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Getting the Indonesian Military out of Politics, 1998–2000

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Getting the Indonesian Military out of Politics, 1998–2000 BACK TO THE BARRACKS: GETTING THE INDONESIAN MILITARY OUT OF POLITICS, 1998–2000 SYNOPSIS In May 1998, Indonesia’s armed forces, which had marched in lockstep with the Suharto regime for more than three decades, were poised to begin a stunning about-face. Suharto, a former major general, had resigned when antigovernment protests rapidly escalated, and his departure opened the door for a small group of military leaders to implement reforms they had discussed quietly for years. Agus Widjojo, one of the officers, drafted a plan that would change the relationship between civilian government and the armed forces. His New Paradigm reform agenda called for eliminating the military from many aspects of politics and governance in which it had long played a dominant role. From 1998 to 2000, the military severed its ties with the ruling party, agreed to reduce its representation in the parliament, ordered active-duty officers to leave many posts in civilian government, and separated the police from the armed forces. The changes represented a major break with the past and set the stage for civilian-led reforms to enhance elected government’s control over military institutions and defense policy. Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case based on interviews conducted in Jakarta in March and April 2015. Case published August 2015. A companion case study, Cooperation and Conflict, examines the role of civilians in furthering Indonesian military reforms from 1999-2004. INTRODUCTION the parliament building, 14 ministers had “Nobody ever expected Suharto to resign,” suddenly resigned their posts, international recalled Agus Widjojo, a retired lieutenant general powers including the United States had stopped in the Indonesian military. “We had never supporting the regime, and the speaker of the prepared for a system that would succeed parliament called for the president to resign. It Suharto.” was clear Suharto had a decision to make.2 On May 15, 1998, Indonesian president Suharto’s authoritarian government had Suharto cut short a trip to Egypt and flew home. woven the military deeply into the fabric of While he had been away, long-running protests Indonesian affairs. “They weren’t just part of the against his brutal and corrupt 31-year rule had regime. They were the regime,” said Sandra intensified, and riots had spread through several Hamid, an activist at the time who had been a cities, leaving at least a thousand people dead. reporter and later led the Asia Foundation’s work The economy was in tatters: Gross domestic in Indonesia. Active-duty officers served in product had shrunk by 12% in the first half of assigned posts in parliament, the civil service, and 1998, and currency value had dropped 85% in local government offices. And the president’s less than a year.1 Demonstrators had taken over dominant Golkar Party had a military faction that ISS is a joint program of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Bobst Center for Peace and Justice: successfulsocieties.princeton.edu. ISS invites readers to share feedback and information on how these cases are being used: [email protected]. © 2015, Trustees of Princeton University Tristan Dreisbach Innovations for Successful Societies exerted a strong influence over the choice of earlier as part of an effort to shore up his electoral candidates. administration by naming political allies to key The armed forces exercised economic power positions. Despite his close ties to the former through control of formal and informal dictator, Habibie tried to establish credibility. He businesses, though there were no clear data about removed press censorship, legalized the the extent of the military’s economic holdings. In formation of new political parties, and called for 2007, the Indonesian government estimated that elections to be held the following year.6 “There military foundations and cooperatives controlled was no censorship,” said Djoko Susilo, who businesses with gross assets of $350 million, but served in parliament with the National Mandate the value may have been far higher prior to the Party from 1999 to 2009. “People were free to 1997 financial crisis.3 Officers often extracted support any political party they liked.” personal profit from those ventures and could This environment of rapid change provided also earn many times their modest official salaries an opportunity for a small group of military by working for businesses in the timber, officers who believed the Indonesian armed insurance, banking, construction, retail, or other forces were too involved in politics and internal industries.4 affairs. Among them were Widjojo and Susilo As the crisis unfolded in 1998, Suharto Bambang Yudhoyono. Widjojo was the son of a summoned Wiranto, whom he had appointed general killed during an attempted coup in 1965. both commander of the armed forces and After graduating from the military academy in minister of defense and security. (Wiranto and 1970, Widjojo began an army career involving the Suharto, like many Indonesians, used only one development of doctrine and strategy and name.) Wiranto, a general and the leader of the including a stint as commandant of the Joint Staff armed forces and the police, said that although and Command College, a school for officers. the country’s military and security services could Yudhoyono, who would become president in restore order, the costs, including further loss of 2004, was also the son of an army officer and had life, would be high. Suharto decided his time had a similar reputation as a military intellectual, come.5 although he had served in command posts. “There were demonstrations all over Both men had studied abroad and were part Indonesia asking President Suharto to withdraw of a group of foreign-educated officers who had from leadership,” said Suaidi Marasabessy, who at risen through the ranks to take leadership roles in the time was a commander of Regional the armed forces. For decades they had discussed, Command VII/Wirabuana in Sulawesi, an island mostly among themselves, how to modernize and east of Borneo. “On May 21, every regional improve the military. By 1998, Widjojo and commander was called by Wiranto to army Yudhoyono had positions that enabled them to headquarters at 8 a.m.” There, Wiranto informed exert strong influence on military doctrine. With them that Suharto would resign. The president Suharto gone, they had the chance to implement appeared on television that evening and made a their ideas. brief statement that ended his 31-year military- backed autocratic regime. THE CHALLENGE When he stepped down, Suharto handed the Widjojo and Yudhoyono had to build presidency to one of his close confidants, support for modernization within a military Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie. The new president institution that had been closely integrated into was an unlikely leader—an aerospace engineer Indonesian life for decades. Thousands of with no military background—whom Suharto had officers thrived under that system, and they were appointed as vice president just two months not likely to embrace a drastic break with the © 2015, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. 2 Tristan Dreisbach Innovations for Successful Societies past. Despite public pressure for reforms, some members who did not work in the armed forces people were likely to resist changes. or government. The military negotiated with those groups to choose candidates for political Military’s outsize influence office.8 The military’s influence in Indonesian society The Suharto government also assigned was far greater than its size suggested. In 1998, military intelligence services the job of screening the manpower of the armed forces, including the electoral candidates for all other political parties police, totaled 451,000 in a national population and empowered military intelligence services to that numbered more than 200 million. By disqualify those it considered politically contrast, the United States, with a population of unreliable.9 about 275 million, had an active-duty military that Those policies meant that many officers was more than three times larger, a figure that did were deeply involved in party politics during the not include police.7 But in contrast to many long- Suharto era. “This was really destructive to the standing democracies, members of the military’s professionalism at that time,” said Kiki Indonesian armed services held prominent Syahnakri, a retired lieutenant general who served positions in politics and government, the police as army deputy chief of staff from 2000 to 2002. were under the command of the military, and Further, military officers held a wide variety of military units operated in parallel with civilian administrative positions in nonmilitary branches of government throughout the country. government services. The government appointed “We had the military in all walks of life, in all them to posts as provincial governors, district functions of the government,” Widjojo said. After heads, members of legislative bodies, the fall of Suharto, Widjojo wanted to end the functionaries in ministries, and ambassadors.10 dual-function doctrine, adopted in the 1960s, that At the time of Suharto’s resignation, 75 of assigned the military significant roles in politics 460 members of the People’s Representative and government in addition to its defense Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), the most responsibilities. That doctrine had its origins in powerful of the country’s two legislative the independence era of the late 1940s, when chambers, were officers whom military anticolonial fighters became the nation’s political headquarters appointed to represent the armed leaders. “The military, starting from its inception, forces. A total of 15 of 26 provincial governors was already political,” Widjojo said. were military officers, as were 119 of the The military formally participated in politics country’s 293 mayors. More than 6,800 active- and government in a variety of ways.
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