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September 23-27, 2019 city,

The Conference Organizer: George Kuzmycz Training Center for Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material

The Conference Sponsors: Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority

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The Conference Organizing Committee

Oleksandr Korobenko NNEGC Energoatom (Chairman of the Committee) Vladyslav Ihnatov SSE “Lviv SISC” - (Deputy Chairman of the Committee) Zlatan Delalic Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Taras Bobrovskyi Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority Nataliia Klos Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine Ihor Uholkov Main Administration of the National Guard of Ukraine Ihor Sorochynsky Ukrainian State Association «Radon» Oleksii Vaskovsky Ministry of Interior of Ukraine Olena Levina George Kuzmycz Training Center Anna Havryliuk-Burakova George Kuzmycz Training Center (Secretary of the Committee)

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LVIV IS OPENED TO THE WORLD LVIV

Lviv is a city of regional importance in Ukraine, the administrative center of the Lviv region, a national-cultural and educational and scientific center of the country, a large industrial center and a transport hub, is considered the capital of and the center of Western Ukraine. Lviv ranks seventh in Ukraine in terms of population. The name "Lviv" is given to the city in honor of Prince Lev Danilovich, son of the King Danil – founder of Lviv city. The city has the largest number of architectural monuments in Ukraine. Lviv's historic center has been on the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage list. The architecture of Lviv which was not badly damaged during the XX century wars reflects many European styles and trends that correspond to different historical epochs. After the fires of 1527 and 1556 Lviv lost most of its gothic-style buildings but it retains many buildings in renaissance, and the classic styles. There are works by artists of the , and . The city has more than fifty monuments: military obelisks and memorials, monuments to national heroes and prominent events, outstanding residents of the city and the region. Lviv has the most architectural monuments of all Ukrainian cities. In 2009, Lviv was awarded the title of Cultural Capital of Ukraine. The first book in Ukraine was published in Lviv, the first railway was opened, a European-style post office, the first professional and the first Ukrainian school were opened also in Lviv. They also lit the first world's kerosene lamp and launched the first balloon. In 2016 according to Lonely Planet Lviv was ranked # 5 in the top of 10 places that are worth visiting in Europe.

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List of participants of the XVI Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material

№ Name Organization Phone 1 MAKARENKO SE “NNEGC “Energoatom” +38044-277-78-19 Oleh Director on physical protection of NF and o.makarenko@direkcy. NM and special security atom.gov.ua 2 KUZNIETSOV SE “NNEGC “Energoatom” +38044-277-78-79 Serhii Leading engineer of division of physical s.kuznetsov@direkcy. protection of nuclear facilities and atom.gov.ua nuclear materials 3 BORYSENKO SE “NNEGC “Energoatom” +38044-277-78-94 Arkadii Leading engineer of division of PP ETM +38069-324-71-48 management and technical operation [email protected] 4 BRODIAHIN SE “NNEGC “Energoatom” +38050-250-00-46 Maksym Chief of Physical protection division of SS +38044-201-09-03 “Atomprojectengineering” m.brodiahin@direkcy. atom.gov.ua 5 BENDO State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of +38061-764-18-87 Ihor Ukraine [email protected] Head of Department (Head of South- Eastern Inspection on Nuclear and Radiation Safety) - Deputy Chief State Inspector of NRS of Ukraine 6 CHERNYSH State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of +38044-277-12-06 Olena Ukraine [email protected] Main specialist – state inspector of safeguards sector of Department on Issues of Nuclear Security and Safeguards 7 NEBISHCHANSKY Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of +38044-206-33-99 Artur Ukraine artur.nebischanskiy@ Chief of sector of physical protection of mev.gov.ua facilities of nuclear energy complex, Department of nuclear energy and nuclear-industrial complex 8 KLOS Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of +38044-206-38-71 Nataliia Ukraine [email protected] Main specialist of sector of physical protection of facilities of nuclear energy complex, Department of nuclear energy and nuclear-industrial complex 9 VOLKOV SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP” +38066-712-28-84 Mark Deputy Head of Physical protection +3806139-563-97 service [email protected]

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10 MASLAKOV SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP” +38066-405-59-32 Oleksandr Engineer – leader of the group of +3806139-559-96 perspective development of planning and [email protected]. analysis of the physical protection service ua 11 SKRYPKA SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP” +38050-456-37-72 Yuliia Leading engineer-technologist of the NM +3806139-552-48 group of the nuclear safety division [email protected] 12 ZHEBET SS “South-Ukraine NPP” +38067-515-34-01 Ivan Deputy director general on physical +3805136-410-03 protection and regime [email protected]. ua 13 YERMOLENKO SS “South-Ukraine NPP” +38067-510-11-57 Oleksandr Leading engineer on physical protection, +3805136-430-34 leader of group of organization of the A_Ermolenko@sunpp. entry and interfacility regimes atom.gov.ua 14 ORLYK SS “South-Ukraine NPP” +3805136-419-36 Dmytro Engineer on control and accounting of +3805136-411-72 nuclear materials, division of nuclear [email protected]. safety ua 15 REDZYNETS SS “Khmelnytska NPP” +38067-380-08-19 Oleh Deputy Director on physical protection redzynets.oleg@khnpp. and regime atom.gov.ua 16 ARTIUSHKIN SS “Khmelnytska NPP” +38067-556-78-72 Andrii Chief of division for ensuring the entry +3803842-633-03 and interfacility regimes of physical tsykalchuk.pavlo@ protection service khnpp.atom.gov.ua 17 TSYKALCHUK SS “Khmelnytska NPP” +38097-636-69-22 Pavlo Leading engineer on physical protection +3803842-625-52 of the group of perspective tsykalchuk.pavlo@ development khnpp.atom.gov.ua 18 NIKULIN SS “Khmelnytska NPP” +38067-382-41-32 Serhii Chief of fuel laboratory of division of +3803842-625-00 nuclear safety Nikulin.sergiy@khnpp. atom.gov.ua 19 SOLTYS SS “Rivne NPP” +3803636-629-11 Yurii 1st category engineer of the group of [email protected] perspective development, planning and analysis, department for ensuring the entry and interfacility regime 20 ANTONIUK SS “Rivne NPP” +3803636-645-78 Serhii Deputy head of service on ensuring the [email protected] entry and interfacility regimes and development of physical protection service – chief of division

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21 VITER SSE “Chornobyl NPP” +3804593-444-80 Valentyn Deputy Director on physical protection [email protected] regime 22 ORLOV SSE “Chornobyl NPP” +3804593-425-81 Roman 1st category engineer of the group of [email protected] perspective development of planning and analysis of the physical protection regime division 23 SAVCHENKO NSC Kharkiv Institute of Physics and +38068-609-70-88 Andrii Technology [email protected]. Chief of division of engineering and ua technical means of physical protection of the physical protection service 24 VANZHA NSC Kharkiv Institute of Physics and +38066-781-59-18 Stanislav Technology [email protected]. 1st category Research Engineer of ua scientific and technical service of nuclear material accounting and export control 25 FEDOTOV Institute for Nuclear Research, NAS of +38044-525-31-30 Hennadii Ukraine [email protected] Chief of physical protection service 26 LOBACH Institute for Nuclear Research, NAS of +38044-525-24-69 Yurii Ukraine [email protected] Senior researcher of the Center for Environmental Problems of Nuclear Power Engineering 27 RIASNYI Institute for Nuclear Research, NAS of +38044-525-13-80 Oleksandr Ukraine Deputy Director 28 LOIKO National Guard of Ukraine +38044-249-28-87 Andrii Senior officer of the engineering support service of the Main Department of NGU 29 KASILOV National Guard of Ukraine +38063-140-48-55 Artem Commandant of the special [email protected] commandant’s office, military unit 3021 30 Mykoliuk National Guard of Ukraine +38095-559-92-87 Mykola Deputy Commandant – chief of staff of the special commandant’s office, military unit 3024 31 PROTSENKO National Guard of Ukraine +38050-313-48-56 Yurii Commandant of the facility [email protected] commandant’s office, military unit 3041 32 ZAICHENKO National Guard of Ukraine +38099-385-60-53 Oleksandra Head of Legal Service, military unit 3042 [email protected]

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33 SHEVCHUK National Guard of Ukraine +38067-382-85-49 Borys 1st deputy commander – chief of the staff, shevchukboriss@gmail. military unit 3043 com 34 MOSPAN National Guard of Ukraine +38067-514-64-64 Ihor Deputy commander of the military unit on work with personnel, military unit 3044 35 REDKOVYCH National Guard of Ukraine +3803636-613-87 Vasyl Head of legal service, military unit 3045 [email protected]

36 VASYLENKO National Guard of Ukraine +38044-525-49-21 Valerii Deputy commandant – chief of the staff of valeriyvasilenko075@ the special commandant’s office, military gmail.com unit 2260 37 HUBAREV National Police of Ukraine +38093-629-01-31 Yevhen Senior inspector of the Department of [email protected] activities related to hazardous materials 38 HONCHARUK MIA of Ukraine +38044-254-77-58 Hennadii Deputy head of the department – chief of [email protected]. office of critical infrastructure protection ua and professional expertise 39 VASKOVSKYI MIA of Ukraine +38044-254-96-41 Oleksii Chief specialist of the office of critical [email protected] infrastructure protection and professional expertise 40 YURIEV State Border Guard Service of Ukraine +38096-925-39-03 Roman Head of the organization of the CBR [email protected] Protection and Metrological Support of the Administration 41 FADIEIEV State Border Guard Service of Ukraine +38068-522-92-56 Ihor Senior officer of the engineering and [email protected] technical division of the North regional administration 42 KUDRIASHOVA SSTC NRS +38044-422-49-71 Yevheniia Leading specialist of PR division yv_kydriashova@sstc. com.ua 43 DOROFEIEVA SSTC NRS +38044-422-49-71 Yevheniia Leading specialist of PR division [email protected]. ua 44 MASLOV Odesa National Polytechnic University +38048-709-12-15, Oleh Head of department +38067-527-65-12 [email protected] 45 BIBIK National Technical University of Ukraine +380673900725 Tymofii “KPI” [email protected] Senior instructor

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46 OSTAPENKO National Technical University of Ukraine +38067-302-27-95 Ivan “KPI” [email protected] Assistant 47 BISHKO Coordination Group of Anti-terrorist +38-067-780-87-37 Ruslan Center at Authority of Security Service of Ukraine in Lviv Region Employee 48 TSIUPAK Lviv State Oncology Regional Treatment +38-073-418-64-12 Myroslav and Diagnostic Center Head of the remote radiotherapy unit 49 HREBENNIKOV USC Radon +38044-229-31-46 Volodymyr Deputy director on technical issues, [email protected] SSE “Kyiv SISC” 50 IHNATOV USC Radon +38067-637-36-83 Viacheslav Director of SSE “Lviv SISC” [email protected] 51 IVANOV USC Radon +38096-760-84-64 Ruslan Chief of physical protection service, [email protected] SSE “Odesa SISC” 52 SKYBA SSE "Central Enterprise for Radioactive +38063-623-05-35 Oleksandr Waste Management" +3804593-519-76 1st category engineer of the scientific- [email protected] informational center of RAW management 53 LUIBINETSKA SSE "Central Enterprise for Radioactive +38067-998-54-89 Liubov Waste Management" [email protected] Head of the regime-secret department 54 KOKHAN Public Joint Stock Company “ +38044-239-81-08 Vitalii Research and Design Institute [email protected] “Energoproject” Main specialist 55 IVANOV State institution "Institute of +38-044-423-81-35, Pavlo Environmental Geochemistry of the +38-066-449-59-02 National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine" [email protected] Researcher 56 GAVRYLIUK George Kuzmycz Training Center for +38044-525-28-49 Viktor Physical Protection, Control and [email protected] Accounting of Nuclear Material Head 57 HAVRYLIUK- George Kuzmycz Training Center for +38044-525-36-21 BURAKOVA Physical Protection, Control and [email protected] Anna Accounting of Nuclear Material Leading Engineer

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58 DRAPEI George Kuzmycz Training Center for +38044-525-25-16 Serhii Physical Protection, Control and [email protected] Accounting of Nuclear Material Leading Engineer 59 LEVINA George Kuzmycz Training Center for +38044-525-25-16 Olena Physical Protection, Control and [email protected] Accounting of Nuclear Material Leading Engineer 60 KAIDYK George Kuzmycz Training Center for +38044-525-25-16 Bohdan Physical Protection, Control and [email protected] Accounting of Nuclear Material Leading Engineer

List of Foreign Organizations’ Participants

№ Name Organization Contacts 1 DELALIC Swedish Radiation Safety Authority +46-8-799-41-04 Zlatan +46-8-799-40-10 [email protected] 2 SÖDERMAN Swedish Radiation Safety Authority +46-8-799-42-13 Jan [email protected] 3 WALDEN Swedish Radiation Safety Authority [email protected] Christopher 4 MATTSSON Norwegian Radiation Protection +47-6-716-15-28 Håkan Authority [email protected] 5 BOBROVSKYI Norwegian Radiation Protection +47-6-716-26-33 Taras Authority [email protected] 6 Tishakov Nordisk Sikkerhet AS + 47-46-50-11-30 Pavel Pavel.tishakov@ nordisksikkerhet.no 7 Lebedev Nordisk Sikkerhet AS +380-67-606-57-42 Pavel Pavel.lebedev@ nordisksikkerhet.no 8 Lampaert Consultant on physical perimeter +32475717321 Marc fencing, Belgium [email protected] 9 Danylov Office of Radiological Security in +38-050-387-15-15 Ihor Ukraine, PNNL [email protected] 10 Shendryk KVG Company +38-067-449-20-31 Viktor [email protected]

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DEAR PARTICIPANTS AND GUESTS OF THE CONFERENCE!

