Issue 42, June 2012

FIELD BULLETIN Federalism discourse in three districts in the Eastern Tarai Background When the draft Interim Constitution of became public in December 2006 it prompted protests from many quarters, most notably Madeshis and Janajatis. The document was prepared by the (SPA)1 and the Maoists, without broad consultations with other actors, in particular the Madhesi and other ethnic groups. Madhesi civil society groups, like the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), the (NSP) as well as Madhesi parliamentarians across party lines demanded explicit commitment to federalism, an electoral system which would have had a greater percentage of seats allocated on the basis of proportional representation and redrawn electoral boundaries. This would, in their view, have been a more equitable system.2 Despite the objections, the Interim Constitution was passed by the legislature‐parliament on January 15, 2007. Immediately, the MJF and the NSP organised protests demanding the amendment of the Interim Constitution and the establishment of the entire Tarai as one single province. The protests quickly spread across the Tarai and turned violent in many places.3 In response to the protests, then Prime Minister G P Koirala appeared on TV and addressed the nation twice, on January 31st and on February 7th, 2007. He guaranteed federalism, a redrawing of electoral boundaries again based on population, and the representation of Madhesis and other minority groups in elected bodies and other state organs. Protests and violence persisted and only died down after the legislature‐parliament passed the 1st amendment to the Interim Constitution on 12 April 2007. The amendment calls for the State to be ”democratic and federal”, but there was no clear commitment to ‘One Madesh’.4 After recurrent protests from January 2007 to February 2008, numerous agreements were signed between the and Madhesi and other agitating ethnic groups, which assured a mixed system of elections5 and assured a federal republic through constitutional amendments. On the one hand, these agreements helped create the political climate necessary for elections, which, in the face of such concerted Madeshi protests, might otherwise have been postponed

1 The seven‐party alliance which signed the twelve‐point agreement consisted of NC, UML, Nepal (Anandi Devi), (Democratic), , NepalWorkers and Peasants Party and United Left Front 2 The interim constitution (Art. 63(3)) provided for a 425‐member constituent assembly with 205 elected by a first‐ past‐the‐post system (FPTP), 204 elected by proportional representation and sixteen “distinguished persons” selected by the interim council of ministers. Madhesi groups’ basic objection was that electoral constituencies are not delineated by equitable population representation. 3 NEPAL: IDENTITY POLITICS AND FEDERALISM, Asia Report No199 – 13 January 2011. International Crisis Group 4 Interim Constitution, Art. 138(1) 5 Two kinds of electoral systems were adopted for the Constituent Assembly election: (a)First Past the Post System‐ (FPTP): The system in which the one leading in the vote count is elected. (b) Proportional electoral process: A proportional election is the one where voting takes place for political parties, considering the entire nation a single election constituency. Seats are allocated based on the votes received by the political parties. Parties have to submit the list of candidates prior to the election. Federalism discourse in three districts in the Eastern Tarai indefinitely. On the other hand, it increased the expectations of many ethnic groups who laid claims on territories which often overlapped or were in direct competition with each other, a dynamic which, in 2012, has posed serious challenges to the peace and stability of Nepal and has had a direct impact on both the peace process and the drafting of the new constitution. The details of the different claims by various groups, are further discussed in the subsequent sections of this field bulletin. Elections for a Constituent Assembly (CA) were held in April 2008, forming a 601 member CA. Since then, deliberation on state restructuring has continued within and outside the CA. This field bulletin looks at how this debate took place specifically in Jhapa, Morang and Sunsari districts6. It describes the interests of the various groups agitating on the federalism issue and examines the potential for conflict between them. The bulletin does not attempt to detail or describe the internal politics of each of the groups. Rather, it maps some of the major actors in the Eastern part of the country, as well as their positions in relation to federalism, and attempts to describe some of the underlying dynamics of their competing claims. The findings are based on interactions with local level leaders, civil society members, community members and various ethnic outfits active in those districts. Discourse on a federal Nepal A number of proposals for a federal Nepal have been presented by different political parties and individuals and have certainly been a principal source of contention in drafting the new constitution. Initially, the proposals mainly fell into two broader categories. One category of proposals suggested a purely territorial subdivision of the country with no regard to socio‐cultural diversity, but based rather on other criteria, such as economic viability, access to international borders, natural resources or reference to previous administrative arrangements in Nepal, such as the larger ‘Morang’ or ‘Chitwan’ units which existed under the system. The other category comprised proposals suggesting a socio‐cultural subdivision based on ethnic identity. At a later stage, most parties, groups and opinion‐makers put forward some ‘mixed’ models combining both elements of identity and viability. As no agreement could be reached on the weightage to be given to these various elements, these ‘mixed models’ were also not enough to bring the political parties to a consensus by May 27. Against this overall backdrop of the nation‐wide debate on federalism, federating the Tarai has proved particularly difficult with conflicting demands driven by various interest groups and political parties. It is important to note that the competing claims in the districts, as described below, have had a direct impact on the national level debate and the national level debate has fed back into the dynamics of the districts of the Eastern Tarai. The CA Thematic Committee on State Restructuring passed a 14 state model in November 2010 by majority voting, envisaging two Tarai provinces, of which one would include districts from Jhapa to Parsa in the east and the other the districts from Nawalparasi to Kanchanpur in the west, leaving out Chitwan, incorporated into a ‘Narayani Province’ in between the two proposed provinces.7 No consensus could be reached. On November 22nd, 2011, the State Restructuring Commission (SRC) was formed to advise the CA on the federal issue. It too could not produce a consensual proposal on federating the Tarai, just as the Thematic Committee before it.

