Informal Logic IX.1, Winter 1987

Interpreting Arguments

JONATHAN BERG University of Haifa

We often speak of "the argument in" Two notions which would merit ex­ a particular piece of discourse. Although tensive analysis in a broader context will such talk may not be essential to only get a bit of clarification here. By philosophy in the philosophical sense, 'claims' I mean what are variously call­ it is surely a practical requirement for ed 'propositions', 'statements', or 'con­ most work in philosophy, whether in the tents'. I remain neutral with regard to interpretation of classical texts or in the their ontological status and shall not pre­ discussion of contemporary work, and tend to know exactly how to individuate it arises as well in everyday contexts them, especially in relation to sentences. wherever we care about reasons given I shall assume that for every claim there in support of a claim. (I assume this is is at least one literal, declarative why developing the ability to identify sentence typically used for making that arguments in discourse is a major goal claim, and often I shall not distinguish in many courses in informal logic or between the claim, proper, and such a critical thinking-the major goal when I sentence. teach the subject.) Thus arises the ques­ What I mean when I say that one tion, just how do we get from text to claim follows from other claims is much argument? harder to specify than what I do not I shall propose a set of principles for mean. I certainly do not have in mind the extrication of argu ments from any mere psychological or causal con­ argumentative prose. In so doing, I aim nection. Nor do I wish to restrict myself to provide both a (meta) philosophical to deductive validity. I shall rely for now theory about a central part of the on a very rough normative formulation: philosophical routine and also some one claim follows from another (or practical guidelines suitable for students others) if one should not accept the lat­ of argument. First I shall present the ter without accepting the former. And an theoretical framework underlying my argument is valid (as opposed to deduc­ remarks, and then, after an exposition of tively valid, in the usual sense) if its con­ the principles, I shall show how they clusion does, indeed, follow from its apply to some questions about implicit premises.1 premises and about ignoratio elenchi.

2. Arguments and Intentions 1. Theoretical Preliminaries A more noteworthy feature of argu­ I take an argument or inference to be ments as conceived here is their inten­ a collection of claims, one of which, the tionality. An argument is not merely a conclusion, is put forth as following collection of claims, nor even a collec­ from the others, the premises. While not tion of claims bearing a certain logical distinguishing strictly between argu­ relation to each other, but rather, a col­ ments and inferences, I think of in­ lection of claims intended, by an arguer, ferences as atomic arguments, in which to bear a certain logical relation to each none of the premises double as conclu­ other.2 This is not to say that we can sions inferred from any of the other speak of an argument only relative to premises. some actual arguer, for we can always 14 Jonathan Berg

