of destitute southernerstrekked across plies from Itang were dispersed over a ful, because of the people's own social the south of Sudan, guided on their wide geographical area. As a result of adaptation to the conditions of war way by the SPLA toward these Ethio- the war, the loss of the Arab merchant and because they did not receive any pian camps. No stopping was allowed. class (who had formed the backbone of significant donor or agency support. In addition, between 1989 and 1991 the rural economy) led to -a distinct relief workers for Operation Lifeline impoverishment of the population in Preparation for Movement as Condi- Sudan often witnessed the movement southern Sudan (Dodge and Magne tions in Ethiopia Deteriorated of truckloads of children, mostly 1991). Itang was hit particularly hard The disintegration of the Mengistu young boys, travelling in the direction because the civil war almost com- government accelerated in 1991, forc- of Ethiopia for supposed education at pletely disrupted commerce between ing the SPLA to think of alternative . the refugee camps. They were labelled north and south, and between the large arrangements. Meetings with camp "unaccompanied minors" and by the garrison towns in the south and the residents to discuss returning to Su- time of their return to Sudan in 1991 rural areas. The merchants that flour- dan were held by the SPLA in Itang as numbered over 14,000. ished at Itang, played a very important early as January 1991. Certain groups Population of Itang part in providing trade in SPLA areas sent individual family members back and hence weakened the impact of the to Sudan in advance of the dissolution The number of refugees in Itang camp northern military strategy of isolating of the camp (to the Akobo area for in- during its heyday was difficult to as- the southern civilian population and stance), where crops were planted by certain due to multiple registration then blaming the SPLA for the returnees weeks prior to the arrival of and the failure to deduct figures of re- scarcities and suffering. the rest of their families. This may have turnees (MDTMRR 1991). Addition- The status of Itangwas duein part to been standard practice in the light of ally, local Nuer and Anuak people who its position within the relatively well the lack of agricultural possibilities at populated the area around. the camp developed Ethiopian marketing net- Itang, but nonetheless serves to illus- and who were assisting their kin from work, but was also facilitated by the trate the effective coping strategies across the border were also registered. substantial relief inputs distributed to employed. In June 1991, chiefs of the Gajaak Nuer the refugees. UNHCR was able to at- The speed with which the Mengistu told us that they had been receiving tract significant donor support, but government collapsed was greater food from the refugee camp even was prevented from administering than anticipated by the SPLA, but it is though some of them were over one this relief tightly, resulting in a food significant that while the SPLA had week's walk from Itang itself, and in- surplus which found its way into contingency plans, neither the UN nor side Sudan. There was also a continu- southern Sudan. Itang replaced the other agencies including the major ous flow of traders in and out of Itang, Arab trading class and was an impor- donors had taken any preparatory ac- registering as refugees, receiving tem- tant safety net for people economically tion. Although the matter had been porary relief and leaving again. affected by the war. Equally, the mar- raised by various concerned NGOs, UNHCR reported in July 1990 that ket at Itang was a major resupply even UNHCR failed to respond, de- 242,093 were claiming relief in Itang source to the SPLA. spite its mandate to protect and facili- camp and 280,000 by January 1991. The In interviews with chiefs after the tate the repatriation of refugees. Even real number of refugees may never be abandonment of Itang camp, often a though repatriation to Sudan, which known, but by mid-1991, when the considerable distance from Itang (for was still at war, was not considered camp population returned to Sudan, it example Abwong was approximately desirable at the time, it must have been was probably in the region of 150,000 two weeks walk away), the loss of this recognized as inevitable or at least according to UN and NGO sources. marketplace was considered to be highly likely in light of the political more significant than the arrival of developments. Itang as a Trading Centre large numbers of returnees. As the number of refugees expanded, Relief camps function as critical fac- The Demise of Itang: What the camp at Itang became a centre for tors in the survival strategy of people Happened? commercial activity. During the dry under stress; families divide them- On May26,1991, the refugees left Itang season the people of the Sobat and selves, some remaining at home trying for Sudan en masse under SPLA guard Pibor river basins and even from the to produce food, others move to relief after reported attacks on the camp. Nile in southern Sudan came to Itang sites to collect assistance and still oth- Itang camp, as described, vanished with their cattle for sale and bought ers move to and fro to trade. It was the overnight. There are many conflicting significant quantities of grain and role of the Ethiopian refugee camps as stories regarding what happened, but household items. They transported commercial and service centres that it is apparent that the camp became a these back to Sudan by river. Small motivated the SPLA to attempt to re- target in the downfall of the Mengistu markets sprung up in Sudan where create these camps inside Sudan. Their regime. A major reason that the refu- goods from Itang were sold. Relief sup- attempt was not particularly success- gees felt unsafe and accepted SPLA