Annual XVI Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material aims to further strengthen the regime of physical protection and the regime of control and accounting of nuclear material and in my opinion should a significant role in establishing in Ukraine what is referred to in the IAEA documents as “nuclear security”. For the first time, our Conference is held outside the nuclear facility. And this can cause some inconvenience for the participants and guests of the Conference as nuclear facilities, in particular NPPs, have always provided significant assistance in holding annual Ukrainian conferences. On the other hand, the XVI Conference takes place in the ancient and at the same time the most modern Ukrainian Lviv city, which largely compensates for the above mentioned inconveniences. It should be noted that any conference is primarily interesting for its topic. Our Conference covers critical issues for the physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear material. More than 50 participants, which provide “nuclear security” in line with the IAEA recommendations, present their reports to the Conference. I believe that our Conference will be one of the factors in promoting the emergence of a concept in the Ukrainian legal field that corresponds to the concept of "nuclear security", no matter how this concept is translated into Ukrainian. Let me express my sincere gratitude from myself, the George Kuzmycz Training Center and all participants to the Swedish Radiation Safety Agency and the Norwegian Radiation Protection Agency for many years of their assistance in conducting annual Ukrainian conferences on the physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear material. I wish the Conference and its participants fruitful work and implementation of the Conference's decisions.

Head of GKTC Viktor Gavryliuk

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TOPICS OF THE XVI UKRAINIAN CONFERENCE ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

1. Physical protection issues 2. Issues of concern of the State System of Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material 3. Staffing of the physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear material 4. Nuclear security culture. Evaluation of the nuclear security conditions 5. Interaction of nuclear safety and nuclear security 6. Improvement of the interaction mechanism for participants of the objective interaction plan, of the regional and State interaction plans 7. Gender issue (impact of gender stereotypes) in nuclear security activities 8. Cyber security in the nuclear security area 9. The architecture (structure) of detection of nuclear materials in illicit trafficking and response for such events. Nuclear forensics 10. Improvement of the legal framework on physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear material

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PROGRAMME OF THE XVI UKRAINIAN CONFERENCE ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

September 23-27, 2019, Lviv city

23 September, Monday

08:30 – PARTICIPANTS’ REGISTRATION 09:00 CONFERENCE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE MEETING 09:00 – OPENING OF THE XVI CONFERENCE 09:15 (Head Oleh Redzynets) Formation of Decision-working committee Session 1 Physical protection issues (Head Oleh Redzynets) 09:15 – Oleh Makarenko 09:40 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ENSURING THE UPGRADE OF NPPS PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS 09:40 – Artur Nebishchansky 10:05 PHYSICAL PROTECTION AS AN INTEGRAL AND COMPULSORY COMPONENT OF SAFE OPERATION OF NUCLEAR POWER ENTERPRISES 10:05 – Maksym Brodiahin 10:30 NUCLEAR FACILITY PHYSICAL PROTECTION AT CONSTRUCTION AND COMMISSIONING STAGE 10:30 – Coffee-break 10:50 10:50 – Ihor Mospan 11:15 POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN NPP PROTECTION FORCES RESULTING IN IMPROVED PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF FACILITIES 11:15 – Serhii Kuznietsov 11:40 CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 11:40 – Hennadii Fedotov 12:05 CERTAIN ASPECTS OF ORGANISATION OF THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AT KINR OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF UKRAINE 12:05– Volodymyr Petrovskyi 12:30 NEW DEVELOPMENTS OF RADIATION CONTROL MEANS OF TM ECOTEST 12:30 – LUNCH 13:30 Session 2 Issues of concern of the State System of Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material (Head Viktor Gavryliuk) 13:30 – Olena Chernysh 13:55 INTEGRATED IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN UKRAINE

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13:55 – Yuliia Skrypka 14:20 TOPICAL ISSUES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS, NM ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AT SS ZNPP 14:20 – Dmytro Orlyk 14:45 TOPICAL ISSUES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AT SS SUNPP 14:45 – Serhii Nikulin 15:10 TOPICAL ISSUES OF THE STATE SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 15:10 – Coffee-break 15:30 15:30 – Roman Orlov 15:55 NM CONTROL AT CHERNOBYL NPP 15:55 – Oleksandr Skyba 16:20 NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING BY SSE CENTRAL ENTERPRISE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE 16:20 – Discussion 16:30 17:00 Official Dinner

24 September, Tuesday

08:30 – Discussion of the previous day 09:00 (Heads Oleh Redzynets, Viktor Gavryliuk) 09:00 – Jan Soderman 09:35 AWARENESS AND PREPAREDNESS CONCERNING ANTAGONISTIC THREATHS ON NATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL LEVEL Session 3 Staffing of the physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear material (Head Nataliia Klos) 09:35 – Tymofii Bibik 10:00 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 10:00 – Ivan Ostapenko 10:25 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 10:25 – Coffee-break 10:50 10:50 – Oleh Maslov 11:15 DEVELOPMENT OF LABORATORY BASE AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATED DISCIPLINES FOR STUDENTS IN THE MAJOR 143. NUCLEAR POWER 11:15 – Yurii Protsenko 11:40 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

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11:40 – Volodymyr Hrebennikov 12:05 ORGANIZATIONAL AND STAFF PROVISION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE CONTROL ON REMOTE POLLUTION OUTSIDE EXCLUSION ZONE Session 4 Nuclear security culture. Evaluation of the nuclear security conditions (Head Ivan Zhebet) 12:05 – Andrii Artiushkin 12:30 NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENTS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE 12:30 – LUNCH 13:30 13:30 – Pavlo Tsykalchuk 13:55 NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE (UNDERWATER STONES) 13:55 – Oleksandr Yermolenko 14:20 NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENTS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE 14:20 – Valentyn Viter 14:45 NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENTS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE 14:45 – Artem Kasilov 15:10 NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENTS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE 15:10 – Coffee-break 15:30 15:30 – Mykola Mykoliuk 15:55 NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENTS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE 15:55 – Valerii Vasylenko 16:20 NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENTS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE 16:20 – Discussion 16:30

25 September, Wednesday

08:30 – Discussion of the previous day 09:00 (Heads Nataliia Klos, Ivan Zhebet) Session 5 Interaction of nuclear safety and nuclear security (Head Serhii Drapei) 09:00 – Serhii Antoniuk 09:20 INTERACTION BETWEEN NUCLEAR SAFETY AND NUCLEAR SECURITY 09:20 – Yevheniia Kudriashova 09:40 INFORMATION PLATFORM UATOM.ORG AS A TOOL FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN EXPERTS AND THE PUBLIC ON NUCLEAR SECURITY, RADIATION SAFETY, AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

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Session 6 Improvement of the interaction mechanism for participants of the objective interaction plan, of the regional and State interaction plans (Head Serhii Drapei, Ivan Zhebet) 09:40 – Ivan Zhebet 10:05 IMPROVEMENT OF COORDINATION MECHANISM OF PARTICIPANTS OF THE FACILITY-LEVEL RESPONSE PLAN IN CASE OF SABOTAGE 10:05 – Viacheslav Bediukh 10:30 IMPROVEMENT OF COORDINATION MECHANISM BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS OF THE SS ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP FACILITY-LEVEL RESPONSE PLAN IN CASE OF SABOTAGE 10:30 – Coffee-break 10:50 10:50 – Borys Shevchuk 11:10 MAIN PRINCIPLES AND AVENUES OF IMPROVEMENT OF INTERACTION MECHANISMS FOR PARTICIPANTS OF FACILITY-LEVEL RESPONSE PLANS AGAINST CONTEMPORARY THREATS 11:10 – Hennadii Honcharuk 11:30 COORDINATION AND INTERACTION OF MIA DIVISIONS IN THE AREA OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION. CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 11:30 – Roman Yuriev 11:50 TASKS AND AUTHORITY OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE IN COUNTERING CBRN RISKS AND THREATS AT THE STATE BORDER 11:50 – Pavel Tishakov 12:10 NORDISK SIKKERHET’S PROJECTS IN UKRAINE 12:10 – Bohdan Kaidyk 12:30 TRAINING AS A KEY ELEMENT OF FACILITY-LEVEL SABOTAGE RESPONSE PLANS SUSTAINABILITY 12:30 – LUNCH 13:30 13:30 Tour to the Lviv Radon Coffee-break

26 September, Thursday

08:30 – Discussion of the previous day 09:00 (Heads Serhii Drapei, Ivan Zhebet) Session 7 Gender issue (impact of gender stereotypes) in nuclear security activities (Head Yuliia Skrypka) 09:00 – Nataliia Klos 09:30 GENDER INEQUALITY IN NUCLEAR SECURITY. THINGS TO KNOW 09:30 – Liubov Liubinetska 09:55 GENDER PROBLEM (IMPACT OF GENDER STEREOTYPES) IN NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTIVITY

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09:55 – Oleksandra Zaichenko 10:20 GENDER PROBLEM (IMPACT OF GENDER STEREOTYPES) IN NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTIVITY 10:20 – Coffee-break 10:40 Session 8 Cyber security in the nuclear security area (Head Oleh Maslov) 10:40 – Serhii Drapei 11:10 CYBER-SECURITY OF INTERNAL RESTRICTED ACCESS NETWORKS OF NUCLEAR FACILITY PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS 11:10 – Yurii Soltys 11:40 PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF CYBER SECURITY AS A NUCLEAR SECURITY ELEMENT AT SS RIVNE NPP 11:40 – Andrii Loiko 12:05 CYBER SECURITY AS PART OF NUCLEAR SECURITY 12:05 – Andrii Savchenko 12:30 CYBER SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FACILITY 12:30 – LUNCH 13:30 Session 9 The architecture (structure) of detection of nuclear materials in illicit trafficking and response for such events. Nuclear forensics (Head Olena Chernysh) 13:30 – Yurii Lobach 13:55 NUCLEAR FORENSICS DEVELOPMENT IN UKRAINE 13:55 – Stanislav Vanzha 14:20 ANALYTICAL CAPABILITIES OF NSC KIPT FOR NUCLEAR FORENSICS AND NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 14:20 – Yevhen Hubarev 14:45 ARCHITECTURE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ILLICIT TRAFFICKING DETECTION AND INCIDENT RESPONSE 14:45 – Ihor Bendo 15:10 ARCHITECTURE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ILLICIT TRAFFICKING DETECTION AND INCIDENT RESPONSE 15:10 – Coffee-break 15:30 15:30 – Oleh Maslov 15:55 ANALYSIS OF APPLICATION OF PORTABLE CdZnTe GAMMA SPECTROMETERS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN ILLICIT TRAFFICKING 15:55 – Ruslan Ivanov 16:20 THREAT OF PROLIFERATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL USABLE IN A DIRTY BOMB 16:20 – Discussion 16:30

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27 September, Friday

08:30 – Discussion of the previous day 09:00 (Heads Yuliia Skrypka, Oleh Maslov, Olena Chernysh) Session 10 Improvement of the legal framework on physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear material (Head Artur Nebishchansky) 09:00 – Vitalii Kokhan 09:25 IMPROVEMENT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 09:25 – Vasyl Redkovych 09:50 IMPROVEMENT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL 09:50 – Oleksandr Maslakov 10:15 IMPROVEMENT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 10:15 – Coffee-break 10:40 10:40 – Round table. Nuclear Security 12:30 Head Viktor Gavryliuk 12:30 – LUNCH 13:30 13:30 – Discussion of draft XVI Conference Decision 14:00 14:00 – Conference Decision-making 15:00 Report – Head of decision-working committee Nataliia Klos 15:00 – ХVI CONFERENCE CLOSING 15:30 Head Oleh Redzynets 15:30 – Coffee-break 16:00

