F Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures

eature

The Chuetsu Earthquake —Railway Response and Reconstruction Masahiko Ogura

on 23 October 2004. Some basic figures Echigo Yuzawa and Niigata were The Earthquakes are given in Figure 1. damaged, as well as sections of narrow- Figure 2 shows the JR East track that gauge track on the Shin’etsu, Echigo and A series of several major earthquakes suffered damage and the time it took other lines. rocked the Chuetsu region of Niigata before services were resumed. Fairly long along the Sea-of- coast from 17:56 sections of the track between

Figure 1 Chuetsu Earthquake Seismic Activity Figure 2 Emergency Stops after Chuetsu Earthquake

Yahiko Niigata Date and time of main earthquake: 23 October 2004 at 17:56 Yoshida Epicentre: ne Naoetsu Kakizaki Chuetsu district of Kashiwazaki Echigo Li Tsubame Sanjo (37°3’N, 136°9’E)

Richter Magnitude: Shin iko Niitsu

6.8 (Maximum seismic intensity (SI) ’etsu Line Line

of 7, registered in Kawaguchi-machi) Yah Miyauchi Number of aftershocks: Higashi Sanjo Four around SI6 Iiyam Nagaoka Eighteen around SI5 Toka-machi a L 877 large enough to be felt NiigataNiigata ine Epicentre (23 October 17:56) (until 28 December) Echigo Kawaguchi Max. SI7 (Kawaguchi-machi) Peak ground acceleration Niitsu Urasa Non-JR East seismometer: Koide 2515 gal (in Kawaguchi-machi) Tsubamesubame SanjoSanjo JR East seismometer: Tadami 846 gal (at Shin Kawaguchi KashiwazakiKashiwazaki NagaokaNagaoka transformer substation, EchigoEchigo KawaguchiKawaguchi Joetsu Line ) KoideKoide Echigo Yuzawa Muika-machi NaoetsuNaoetsu Urasa Toka-machioka-machi Muika-machiMuika-machi Main epicentre Shinkansen EchigoEchigo Aftershocks Joetsu JR East narrow-gauge lines Yuzawauzawa epicentres Shinkansen (≥M6) to Tokyo

Figure 3 Response Timeline

Emergency Response Meetings Press Conferences Other Events 17:56 Began gathering information on possible 18:00 Response Headquarters established injuries and damage (Director sent from within JR East Head Office Headquarters) 18:19 First report indicates 325 derailed between 19:40 First Emergency Response Meeting Urasa and Nagaoka • Ascertained Toki 325 derailment 20:25 Press conference • Ascertained injuries to passengers • Ascertained how many people on board • Overall situation Toki • Ascertained positions of halted trains • 325 derailed 21:50 M. Otsuka, JR East President,

23 October • No deaths or injuries prepares to return to Japan from 22:00 Emergency Response Meeting London, UK, where on investor • Planned passenger relief relations business. • Ascertained condition of damaged equipment 22:45 Press conference • Ascertained derailment situation • Eight carriages derailed • Decided to send Executive Director to derailment site • Situation of trains halted between stations • Relief effort plans, etc. 00:27 Press conference 03:30 Emergency Response Meeting • Relief efforts • Report on derailment 05:00 Derailment Investigation Committee • Passenger relief efforts start on-site investigation 08:00 Emergency Response Meeting • Report on derailment 09:03 Press conference • Report on equipment damage 10:30 M. Otsuka, JR East President, • Derailment situation • Planning 24 October passenger services arrives at Headquarters (visits • Equipment damage • Methods to get derailed cars back on track (proposals) site on 25 October) • Relief efforts 11:30 Emergency Response Meeting • Plans for 24 October passenger services

24 October • Methods to get derailed cars back on track • Report on equipment damage 13:00 Field Response Headquarters (proposal) • Plans for getting derailed cars back on track established, with Executive • Situation of staff sent to site for recovery efforts Director M. Ogura in charge 16:00 Emergency Response Meeting • Report on equipment damage 17:05 Press conference • Current passenger operations situation • Damaged equipment • User situation • Current passenger operations situation • User situation

46 Japan Railway & Transport Review 43/44 • March 2006 Response on Day 1 Figure 4 Passenger Movement and Evacuation after First Earthquake

Figure 3 is a timeline of events on 23 and 23:23 Passengers begin disembarking Traffic situation under guidance from staff 7 trains 24 October. I was in Tokyo at the time members. Four buses take 22:20 Passengers begin (not including deadheads) passengers to Echigo Yuzawa disembarking under make emergency stop and as soon as we heard that a Station. guidance from staff 02:00 All passengers disembarked. members. Two • 4 trains halted between 02:40 All passengers arrived at Echigo By bus mini-buses and one stations; passengers shinkansen had derailed, JR East Yuzawa Station where spend taxi take them to disembark there night in train. evacuation shelter. • 1 train halted at platform; executive officers including myself 01:30 All passengers arrive passengers disembark from Matsukawa at evacuation shelter. rushed to headquarters, with nearly 21:47 Trains inclined lead car resume shaft • 2 trains resume operations operations after inspections everyone arriving by 19:00. Echigo Yuzawa As the left column shows, our first (151.4 km) Jomo Kogen Max Toki Deadhead train Urasa Emergency Response Meeting began at (119.1 km) 327 On foot (181.0 km) (145.9 km) 19:40 attended by all executive officers 410 passengers who had arrived at headquarters by then.

By this time, we had confirmed that a train 100.5 km—Ground 149 km—Ground observations had derailed, but fortunately with no observations (120 gal) and structural inspections (>200 gal) injuries, so the meeting did not have the Max Toki Deadhead Max Toki tension it would otherwise have had. 330 train 332 (103.2 km) 21:50 Passengers begin (177.7 km) 440 passengers disembarking under 316 passengers The centre column shows our press guidance from staff members and walk conferences after the meeting at 20:25, to . 22:28 All passengers By bus By By bus 22:45, and at 00:27 in the small hours of disembarked. and taxi Higashi train Imamachi and taxi Evacuation 00:20 All passengers arrived Sanjo Niigata inclined shelter the next day. At the time, we had no clear at Nagaoka Station Mitsuke walkway and three buses take inclined idea of circumstances in the disaster area. 70 or 80 to evacuation walkway shelter. An Executive Director who joined the Niigata Nagaoka Tsubame Sanjo (269.5 km) company at the same time as myself and Toki 325 (213.8 km) Toki 361 (237.4 km) Toki 405

