This article was downloaded by: University of Pennsylvania On: 09 Jan 2018 Access details: subscription number 10622 Publisher:Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK

The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary History, politics, society Andrea Mammone, Ercole Giap Parini, Giuseppe A. Veltri

Welfare, Italian Style

Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 Julia Lynch, Peter Ceretti Published online on: 27 May 2015

How to cite :- Julia Lynch, Peter Ceretti. 27 May 2015 ,, Italian Style from: The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Italy,History, politics, society Routledge. Accessed on: 09 Jan 2018 https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315709970.ch20

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT

Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms.

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 Italian welfare and economy PART IV PART Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 This pageintentionallyleftblank Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 De GasperiIV government, recommendedthat Italyconsidermovingtoward acitizenship- rather thanlabormarketparticipation. In1948,theD’AragonaCommission,convenedby the as manyothercountriesinEurope beganshiftingtowardsocialentitlementsbasedoncitizenship Quine, 2002;Lynch,2009). minimal stateintrusionintothe spheresofcharityandearlychildhoodeducation(Fargion,1997; important tracesonthesysteminformofweakstateparticipation, inadequatefunding,and opponents oftheregime.Atsametime,bothLiberal(anti-state) andCatholicelementsleft separate schemesfordifferentgroupsofworkersinordertoreward supportersandpunishpotential government expandedthecorporatistsystemofsocialinsurance, furtherfragmentingitinto conditional onparticipationinthelabormarketandgradated accordingtoearnings.TheFascist social servicesandsafetynetprograms.Thesystembeganinclassic Bismarckianstyle,withbenefits ; citizenship-basednationalhealthinsurance; andregionallybasedprovisionof The Italianwelfarestatecombinesoccupationallybased social insuranceforoldageand welfare stategoingforward. Republic. Finally,inthethirdsectionweassessprospectsforsignificantreformofItalian of theFirstRepublic.ThesecondsectionanalyzesreformsandcontinuitiesinSecond the developmentofmainstructuralfeaturesItalianwelfarestatethroughend run awelfarestate—andanexpensiveone,atthat.Thefirstsectionofthischapterdescribes Lynch, 2006:93).Yetbythelate1980sItalyseemedtoofferanobjectlessoninhownot generous systemoffamilyallowancessetupinthe1950sand1960s(Fargion,2013:176; unemployment insuranceprogramsforagriculturalworkersasearly1919;andadmiredthe trialized nations.InternationalobserverslaudedItaly’sleadershipinintroducingpensionand At onetime,theItalianwelfarestatewasenvyofsocialreformersinadvancedindus After WorldWarII,theoccupational foundationsoftheItalianwelfarestatepersisted,even From Bismarckian toand beginnings crisis A verybriefhistoryoftheItalianwelfarestate WELFARE, ITALIAN Julia LynchandPeterCeretti STYLE reform 20 239 1 - Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 placed ontheimproper useofsocialinsurance benefitsfromthemid-1980s (e.g.introduction long asItalymaintainedcontrol overitsowncurrencyexchangerates.Somerestrictionswere system werecoveredbythegovernment viadeficitspending,whichwassustainableonly as system wasthusadditionallyburdened withsocialassistancefunctions.Someofthecosts this illicitly, tobufferincomes.Italy’s alreadyexpensivecontribution-financedoccupationalpension and otherprogramssuchasdisability pensionsorminimumthatcouldbeused,often underdevelopment inItaly’sMezzogiornotoproduceheavy demands onthosesocialinsurance Incomplete protectionagainstsocialriskscombinedwith structuralunemploymentand variable “geographyofcitizenship”(Fargion,1997). variation inentitlements,actualavailabilityofservices,andquality ofservicesresultedinahighly social servicesremainedalmostentirelyinthehandsoflocal and regionalauthorities.Regional Italy didnotdevelopastatutoryminimumincomeguarantee, andpovertyalleviationother and disabilitypensions—wereintegratedintotheoccupational socialinsurancesystem.However, Italy. Aswehaveseen,elementsofincomeprotection—minimum ,social robust socialservicesandanationalminimumincome,remain conspicuousbytheirabsencein the equityandfiscalsustainabilityofhealthcareinItaly. in thenextsection,regionalizedadministrationofhealthcareserviceshasraisedquestionsabout of Italyforitsuniversalism,lowcosts,andgoodhealthoutputs.However,aswillbediscussed SSN’s implementation,theItalianhealthcaresystemhasbeengenerallywellregardedoutside significant out-of-pocketpaymentsintroducedbyLiberalhealthministersresponsibleforthe to allItalians.Despitelackofclarityinthefinancialarrangementsgoverningsystemand power whentheSSNwasadopted,promisedhealthcarefreeatpointofservice the BritishNationalHealthService.AvictoryforItalianleft,whichwasatpeakofits IV government)withtheintroductionofServizioSanitarioNazionale(SSN),modeledon to provideasubstantialbenefitfamilieswithchildrenbecameminorwagesupplement. languished after1964(MoroIandIIgovernments),sothataoncegeneroussystemdesigned were subjecttodiscretionaryactionbythestate,notentitlements.Moreover,familyallowances earnings