I 20 Rsm, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1994) safe passage back to Sudan, was that mediate homesteads. The maincentres The government of Sudan's policy Mengistu had nurtured the SPLA. The for relief in SPLA areas were inevitably toward the relief of the people of south- refugees in Itang felt, rightly or in areas most accessible from Kenya em Sudan at this time was described wrongly, that they were identified and Uganda, but even the Ethiopian by US AID as "clearly capricious, if not with the SPLA and as such considered border areas including the Sobat and blatantly obstructionist." The United themselves vulnerable when the Pibor river basins deep inside south- Nations, although not completely una- Ethiopian government fell. The refu- ern Sudan benefitted from some relief ware of the likely arrival of over gees' acceptance of repatriation by the under OLS. 250,000 people from the three Ethio- SPLA was also based on their knowl- However, in 1991, although the po- pian refugee camps (150,000 from edge that a relief structure now existed tential for a massive return of refugees Itang and 100,000 from Panyido and inside southern Sudan. Their faith in from Ethiopia was very clear, OLS did Dima), also did not protest. Perhaps this relief structure may have been not prepare adequately for the inevita- they were tired from the endless strug- greater than warranted by reality. ble suffering of such a move. A pro- gle to negotiate each shipment of relief The camp population crossed into posal was made at an OLS program food with the conflicting parties. The Sudan at Jekau, where their movement meeting in Kenya in October 1990 to United Nations accepted the suspen- was witnessed by a UN assessment supply Waat district and the Sobat ba- sion of the program until the rains be- team. Just as in 1988, the refugee move- sin with relief food, seeds, tools and gan to fall and the area became ment was assisted by SPLA, who had fishing equipment by overland con- virtually inaccessible to relief from the fended off the depredations of bandits voys to reduce the vulnerability of the south. on the flooded route from the camp to local population. The proposal was the border and also on to Nasir. The accepted by all present, including UN The Refugees Return SPLA left a unit at the camp as a rear representatives from Khartoum and a On May29,1991 the authors witnessed guard which followed the stragglers similar recommendation was made by the arrival of approximately 15,000 back into Sudan. the Multi-Donor Technical Mission in people at Jekau on the Ethiopia-Sudan Ethiopia just a few months later. Re- border. These people were forced to The Role of Operation Lifeline grettably, due to Sudanese govern- continue moving by the bombing of Sudan ment intransigence, little was put into Jekau by the Sudanese air force on that OperationLifelineSudan (OLS), a joint place to reduce local vulnerability let same day. Most proceeded to Nasir in UNICEF/ WFP/NGO relief operation alone assist returnees. Both refugee Upper Nile province where some under the loose coordination of UNDP and OLS operations continued in iso- 130,000 were eventually registered functioning in parallel with ICRC, lation without taking into account the during the next three weeks. A smaller started in early 1989, and despite con- obvious political change in Ethiopia group of twenty thousand refugees siderable political and physical con- and its potential ramifications. who originated from the Akobo area straints, managed to provide returned straight home. Interviews significant food and non-food relief Government of Sudan Limits with those arriving at Jekau indicated and assisted in the re-establishment of Assistance to Civilians in SPLA a representative population drawn networks of schools and health facili- Areas from every area of origin known to ties in SPLA and government areas WFP was the largest transporter of have been at Itang except for the Blue (Minear 1990). Although initially a food in this area and had brought over- Nile group, who appeared later. This consortium of UN agencies and allied land convoys up to Waat in late 1990. confirmed the report that all the resi- NGOs working under a special agree- The WFP office in Khartoum, however, dents of Itang camp had left. ment with the conflicting parties in was refused permission from the gov- The UN and NGOs had, from their Sudan, OLS was later to take its place ernment of Sudan for the movement of small base at Nasir on the Sobat River, as a program under the UN Depart- convoys into southern Sudan in the assisted the newcomers in setting up ment of Humanitarian Affairs, thereby dry season of 1991. UNICEF did de- their camps. In Nasir the UN and local becoming a UN operation similar to liver some seeds, tools and fishing authorities established six registration those in Yugoslavia, Angola, Mozam- equipment, but only after the embargo sites where 130,000 returnees werereg- bique and Cambodia. was lifted in late March, and in the istered during June 1991. A multi- The expansion of OLS coverage absence of the complementary relief agency team including International moved in the wake of expansion of food this input was of more limited Rescue Committee, World Vision In- SPLA territory and although never effect thanintended. The failure of OLS ternational, Action International adequate, was instrumental in assist- at that time to extract the requisite per- Contre Le Faim, Action Africa in Need, ing the adaptive local coping mecha- mission from the government to allow UNICEF and World Food Program, nisms employed by the southern adequate assistance in the Sobat/ Waat rapidly established food distribution, Sudanese toward recovery once con- area later conspired to increase the suf- feeding centres, clinics and informa- flict had moved away from their im- fering of the returnees from Itang. tion dissemination systems. Due to the