(208 km) (225.8 km) On foot (247.1 km) now in charge of operations and 151 passengers 238 passengers 220 passengers (derailed train) marketing made it clear that we had to be On foot frank and open about everything that we Ground observations and structural knew and didn’t know. This was the right inspections (>200 gal) approach, and set the stage for the excellent rapport we maintained with the Toki 406 media over the next 60 days. 22:25 Passengers begin disembarking 19:11 Train resumes The column on the right highlights the By bus under guidance from staff operations members and walk or take taxis activities of our company President, Evacuation shelter to Mitsuke Station. Emergency stop 23:30 All passengers disembarked and Mr Mutsutake Otsuka. He was in London three buses and 20 taxis take 18:20 Passengers disembark them to Higashi Sanjo Station. Train permitted to on JR business when the quakes struck, onto platform from 00:15 All passengers arrived at resume operations lead car and three buses Higashi Sanjo Station. and luckily phoned his wife in Japan that take them to evacuation 00:20 About 200 passengers depart Deadhead train shelter. on local train for . evening not knowing about the accident. As soon as his wife told him a JR East shinkansen had derailed, he began preparing to return to Japan immediately, He put me in charge of the Field Response later, reconstruction has gone almost and arrived at headquarters in Japan at Headquarters and I flew by helicopter next entirely according to plan. 10:30 on 24 October, proving just how morning to the derailment site. We arrived Figure 4 shows the shinkansen stations small the world has become! He proved there at about noon and made a number from Jomo Kogen to the Niigata terminus our faith in him as a President who is of arrangements. I was trackside by 13:00 and the position of trains stopped on the always ready to go where he is needed serving as Chief of Field Response line after the earthquakes. and point us in the right direction. His Headquarters. I must confess now that I The Toki 325 shinkansen carrying 151 quick return has become something of a had no idea how our recovery efforts passengers derailed close to Nagaoka legend at JR East. would go, but thankfully, as I will explain Station and five other trains carrying

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passengers had stopped without derailing from 151 to 410 passengers and every between stations. Two other trains had Passenger Safety First passenger had to be guided to safety by also stopped temporarily but could the train crews and our employees who proceed almost immediately thereafter. The first shock halted trains carrying rushed from stations and depots. The evacuation routes were varied, with some passengers climbing a shaft from Figure 5 Situation after Derailment a tunnel and others descending from a Tokyo-bound (up) track viaduct. Our employees had undergone rigorous disaster-response training and Train travelling to Niigata To Niigata To Tokyo I was confident of their professionalism. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 One might have expected passengers to Niigata-bound (down) track panic, but our crews remained calm Tokyo-bound (up) track during the evacuation and kept the 22 of 40 axles derailed. Car No. 1 slipped into water passengers calm too. No one was drainage channel and came to rest at 30° angle Car No. 1 (tail car) injured before or during the evacuation,

Niigata-bound not even on the derailed train, giving (down) track everyone at Field Response Headquarters a strong sense of pride and encouraging us in our work. Figure 5 shows photographs and a diagram of the derailed train to Niigata Car No.1 (tail car) Car No.10 (lead car) (left to right in the picture). The first carriage is at the extreme left and 22 of

Figure 6 Positioning Cars Back on Track—Plans and Implementation

22/10 23/10 24/10 25/10 26/10 27/10 28/10 29/10 30/10 31/10 1/11 2/11 3/11 4/11 5/11 6/11 7/11 8/11 9/11 10/11 11/11 12/11 13/11 14/11 15/11 16/11 17/11 18/11 19/11

Initial plan Revised plan

Use jacks and cranes to position cars on tracks Cars to be positioned on track by crane

M7 Cars to be jacked: Cars to be lifted at 17:56

earthquake No. 10 No. 3 No. 9 No. 1 No. 2 and 4 No. 5 No. 10 No. 9 No. 8 No. 8 No. 1 No. 2No. 3No. 4 No. 5 Revised plan *New plan calls for Site to be Site open positioning of all derailed open to Cars to be moved from site to depot to media cars on track by crane. media M6 Aftershock causes JR to abandon initial 12/27 jacking plan. 10:40

Work as carried out [Media invited to recovery site] • Jacking of cars 10, 9, 8 and 5 Cars positioned on track by crane • Cars 4, 3, 2 and 1 to be lifted Press Press Press No. 2 No. 10 release release by crane beginning on 28 October release No. 1 No. 4No. 5 No. 8 • Media given illustrated documentation and 3 and 9 on proposed work [Derailment situation] • 22 of 40 axles derailed Site open Cars moved from site to depot • Car No. 1 tilt: about 30° [Media invited to recovery site] to media • Car No. 2 tilt: about 5° • Cars to be lifted onto rails between 10 and 16 • Car No. 4 tilt: about 5° November • Cars to be moved from site between night of 11 Proposed repositioning methods November and before dawn of 19 November • Jacking and cranes 27 October M6 aftershock 10 November cranes lifting car on track Positioning and car removal completed 1 day earlier than plan

48 Japan Railway & Transport Review 43/44 • March 2006 the 40 axles had derailed either left or right would have been close to jacks supporting car to prevent it shifting. Each derailed of the track. the carriage and some would probably car was positioned back on track in order, As I explain in greater detail later, cars 5, have been injured. one after the other. The whole operation 8, 9 and 10 were slightly affected, cars 6 Scenes of the violent aftershock and was quite a sight! and 7 were unaffected, and cars 1 through scrambling workers were shown on TV The bottom right photo shows how we 4 were badly derailed with car 1 shifting throughout Japan, which was a blessing positioned the cranes close to the viaduct, a long way towards the Tokyo-bound track for us because until then the media had which was difficult in itself. First, we and coming to rest at an alarming angle. been very critical, making comments like needed permission to access the land ‘The nearby expressway is back in (luckily the rice had just been harvested). Aftershocks Caused operation, but 5 days have passed since Next, we had to lay down metal sheets Cold Sweats the earthquake and JR East still hasn’t and drive piles to create a firm base for moved its derailed cars.’ After TV shots the cranes. This took some time. Soon after I arrived at the site I realized of the shinkansen cars rocking to and fro The local people must have wondered that our first task would be to get the cars were broadcast, the media quieted and what we were up to. Some thought we back on the tracks. Figure 6 is a timeline their stance changed to respect for the were going to lower the whole shinkansen of our efforts to achieve this. On day 4, difficult job we faced. train set to the ground. What we did was we began raising some cars. Our initial We learned that the job was more dangerous simpler—we used the cranes to hoist each plan was to use jacks for slightly derailed than we had assumed, which led to a car from the Niigata-bound track to the cars and cranes for cars further off the change in our strategy. Keeping safety in Tokyo-bound track. This work was track. What happened next was widely mind, we decided to lift all the derailed cars finished by November 17. reported with headlines like ‘JR Workers with cranes and started on 10 November. Figure 8 shows the track in the general Run for Their Lives.’ Just as we were about Figure 7 shows the main tasks. The area area of the derailment. I will explain the to start jacking, a violent aftershock of around the derailment site is all rice general mechanism of the derailment almost magnitude 6 rocked the area. paddy, and we had to bring three 360- to without getting too technical. Figure 8 During the jacking preparations, I was on 450-tonne cranes across the paddy from has five parts, the top left shows the track the viaduct giving instructions. There had a company in Niigata. Basically, the job closest to Tokyo, the bottom right closest already been a small aftershock, so I involved using two cranes to hoist one car, to Niigata. The figure 206 km 191 m decided to suspend the jacking operation. and the third crane to steady the adjacent (meaning distance from Omiya base) near The site was open to the media and many media people had been on the viaduct, Figure 7 Lifting Cars on Track but nearly everyone had gone down to ground level after I suspended work. The three cranes were moved sequentially to position one car after another back on the track. About the only people left on the viaduct To Tokyo To Niigata were near the front cars and they were 1 2345678 910 85 29 29 11 11 11 10 33 reporters from two media organizations. 10 10 10 83 90 90 They were milling around, some with their 143 143 143 138 80 80 cameras at the ready, so we shouted to them that the situation was dangerous and 1 234 5 6 78910 that they should get down because the work was suspended. They were slow and were still near the train as the major aftershock struck, explaining why they could take the pictures used as a media scoop. I guess it goes to show that being a slowpoke pays off sometimes. Three cranes (min. 360 tonnes) The danger was obvious and it sent a chill Sand was spread on Piles were driven into the ground where soil for levelling and cranes would be positioned. down our backs. Without the small then covered with metal sheets. warning aftershock, if the violent shock had struck 30 minutes later, many workers