supplements)and,later,“mobilityallowances.”However,theseformsofincomesupport receive wages), andfirst-timejobseekershadnoprotection.Certaingroupsoflaid-offworkerscould Italy’s regularunemploymentinsurancebenefitswereminimal(lessthan20percentofaverage system containedblindspots.Forexample,comparedwithotherBismarckianwelfarestates, employment history. nearly universal,withtheamountofsupportlargelydependentonrecipient’s(orspouse’s) By theendof1970s,entitlementtoincomesupportinoldageorcasedisabilitywas pensions (DeGasperiVIIgovernment1952)andsocial(RumorI1969). intended toprovidereliefforthosewhowerenoteligiblefullcoverage—e.g.minimum benefits (e.g.FanfaniIIgovernment1958,Moro1965);andnewprograms self-employed [Segnigovernment1959,MoroIII1966]);moregenerouspension to includenewgroups(e.g.agriculturalworkersandhousewives[Zoligovernment1957];the social protectiontookplaceprimarilythroughtheinsurancesystem,whichexpanded be financedbyemployment-basedcontributions.Subsequenteffortstobroadenanddeepen term, thecountry’sfiscalinfrastructurewasbettersuitedtoasysteminwhichbenefitscould based modelofsocialprovisionsimilartoBritain’s,butopinedthatintheshortmedium By the1980s,Italianpolicymakersrecognizedsystemicproblems withtheirwelfarestate. Aside fromhealthcare,othertypicalelementsofacitizenship-based welfarestate,suchas A majordeparturefromtheoccupationalmodelinItalycame1978(underAndreotti Despite itsstrengthsandevenattheheightofgenerosity,however,socialinsurance Cassa integrazioneguadagni Julia LynchandPeterCeretti (CIG andCIGS;regularextraordinaryshort-term 240 Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 www.oecd.org/els/social/inequality). Gini coefficientfromOECD(2011). DividedWeStand:WhyInequality KeepsRising median income.DatafromLuxembourg IncomeStudy(2013),KeyFigures. Poverty ratescalculatedasshareof populationwithsize-adjustedhouseholdincomesbelow50%ofnational Total publicsocialexpenditurefrom OECD(2013),SocialExpenditureDatabase. Denmark Table 20.1 misuse ofbenefitssuchasdisabilitypensionstomakeupforpooremploymentprospects;fiscally social riskssuchasyouthunemploymentorchildcareneedsduetofemaleemployment;systematic social riskssuchasunemploymentorearningsinsufficienttosupportalargefamily,and“new” problems: starkregionaldivergenceinsocialprotection;incompleteprotectionagainstboth“old” no benefits. younger “outsiders”whospentlongspellswithoutworkorintheinformallabormarketwith generous pensionsandsupplementalunemploymentprotection;underprotected,often classes ofworkersinItaly:overprotected,oftenolder,labormarket“insiders”whoenjoyed additional workers.Thiscontributedtohigherunemploymentandthedevelopmentoftwo and 1990,whichcreateda“fiscalwedge”thatmadeitexpensiveforemployerstohire growing debtsinthesocialinsurancesystem,contributionswereraisedfivetimesbetween1980 that paidbyemployeesandtheiremployers(12percentvs.25.9ofwages).Tocombat employed personswerepermittedtooptintothesystematacontributionratefarlowerthan the levelofpensionsin1988(Goriagovernment).In1990(AndreottiVIgovernment),self- 1983 (CraxiIgovernment),andariseintheceilingonearningsallowedtocounttowardsetting system continuedtogrow,withmoregenerousindexationofhigh-endpensionsintroducedin pensions in1984,bothundertheCraxiIgovernment).Butatsametime,socialinsurance of ameanstestforreceiptminimumpensionsin1983andreformeligibilitydisability US Spain Netherlands Ireland Sweden Canada Italy Norway Finland Australia Austria UK Greece Switzerland France Luxembourg Germany By thedawnofSecondRepublic,then,Italianwelfarestatefacedseveralstructural Italian socialspending,povertyandinequalityincomparativeperspective 29.5 fGPpplto 20–)income disposable (2004–5) rate:children Gini,household population rate:total Relativepoverty Relativepoverty % ofGDP spending Public social (2012) 19.5 25.3 21.5 19.8 28.0 26.5 19.3 26.4 22.4 16.1 18.5 28.1 22.9 23.1 29.9 25.8 23.6 Welfare, Italianstyle (2004–5) 17.189 14.092 13.209 12.187 12.977 12.038 11.867 11.221 5.586 6.617 6.338 5.596 8.001 7.07 7.073 8.489 8.518 8.882 241 20.945 17.256 13.96 15.857 16.872 18.256 12.429 10.174 10.9 12.983 13.494 3.872 4.008 9.15 9.308 6.82 4.72 5.264 (available onlineat 0.243 (2007) 0.258 0.37 0.324 0.313 0.29 0.261 0.297 0.289 0.307 0.259 0.328 0.334 0.292 0.3 0.256 0.345 0.292 Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 Seniority pensions havebeenreplacedwithan earlyretirementschemethatpenalizes retirement harmonization ofpensionplans havebeenaccelerated,andretirementflexibilityhasrestored. according tothenewformula. Indexationofbenefitstoaggregatelifeexpectancy and the Dinireformandpost-crisis measures.Allbenefitsaccruedsince2012arenowcalculated pressure fromtheEuropeanCentral Bank,the2011Forneroreformspedupphase-in of expectancy, andretirementflexibility waslimited(Jessoula,2012:14–15).Finally,under women inthepublicsectorweremadeidentical,statutory retirementagewaslinkedtolife 2009–10, inresponsetothefinancialandsovereigndebtcrises, retirementagesformenand introduced incentivestoforgoearlyretirement,andgradually increasedtheretirementage.In 2005: 56). period toprotectolderworkers(Schludi,2005:116;Ferreraand Jessoula,2007:433–7;Schludi, the priceofunionsupportforbothAmatoandDini reformswasaslowphase-in workers’ accumulatedcontributionsarelinkedmoredirectly toeventualbenefits.However, age