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LIST OF THE ABSTRACTS

No Speaker Name Title of the Presentation Page 1 ANTONIUK INTERACTION BETWEEN NUCLEAR SAFETY AND 41 Serhii NUCLEAR SECURITY 2 ARTIUSHKIN NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENTS OF 36 Andrii NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE 3 BIBIK HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOR PHYSICAL 33 Tymofii PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 4 BRODIAHIN NUCLEAR FACILITY PHYSICAL PROTECTION AT 25 Maksym CONSTRUCTION AND COMMISSIONING STAGE 5 CHERNYSH INTEGRATED IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN UKRAINE 28 Olena 6 DRAPEI CYBER-SECURITY OF INTERNAL RESTRICTED 50 Serhii ACCESS NETWORKS OF NUCLEAR FACILITY PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS 7 FEDOTOV CERTAIN ASPECTS OF ORGANISATION OF THE 27 Hennadii PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AT KINR OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF UKRAINE 5 HONCHARUK COORDINATION AND INTERACTION OF MIA 45 Hennadii DIVISIONS IN THE AREA OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION. CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 9 HREBENNIKOV ORGANIZATIONAL AND STAFF PROVISION OF 36 Volodymyr RADIOACTIVE WASTE CONTROL ON REMOTE POLLUTION OUTSIDE EXCLUSION ZONE 10 HUBAREV ARCHITECTURE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ILLICIT 54 Yevhen TRAFFICKING DETECTION AND INCIDENT RESPONSE 11 IVANOV THREAT OF PROLIFERATION OF RADIOACTIVE 56 Ruslan MATERIAL USABLE IN A DIRTY BOMB 12 KAIDYK TRAINING AS A KEY ELEMENT OF FACILITY-LEVEL 47 Bohdan SABOTAGE RESPONSE PLANS SUSTAINABILITY 13 KASILOV NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. 39 Artem ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE 14 KLOS GENDER INEQUALITY IN NUCLEAR SECURITY. 48 Nataliia THINGS TO KNOW 15 KOKHAN IMPROVEMENT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 57 Vitalii PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 16 KUDRIASHOVA INFORMATION PLATFORM UATOM.ORG AS A TOOL 42 Yevheniia FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN EXPERTS AND THE PUBLIC ON NUCLEAR SECURITY, RADIATION SAFETY, AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

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17 KUZNIETSOV CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION 26 Serhii SYSTEM RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 18 LOBACH NUCLEAR FORENSICS DEVELOPMENT IN UKRAINE 53 Yurii 19 LOIKO CYBER SECURITY AS PART OF NUCLEAR SECURITY 51 Andrii 20 LUIBINETSKA GENDER PROBLEM (IMPACT OF GENDER 49 Liubo STEREOTYPES) IN NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTIVITY 21 MAKARENKO THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN 22 Oleh ENSURING THE UPGRADE OF NPPS PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS 22 MASLAKOV IMPROVEMENT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON 58 Oleksandr PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 23 MASLOV DEVELOPMENT OF LABORATORY BASE AND 34 Oleh METHODOLOGY FOR THE NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATED DISCIPLINES FOR STUDENTS IN THE MAJOR 143. NUCLEAR POWER 24 MASLOV ANALYSIS OF APPLICATION OF PORTABLE CdZnTe 55 Oleh GAMMA SPECTROMETERS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN ILLICIT TRAFFICKING 25 MOSPAN POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN NPP PROTECTION 26 Ihor FORCES RESULTING IN IMPROVED PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF FACILITIES 26 MYKOLIUK NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENT OF 40 Mykola NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE 27 NEBISHCHANSKY PHYSICAL PROTECTION AS AN INTEGRAL AND 24 Artur COMPULSORY COMPONENT OF SAFE OPERATION OF NUCLEAR POWER ENTERPRISES 28 NIKULIN TOPICAL ISSUES OF THE STATE SYSTEM OF 30 Serhii NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 29 ORLOV NM CONTROL AT CHERNOBYL NPP 31 Roman 30 ORLYK TOPICAL ISSUES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL 30 Dmytro ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AT SS SUNPP 31 OSTAPENKO HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOR PHYSICAL 34 Ivan PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 32 PROTSENKO HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOR PHYSICAL 35 Yurii PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 33 REDKOVYCH IMPROVEMENT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON 57 Vasyl PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

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34 SAVCHENKO CYBER SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FACILITY 52 Andrii 35 SHEVCHUK MAIN PRINCIPLES AND AVENUES OF 44 Borys IMPROVEMENT OF INTERACTION MECHANISMS FOR PARTICIPANTS OF FACILITY-LEVEL RESPONSE PLANS AGAINST CONTEMPORARY THREATS 36 SKRYPKA TOPICAL ISSUES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA 33 Yuliia SAFEGUARDS, NM ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AT SS ZNPP 37 SKYBA NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING BY SSE CENTRAL 31 Oleksandr ENTERPRISE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE 38 SÖDERMAN AWARENESS AND PREPAREDNESS CONCERNING 35 Jan ANTAGONISTIC THREATHS ON NATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 39 SOLTYS PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF 56 Yurii CYBER SECURITY AS A NUCLEAR SECURITY ELEMENT AT SS RIVNE NPP 40 TISHAKOV NORDISK SIKKERHET’S PROJECTS IN UKRAINE 51 Pavel 41 TSYKALCHUK NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE (UNDERWATER 37 Pavlo STONES) 42 VANZHA ANALYTICAL CAPABILITIES OF NSC KIPT 53 Stanislav FOR NUCLEAR FORENSICS AND NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 43 VASYLENKO NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENT OF 40 Valerii NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE 44 VITER NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. 38 Valentyn ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE 45 VOLKOV IMPROVEMENT OF COORDINATION MECHANISM 44 Mark BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS OF THE SS ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP FACILITY-LEVEL RESPONSE PLAN IN CASE OF SABOTAGE 46 YERMOLENKO NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENT OF 41 Oleksandr NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE 47 YURIEV TASKS AND AUTHORITY OF THE STATE BORDER 50 Roman GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE IN COUNTERING CBRN RISKS AND THREATS AT THE STATE BORDER 48 ZAICHENKO GENDER PROBLEM: INFLUENCE OF GENDER 50 Oleksandra STEREOTYPES ON NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTIVITY 49 ZHEBET IMPROVEMENT OF COORDINATION MECHANISM OF 43 Ivan PARTICIPANTS OF THE FACILITY-LEVEL RESPONSE PLAN IN CASE OF SABOTAGE

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THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ENSURING THE UPGRADE OF NPPS PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS

O. Makarenko SS NNEGC Energoatom

Today, the issue of technical renewal of NPPs physical protection systems is determining matter for Energoatom, taking into account the fact that the construction of nuclear facilities in Ukraine began as early as 70-80s and when designing them, those technical solutions were not which allow to provide counteraction to the threats existing in the modern world. At the same time, it is necessary to approach this issue comprehensively, not just upgrading the equipment of physical protection systems on the perimeter or power unit, but using new technical solutions and approaches, rebuilding the entire system as a whole. It is quite clear that such an approach is rather costly and not even such a large company as Energoatom is able to provide an adequate level of funding to ensure the implementation of projects in the planned time frame. One of the ways to solve this problem for us was to attract international technical assistance. Today, the risk of using nuclear or other radioactive material for criminal or deliberate unauthorized actions remains a matter of concern for the international community and continues to be regarded as a threat to international security. Understanding that more and more attention is being paid by developed countries to combat nuclear terrorism, not only within the internal borders, but also beyond their borders, the physical protection specialists of Energoatom have been focused for many years on finding foreign partners for the joint implementation of projects. The most favorable platform for achieving our goals was the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. I want to note that long before the aggression of Russian Federation, when the European community was not so actively involved in the internal affairs of Ukraine, participation in the meeting of the subgroup on nuclear and radiological protection in the Global Partnership was Energoatom's landmark. Even then, during my first speech to physical protection specialists from all over the world, who did not quite understand yet the depth of the problem of moral and technical obsolescence of the physical protection systems of nuclear power plants in Ukraine, we managed to attract attention and lay the foundation for further fruitful cooperation, which grew into a full-fledged partnership. In this regard, I want to digress a little from the topic of my speech and call on all to learn a foreign language, to take part in various international meetings, seminars, conferences both on my own behalf and on behalf of my organization, since even casual contacts can turn into fruitful cooperation. Returning to the experience of Energoatom, I want to note that as a result of the tremendous work we have done at the international level, today we are working with a number of major countries, including the United States, Germany and Canada. Thanks to participation in the activities of the Global Partnership, Energoatom was able to attract significant amounts of technical assistance, which is aimed at implementing projects to improve the nuclear security of strategic facilities in our country. Moreover, in our work we try to cover all problem sites, therefore, each NPP has a specific donor for its projects. A significant contribution was made by the US Department of Energy. Since 2013, the American partners have been gradually funding the project of technical re-equipment of the physical protection system of the South-Ukrainian NPP. 22

The total amount of technical assistance allocated for the implementation of this project exceeds $ 7 million and the largest facility completed by us together with the United States is the construction of a central alarm station. Much has been done together with our German partners. After the approval of the intergovernmental agreement between Ukraine and Germany on cooperation within the Global Partnership, starting in 2014, German specialists have been fruitfully working on projects for the technical re-equipment of the physical protection systems of the Rivne and South-Ukrainian NPPs. You may have noticed that significant amounts of technical assistance are allocated specifically for the South-Ukrainian NPP. This was caused both by technical condition of physical protection system, and by the proximity to the conflict zone in the East of Ukraine. But this does not mean that other sites of Energoatom are deprived of assistance from financial donors. Our Swedish partners were invited to participate in projects for the technical upgrade of the physical protection system of power unit 1 and the construction of the central alarm station of the Khmelnitsky NPP. Projects successfully implemented to this day. Moreover, seeing the success of their Swedish counterparts, the Norwegian partners joined these projects under conditions of cost-sharing. This year, the priority for us is the start of cooperation of the Zaporizhia NPP with the United States. A number of visits to the site have already been made, our physical protection specialists remain in touch constantly with representatives of the US Department of Energy to provide advice and further negotiations. In this regard, I want to note that often the international department conducts work on negotiations with foreign partners in the organization. Therefore, it is very important for physical protection specialists to be also involved in the negotiation process, as knowing and understanding all aspects and nuances of implementing physical protection projects, for example, related to the protection of state secrets, they can prevent problems in the early stages further. Very often, potential donors ask questions at the negotiation stage regarding the feasibility or priority of the implementation of a project. At Energoatom, this issue has been resolved by approving the order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On approving the action plan for technical upgrade and reconstruction of engineering and technical means of the physical protection systems of Energoatom”. In this document, we clearly described the action plan for the next five years with specific deadlines for the implementation of activities, which allows us not only to argue the need to perform work for international partners, but also greatly simplifies the task of allocating funds within Energoatom. Of course, not everything is as perfect as we wanted, there is already some lag behind the plan associated with the complicated procedure for coordinating funding with National energy and utilities regulatory commission of Ukraine, but we hope that Ukraine’s transition to the new model of the electric power market will be the starting point when the issues of financing physical protection will be no less important than issues of ensuring nuclear security, as is customary throughout the world.

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PHYSICAL PROTECTION AS AN INTEGRAL AND COMPULSORY COMPONENT OF SAFE OPERATION OF NUCLEAR POWER ENTERPRISES A. Nebishchanskyi Ministry of energy and coal industry of Ukraine

International community is presently focused on balancing nuclear safety measures and physical protection measures – this is repeatedly declared by international community at international summits, meetings and conferences. Main principles of the state policy in the area of nuclear energy use and radiation protection have been defined as follows: administration in the area of nuclear energy use; safety of nuclear energy use; siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities and sources of ionising radiation; radiation protection and nuclear safety rating and assurance; physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste management sites and other sources of ionising radiation; state accounting of nuclear material and sources of ionising radiation; rate setting, licensing and oversight in the area of nuclear energy use. State policy is implemented through establishing an optimum system of management in the area of nuclear energy use, ensuring nuclear and radiation safety, developing and implementing state safety programmes, including measures for public protection in observation areas and making arrangements to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism (sabotage), theft or any other unauthorised removal of nuclear material, radioactive waste, other sources of ionising radiation and to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation regime. The above is based on implementation of main provisions for nuclear facility operation, including: accident-free operation of nuclear facilities; nuclear and radiation safety; creating and maintaining physical protection systems; emergency preparedness for elimination of consequences. Article 1 of the NE Law determines that: nuclear energy use is an aggregate of activities related to use of nuclear technology, nuclear material, sources of ionising radiation in science, production, health care and other sectors, as well as for the mining of uranium ore and management of radioactive waste; radiations safety means compliance with admissible limits of radiation exposure of personnel, the public and the natural environment set by safety norms, rules and standards; nuclear safety means compliance with nuclear material use norms, rules and standards that ensure radiation safety. Article 7 of the NE Law provides that the Law has jurisdiction over all types of activity in the area of nuclear energy use including, inter alia, works and services that affect safety in the use of nuclear energy, state regulation of safety in the use of nuclear energy and physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste management sites and other sources of ionising radiation. PP Law Article 1 provides that physical protection is an activity in the area of nuclear energy use aimed for security of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste, other sources of ionising radiation and for the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Accordingly, physical protection is, obviously, a nuclear energy use activity, which is integral and compulsory constituent of safe operation of nuclear power enterprises. Its implementation has the goal of, inter alia, peaceful use of atomic energy, enhancement of 24

nuclear and radiation safety and implementation of IAEA safeguards at nuclear power and nuclear industry facilities. Functions for the physical protection, nuclear and radiation safety and international non-proliferation regimes cannot be duly performed other than in coordination with the issues of nuclear power facilities operation, nuclear material accounting and control, etc.