imagine, for the sake of discussion, a arguer's intentions, which otherwise hypothetical arguer with the requisite in­ tend to be neglected as attention centers tentions (much as we can discuss a on strict logical validity. As I shall try to speech act, such as the assertion that p, show, giving the arguer's intentions their without regard to any actual speaker). due can shed some light on certain But whether the arguer be actual or issues in the theory of argument inter­ hypothetical, the structure of an argu­ pretation. Secondly, general principles ment (as well as the content) is largely of interpretation cannot be applied to determined by the arguer's intentions. argumentative discourse without special Consequently, extracting arguments attenti.on to validity, due to its centrality from their textual surroundings is a mat­ in the enterprise of argument. Above all, ter of discerning intentions. And how the principles I present here constitute those intentions are to be discerned a reasoned, unified basis for argument depends, of course, on our intentions as interpretation, applying systematically to interpreters. In philosophical discussion all aspects of the interpretive process­ the point of recounting an argument is as opposed to, for instance, ad hoc rules to enable its evaluation, with regard to for determining implicit premises. both its validity and also the acceptability of its premises-or at least I shall assume this as a working hypothesis. That is, I 3. Principles of Interpretation take it that I am not unusual among philosophers in intending when The following principles are put forth elucidating an argument to facilitate as guidelines for presenting the argu­ judgment of its soundness.3 Of course, ment contained in a given text, where I may have the ulterior motive of wan­ the argument is to be presented by giv­ ting to impart a particular attitude ing sentences corresponding to its toward the argument, but I must never­ claims and by indicating, via these theless at least make out to be presen­ sentences, which claims allegedly follow ting the argument for the sake of objec­ from which. Such a presentation often tive evaluation (as I would want the at­ takes the form of a numbered list of titude I favor to be seen as the inevitable sentences along with a tree diagram of result of fair and fitting consideration). the sentence numbers which indicates Thus construed, the interpretation of the lines of inference, but any method argumentative discourse is like the inter­ of presenting a set of sentences under pretation, for the sake of critical review, a partial order will do. of any expository prose, in that in both I view these principles as mere cases we aim to determine on the basis guidelines, because they are not hard of the text (and its context) what the and fast rules; indeed, they are largely author meant, so that a decision may overdeterminate. Hence, all except the then be reached about its correctness. last should be understood as implicitly It should come as no surprise, then, that qualified by a certain paribus operator. the principles of interpretation I for­ Furthermore, they are by no means mulate apply not only to argumentative meant to provide a complete method for discourse, but to any discourse being in­ extricating arguments. Rather, they are terpreted in preparation for the assess­ intended to help in the application of ment of its descriptive content. more basic strategies for identifying the The application of these general prin­ elements of an argument's structure, by ciples to argu mentative discou rse is contributing to the resolution of ques­ especially valuable for several reasons. tions raised by these more fundamental First of all, when the extrication of strategies about how a particular claim arguments is treated as a kind of inter­ should be formulated and how it func­ pretation, more attention is paid to the tions in the argument.4 Interpreting Arguments 15

(a) The Principle of Loyalty: Be loyal to the defenceless fetus must bear full responsibili­ text (written or spoken-in formulating ty for his wicked crime. claims prefer the wording of the text, and in general prefer interpretations supported with by the strongest, most direct textual evidence (including what is known of the cir­ An individual who performs an abortion cumstances under which the text was must bear full responsibility for his action. produced). (d) The Principle of Charity: Assume the The text, after all, is the entire arguer is not grossly deficient in either manifestation of the argument; it is, in general knowledge or logical competence, a sense, all the interpreter has to go on. i.e., that he would not make wildly absurd claims or inferences. Since the text completely exhausts the arguer's explicit commitments, deviation This follows more or less from the from it increases the interpreter's assumption that the argument in ques­ vulnerability to charges of misinterpreta­ tion is worth considering, which should tion. And the interpretation is fatally be assumed at least for the sake of flawed to the extent that the arguer can discussion.7 This principle is much more say it is not what he meant.5 This applies modest than many of its popular not only to the formulation of the argu­ namesakes, for it is aimed at pulling out ment's claims, but also to the determina­ of the text the arguer's argument, which tion of the lines of inference. The word is not always the best argument that can 'therefore' is strong, direct textual be read into the text. 8 evidence in support of taking the claim (e) The Principle of Principled Preference: immediately after it as allegedly follow­ The preferability of the favored interpreta­ ing from the c1aim(s) before it; mere jux­ tion over rejected competing interpretations taposition may also suggest such a link must be justifiable in terms of the principles (though with no hint of the direction of above; hence, alternative interpretations that cannot be dismissed so must not be the inference), but it would be much neglected. weaker, less direct evidence. This principle deals with the (b) The Principle of Clarity: Present the argu­ overdeterminacy of the others. As noted ment as clearly as possible-be literal, precise, and terse. above, the principles are overdeter­ minate in that they may conflict-various This obvious infringement on-or principles may support various incom­ restriction of-the Principle of Loyalty patible interpetations. Such conflicts call follows from the hypothesis that the for subjective judgment, weighing the point of recounting the argument is to relative pull of the various principles facilitate its proper evaluation. For sure­ along with the grounds for their applica­ ly it is easier to assess claims and in­ tion and the circumstances under which ferences when they are clearly put.6 the argument is being discussed. Facing Resolving conflicts between principles a conflict between the Principles of will be discussed below with the last Loyalty and Clarity, for instance, we principle. weigh the clarity gained by a particular (c) The Principle of Neutrality: Formu late the reformulation of the arguer's words claims in neutral terms. against the risk of misinterpretation in­ Again, the point is to facilitate the curred by the requisite deviation from argument's proper evaluation, on the the text; and this involves taking into ac­ assumption that claims can be more count the abilities and interests of our judiciously assessed stripped of logica­ intended audience, e.g., how clear the Iy extraneous emotional charges. Com­ relevant expressions are to them, and pare, for instance, how important for them is faithfulness to the original text. Clearly one inter­ The murderer who executes a poor, pretation may be favored in the c1ass- 16 Jonathan Berg

