Contribution to Growth: the Single Market for Services. Delivering
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Regulation of Professional Services in EU Member States
SERVICEGAP Discussion Paper No. XXX Regulation of Professional Services in EU Member States Classification, Measurement and Evaluation November 2012 Iain Paterson, Bianca Brandl* and Richard Sellner* * Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria Corresponding Author: Iain Paterson ([email protected]) This paper was developed as part of Deliverable 2.3 of SERVICEGAP “Papers on linkages between manufacturing and services, regulation in professional services and banks” SERVICEGAP project is funded by the European Commission, Research Directorate General as part of the 7th Framework Programme, Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities. Grant Agreement no: 244 552 1 Regulation of Professional Services in EU Member States: Classification, Measurement and Evaluation Iain Paterson Bianca Brandl, and Richard Sellner November 2012 Abstract This paper has a two-fold purpose: on the one hand of presenting methods and results from studies (mainly involving the authors) that have fed into ongoing efforts at European Union level to classify regulatory systems in Member States, to find ways to measure the extent of regulation, and to evaluate whether state-legislated or self-regulation is anti-competitive as distinct from quality- enhancing regulation for consumers’, rather than producers’, benefit. On the other hand, the paper presents results from a partial update of regulatory knowledge (regulation indices) and further develops a new measure of regulatory effect of professional services throughout the Member States’ economies based on newly developed empirical measures of interlinkage (Cf. Paterson and Sellner 2012). The results of the updated indicator show some modest decrease in anti-competitive regulation in professional services, mainly with respect to market conduct behaviour: more openness to new forms of businesses, price setting, fees and advertising. -
The Macroeconomics of Regulation
International Finance 18:3, 2015: pp. 343–360 DOI: 10.1111/infi.12077 BOOK REVIEW The Macroeconomics of Market Regulation y z Matteo Cacciatore and Giuseppe Fiori y z HEC Montreal, and North Carolina State University. Boeri,T.,M.Castanheira,R. Faini and V. Galasso, eds., Structural Reforms Without Prejudices. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2006. Schindler, M., H. Berger, B. B. Bakker and A. Spilimbergo, eds., Jobs and Growth: Supporting the European Recovery. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 2014. Solow, R., ed., Structural Reform and Economic Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2004. I. Introduction In each country, a complex set of laws and institutions regulates the functioning of product and labour markets. Broadly defined, the regulation of labour directly affects hiring and firing decisions, the number of working hours, the intensity of job search and wage dynamics. Examples include employment protection legislation, the generosity and duration of unemployment benefits, restrictions on the length of contracts, the level of centralization in wage bargaining, labour unions and © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 344 Matteo Cacciatore and Giuseppe Fiori minimum wages. Product market regulation affects producer entry and exit in a given market or industry, the incentives to create and commercialize goods and services, and the behaviour of prices. Examples include the procedures governing market entry (e.g. the legal requirements to be met for a business to start operating), the laws and institutions that limit the market supply of goods and services, and price controls. The rationale for the emergence and consolidation of such laws and institutions has been related to various factors, including the promotion of social equity goals, the correction of market imperfections (e.g. -
EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 31.5.2018 COM(2018
EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 31.5.2018 COM(2018) 379 final 2018/0204 (COD) Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents) {SEC(2018) 272 final} - {SWD(2018) 286 final} - {SWD(2018) 287 final} EN EN EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL • Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Among the EU’s tasks is that of developing a European area of justice in civil matters based on the principles of mutual trust and the mutual recognition of judgments. The area of justice requires judicial cooperation across borders. For this purpose, and to facilitate the proper functioning of the internal market, the EU has adopted legislation on the cross-border service of judicial documents1 and on cooperation in the taking of evidence2. These instruments are crucial in the regulation of judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters between the Member States. Their common purpose is to provide an efficient framework for cross-border judicial cooperation. They have replaced the earlier international, more cumbersome system of the Hague Conventions3 between the Member States4. This legislation on judicial cooperation has a real impact on the everyday lives of EU citizens, be it as private individuals or business operators. It is applied in judicial proceedings with cross-border implications, where its proper functioning is indispensable to ensuring access to justice and fair trials (e.g. -
Regulatory Competition in the Digital Economy of the Eurasian Economic Union
REGULATORY COMPETITION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY OF THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION Alexey Yefremov1 Abstract. Digital transformation is becoming a mainstream of world economic development both at the national and international levels. The development of Eurasian economic integration makes it relevant to analyse both digital integration and regulatory competition of digital economies of the EAEU countries and the factors that affect these phenomena. It also prompts a deeper discussion on whether or not regulatory competition is necessary for international (and regional) integration, including in the digital sphere. The analysis demonstrates that regulatory competition is dialectically interrelated with the coordina- tion (harmonization) of legal regulation at the supranational (international) level, and together, they provide both improved regulatory quality and economic integration. The economic and legal assessment of actual regulatory competition should be based on an analysis of the aggregate of factors and the law (tax law, corpo- rate law, anti-monopoly law, telecommunication law, law on information technologies and cyberspace). But it is not enough to harmonize regulation of the EAEU’s bodies that have the greater significance for the de- velopment of regulatory competition within the framework of the EAEU, but rather the improvement of the quality of regulatory policy on digital economy at the international and national level. At the same time, the Eurasian Economic Commission can be a driver for such improvements. Based on the analysis, the new general algorithm of the consistent (cyclical) development of integra- tion (harmonization) regulation and regulatory competition in digital economy of the EAEU is proposed. Implementation of these recommendations would help improve business environment in the EAEU and en- hance their regulatory competitiveness in the area of digital economy. -