NUCLEAR FACILITY PHYSICAL PROTECTION AT CONSTRUCTION AND COMMISSIONING STAGE

M. Brodiahin SS “Atomproektengineering”, SE NNEGC Energoatom

Ukraine has in operation 13 nuclear power units with reactors type VVER-1000 and two more power units with reactors type VVER-440. Nuclear power plants account for nearly 60 per cent of the nation’s aggregate power generation. Production of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the process of nuclear power plant operation is an integral component of a nuclear fuel cycle. SNF from VVER reactors of Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South-Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants is shipped for process storage to the Russian state enterprises Mining and Chemical Combine and Mayak. The existing SNF handling scheme for the Ukrainian NPPs does not fully ensure energy security of the state considering that there is monopoly dependence from enterprises in the Russian Federation; in case they refuse to accept spent nuclear fuel from Ukrainian nuclear plants for temporary storage there will be threat of shutdown of nuclear units of Rivne, Khmelnitsky, and South-Ukrainian Power Plants. Construction and commissioning in Ukraine of its own storage facility for SNF from Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South-Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants – the Centralised Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel from VVER Reactors of Domestic Nuclear Power Plants (CSSNF) – is a priority state policy aimed to alter the above scheme. This priority has been defined by the “On the Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel in Respect of the Siting, Design and Construction of the Centralised Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel from VVER Reactors of Domestic Nuclear Power Plants.” CSSNF is a 2nd category nuclear facility and therefore should have the 2nd level of physical protection. During the independence period Ukraine has accumulated a fairly limited experience of design of nuclear facility physical protection systems starting from the siting stage, specifically considering the ongoing development and improvement of domestic regulatory framework in the area of physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. Based on the CSSNF example the presentation will focus on key aspects of physical protection of a new nuclear facility at the stage of its construction and commissioning.

POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN NPP PROTECTION FORCES RESULTING IN 25

IMPROVED PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF FACILITIES

I. Mospan Unit 3044, National Guard of Ukraine

In 2019, the re-established National Guard of Ukraine is celebrating its 5-th anniversary. Creation of a new-type mobile military force combining functions of state protection and law enforcement was a response to annexation of Crimea and military aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation. Over the 5 years NGU has conquered the thorny path of evolvement and development. The most palpable progress was made in the military sphere. Operational units of NGU were structured similarly to Ukrainian army units and provided with armoured element and weapons. Furthermore, NGU has expanded its capabilities in the area of public order and security enforcement anywhere in Ukraine based on best experience of similar forces in Europe and worldwide. NGU now is one of the main components of the Ukraine’s security and defence sector. Its divisions are prepared to act at the time of peace, during crises and martial law. Modern NGU is unique for minimum time it takes the units to convert from one state of readiness to the other. Over 40 thousand NGU personnel are now performing a broad circle of assignments both on their own and in coordination with colleagues from law enforcement agencies, armed forces and other agencies pertaining to the Ukrainian security and defence sector. Specifically, NGU units are involved in the operations of the Combined Forces, cover the state border, combat crime, protect public order, and guard critical facilities, government agencies etc. Positive developments that took place in NPP protection units, in their turn, improve level of physical protection of facilities.

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

S. Kuznetsov SE NNEGC Energoatom

At the modern stage of the development of physical protection systems industry return on investment is one of the most discussed concepts – although one of the least comprehensible ones. Return on investment in a physical protection system, properly calculated and substantiated, may be a powerful tool for physical protection experts in competition for limited company resources. Investments in security could be returned in two ways: through improvement of security level and improvement of financial performance. Security personnel are used to draw opinions based on expected results from improved security without paying attention to how improved security may improve profitability of investments in physical protection. When working on a business case for investment in security technology one should clearly specify costs and benefits and present results in the form of convincing financial estimates. Knowing how to evaluate need of investment in physical protection and profit forecast such that this becomes clear for people who are not physical protection experts but are responsible for decision making could be decisive for allocation of financial resources at the state level and the organisational level. 26

Considering that organisations have traditionally treated security as a necessary cost of risk and expense mitigation, it is important to help the management see its financial value. Acknowledgement and quantitative evaluation of physical protection value helps better prioritise investments therein. Return on investments is a concept that is used to maximise benefit from spent organisational funds and to establish financial value of a project. The report on return on investments in a physical protection system will provide an overview of return of investments in security and will propose a simple algorithm for preparation and calculation of principal return on investment indicators for security technologies. The target audience includes physical protection experts and other persons who want to understand a potential for financial return in the physical protection area. This report has the goal of offering a basis for further studies on return on investments in physical protection systems and of supporting improvement of methodology approaches to identification of a highly valuable security project through holistic assessment of benefits it offers.

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF ORGANISATION OF THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AT KINR OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF UKRAINE

H. Fedotov KINR, NAS of Ukraine

1. Introduction Current KINR tasks:  current maintenance works to identify remaining lifetime of structural materials of active power reactors on order of Ukrainian NPPs;  research to identify impact of radiation loads on physical properties of structural materials of nuclear reactors;  research to select new prospective structural materials for nuclear reactor engineering;  leading expert organisation to study and identify characteristics of radioactive material recovered from illicit trafficking (para. 2, Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 813 of 2 June 2003).  work (jointly with medical establishments of Ukraine) to generate radiopharmaceuticals at KINR nuclear physical installations;  a series of scientific tasks. Areas and achievements of KINR in nuclear power sector and in addressing scientific and technical problems:  Assurance of safe operation of NPPs and physical problems of thermonuclear synthesis, specifically, development of a unique method of measuring nuclear safety parameters of nuclear power facilities implemented at Object Shelter.  Systematic research of physico-mechanical properties of metal in “witness samples” made of the same material as reactor vessel (in hot cells).  Development of modern methods for monitoring radiation loads on reactor vessels of VVER-1000 and dose monitoring of irradiated witness samples providing information required to identify residual operating lifetime of the reactor vessel and to make scientifically justified decisions for possible extension of its lifetime. 2. State and certain features of a PPS at KINR/NAS of Ukraine: 27

Negative elements of KINR PPS state: Administrative issues:  no clear vertical PPS management structure between NAS and KINR (no person at the level of NAS of Ukraine to be personally responsible for physical protection);  existing staff structure of KINR PPS Service is not sufficient to effectively maintain appropriate state of not only the Institute but even the reactor department!  no proper financial motivation for Physical Protection Service personnel (and KINR personnel in general);  physical protection is not a priority in the system of the NAS of Ukraine (therefore KINR physical protection personnel is treated as support personnel). Negative elements of PPS state: Technical issues:  KINR fence does not meet requirements of regulatory documents (part of KINR fence absent, the remaining part requires replacement or capital renovation);  KINR site area adjacent to external perimeter fence is not lit, allowing unauthorised persons (adversaries) to penetrate to the KINR site almost unnoticed;  not all buildings with restricted access rooms are connected to the central alarm station. Positive aspects of PPS maintenance in 2019: • high percentage of completion of measures planned by the Inter-Departmental Commission statement; • detection and video surveillance equipment installed in several buildings with restricted access rooms; • video surveillance equipment installed to monitor KINR site and approaches thereto; • review of construction of external fence in the KINR site exclusion area is at the final stage; • protected computers procured and installed; formalities (approvals processes) are being finalised with appropriate authorities; • PPS support funding is growing (versus 2014-2017); • possible upgrade decision for security equipment being part of the research reactor PPS (subject to US financial support). 3. Conclusions. The following is needed to maintain the PPS (physical protection system) in a continuously operational mode:  revise the system of funding PPS maintenance needs;  revise the staff structure of the physical protection system;  make arrangements for motivation of physical protection system specialists. We see therefore that the PPS plays an important role in the everyday activity of KINR and has some specific aspects. It is challenged with insufficient attention, but the situation is being notably improved.

INTEGRATED IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN UKRAINE

O. Chernysh SNRIU

Integrated safeguards have been applied in Ukraine since 2012. An important aspect of integrated safeguards is enhanced effectiveness of IAEA activity through implementation of the state-level approach (SLA) for safeguards application. SLA is developed by the IAEA on the basis of: 28

- review of all aspects of capabilities of the country’s NFC such as existing NFs, experience and expertise, scientific activity, ability to develop and import technologies and/or expertise, resources and - identification of possible ways to obtain nuclear material to create a nuclear explosive device. Application of this approach may cause the reduction of the scope of IAEA inspection activity in the country but should improve effectiveness of this activity. In case any changes occur in the country’s NFC the state-level approach is revised by the IAEA. Changes in the Ukrainian NFC, such as construction and completion of new NFs (KNPP and CS SNF) and increased nuclear material flows, require extension of IAEA inspection activity; thus, new approaches are being implemented to improve (enhance) IAEA effectiveness and to minimise Agency’s inspection activity. Situation analysis and potential revision of the state-level approach is an annual routine. As a rule, such changes are implemented as the result of discussions at the highest level meetings convened annually. SLA actions successfully implemented in Ukraine: Effective 2012: - application of remote monitoring, - implementation of unscheduled component: short-notice or unannounced inspections (UI / RI at NF fresh fuel section), - activation of communications between the IAEA, state authority and operator. Effective 2017: - truly UI in addition to UI / RI (truly unannounced inspections); - unannounced inspections based on mailbox declarations; - activation of communications between the IAEA, state authority and operator due to the use of SDP (State Declaration Portal) and email correspondence; - FDET during spent fuel shipments, etc. The integrated safeguards system is characterised as expressing the highest level of trust to the state who excels in performance of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. The opinion on effectiveness of integrated safeguards and IAEA state-level approach in Ukraine is reflected in the “broader conclusion,” which Ukraine has been receiving annually since 2010.

TOPICAL ISSUES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS, NM ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AT SS ZNPP

Yu. Skrypka SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP”

A number of urgent issues have emerged recently with regard to the IAEA safeguards application, specifically:  upgrade of IAEA equipment (no formal information on modified equipment and, accordingly, no possibility to update design and operational documentation);  optimisation of inspection activity (potential reduction of time and operational costs, doses etc.);  operation of the IAEA equipment;  systematic provision of consolidated information on IAEA representatives (to ensure unimpeded access into the protected area for undeclared inspections and clearance for 29

work in contamination control area);  verification of information provided in accordance with the Additional Protocol. Regarding NM accounting and control, the focus should be on the modifications of regulatory framework to:  update or specify requirements of certain regulations;  revise or cancel specific regulations (due to loss of relevance);  remove discrepancies between (different interpretations of) specific regulations.

TOPICAL ISSUES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AT SS SUNPP

D. Orlyk SS “South-Ukraine NPP”

The presentation will dwell upon topical issues of the nuclear material accounting and control system at SS SUNPP. Particular attention is paid to repair of mechanically damaged W fuel assemblies at FFS using Fuel Inspection and Repair Bench equipment, namely:  History of fuel assembly damages.  Plans for the repair of fuel assembly damages at FFS.  Accounting and control of retrieved fuel elements after fuel assembly repair. The aspects covered will include implementation and testing of the HOLTEC technology and nuclear material accounting and control for spent fuel assemblies dispatched to the SNFCSF using HOLTEC equipment.

TOPICAL ISSUES OF THE STATE SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

S. Nikulin SS “Khmelnytska NPP”

The presentation will dwell on the issues related to nuclear material accounting during nuclear fuel handling at SS Khmelnitsky NPP and the IAEA requirements including for: - receipt of fresh fuel; - shipment of spent nuclear fuel to fuel recovery plants or to a SNFCSF based on the modified Holtec International technology; - problems related to nuclear fuel accounting. The presentation will also offer substantiation of update to SKINRU requirements regarding the accounting for category ІІІ and ІV nuclear material and of requirements for IAEA equipment handling at NPPs.