room and quite another in a professional argument which must be distinguished journal. And even with the same au­ from the one given by the arguer. In dience different interpretations may be some cases the addition of an implicit preferred in accordance with, for exam­ premise will yeild a stronger argument, ple, whether the discussion is primarily in which the conclusion is better sup­ historical or topical. In any case, the Prin­ ported by the premises. But ciple of Principled Preference requires distinguishing between different that the choice of interpretation arguments for the same conclusion on ultimately be based in this way on the the basis of how much support the other four principles. Sometimes, of premises provide is fundamental to the course, such deliberations will be in­ whole enterprise of assessing conclusive, in which case there is no arguments. In other cases the addition choice but to present all of the equally of an implicit premise will yield a weaker acceptable alternatives.9 argument, depending on commitment In the remaining sections I shall bring to a more questionable claim. But these principles to bear on specific distinguishing between arguments on issues concerning implicit premises and the basis of the acceptability of their ignoratio elenchi. premises is also crucial to argument assessment. The new, expanded argu­ ment may well be worth considering, 4. Implicit Premises especially if there is good reason to believe that the arguer would endorse it. Often-perhaps typically-not all the Nevertheless, it cannot be taken as the claims in an argument are set forth ex­ arguer's argument, as long as it contains plicitly. I do not have in mind cases claims not appearing in the arguer's text. where a claim is merely presented by The problem with the textualist tack name, as in lies, not surprisingly, in the undue Due to the law of supply and demand, in­ weight it places on the text. While sure­ vestors should carefully study prevailing ly a distinction is to be made between market conditions before investing in a par­ the argument without any implicit ticular product. premises added and the argument with, or by some non propositional construc­ the question remains, which of these tion, as in two arguments is the arguer's? Although the Principle of Loyalty points to the first, By the tatoo on his arm, we can infer that the Principle of Charity prohibits at­ he is a sailor. tributing to the arguer any gross non­ I mean to consider, rather, cases in sequitur; hence, the need for attributing which one (or more) of an argument's implicit premises.10 This does not mean, premises is not stated (or mentioned) at of course, that the Principle of Loyalty all. This raises two questions. First, why should be ignored. Indeed, as will be think that there are such claims? If an seen shortly, it severly constrains ascrip­ arguer does not make a certain claim, tions of implicit premises, requiring why consider it part of his argument? overriding evidence for each implicit Secondly, even if there are implicit premise posited. However, keeping in premises, how do we decide in par­ mind the importance of the arguer's in­ ticular cases what they are? tentions, as described above, we must In response to the first question a not remain stuck to the text when the strict textualist would simply deny that arguer's intentions clearly transcend it. there ever are any (entirely) implicit The point may be more evident with premises. According to the textualist regard to implicit conclusions, the ex­ view, by throwing in so-called implicit istence of which seems beyond ques­ premises the interpreter constructs an tion, but it applies to implicit premises Interpreting Arguments 17 just as well. Clarity would favor the interpretation Given that there are implicit lacking the superfluous implicit premise. premises, how do we identify them?11 Whatever might have been said about Were we solely concerned with patching that implicit premise could just as well up non-sequiturs, the surest way to pro­ be put in terms of the validity of the in­ ceed would be by adding as an implicit ference. 14 premise to every inference that is not Of course, nothing I have said should deductively valid the validating condi­ be construed as a general ban against tional of the inference, formed by the taking validating conditionals as conjuction of the inference's premises premises. To whatever extent the text in­ as antecedent and the conclusion of the dicates that the arguer actually intend­ inference as consequent.12 Since the ed a validating conditional as a premise, validity of any inference is equivalent to Le., as one of the claims from which a the truth of its validating conditional, the conclusion is inferred, the Principle of validating conditional is implicit in the Loyalty requires presenting it as such. 15 inference in at least the sense that the But because of the very same principle, arguer is as committed to its truth as he no unstated claim, whether validating or is to the validity of the inference.13 not, may be thrown in without good But the attribution of validating con­ reason. ditionals as implicit premises is neither To be included as an implicit premise called for nor even condoned by the a claim must meet certain criteria deriv­ principles of interpretation. The princi­ ing from the principles of interpretation. ple of Charity does not make it the in­ First of all, insofar as the Principle of terpreter's business to eliminate all non­ Charity provides that justification for at­ sequiturs-only gross ones. So where tributing implicit premises in spite of the there are no gross flaws in an argument, Principle of Loyalty, implicit premises the Principle of Charity provides no must enhance the inference's validity. justification for riding roughshod over That is, there should be more reason to the Principle of Loyalty by adding accept the conclusion when the anything implicit. And even when a non­ premises of the inference are sequitur is gross enough to activate the augmented by the implicit premise than Principle of Charity, it can be dealt with, when they are taken alone.16 among other ways, by adding an implicit Secondly, out of respect for the Prin­ premise that merely makes it tolerable, ciple of Loyalty, there must be sufficient rather than by making the inference reason for thinking that the implicit deductively valid. premise is indeed held by the arguerY So the principles of interpretation­ Such reason may derive from the text, in particular, the Principle of Charity­ directly or indirectly, from information do not generally require taking unstated about the author, including other texts validating conditionals as implicit he has produced and the circumstances premises. Moreover, they may be seen under which he wrote, and even from as not even allowing it. For if two inter­ general background knowledge. Failure pretations of an argument differ only in to satisfy this criterion may give rise to that one includes a validating condi­ arguments against a straw man.16 tional as an implicit premise where the At this point John Nolt adds his ver­ other does not, then they are equally in­ sion of the Principle of Charity: "If formative, attributing to the arguer the several different sets of premises satisfy very same commitments (due to the criteria (1)-(3) [the author expects us to aforementioned equivalence between take them for granted, they strengthen the validity of the inference and the truth the reasoning, and they do not merely of its validating conditional). And so, for embody a stated inference], add the the sake of terseness, the Principle of premise or set of premises which make 18 Jonathan Berg