andshiftingfromadefined-benefitto“notionaldefined contribution”system,inwhich The Dinigovernmentpassedanothersignificantreformin1995, introducingaflexibleretirement private sectorworkers,andgraduallyraisedcontributoryrequirements forsenioritypensions. reference periodforcalculatingbenefits,adjustedindexation,increasedtheretirementage and povertyinoldage. of adjustmenthasbeguntoraisenewconcernsaboutgenerationalfairness,pensionadequacy, As aresult,thesustainabilityofsocialinsurancesystemhasgreatlyincreased,butpace below thestatutoryretirementagewhohavemadeacertainnumberofyearscontributions). and acrosssectors,increasedtheretirementage,curbedsenioritypensions(availabletothose adopted since1992havegraduallyharmonizedpensioneligibilityrequirementsbetweengenders 23.4 percentofGDPby2040ifleftunchecked(FerreraandJessoula,2007:431).Measures spendinghadreached12.8percentofGDPin1992,andwasprojectedtoballoon successful insomeareas(e.g.pensions)thanotherssocialassistance). pensions, unemploymentbenefits,healthcare,andsocialassistance.Theseeffortshavebeenmore became urgentpriorities,andthenexttwentyyearssawanincrementalseriesofreformsto wait nolonger.Stabilizingthepublicfinancesandstructuralreformstoeconomysuddenly European MonetarySystemin1992madeitclearthatcomprehensivewelfarestatereformcould As theFirstRepublicbegantocrumble,speculativecrisisthatforcedItaly’sexitfrom approached thoseintheUnitedStates(seeTable20.1). EU15 averageof24.4percent[Eurostat]),levelspovertyandinequalityinItalyhave welfare spendingneartheWestEuropeanaverage(23.7percentofGDPin1990,versus varying levelsofeconomicdevelopmentbetweenItaly’sNorthandSouth,sothatdespitesocial a nationwidesafetynetexacerbatedpre-existingdivergencesinlivingstandardsresultingfrom in bothaccesstosocialprotectionandresponsibilityforfinancingthesystem.Theabsenceof the occupationalbenefitslinkedtolabormarketparticipation;andintergenerationalimbalances unsustainable socialinsuranceprograms;aninsider/outsidercleavageinthelabormarketand Subsequent reformsin1996and2004furthertightenedrequirements forsenioritypensions, The pensionreformprocessbeganwiththeAmatoin1992,whichlengthened The incompletetransformationoftheItalianwelfarestate during theSecondRepublic Julia LynchandPeterCeretti Pensions 242 Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 for those55andover.Thereplacementrateis75percent monthlyincomesupto in, theAspiwilllastamaximumof12monthsforworkersupto55yearsage,and18 age differentiationofbenefitshavebeenadjusted,andcoverageexpanded.Whenfullyphased January 2013.Contributionandinsurancerequirementsremainthesame,butduration replaced thestandardOUBwithanew“socialinsuranceforemployment”benefit(Aspi)from schemes andphasingoutmobilityallowancesasof2017(CGILRimini,2012).Thereform , bringingthereplacementratecloserto80percentofferedbyCIG/CIGS availability toworkthaninthepast(SacchiandVesan,2011:8). benefits werealsolimitedmainlytocasesofinvoluntaryjoblossandtiedmoretightly and moregenerousbenefitsforolderworkers(Leombruni and generositygraduallyrose,butbenefitsweredifferentiatedaccordingtoage,withlonger year beforeunemployment)(MadamaandColetto,2009).Between20012008,bothduration contribution requirements:2yearsofinsurancecoverage,and52weekscontributionsinthe a 25percentreplacementrate(withdurationcappedat6months,andsubstantialinsurance still substantiallylessgenerousthaninmostotherEuropeancountries,buthadbeenraisedto but startingfromaverylowlevel.By1993,theordinaryunemploymentbenefit(OUB)was In contrasttopensions,sincetheearly1990sunemploymentbenefitshavebecomemoregenerous, thorough protectionfornon-elderlyItalians,particularlylabormarketoutsiders. stalemate oftheFirstRepublicthathadprotectedpensionspendingatexpensemore the changestopensionsystemhavebeensignificant,andsignalabreakthroughofpolicy when only13percentofworkerswereenrolled(Coletto,2007).Inotherregards,however, (Finocchiaro, 2012:11).Whilestillmodest,thecoveragerateisasubstantialincreaseover2005, supplementary schemescoveredabout5.5millionworkers,or24percentofthoseemployed across occupationalandgeographiclines,coverageislimited.Attheendof2011, an individualandacollectivebasis.Nevertheless,supplementarypensionsremainfragmented all, increasingtoatleast67by2021. before 62.By2018,theretirementageisprojectedtobeauniform66yearsand7monthsfor has beeneliminated, butthecontributoryrequirement hasbeenincreased(13 weeksintheyear renamed the“mini-Aspi,”equal tothatofthefull-fledgedAspi.Theinsurancerequirement loss (MadamaandColetto,2009). The2012MontireformsetthereplacementrateofRUB, before unem of insurancecoverage),butlower contributoryrequisitesthantheOUB(78daysin year Until theMontigovernment’s reform,theRUBhadalengthyinsurancerequirement(2years 4 monthsofeligibility,and40percentthereafter,forupto 6months(CGILRimini,2012). unemployment benefit”(RUB),whichby2012hada35percent replacementrateforthefirst and temporaryworkersaremorelikelytoqualifyfortheless generous“reducedrequirement [CNEL], 2012:247–8,262). 