NM CONTROL AT CHERNOBYL NPP 30

T. Morozova, R. Orlov SSE “Chernobyl NPP”

According to the Rules for Nuclear Material Accounting and Control, NP 306.7.122-2006, a license holder should ensure operability of the NM measurement system and implementation of NM measurement programmes in order to be able to maintain a NMAC system. NM is measured on receipt to a MBA, during transfer from one MBA to another, or in case of change of nuclear material amount inside a MBA. A nuclear material measurement system has the goal of determining nuclear material quantities at handling locations within the pre-set uncertainties. The main tasks of the nuclear material measurement system are as follows: - acquisition of data on quantitative and isotopic composition of plutonium and uranium, including available material, material received to or shipped from a material balance area; - determination of physical inventory of nuclear material inside a material balance area during physical inventory takings; - determination of uncertainty of nuclear material measurement results for the material balance area. Measurement control procedure for NM, losses, shipper/receiver differences is one of the measures directed for detection and prevention of NM losses or unauthorised use. NM measurement programmes are developed for each MBA and list KMPs, provide information on measurement methods, measurement instrumentation, samples, including standard samples, margins of measurement uncertainty, measurement procedure and measurement results documentation procedure. At Chernobyl NPP, the following systems are applied to implement NM control procedures including NM measurements for the purposes of international safeguards:  measurement suite POTOK-N;  CDAS – Chernobyl Drum Assay System;  CWAD – Chernobyl Waste Assay Detector – to be supplied to CNPP. NM measurement results are documented in a report reflecting information on quantitative and isotopic composition of plutonium and uranium. Qualitative and quantitative assessments of NM reflected in the reports are used to make a conclusion on losses or unauthorised use of NM. NM measurement reports are treated as accounting records.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING BY SSE CENTRAL ENTERPRISE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

V. Antropov, O. Skyba SSE CEMRW

Pursuant to its license, SSE CEMRW organises accounting for and control of nuclear material in accordance with the Rules for Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NP 306.7.122-2006). Nuclear material accounting results are regularly submitted to the Regulator in the form of standard reports. Part of nuclear material is stored in “legacy” storage facilities of the Exclusion Zone radioactive waste; the other part is in the centralised storage facility for the disused sources 31

of ionising radiation (CSFDSIR) established within the framework of our enterprise for acceptance and processing of sources delivered for long-term storage from the enterprises of the UkrSA Radon. CSFDSIR being part of the Vektor Production Complex is used to store disused sources of ionising radiation containing nuclear material – separately from other radioactive waste. Nuclear material accounting is based on computer programmes used for primary processing of information obtained during entry monitoring, as well as to form accounting records and report, etc. Accounting information on characteristics of nuclear material in storage at the enterprise is saved on the server of the Regional Centre for Exclusion Zone RAW Accounting.

AWARENESS AND PREPAREDNESS CONCERNING ANTAGONISTIC THREATHS ON NATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

Jan Soderman Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

The presentation is a reporting of an ongoing research assignment carried out by Swedish Defence University (FHS) on behalf of SSM. The focus is on the situation in Sweden, but we are convinced that the work is so universal that it has relevance in other countries as well. One of the tasks of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is to assess whether society's overall protection of the nuclear power plants in Sweden meets the requirements and expectations set for its operations in international and national regulations and agreements. To be able to solve this problem, a.o. it is necessary to ensure the ability of the different stakeholders in the society to be aware of various possible forms of hostile attacks. This is of central importance, not least on the basis of historical experience which shows that both operative staff and policy makers tend to ignore clear indications of an impending attack in situations where these indications deviate too much from normal reference frames. Within the framework of SSM's supervisory work, the authority shall assess the protection of the nuclear power plants against various forms of so-called antagonistic attacks. This protection encompasses the Swedish state's overall ability to respond to an attack, i.e. the government, relevant ministries, regulatory authorities, license holders the Police Authority and the Armed Forces. A central condition in this work is involvement of both structural and human factors, which means that SSM needs to assess comprehension of this problem by all parties involved, in the same way that technical equipment is optimized. It is necessary that all parties involved possess a relevant risk awareness and understanding of these problems.

HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND 32

NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

T. Bibik Ihor Sikorskyi KPI

2019 saw the first enrolment of students for the new graduate programme in nuclear security at the National Technical University of Ukraine Igor Sikorski Kyiv Polytechnic Institute. The course will offer a master’s degree in the Nuclear Security major as part of the discipline 143 Nuclear Power, on both full-time and distant basis. Training duration: 18 months. Training base is the chair of nuclear power plants and thermal engineering at the thermal energy department having the required license and accreditation to provide necessary training. Professors involved have undergone training at the University of Texas and Sandia National laboratories in the US and attended a number of IAEA training courses. Practical part of the training will be hosted by the George Kuzmycz Training Centre for Physical Protection and Nuclear Material Accounting and Control at the Nuclear Research Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. In the framework of the course, the students will get knowledge and practical skills in: - nuclear security essentials; - international and national legislation on nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection; - use of nuclear material accounting and control for nuclear security; - vulnerability assessment and development of threat assessment and design basis threat; - nuclear security culture; - design and assessment of physical protection systems; - preventive and protective measures against insider threat; - non-destructive assay of nuclear material; - legal drafting; - radioactive waste management systems; - physical protection technologies and equipment; - information and computer security; - control of emergencies and contingency situations; - nuclear security management at the national and facility levels. Master’s degree in the Nuclear Security major as part of the discipline 143 Nuclear Power shall be available to persons who own a bachelor’s degree. Persons who have a historical degree of a specialist are also accepted. However, persons who have a specialist’s degree by a public contract may only claim the master’s degree on a commercial basis. Enrolment to the graduate course of persons who have bachelor’s or specialist’s degrees other than in the discipline 143 Nuclear Power will be based on successful additional entry exams. The entry test is a combined examination in dosimetry and radiation protection, environment protection strategy, and nuclear security essentials. The additional entry test is organised in the form of a combined exam in nuclear and neutron physics, nuclear and thermal power plants, and safety culture.

HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND 33

NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

I. Ostapenko Igor Sikorsky KPI

Training highly qualified staff in the area of physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control, including theoretical and practical training, is very time consuming. From the theoretical training standpoint, a substantial amount of information could be allocated for individual work, and this will not affect quality of knowledge in any significant way. As for practical training, it is not as easy to achieve high-quality skills through individual work. Given enough time for practical and laboratory classes there still remains a number of problems. The key one is that there is no possibility to arrange training benches with all required samples of hardware and software used in the industry. This problem could be resolved by development of specialised software to support virtual 3D simulations. In this case it would be possible to simulate operation of various combinations of equipment. For physical protection systems, an example of such a simulation would be a virtual 3D model of a Shapash Nuclear Research Institute [1]. This software is under development by IAEA specialists [2]. Release was scheduled for 2018 but was subsequently postponed. The international project Implementation of a Major in Physical Protection and Nuclear Material Accounting and Control at the Chair of Nuclear Power Plants and Thermal Engineering of Igor Sikorsky KPI Thermal Energy Department supported the establishment of a specialised computer modelling laboratory. The laboratory includes 20 powerful workstations interlinked into a single network with 1 server. This laboratory provides resources required to design an in-house 3D model of a hypothetical nuclear facility. Such project of an in-house hypothetical nuclear power plant is currently underway. The project covers a master plan of a NPP site with two SMR-160 reactors, one VVER-440 reactor and one VVER-1000 with all relevant ancillary installations, road and rail access ways. Detailed layouts of all installations will be designed further. A physical protection system will be the next stage. After that it will be possible to create a virtual 3D model of this hypothetical facility. Once designed, the in-house 3D model of a hypothetical facility will support a high level of practical training, moving a large portion of practical classes into virtual reality.

DEVELOPMENT OF LABORATORY BASE AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATED DISCIPLINES FOR STUDENTS IN THE MAJOR 143. NUCLEAR POWER

O. Maslov, V. Kravchenko Odesa National Polytechnic University

The discussion of university training problems at the workshop “Nuclear Security Education Programme in Ukraine: Practice and IAEA Guidelines and Implementation Experience in Some Higher Learning Institutions” in winter 2017 uncovered expediency of a number of optional disciplines related to nuclear security under the major 143 “Nuclear Power.” In line with this the University is implementing the following educational projects: 34

development of a number of undergraduate courses; development of the course in nuclear security essentials for PhD students and establishment of a scientific and educational gamma spectrometry laboratory. In the framework of implementation of the first two projects, educational modules for Nuclear Security, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Nuclear Material Non-Destructive Assay Methods, and Physical Protection Systems Analysis and Modelling courses have been developed and published at the University website. The Gamma-Spectrometry Lab project includes creation of a modern scientific and educational gamma-spec laboratory to train postgraduates, graduates and undergraduates taking major 143 in nuclear power. Numerous IAEA publications state that support of competency at nuclear industry organisations and nuclear regulatory bodies will become one of the most critical problems. In order to get relevant competencies university students need experience and skills to operate modern instruments and scientific equipment taking into account aspects of educational activity. Students, and particularly graduates and postgraduates, should be trained proactively. For this purpose students should be able to get fundamental knowledge and practise it through laboratory exercises on state-of-the-art equipment. This is an opportunity offered by applying gamma-spectrometry methods in mastering such disciplines as experimental methods in nuclear physics, dosimetry of ionising radiation, radiation control and radioecological monitoring of environment, non-destructive methods of nuclear material monitoring. It should be noted also that the most advanced semiconductor CdZnTe gamma detectors will be used. This will offer an additional opportunity to learn modern information processing technology. This project is implemented with the support of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM). Equipment has been received already including micro spectrometers and CdZnTe detectors, laboratory work programmes have been developed – primarily for the disciplines such as Experimental Methods in Nuclear Physics (planned for introduction during the autumn term) and Dosimetry of Ionising Radiation (to be introduced during the spring term). Additionally, laboratory exercises will involve application of scintillation gamma-spectrometers given to the University by AtomComplexPrylad company. The largest remaining problem is the restrictions for the use of laboratory ionising radiation sources.

HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

Yu. Protsenko Military unit 3041, National Guard of Ukraine

Human resource development in the area of physical protection plays an important role, since a well-trained professional is a token of security, reliable protection of a facility and successful performance of assigned tasks. In present-day reality, protection activity is the task of units of the National Guard of Ukraine. The presentation will cover the following issues: 1. Screening of candidates for nuclear power plant guard forces. Recruiting arrangements for the contractual service involve comprehensive check of psychological, physical, mental, professional qualities, competencies and other personal qualities, social behaviour and motivation of candidates to verify their aptitude for contractual military service. Screening of candidates for the NPP protection contractual military service is the responsibility of unit commanders, officers of specialised departments and services, and 35

recruitment personnel. 2. Training of enlisted personnel for combat service, including focused and organised process of training and education towards preparedness to performance of the assigned tasks in peaceful time and during the special period.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND STAFF PROVISION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE CONTROL ON REMOTE POLLUTION OUTSIDE EXCLUSION ZONE

V. Hrebennikov SSE Kyiv SISC

Kyiv SISC has in its service 54 vehicle decontamination areas and decontamination waste disposal sites (hereinafter the contaminated sites – CS) in Kyiv, Chernihiv and Zhytomyr oblasts, that emerged in the course of the 1986 Chernobyl NPP accident clean-up, are located outside the Exclusion Zone, have individual areas from several hundredth of a hectare to several hectares, with the solid RAW placement depths ranging from 0.5 to 2.5 meters, covered from above with a soil layer of up to 0.5 meters thick. Ten of these sites have a rather high contamination level and require urgent retrieval of RAW for further shipment to permanent storage facilities. In former years, numerous evidences of attempts of unauthorised removal of metal scrap through manual excavation were detected at the CS territories during radiation monitoring activities. The first objects to be removed were metal fences and radiation hazard signs. Works to remove RAW from CS Pisky-1 near village Pisky, Ivankiv district, Kyiv oblast began in May-June this year. The report will dwell on results of these RAW retrieval works and their impact on the security culture state.

NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENTS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE

A. Artiushkin SS “Khmelnytska NPP”

This presentation will focus on key measures applied in accordance with legal requirements at SS Khmelnitsky NPP for the establishment and development of nuclear security culture among nuclear facility divisional personnel, including organisation and implementation of:  personnel training in security culture (organisation of executive training classes, training of all SS KNPP personnel);  security culture surveys for personnel;  etc. SS KNPP conducts assessments of nuclear security culture. To this end, it reviews measures to organise security culture assessment (development and issue of the appropriate 36

internal regulations, development of a security culture assessment plan, assignment of tasks to assessment team members) and practical implementation of the security culture assessment (principal methods used at SS Khmelnytska NPP for the assessment of nuclear security culture).

NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE (UNDERWATER STONES)

P. Tsykalchuk SS “Khmelnytska NPP”

The earliest documented facts pertaining to nuclear security culture at SS KNPP are dated 2010: in pursuance of the Presidential Decree on approval of the National Plan to Implement the Working Plan of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit for 2010-2012, a working group to establish, develop and support nuclear security culture at SS KNPP was formed by the order of the general director (dated 05 October 10 No. 1522). Since then, a titanic effort was exerted to establish and develop nuclear security culture. The full package of measures to implement nuclear security culture at SS KNPP was carried out in accordance with NP 306.8.191-2013 “Procedure for Establishment and Development of Nuclear Security Culture at Nuclear Facilities and Radioactive Waste and Other Radioactive Source Management Sites” and the “Instruction on Assessment of Nuclear Security Culture at Nuclear Facilities and Radioactive Waste and Other Radioactive Source Management Sites.” SS KNPP personnel is regularly surveyed to assess the need and sufficiency of measures applied to establish high level of nuclear security culture. Nuclear security culture and many other aspects are assessed on a continuous basis. The presentation will dwell on problems faced in the implementation of the nuclear security culture at SS KNPP by the physical protection service as a unit responsible for establishment and development of nuclear security culture at SS KNPP.

NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE

O. Yermolenko SS “South-Ukraine NPP”

1. Measures taken at SS South-Ukrainian NPP to establish and maintain nuclear security culture among divisional personnel of a nuclear facility. 1.1 Regulatory framework for establishment and development of nuclear security culture. 1.2 Training of personnel in nuclear security culture (organisation of training). 1.3 Staff surveys on nuclear security culture (organisation and conduct). 2. Assessment of nuclear security culture at SS South-Ukrainian NPP. 2.1 Measures to organise nuclear security culture assessment. 2.2 Assessment of nuclear security culture at SS South-Ukrainian NPP. 2.3 Documentation of nuclear security culture assessment. 2.4 Proposals to develop and maintain nuclear security culture. 3. Analysis of physical protection violations based on nuclear security culture 2017 – 37

2019 assessment results. Lessons learned.

NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE

R. Orlov, V. Viter, T. Yuldasheva SSE “Chornobyl NPP”

Pursuant to the Law of Ukraine “On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste and Other Sources of Ionising Radiation,” recognition of priority of nuclear security culture is one of the fundamentals of the state physical protection policy. Management of SSE Chernobyl NPP, in recognition of current threats to nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionising radiation, taking into account international obligations of Ukraine and legal requirements for physical protection and deeply dedicated to its responsibility for the security of use of nuclear energy, has demonstrated commitment to physical protection principles and priority of nuclear security culture at SSE Chernobyl NPP in the Policy Statement for Physical Protection and Priority of Nuclear Security Culture. The principles followed by the management of SSE Chernobyl NPP in establishment, implementation and development of nuclear security culture are as follows:  responsibility;  competence;  control;  motivation. The main goal of formation and support of nuclear security culture at SSE Chernobyl NPP is to ensure high level of security culture through:  identification of persons who bear personal responsibility for the state of nuclear security culture at SSE CNPP in general and in its structural divisions in particular;  recognition of importance of physical protection and acknowledgement of priority of nuclear security culture by each employee of SSE CNPP, its contractors and guard force;  ensuring high competence for the formation and support of nuclear security culture among the management of SSE CNPP and contractors, physical protection personnel, commanders and personnel of SSE Chernobyl NPP guard force;  implementation of a well-considered and properly used motivation policy;  continuous control of works that may influence state of physical protection by the management of SSE CNPP, contractor organisations and physical protection personnel;  awareness of possible consequences of violation of physical protection requirements by every personnel member. Nuclear security culture promotion measures are implemented at SSE CNPP in order to expand realisation of the need to establish and support nuclear security culture and to enhance personnel awareness of nuclear security culture. SSE Chernobyl NPP nuclear security culture assessments are conducted on an annual basis in accordance with the Instruction on Assessment of Nuclear Security of Nuclear Facilities, Radioactive Waste Management Sites and Other Sources of Ionising Radiation approved by Order of SKINRU of 25 July 2013 No. 76 to provide SSE Chernobyl NPP Director

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General credible information on the state of the SSE CNPP nuclear security culture. SSE CNPP commission for the assessment of nuclear security culture applies the following work methods in accordance with the Commission Work Plan:  survey of divisional personnel ensuring operation of the facility, use and storage of radioactive material;  observation of personnel compliance with physical protection requirements;  documentation analysis;  interviews with certain personnel members of divisions ensuring operation of the facility, use and storage of radioactive material;  processing and analysis of results obtained. Commission results are recorded in the Statement of Assessment of Nuclear Security Culture at SSE Chernobyl NPP to present a conclusion of the commission on nuclear security culture assessment and commission recommendations aimed to sustain high level of nuclear security culture at SSE CNPP.

NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE

A. Kasilov Military unit 3021, NGU

Nuclear security principles are currently well known and are implemented throughout the world – this creates good accord in their implementation. However, the world changes, and new challenges and threats emerge. There is a widespread opinion that terrorism is the main threat of the 21st century. Countering new threats requires new approaches that go beyond simple performance of set rules and standards. Continuous enhancement of security level at all organisational tiers of enterprises and National Guard protection forces (as a component of a physical protection system) requires comprehensive nuclear security culture, which should be “cultivated” through a leading role of their managers and commanders. The National Guard of Ukraine as a component of the physical protection system (and specifically the division for the protection of nuclear material in the transport) is not a side viewer of the security culture development and improvement process. Pursuant to the physical protection policy statement developed in 2013, establishment and development of nuclear security culture among pro-force personnel still remains a priority. An elaborate security culture largely contributes to “defence-in-depth”; it helps improve vigilance of military personnel so much required to identify potential threats; improves their interrelations and their commitment to protection and defence of nuclear material in any situation. The entire personnel of protection force is involved in enhancement of security culture principles – from the commander to a private. Professional development of personnel is an integral part of combat and special training and therefore continues throughout the service time. Periodical self-assessments is one of characteristics of an effective security culture. In accordance with the IAEA guide, security culture is effective where there is accounting and planning of self-assessment activities, analysis of violations, consideration of human factor, review of target performance indicators (based on best practice), control over personnel actions to verify compliance, and development of corrective actions. Effectively organised self- assessment process will assure confident motion towards improvement of security culture 39

and security in general.

NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE

M. Mykoliuk Military unit 3024, National Guard of Ukraine

In 2013, the command of the Interior Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (presently the National Guard of Ukraine) made the following statement to acknowledge nuclear security culture: “The activity of the command of the Interior Troops of the MIA of Ukraine for the discharge of protection functions within the physical protection system is aimed for ensuring reliable protection and defence of nuclear facilities and nuclear material, as well as further implementation and development of nuclear security culture.” Operations of the special commandant’s office for the protection of NSC Kharkiv Institute of Physics Technology under NG unit 3024 are specific for continuous interaction between military personnel and scientific and technical personnel of the protected facility. In the course of the discharge of their service functions – protection and defence of the facility and access control – unit personnel are continuously subjected to the so-called public control. Under the existing circumstances the unit should play representative functions not just during formal events but on a daily basis. This shifts the focus on the issues related to the human factor. The presentation will offer conference participants a concise rundown of detection and prevention methods for man-induced crises threatening operation of facility’s physical protection systems and will demonstrate the algorithm of actions of the unit command to address issues arising at all levels of integration with the Institute personnel.

NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE. ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE

V. Vasylenko Military unit 2260, NGU

The responsibility of a facility operator to maintain nuclear security culture at all lifecycle stages of the nuclear facility is a general requirement for physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. Formation, development, attainment and maintaining of the high level of nuclear security culture in a guard force as an important component of a physical protection system. Financial, human and material resources for implementation of activities related to formation, development and maintaining of a high level of nuclear security culture. State of nuclear security culture in the guard force defines the state of nuclear security culture generally at the facility level. Pursuant to the Requirements for the Application of Guard Forces in Physical Protection Systems of Nuclear Facilities, Radioactive Waste and Other Radioactive Source Management Facilities and Radioactive Material, the guard force commander is responsible 40

for formation and development of nuclear security culture in the guard force. Actions of the guard force commander in the formation and development of nuclear security culture in the guard force. Assessment of nuclear security culture in the guard force. Goal, objectives and criteria of nuclear security culture state. Nuclear security culture assessment methods. Preparation to an assessment and measures to improve nuclear security culture, if required (interviews, training etc.) Self- assessment plays an important role in development of a serviceperson’s personality, is one of the main indicators of their personal and professional maturity and operates as a behavioural regulator. Importance of appreciation of a real state of things concerning nuclear security culture in the guard force. Preparation of a conclusion and arrangement of the appropriate meeting for familiarisation. Preparation of a Certificate of Nuclear Security Culture Assessment in the Unit.

INTERACTION BETWEEN NUCLEAR SAFETY AND NUCLEAR SECURITY S. Antoniuk SS “Rivne NPP”

Generally speaking, nuclear safety and nuclear security arrangements have the common goal – to protect the environment and humans against unacceptable radiological effects. At the same time, threats postulating conceivable reasons and factors causing such unacceptable consequences are different, thus the approaches to attainment of this common goal are different, too. In my everyday communications with colleagues from different divisions and activities at the nuclear power plant I often give a simple example: the task of nuclear safety is to secure people from negative effects of radiation and the task of nuclear security is, on the contrary, to secure nuclear facility and radioactive material against unlawful acts of people. Considering similarity between these two concepts it is difficult to imagine them apart from one another; this presentation will demonstrate common practical measures of physical protection system, nuclear material accountancy and control system, radiation protection system, safety system etc. at SS RNPP. Aspects of physical protection correlation specifically with nuclear material accounting and control and generally with nuclear safety is rather topical for Ukraine; this activity requires further improvement at the level of both regulatory framework and practical implementation. Instead of criticism, I will be focussing on positive practices we have been able to implement at SS RNPP through our joint effort for the enhancement of nuclear security in balance with nuclear safety for the sake of their common goal.

INFORMATION PLATFORM UATOM.ORG AS A TOOL FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN EXPERTS AND THE PUBLIC ON NUCLEAR SECURITY, RADIATION SAFETY, AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 41

Ye. Kudriashova web-site Uatom.org

There is lack of generally acceptable information and subject-matter news on current events and their expert assessments in the area of radiation safety. Very often, information is distorted, exaggerated and misleading before it reaches the public and professionals. In 2010, SKINRU, with the support of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, created the web-portal Uatom.org as an additional official tool to inform the public on nuclear safety, radiation protection, and nuclear non-proliferation. The goal was to establish a Ukrainian specialised web-resource for nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear non-proliferation, which would be user-friendly and clear to the general public. The main objective of the information portal is to improve quality of information and awareness of the society in the area of nuclear and radiation safety and nuclear non-proliferation; satisfaction of information needs of the public in this area; provision of verified and credible information on topical issues of nuclear and radiation safety and security. Uatom.org contains both general educational and subject-matter information on all areas of nuclear and radiation safety and security and nuclear non-proliferation. Main content of the site is topical Ukrainian and international news and analysis on the following subjects: nuclear sector, nuclear and radiation safety, Exclusion Zone, voluntary surrender of SIRs. Technical support of the web resource is provided by the State Scientific and Technical Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC NRS). General presentation of information is democratic and subject-matter based. Publications at the site are in three languages (Ukrainian, English, Russian) because the main audience is people from 24 to 35 from almost all over the world. Main tasks of the web portal: information and awareness-raising activity in nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear non-proliferation, provision of information – high- quality but at the same time easy to perceive for regular internet users in both Ukraine and abroad; imaging activity aimed to enhance reputation of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine and public trust to the Inspectorate as a central executive authority charged to ensure nuclear and radiation safety of Ukraine; coordination between the State Regulator and the public on nuclear safety. Nuclear and radiation safety exists in Ukraine in a challenging national context. Radiation safety information should be transparent and accessible to the largest extent possible. Communication in this area is also important but even more important is correct communication. Modern society requires new forms of communication. Accordingly, involvement of specialists to create modern and convenient internet content is a tool to improve public trust to actions of the regulator and state institutions. Trust is a key prerequisite of successful acceptance by the society of future and current changes in nuclear power, management of radioactive waste, safe use of radioactive sources in industry and health care. Building trust to Uatom.org platform Engagement of a broader circle of professionals to write materials is an important factor for the formation of public opinion: such information is more objective, reflects multitude of views to events, involves both government and independent experts, scientists and representatives of public organisations as our authors. Materials posted to the site are official and are approved by editorial board composed of representatives from SKINRU and SSTC NRS as its expert organisation. Feedback is exercised through assessment of qualitative and quantitative statistical indicators to see what materials are most in demand, registration and analysis of web-site, 42

Facebook page and YouTube channel statistics. Account is taken of feedback from nuclear and radiation safety experts, comments in social media, and results of regular public surveys. On the other hand, communication with mass media is also important, since they are both an audience and a channel to reach out to other audiences. Reader-friendly and timely response to topics being of public interest is vital. Building out coordination between experts and the public The main advantage of a link between the expert community and the public through the Uatom.org web-resource is creation of a subject-matter information field – and not only by online events, through the web-site and pages in the social media. Offline tools used for establishing close communication with the public are also an important part of the development. Plans are to establish a platform for dialogue and rapid exchange of opinions with sector’s leading experts to encourage Ukrainian and international experts to discuss topical events in real time.