6 These three districts are similar enough in terms of demographic attributes, political dynamics and geographical features to warrant being analyzed together. This, however, does not in any way imply on opinion on their future in a federal Nepal. 7 Restructuring of the State and Distribution of State Power Committee: Report on Concept Paper and Preliminary Draft, 2010 Page 2 of 8

Federalism discourse in three districts in the Eastern Tarai The majority of the SRC floated an 11 province model in which the Tarai is similarly divided into two provinces with the exception of Chitwan now being included in the eastern province. This proposal did not meet with wide acceptance and prompted protests across the country, particularly the Far Western region on its release in early 2012. The minority of the SRC, on the other hand, proposed a six‐state model in which Jhapa, Morang, Sunsari, Chitwan and Kanchanpur would be excluded from the Tarai provinces.8 Some observers felt that this proposal, in its own way, was a type of ethnicity‐based federalism as the districts mentioned have high proportions of Pahadi population and the proposal to detach these districts from any other Tarai provinces was seen by some as an attempt to safeguard the interests of that population. The proposals also varied on the degree of autonomy to be provided to the future provinces. Currently most discussions at the national and local level seem to concentrate on the delineation of provincial boundaries and the names of proposed provinces and there does not seem to have been much public debate on issues such as the relationship between the states and the centre, the form of governance within the provinces or even the rights of various populations within these proposed states. As the CA and constitution drafting process were key to the discussion on federalism (and resolving tensions around it), the dissolution of the CA on 27th May 2012 has added new dynamics to the whole debate; common people as well as political parties and ethnic groups are uncertain about the future of federalism, and, for that matter, the political process by which it may or may not be realized. Given that there was, in the end, no constitution, the tensions around federalism remain unresolved and unaddressed. At the time of writing there is an absence of any formal institution to deal with these deliberations and it is likely that various groups described in this Field Bulletin will resort to various forms of protest to push for their demands. As illustrated below, many of the political actors lobbied in the Constitution drafting process specifically on the interests of their respective ethnic groups (e.g. Khambhus, Limbus, Tharus, Chettri Samaj Nepal), either through political parties or through protests outside of the CA, with the political debate at times assuming a communal aspect. For example, the fact that the Nepal Brahmin Samaj and Chettri Samaj Nepal were actively campaigning against ethnicity based federalism, while many Janajati organizations were campaigning in favour of it, led to serious tensions between their respective supporters in many parts of the country. In certain areas, it seemed as though these tensions would move beyond the political realm and into open communal confrontation and violence. Fortunately, this happened only to a limited extent, but it made genuine dialogue between the groups described below increasingly difficult and the

