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1 the Day of the Dolphins Puzzling Over Epistemic THE DAY OF THE DOLPHINS PUZZLING OVER EPISTEMIC PARTNERSHIP1 Bas C. van Fraassen Published pp. 111- 133 in A. Irvine and K. Peacock, eds., Mistakes of Reason: Essays in Honour of John Woods. University of Tororonto Press, 2005. I. Background: a position in the philosophy of science.................................... 2 II. Observability perspectival............................................................................. 3 Observation and the epistemic community ................................................ 3 Smart detectors and bionic persons............................................................. 4 Changes in our epistemic community ......................................................... 7 The new riddle of prevision........................................................................ 9 Epistemic marriage ................................................................................... 10 III. Self-Prevision: its logical laws, its subjective sources ............................... 12 Hintikka's problem..................................................................................... 12 Logic in the first person.............................................................................. 13 Rational change in view............................................................................ 17 IV. Epistemic marriage revisited ...................................................................... 22 The Reflection Principle applied .............................................................. 24 To envaguen.............................................................................................. 24 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 25 NOTES.............................................................................................................. 27 It is a curious but profoundly important fact that general philosophical problems, no matter how traditional or venerable, lead us into sticky technical problems. In fact, the topic of this paper is a technical problem about subjective probability reasoning, but I got into it quite innocently by taking a position in philosophy of science. It was an unpopular position so I had a lot to defend. Today – well, today after many years of struggle to vanquish the foes, and much 1 The Day of the Dolphins son et lumière on both sides, ... it is still unpopular and there are still more technical problems ... but hope springs eternal .... I will begin with a brief introduction to the general philosophical problems and then jump into subjective probability reasoning about what our future can be if we think we may have surprisingly alien new partners in the enterprise of knowledge. I. Background: a position in the philosophy of science The position I took is that full acceptance of science, even with no qualifications and no holds barred, need not involve belief that the sciences are true – that even such wholehearted acceptance requires no more belief than that they are empirically adequate. That means: what the sciences say about the observable parts of the world is true, the rest need not matter. I'm putting this very roughly, but it is enough to make you see the immediate challenge. Suppose that in accepting science I believe whatever it says about the observable. Doesn't the line between the observable and the rest of nature shift continuously – with the invention of microscopes, spectroscopes, radio telescopes, etc.?2 What I mean by 'observable' here is just what is accessible to the unaided human senses. The word 'observable' is like 'breakable' and 'portable'. I would not call this building or a train locomotive breakable just because we now have instruments that can break them – nor call a battle tank portable because it can be carried using a Hercules transport plane. In the same way the word 'observable' does not extend to what is purportedly detected by means of instruments. But this opens up the immediate second challenge: we humans change too, not just our technology.3 Evolution has not stopped, who knows what we can yet grow into? A good point, and that is what I want to take up today. 2 The Day of the Dolphins II. Observability perspectival The first point I want to make is that 'observable' is redundantly equivalent to 'observable by us' – in that way too it is like 'breakable' and 'portable'. And yes, we can change. So thereby hangs a tale ... Observation and the epistemic community The ‘able’ in ‘observable’ does not look indexical. But it is; it refers to us – just as it does in ‘portable’, ‘breakable’, and ‘potable’, though perhaps not in ‘computable’, and certainly not in ‘trisyllable’. Just now it does not seem to make too much difference whether we say ‘within our limitations’ or ‘within human limitations’. But the range and nature of beings that we count as us is not fixed, either necessarily or even historically. The observable phenomena consist exactly of those things, events, and processes that are observable to us. We may very well be quite certain of who we are, and may have full beliefs about the characteristics that all and only we have in common. Suppose those common features are summed up in ‘human.’ Then we fully believe that the observable phenomena are exactly the humanly observable phenomena. But we realize that we are in evolution. We are also not so given to tribalism or species-chauvinism as to see those common features as essential. Even a modal realist could say ‘We are human, and humans are essentially X, so each of us is essentially X, but we may (could, might) in the future have beings among us who are not X.’ Epistemology and cognitive science part ways here. The cognitive scientist, in so far as s/he engages in empirical research and not merely in theorizing, studies human and animal information processing. In epistemology we must take the indexical seriously and reflect also on how we are to think of our own beliefs, opinions, and epistemic activity in general in the light of those contemplated futures where we and human do not coincide. 3 The Day of the Dolphins The touchstone for the difference will clearly appear when we envision changes in the epistemic community, with consequent changes in the referent of ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our.’ This was noticed at once by various scientific realists who tried to exploit it in arguments against constructive empiricism. It will be instructive to diagnose the fallacies in those arguments for that will in fact lead us to genuine problems for anti-realist epistemology. Smart detectors and bionic persons Humans equipped with instruments, surgically implanted electronic devices, evolutionary stories of progeny who grow electron microscope eyes or eventual assimilation of dolphins or extraterrestrials into our community … these all are ways in which we, and our self-conception, could change. In such changes, what is observable by us also changes. Question: does that not change right now what we can give as reasonable and intelligible content to ‘observable’? Let us carefully consider the form of argument that challenges, by such illustrations, the observable/unobservable boundary on which constructive empiricism relies: 1) We could be or could become X. 2) If we were X then we could observe Y. 3) In fact, we are under certain realizable conditions, like X in all relevant respects. 4) What we could under realizable conditions observe is observable. Therefore: Y is observable. Certainly a valid argument. But what does it look like when instantiated to a particular content? Suppose we take as our example the alpha particles familiar from the earliest descriptions of cloud chambers. Let Y be alpha particles. Let X be an 4 The Day of the Dolphins organism with special senses that operate like the cloud chamber, plus sensor that registers what corresponds to cloud chamber tracks. Then premise 2 says: If we were (or were like) X, then we could observe alpha particles What is the basis for this claim? It is clearly a theory which implies that those tracks in the cloud chamber are made by alpha particles. And they are indeed made by alpha particles if alpha particles are real and that theory is true. But our current acceptance of that theory – even if we in fact accept it – does not imply belief in that much. So the argument already assumes, for its polemical success, a different construal of acceptance of scientific theories, thus begging the question against constructive empiricism. Just to round out the picture: the same sort of question begging presumption surrounds premise 3, when given concrete content. We do not really need to appeal to AI, current electronics, or new physics, let alone molecular biology to provide the setting for the arguments. We only need the indubitable possibility of a smart detector of, for example, single electrons or single photons or single alpha particles. But that possibility is already easily within reach, if anyone cared to adapt the technology – always, however, on the assumption of the reality of those particles and truth of the relevant theory. For rather than waiting for the emergence of new kinds of smart detector, we can modify one we know already – me or you, for example. To do this we rig up a physical detector, coupled to an amplifier, which can register the impact or presence of a single electron. It emits the sound ‘Bingo’ whenever that happens. If we point an electron gun at it, designed via our current theory to emit one electron per minute, the apparatus emits
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