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Interpreting Arguments Informal Logic IX.1, Winter 1987 Interpreting Arguments JONATHAN BERG University of Haifa We often speak of "the argument in" Two notions which would merit ex­ a particular piece of discourse. Although tensive analysis in a broader context will such talk may not be essential to only get a bit of clarification here. By philosophy in the philosophical sense, 'claims' I mean what are variously call­ it is surely a practical requirement for ed 'propositions', 'statements', or 'con­ most work in philosophy, whether in the tents'. I remain neutral with regard to interpretation of classical texts or in the their ontological status and shall not pre­ discussion of contemporary work, and tend to know exactly how to individuate it arises as well in everyday contexts them, especially in relation to sentences. wherever we care about reasons given I shall assume that for every claim there in support of a claim. (I assume this is is at least one literal, declarative why developing the ability to identify sentence typically used for making that arguments in discourse is a major goal claim, and often I shall not distinguish in many courses in informal logic or between the claim, proper, and such a critical thinking-the major goal when I sentence. teach the subject.) Thus arises the ques­ What I mean when I say that one tion, just how do we get from text to claim follows from other claims is much argument? harder to specify than what I do not I shall propose a set of principles for mean. I certainly do not have in mind the extrication of argu ments from any mere psychological or causal con­ argumentative prose. In so doing, I aim nection. Nor do I wish to restrict myself to provide both a (meta) philosophical to deductive validity. I shall rely for now theory about a central part of the on a very rough normative formulation: philosophical routine and also some one claim follows from another (or practical guidelines suitable for students others) if one should not accept the lat­ of argument. First I shall present the ter without accepting the former. And an theoretical framework underlying my argument is valid (as opposed to deduc­ remarks, and then, after an exposition of tively valid, in the usual sense) if its con­ the principles, I shall show how they clusion does, indeed, follow from its apply to some questions about implicit premises.1 premises and about ignoratio elenchi. 2. Arguments and Intentions 1. Theoretical Preliminaries A more noteworthy feature of argu­ I take an argument or inference to be ments as conceived here is their inten­ a collection of claims, one of which, the tionality. An argument is not merely a conclusion, is put forth as following collection of claims, nor even a collec­ from the others, the premises. While not tion of claims bearing a certain logical distinguishing strictly between argu­ relation to each other, but rather, a col­ ments and inferences, I think of in­ lection of claims intended, by an arguer, ferences as atomic arguments, in which to bear a certain logical relation to each none of the premises double as conclu­ other.2 This is not to say that we can sions inferred from any of the other speak of an argument only relative to premises. some actual arguer, for we can always 14 Jonathan Berg imagine, for the sake of discussion, a arguer's intentions, which otherwise hypothetical arguer with the requisite in­ tend to be neglected as attention centers tentions (much as we can discuss a on strict logical validity. As I shall try to speech act, such as the assertion that p, show, giving the arguer's intentions their without regard to any actual speaker). due can shed some light on certain But whether the arguer be actual or issues in the theory of argument inter­ hypothetical, the structure of an argu­ pretation. Secondly, general principles ment (as well as the content) is largely of interpretation cannot be applied to determined by the arguer's intentions. argumentative discourse without special Consequently, extracting arguments attenti.on to validity, due to its centrality from their textual surroundings is a mat­ in the enterprise of argument. Above all, ter of discerning intentions. And how the principles I present here constitute those intentions are to be discerned a reasoned, unified basis for argument depends, of course, on our intentions as interpretation, applying systematically to interpreters. In philosophical discussion all aspects of the interpretive process­ the point of recounting an argument is as opposed to, for instance, ad hoc rules to enable its evaluation, with regard to for determining implicit premises. both its validity and also the acceptability of its premises-or at least I shall assume this as a working hypothesis. That is, I 3. Principles of Interpretation take it that I am not unusual among philosophers in intending when The following principles are put forth elucidating an argument to facilitate as guidelines for presenting the argu­ judgment of its soundness.3 Of course, ment contained in a given text, where I may have the ulterior motive of wan­ the argument is to be presented by giv­ ting to impart a particular attitude ing sentences corresponding to its toward the argument, but I must never­ claims and by indicating, via these theless at least make out to be presen­ sentences, which claims allegedly follow ting the argument for the sake of objec­ from which. Such a presentation often tive evaluation (as I would want the at­ takes the form of a numbered list of titude I favor to be seen as the inevitable sentences along with a tree diagram of result of fair and fitting consideration). the sentence numbers which indicates Thus construed, the interpretation of the lines of inference, but any method argumentative discourse is like the inter­ of presenting a set of sentences under pretation, for the sake of critical review, a partial order will do. of any expository prose, in that in both I view these principles as mere cases we aim to determine on the basis guidelines, because they are not hard of the text (and its context) what the and fast rules; indeed, they are largely author meant, so that a decision may overdeterminate. Hence, all except the then be reached about its correctness. last should be understood as implicitly It should come as no surprise, then, that qualified by a certain paribus operator. the principles of interpretation I for­ Furthermore, they are by no means mulate apply not only to argumentative meant to provide a complete method for discourse, but to any discourse being in­ extricating arguments. Rather, they are terpreted in preparation for the assess­ intended to help in the application of ment of its descriptive content. more basic strategies for identifying the The application of these general prin­ elements of an argument's structure, by ciples to argu mentative discou rse is contributing to the resolution of ques­ especially valuable for several reasons. tions raised by these more fundamental First of all, when the extrication of strategies about how a particular claim arguments is treated as a kind of inter­ should be formulated and how it func­ pretation, more attention is paid to the tions in the argument.4 Interpreting Arguments 15 (a) The Principle of Loyalty: Be loyal to the defenceless fetus must bear full responsibili­ text (written or spoken-in formulating ty for his wicked crime. claims prefer the wording of the text, and in general prefer interpretations supported with by the strongest, most direct textual evidence (including what is known of the cir­ An individual who performs an abortion cumstances under which the text was must bear full responsibility for his action. produced). (d) The Principle of Charity: Assume the The text, after all, is the entire arguer is not grossly deficient in either manifestation of the argument; it is, in general knowledge or logical competence, a sense, all the interpreter has to go on. i.e., that he would not make wildly absurd claims or inferences. Since the text completely exhausts the arguer's explicit commitments, deviation This follows more or less from the from it increases the interpreter's assumption that the argument in ques­ vulnerability to charges of misinterpreta­ tion is worth considering, which should tion. And the interpretation is fatally be assumed at least for the sake of flawed to the extent that the arguer can discussion.7 This principle is much more say it is not what he meant.5 This applies modest than many of its popular not only to the formulation of the argu­ namesakes, for it is aimed at pulling out ment's claims, but also to the determina­ of the text the arguer's argument, which tion of the lines of inference. The word is not always the best argument that can 'therefore' is strong, direct textual be read into the text. 8 evidence in support of taking the claim (e) The Principle of Principled Preference: immediately after it as allegedly follow­ The preferability of the favored interpreta­ ing from the c1aim(s) before it; mere jux­ tion over rejected competing interpretations taposition may also suggest such a link must be justifiable in terms of the principles (though with no hint of the direction of above; hence, alternative interpretations that cannot be dismissed so must not be the inference), but it would be much neglected. weaker, less direct evidence. This principle deals with the (b) The Principle of Clarity: Present the argu­ overdeterminacy of the others. As noted ment as clearly as possible-be literal, precise, and terse.
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