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of destitute southernerstrekked across plies from Itang were dispersed over a ful, because of the people's own social the south of Sudan, guided on their wide geographical area. As a result of adaptation to the conditions of war way by the SPLA toward these Ethio- the war, the loss of the Arab merchant and because they did not receive any pian camps. No stopping was allowed. class (who had formed the backbone of significant donor or agency support. In addition, between 1989 and 1991 the rural economy) led to -a distinct relief workers for Operation Lifeline impoverishment of the population in Preparation for Movement as Condi- Sudan often witnessed the movement southern Sudan (Dodge and Magne tions in Ethiopia Deteriorated of truckloads of children, mostly 1991). Itang was hit particularly hard The disintegration of the Mengistu young boys, travelling in the direction because the civil war almost com- government accelerated in 1991, forc- of Ethiopia for supposed education at pletely disrupted commerce between ing the SPLA to think of alternative . the refugee camps. They were labelled north and south, and between the large arrangements. Meetings with camp "unaccompanied minors" and by the garrison towns in the south and the residents to discuss returning to Su- time of their return to Sudan in 1991 rural areas. The merchants that flour- dan were held by the SPLA in Itang as numbered over 14,000. ished at Itang, played a very important early as January 1991. Certain groups Population of Itang part in providing trade in SPLA areas sent individual family members back and hence weakened the impact of the to Sudan in advance of the dissolution The number of refugees in Itang camp northern military strategy of isolating of the camp (to the Akobo area for in- during its heyday was difficult to as- the southern civilian population and stance), where crops were planted by certain due to multiple registration then blaming the SPLA for the returnees weeks prior to the arrival of and the failure to deduct figures of re- scarcities and suffering. the rest of their families. This may have turnees (MDTMRR 1991). Addition- The status of Itangwas duein part to been standard practice in the light of ally, local Nuer and Anuak people who its position within the relatively well the lack of agricultural possibilities at populated the area around. the camp developed Ethiopian marketing net- Itang, but nonetheless serves to illus- and who were assisting their kin from work, but was also facilitated by the trate the effective coping strategies across the border were also registered. substantial relief inputs distributed to employed. In June 1991, chiefs of the Gajaak Nuer the refugees. UNHCR was able to at- The speed with which the Mengistu told us that they had been receiving tract significant donor support, but government collapsed was greater food from the refugee camp even was prevented from administering than anticipated by the SPLA, but it is though some of them were over one this relief tightly, resulting in a food significant that while the SPLA had week's walk from Itang itself, and in- surplus which found its way into contingency plans, neither the UN nor side Sudan. There was also a continu- southern Sudan. Itang replaced the other agencies including the major ous flow of traders in and out of Itang, Arab trading class and was an impor- donors had taken any preparatory ac- registering as refugees, receiving tem- tant safety net for people economically tion. Although the matter had been porary relief and leaving again. affected by the war. Equally, the mar- raised by various concerned NGOs, UNHCR reported in July 1990 that ket at Itang was a major resupply even UNHCR failed to respond, de- 242,093 were claiming relief in Itang source to the SPLA. spite its mandate to protect and facili- camp and 280,000 by January 1991. The In interviews with chiefs after the tate the repatriation of refugees. Even real number of refugees may never be abandonment of Itang camp, often a though repatriation to Sudan, which known, but by mid-1991, when the considerable distance from Itang (for was still at war, was not considered camp population returned to Sudan, it example Abwong was approximately desirable at the time, it must have been was probably in the region of 150,000 two weeks walk away), the loss of this recognized as inevitable or at least according to UN and NGO sources. marketplace was considered to be highly likely in light of the political more significant than the arrival of developments. Itang as a Trading Centre large numbers of returnees. As the number of refugees expanded, Relief camps function as critical fac- The Demise of Itang: What the camp at Itang became a centre for tors in the survival strategy of people Happened? commercial activity. During the dry under stress; families divide them- On May26,1991, the refugees left Itang season the people of the Sobat and selves, some