4-Volume Set Philosophy of Mind CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN PHILOSOPHY
Edited and with a new introduction by Sean Crawford, University of Manchester, UK
Philosophy of mind is concerned with fundamental issues about the relation between mind and body and mind and world, and with the nature of the diverse variety of mental phenomena, such as thought, self-knowledge, consciousness, perception, sensation, and emotion. Philosophers of mind explore some of the most perplexing questions about our mental lives. For instance: • How exactly is the mental related to the physical? • How is it that our thoughts can reach out to reality and refer to objects distant in time and space? • What is consciousness? Can it be explained by science? For as long as humanity has sought an understanding of its place in the universe, philosophy of mind has been at the centre of philosophy, but it flourishes now as it has never done before. This new title in the Routledge’s Major Works series, Critical Concepts in Philosophy, meets the need for an authoritative reference work to make sense of the subject’s enormous literature and the continuing explosion in research output. Edited by Sean Crawford, a prominent scholar in the field, it is a four-volume collection of classic and contemporary contributions to all of the major debates in philosophy of mind. With comprehensive introductions to each volume, newly written by the editor, which place the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, Philosophy of Mind— is an essential work of reference and is destined to be valued by philosophers of mind-as well as those working in allied areas such as metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language; and cognate disciplines such as psychology—as a vital research tool.
Routledge September 2009 234x156: 1,600pp Set Hb: 978-0-415-47191-6
Routledge Major Works Philosophy of Mind CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN PHILOS
VOLUME I VOLUME II Foundations The Mind–Body Problem
1. Bertrand Russell, ‘Mind and Matter’, Portraits from Memory (George 26. Ned Block, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, Minnesota Studies in the Allen and Unwin, 1956), pp. 142–53. Philosophy of Science, 1978, 9, 261–325. 2. Franz Brentano, ‘The Distinction between Mental and Physical 27. Paul Churchland, ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Phenomena’ [1874], Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, vol. I, bk. Attitudes’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1981, LXXVIII, 2, 67–90. II, ch. I, §5 (Routledge, 1995), pp. 88–91. 28. Jerry Fodor, ‘Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent 3. Bertrand Russell, ‘Knowledge by Description and Knowledge by Aunties’s Vade-Mecum’, Mind, 1985, 94, 373, 89–95. Acquaintance’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1910–11, XI, 29. John Searle, ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’, The Behavioral and Brain 108–28. Sciences, 1980, III, 3, 417–24. 4. Samuel Alexander, ‘Natural Piety’, The Hibbert Journal, July 1922. 30. William Lycan, ‘Form, Function, and Feel’, The Journal of Philosophy, 5. C. D. Broad, ‘Mechanism and its Alternatives’, The Mind and its Place in 1981, LXXVIII, 24–50. Nature (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925), pp. 44–6, 50–81. 31. Jaegwon Kim, ‘The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism’, Proceedings 6. Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, ‘On the Idea of Emergence’, and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1989, 63, 31–47. Part II of ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation’, Philosophy of Science, 32. Terence Horgan, ‘From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting 1948, 15, 2, 146–52. the Demands of a Material World’, Mind, 1993, 102, 555–86. 7. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Hutchinson, 1949), pp. 11–24, 33. Noam Chomsky, Language and Problems of Knowledge (MIT Press, 43–5, 134–5. 1988), pp. 142–7. 8. Carl G. Hempel, ‘The Logical Analysis of Psychology’, in Herbert Feigl 34. J. J. C. Smart, ‘The Content of Physicalism’, Philosophical Quarterly, and Wilfrid Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis (Appleton- 1978, 28, 113, 339–41. Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), pp. 373–84. 35. David Papineau, ‘The Rise of Physicalism’, in Barry Loewer (ed.), 9. Peter Geach, ‘Ryle’s Rejection of Mental Acts’ and ‘Acts of Judgement’, Physicalism and its Discontents (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. Mental Acts (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 4–9. 3–36. 10. Hilary Putnam, ‘Brains and Behaviour’, in R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical 36. John Heil, ‘Levels of Reality’, Ratio, 2003, XVI, 205–21. Philosophy, vol. 2 (Basil Blackwell, 1968), pp. 1–19. 37. Galen Strawson, ‘Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails 11. Roderick Chisholm, ‘Sentences about Believing’, Proceedings of the Panpsychism’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2006, 13, 10–11, 3–31. Aristotelian Society, 1955–6, 56, 125–48. 38. Jaegwon Kim, ‘Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues’, Synthese, 2006, 151, 12. W. V. Quine, ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, The Journal of 547–59. Philosophy, 1956, 53, 5, 177–87. 39. Steven Yablo, ‘The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body’, 13. Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, Minnesota Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1990, 16, 151–4, 162–70, 177–201. Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1956, I, 307–29. 40. Barbara Montero, ‘What Does the Conservation of Energy Have to Do 14. U. T. Place, ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, British Journal of with Physicalism?’, Dialectica, 2006, 60, 4, 383–96. Psychology, 1956, 47, 44–50. 41. W. D. Hart, The Engines of the Soul (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 15. J. J. C. Smart, ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, The Philosophical Review, pp. 1–8, 50–9, 62, 65–7, 69, 130, 135–44, 147–50, 179. 1959, LXVIII, 2, 141–56. 16. Richard Rorty, ‘Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories’, Review of Metaphysics, 1965, 19, 1, 24–54. 17. David Armstrong, ‘The Nature of Mind’ [1966], reprinted in David Armstrong, The Nature of Mind (The Harvester Press, 1981), pp. 1–15. 18. David Lewis, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1972, L, 3, 249–58. 19. Hilary Putnam, ‘The Nature of Mental States’, originally published as ‘Psychological Predicates’, in W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind and Religion (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 37–48. 20. Donald Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory (Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 79–101. 21. Daniel C. Dennett, ‘Intentional Systems’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1971, 68, 4, 87–106. 22. Jerry Fodor, ‘Special Sciences’, Synthese, 1974, 28, 77–115. 23. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 144–55. 24. Hilary Putnam, ‘Meaning and Reference’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1973, 70, 19, 699–711. 25. Thomas Nagel, ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, The Philosophical Review, 1974, LXXXIII, 435–50.