the argument strongest" (p. 101). Just we could say that one claim follows from what this amounts to is not clear. On the another (or others) if, given what is one hand Nolt stresses how this princi­ generally known and not in question, ple respects the author's intentions, one should not accept the latter without directing us "to assume that he or she accepting the former. Alternatively, made the best possible case for the con­ avoiding such a nonstandard notion of clusion within the bounds of what was validity, we can justify the omission of actually stated" (p.101), and "to con­ trivial implicit premises on conversa­ struct the best possible argument within tional grounds: uncontroversial implicit what we know of the author's inten­ premises are not mentioned simply tions" (p. 102). But on the other hand, he because they are not interesting. justifies the principle on the grounds that "if we sincerely want to know S. Ignoratio Elenchi whether the conclusion is true, then it is in our interest to examine the Sometimes an arguer argues beside strongest argument possible-even if it the point, trying to get his conclusion ac­ isn't exactly what the author had in cepted by making a claim from which mind" (p. 101, emphasis mine). Now if follows, at best, some related but our aim is to find out whether the con­ significantly different conclusion. I clusion is true, the author's intentions do classify it as a case of ignoratio elenchi not matter at all; in such circumstances when the arguer does this deliberately, we should consider whatever plausible recognizing (at least upon reflection) the arguments we can think of for or against discrepancy between the apparent con­ the conclusion, including those not even clusion and the plausible conclusion. suggested by the text. If, however, our This differs from standard characteriza­ aim is, as Nolt says, to determine "which tions of ignoratio elenchi in two impor­ argument the author intended" (p. 102), tant ways. First, I do not count as ig­ then the bounds of his intentions must noratio elenchi honest errors in reason­ not be violated at all. Nolt claims that his ing, but only cases where the arguer is Principle of Charity merely tells us how aware (at least upon reflection) that he to choose among possible implicit is arguing beside the point; there must premises all of which the author intend­ be logical malice aforethought. Second­ ed to be taken for granted. But if the ly, instances of ignoratio elenchi are by author intended them all to be taken for my definition fallacious. They do not in­ granted, there is no reason to choose clude, for example, legitimate arguments between them-the interpretation ad hominem.20 should include all intended premises. Ignoratio elenchi so understood has The need to choose can arise only when no place in argument; instances of it it is not clear what the author intended, never belong to the argument proper. in which case the Principle of Principl­ For insofar as the arguer realizes that a ed Preference directs us to offer all in­ claim does not really support his conclu­ terpretations that cannot be ruled out by sion, he cannot intend it as such.21 So the other principles. however effective a rhetorical device it In actual practice our ascription of im­ may be, it is not part of the argument (in plicit premises is restricted fu rther by a the favored sense). criterion of questionability-to the ex­ Furthermore, to the extent that an tent that an implicit premise is general­ argument is clearly beside the point, and ly accepted we tend not to bother men­ hence, obviously fallacious, it would be tioning it.19 One way to account for this uncharitable to interpret the arguer as would be by loosening the notion of truly arguing that way, since the Princi­ validity so that it would be relative to un­ ple of Charity is formulated in terms of controversial general knowledge. That is, logical acumen and not moral scruples. Interpreting Arguments 19