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the middle of the second section from the Many Contradicted assumed that if we simply replaced the top was where we found marks indicating Assumptions rails and repaired the area where the that wheels had mounted the right rail. metal fasteners hold the rails to the slab, The rails were badly deformed from the Next, I went to inspect the track where we could have the shinkansen fully area shown on the left of the fourth the derailment began. My first operational in about 2 weeks. As far as section. Because the construction is a slab impression was that although the rails the track condition was concerned this track, it was obvious that the rail fasteners were badly twisted and had been may have been on target, but other here had been ridden over by the wheels. severely thrown out of alignment in problems—including a need to change The rail was broken in three places as places, the concrete slab track itself was our system for hoisting the cars—slowed shown in the bottom of the figure. in good condition. The train had run on progress considerably. In addition, The train ran about 1.6 km from where the slab, causing some damage, but the although I was on site, we discovered the wheels first mounted the rail to where slab remained almost unbroken. Basing only later that the tunnels between it finally came to a stop. my judgment on past experience, I the derailment and Urasa Station were

Figure 8 Damage to Railway Infrastructure near Shinkansen Derailment Site

205 km 960 m to 206 km 206 m 206 km 014 m to 206 km 057 m Near 206 km 070 m Distance between rails Maximum sinkage of 7 cm below normal Distance between rails begins widening rail level at Jodo Bridge widened about 11 mm To Tokyo 205 km 900 m 206 km 100 m Near 206 km 217 m Near 206 km 160 m Scoring on head of left rail Maximum sinkage of 3 cm 206 km 211 m below normal rail level at 3‰ Vicinity of 206 km 227 m Toka-machi Viaduct T3 6‰ Fasteners of left rail begin showing damage 206 km 300 m

Near 206 km 207 m Near 206 km 191 m Marks on right side of right rail, presumably from right wheel Scoring on head of right rail Near 206 km 206 m Fasteners of right rail begin showing damage

206 km 300 m 206 km 500 m

206 km 500 m 206 km 700 m

Near 206 km 696 m Welded joints on left and right rails separate

To Niigata 206 km 700 m 206 km 900 m

Near 206 km 828 m to near 207 k 580 m 206 km 717 m 206 km 741 m Markings on top surface of up slab, Right rail broken Right rail broken presumably caused by Car No.10

50 Japan Railway & Transport Review 43/44 • March 2006 badly damaged. This was certainly a Sanjo stations, with Niigata Station off to There are five tunnels between Urasa and rude awakening! the right. The most damaged section was the derailment site. Proceeding from the Figure 9 shows the track between Echigo between Urasa and Nagaoka stations, station we have the Urasa and Horinouchi Yuzawa, Urasa, Nagaoka and Tsubame near the epicentre. tunnels, about 800 m of aboveground

Figure 9 Major Damage to Aboveground Structures—Joetsu Shinkansen

To Tokyo Urasa Tunnel Horinouchi Tunnel No. 3 Wanazu Viaduct Tunnel No. 1 Wanazu Viaduct Uonogawa Bridge Echigo Yuzawa Urasa • Fallen concrete • Fallen concrete • Slab track deformed • 4 columns damaged • 2 columns damaged • Fallen pieces from arch • 8 columns damaged and side walls • Side wall of central passageway damaged

Between Echigo Yuzawa Urasa Station Between Urasa and Nagaoka stations and Urasa stations • 11 catenary • 70 catenary poles tilted • 44 catenary poles tilted poles tilted • 2 snow-melting stations damaged • 2 snow-melting stations damaged

Myoken Tunnel Takiya Tunnel Toki 325 No. 1 To Niigata Muramatsu Katada Viaduct Fukuro-machi Sorida Hayami Kaibami Viaduct Viaduct Viaduct Viaduct Viaduct Nagaoka Tsubame Sanjo • Slab track • Fallen concrete deformed • 28 columns damaged • 1 column damaged • 1 column damaged • Fallen concrete 1 column damaged • 1 column damaged • 1 column damaged • Cracks in central • Subsidence in two places, on Jodogawa • Subsidence at one place on passageway Bridge and Toka-machi Viaduct Kamishima Viaduct Between Nagaoka and Between Tsubame Near 206 km 230 m to 207 km 820 m Tsubame Sanjo stations Sanjo and • Slab and rail fasteners damaged Nagaoka Station • 14 catenary poles tilted Niigata stations • 37 catenary • 5 snow-melting stations • 1 snow-melting Near 206 km 600 m to 207 km 500 m poles tilted damaged station damaged • Rails thrown off track

Damage to track caused by Uonuma Tunnel Myoken Tunnel passage of derailed Toki 325

No. 1 Wanazu Viaduct No. 3 Wanazu Viaduct Uonogawa Bridge

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track, then the Uonuma, Myoken and more than 8-km long, was badly damaged We continued inspecting each area and Takiya tunnels, and then the derailment in three places, with cracks in the tunnel repairing the viaducts, making it possible site. From the last tunnel to the derailed arch and upheaval in the slab. The to resume passenger services in one train and on to Nagaoka Station is all Myoken Tunnel was quite seriously section after another. The Tsubame Sanjo– above ground. damaged in two places. Niigata section was reopened on 30 The worst hit areas were the Uonuma, Some viaduct columns suffered shear- October followed by the Nagaoka– Myoken and Takiya tunnels, with the induced damage, with concrete falling Tsubame Sanjo section on 4 November. former two in especially bad shape. What away to expose the reinforcing bars. The Excluding the track between Echigo the figure does not show is that there are Uonogawa Bridge (Fig. 9, bottom right) Yuzawa and Nagaoka, we were back in snow shelters over the track between the looked awful with exposed reinforcing operation just 12 days after the Uonuma and Myoken tunnels, and bars after concrete broke off about halfway earthquakes. Buses were used to carry between the Myoken and Takiya tunnels, up the columns. passengers between Echigo Yuzawa and so this whole section is really one long We repaired the structures in methodical Nagaoka until the entire line was made tunnel. This made the remedial work order. The solid black lines in Figure 10 fully operational again on 28 December. difficult, because we could only use the show track sections where there were no Figure 11 shows Uonuma Tunnel with entrances at the two extremities to enter passenger services, while the shaded lines damage in three places. The damage in the tunnels with equipment. The No. 1 indicate sections with resumed services. the middle looks serious, but actually only Wanazu Viaduct, No. 3 Wanazu Viaduct, Immediately after the earthquake, we some 5 to 10 m was badly damaged with and Uonogawa Bridge beyond the suspended services on all sections from about 100 m of the concrete substructure Uonuma Tunnel on an aboveground before Echigo Yuzawa Station to Niigata damaged by heaving. Even so, this was section of only about 800 m between the Station. The day after the earthquake, unusually serious for a tunnel bored two tunnels were all quite damaged too. trains were running from Echigo Yuzawa through a mountain and we decided that The Uonuma Tunnel, which is slightly from Tokyo. we would not resume services until we