Refuge, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1994) 21 difficulties of moving in bulk supplies from Itang; the majority had been at istered in and around Nasir, of which without permission from the govern- Dima and returned to Sudan via about 40 percent were children, 40 per- ment these facilities were in place for Pochalla). While it was true that sig- cent women and 20 percent men. These some time before the arrival of relief nificant relief was required, it is impor- figures were available to the UN team inputs such as food or shelter material$. tant to recognize the role the press who negotiated a schedule of relief Political Manipulation of the played in focusing on the severely with Khartoum. However, the relief malnourished unaccompanied minors agreement which was announced on ~etuiees while ignoring the relatively healthy June 16 allowed for only 1,000 tonnes It was only with the arrival of 3,000 majority. Although this helped to gen- of grain and no other food commodi- Uduk and Maban families, originally erate what little assistancewas offered, ties or non-food survival items such as from Blue Nile, that it became clear it was another example of how the re- blankets or shelter materials. Five hun- that there was a significant element of turnees were manipulated. This inter- dred tonnes of grain were to be deliv- SPLA controlin the choices that at least est in the children and the resulting ered by immediate airdrop and 500 some of the returnees were making. speculation rapidly became a political tonnes by barge from the river port of The Blue Nile group arrived at Nasir issue and was a leading factor in the Kosti in northern Sudan. Both the type two weeks after the first returnees. subsequent split in the leadership of and amount of food allowed was They had walked to Maiwut, a location the SPLA in July 1991. widely known to be inadequate-the en route to their home territory, and diet was not balanced and provided had been turned around by the SPLA Some did not Believe that Itang had for only a total of six kilos of whole and brought to Nasir. By this time, been Evacuated wheat per person. There were limita- many of the first wave of returnees had The local SPLAI SRRA authorities tions imposed on the number of days left Nasir in search of food, and the were well aware that without a highly an airdrop could fly, so there was a arrival of the second major wave al- visible humanitarian crisis the obsta- long gap built into the agreement be- lowed SPLA authorities to pressure cles to relief, which included the objec- tween the termination of the airdrop the international community for con- tions of the government of Sudan, and the arrival of the barge from Kosti. tinued assistance. would be too great too allow any sup- Later in the year supplementary air- At Nasir they camped on a small plies to reach the area. Other objections drops were negotiated but these were hillock that projected above She flood to increased relief came from donors never enough to meet the needs and at plain by a few inches, very near to the and others who initially did not be- no time was the food supply guaran- UN base that had grown from the lieve that Itang camp had been evacu- teed. This created a chronic state of original small office in Nasir town. ated nor that the registration figures nutritional deficiency in those who These Uduk and Maban people were provided by the United Nations were had to remain in camps around Nasir. denied permission to leave the camp accurate. For example, for some weeks The government of Sudan also by the SPLA until May 1992. They were after the evacuation of Itang, U.S. gov- failed to allow food to be delivered to the living (and dying)proof of the need ernment sources claimed that the refu- other locations, where many of the re- for continued relief at Nasir. They were gees were still in Itang. As a result, the turnees had settled or were heading. without kinship or other social links, WFP office in Khartoum was initially The concentration of the relief effort at without potential sources of local as- unwilling to credit UN reports from Nasir meant that the dispersal of re- sistance and they were also caught be- the field. This delayed the organiza- turnees to other areas was inevitably tween the SPLA-who suspected them tion of relief and also justified Khar- delayed, which ironically played into of being allied to the government- toum's resistance to relief proposals. the hands of both the SPLA and the and the government-who suspected This was particularly galling to the government in the north. The return- them of being allied to the SPLA. This field workers who, although not pre- ees became increasingly vulnerable refugee community from the Blue Nile pared in advance, managed to track and were more than ever pawns in a was not native to the southern Sudan, the arrival of the returnees, established war they sought to escape. but could not go back to their old registration procedures, closely moni- The provision of shelter, blankets, homes due to persisting insecurity. tored the situation and provided accu- seeds and tools was also inadequate, While other ethnic groups were able to rate estimates of the numbers of largely because of the restrictions use their social linkages and ethnic returnees involved and the effective- placed on the mode of delivery. It was identity to their advantage, this group ness of the relief effort. clear by mid July that a very large was prevented from doing so and as a number of returnees would be staying of result was much more vulnerable. The Failure the UN to Negotiate in the Nasir and Sobat area during the The unaccompanied children were Adequate Relief for the remainder of the rains. In order to im- another group whose poor state was Returnees prove food security and thus reduce pointed out as a compelling reason for By June 11,1991it was reported that their dependence on relief food, it was continued relief (2,800 arrived at Nasir nearly 100,000 returnees had been reg- necessary to provide seeds and tools in

