On What Language Is by David Alexander Balcarras MA, University
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On What Language Is by David Alexander Balcarras M.A., University of Toronto (2014) B.A. (Hons.), University of Toronto (2013) Submitted to the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY September 2020 c 2020 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All rights reserved. Signature of Author . Department of Linguistics and Philosophy September 1, 2020 Certified by . Alex Byrne Professor of Philosophy Thesis Supervisor Accepted by . Bradford Skow Laurence S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy Chair of the Committee on Graduate Students 1 On What Language Is by David Balcarras Submitted to the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy on September 1, 2020 in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy ABSTRACT What is language? I defend the view that language is the practical capacity for partaking in communication with linguistic signs. To have a language just is to know how to communicate with it. I argue that this view—communicationism—is compatible with its main rival: the view that we know our language by tacitly knowing a particular generative grammar, a set of rules and principles pairing sounds with meanings. But only communicationism gets at language’s essence. Moreover, the rival view may be false, for there is in fact little reason to think we tacitly know grammars. In chapter 1, I argue that communicationism is compatible with the view that language is con- stituted by tacit knowledge of grammar because the brain states that realize grammatical knowl- edge do so because they enable us to know how to linguistically communicate. In chapter 2, I offer further reasons to accept communicationism. The starting thought that we know how to communicate by knowing how to use sentences in a particular rule-governed way in order to ex- press our thoughts is developed into a use-based account of meaning, on which all expressions have their meanings because we know how we use them to mean things. In chapter 3, I explore the extent to which language use is enabled by unconscious representa- tions of grammatical rules. In particular, I consider whether linguistic understanding is enabled by tacit knowledge of compositional semantics. I argue that it is not. Language comprehension and production can be explained without appeal to tacit knowledge of semantics, by instead appealing to our subpersonal capacity to translate natural language sentences into the medium of thought. I conclude that there does not seem to be any reason to believe in tacit knowledge of grammar. Finally, in chapter 4, I survey proposals about what it would be for a speaker to tac- itly know a grammar, and argue that they are all inadequate. I conclude that linguistic meaning cannot be explained in terms of tacit knowledge of grammar. Rather, it should be understood in terms of the practical knowledge that manifests in intentional linguistic action, rather than in terms of that which might underlie it. Thesis Supervisor: Alex Byrne Title: Professor of Philosophy 2 Contents Acknowledgments 7 Introduction 9 1 What is it to have a language? 13 1.1 Laguage and communication . 13 1.2 Knowing how to communicate with a language . 17 1.2.1 Communicating with a language . 17 1.2.2 Inner speech . 19 1.2.3 The ‘language’ of thought . 20 1.2.4 Variation in speakers’ linguistic abilities . 22 1.2.5 Non-social, non-conventional linguistic communication . 23 1.3 The psycho-biology of language . 27 1.3.1 Cognitivism and Neurobiologicalism . 27 1.3.2 How psychogrammars are realized . 31 1.3.2.1 Functional realization . 31 1.3.2.2 Realizers do not suffice .................... 33 1.3.2.3 Are integrated physiogrammars neurophysiological? . 35 1.3.3 The evolution of language . 37 1.4 Conclusion . 39 2 Meaning, use, and know-how 41 2.1 Meaning and use . 41 3 2.2 Communicationism . 45 2.2.1 A framework for metasemantics . 45 2.2.2 Communication and speaker-meaning . 46 2.3 An argument for communicationism . 50 2.3.1 Having L entails knowing how to communicate with L ......... 50 2.3.2 Knowing how to communicate with L entails having L ......... 54 2.4 Another argument for communicationism . 55 2.4.1 Sentence-meaning from know-how . 56 2.5 Objections to communicationism . 59 2.5.1 Individuating languages . 59 2.5.2 Non-literal communication . 60 2.5.3 Speaker-meaning . 62 2.5.4 Semantic value versus content . 62 2.5.5 Meaning without use . 63 2.5.6 The subsentential meaning problem . 64 Appendices 67 2.A Word-meaning from sentence-meaning . 67 2.B Languages and semantic interpretations . 71 2.B.1 Speaker-relative meaning supervenes on interpretation-use . 73 2.B.2 Language supervenes on speaker-relative meaning . 74 2.B.3 Language supervenes on interpretation-use . 