Figure 10 Operation Restart Timeline—Joetsu Shinkansen

23 October 2004: Earthquake strikes and services suspended on entire Joetsu Shinkansen Shin Yuzawa Shin Nagaoka Shin Toyano transformer Shin Muika-machi Shin-Kawaguchi supplementary Shin Oshikiri Shin Nakanokuchi secondary station feeder station transformer station feeder station feeder station transformer station feeder station 125 gal 270 gal 846 gal 466 gal 203 gal 116 gal 87 gal

Echigo Yuzawa Urasa Nagaoka Tsubame Sanjo Niigata 24 October 2004: Passenger services resume between Tokyo and Echigo Yuzawa stations

Echigo Yuzawa Urasa Nagaoka Tsubame Sanjo Niigata 30 October 2004: Passenger services resume between Tsubame Sanjo and Niigata stations

Echigo Yuzawa Urasa Nagaoka Tsubame Sanjo Niigata 4 November 2004: Passenger services resume between Nagaoka and Tsubame Sanjo stations

Echigo Yuzawa Urasa Nagaoka Tsubame Sanjo Niigata

After-quake operation restriction lowered one level, permitting precautionary services 28 December 2004: Passenger services return to full operation

Echigo Yuzawa Urasa Nagaoka Tsubame Sanjo Niigata

Services suspended After-quake operation restriction lowered one level, permitting precautionary services Services resumed

52 Japan Railway & Transport Review 43/44 • March 2006 had made the tunnel stronger than it was Figure 11 Damage at Uonuma Tunnel before. Figure 11 shows how we inserted rock bolts into the bedrock to reinforce Damage the tunnel structure and prevent lining Damaged Damage (1) Fallen pieces collapse. We also installed fibre- (1) Fallen pieces of arch of arch (about 5 m) reinforced concrete plates from the inside. (2) Separation in side wall (2) Separation (about 10 m) in side wall In some cases we also inserted rock bolts (3) Upheaval of roadbed concrete (about 100 m) Down Up through the tunnel flooring into the (4) Tilted concrete side walls track track of central passageway bedrock, making tunnel stronger than it (about 50 m) (5) Cracks (5) Cracks in some inverts Void had ever been. (about 20 m) * Tests on invert (4) Tilted concrete adherence to rock side walls of central passageway

Announcing Resumption of Recovered Remedial work Rock Back-fill grouting Full Service bolts Fast Fissures reinforcing plugged shotcrete We hesitated over announcing a date for with concrete grouting

Inner resuming services over the entire line and surface reinforce- Roadbed ment concrete waited until 19 November before doing Down track Up track so. Prior to this date, we were extremely Sidewall pinned Sidewall pinned busy determining how badly the tunnels to inverts to inverts were damaged. The illustration in the top right of Figure 11 gives an idea of the complex structure of a tunnel. Concrete inverts are installed Figure 12 Damage at Uonogawa Bridge for the arch, tunnel walls and substructure. Damaged Next, the roadbed concrete is poured, and then 5-m slabs are installed on that. All Damage Repair and reinforcement these components make for quite a Remedial work to Increasing original structure quake-resistance complicated structure. We were most worried about fissures or gaps between the concrete inverts, roadbed concrete and bedrock, but there CConcreteoncrete jacketjacket appliedapplied was no way of knowing without peeling back the concrete facing. There was no Recovered time to peel back the facing throughout SSteelteel jacketjacket the entire tunnel, so we drilled holes appliedapplied every 20 m to obtain samples. This was (1) Longitudinal (1) Concrete reinforcement inserted into long and frustrating work, but it helped bars buckled fissures and loosened (2) Reinforcement us to eventually decide to tell the public (2) Cracks in bars reinserted on 19 November when we hoped to concrete (3) Section (3) Fallen concrete repaired resume services. The top left photograph in Figure 12 shows some of the damage to Uonogawa Bridge. Damage to the mid-level of the line and steel jackets below it. This made work consisted mainly of replacing the piers looks extensive, but from a civil the structure more quake-resistant. The metal fasteners. This job went according engineering viewpoint they were not work was a little more difficult than I to plan. difficult to repair. The rough drawings describe, but you can see the repaired Repairing the slab track in the tunnel was show how we plugged the fissures with structure in the bottom photograph. more complicated. The photographs in shotcrete, applied reinforced concrete In the derailment area, the slabs were Figure 13 do not show the structural jackets around the piers above the water basically in good condition, so remedial components or remedial process clearly,

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are laid one-by-one on top of the base. Figure 13 Repairs at Derailment Area and Tunnel Track We had to lift about 300 of these slabs, Remedial work to derailment track remove them from the tunnel, repair the concrete base and slabs, then bring the slabs back in four or five at a time and realign them. This was hard and long work, but we finished it on schedule. Figure 14 shows the final running tests in late December after most of the construction and remedial work was Remedial work to slabs and Slab T-bolt repairs, rail replacement, finished. We began the speed tests on roadbed rail surface adjustments 24 December, starting at about 30 km/h and increasing in increments. The Track remedial work in Uonuma Tunnel photograph on the right shows an East-i track inspection car that used to be nicknamed Dr Yellow. On day 1, we began return runs at 30 km/h, then increasing sequentially to 70, 110, and 160 km/h. Most of our attention was focussed on the most damaged track section between Urasa and Nagaoka. Although our test runs went • Slab T-bolt repairs Breaking up concrete base • Roadbed repairs as high as 160 km/h, the first resumed • Rail surface adjustments passenger services ran at a reduced speed of 110 km/h over this section. All safety verification tests are generally conducted Figure 14 Running Tests on Joetsu Shinkansen between Urasa and Nagaoka in this fashion, but we were restricted in this case because of the fast-approaching Test runs service resumption date. We managed to Echigo Tsubame Yuzawa Urasa NagaokaSanjo Niigata finish the running tests in 2.5 days, running Day 1 (24 Dec) 30 km/h back and forth on 26 and 27 December. 70 km/h Then, the first day of full services came on

Work time slot 28 December. Day 2 110 km/h (25 Dec) Work time slot Back to Full Passenger 160 km/h Work time slot Services Day 3 (26 Dec) Test running by East-i Work time slot The first passenger-carrying train to pass through Uonuma Tunnel leaves Niigata Decision-making factors permitting higher speed trial runs Station at 05:40 each day. Company Electric supply Speed increase Track Infrastructure system Signalling system President Mr Otsuka was determined to (1) Car vibration Measurement of (1) Catenary (1) ATC Signal ride this train. I am sure he didn’t intend 30 km/h→70 km/h • Vertical and horizontal extent of subsidence height transmission vibrations on No. 1 Wanazu (2) Catenary verification to become a human sacrifice, but he said (2) Track displacement Viaduct, No. 3 tilt (2) Verification of train 70 km/h→110 km/h • Distance between Wanazu Viaduct, (3) Catenary wireless system he wanted to ride in the lead car of the rails, level, Uonuma Tunnel and gradient field strength unevenness, ease of elsewhere first passenger train to use the track his 110 km/h→160 km/h passage, smoothness company had repaired. He boarded in good spirits and I joined him in the lead car. so I will explain. After the concrete base concrete slabs, each measuring about The driver was quite young. Many of our is poured during the original construction, 2.34 x 5 m and weighing about 5 tonnes drivers had been at the controls during