4 millionworkersin2013to122017(Consiglio NazionaleEconomieeLavoro to allcategoriesofdependentemployees,andcoverageis expected toincreasefromabout falls to60percentformonths6–12,and45thereafter. Eligibilityhasbeenextended in 2012,bringingthebenefitlinewiththatofferedother Europeancountries.Thebenefit The Montigovernment’s2012laborreformthenmadebroaderchangestounemployment Steps havealsobeentakensince1993todevelopfunded,supplementarypensionsonboth Given thehighcontributoryandinsurancerequirementsfor theOUBandAspi,younger ployment). However,thebenefit waspaidoutinalumpsumtheyearafterjob Unemployment benefits Welfare, Italianstyle 243 et al.,2012:11–12).Unemployment € 1,180 Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 time, fixed-term,orcontracted-out)(Fargion,2013:189). is poorlyadaptedtoaneconomicrealityinwhich60percentofnewjobsare“atypical”(part- the costsoftheirowninsurance.Inshort,socialinsurancelogicItalianwelfaresystem of 26weeks.Similarly,formallyself-employedworkersundercontracttosinglefirmsmustbear workers onshort-termcontractsareeligibleonlyformini-Aspibenefits,withamaximumduration start oftheSecondRepublic,labormarket“outsiders”remainvulnerable.Forexample,most of recoursetotheAspiormini-Aspibyless-protectedtemporaryworkers. contracts, bothtoincreasetheattractivenessofapprenticeshipsandcoverhigherlikelihood by employersandemployees).Thecontributionadditionis3.01percentforfixed-term regular employeesontopofthepriortotalsocialcontribution33percentwages(shared new unemploymentbenefits,employersnowpayafurther1.61percentforapprenticesand financing, whichaggravatedthealreadysubstantialtaxwedgeonemployment.Tofinance to linkfunding allotted totheregionscover essentialservicesto“standard cost”benchmarks, Constitution confirmedtheregions’ responsibilityfororganizinganddeliveringhealthcare. (Frisina DoetterandGötze,2011: 6).Finally,in2001,thereformofTitleVItalian expanded; andaredistributivefund wascreatedtocomplementtheregions’independentresources to financehealthcarespending; revenuesharingandthescopeforregionaltaxadditionswere and Gualmini,2004:117).Duringthisperiod,aregionalbusiness (theIRAP)wasintroduced of full-timeSSNdoctors,andalteredregulationsonsupplementary healthinsurancefunds(Ferrera the nationalgovernment’sandregions’financingresponsibilities, restrictedtheprivateactivities accelerated regionaldevolutionandcreatednewfundingsources. The1999reformreorganized standard packageofmandatoryor“essential”services(LEAs). central governmentretaineditsplanningrole,providingthe regionswithfundingtodelivera independence. Deficitsweretobecoveredbyregionaltax additions orhigherco-pays.The over toprofessionalexecutives,andwererequiredrun balancedbudgetstokeeptheir and largerhospitalspreviouslyrunbyelectedcommittees politicalappointeesweregiven provision (FerreraandGualmini,2004:114;FrisinaDoetterGötze,2011:4).Healthagencies began thedecentralizationofhealthcaresystemandintroducedgreatercompetitionincare challenge insomeregions. healthcare spendingislowerthaninmanyotherrichdemocracies,costcontainmentremainsa quantitative andqualitativedisparitiesbetweentheNorthSouthpersist;whileItalian regional governments(JessoulaandPavolini,2012:16).Despitethesechanges,serious role oftheprivatesectorincareprovision,anddevolvedpolicy-settingcompetenciesto changes overthelasttwentyyears.Reformshaveprofessionalizedmanagement,increased Like unemploymentandsocialinsurance,Italy’shealthcaresystemhasalsoundergoneprofound post Aspi, butthebenefitisalsopaidoutattimeofjobloss,whicheliminatespeculiar contributed inthepreviousyear.Notonlyhascoveragebeenexpandedascaseof before jobloss).Workerswillnowbeabletocollectthebenefitforhalfasmanyweeksthey Despite significantimprovementsinsocialprotectionfortheunemployedItalysince Expanding andstrengtheningtheAspimini-Aspirequiredadditionalcontribution-based In 2009,thethirdBerlusconi government’s frameworklawonfiscalfederalismattempted A thirdhealthcarereformin1999andotherlegislationpassed between1998and2000 The healthcarereformprocessbeganwiththe1992“reformof[1978]reform,”which nature oftheRUB(CGILRimini,2012). Julia LynchandPeterCeretti Healthcare 244 ex Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 remains (Fargion,2013). more difficult(SacchiandBastagli, 2005:70),andverysubstantialregionalvariationinprovision for socialassistancetransfersand services,craftingterritoriallycoherentpoliciesisnowmuch were watereddown,andalthough thestatestillretainspowertosetessentiallevelsofprovision local governments,muchasinthe areaofhealthcarepolicy.Centralgovernmentplanningpowers as the2001constitutionalreformdevolvedgreatercontrolover socialassistancetoregionaland and Bastagli,2005:69).Nevertheless,thenewpolicyframework wasonlyusedbriefly,however, firm powerstosetguidelinesforvariousaspectsofassistancepolicy throughnationalplans(Sacchi provincial, andmunicipalresponsibilitiesforsocialassistance. However,italsogavethestate other socialservices.Thelawfitintothefederalizationprocess bydefiningnational,regional, to setnationalstandardsfordecentralizedprovisionofchildcare, eldercare,rehabilitation,and The planningarchitecturewasmodeledonthehealthcaresystem, whichallowedthegovernment tested benefits(FerreraandGualmini,2004:117;Sacchi Bastagli,2005:68). social equivalent”(ISEE),wasalsointroduced.TheISEEwould beappliedtoallnewmeans- activation component.Anewscaleformeasuringeligibility,the“indicatorofeconomic experimental “minimuminsertionincome”(RMI),ameans-testedminimumwagewithan social assistancefinancing.Then,inthe1998budgetlaw,provisionswerelaidoutforan based socialinsurancesystem,theProdigovernmentpassedclearer,moretransparentruleson