IMPROVEMENT OF COORDINATION MECHANISM OF PARTICIPANTS OF THE FACILITY-LEVEL RESPONSE PLAN IN CASE OF SABOTAGE

I. Zhebet SS “South-Ukraine NPP”

Preparedness of physical protection system components (physical protection division personnel, guard force personnel, engineered facilities and physical protection procedures) to counter potential threats is tested and understanding of response procedures is enhanced by way of exercises and drills being an important and the most effective form of training and verification of preparedness of equipment and personnel involved in NPP physical protection. Such an exercise was held at SS South-Ukrainian NPP on 22-23 May 2019 to drill coordination of the Counter-Terrorist Centre, PPS personnel, and National Guard unit 3044 with law enforcement agencies, bomb squad, fire and rescue service, and medical service. Vigilance checks of National Guard unit 3044 personnel, plant and PPS personnel using training mock-ups of explosive devices are conducted regularly in a real setting. Air defence coordination between the South-Ukrainian NPP and air defence troops of the Ukrainian armed forces is sustained continually based on a special plan. The Plant has implemented the Memorandum on Actions in Case of Detection of Unauthorised Flights of Aerial Vehicles over South-Ukrainian NPP Facilities and the Algorithm of Action of Duty Services of SS SUNPP on Detection of Unauthorised Flights of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) or Other Aircraft over South-Ukrainian NPP Facilities. A UAV is used for reconnaissance of adjacent territory and detection of drone launch and landing locations. Coordination is in place with territorial units of SSU and the National Police of Ukraine in respect of notification and action on detection of UAV over the site of SS SUNPP. Collected Materials for Enhancement of Vigilance for Personnel of the South-Ukrainian Power Complex in Case of Detection of Suspect Objects and on Identification of Persons Who May Be Related to Hostile Commando Groups have been compiled for the Plant. Proposals to amend key regulations governing the use of Ukrainian airspace and to develop, endorse and approve at the institutional level of a document to govern actions of guard force, physical protection personnel and air defence on detection of a UAV in the NPP restricted area and interaction of these forces with SSU and the National Police have been worked out as the result of analysis of regulatory framework on anti-terrorism activity and of a tactical exercise conducted in 2019. 43

IMPROVEMENT OF COORDINATION MECHANISM BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS OF THE SS ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP FACILITY-LEVEL RESPONSE PLAN IN CASE OF SABOTAGE

M. Volkov SS” Zaporizhzhia NPP”

This presentation will dwell on the following measures taken at SS ZNPP for the enhancement of mechanisms of coordination between the participants of the Facility- Level Response Plan in Case of Sabotage (hereinafter the Facility-Level Response Plan): 1. Revision of existing threats to ZNPP based on the completed analysis of the Facility- Level Design Basis Threat for SS Zaporizhzhya NPP of SE NNEGC Energoatom and information received from National Police and Security Service of Ukraine in Zaporizhzhya and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. 2. Development, endorsement and approval of the Facility-Level Response Plan. 3. Verification of efficiency of procedures specified in the Facility-Level Response Plan, practical exercise of procedures described in the Facility-Level Response Plan and of notification and action algorithms depending on threats. Examples of practical application of the Facility-Level Response Plan on obtaining (from different sources) of information on potential unlawful acts against Zaporizhzhya NPP, specifically: - examples of negative information received from various sources (during 2014- 2019); - procedure of activation of the Facility-Level Response Plan; - practical action in response to information injects; - documentary support.

MAIN PRINCIPLES AND AVENUES OF IMPROVEMENT OF INTERACTION MECHANISMS FOR PARTICIPANTS OF FACILITY-LEVEL RESPONSE PLANS AGAINST CONTEMPORARY THREATS B. Shevchuk, A. Boiko Military unit 3043, National Guard of Ukraine

The most recent revision of the Design Basis Threat has been approved by the Presidential Decree in April this year and requires adequate and effective revision of facility-level threats and respective response plans. In current circumstances, the level of threat of sabotage against nuclear facilities by real adversary is growing exponentially. The design basis threat provides, based on the hybrid war experience, description of intruders, tactics, weapons and equipment of saboteurs and lists beyond-design basis threats; it requires additional administrative measures to enhance physical protection of nuclear facilities and arrangements to improve performance of participants of facility-level response plans. Considering the above the participants of facility-level response plans are challenged with the following topical questions: 44

1. “Is the deployment time and notification procedure for participants of facility-level response plans sufficient for prompt response and necessary decision-making?” 2. “Is composition and competencies of participants of facility-level response plans sufficient to address modern threats?” 3. “Is the required material base in place for high-quality analysis and processing of information during work of participants of facility-level response plans?” The relevant analysis was performed at SS Khmelnitsky NPP during joint table top exercise (drill) in May 2019. The exercise identified principal avenues of improvement of mechanisms of work of the participants of facility-level response plans with account for the new Design Basis Threat.

COORDINATION AND INTERACTION OF MIA DIVISIONS IN THE AREA OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION. CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

H. Honcharuk, O. Vaskovskyi Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine

As the result of the central government reform in 2014 Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine lost its status of the “ministry of militia” and was transformed into a multi- disciplinary civil agency after a European pattern to coordinate the activity of authorities who implement the state policy for the interior. In this way, the tasks of political administration were segregated from the tasks of professional activity in the internal affairs. MIA has been able generally to achieve substantial progress on the way to reform. Practical completion of implementation of conceptual and programmatic tasks defined back in 2014 calls for analysis of results, thinking over the content and the directions of change, and determination of a vector for further development. The past year has been the time to accumulate strength for further reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Changes and innovations applied to all components of the MIA organisation. In the face of the existing challenges there is need to revise certain aspects of Ministry functions and implement appropriate structural changes. Specifically, at present the Ministry of Internal Affairs has in its structure central executive agencies covering the full spectrum of tasks in the area of physical protection of nuclear and radioactive material – protection of nuclear material at NPPs and during transport is provided by the National Guard; protection of radioactive material including during transport is the responsibility of the National Police; illicit trafficking of material is detected by the State Border Guard Service and elimination of consequences of radiation accidents and incidents is the task for the State Emergency Service of Ukraine. On the one hand, such an organisation should support interaction between MIA agencies for the search of lost sources; on the other, it should sustain and simplify inter-agency coordination, since the National Guard of Ukraine has vast experience and capabilities in physical protection of nuclear facilities. Albeit the consistent upward trend there is still room for improvement. It is first of all related to lack of appropriate dialogue between agencies in jurisdiction of MIA in the course of operations to detect lost sources. Furthermore, there are discrepancies in: - preparation of subject-matter specialists for CBRN protection and, consequently, no experience exchange system and no exchange of professions within the MIA system; 45

- types and kinds of material resources and equipment and therefore no unified approach to their procurement, use and maintenance. Our activity in the near future will be focused on these specific tasks.

TASKS AND AUTHORITY OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE IN COUNTERING CBRN RISKS AND THREATS AT THE STATE BORDER

R. Yuriev, I. Fadeiev SBGS of Ukraine

State Border Guard Service of Ukraine is a specialised law enforcement agency. As a role player in counter-terrorist activity, SBGS Administration and border control divisions are assigned to “…prevent, detect and interrupt attempts of Ukrainian border crossing by terrorists, of illicit trafficking across the state border of weapons, explosives, toxic and radioactive substances and other items that may be used as means of terrorism…” Pursuant to the Law of Ukraine “On Amendment of the Customs Code of Ukraine and Some Other Laws of Ukraine Concerning Implementation of a “One Stop Shop” Mechanism and Optimisation of Control Procedures for Goods Crossing Customs Border of Ukraine,” check of radioactive contamination of vehicles and cargoes entering the Ukrainian territory, including for transit, is currently treated as a form of border control. On detection of increased level of radioactive contamination, SBGSU proceed with verification, search, localisation and primary identification activities in respect of radioactive material. If transfer of radioactive material or goods with natural radioactivity is found to be legal the vehicle and the shipment will be free to cross the state border. In the event radioactive material is found to be illicitly trafficked or radioactive material transport procedure and rules have been violated the vehicle and the shipment may not cross the border and SBGSU notifies relevant central executive authorities specified in the National Response Plan. Analysis of effectiveness and efficiency of recent measures for the detection of radioactive material at the state border shows the trend towards the increasing number of cross-border shipments of radioactive cargoes and border crossings by persons who had undergone radiopharmaceutical based medical treatment (diagnostics). Based on the IAEA statistics, Ukraine has the largest number of cases of illicit trafficking in radioactive sources detected compared to other states. As at 1 July 2019 border patrols: banned further movement across the state border of objects containing radioactive substances in 11 cases; responded to over 8 thousand transfers of radioactive goods – mostly items with NORM (ceramics, construction materials, etc.) – and 1570 cases of border crossings by individuals after treatment (diagnostics) at different crossing points.

NORDISK SIKKERHET’S PROJECTS IN UKRAINE

P. Tishakov, P. Lebedev Nordisk Sikkerhet AS

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The Norwegian company Nordisk Sikkerhet AS is an implementor of projects financed in the framework of the Norwegian Government Action Plan for Nuclear Activities and the Environment in the Northern Areas. Together with the Administration of State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS), the company has successfully completed two projects for Mukachyvskyi and Zhytomyrskyi Border Detachments of SBGS. The third project with Lisichansk Border Detachment is in its final phase at the moment. The following equipment was supplied to Mukachyvskyi Border Detachment as part of the project: Mobile Automated Complex for detection of radioactive and nuclear materials – 1 pce.; trailer-based mobile decontamination system – 1 pce.; search alarm dosimeters – 28 pcs.; search dosimeter-radiometers – 5 pcs.; personal dosimeters – 44 pcs.; personal protective kits – 44 pcs.; gas masks – 44 pcs. The following equipment was supplied to Zhytomyrskyi Border Detachment within the framework of the project: search alarm dosimeters – 50 pcs.; multipurpose search dosimeter- radiometers – 10 pcs.; gamma spectrometers – 5 pcs.; personal dosimeters – 44 pcs.; personal protective kits – 44 pcs.; gas masks – 50 pcs. The following activities were carried out for the detachment personnel: training on the integrated use of newly supplied equipment (Orshanets), field exercises on reconnaissance and localization of territories contaminated with RN materials, decontamination of equipment and personnel (Chernobyl exclusion zone), as well as exercises on detection, localization and identification of RN materials at one of the checkpoints of Zhytomyrskyi Border Detachment. At the moment, a project is being implemented for Lisichansk Border Detachment of SBGS. Tenders have been held, winners have been chosen. Equipment supply starts in October 2019. The project is planned to be completed by the end of the year. The following equipment is to be supplied within the framework of the project: decontamination complex based on Volkswagen Crafter – 1 pce.; multipurpose search dosimeter-radiometers – 20 pcs.; gamma spectrometers – 5 pcs.; personal dosimeters – 20 pcs.; information boards for monitoring the radiation situation – 5 pcs.; equipment repair kit – 1 pce. A comprehensive training on the use of newly supplied equipment and field exercises for the personnel of Lisichansk, Zhytomyrskyi and Mukachyvskyi Border Detachments are also planned within the framework of the project. Future plans of Nordisk Sikkerhet include the beginning and implementation of the second phase of the project with Lisichansk Border Detachment, as well as joint projects with Kramatorsk Border Detachment of SBGS.

TRAINING AS A KEY ELEMENT OF FACILITY-LEVEL SABOTAGE RESPONSE PLANS SUSTAINABILITY

S. Drapei, B. Kaidyk GKTC

The presentation will cover issues and problems that may arise in the implementation of facility-level response plans in case of sabotage. Training of specialists involved in the development and implementation of the response plans is a necessary prerequisite for plans sustainability. The example of the Training Centre for Physical Protection and Nuclear Material Accounting and Control will be used to review approaches to specialist training for response plan developers and personnel of response plan participant forces to provide knowledge in 47

the development, sustainability support and sustainability checks of facility-level response plans in case of sabotage and awareness of the role of respective organisations and units in proper response to attempted malicious acts against nuclear and radioactive material.

GENDER INEQUALITY IN NUCLEAR SECURITY. THINGS TO KNOW

N. Klos Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine

What is gender inequality? Does this phrase raise any associations? Or did you at once think about feminism? Or about impairment of rights of women? Or impairment of rights of men? Are these issues indeed worth discussion? Why is it important? First thing to understand is what “gender” is. Before 1960s, psychic and behavioural attributes that supposedly distinguished men from women were referred to as sex attributes or distinctions. The term “gender” in its today’s interpretation was introduced to the scientific sphere by the US psychoanalyst Robert Stoller in late 1960s: he proposed using the concept of “gender” to define social and cultural aspects of sex – previously this word served to denote biological gender; afterwards it was reduced to the meaning of sex. What is the status of gender equality in Ukraine? , namely its Article 24 paragraph 1 provides that Ukrainian citizens enjoy equal rights and freedoms and are equal before the law. The main role attributed to women in the Ukrainian society is the “keeper” in the narrow context of household and family. A woman is not considered successful if she has no family; her aspiration to realise herself in another way is condemned by both sides. Note that these stereotypes are still widespread among technical professions, particularly as it comes to nuclear energy use. The general belief is that women are less effective in hard sciences therefore a girl’s desire to choose this trade is not welcome. On average, women account for only 10% of the total number of students on the Nuclear Power major; even less than that are involved in academic activity. In the whole history of nuclear power Ukraine has seen no women as a NPP unit control room operator. Internationally, the trend is, on the contrary, to encourage women’s involvement in nuclear power development. IAEA, for example, accounts for gender problems in its programmatic activity, exerting efforts, inter alia, for improvement of female representation. Nuclear security covers such areas as physical protection, nuclear material accounting and control, nuclear forensics, response to nuclear security events, and information and computer security. It is no secret that nuclear security is a masculine activity. The main force of employees in the area of physical protection are men – ex-military or law enforcement personnel. Although Ukraine has no military nuclear facilities and physical protection activity is reduced to civilian sites, traditionally staff are representatives of the said professions, who form a close hierarchy. Interestingly, discrimination here equally works against men who were not in the “service” – they do not have sufficient “weight” and are subjected to patronising treatment by “masculine males.” The only area where women are represented somewhat better is material accounting and control, but even here the situation is not even close to equality. What about career progress? Are women successful in building their professional success up the career ladder? Hardly so. The Ukraine’s only woman who is the head of a physical protection service today is Tamara Kuznetsova of STC Kharkiv Institute of Physics 48

Technology. This article will cover the results of survey of the proportion of men and women in the nuclear security field, including in managerial positions; this information will be presented at the conference to bust the myth regarding Ukrainian matriarchate and equal opportunities for women. Certainly, nuclear security in Ukraine is the area of inequality rather than equality, and it is difficult to forecast when this situation changes, although changes must be aspired. Any restriction causes degradation; gender variety is a token of development and sustainability of nuclear sector and of enhancement of nuclear security level in Ukraine.

