State-Firm Bargaining at the Subfederal Level: the Case of California’S Unitary Tax
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STATE-FIRM BARGAINING AT THE SUBFEDERAL LEVEL: THE CASE OF CALIFORNIA’S UNITARY TAX Kathryn N. Scott London School of Economics Ph.D. Thesis in International Relations 1 UMI Number: U183180 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U183180 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 J S F 8185 Abstract This thesis models negotiations over U.S. subfederal economic policies that conflict with international norms. It analyses a recent case of a U.S. state government bargaining with foreign entities over a subfederal economic regulation which violated international norms: California’s system of worldwide combined unitary taxation. The thesis applies Stopford and Strange’s framework of state-firm bargaining to the subfederal level by: 1) determining which actors were involved in lobbying to change a U.S. state economic policy which violated international norms, California’s unitary tax method; 2) determining the actors’ policy agendas; 3) determining the different types of political and economic assets each actor possessed, and how effectively the actors used these assets to achieve their policy agendas; 4) determining how effectively the actors used various channels of negotiation to influence California’s policy, and; 5) determining the most effective uses of assets and negotiating channels, key initiatives which influenced the outcome of the policy debate. What happens when U.S. state economic regulations conflict with international norms? What capabilities do states possess to defend their regulations when bargaining in the international arena? This thesis will argue that in the case of California’s unitary tax, the following hypotheses are valid: 1) Poweful U.S. states such as California can maintain regulatory standards at odds with federal and international norms. Growing global economic interdepence is not eliminating California’s regulatory options, since the U.S. federal government often refuses to effectively constrain powerful states which violate federal and international norms. 2) U.S. state governments can bargain directly with foreign governments and multinational enterprises as actors in the international arena. As the international arena increasingly intrudes on the affairs of subfederal governments, the U.S. federal 2 government will not always be the preeminent negotiating channel for international actors seeking to influence U.S. economic policies. 3 Table of Contents Page Title page .....................................................................................................................1 A bstract...................................................................................................................... 2 Table of contents .......................................................................................................4 Boxes, Charts and Figures .......................................................................................12 Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................14 Dedication ................................................................................................................. 15 List of abbreviations ................................................................................................16 List of appendixes .................................................... 19 Chapter 1. Introduction 1) Research problem............................................................................................20 2) The issue examined .........................................................................................21 3) Locating the issue in the theoretical realm .................................................... 23 4) Modeling paradiplomacy ................................................................................ 29 5) Methodology a) Multilayered state-firm bargaining theory ................................................ 32 b) Applying state-firm bargaining to the subfederal level ............................34 c) The model ...................................................................................................34 i) Actors ......................................................................................................35 ii) Agendas ..................................................................................................36 iii) Assets......................................................................................................36 iv) Channels of negotiation ......................................................................... 37 v) Key initiatives .........................................................................................38 4 Page vi) The question of regimes .................................................................. 38 d) Research approach.................................................................................... 39 6) Core questions and hypotheses ....................................................................... 40 7) Structure of the thesis......................................................................................41 Chapter 2. Defining the Problem: Taxation of MNEs 1) Introduction ..................................................................................................... 47 2) Issues in international taxation ....................................................................... 48 i) Source of income .................................................................................. 50 ii) Residence of taxpayer .......................................................................... 51 3) Transfer pricing ...............................................................................................52 a) Which firms use transfer pricing...............................................................53 b) Reasons for transfer price manipulation .................................................. 54 c) Limits on transfer price manipulation .......................................................56 4) The arm’s length standard a) Definition ...................................................................................................57 i) Comparable unrelated price ...................................................................58 ii) Cost-plus .................................................................................................59 iii) Sales-minus ............................................................................................59 iv) ‘Fourth’ methods ........................... 59 v) Profit splitting ....................................................................................... 60 b) Criticisms of the arm’s length standard ................................................... 60 5) Formula apportionment a) Definition ...................................................................................................63 b) Unitary taxation ..........................................................................................64 c) Criticisms of formula apportionment.......................................................65 d) Criticisms of worldwide combined unitary taxation ................................69 e) The international regime for transfer pricing standards ...........................70 5 Page 6) Summary......................................................................................................... 73 Chapter 3. The Actors 1) Introduction .....................................................................................................77 2) Federal government a) Actors ........................................................................................................79 b) Agendas .....................................................................................................85 c) Assets i) Political ..................................................................................................86 ii) Economic ...............................................................................................87 3) State governments a) State corporate income tax ....................................................................... 88 b) Legality of state activity in the international arena .................................89 c) State tax autonomy ................................................................................... 89 d) Actors ........................................................................................................91 e) Agendas .....................................................................................................95 f) Assets i) Legal ......................................................................................................97 ii) Economic ..............................................................................................98 iii) Institutional .......................................................................................... 98 4) Firms a) Actors ........................................................................................................99