 American Congress, http://www.pac1944.org/three-seas- 45) Alexander Van der Bellen, “Gipfeltreffen der Drei-Meere- E-Mail: [email protected] initiative/three-seas-initiative-source-digest-2/ (Accessed May Initiative in Bukarest: Bundespräsident Alexander Van der Bellen Website: www.aies.at 27, 2021). befürwortet das Projekt, um die regionale Zusammenarbeit in 14) Sál, “Iniciativa Trojmorí: Velké ambice.” Mittel- und Osteuropa zu fördern,“ Bundespraesident.at, Sep- Layout: Medienbüro Meyer

4