75 2.B.4 Explaining the supervenience of language-having . 76 3 Is meaning cognized? 81 3.1 Introduction . 81 3.2 Why meaning is said to be cognized . 82 3.3 Against semantic cognizing . 85 3.3.1 Forming semantic beliefs by disquotation . 86 4 3.3.2 Semantic beliefs formed by disquotation are epistemically safe . 87 3.3.3 Semantic knowledge by disquotation . 88 3.3.4 Non-natural languages of thought . 89 3.4 Sentence disquotationalism vs. speaker disquotationalism . 92 3.4.1 Pragmatic knowledge is insufficient for semantic knowledge . 93 3.5 Disquotationalism versus cognitivism . 94 3.6 Objections and replies . 98 3.6.1 The ‘there’s more to semantic competence’ objection . 98 3.6.2 The ‘no evidence’ objection . 102 3.6.3 The ‘no semantics-free translation’ objection . 103 3.6.4 The indexicality objection . 105 3.6.5 The ‘anti-reliabilism’ objection . 109 3.6.6 The ‘baseless semantic beliefs’ objection . 110 3.6.6.1 Against reason . 111 3.6.6.2 Cognitivism fails to satisfy Reason .............. 113 3.6.6.3 Fricker on the perception of meaning . 113 3.6.7 The indication objection . 117 4 What might knowledge of grammar be? 121 4.1 The trouble with psychogrammars . 121 4.2 Desiderata for a theory of psychogrammars . 123 4.3 Theories of psychogrammars . 127 4.3.1 Working theories . 127 4.3.2 Schematic theories . 129 4.3.3 Functionalist theories . 132 4.3.3.1 Psychofunctionalism . 132 4.3.3.2 Against psychofunctionalism . 133 4.3.3.3 De-semanticalizing understanding . 136 5 4.3.4 Computational theories . 138 4.3.4.1 Computational functionalism . 140 4.3.4.2 Computational structuralism . 142 4.3.4.3 Computational descriptivism . 143 4.3.4.4 Computational mechanicalism . 146 4.3.5 The Evans-Davies-Peacocke theory . 149 4.3.5.1 Peacocke’s account of psychogrammars . 151 4.3.5.2 Against Peacocke’s account . 153 4.3.6 Biological theories . 160 4.3.6.1 The biolinguistic conception of psychogrammars . 160 4.3.6.2 Limitations of the biological theory . 163 4.3.6.3 The multiple realizability of language . 164 4.4 Competence as performance . 167 6 Acknowledgments The following counterfactual is most likely true, or is at least assertible: If Alex Byrne had not been my advisor, this dissertation would have been largely bereft of whatever degree of preci- sion and concision it achieves, while containing many more barbarisms and implicit denials of Moorean truths. Thanks of the highest order to Alex. And enormous thanks also to the rest of my committee, Justin Khoo, Agust´ın Rayo, and Bob Stalnaker, for supporting, inspiring, and challenging me. I have been equally spurred on by the work of my thesis grandfather, David Lewis. I should have liked to raise to him my 28 objections to his 28 replies to the 28 objections considered in “Languages and Language”, but I am sure he would have already anticipated them. (Those about to read this dissertation are advised to stop and instead read (or reread) Lewis (1983).) Another assertible counterfactual: If it were not for Benj Hellie and Jessica Wilson, this dissertation would not exist, not now or in the future. Thank you for showing me how to do philosophy, and why. For conversation and comments on my chapters or earlier incarnations thereof, thanks to Mart´ın Abreu Zavaleta, Allison Balin, Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt, Marion Boulicault, Tyler Brooke-Wilson, David Builes, Thomas Byrne, Kevin Dorst, Kelly Gaus, Cosmo Grant, E.J. Green, Samia Hesni, Kat Hintikka, Stephen Hollingworth, Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello, Ari Koslow, Daniel Munoz,˜ Dennis Papadopoulos, Amogh Sahu, Steve Schiffer, Haley Schilling, Kieran Setiya, Jack Spencer, Kirsi Teppo, Quinn White, Roger White, Steve Yablo, and to au- diences at MIT, Brown, NYU, and Manchester. (Apologies if I have left anyone out!) For making grad school more than grad school, heartfelt thanks to Allison, David, Nathaniel, and Samia. Finally, I owe an unrepayable debt to my family: to its honorary members, Dennis, Mehtaab, Jamus, Iris, and Paul, whose unrivaled constancy got me through; to Sam, for helping me raise the Massachusetts Sutherland population to two; and to my kin, Tim, Stu (and Meaghan, Teddy, and Rachel), Dave, and Kathy, for books, being there, and home base. (Disclaimer: The majority of this dissertation was written or proofed in conditions of pan- demic isolation, which may or may not have resulted in undue severity of tone throughout.) 7 8 Introduction What is language? Many philosophers and linguists see language as a social, conventional system of communication. Others disagree. They say language is fundamentally the medium of thought, a psychological, ultimately biological phenomenon; it occurs at the level of the individual, and so is not social or conventional; and it is sharply distinct from linguistic com- munication, which evolved as a mere externalized byproduct of internalized language.