54 Japan Railway & Transport Review 43/44 • March 2006 the more than 2 days of running tests Damage to Narrow-gauge lines shut on 23 October. Services on the through Uonuma Tunnel, although some Tracks affected sections resumed gradually—the had driven only at lower speeds. But our on 26 October, part of the driver had not. I didn’t know this and So far, I have discussed only damage to Joetsu Line on 2 November, the Joetsu Line asked, ‘You must have been on the test our shinkansen, but our narrow-gauge as far as Koide on 13 November, the runs, eh?’ but he replied, ‘No, today’s the lines were also badly affected as you can Tadami Line on 20 November, and the first time.’ President Otsuka then asked see in Figure 16. Damage to the Shin’etsu Line on 29 November. him, ‘Are you nervous?’ He said nothing. shinkansen stole much of the limelight Finally, on 27 December, 1 day before full On this first commercial run through the from our conventional lines, explaining Joetsu Shinkansen services resumed, trains tunnel since the earthquake, I thought he why not much was reported about them. began running again on affected sections might say, ‘No, not nervous at all!’ at least The top right photograph in Figure 16 of the Joetsu and Iiyama lines. Somehow if that was the case. Of course, he could shows a line along the River we found a way to get all our narrow- hardly say ‘Yes, I’m nervous’ to the where the track paralleling the river gauge lines back in operation. President—so he remained silent. suffered dramatic damage at cliffs and The photographs on the left of Figure 15 Mr Otsuka rose to the occasion. ‘Mr slopes. Altogether, our narrow-gauge show the slope failure and roadbed Ogura here, his staff and many workers track was damaged at 86 locations. As collapse on the Joetsu Line next to the did what was necessary to repair the shown, the tracks were washed out, . The scene of track tunnel and make it stronger than before, leaving what appears to be a rope ladder suspended in mid-air like a rope ladder is so there’s no need to worry. Just relax instead of a railway. Quite a few trains typical. The photographs in the centre and take us to Tokyo!’ The driver listened, were on the affected tracks, but all stopped were taken after the remedial work. obviously only half believing him, but I before or after damaged track, so luckily The two diagrams on the right show new was very glad to hear Mr Otsuka express not one train derailed and no passengers retaining walls with earth laid behind his confidence in our workers and me. were injured. them, using the popular Reinforced During the 3 days of running tests a The bottom of Figure 17 shows dates and Railroad with Rigid facing (RRR) number of interesting things happened, places of service resumption after construction method, taking into account but I will save discussion of those events remedial work was completed. The soil drainage. Thanks to these solid for another time. columns from left to right show the dates embankments, passenger services are and affected sections of the Shin’etsu, once again operating smoothly. Joetsu, Iiyama, Tadami and Echigo lines. The Uonogawa Bridge on the The top bar shows that sections on all five (Fig. 18) is quite old and was severely damaged, as the photograph shows. The bridge dates from another era before Figure 15 Embankment Failure on Joetsu Line reinforcing; pier 13P in the foreground Vicinity of 220 km 500 m After remedial work experienced considerable failure in its Track damage After remedial work [RRR Construction Rock bolts upper section and the next pier (14P) was method] Shotcrete TenTennono Down track TunTunnelnel ((up)up) severed in the middle, because the top section shifted laterally by about 50 cm. Drain pipe This is a textbook failure. Sediment Drainage blanket Cement-mixed soil The diagrams at the bottom right show the Slope Ground anchors reconFigureuration application of a layer of concrete around (separate construction project) the pier, followed by a grid of reinforcing Vicinity of 221 km 000 m After remedial work bars around the pier, covered by a Track damage After remedial work [RRR Construction Down track Up track concrete jacket. The resulting structure method] is now stronger than ever. The photograph at the bottom left was taken after Drain pipe Sediment Drainage blanket completion of the remedial work.

Rock bolts

Japan Railway & Transport Review 43/44 • March 2006 55 Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures

Figure 16 Major Damage to Narrow-gauge Infrastructure

Ya h i ko Niigata

Yo shida Echigo Line Kashiwazaki Tsubame Sanjo Echigo Line: Some damage Joetsu Line: Collapsed embankment at Station near 221 km 000 m

Shin’etsu Line Niitsu

hiko Line hiko Ya MiyauchiMiyauchi IiyamaIiy Line am Higashi Sanjo a L Nagaoka ine Tokamachi EchigoEchigo KawaguchiKawaguchi Epicentre (23 October around 17:56) Max. seismic activity: SI7 (Kawaguchi-machi) Urasa Ta dami Line Koide

Shin’etsu Line: Collapsed embankment Joetsu Line: Collapsed embankment near 54 km 800 m Tadami near 220 km 500 m

Joetsu Line Echigo Joetsu ShinkansenMuikamachi Yuzawa

Iiyama Line: Deformed Tadami Line: Some damage columns, Uonogawa Bridge at Echigo Suhara Station

Figure 17 Service Resumption on Narrow-gauge JR Lines

Shin’etsu Line Joetsu Line Iiyama Line Tadami Line Echigo Line 23 October 2004: Earthquake strikes; services suspended

Kashiwazaki NagaokaHigashi Minakami Muikamachi Koide Miyauchi Echigo Kawaguchi Tokamachi Koide Tadami Kashiwazaki Yoshida Sanjo

26 October 2004: Services resume on Shin’etsu Line between Nagaoka and Higashi Sanjo, and on Echigo Line between Kashiwazaki and Yoshida

Nagaoka Higashi Kashiwazaki Yoshida Sanjo 2 November 2004: Services resume on Joetsu Line between Minakami and Muikamachi

Minakami Muikamachi

13 November 2004: Services resume on Joetsu Line between Muikamachi and Koide

Minakami Muikamachi Koide

20 November 2004: Services resume on Tadami Line between Koide and Tadami

Koide Tadami

29 November 2004: Services resume on Shin’etsu Line between Kashiwazaki and Nagaoka

Kashiwazaki Nagaoka Higashi Sanjo 7 December 2004: Services resume on Joetsu Line between Koide and Miyauchi, and on Iiyama Line between Echigo Kawaguchi and Tokamachi

Minakami Muikamachi Koide Miyauchi Echigo Kawaguchi Tokamachi

Services suspended Services resumed *Services between Echigo Kawaguchi and Echigo Takiya resume on single track

56 Japan Railway & Transport Review 43/44 • March 2006 Only Single Track on Figure 18 Infrastructure Damage on Uonogawa Bridge, Iiyama Line Joetsu Line

The last section of our narrow-gauge lines To Toka-machi To Echigo Kawaguchi Over road Over river Over road Over road to resume services was between Echigo Damaged piers 1P 2P 3P 4P 5P 6P 7P 8P 9P 10P 11P 12P 13P 14P 15P 16P 17P 18P 19P 2A Kawaguchi and Echigo Takiya stations on 1A Shearing in the Joetsu Line (Fig. 19) and this section abutment Peeling and collapse Peeling and collapse Failure and facing in crown concrete in stone masonry lateral still has only single-track operations. We slippage at Peeling and Peeling and collapse in crown concrete mid-pier collapse in hope to have both tracks operating by the Peeling and collapse in stone masonry concrete Peeling and collapse structure end of March 2006. The top right aerial in crown concrete Damage to Remedial work shot shows Enoki Pass where a car was 14P and15P Fissure plugged with shotcrete; Concrete jacket Required horizontal sandblasting; reinforcing bar reinforcement buried by a landslide and only a small boy After remedial work level for roadbed grid work was rescued alive. The photograph shows our two tracks to the right of that road. The tunnel entrance for the down track on the left remains completely blocked by landslide debris. Luckily, the up track Lateral slippage Lateral to the right of it is free of debris and we are now using it for both up and down services.