That is, from a logical point of view it is truth through reasoning" (p. 19). This better to be called a logically competent leads to a reconstructionist approach cheat than an honest fool. The upshot to the interpretation of arguments, of this is that ad hominems and the like putting more weight on the argu­ should not, when cleary fallacious, even ment's strength than on the arguer's be considered part of the argument.22 intentions. See below on Loyalty and If this result seems extreme, that is Charity. because it is. For I am urging that we purge from our conception of the argu­ 4 Some such strategies: (a) locate in­ ment in a text what has traditionally been ference words (such as 'therefore') a major part of informal logic; that much and identify the claims they link; (b) of what is typically called "argument ad list all the claims in the text, and then such-and-such" is not really argument at determine which are given in support all. But this is exactly what follows from of which; (c) determine the conclu­ my stated conception of an argument as sion and work backwards-identify a collection of claims intended by the the claims from which the conclusion arguer to be such that one follows from is most directly inferred, then identify the others. It was on the basis of this the claims from which those claims view of argument, along with some are inferred, and so on, down to un­ minor assumptions about the point of supported premises. reporting arguments, that I arrived at the 5 This is a trivial consequence of my principles of argument interpertation conception of arguments as ordered presented above. Just as these principles by the arguer's intentions. As valuable were applied in the previous section to as it is to consider arguments sug­ yield some results on the formulation of gested by a text, even in the spirit of an argument's implicit premises, they the text, this is to be distinguished are applied here to a problem in the for­ from interpreting the argument given. mulation of an argument's bounds. As Nolt puts it, "we must try to divine Given the conception of argument from the author's thoughts. An argument, which the principles derive, it is natural after all, is its author's creation" (p. that they place insincere rhetorical 99). Cf. Scriven: "The principal func­ devices beyond the bounds of the argu­ tion of argument analysis is not that ment proper, despite how much such of reconstructing the state of mind or devices superficially resemble body of beliefs of the arguer ...You argu mentation. need to decide whether you are argu­ ing against the arguer or the argu­ ment" (p. 85). (I would describe the Notes choice as between discussing the arguer's argument and discussing 1 Cf. Govier, pp. 60 ff. other arguments for the same conclu­ 2 Govier's definition makes this inten­ sion.) For a full exposition of this tionality fairly explicit: "An argument crucial distinction between the is a set of claims that a person puts arguer's argument and the best argu­ forward in an attempt to persuade an ment compatible with the text, in­ audience that some further claim is cluding reasons for aiming in inter­ true ...A person who argues ...gives pretation at the former, as I do, see some reasons intended to back up Govier's "Uncharitable Thoughts her view" (p. 1). About Charity" and "On Adler on Charity." 3 Cf. Thomas: "myaim in studying logic is not so much to refute other peo­ 6 Thomas: "When reasoning contains ple's arguments as it is to find the unclear language, we often must 20 Jonathan Berg