22 Refuge, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1994) time for the second planting in late had elapsed. Most people, on arrival in For those that had no claim to local August. This deadline was not met; Nasir, were visibly exhausted from resources and who had to remain in greatly jeopardizing those who had no their journey and hungry. Many displaced camps around Nasir, the kinship links with the local commu- (93,000) continued on while others situation was desperate.This situation nity. waited or were forced to wait for relief was well documented; suffice it to say Some donors agreed with the prin- at Nasir. Possessions brought from that conditions were terrible, malnu- ciple of limitingrelief; arguing that the Itang such as clothes, blankets and trition the norm and deaths from diar- returnees could now go back to Itang, cooking utensils were traded with the rhoea very high. where it would be far easier to supply local people for food and those that During October 1991 among the Blue them (Brennan 1991). However this were entitled, cashed in on kinship ties Nile displaced (the most vulnerable policy did not take into account the and received food from relatives. Even community at Nasir), morbidity and extremely poor security situation that wild food in the surrounding area was mortality were as follows (UNIOLS prevailed in the Ethiopian border ar- eaten. 1991): eas and which continues to this day, After waiting for the arrival of relief Disease Reported Deaths nor did it consider the SPLA tactic of for as long as they could, many de- Diarrhoea 75% keeping them in camps to attract relief. cided to move on to accessible home Malaria 4% areas or, if their homes were inaccessi- Respiratory infections 4% The ICRC Operation ble, at least to areas near their homes. Approximate mortality rate from In contrast to the UN operation, the The majority of those who remained in Malaria: l6/ 1000/month with 45.8% ICRC relief operation at Pochalla suc- the Nasir area after a month were those of these deaths being children under cessfully assisted 100,000 returnees who had local entitlements to both five years old. from Panyido camp. The ICRC ob- food and land for agriculture. These tained a far more comprehensive included Nuer of local origin and those It is apparent that few of the returnees agreement from Khartoum than did from places such as Waat who had ties who moved through Nasir to their the UN and had no need to convince to local people by marriage. Some peo- home areas returned to Nasir to re- donors of the need for assistance.Their ple, mainly the Shilluk from White register themselves and receive free relief flights were unrestricted and Nile province, came when the relief food. In fact the question was often they used three planes for daily air- airdrop started. In addition, some asked of returnees "Why have you not drops of grain, pulses [such as peas, families from adjacent areas, notably moved back to Nasir?" Invariably the beans or lentils], oil and salt, as well as Akobo, later sent some representatives answer given was "It is better to be supplementary foods for malnour- into Nasir to reduce the food pressure with one's relatives and friends rather ished children, shelter material, medi- in their home region whilst they culti- than waiting for food." cines, blankets, cooking utensils, seeds vated. The flux of population stabi- At the beginning of the returnee and tools. lized by the end of June 1991 and a emergency operation, many believed The scale of the ICRC operation second registration was undertaken by that the provision of food and other highlights the inadequacies of the the UN at the sites around Nasir. relief in Nasir would attract people. UN's overall performance and raises The transition from a relatively easy This did not happen, instead requests the question of why the UN did not life in the refugee camp to the hard were made through chiefs that return- also obtain a more satisfactory agree- realities of poor shelter, little food and ees and local people alike should be ment for the returnees under its care. It unreliable relief cannot have been an assisted with tools, seeds and fishing should be pointed out, however, that easy one. However, to rural Sudanese equipment, health, education and there have been a number of instances who were refugees in Itang, not being cattle vaccination to help ensure food in southern Sudan when ICRC have able to produce food for their families security and survival. It is a sad com- failed to gain access agreements while was tantamount to losing control of mentary that not enough of such sup- the UN have managed to do so. This their destinies, a state which had seri- port was provided to the returnees, demonstrates once again the degree of ous psychological consequences. particularly to those who returned to manipulation faced by those wishing Nearly everyone interviewed during their own home areas. to provide humanitarian relief in a the returnee registration process held Of the 150,000 people who fled situation of conflict. the opinion that it was good to be Itang, approximately 120,000 moved home, or at least in Sudan. A visiting on to home areas or cashed in on lan- How the Returnees Fared UNHCR officer in Nasir reported that guage affinity or kinship networks. Without doubt, the majority of the re- despite the paucity of relief and diffi- These people benefitted only margin- turnees who survived, did so due to culty of their circumstances, the re- ally from any relief; but they are now their own coping mechanisms. From turnees looked far happier in Sudan integrated into the life and community the time they arrived in Nasir until the than when she had worked with them of southern Sudan, such as it is in a civil first provision of relief food, five weeks as refugees in Itang. war. As far as is known, the great ma-