unions andlargeemployersthatsocialassistancefunctionsbeseparatedfromthecontribution- to theOnofriCommision’srecommendations,andsatisfyingalong-termdesideratumofboth recommendations weretakenupinearnest(FerreraandGualmini,2004:114–20).Inresponse unemployment insurance,aswell,socialassistancewasoneofthefewareaswhereits of long-termcareandchildcare,amongotherreforms(Bosi a greateremphasisonservicesinkindratherthancashtransfers,andbetterofferingstheareas criteria fordeterminingeligibility.Italsocalledfurtherdecentralizationofserviceprovision, report recommendedacitizenship-basedassistancearchitectureandmoreeffectiveselection with reviewingtheperformanceofwelfarestatein1997.TheOnofriCommission’sfinal Southern regions. largely transfer-based,withservicesinkindinsufficienttomeetdemand,particularlymany federalization anddevolution.Asaresult,socialassistanceremainsregionallyvariegated is oneofanattemptedtransitiontoauniversalsystemthatwashaltedbytheprocess Republic, butincontrasttootherwelfarepolicyareas,eventuallyflagged.Theoverallpicture As withhealthcare,progressinthefieldofsocialassistancegotofftoabrightstartSecond worked out. result, thefinancingofregionalhealthbudgetsremainsinlimbountilcostbenchmarkscanbe Monti insteadsoughttoreassertcentralgovernment’sprimacyoverlocaladministrations.Asa to stabilizethepublicfinancesandenactstructuralreforms.Infact,inaneffortcontrolspending, was notapriorityforMonti’stechnocraticadministration,whichappointedwithmandate However, theMontigovernmentleftstandardcostprovisionsunimplemented:federalization determined bythecostofprovisioninseveralregionswith“virtuous,”efficienthealthcaresystems. The mostimportantinnovationwasaframeworklawonsocial assistance,adoptedin2000. Although theCommissionprescribedincisivereformstopensions,healthcare,and The pathtoreformingsocialassistancebeganwiththeOnofriCommission,whichwastasked Social assistance Welfare, Italianstyle 245 et al.,2003:2–3). Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 labor forceparticipation(NaldiniandJurado,2013:52–5). leave byfathers,andmanyprimaryschoolsinsouthernItalylackcafeterias,whichstuntsfemale respects aswell:verylowreplacementrates(30percentofwages)resultintake-upparental and Sabatinelli,2013).ItalianfamilypolicyhaslaggedbehindotherEuropeancountriesin demand inmanyregions,andprivatesolutionshavenotbeenadequatetofillthegap(DaRoit family policyarsenalremainsantiquated.Forexample,childcarespacesareinadequatetomeet according totheISEE(SacchiandBastagli,2005:80).Despitethesenewadditions,Italian households ineligibleforaninsurance-basedmaternitybenefit.Means-testingisperformed cash benefitsreducechildpovertyinItalybyonly8percent. EU-member familiesresidentinItaly.Arcanjoetal.(2013:16)estimate,however,thatfamily or morechildren(assegnoperilnucleofamiliare)hasbeenavailabletoItalianandother (Sacchi andBastagli,2005:80).Since1999,ameans-testedbenefitforallfamilieswiththree pensions, andinabilitypensionsforthosetotallydisabledallplaysomepoverty-alleviationrole means-tested familyallowances,pensionsupplements(availableuntiltheDinireform),disability a monthlypensionlessthanthesocialallowanceitself. collected bythoseover65whoareineligibleforapension,orwhosecontributionswouldyield “social allowance,”introducedbytheDinireformof1995toreplacesocialpensions,canbe no contributionrequirement,andareintendedforthosewhoalmosttotallydisabled.The minimum incomethatcouldeffectivelycombatpoverty. experimental periodendedin2002,theRMIwasdiscontinued.Thus,Italystilllacksanational half timeshigherthanthoseintheNorth(SacchiandBastagli,2005:73).However,afterits the SouthandIslandsweremorethanthreetimeshigherinCenter,foura a markedNorth–Southdivergenceinrelativeandabsolutepoverty;2002,povertyrates and Zoli,2012;Devicientietal.,SacchiBastagli,2005).Thesesamestudiesalsoreveal of deprivationconfirmthevulnerabilityfamilieswiththreeormorechildren(Coromaldi Italy stillhasbyfarthehighestpovertyrateinWesternEurope(seeTable20.1).Absolutemeasures Poverty haslongbeenachallengeforItaly,particularlyamongchildren,groupwhom cratic (orleft-leaning, partlytechnocratic)governments intoaprocessofinstitutional learning. Jessoula, 2012).Inthe1990s, goalofEMUaccessionpushedthesocialpartnersandtechno have alsoplayedaninstrumental roleinencouragingreform(FerreraandGualmini,2004; assistance reformdemonstrate. disparities (especiallybetween northern andsouthernregions)thestuntedprocessofsocial and Götze,2011:6).Federalizationhasnotalwaysledtopositive outcomes,aspersistenthealthcare something ofapanaceawithrespecttohealthcareandwelfare(Fargion, 2005:139;FrisinaDoetter Italian state,thispolicy“solution”wasadoptedbythecenter-left andcenter-rightalikeas assistance. WhilepressurefromtheNorthernLeaguetriggered thestartoffederalization also stronglyaffectedtheevolutionofwelfarestatein the areasofhealthcareandsocial to jointheEU’sEconomicandMonetaryUnion(EMU).The politicsofdecentralizationhave of Italy’sdomesticpoliticsandinternationalpositionsince Many ofthechangesinItalianwelfarestatesince1990s areduetothetransformation The samelegislationalsoprovidedforanew,five-monthmaternitybenefitlegalresident A numberofcategoricalbenefitshaveanti-povertyeffects.