8 SRC minority and majority reports, 2012 Page 3 of 8

Federalism discourse in three districts in the Eastern Tarai achievement of a mutually acceptable solution harder to reach. This, it seems, further impacted on the national level as the political parties involved in drafting the new constitution were constantly obliged to reconsider their positions on federalism in the face of pressure from within and from outside to accommodate demands on federalism from a wide and ever‐increasing number of actors.

It is clear that the central level political process has the capacity to influence the kind of local dynamics described here, and that at the central level, attention should be paid to local dynamics, as they have the capacity to influence central level political processes. Certainly, this complex interplay between national and regional dynamics contributed to the difficulties faced by the parties to produce a constitution on 27 May and the growing polarization of the political landscape on ethnic lines may result, in the worst‐case scenario, in renewed ethnic conflict in many districts of the region. The ways in which these national level issues played out at the local level and might do so again in the future, are examined below. Overlapping claims in Jhapa, Sunsari and Morang Districts Despite the ongoing rhetoric of “One Madhesh” by the Madhesh based parties ‐ often described as a maximalist position and one open to compromise ‐ the social landscape of the three districts east of the Koshi River is starkly different from the Eastern Tarai districts west of the Koshi. Before the large scale movement of people from the hills in the 1950s, the northern parts of Jhapa, Sunsari and Morang were primarily inhabited by indigenous communities such as Rajbanshi, Satar, Tajpuria, Dhimal and Tharus and the southern parts by Madhesi caste groups. Not all of these groups have been in the area for the same length of time and some actors, particularly groups such as the Brahmin Samaj or Chettri Samaj Nepal, challenge the claims of indigenousness of some of these groups, particularly as their indigenousness is often cited as a source of legitimacy for their claims over a given territory. Some of the hilly areas and foothills in Morang and Sunsari are also home to people of hill origin, generally referred to as “Pahadis”, including both Hindu caste groups and hill Janajatis like Limbu, Rai, Tamang, and Gurung. The social landscape of these districts changed drastically with a huge influx of hill migrants since the 1950s who settled mainly along the East‐West highway and in urban centers such as , Birtamod and Damak as malaria was eradicated, jungles got cleared and industries began to develop. The region turned into a demographically very diverse9 area, which, in the context of the current discourse on federalism, has resulted in overlapping claims by various groups demanding their separate states within these three districts. Federalist movements in the area There are four broad federalist movements in this ethnically sensitive region. A significant amount of political action in the area has revolved around the demands for a Limbuwan state comprising the nine districts east of the Arun River. The second calls for a Khambuwan or a Kirat state (see Box 1). A third and more recent contention speaking for an eastern Tharuhat/Kochila10 state claiming six districts of the Tarai region — Jhapa, Morang, Sunsari, Saptari, Siraha and Udaypur. The fourth movement demands a larger Madhesh state in line with the Madhesh based parties’ agenda, i.e. that the whole Tarai should be one, unified Madesh province. In addition, there is an increasing number of groups mobilizing around and advocating against ethnicity based federalism,

9 Voices from the East, Deepak Chaudhary. http://www.ekantipur.com/the‐kathmandu‐ post/2012/03/08/oped/voices‐from‐the‐east/232422.html 10 Tharus in this area are often referred to as ‘Kochila Tharus’ –they are distinct, linguistically and culturally, from Tharus in other areas of Nepal Page 4 of 8

Federalism discourse in three districts in the Eastern Tarai mostly, it appears, out of fear for social disharmony.11 Although this movement has no stated links to any ethnicity or caste, groups such as the National Integrity and Ethnic Goodwill Front12 in particular have been prominent in this connection. As a movement, these groups are still taking shape but could potentially gather prominent support in the next few months leading to increased activism for ethnicity based federalism in reaction.