clarify it in order to evaluate the sufficiently be established in this way reasoning" (p. 163). Govier reasons (such sufficiently being relative, of similarly: course, to the context of the analysis). Also, my remarks apply not only to In order to understand the exact line of argu­ ment that someone is using, it is helpful to the argument's structure, but to its set out the premises and conclusion in a sim­ claims, as well. ple standard format. ..To standardize an argument is to set out its premises and con­ 10 Thus, the implicit premises of which clusion in clear, simple English state­ I speak are what Ennis calls "gap­ ments... Standardizing arguments gives us fillers" as opposed to "back-ups" (pp. a clear version of where they are going and 62-3). forces us to look carefully at what the arguer has said. When we come to the more in­ 11 As indicated above (see notes 3, 5, and teresting stage of criticizing arguments, we will find standardizing extremely helpful. 8), I am concerned with identifying (Page 21) the implicit premises in the arguer's argument. Those who prefer to con­ Govier requires standardization only sider other arguments, typically if the argument is not worded in a stronger than the arguer's, will con­ "relatively simple and straightforward strue the search for implicit premises way" (p. 144), which may be no less differently, as they are searching for than what the Principle of Clarity re­ implicit premises in other arguments. quires, depending on what counts as (I believe this is the distinction Ennis "relatively simple and straightfor­ means to capture by distinguishing ward." I assume her demand for between "used" and "needed" English statements was meant to ap­ assumptions, pp. 63 f.) For examples ply only to English standardizations. of the latter see Scriven, pp. 162 ff., Thomas, pp. 253 ff., Ennis, pp. 64-6 7 I believe this is the idea behind Jon­ and 69 ff., Hitchcock, pp. 89 ff., and son's proposal that "charity begin at Burke. home," i.e., that "our obligations under the Principle of Charity... 12 For the sake of discussion we may in­ should be honored only in the case clude in the category of validating of real and serious arguments" (pp. conditionals suitable quantified 8-9). variants, such as the universal generalization of the cond itional 8 Cf. Thomas, pp. 18-9, Scriven, pp. 71 described. Regarding such premises f. See notes 3 and 5 above. in argument reconstruction, as oppos­ 9 ct. Govier: ed to interpretation, see Hitchcock.