Routledge Major Works Intended Contents SOPHY
VOLUME III VOLUME IV Intentionality Consciousness
42. John Searle, ‘What Is an Intentional State?’, Mind, 1979, 88, 349, 61. Gareth Matthews, ‘Consciousness and Life’, Philosophy, 1977, LII, 199, 74–92. 13–26. 43. Steven Schiffer, ‘Propositional Content’, in Ernest Lepore and Barry C. 62. Sydney Shoemaker, ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, Philosophical Studies, Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language 1975, XXVII, 5, 292–315. (Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 267–94. 63. Frank Jackson, ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’, The Journal of Philosophy, 44. Tyler Burge, ‘Belief De Re’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1977, 74, 338–62. 1986, LXXXIII, 5, 291–5. 45. Daniel Dennett, ‘Beyond Belief’, in Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought 64. Joseph Levine, ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’, Pacific and Object: Essays on Intentionality (Clarendon Press, 1982). Philosophical Quarterly, 1983, 64, 354–61. 46. Simon Blackburn, ‘Reference’, Spreading the Word (Clarendon Press, 65. Brian Loar, ‘Phenomenal States’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1990, 4, 1984), pp. 310–28. 81–108. 47. John McDowell, ‘Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space’, in 66. Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered (MIT Press, 1992), pp. Philip Pettit and John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought and Context 97–102. (Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 137–68. 67. David Papineau, ‘Kripke’s Proof That We Are All Intuitive Dualists’ 48. Sean Crawford, ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes: Quine (www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/davidpapineau). Revisited’, Synthese, 2008, 160, 75–96. 68. Gilbert Harman, ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, Philosophical 49. Tyler Burge, ‘Individualism and the Mental’, Midwest Studies in Perspectives, 1990, 4, 31–52. Philosophy, 1979, IV, 73–87. 69. Ned Block, ‘Inverted Earth’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1990, 4, 53–79. 50. Jerry Fodor, ‘Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Strategy in 70. David Rosenthal, ‘State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness’, Cognitive Psychology’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1980, III, 1, Consciousness and Cognition, 1993, 2, 355–63. 63–72. 71. Fred Dretske, ‘Conscious Experience’, Mind, 1993, 102, 406, 263–83. 51. Gareth Evans, ‘Commentary on Fodor’s “’Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Strategy in Cognitive Psychology’’’, The Behavioural 72. Tyler Burge, ‘Two Kinds of Consciousness’, in Ned Block, Owen and Brain Sciences, 1989, III, 1. Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 427–33. 52. Brian Loar, ‘Social Content and Psychological Content’, in Robert H. Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought (University of 73. Michael Tye, ‘A Representational Theory of Pains and their Arizona Press, 1988), pp. 99–110. Phenomenal Character’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1995, 9, 223–40. 53. Robert Stalnaker, ‘On What’s in the Head’, Philosophical Perspectives, 74. Colin McGinn, ‘Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?’, Mind, 1989, 1989, 3, 287–316. 98, 391, 349–66. 54. Barry Loewer, ‘A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics’, in Bob Hale and 75. Kathleen V. Wilkes, ‘Is Consciousness Important?’, British Journal for Crispin Wright (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of the Philosophy of Science, 1984, 35, 223–43. Language (Blackwell, 1997), pp. 108–26. 76. David Chalmers, ‘Facing Up To the Problem of Consciousness’, Journal 55. Ruth Millikan, ‘Biosemantics’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1989, 86, 6, of Consciousness Studies, 1995, 2, 3, 200–19. 281–97. 77. John Searle, ‘Consciousness’, Annual Review of Neuroscience, 2000, 23, 56. Fred Dretske, ‘If You Can’t Make One, You Don’t Know How it Works’, 557–78. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1994, 19, 468–82. 78. Daniel Dennett, ‘A Third-Person Approach to Consciousness’, Sweet 57. Donald Davidson, ‘Knowing One’s Own Mind’, Proceedings and Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness (MIT Press, Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1987, 441–58. 2005), pp. 25–56. 58. Tyler Burge, ‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge’, The Journal of 79. Martin Davies, ‘Individualism and Perceptual Content’, Mind, 1991, Philosophy, 1988, 85, 649–63. 100, 461–84. 59. Michael McKinsey, ‘Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access’, Analysis, 80. Christopher Peacocke, ‘Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual 1991, 51, 9–16. Content?’, The Journal of Philosophy, 2001, 98, 5, 239–64. 60. Sydney Shoemaker, ‘On Knowing One’s Own Mind’, Philosophical 81. Tim Crane, ‘Is There a Perceptual Relation?’, in Tamar Szabó Gendler Perspectives, 1988, 2, 183–209. and John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience (Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 126–46.
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