Refuge, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1994) 23 jority have survived4espite the sub- tions and suggests some obvious con- interference have been helpful or merely sequent withdrawal of OLS from large clusions. It is clear that the people who added another conflicting party? It seems areas of the south as a result of in- became refugees at Itang and subse- fair to conclude that yes, a strongerline creased insecurity. It is known that quently returnees at Nasir were un- should have been taken, on the basis of their existence is very much on a knife- dermined by war, manipulated by the a thorough political understanding. edge, vulnerable as they are to the va- conflicting parties, and inadequately However, the history of international garies of climate and disease, to the protected and assisted by the interna- humanitarian involvement in cross- continuing destruction wreaked by the tional community. Their survival had border situations and conflict make it war and to the disruption of com- more to do with their own tenacity and clear that it is not only a strong merce. It seems likely that they have no coping strategies than any other exter- response that is needed, but also an capital left, only their tenacity to sur- nal factor. intelligent, politically aware and co- vive. Meanwhile they have weakened Were the political realities of their ordinated one. Many have suggested the economic capacity of their hosts to manipulation also useful to their own sur- that OLS, under the direct control of the point that any major change in their vival? Yes, without the interference of the Department of Humanitarian Af- circumstances will cause yet another the SPLA many would never have fairs, would be more effective at deal- mass migration. reached Itang nor benefited from refu- ing with such issues, but it has not Of the other 30,000, the greater pro- gee security and the subsequent food, succeeded so far in this respect. portion were the Blue Nile group. They health and education programs they We can conclude that, particularly were finally released from their role as received there. Neither would they in the context of war, the international hostages for relief and were allowed to have managed to alert the interna- community and particularly the UN move back toward their home terri- tional community so rapidly of their withits mandate, needs to spend more tory in May 1992. However, with poor plight. On the other hand, perhaps time understanding the political fac- rains and a lack of any support from many could have stayed with their tors at play in the sufferingof civilians. relief agencies (who were once again families in their home areas-areas Having recognized the forces in- prohibited access) many floundered that subsequently saw the re-establish- volved, a consistent application of ap- and subsequently half of them have ment of schools, health facilities and propriate leverage should be brought been recorded as refugees in Ethiopia. food security under OLS. to bear, based on the rights of civilians The remainder have temporarily es- At issue is the unacceptable ma- and especially children to humanitar- tablished themselves inside Sudan, in nipulation by the SPLA and govern- ian assistance. The UN is in a unique theDagu1Chegile area, awaiting a late ment of Sudan (and the government of position to demand these rights, to harvest. It would seem that the fami- Ethiopia of the time) which the inter- negotiate access and to publicize ma- lies have split-with dependants leav- national community was powerless to nipulation, particularly with its re- ing in search of relief while other prevent. The failure of the government cently strengthened mandate for stronger family members continue to of Sudan to allow the international intervention, as applied in Yugoslavia, try to produce food. The success of agencies to provide for returnees' food Angola and Cambodia. their venture is, however, already and non-food needs once they Part of the negotiation for protec- compromised by both SPLA and gov- returned to Sudan was completely un- tion and assistance must include corri- ernment raids and the above men- justified. The limitation on the move- dors of tranquillity from zones of tioned denial of relief access. ment of the Blue Nile group at Nasir displacement back to home territories. One small success on the part of the imposed by the SPLA was equally un- However it is crucial to recognize that international community was the re- justified. Thus the second major issue such corridors include protection in, turn of some forty women and chil- is the failure of the international com- and access to, the home areas them- dren, originally SPLA prisoners of munity to recognize the political as- selves and this protection and access war, to their homes in northern Sudan. pects of the situation. As such, while must be continuous rather than occa- Recognized by a UN worker in one of managing effectively to support sional. the camps, the ICRC negotiated their 150,000 people as refugees, they were The third consideration is the im- safe passage home. They were taken unable to help them when they re- portance of the local social, economic on a UN barge up the Nile to White turned home. The UN in particular and cultural setting. This is a factor in Nile province where they were put failed to recognize the vulnerability of survival that is often recognized, but under the protection of ICRC officials the refugees to the changing politics of seldom acted upon. The underlying from Khartoum. Ethiopia and was ill-prepared to pro- rationale for assistance should be pri- tect them inside Ethiopia or to help marily that the beneficiaries are them- Discussion them when they returned, despite a selves responsible for their own This tale of forced movement, the clear mandate of protection. survival. Relief inputs and programs struggle to survive and poor interna- Should the international community must therefore reinforce this responsi- tional response provokes some ques- have taken a stronger line? Would such bility rather than undermine it.