If you are working on an argument, trying 13 Grice suggest that the validating con­ to construct a diagram, and you find that ditional can be conventionally im­ several distinct models are plausible, it is plicated (pp. 44-5). ct. van Eemeren ... a real possibility that both models are in and Grootendorst. some sense "right" interpretations, even though they differ from each other in some 14 See Govier on "reconstructed" respects. In this situation you should work arguments, pp. 123 ff., and Scriven, with the diagram that seems to fit the passage best, while noting that your inter­ pp. 84 and 163-4; but d. Thomas, p. pretation of the argument's structure is not 260. I have been considering the treat­ the only plausible one. ment of validating conditionals as im­ plicit premises ony in inferences that Contra Govier, I explicitly insist on are not deductively valid. Concerning having the choice between models the extension of such a policy to all based on the given principles of inter­ inferences, see Carroll. pretation, and on working with all models whose implausibility cannot 15 ct. Nolt, who, though arguing on Interpreting Arguments 21

grounds similar to mine, infers the ollary to Scriven's Principle of Chari­ stronger, general conclusion, that "it is ty: "If a sub-section of a passage pointless to add any premise which already identified as an argument con­ merely embodies a stated inference" (p. tains obviously bad reasoning and if 101). If our aim in attributing im­ it can be interpreted as 'clutter" (ex­ plicit premises is, as Nolt says, "to fill in traneous to the argument), then one the author's thoughts" (p. 99), then we should disregard that sub-section in must allow for cases in which the author the final analysis" (p. 5); where ig­ seems to be thinking of the validating noratio elenchi is viewed as clutter. conditional. Ironically the example johnson gives to demonstrate how the Principle of 16 Nolt: "Add premises only if they Charity regulates the ascription of im­ strengthen the reasoning" (p. 99). Cf. plicit premises. Scriven: "the assumptions have to be strong enough to make the argument Premise: X is a person of bad sound" (p. 85). This can be right only character. if one is not restricting one's attention Conclusion: X's views about the to the arguer's argument. press and the media are invalid,

17 Nolt: "Add only statements which the is what I would classify as ignoratio author would have intended to be elenchi, hence, "clutter," hence, taken for granted" (p. 99). As Govier non-argument. sums it up, "no supplementation without justification" (p. 33). I believe that such deference to the Principle References of Loyalty is what underlies Gough and Tindale's view of hidden Burke, Michael, "Unstated Premises." premises as extracted from the text Informal Logic, 7 (1985), 107-118 rather than added to it. Cf. Thomas, Carroll, Lewis. "What the Tortoise Said pp. 253 ff. to Achilles," Mind, (1895). van Eemeren, Frans H., and Rob Grott­ 18 See Govier on the Straw Man fallacy, endorst. "Unexpressed Premises: Part p.109. I. Journal of the American Forensic 19 Ennis: "in order that the activity be Association, 19 (1982), 97-106. perceived to be significant, I general­ van Eemeren, Frans H., and Rob Groot­ ly ask for implicit assumptions that in endorst. "Unexpressed Premises: Part addition someone might challenge" II." Journal of the American Forensic (p. 62). Govier recognizes the ob­ Association, 19 (1983), 215-25. viousness of a claim as a reason for Ennis, Robert H. "Identifying Implicit not mentioning it in an argument (p. Assumptions." Synthese, 51 (1982), 37); I am offering it as a reason for not 61-86 mentioning the claim even in the Gough, james, and Christopher Tindale. analYSis of the argument. "'Hidden' or 'Missing' Premises." Informal Logic, 7 (1985), 99-106. 20 For an excellent discussion of the ad Govier, Trudy, "Ad Hominem: Revising hominem fallacy see Govier's "Ad the Textbooks." Teaching Philosophy, Hominem: Revising the Textbooks." 6 (1983), 13-24. 21 The relevant sense of support is as Govier, Trudy. "On Adler on Charity." something done by claims, not Informal Logic Newsletter, 4 (1982), people. 10-1 . Govier, Trudy. A Practical Study of 22 What I am urging can be seen as an Argument. Belmont: Wadsworth, application of johnson's second cor- 1985.