Limbuwan Demand for a Limbuwan state has been led by the Federal Democratic National Forum affiliated Federal Limbuwan State Council (led at present by Kumar Lingden) and the Federal Limbuwan State Council (led by Sanjuhang Palungwa), which has recently amalgamated with three other smaller Limbu groups. There are, however, a number of Limbu groups advocating for roughly the same thing and the landscape can at times be complex. In recent months the FDNF affiliated FLSC has been extremely active in its political activities, both independently and as part of the Samyukta Limbuwan Morcha, a front including nine Limbuwan groups. In the follow up to the May 27 deadline, the Samyukta Limbuwan Morcha issued its own constitution on May 26 as a symbolic political document. Most of the Limbuwan groups demand for a Limbuwan state to include nine districts east of the Arun River, in addition to Jhapa, Sunsari and Morang. Though their demand resonates well in the eastern hill districts, their influence is limited to the northern parts and some settlements along the EW highway in the Tarai districts of Jhapa, Sunsari and Morang. Khambuwan While the Khambu people often refer to themselves by that name, they are usually called ‘Rai’ by other communities, although there are also groups who consider themselves Khambu but are not called Rais by outsiders. Demand for a Khambuwan state has been led primarily by the Khambhuwan Rastriya Dal (formerly the Khambhuwan Rastriya Morcha) under the leadership of RK Khambhu. There have also been underground armed groups, such as the Kirant Janawadi Workers’ Party (KJWP) and the Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha(SJMM), which have been advocating for a Khambhu province. However, the violence and semi‐criminal activities which they have often been associated with have distracted attention from their political goals and not contributed to the overall legitimacy of the broader movement. Both groups have suffered several splits in the past. KJWP was established in 2007 as an armed underground outfit but after a split some of its leaders have engaged in a dialogue with the government and have denounced violence. In recent months the strength of KJWP has significantly decreased; following their attack on a police post in Nunthala, Khotang in September 2011, the Nepal Police has arrested several of its cadres and leaders. KJWP demands for a greater Kirant state to include all hill districts of the Eastern Region and Ramechhap of the Central Region as well as Jhapa, Morang, Saptari and Udaypur. The KRM demands a state encompassing Udaypur, Khotang, Bhojpur, Dhankuta, Solukhumbu, Sankhuwasabha, Okhaldhunga, Ramechhap, Sindhuli, Dolakha, Saptari, Sunsari, Siraha and parts of Sarlahi, Mahottari, Dhanusa and Morang (“Khambuwanko rajnaitik prastav”, KRM, 2010). They have not been overly active in the Tarai districts of the Eastern Region except for some northern areas of Sunsari and Udaypur. As the Khambhuwan Rastriya Dal is a comparatively new and developing party, many observers opine that they have carried out some of their activities with the assistance of the Kirant Rai Yayokha a non‐political socio‐cultural organization of the Khambu community, and are also associated with NEFIN. Tharuhat /Kochila The demand for a separate Kochila/ Tharuhat state is supported by the Tarai indigenous groups like Tharu, Rajbanshi, Satar, Tajpuria and Dhimal. The Unified (Maoist) (UCPNM) promised a Kochila state comprising Jhapa, Sunsari and Morang in their election manifesto but during the deliberations in the CA, they did not raise this demand strongly. At the initiative of an UCPNM CA member a Joint Struggle Committee was formed in February 2012. Due to their small demographic share in the Tarai districts, they have limited influence except in some areas of these three districts. Madhesh The major actors in the movement are constituents of the United Madhesi Democratic Front, the MJF (Nepal) and several other fringe parties which split from their parent parties. Their major demand is the creation of a single province in the Tarai from Jhapa to Kanchanpur district. However, during the negotiations around the May 27 deadline they appeared to be accepting a two provinces model in the Tarai. Their demand is autonomy with rights to self determination and recognition of Hindi as a second official language at the centre.

