Copyright Notice Users are reminded that copyright subsists for this extract and the work from which this document was taken. You are reminded that this digital copy supplied to you is for use of the GC MOOC Memory Sites and Human Rights only. You may retain a copy after the end of the online course, but strictly for your own personal use. No further copying, storage or distribution (including by email) is permitted. Israel-Palestina Informatie een on-line gids over het Midden-Oosten Conflict Deir Yassin: Levitza’s Account Posted on 15 juli 2012 by IPI Deir Yassin Levitza’s Account from ‘Nine Measures’ by Yitzhak Levi (“Levitza”) published by the ‘Maarachot’ the Israel Defense Army Press Tel Aviv 1986 Presented by the PEACE Middle East Dialog Group Translated by Ami Isseroff Translator’s Introduction Yitzhak Levi was chief of intelligence in Jerusalem for the Haganah at the time of the Deir Yassin massacre. The Jerusalem Intelligence Service (Shai) was credited with some uncanny intelligence feats – not always well used by the Haganah command. Two of the branch chiefs were Chaim Herzog and Yitzhak Navon, both later presidents of Israel. There is no doubt that what Levitza said about the things in which he was in a position to know are accurate. It is probable that his book ‘Nine Measures’ is the definitive Israeli history of the battle for Jerusalem. In previous pages Levitza explains that the revisionist Irgun and Lehi insisted on remaining separate from the Haganah on the excuse that Ben Gurion would give in to the U.N. Internationalization plan. He discusses some of the activities (and basic inactivity) of these two groups, the steps taken to neutralize their provocations of the British, and notes that they were not very well trained or equipped – not even by the poor standards of the Haganah. The Haganah district commander at the time of the attack on Deir Yassin was David Shaltiel, a somewhat controversial figure. Another key figure is Meir Pail, head of a Palmach/Haganah special operations unit, who joined the attacking forces under cover and reported the massacre. In the text below, translator’s comments are in curly brackets, in italics. I have referred also to the ‘ZOA Study’ by Morton Klein, posted at www.zoa.org and to Uri Milstein in these notes. ‘Uri Milstein’ is Uri Milstein, The War of Independence, Out of Crisis Came Decision, Zamora, 1991 Vol. IV in Hebrew. The relevant material in translation is posted elsewhere References to Meir Pail are based on his eyewitness account, as well as an interview with Dan McGowan in McGowan and Ellis eds, Remembering Deir Yassin , Olive Branch Press, Interlink Publishing Group 1998 page 35 ff. Numeric references refer to the original references of Yitzhak Levi, given as end notes. See also Map and Plan of Battle. Translation begins below. Page 340 Background to Deir Yassin At the beginning of April, the Haganah carried out Operation Nachshon, with the participation of about 1,500 troops. The Lehi and Etzel (Irgun) commanders in Jerusalem, Mordehai Raanan and Joshua Zettler, whose units had not been active for several weeks, met and decided to attack Deir Yassin.41 Operation Nachshon had created a precedent because Haganah units had begun conquering territories and taking them over. The Etzel and Lehi were unable to carry out a large scale operation. The commanders in Jerusalem were afraid that the two organizations would become isolated and inactive in the light of the Haganah activities, so they decided to join forces in a relatively large operation that would keep them in the picture. Zettler proposed to attack and conquer the village of Shuaffat and Sheikh Jerach. Yehoshua Goldshmidt (Gal) the Etzel operations officer who lived in Givat Shaul next to Deir Yassin, proposed to attack Deir Yassin.42 Ophir* gives these reasons for the proposal, ” Gal’s father, Reb Joseph Tzvi Goldshmidt, a Jewish ritual slaughterer (shochet) in Givat Shaul, was famous in his youth as a brave warrior against the Arab rioters from adjacent Deir Yassin… Goldshmidt learned from his father to be a soldier and also got his inspiration to fight the Arab village from him. This village had frequently endangered the lives of the inhabitants of the neighborhood in which he grew up. When he returned to Jerusalem in 1948, the old shochet reminded his son to “remember what Deir Yassin did to us. “43 Deir Yassin was situated on a hill overlooking the Motza-Qastel area and the Roman road from lower Motza to Jerusalem. Its location gave it a certain importance in ensuring security to the north and west or as a base for attacks in Givat Shaul and Beit Hakerem, as well as a link connecting the Arab villages in the south of the city with those to the north and west. However, the people of Deir