“Civildisability”pensions The externalconstraintsposed byfinancialmarketsanddeepeningEuropeanintegration Reforms inpoliticalcontext Poverty andfamilypolicy Julia LynchandPeterCeretti 246 2 Within thesocialinsurancesystem, Tangentopoli, andthecommitment - Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 so eventuallyopposed universalizingreforms despite havingshownsomeenthusiasm forthem and povertyreliefwouldprovide evenmorefodderforDCandPSIclientelistactivities, and unions cametofearthatexpansion ofthestate’sroleinareasunemploymentinsurance who hadanideologicalaffinity formoreequitableuniversalistsolutions:thePCIandlabor predominantly bytheDCand laterthePSI,alteredpreferencesofthosepoliticalactors and aweakeningcontribution base. Theuseofselectivewelfarebenefitsforclientelistpurposes, were graveindeedwhencombinedwithpopulationaging,declining laborforceparticipation, citizens andevenpolicyspecialiststoprojectthelong-term budgetaryconsequences—which mentation ofpensions,inparticular,benefitedclientelistpoliticians, butmadeitdifficultfor in 1963,theOnofriCommission1992)forasystemof universalbenefits.Extremefrag occupationalist welfareprogramseveninthefaceofcallsbyhigh-level commissions(theCNEL exchanging tailoredpoliciesandevenindividualbenefitsfor votesinItalyhelpedmaintain elderly andmale-breadwinnerorientation(seeLynch,2006 formoredetail).Atraditionof of theItalianwelfarestate’spathologies,includinginsider/outsider cleavageandthestrong of polarizedpluralisminthepartysystem(Ferrera welfare reformefforts. persisted throughouttheFirstandintoSecondRepublic,continuestobedevilserious economic divergence—constitutesaseriousimpedimenttoreform.Thishas in Italy—markedasitisbylongstandingpatternsofclientelismandconflictoverterritorial outsider inequities,provedresistanttofundamentalchange?Thenatureofpoliticalcompetition Why hastheItalianwelfarestate,withitsrecognizedterritorial,generational,genderandinsider/ the SecondRepublic. government withapoliticalmandatestrongenoughtocontinuetheworkleftunfinishedin recent years,welfarestatereformisnowina“holdingpattern,”awaitingtheemergenceof the welfarestatetocomewillbewell-planned,far-sightedones.Despitesignificantprogressin developments inthepartysystemunderway,itlooksincreasinglyunlikelythatchanges Withapublicsufferingfromthebeginningsofreformfatigueandsignificant Monti government. espoused bythecenter-rightunderBerlusconiandseverityofreformsimposed have diminishedinrecentyears,thanksparttotheheavy-handedapproachnegotiations welfare stateisuncertain.Thescopeforcollaborationwiththesocialpartnersalsoappearsto supporting austerefiscalpolicyandstructuralreforms,theoutlookforfuturechangesto Common Good”coalitionandMarioMonti’scentristswerepenalizedbythepublicfor 2012: 25–7). factors tofacilitatethepassageofstrictausteritymeasuresandpensionlaborreforms(Jessoula, response topressurefromfinancialmarketsandEUinstitutions,reliedontheseexternal is underscoredbytheexperienceofMontigovernment,whichwasappointedlargelyin are asrealeverandcontinuetotighteninstepwithEuropeanfiscalintegration.Thispoint priorities andincreaseinstitutionalcapacity(FerreraGualmini,2004:104). addition, EUinitiativessuchastheEuropeanEmploymentStrategyhelpedtoclarifypolicy governments tocollaborateonmeasuressuchastheDinireformandaseriesofsocialpacts.In The searchforpolicysolutionsinanadversefiscalclimateledunions,employers,and Clientelist politicalcompetitionduringtheFirstRepublic, aided andabettedbyapattern In lightoftheresults2013parliamentaryelections,inwhichcenter-left“Italy, In recentyears,welfarestatereformhasbeenlesscollaborative,thoughtheexternalconstraints Sources ofpolicystabilityinwelfare Welfare, Italianstyle 247 et al.,2012),wasdirectlyresponsibleformany all’italiana - Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 costs andcreategreatergeographicequityinaccesstohealthcare. the state’sinvestmentinmajorinfrastructuresuchashospitals andmedicalcenterstoreduce citizens havealsooccasionedinvidiouspoliticalcomparisons, andmakeitdifficulttorationalize the sub-nationallevel,continuingregionaldisparitiesin benefitsandservicesavailableto devolution hasledtosomefruitfulexperimentsinalternative welfareandhealthcaremodelsat oversight andtheeventualcompletionofthesedecentralization processes.Further,while transfers betweenregionsnecessitatedbyfederalizationhave hinderedbothnational-level autonomy inthehealthandsocialassistancesectors,while tensions overnewlyvisiblefiscal The federalizingreformspushedbytheLegaNordhave resultedinsubstantialregional government socialspendingthatthepartyclaimsbenefits South attheexpenseofNorth. Lega Nord’scriesof“Romaladrona”refernotonlytopoliticiansonthetake,butalso and couldinanycaseleadtomoreeffectiveefficientpolicies. the entireedificeofwelfarestatemightitselfcontributetolesseningeconomicdivide, those aspectsofthewelfarestatethatprovideresourcesforSouthernfamilies—evenifrebuilding in theSouth.Untilregionaleconomicdividelessens,therewillbepoliticalpressuretoretain the waytheyhavebeen(mis)usedassubsidiesforunderemploymentandlowhouseholdincomes minimum, seniority,anddisabilitypensionshaveallfoundpoliticalsupportinpartbecauseof they providedapoliticalbufferagainsttheeconomicmal-integrationofSouth.Forexample, Throughout itshistory,manyaspectsoftheItalianwelfarestatewereinventedorsurvivedbecause thoroughgoing reformistheperennialpoliticalsalienceofNorth–Southeconomicdivide. of