11 Territorial tensions. Tika Pd. Dahal. http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?id=28011&sec=3 12 This group comprises Nepal Brahmin Samaj, Chettri Samaj Nepal and other Hindu groups Page 5 of 8

Federalism discourse in three districts in the Eastern Tarai According to a Morang‐based MJF Nepal leader, none of the groups mentioned in the box above were in existence during the peak of the Madhesh uprising in 200713. The same MJF leader claimed that the groups have been “instigated” by Pahadis to dilute the demand for one Madhesh. However, a leader associated with FDNF‐FLSC argued that historically the area has been known as Limbuwan, thus making their claims legitimate. In his view, a possible Limbuwan province, as detailed in the above mentioned constitution of the Samyukta Limbuwan Morcha, is not envisaged as an oppressive, monolithic state and diverse social groups like Tharus, Rajbanshis, Muslims and Madhesis living in the province would be guaranteed autonomous regions within Limbuwan, while the rights of other groups, such as so‐called Upper Castes, would be guaranteed. A different view was put forward by an activist associated with the newly formed Eastern Tharuwan Kochila State Joint Council (ETKSJC) refuting the claims of the Limbuwan groups by underscoring that tribal communities such as Satar, Tajpuriya, Dhimal, Rajbanshis, Tharus and Gangais are indigenous to this part of Nepal ‐ although there are groups which challenge this ‐ and all other groups, including Limbus, are originally migrants. He further claimed that most of the people from the indigenous Tarai groups are now landless as their lands were fraudulently captured by those who migrated from the hills. In his view, the formation of a separate state, based on identity of these groups, is a way to correct past mistakes. If integrated in the larger Madhes province, the Tarai indigenous groups would again become a demographic minority and would not be able to assert themselves socially and politically, he opined. There is also a potential rift between Khambuwan and Limbuwan supporters over the same districts. Both groups want all three districts of Jhapa, Sunsari and Morang to be included in their province. This has not yet manifested itself violently as other potential conflicts have done and, as the political process is in abeyance at the time of writing, tensions on the issue have receded. Once there is again the possibility of state restructuring actually being implemented, these tensions can be expected to appear again. A social organization representing the Rai Community, the Kirant Rai Yayokha, expressed its anger at Limbu groups and termed their aggressive claims on all of the 9 districts east of the Arun River as an effort to disturb unity among various hill Janajati groups. Its representative was also of the view that Limbuwan groups are making claims to strengthen their bargaining position, but that their actual demographic and political strength is limited to only 4‐5 districts (Terhathum, Ilam, Panchthar, Dhankuta and Taplejung) in the hills. Yet another recent demand was made for a separate state comprising Jhapa, Sunsari and Morang in the Eastern Region, with Biratnagar as the capital. This proposed state would be known either as the Morang province, in reference to the larger Morang unit which existed under previous administrative arrangements, or as the Birat province, in reference to the Mahabharat era King Birat, who ruled the area, according to tradition. A local journalist from Biratnagar observed that most of the Pahadi leaders from the mainstream parties and hill caste groups were supporting this movement because they feel cornered by the Limbuwan and Madhesi movements; restructuring the area in this way would both diminish the claims of the Limbu groups as well as make sure that the population of the state would be extremely mixed, allowing no single group to dominate. However, a Morang‐based Nepali Congress leader who is spearheading the protests for such a state, claims that they are supported by all ethnic groups living in the region and that they merely want to re‐establish the former glory of Biratnagar. A Madhesi leader of the UCPNM, on the other hand, believes that the demand for a ‘Morang Province’ is ambiguous and primarily aimed at

13 Although Limbu actors point out that some of the Limbuwan groups date back to 1991 and predate even the Maoist movement and that periodically, there have been political expressions of Limbu identity and demands for a Limbu state of some kind since at least 1867 even if, at that time, the demands did not have the same clarity that they do today. Page 6 of 8