Yassin were interested in keeping out of the battles, and reached an agreement with their neighbors in Givat Shaul to maintain neighborly relations and to prevent infiltration of the members of the gangs {Palestinian irregulars} into Deir Yassin. The agreement was passed to district headquarters by the Hagana intelligence Service on Jan 20th {1948} for approval. Communications arrangements were made whereby the people of Deir Yassin would inform the Hagana about movements of outsiders in the area, and likewise arrangements were made to allow vehicles from the village to pass through Givat Shaul.44 The situation of Deir Yassin following the agreement was similar to that of Abu Ghosh, which was not taken by our forces during the War of Independence. The inhabitants of Deir Yassin fulfilled the agreement scrupulously. On the night of January 11th an Arab gang tried to set up a base in the village mill. The people of Deir Yassin opposed this entry with force. In the exchange of fire the son of the miller was killed. The inhabitants called the police and in the end the attempt of the gang to hold the place was frustrated.45 On the 27th of the January a force {belonging to} Abdel-Khader {Abdel Khader El-Husseini Suleiman} tried to enter the village. Again the village people resisted the encampment of the force in their twon, and the gang left in the direction of Beth Jallah.46 On March 30th there was a report that 150 troops, mostly Iraqi and Syrian, had entered Deir Yassin, and that the villagers were leaving. The Arab command pressured the villagers to agree to the presence of the troops, but gave up in the face of the determined resistance of the inhabitants. {A.I. – This must be compared with the text of the ZOA report, and Uri Milstein, which mentions only the fact that the troops entered – not that they left} On the 7th of April, two days before Deir Yassin was attacked by Etzel and Lehi, the Haganah Intelligence Service announced that three days previously there had been a meeting Page 341 in Ein Kerem {Arab village} between the elders of both villages, in which Kemal Erikat, Abdel-Khader’s deputy, participated. He proposed to bring foreign troops into the villages to strengthen them. The elders of Deir Yassin rejected the proposal and said that peaceful relations were in effect with their Jewish neighbors, and they did not want to break the peace .47 The revisionist organization were well acquainted with the existence of the agreement. In the Lehi Journal ‘Ma’as’ that appeared three weeks before the attack on the village, we find “The elders of the Arab village of Deir Yassin approached the leaders of Givat Shaul and asked to conclude a non-aggression pact. The agreement has been kept to date.”48 Contrarily, the Lehi people claimed afterwards that the village was an active nest of terrorists, that Deir Yassin served as a base for attacks on Jewish neighborhoods in the city, and that among the dead there were also Syrians and Iraqis who were encamped in the village.49 All of these claims had no factual basis whatever. The Decision to Conquer Deir Yassin District headquarters saw no reason to take over the village, as long as our forces were in Motza. On the 6th of April the Revisionist organizations decided to conquer Deir Yassin. In that period a particularly difficult situation developed in the Qastel and Lower Motza, as the Arabs had increased their pressure. The Palmach was busy with operation Nachshon and the district command had no reinforcements it could send to the Qastel. Yeshurun Schiff, Commander of the Michmash regiment, turned to the operations officer of the Irgun on his own initiative, and asked him to give him the use of the Irgun troops as reinforcements for the Qastel. The Irgun posed three conditions: receipt of permission of the Irgun commander in Tel-Aviv, command over the entire sector, and weapons from the Haganah. Schiff also turned to the Lehi and got a similar answer. Additionally, both organizations required that the district commander submit a formal request for help to them. When Shaltiel found out about Schiff’s contacts with the Irgun and Lehi, he reprimanded him and told him to stop all negotiations with them. According to Ophir’s account, the commanders of the two organizations then met, on the 6th of April and decided to attack Deir Yassin. The date of the decision invalidates the claim made afterwards that the conquest of Deir Yassin was coordinated to coincide with the reconquest of the Qastel that was carried out on the night of 8/9 April.50 {this is exactly the claim made in the ZOA study-A.I.} News of the revisionist decision to conquer Deir Yassin caught Shaltiel by surprise and he tried to change their target and get them to help him in the battle for the Qastel.