Figure 19 Services Reduced to Single Track Only on Joetsu Line

Aiming for quick resumption of double-track services

New interlocking devices Collapsed embankment (220 km 500 m from base) Landslide blocking Enoki Pass Tunnel portal installed New signalling equipment Hand signalling devices for installed authorizing train departure (Down track)

Echigo Kawaguchi Ojiya Echigo Takiya

(Up track)

Tenno Tunnel Tur nout installed

Level crossings modified to accommodate single-track operations Modifications required for single-track operations Level crossings closed to road traffic • Tablet/block system for up track (until end of March) • Turnout and signalling devices newly installed at Echigo Takiya Station • Level crossings modified at 9 locations to accommodate single-track operations • Level crossings at 2 of 11 locations in single-track section closed to road traffic for winter—these modifications coordinated with road authorities

Installed turnout (Echigo Takiya Station)

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Of all transportation corridors blocked by electricity that we need for morning landslides, this JR East line is the only one peak operations. Nearly all these Dealing with Crisis still being cleared of debris despite the facilities were severely damaged. We heavy winter snows. We couldn’t wait have drained the reservoirs and are now Figure 21 summarizes bus services that for the roads department to get round to examining how best to repair the replaced the lost rail section. From 31 clearing winter snow, so we are going all infrastructure. Unfortunately, the area October, buses ran between the Echigo out to keep access open with the aim of is now under deep snow and we Yuzawa and Tsubame Sanjo shinkansen getting both tracks running again. probably cannot get everything back stations, as well as over the shorter gap into full operation before late 2006. between Echigo Yuzawa and Nagaoka Restoring Shinanogawa However, we need the power and can’t stations. Two JR companies, Kanto Bus Power Plant wait until then, so from last February we and Tohoku Bus, did everything they started drawing water directly from the could as did many other companies. We Moving away from rail services for a river into the races to generate some adjusted fares so that the combination of moment, I’d like to discuss the major power without filling the reservoirs. train and bus would not exceed what damage sustained by our Shinanogawa This is providing about 35% of the passengers would have paid if going by Power Plant (Fig. 20). This hydropower plant’s normal capacity. shinkansen only. But passengers could plant has three large storage reservoirs not enjoy the speed and convenience of that draw water from the River Shinano shinkansen services only and we greatly to power three generators making the regretted this inconvenience.

Figure 20 Damage to Shinanogawa Power Plant

Senju Generating Station Shin Yamamoto Reservoir

Shin Miyanaka Intake Damage to lightening arrester Damage to main transformer Cracks in levee riprap Miyanaka Intake Dam MiyanakaMiyanaka IntakeIntake SedimentationSedimentation basinbasin No. 3 Asagawara Phase 1 Tunnel Diversion Facility MinafujiyamasawaMinafujiyamasawa Shin Masatosawa AqueductAqueduct Aqueduct Spillway Phase 2 Tunnel Link Canal No.No. 3 AsagawaraAsagawara SpillwaySpillway TunnelTunnel PhasePhase 5 TunnelTunnel AsagawaraAsagawara ReservoirReservoir PhasePhase 1 PressurePressure TunnelTunnel

No. 2 Asagawara PhasePhase 2 PressurePressure TunnelTunnel Surge Tanks Spillway Tunnel Shin Masatosawa Aqueduct No.No. 1 AsagawaraAsagawara Senju Generating SpillwaySpillway TunnelTunnel Station Pressurized Water Tank Steel Conduits Spillway Tunnel water infiltration Phase 3 Tunnel Discharge Lagoon Phase 4 Tunnel Discharge Channel OjiyaOjiya GeneratingGenerating StationStation DiversionDiversion FacilityFacility Asagawara Reservoir ToTomoshigemoshige DischargeDischarge ChannelChannel Shin Ojiya Generating Station

Power transmission line Ojiya Generating Station

Cracks in earth levee

Steel pylon foundation exposed Collapsed discharge Leakage from pressurized Damage to channel wall steel conduit distribution panel

58 Japan Railway & Transport Review 43/44 • March 2006 Table 1 shows the losses to JR East caused Figure 21 Bus Transport Replacing Suspended Joetsu Shinkansen Services by the earthquakes. Lost fares amounted to about ¥13 billion (¥115 = US$1), which Challenges and Response is not surprising. Remedial work has cost About 100 buses from 22 companies in Niigata about ¥20 billion so far and the Ensuring sufficient buses Prefecture and from JR Kanto Bus and JR Tohoku Bus Shinanogawa Power Plant will require borrowed on temporary basis for daily use. considerable investment of a so-far Immediately after the earthquake, the expressway was unknown amount. Another problem is closed to buses and other ordinary vehicles. JR East Use of expressway for submitted a letter to the Japan Highway Public bus transport for days that since we cannot generate sufficient Corporation and received permission exempting them immediately after earthquake from restrictions in force at the time to use vehicles on power, we are depending on electricity the expressway. from many thermal plants and are buying power from Tokyo Electric Power. This The bus service was an express service that would ordinarily require passengers to pay an express charge, will cost another ¥5 billion. These costs Setting fares but this would have raised fares above what they would total about ¥40 billion and we expect the have paid if travelling only by shinkansen. The fare was adjusted to prevent this. entire bill to come in at under ¥100 billion, including the cost of repairing the Shinanogawa Power Plant. In any event, Other measures: Directions given passengers at stations; precautionary measures taken during period of aftershocks; parking lots provided the financial burden is very heavy. We intend to minimize it in several ways, including drawing on reserve funds, so we expect to start next fiscal year in a site, our train crews and our station , Takasaki and other places sent relatively healthy financial state. personnel all showed true professionalism enough to make up the difference. in handling the situation. On a personal note, the day after the quake, As the first item on the list shows, one I went to the derailment site and quickly Rights and Wrongs thing that went well was our use of radio realized that the area had no electricity and and TV to give passengers information on little food. I saw convenience stores but After everything settled down, we drew the situation as it developed. most were closed. I had a cell phone but up lists of things that went right, and others The pocket body warmers and blankets the battery soon died. Although I wanted that went wrong. The first list (Table 2) were a success because we had set aside to buy batteries, the local people had rightly relates to emergency information given to many in case of an emergency in winter. snapped them all up. In Nagaoka and passengers and passenger evacuation. As Food supplies ran low in Niigata neighbouring communities, it was I mentioned before, our employees on Prefecture because of the earthquake, but impossible to buy a ready-made box lunch

Table 1 Financial Burden of Chuetsu Niigata Table 2 Emergency Information for Passengers and Earthquakes (FY2005) Their Evacuation

Things that went right Things that went wrong

• Lost fare revenues Approx. ¥13 billion • Radios, and TVs powered by emergency • Flashlights used during power supply were useful in explaining the evacuation from trains halted overall emergency situation to passengers. between stations were not • Cost of remedial work for This helped relieve their anxiety somewhat. bright enough. railway infrastructure • We had established emergency reserves of • We should have sent staff from (cost of replacement bus disposable body warmers and blankets for stations to Disaster Response any emergency winter service suspension. Headquarters to request the services not included) Approx. ¥20 billion These supplies were most useful. help of local municipal • A nearby JR branch office quickly responded governments in establishing • Cost of remedial work for by delivering food, disposable body warmers evacuation shelters, etc. and other relief supplies early next morning • The cell phones of many Shinanogawa Power Plant Still unknown after the quake. employees and passengers Purchase of electricity, etc. Approx. ¥5 billion • Cell phone reception was extremely poor, so ran out of battery power. Personal Handyphone System (PHS) phones • We saw a need for more communication were most useful. emergency reserves of • Lost revenues from station • Staff had previously undergone training in blankets, pharmaceuticals, kiosks, etc. Approx. ¥1 billion passenger evacuation using inclined batteries, etc. passageways, so evacuations went smoothly.