Federalism discourse in three districts in the Eastern Tarai conserving the political strength of so called ‘Upper Caste’ leaders from the region. He claimed that not a single Madhesi or Janajati leader from either his own party or other parties is supporting this demand. A local civil society leader observed this indicates that most federal demands are driven primarily by ethnic affiliations rather than partisan positions. Certainly, in many areas of Nepal, not just the Eastern Region, many political actors have begun to act on the basis of their identity, rather than on party lines, particularly in relation to debates on federalism. It should also be noted that there is a wide range of opinions within the so called ‘Upper Caste’ communities in this area. The Khas Chettri Ekata Samaj (Janajati Adibasi), a Chettri group claiming Janajati status and favouring ethnicity based federalism is particularly strong in Biratnagar, and , while there is a strong Brahmin Samaj in Jhapa, who have very publicly opposed ethnicity based federalism. It is important to recall these distinctions so that the debate on federalism does not become oversimplified and political positions be assumed simply on the basis of identity.

Conclusion The situation in these three Tarai districts in the aftermath of the dissolution of the CA is unusually calm and life has seemingly returned to normal. Politicians at the local level seem uncertain about the course their parties and leaders will take in the future. Among Janajati and Madheshi groups there is a sense of loss and anger, often directed against the Nepali Congress and UML parties, who are being blamed by these groups for opposing ethnicity based federalism, amongst other things. Certainly there has been a profound change in the political landscape of these districts and a local analyst believes that most of the Janajati cadres of parties like the Nepali Congress and UML are increasingly disregarding their parties’ official positions on federalism and are acting on the basis of their identity rather than party lines. These three districts have a mixed demography of various groups with overlapping claims which have, of late, placed some of those groups in competition and confrontation with each other. According to one analyst, given the strong polarization along ethnic lines any small incident or a political protest may induce violent conflict in those districts. In the absence of a formal state institution, i.e. the CA, there is clearly a need for the local administration and civil society actors to facilitate some form of dialogue between groups who see themselves as being in competition with each other, in the interests of preventing future conflict between them. Many observers felt that the local administration could have played a much more active role in the period immediately before May 28th than it did. Rather than simply limiting its role to ensuring that there were no clashes between various groups, one prominent Madeshi observer felt that the Administration could have been making an attempt to facilitate some kind of genuine dialogue on federalism between them, both as a way of avoiding future conflict and contributing to future political progress on the national level. Perhaps the Local Peace Committees could play this role more actively going forward. In light of the proposal to hold elections in November 2012, many observers have expressed concern that this could be another potential trigger for conflict or further ethnic polarization, particularly in areas like those described here, where there are so many competing groups. However, election campaigns or results are only one possible trigger for these groups to come into confrontation and are distinct from other issues related to drafting the new constitution and federalism. In the districts under discussion, for example, the results of the 2011 Census could also prove controversial because they might indicate a shift in population distribution in favour of

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Federalism discourse in three districts in the Eastern Tarai one group or another, as could the possible re‐delineation of electoral constituencies, which could be seen as favouring one or other group. The fact that the population is so mixed, with so many competing interests and so many actors trying to influence the federal design issue, suggests that the area could be prone to inter‐ethnic and inter‐caste tensions as the debate on federalism progresses. It remains important that the actors in the area make genuine efforts at dialogue, going beyond preventing clashes around demonstrations, and actually searching for solutions to these overlapping claims. The potential for significant political protests and the possibility of violence (not only between various groups and the State but also between the groups themselves), while distant at present, deserves urgent attention.

Disclaimer: This field bulletin is prepared following a brief field study and also uses secondary data. The information presented in this field bulletin does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Although the RCHCO aims to confirm all information independently, occasional factual inaccuracies can occur.

United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator’s Office (UN RCHCO) GPO Box: 107, UN House, Pulchowk, Email: [email protected] Phone: +977 1 5523200, Fax: +977 1 5523991 Visit the UN Nepal Information Platform at http://www.un.org.np

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