Cost of Service Regulation in the Investor-Owned Electric Utility Industry: a History of Adaptation
Cost of Service Regulation In the Investor-Owned Electric Utility Industry A History of Adaptation Prepared by: Dr. Karl McDermott June 2012 © 2012 by the Edison Electric Institute (EEI). All rights reserved. Published 2012. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system or method, now known or hereinafter invented or adopted, without the express prior written permission of the Edison Electric Institute. Attribution Notice and Disclaimer This work was prepared by Dr. Karl McDermott. When used as a reference, attribution to EEI is requested. EEI, any member of EEI, and any person acting on its behalf (a) does not make any warranty, express or implied, with respect to the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of the information, advice or recommendations contained in this work, and (b) does not assume and expressly disclaims any liability with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the use of any information, advice or recommendations contained in this work. The views and opinions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect those of EEI or any member of EEI. This material and its production, reproduction and distribution by EEI does not imply endorsement of the material. Published by: Edison Electric Institute 701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004-2696 Phone: 202-508-5000 Web site: www.eei.org Cost of Service Regulation in the Investor-Owned Electric Utility Industry: A History of Adaptation Table of Contents Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................. -
On Democracy and the “Public Interest”
Center for European Studies Working Paper No. 93 On Democracy and the “Public Interest”: in the European Union by Andrew Moravcsik Andrea Sangiovanni Professor of Government Department of Government Director, European Union Center Harvard University Harvard University Visiting Fellow (2002) Center for European Studies Cambridge University 27 Kirkland Street [email protected] Cambridge, MA 02138 USA Tel: (617) 495-4303 x205; Fax: (617) 495-8509 e-mail: [email protected] This is a draft. Before citing, please contact the authors at [email protected] or [email protected] ABSTRACT Perhaps the most fundamental question in contemporary European Union politics is whether the existing division and sharing of competences between national and supranational levels is pragmatically and normatively justifiable. In his classic book, Governing in Europe (1999), Fritz Scharpf argues that the current policy mix is sub-optimal and, therefore, democratically illegitimate, because the multi-level European polity lacks the ‘problem-solving capacity’ necessary to permit citizens and their representatives to bargain to optimal outcomes. Instead it is likely to trigger a vicious circle of downward adaptations in social policy and public services that are likely to sap the EU's support. Scharpf recommends granting domestic social welfare policies constitutional status in EU jurisprudence, and permitting ‘differentiated integration’ or ‘flexibility’ for high-standard countries to legislate as an EU sub-group. In this challenge by Scharpf to the ‘output legitimacy’ of the EU, we argue, a number of important issues remain unresolved. First, his argument rests on an implicit and insufficiently elaborated conception of the public interest in maintaining or expanding current patterns of social welfare protection. -
Regulation OTT Regulation
OTT Regulation OTT Regulation MINISTRY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS EUROPEAN UNION DELEGATION TO BRAZIL (MCTIC) Head of the European Union Delegation Minister João Gomes Cravinho Gilberto Kassab Minister Counsellor - Head of Development and Cooperation Section Secretary of Computing Policies Thierry Dudermel Maximiliano Salvadori Martinhão Cooperation Attaché – EU-Brazil Sector Dialogues Support Facility Coordinator Director of Policies and Sectorial Programs for Information and Communication Asier Santillan Luzuriaga Technologies Miriam Wimmer Implementing consortium CESO Development Consultants/FIIAPP/INA/CEPS Secretary of Telecommunications André Borges CONTACTS Director of Telecommunications Services and Universalization MINISTRY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS Laerte Davi Cleto (MCTIC) Author Secretariat of Computing Policies Senior External Expert + 55 61 2033.7951 / 8403 Vincent Bonneau [email protected] Secretariat of Telecommunications MINISTRY OF PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT + 55 61 2027.6582 / 6642 [email protected] Ministry Dyogo Oliveira PROJECT COORDINATION UNIT EU-BRAZIL SECTOR DIALOGUES SUPPORT FACILITY Secretary of Management Gleisson Cardoso Rubin Secretariat of Public Management Ministry of Planning, Development and Management Project National Director Telephone: + 55 61 2020.4645/4168/4785 Marcelo Mendes Barbosa [email protected] www.sectordialogues.org 2 3 OTT Regulation OTT © European Union, 2016 Regulation Responsibility -
The Case for Centralized Authority
Telecommunication Regulation in the United States and Europe: The Case for Centralized Authority William Lehr1 Thomas Kiessling Columbia University & MIT Global One & Harvard University [email protected] [email protected] Paper presented to the Twenty-sixth Telecommunications Policy Research Conference Alexandria, VA First Draft, Comments Welcome October 3-5, 1998 Telecommunications regulators in both the US and the European Union are facing a year 2000 problem: how best to reform the current dual regulatory regime (Federal/State in the US; European Commission/Member States in Europe) in light of industry convergence, globalization, and liberalization. These trends are perhaps best exemplified by the emergence of the Internet as a global communications platform for communications services, as well as, electronic commerce and what it entails. This paper argues that in both the US and the European Union there are important economic reasons why the regulatory balance needs to tilt in favor of a stronger centralized authority. In the US, this means affirming the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC’s) ability to preempt State authority in areas relating to the promotion of wholesale-level carrier competition; while in Europe, this means interpreting the subsidiarity principle more narrowly to permit the European Commission (EC) to assert more authority over the National Regulatory Authorities (NRA) in the member states. This paper is organized into five sections. Section 1 provides an overview of our main arguments, explaining why it is important to have a stronger centralized authority. Section 2 reviews the economic and legal justification for the dual-regulatory system of centralized/local regulation that exists in both the US and Europe. -
Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition
Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 2014 Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition Eric L. Talley Columbia Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Securities Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons Recommended Citation Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, VOL. 101, P. 1649, 2015; UC BERKELEY PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2511723; USC CLASS RESEARCH PAPER NO. CLASS14-32; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 14-475 (2014). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1888 This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TALLEY_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2015 1:40 PM CORPORATE INVERSIONS AND THE UNBUNDLING OF REGULATORY COMPETITION Eric L. Talley* INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1650 I. FEDERAL TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL ENTITIES: A HIGH- LEVEL PRIMER .............................................................................. 1658 A. Nominal Tax Rates ................................................................ 1659 B. Residency Rules .................................................................... -
Regulatory Competition and Co- Opetition
Page 1 REGULATORY COMPETITION AND CO- OPETITION Damien Geradin* and Joseph A. McCahery** Introduction The reduction in barriers to trade and the liberalization of financial markets, transportation and telecommunications, have created the basis for the increase in flows of factors of production between jurisdictions.1 As countries move to a more liberalized domestic economy, questions of competition between jurisdictions abound. With the prospect of increased capital mobility, it is becoming conventional wisdom that national governments are forced to perform their economic policy functions more efficiently since governments that yield optimal levels of public goods may be more successful in the competition between jurisdictions for attracting mobile resources. The concern to attract mobile resources has shaped entire areas of governmental policy and plays a determinative role for firms locating new plants. Arguments in favor of decentralization follow from the economics of competition between jurisdictions. The theory of regulatory competition tells us that allowing for more decentralization helps to remove much of the asymmetrical information problems, reduces the prospects of regulatory capture, and enhances the introduction of a range of alternative solutions for similar problems. The economic advantages of decentralization undoubtedly provided a strong argument for politicians within federal systems to introduce the dynamic of diversity as a counterbalance to the discretion of central government.2 Regulatory competition is an economic theory of government organization that equates decentralization with efficient results. The theory makes an analogy between law and commodities, and then asserts that lower level governments—local, state, or national, as opposed to federal or supranational—should compete for citizens and factors of production when they regulate. -
Optimal Integration in the Single Market: a Synoptic Review
Error! No text of specified style in document. Optimal Integration in the Single Market: A Synoptic Review A Europe Economics report for BIS April 2013 - 1 - Europe Economics is registered in England No. 3477100. Registered offices at Chancery House, 53-64 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1QU. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information/material contained in this report, Europe Economics assumes no responsibility for and gives no guarantees, undertakings or warranties concerning the accuracy, completeness or up to date nature of the information/analysis provided in the report and does not accept any liability whatsoever arising from any errors or omissions © Europe Economics. All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism or review, no part may be used or reproduced without permission. Contents Summary .................................................................................................................................................................................... 0 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................... 7 2 What is the Single Market and what Policies are used to Create and Sustain it? ......................................... 8 2.1 Trade and comparative advantage .................................................................................................................... 8 2.2 Barriers to trade .................................................................................................................................................. -
ARTICLE 99 INSPECTION Report of the Schengen Joint Supervisory Authority on an Inspection of the Use of Article 99 Alerts in the Schengen Information System
ARTICLE 99 INSPECTION Report of the Schengen Joint Supervisory Authority on an inspection of the use of Article 99 alerts in the Schengen Information System Report nr. 07-02 Brussels, 18 December 2007 Contents I. Introduction..................................................................................................................................3 II. Data Protection Supervision........................................................................................................3 III. Reason for inspection...................................................................................................................4 IV. Scope and method of inspection...................................................................................................5 V. Reactions received .......................................................................................................................6 VI. Results..........................................................................................................................................6 A. Decision of Article 99 Alert .................................................................................................... 6 1. Competent Authorities that may decide on an Article 99 alert.................................................................................6 2. A specific procedure has been established for Article 99 alerts...............................................................................7 3. A prerequisite for such alerts is the prosecution of criminal offences