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for a few days. Luckily, the local JR branch The Joetsu Shinkansen was not the only we used to test the ability of infrastructure office sent us meals. part of our operations to receive a to support higher speeds. But until we The last item in the ‘Things that went right’ crippling blow. As I mentioned, our repaired Uonuma Tunnel, we could not column reads: ‘Staff had previously narrow-gauge track sustained damage in get it onto track on the Niigata side of the undergone training in passenger more than 80 locations. Some probably tunnel, the section where we needed evacuation using inclined passageways, would not have been discovered as speed tests. Keihin Electric’s trains run so evacuations went smoothly.’ By great quickly if we had not taken aerial on the same gauge as shinkansen, and good luck, just 2 days before the quake, photographs and video. Our head and their EM30 track inspection car runs at our Niigata office had run a training branch offices were able to make an speeds up to 30 km/h. We made good session on evacuating passengers from a overall assessment of the damage before use of it until services resumed over the shinkansen train and giving on-board local authorities on the ground had entire line. Without it we would have had emergency announcements. Quite a few similar information. to use far simpler inspection devices and employees who were caught up in the probably could not have resumed full emergency had participated in that session Tremendous Help services on 28 December. and were able to put what they had from Other Companies The Japan Railway Construction, learned into practice. The column on the Transport and Technology Agency right lists things that went wrong, The third item that ‘went right’ is that other (formerly Japan Railway Construction including cell phones losing power. companies were quick to lend a hand. For Public Corporation—JRCC) loaned us The left side of Table 3 lists things that example, Keihin Electric Express Railway, their Oiran inspection car for checking went well during remedial work. One which operates mainly in the Yokohama– structural clearance. Actually, we do not successful strategy was the numerous Tokyo area, kindly loaned us their EM30 have such an inspection vehicle for helicopter flights to examine the effects track inspection car. shinkansen track, because we normally of the earthquake. I have already mentioned our East-i that don’t need one. The predecessor JRCC built the Joetsu Shinkansen, explaining why its successor Table 3 Remedial Work could lend us Oiran, without which we

Things that went right Things that went wrong probably couldn’t have resumed services as early as 28 December. In addition to • Helicopter flights made it possible to take aerial photos and • The extensive damage and series of videos used to rapidly assess damage over wide areas. aftershocks made it difficult to obtain a the tremendous help from other • A civil engineering project team was set up in the stricken area clear understanding of the damage. immediately after the quake, making it possible to provide • After repairing tunnel roadbeds, we companies, we could also draw on our humanitarian aid in an organized fashion. discovered it was necessary to rectify past experiences coping with disasters. • Other companies quickly arranged supplies for us and leased us long-wave track irregularities in many heavy-duty maintenance machinery. locations. - Keihin Electric Express Railway leased us their EM30 track • We did not fully realize the importance of inspection vehicle, greatly improving our inspection efficiency. investigating the derailment, so we were - The Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology slow in establishing investigation Challenges at Derailment Site Agency leased us a shinkansen track inspection vehicle for mechanisms. Also, we found it difficult to clearance inspections, greatly improving our infrastructure find staff with sufficient expertise to inspection efficiency. conduct such an investigation. The right column in Table 3 lists our main • Our ‘Aluminium Cart’ (a bicycle built to run on track) was most • We had difficulty establishing contractual useful for infrastructure inspections. agreements with electric power utilities for difficulties during the remedial work. As • Communications and cooperative efforts with police were emergency supply of electricity. one example, the last item on the list deals excellent. During the emergency, patrol cars provided us with • We had difficulty buying gasoline and road information and greatly helped with evacuations. other supplies in the stricken area. with removal of the shinkansen rolling • JR East’s Structural Engineering Center formed an emergency (Gasoline stations were closed during the technical team that quickly established a reconstruction plan blackout.) stock. As I mentioned before, we based on the damage, making it possible to take on-site decisions • Just when we were jacking up carriages eventually repositioned it on the opposite rapidly. to position them back on the track, an • Giving on-site personnel greater authority over and responsibility aftershock measuring almost SI6 struck track and then had to remove it from the for remedial work made it possible to base remedial work created a very dangerous situation. scene. A maintenance vehicle arrived to decisions on the actual situation, helping reconstruction proceed - We decided to use only cranes to faster. reposition all cars. do this but it was immediately apparent • We used technical know-how gained from experience after the • We used a maintenance vehicle to tow the 2003 Sanriku-Minami earthquakes (north-east Honshu) and repositioned carriages away, but structural that the couplers were different, so we had elsewhere, making remedial work proceed faster. differences made coupling difficult. - We had to make a special device to to make a special device to link the two. • There was little snow even in December—unusual for Niigata couple the maintenance vehicle and Prefecture—so weather did not slow reconstruction work very The second item in the column, long- shinkansen. much. wave track irregularities, did not stop us from resuming services on 28 December,