recalibrationinitiatedintheearlyyearsSecondRepublic. policy instruments,suchassenioritypensions.Allofthesefactorshavetendedtoslowtheprocess League—has ledtoambiguousstancesontaxevasionandhesitanceoverhaulcertainwelfare for instance,businessownersandprofessionalsthePdL,northernpensionersNorthern to havebeengraftedontoaneo-liberalagenda.Theprotectionofkeycenter-rightclienteles— has yettobedissolved.UnderBerlusconi,thefamiliarpatternofclientelistexchangeappears the FirstRepublic,longstandinglinkbetweenItalianwelfarestateandclientelistpolitics suggest thatdespitethedisappearanceoftwopartiesmostimplicatedinclientelismduring regional healthcareadministrations—LazioandLombardyaretwoprominentexamples— clientelism poseacontinuedobstacletoreformintheSecondRepublic?Persistentscandals of politicalcompetitionthatsodominatedthecontextFirstRepublic.Does that tendto“stick”onceenacted,theItalianwelfarestatestillbearsstrongtracesofthisaspect to theendofFirstRepublic.Andbecausewelfarestatepoliciesarecomplexinstitutions et al.,2012). in theextraordinarilygenerousandexpensivepensionsystemputplacefrom1969(Ferrera that itwouldneverhavetokeep,whichledapatternofleap-froggingpromisesresulted system ofpolarizedpluralism,itwastemptedtomakepromisesintherealmwelfarepolicy in theearlypost-warperiod.Additionally,sincePCIwasexcludedfrompowerunder Furthermore, while pressurefrominternational financialactorstoincrease productivityand closely resemblethecontinental socialinsurancesystemsofGermany,theNetherlands,orFrance. model withflat-ratebenefitsis exceedinglyunlikely.Atbest,Italywillprobablycometomore Italy’s socialinsurancemodelis highlyresilient.Transformationtoauniversal,citizenship-based Of course,thewelfarestateitselfhasalsoservedasacauseofinterregionaltensions.The The secondkeyfeatureofItalianpoliticsthathasrenderedthewelfarestatesoresistantto Clientelism, then,wasamajordeterminantoftheconfigurationwelfareregimeup Prospects forfurtherreform Julia LynchandPeterCeretti 248 Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 Arcanjo, M.,Bastos,A.,Nunes,F. andPassos(2013).Childpovertythereformoffamilycashbenefits. Thankstothethird Berlusconi government’spensionmeasuresandtheForneroreform,eligibility 2 Thischapterwasdrafted inMarch2013,shortlyafterItaly’sgeneralelectionsandatamomentof 1 workers. welfare policyawayfromhighlyprotectedinsiders,andtoward theneedsoffamiliesandyounger increase inyoungerandfemaleparliamentariansmayalsopersistleadtoareorientationof welfare policychanges.Butifpartiescontinuetoholdprimarycontests,itseemslikelythatthe held bythePDandM5S.Thisparliamentisunlikelytolastlong,orundertakeanysubstantial female parliamentariansthaninthepast(Coldiretti,2013),whichmaybearesultofprimaries France, Germany,Spain,GreatBritain,ortheUnitedStates.Thereisalsoalargershareof After decadesofgerontocracy,therecentelectionshavereturnedayoungerparliamentthanin actually gottenworsesincethecrisis—havefinallygeneratedameaningfulpoliticalbacklash. intergenerational inequities—whichdespitethequickerphase-inofpensionreformsmayhave press forgreateruniformityofsocialprovisionacrossregions. will haveincreasedcontroloverhealthandsocialassistancespending,mayalsobeableto at thispoint,standardcostswillhavetobedefined.Onceoccurs,thecentralgovernment in limboindefinitely.Unlessthefederalistprojectisabandonedaltogether,whichseemsunlikely to newprotectionsforlabormarketoutsidersandyoungerItalians. the politicalcoverneededtoundertakeveryunpopularreforms,freeingupresourcesdevote the totalresourcesavailableforsocialprotection.Onotherhand,itmayalsogivereformers both Europeananddomesticpoliticalelites,itisalmostcertaintoresultinadecrease This significantreductionindomesticpolicyautonomymaygeneratepoliticalillwilltoward after 2011inreturnforFrankfurt’ssupportsecondarybondmarkets(Jessoula,2012:25). For example,theECBoutlinedaseriesofspecificpensionreformsthatneededtobeundertaken have beenmet,internationalactorsarenowpressingfor(andreceiving)veryspecificreforms. of demandingadherencetogeneralfiscaltargets,generatingfixesthatmayunraveloncetargets international financialactorsthatintroducesafundamentallynewkindof optimism inthisregard.First,thefinancialcrisishasbroughtpressurefromECBand for subsequentgovernmentstoundertakefurtherreform.Weseethreereasonscautious indefinitely? ’soccupational,insider-protecting,andregionallyvariegatedstatetopersist between Italy’sNorthandSouthalsoseemunlikelytorecede.ShouldwethenexpecttheItalian decrease unitlaborcostscouldprovokesomeconvergence,thestructuraleconomicdifferences Journal ofSocio-Economics , 43,11–23. Third, andmostspeculatively,thereareindicationsthattheItalianwelfarestate’sharsh A secondcauseforcautiousoptimismisthatthedetailsoffiscalfederalismcannotremain Perhaps not.Oncereformoftheelectorallawisaccomplished,theremaybeopportunities is revisedupwardsovertime(Jessoula andPavolini,2012:140). means thattheelderlypoorwilleffectivelybeforcedtowaitlongerfor reliefastheeligibilityrequirement age forthesocialallowanceisnowindexedtolifeexpectancy,much liketheretirementage.This under wayorhavealreadybeenenacted. welfare policychanges—mostnotablywithrespecttotheunemployment insurancesystem—arecurrently considerable politicalvolatility.Sincethen,theoutlookhas changedsignificantly,andsome Welfare, Italianstyle Bibliography Notes 249 vincolo esterno.Instead Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 Naldini, M.andJurado,T.