remaining at home trying for Sudan en masse under SPLA guard Pibor river basins and even from the to produce food, others move to relief after reported attacks on the camp. Nile in southern Sudan came to Itang sites to collect assistance and still oth- Itang camp, as described, vanished with their cattle for sale and bought ers move to and fro to trade. It was the overnight. There are many conflicting significant quantities of grain and role of the Ethiopian refugee camps as stories regarding what happened, but household items. They transported commercial and service centres that it is apparent that the camp became a these back to Sudan by river. Small motivated the SPLA to attempt to re- target in the downfall of the Mengistu markets sprung up in Sudan where create these camps inside Sudan. Their regime. A major reason that the refu- goods from Itang were sold. Relief sup- attempt was not particularly success- gees felt unsafe and accepted SPLA I 20 Rsm, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1994) safe passage back to Sudan, was that mediate homesteads. The maincentres The government of Sudan's policy Mengistu had nurtured the SPLA. The for relief in SPLA areas were inevitably toward the relief of the people of south- refugees in Itang felt, rightly or in areas most accessible from Kenya em Sudan at this time was described wrongly, that they were identified and Uganda, but even the Ethiopian by US AID as "clearly capricious, if not with the SPLA and as such considered border areas including the Sobat and blatantly obstructionist." The United themselves vulnerable when the Pibor river basins deep inside south- Nations, although not completely una- Ethiopian government fell. The refu- ern Sudan benefitted from some relief ware of the likely arrival of over gees' acceptance of repatriation by the under OLS. 250,000 people from the three Ethio- SPLA was also based on their knowl- However, in 1991, although the po- pian refugee camps (150,000 from edge that a relief structure now existed tential for a massive return of refugees Itang and 100,000 from Panyido and inside southern Sudan. Their faith in from Ethiopia was very clear, OLS did Dima), also did not protest. Perhaps this relief structure may have been not prepare adequately for the inevita- they were tired from the endless strug- greater than warranted by reality. ble suffering of such a move. A pro- gle to negotiate each shipment of relief The camp population crossed into posal was made at an OLS program food with the conflicting parties. The Sudan at Jekau, where their movement meeting in Kenya in October 1990 to United Nations accepted the suspen- was witnessed by a UN assessment supply Waat district and the Sobat ba- sion of the program until the rains be- team. Just as in 1988, the refugee move- sin with relief food, seeds, tools and gan to fall and the area became ment was assisted by SPLA, who had fishing equipment by overland con- virtually inaccessible to relief from the fended off the depredations of bandits voys to reduce the vulnerability of the south. on the flooded route from the camp to local population. The proposal was the border and also on to Nasir. The accepted by all present, including UN The Refugees Return SPLA left a unit at the camp as a rear representatives from Khartoum and a On May29,1991 the authors witnessed guard which followed the stragglers similar recommendation was made by the arrival of approximately 15,000 back into Sudan. the Multi-Donor Technical Mission in people at Jekau on the Ethiopia-Sudan Ethiopia just a few months later. Re- border. These people were forced to The Role of Operation Lifeline grettably, due to Sudanese govern- continue moving by the bombing of Sudan ment intransigence, little was put into Jekau by the Sudanese air force on that OperationLifelineSudan (OLS), a joint place to reduce local vulnerability let same day. Most proceeded to Nasir in UNICEF/ WFP/NGO relief operation alone assist returnees. Both refugee Upper Nile province where some under the loose coordination of UNDP and OLS operations continued in iso- 130,000 were eventually registered functioning in parallel with ICRC, lation without taking into account the during the next three weeks. A smaller started in early 1989, and despite con- obvious political change in Ethiopia group of twenty thousand refugees siderable political and physical con- and its potential ramifications. who originated from the Akobo area straints, managed to provide returned straight home. Interviews significant food and non-food relief Government of Sudan Limits with those arriving at Jekau indicated and assisted in the re-establishment of Assistance to Civilians in SPLA a representative population drawn networks of schools and health facili- Areas from every area of origin known to ties in SPLA and government areas WFP was the largest transporter of have been at Itang except for the Blue (Minear 1990).

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