60 Japan Railway & Transport Review 43/44 • March 2006 but there are still some small irregularities in the slab track. Although we could run Table 4 Organizational Response: Sharing Information trains at 240 km/h over the track without Things that went right Things that went wrong compromising safety, ride comfort would • A Field Response Headquarters was established immediately after the • Train crew used wireless suffer so we are still operating at slightly quake, and JR East’s Executive Director was sent there as Headquarters devices to ask superiors for Chief. This organizational measure created a responsible position for directions, leading to lower speeds. This shows that a slab track directing recovery efforts and working with media on-site. overloaded telecommunications requires more careful final adjustments • The company intranet (Joi-Net) was quickly connected to the Field circuits making it difficult to give Response Headquarters at the derailment site, permitting efficient passengers required than ballasted track. information sharing. emergency information. • Coordination made train crew announcements more effective. • Cell phones often could not be Table 4 examines the emergency response used for voice communications, • Trackside telephones were used to gather information at the derailment site. taken at the organizational level. One and in many cases batteries • When cell phones could not be used for voice communications, they could went dead quickly. still be used to send text messages, providing an effective means of thing listed as going well is ‘A Field • Since telephone lines were communication. often busy, we could not quickly Response Headquarters was established • The frequent Emergency Response Meetings ensured that information was learn whether employees were and JR East’s Executive Director was sent shared. The meetings provided an opportunity for top executives to make safe. (Employees did not rapid decisions that spurred recovery and reconstruction efforts. contact us to report their own there as Headquarters Chief.’ I was the • Frequent press conferences gave the media much information. This situation.) Headquarters Chief, so I should be established a good rapport with the media. pleased with this comment. The same item continues: ‘This organizational measure created a responsible position for Figure 22 Countermeasures after 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake directing recovery efforts and working with the media on site.’ In truth, I did not Viaduct column reinforcement have to do much after arriving—I probably Tohoku Reinforcement efforts prioritize columns at risk of would have been busier at JR East Shinkansen major damage through shear failure in earthquake as severe as Hanshin-Awaji or Chuetsu Niigata Headquarters in Tokyo. As it was, many earthquakes. qualified, experienced personnel came to Shinkansen the derailment site where they worked Plans call for aseismic reinforcement of about admirably, greatly simplifying my task of 18,500 out of approx. 82,100 columns. • Approx. 12,300 columns (66%) to be reinforced Joetsu overseeing the recovery. Shinkansen during FY2004 One function that I could fulfil as • Additional 6,200 columns (approx.) to be reinforced by end of FY2007 executive officer with on-site responsibility was to grant or refuse Narrow-gauge lines [Narrow-gauge lines] Plans call for aseismic reinforcement of about admittance to the many people who Sendai area South Kanto region 12,600 out of approx. 42,400 columns in South wanted to get close to the derailed train. Kanto and Sendai areas. • Approx. 9,800 columns (78%) to be reinforced The scene was unique and dramatic—a during FY2004 derailed shinkansen—and the site could • Additional 2,800 columns (approx.) to be reinforced by end of FY2008 be easily seen from a nearby road, so we naturally attracted a lot of attention. People wanting a close-up view included Cabinet Ministers on two occasions, more were highly qualified in their respective Emergency Response Meetings ensured than 30 politicians, the media, fields and it was they who did what was that information was shared. The bureaucrats, experts, non-profit required. I was representing meetings provided an opportunity for top organizations—and of course I can’t forget Headquarters, and my presence indicated executives to make rapid decisions that the curious bystanders. Everyone wanted to everyone working on site that JR East spurred recovery and reconstruction to get up on the viaduct to ‘take a look,’ was naturally anxious that the recovery efforts.’ It is commonly known that and it was my job to say who could and and reconstruction proceed smoothly. different departments in a company can couldn’t. Anyone other than an executive squabble over decision-making powers officer would have had a hard time saying Organizational Response and and work for their own interests against ‘No’ to some of those people! Information Sharing each other. However, in our case, But when it came to directing the actual members of each department came recovery work, we had specialists who Another ‘went well’ item is ‘The frequent together for the meetings and worked as

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a team for early resumption of services. I Figure 23 Early Earthquake Detection System Improvements for Shinkansen know I am blowing the JR East horn, but I must say that we took the best approach— System improvement objective: Shorten time required to detect seismic activity, thereby permitting faster power transmission cut-off and train braking our departments cooperated and compromised very well, placing the Seismometer Track section Existing New Total (1) Earlier warning using P-wave detection location Detection of P-waves, which arrive before S-waves, interests of our passengers ahead of their Tohoku Shinkansen 28 16 44 permits earlier warning. Trackside Joetsu Shinkansen 13 9 22 Earthquake S-waves own interests. I said at the beginning, JR Nagano Shinkansen 8 3 9 East’s frequent and frank press conferences Pacific-Ocean side 9 - 9 Coast Time Sea-of-Japan side 6 - 6 P-waves established a good rapport with the media Total 82 28 90 Arrival of seismic waves P-wave warning for the benefit of all. S-wave warning

Shorter warning lag (using coastal seismometers, Hachinohe lag shortened from 3 to 2 s) [FY2005] Safeguarding Lives Next Time (2) Use of coastal seismometers in earlier earthquake detection Warning triggered by coastal seismometers located closer to epicentre of undersea earthquake Figure 22 shows our plans to reinforce Location Niigata viaducts to make them more earthquake- Nagano resistant. We are making considerable Trackside (existing) Trackside seismometers Trackside (new) investments in this endeavour and have Coast Coastal seismometers decided to implement reinforcement plans Tokyo Additional installation of trackside earlier than first scheduled. seismometers [FY2006] Time Figure 23 gives information on our Miura Choshi installation of more seismometers in our Operation control method: Trackside seismometers indicate the earthquake magnitude, Urgent Earthquake Detection and Alarm forming the basis for a decision to stop operations. System (UrEDAS) and our efforts to reduce In FY2005, JR East changed its seismic activity index from gal to kine (SI), and, without sacrificing safety, changed its Operating Rule Criteria to more accurately predict possible damage to track infrastructure. response times from 3 to 2 seconds.

Operation restarts: <80 gal Operation restarts: <9 kine The information in these two figures has Speed restrictions: 80 to <120 gal Speed restrictions: 9 to <18 kine been published elsewhere, so I will not Operation stops: 120 gal Operation stops: 18 kine + go into greater detail here.

Raising Ridership to Figure 24 Niigata Tourism Campaign—We’re Getting it Done! Pre-disaster Levels Figure 24 highlights our ‘Niigata Tourism Joetsu Shinkansen trains are once more running between Tokyo and Niigata, but things will Campaign—We’re Getting It Done!’ return to normal only when the same number of tourists are riding the rails again. JR East and local governments in Niigata Prefecture are working together to promote tourism in the programme. The weeks of interrupted prefecture. The campaign lasted until the end of March 2005. shinkansen services in the Niigata area greatly inconvenienced the travelling The Niigata prefectural government, local municipal governments and tourist agencies are organizing events and offering special attractions. public, so we are trying to make it up to them through special offers. 70,000 110,000 By February 2005, our Joetsu Shinkansen passengers passengers 180,000 passengers ridership returned to similar levels as the previous year. This is a great turnaround

JR East Tourist agencies after the recent slump.

• More travel promotion specials, discount fares, across-the-board discounts of ¥2,000 Further Study and • ‘Come to Niigata’ tickets with some unrestricted boarding/disembarking privileges • Campaign logo displayed on MAX Joetsu Shinkansen rolling stock Countermeasures • Campaign prizes • Campaign kick-off attended by representatives of promoting organizations Our remaining main tasks are examining the derailment mechanisms and

62 Japan Railway & Transport Review 43/44 • March 2006 Pamphlets of 'Niigata Tourism Campaign—We're Getting It Done!' (JR East) infrastructure failure, and developing Acknowledgments countermeasures. We have The article is based on a lecture given at a documentation covering these issues, but Transportation Research Committee seminar on 15 I am not going to describe it here. February 2005 organized by Japan Transportation The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Association. Transport is involved in ongoing safety- related discussions, so some matters cannot be made public yet. Future investigations will focus mainly on how to prevent a derailment, how to prevent carriages from causing harm if they do Masahiko Ogura derail, and how to prevent major damage in so many tunnels. The Joetsu Mr Ogura is a JR East Executive Director. After graduating in civil engineering from the University of Shinkansen has resumed operations, but Tokyo in 1974, he joined Japanese National Railways where he later served as Head of the Track we expect that the hardest part of our job Maintenance Division at the South Tokyo Railway Operating Division. After transferring to JR East, ■ he served in various capacities, including Head of the Engineering Works Department at JR East’s is still ahead. Morioka Branch Office. He was appointed Director of the Yokohama Branch Office in 2002 and has been an Executive Director, and Deputy Director of Railway Operations Headquarters since 2004.

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