(2013). FamilyandwelfarestatereorientationinSpaininertiaItalyfrom Madama, I.andColettoD.(2009). Italy:flexicurityandindustrialrelations.Availableonlineathttp:// Lynch, J.(2009).Italy:AChristian Democraticorclientelistwelfarestate?InK.V.Kersbergenand P. Lynch, J.(2006).AgeintheWelfareState:TheOriginsofSocialSpendingonPensioners,Workers, andChildren Leombruni, R.,Paggiaro,A.andTrivellato,U.(2012).Perun pugnodieuro.Storieordinaria Jessoula, M.andPavolini,E.(2012).Pensions,HealthCareLong-terminItaly.AsispAnnualNational Jessoula, M.(2012).LikeinaSkinnerbox:externalconstraintsand thereformofretirementeligibility Frisina Doetter,L.andGötze,R.(2011).Thechangingroleofthe stateintheItalianhealthcaresystem. Finocchiaro, A.(2012).COVIP:CommissioneDiVigilanzaSuiFondiPensione:RelazioneperL’Anno Ferrera, M.andJessoula(2007).Italy:anarrowgateforpath-shift.InK.Anderson,E.Immergut Ferrera, M.andGualminiE.(2004). Ferrera, M.,Fargion,V.andJessoula,M.(2012).Alleradicidelwelfareall’italiana:originiefuturodiunmodello Fargion, V.(2013).Italy:aterritorialandgenerationaldivideinsocialcitizenship.InA.EversM. Fargion, V.(2005).FromtheSoutherntoNorthernQuestion:territorialandsocialpoliticsinItaly. Fargion, V.(1997).GeografiadellacittadinanzasocialeinItalia:regioniepoliticheassistenzialidagliannisettanta Eurostat (2013).Maintables.Socialprotection.Expenditureonsocialprotection(tps_00098).Available Devicienti, F.,Gualtieri,V.andRossi,M.(2012).Thepersistenceofincomepovertylifestyle Da Roit,B.andSabatinelli,S.(2013).Nothingonthemoveorjustgoingprivate?Understanding Coromaldi, M.andZoli(2012).Derivingmultidimensionalpovertyindicators:methodologicalissues Consiglio NazionaleEconomieeLavoro(CNEL)(2012).Rapportosulmercatodilavoro2011–2012. Coletto, D.(2007).Agreementreachedonend-of-serviceallowance.Availableonlineathttp://www. Coldiretti (2013).Elezioni:Coldiretti,parlamentopiùgiovanestoria.48anniinmedia.Availableonline CGIL Rimini(2012).MiniA.S.P.I.(Comecambialadisoccupazionestagionale).Availableonlineat Bosi, P.,Dirindin,N.andTurati,G.(2003).ReformpathsinItalianhealthsocialassistance a Europeanperspective. PopulationReview www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn0803038s/it0803039q.htm (accessed16March2013). Cambridge UniversityPress. Manow (eds.),Religion,ClassCoalitions,andWelfare States Cambridge andNewYork:UniversityPress. for EmploymentStudies. disoccupazione. Report. EuropeanCommissionDGEmployment,SocialAffairsandInclusion. rules inItaly.Laboratoriodipoliticacomparataefilosofiapubblica,4.CentroEinaudi. TransState WorkingPapers,150.UniversityofBremen. 1337766508RelazionePresidente2011.pdf (accessed20October2012). 2011: ConsiderazioniDelPresidente.Availableonlineathttp://www.covip.it/wp-content/files_mf/ University Press. I. Schulz(eds.),HandbookofWestEuropeanPensionPolitics to Berlusconi.Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress. sociale squilibrato.Venice:Marsilio. University Press. Guillemard (eds.),SocialPolicyandCitizenship:TheChangingLandscape.OxfordNewYork: In N.McEwenandL.Moreno(eds.),TheTerritorialPoliticsofWelfare agli anninovanta.Bologna:IlMulino. tps00098&plugin=1 (accessed26August2013). online athttp://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode= deprivation: evidencefromItaly.BulletinofEconomicResearch (3): 430–53. freeze onchild-andeldercarepoliciesthedevelopmentofcaremarketsinItaly. and anempiricalanalysisforItaly.SocialIndicatorsResearch,107(1),1–18. Rome. eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2006/11/articles/it0611039i.htm (accessed21October2012). at http://www2.coldiretti.it/News/Pagine/141-26-Febbraio-2013.aspx(accessed18March2013). 2013). http://www.cgilrimini.it/ARCHIVIO/Volantini/volantinoDSstagionale2013.pdf (accessed16March at http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/prj-rc/macro/macro15/10-4-R.pdf(accessed9March2013). expenditure. The ConsolidationoftheGeneralBudgetinItaly:Tools,Costs,andBenefits.Availableonline LABORatorio R.RevelliWorkingPapersSeries Rescued byEurope?SocialandLabourMarketReformsinItalyfromMaastricht Julia LynchandPeterCeretti , 52(1),43–61. 250 (pp. 396–453). (pp. 91–118).CambridgeandNew York: , 120.LABORatorioR.Revelli,Centre , 66(3),246–78. (pp. 127–47).London:Routledge. Oxford andNewYork: Social Politics,20 . Downloaded By: University of Pennsylvania At: 16:22 09 Jan 2018; For: 9781315709970, chapter20, 10.4324/9781315709970.ch20 Quine, M.S.(2002).Italy’sSocialRevolution:CharityandWelfarefromLiberalismtoFascism.Houndmills Schludi, M.(2005).TheReformofBismarckianPensionSystems:AComparisonPoliticsinAustria, Sacchi, S.andVesanP.(2011).InterpretingemploymentpolicychangeinItalysincethe1990s:nature Sacchi, S.andBastagli,F.(2005).Italy–strivinguphillbutstoppinghalfway:thetroubledjournalof France, Germany,ItalyandSweden.Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress. and dynamics.CarloAlbertoNotebooks,228.CollegioAlberto. York: Routledge. Fighting PovertyandSocialExclusioninItaly,Spain,PortugalGreece experimental minimuminsertionincome.InM.Ferrera(ed.),WelfareStateReforminSouthernEurope: and NewYork:Palgrave. Welfare, Italianstyle 251 (pp. 65–109).LondonandNew