, 24 Rcfrrge, Vol. 14, No. 1(April 1994) The fourth consideration is the de- gees. The difficultiesof providing such References gree of support provided to returnees support are not so great as to warrant Brennan T. 1991. Report to OFDA. Unpub- or displaced persons by the interna- our ignoring the vital role that it plays. lished mimeograph. tional community compared to that Conferring responsibility for survival Dodge, Cole P. and Raundalen Magne. 1991. provided to refugees. In 1987 it was means assisting in returnees' areas of Reaching children in war. Uppsala: Scandi- estimated that per capita relief invest- origin, thereby eventually reducing navian Institute for African Studies. ment in the Sudanese refugees in the burden of support required. Such Johnson, Douglas H. 1992. Increasing the trauma of return: An assessment of the UNS Ethiopia was $30, while at the same an approach also reduces the burden emergency response to the evacuation of the time aid to southern Sudanese dis- borne by traditional support networks. Sudanese refugee camps in Ethiopia in 1991. placed in Khartoum was of the order of Without this, the stress of coping with Unpublished mimeograph. $2.50 per person (MDTMRR 1991). As the burden of dispossessed-returnees Minear, Larry. 1990. Humanitarianism under the general level of security once more is likely to result in greater levels of siege: A critical review of Operation Lifeline declines in southern Sudan, there is, vulnerability and massive re-displace- Sudan. Trenton, New Jersey: Red Sea yet again, movement of Sudanese into ment among the home community. Press. Ethiopia. We readily recognize that Finally it is important to stress once Multi-Donor Technical Mission on Refugees and Returnees. 1991. Report on mission to adequate assistance must be provided again the issue of political manipula- western region Sudanese refugee camps. Un- to them as refugees, nonetheless sup- tion. Between 1987 and 1988 it was es- published mimeograph. port to their home areas would go far timated that 96 percent of fatalities in Scott-Villiers, A. and P. Scott-Villiers. 1991. to enhance the efforts of the southern the southern Sudanese war were civil- The return of the Sudanese refugees from Sudanese in improving their own food ians. From our experience we can pos- ltang camp, Cambela, Ethiopia. A report on security and basic services, and mak- tulate that a large proportion of those their current situation, numbers, areas of ori- ing their homes a place where at least civilians had been manipulated in some gin and present location along the Baro, Pibor and Sobat Rivers of Southern Sudan. UN/ part of the family (if not all) can re- way or another into a state of extreme OLS, unpublished mimeograph. main. vulnerability which contributed to their UN/OLS. 1991. 1992 assessment and appeal. Is it necessaryfor people to live beyond deaths. It is this fact, more than any Unpublished mimeograph. their own borders just for the purposes of other, that should galvanize the inter- USAID. 1991. Southern Sudan assessment, Fi- relief, basic services or trade? No, dis- national community toward an aware- nal report. Unpublished mimeograph. placed persons, particularly those ness of the politics of displacement and Woldridge, Michael. 1987. "Why they fled," struggling to return to their homes and toward a more consistent approach to In War wounds, Development costs of con- rebuild their self-reliance should be solidarity with and protection of the flict in Southern Sudan, editedby N. Twose given the same level of support as refu- innocent victims of war. and B. Pogrund. London: Panos. J

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