GENDER PROBLEM (IMPACT OF GENDER STEREOTYPES) IN NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTIVITY

L. Liubinetska SSE CEMRW

Based on the estimates of the World Economic Forum, women could expect achieving the much-desired equality of rights and freedoms no earlier than 100 years from now; in economy, their equal realisation with men is expected in 200 years. Gender equality worldwide would eKINRch humanity by 21 trillion dollars – i. e., each person would become 14% richer. Ukraine has occupied the 65th place out of 149 countries in the global rating of gender equality of the 2018 World Economic Forum. The index that is used for the rating accounts for a number of parameters: situation in education, health care, economic and political opportunities of women. Ukraine has traditionally better positions for availability of education (26th position worldwide) and economic opportunities for women (28th position), however, is notably lagging behind in health care (56th position). The lowest indicator is for access to politics for which Ukraine is in the 105th place. Although energy sector is traditionally believed to be a “male” industry, many female experts who work in this industry are demonstrating professional excellence. By the existing statistics, the share of women among people employed in the energy sector has remained fairly stable at the level of 26.85%. The share of women employed in the energy sector worldwide is 20-25%. Women work at the Ukrainian energy sector as professionals, experts and do basic work. Thus it is important to start moving forward already now. Having chosen the democratic way Ukraine is targeting its legislative activity at establishing equal gender relations in all spheres of public life. General principles of gender development in Ukraine are provided in the Constitution. Specifically, article 3 of the Constitution asserts equality of men and women in all spheres of life. Gender equality norms are also included in articles 21, 24 and 51 of the Constitutions of Ukraine. Article 24 part 3 of the Constitution specifically contemplates the overcoming of discrimination of women in Ukraine and emphasises that equal rights of women and men are ensured through provision of equal opportunities to men and women in socio-political and cultural activity, in education and professional training, in labour and compensation; through special arrangements for occupational health and safety of women, retirement benefits and conditions to balance motherhood and work; through legal protection, material and moral support for motherhood and childhood, including paid vacations and other benefits for pregnant women and mothers. However, constitution norms may only be duly implemented if they are further integrated in the legal system and practically implemented through appropriate institutional 49

mechanisms. Note that our state has paid attention to the existing gender inequality – not without help of the international community – only in the beginning of the 21st century. It was after the UN summit in September 2000 that Ukraine acknowledged gender equality as a priority of the state policy and adopted a series of regulatory instruments towards gender equality. The attitude towards protection of female rights in modern Ukraine is ambiguous. On the one hand, the government declares loyalty to European approaches; on the other, some politicians, as well as part of the population treat gender equality as an alien ideology enforced from outside, or else as a less than priority issue.

GENDER PROBLEM: INFLUENCE OF GENDER STEREOTYPES ON NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTIVITY

O. Zaichenko Military unit 3042, NGU

Gender issues are now discussed more openly than just several years ago. Nonetheless, the Soviet past of Ukraine still influences gender relations and the acceptance of women in military service, specifically, in the nuclear security sector. Perception of gender equality and issues related to gender aspects relevant to service personnel of NPP protection military units remains very narrow. Ukrainian society is dominated by traditional and patriarchal gender norms – NPP protection units are no exception. Gender stereotypes are embedded in the social structure of a society and are sustained by both men and women. Men are perceived as protectors of the people and providers of security for women and children, being responsible for family financial support. Women, on the other hand, are treated as vulnerable creatures requiring male protection and responsible for the household and parenting. Recently enlisting of women to the service in the National Guard units for the protection of NPPs was an exception rather than a rule. Right now this stereotype is being changed. This is neither good nor bad – this is normal for any truly civilised society.

CYBER-SECURITY OF INTERNAL RESTRICTED ACCESS NETWORKS OF NUCLEAR FACILITY PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS

V. Gavryliuk, S. Drapei, B. Kaidyk, O. Romanova GKTC

This presentation will cover inside and external threats to internal restricted access information networks of a nuclear facility physical protection system, their causes, consequences and some practical cases involving such threats. General assessment will be offered for physical protection system network systems and equipment security to cyber-attacks together with analysis of sufficiency of measures implemented at facilities. A series of technical and procedural recommendations will be presented for implementation both at the nuclear facility level and at the level of government agencies.

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PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF CYBER SECURITY AS A NUCLEAR SECURITY ELEMENT AT SS RIVNE NPP

Yu. Soltys SS “Rivne NPP”

Cyber space is playing an increasingly important role in all aspects of human life. Nuclear power sector is no exception. Computer systems ensure required effectiveness of both management decisions and sustainable and safe operation of nuclear units or physical protection of nuclear facilities. The increasing number of computer systems used at NPPs, including non-standard systems, and their growing role in nuclear safety and security has the natural result of a growing number of unauthorised attempts against these systems. Considering the significance of protection against cyber threats as a component of nuclear security the IAEA recently has been paying an increasing attention to the development of technical guidance on this subject. One of the publications specifies that malicious acts committed against NPP computer systems may be classified as follows:  information gathering attacks aimed at planning and executing further malicious acts against a nuclear facility;  attacks disabling or compromising the attributes of one or several elements of computer system crucial to facility nuclear security or safety;  compromise of one or several elements of computer system critical for nuclear security combined with other concurrent modes of attack, such as physical attack of the nuclear facility. This classification is omni-purpose for any computer system whose protection is vitally important. The presentation will cover topical challenges of implementation of cyber security measures as an element of nuclear security of a nuclear facility.

CYBER SECURITY AS PART OF NUCLEAR SECURITY

A. Loiko NGU Chief Directorate

1. Legal and regulatory framework for combating cyber crime: a) International legislation and IAEA guidelines for cyber security: - regulatory framework for cooperation in investigation of cyber crimes; - classification of cyber crimes; - inter-governmental acts for the combating of cyber crime; - general IAEA recommendations for the protection of information and computer security. b) Ukrainian legislation for the combating of cyber crime: - Ukraine cyber security strategy; - build-up of security and defence sector cyber security potential; 2. Global threats of modern cyber crime:

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- existing threats; - examples of global cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure, including nuclear facilities, and consequences thereof. 3. Response to and prevention of cyber threats in the NGU organisation: - legal and regulatory framework for the combating of cyber threats in NGU units; - organisation and implementation of cyber threat (cyber-attack) detection and response measures in the NGU organisation. 4. Preventive measures against cyber-attacks during service and combat missions of units and divisions for the protection of nuclear facilities: - preventive measures against cyber-attacks in the course of protection of nuclear facilities; - preventive measures against cyber-attacks during the transport of nuclear material in the Ukrainian territory.

CYBER SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FACILITY

A. Savchenko STC KIPT

Information security plays an important role on the global scale. It is realised that attempted interception, distortion or theft of restricted information at a nuclear facility is likely and therefore protection of such information – particularly from an insider – is in a strong focus. Considering that the physical protection engineered equipment operation division of STC KIPT is inter alia responsible for allocation of telecom resources to all facility users, the presentation will focus on cyber security of the nuclear facility in general. Cyber security at a nuclear facility is a multi-faceted task. It has to account for administrative issues (such as allocation of responsibilities and delimitation of authority for system administration elements, restriction of access to information proper, etc.) as well as technical aspects (checks of hardware and software components for presence of embedded devices, protection of hardware elements and nodes from unauthorised intrusion, closed local area network of the physical protection system without access from outside the nuclear facility). Nuclear security should be implemented in three areas: 1. Security of host server and, for telecommunications, of input/output information channels (installation of firewall servers, blocking individual ports, filtration of both mail and web traffic). 2. Structuring of internal network through implementation of managed switches and organisation of separate VLANs. 3. Individual protection of separate workstations through delimitation of privileges and access passwords, installation of antivirus tools and binding specific MAC/IP addresses to a managed switch port (to prevent connection of unauthorised equipment to the local network). The presentation will cover issues pertaining to both administrative and legal frameworks for information protection (information classification as secret) and the technical sphere: short selection of integrated security systems whose reliability would be verified.

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NUCLEAR FORENSICS DEVELOPMENT IN UKRAINE

O. Haidar, Y. Lobach, I. Maliuk, M. Strilchuk, V. Tryshyn KINR, NAS of Ukraine

Nuclear terrorist threat is one of the key international security problems. Nuclear terrorism is a new form of illicit activity and involves actual or threatened use of nuclear or radiological devices, explosive or contaminating devices on their basis for the achievement of social, economic or political goals. International community has acknowledged serious threat related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. Nuclear security of individual nations as well as control over proliferation of nuclear technology and material at the international level are needed to overcome this threat. Nuclear forensics currently is one of the important aspects of international nuclear security aimed at academic research for identification, attribution, defining hazard level, origin and transportation routes of seized nuclear, radioactive material and radioactive sources. Nuclear forensics is research of nuclear or other radioactive material or radionuclide- contaminated evidence in the context of prosecution under international or national law on nuclear security. Nuclear forensics includes direct measurements of material characteristics, matching measured data with reference information and expert interpretation for forensic opinion required to answer questions of the investigation. Such matching is often an important part of finding out how and why the material was taken out of regulatory control. The presentation will provide description of the modern state of the nuclear forensic lab at the KINR of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, its equipment and analysis capabilities, list some expert analyses completed recently and dwell on laboratory’s involvement in international cooperation.

ANALYTICAL CAPABILITIES OF NSC KIPT FOR NUCLEAR FORENSICS AND NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

D. Kutnii, S. Vanzha, A. Medvedev, D. Burdeiny STC KIPT

The goal of nuclear forensics is to analyse nuclear and other radioactive material to identify its origin and transfer routes in the context of law enforcement investigations. The spectrum of assay methods used for this purpose becomes an indispensable tool of criminal investigation of illicit trafficking in nuclear material. Similar analysis methods are used for quality control at all stages of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) including uranium ore mining and fabrication of fresh nuclear fuel. For example, control of elemental composition of structural and fuel materials is critically important for forecasting their behaviour under irradiation, where even a minor concentration of an element may cause dramatic change in the properties. Thus, development and implementation of assay methods for elemental analysis is a topical objective whose achievement is focused on certification of material and equipment for nuclear power facilities. Modern methods of nuclear physics analysis of isotopics and elemental composition of matter have a high potential able to improve effectiveness of prospecting, mining and eKINRchment of mineral resources and fabrication of finished product of appropriate quality; they are express and computer-compatible, more cost-effective and less labour-intensive. 53

This presentation will provide an overview of analytical equipment, certified standard samples, and measurement methods developed at STC KIPT to be used in nuclear forensic analyses and research for the nuclear fuel cycle.

ARCHITECTURE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ILLICIT TRAFFICKING DETECTION AND INCIDENT RESPONSE

Y. Hubarev National Police of Ukraine

National Police of Ukraine is a central executive authority serving to the society through assurance of human rights and freedoms, countering crime, and sustaining public security and order. The National Police structure includes the police central administration and territorial police divisions. The central administration includes departments and directorates covering separate areas of activity in accordance with the National Police goals and functions and coordinating, within the scope of their competence, the activities of police territorial divisions. At the same time, police territorial divisions serve as independent National Police units responsible for addressing police tasks in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, in the oblasts and the city of Kyiv. The National Police Hazardous Material Department (hereinafter the HMD) is the part of the Police Central Administration. The main tasks of HMD are operative and investigative activities aimed to combat offences involving radioactive, chemical, biological and nuclear material whose harmful properties threaten interests of the state and life and health of the public. The Department pursues two main areas of activity: immediate counteraction to crime related with CBRN materials and regulatory support of the activity. The Department works in close coordination with operative divisions of Ukrainian law enforcements, as well as with international organisations and agencies. Department employees have undergone high quality training enhancing efficiency of counteraction to criminal offences. Due to international support the training for counteraction to hazardous material offences covered also representatives of police territorial units. Specifically, in September 2018 police officers took part in the training on WMD proliferation pathways in the framework of the International WMD Proliferation Countering Programme, conducted by the US Defence Threat Reduction Agency. Further, in May this year, the first phase of the training for the territorial police officers and HMD personnel took place at the George Kuzmycs Training Centre for Physical Protection and Nuclear Material Accounting and Control. Special attention will be paid to criminal responsibility related to radioactive material. 11 articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine impose penalties for crimes involving radioactive material. These include eight (8) articles in the jurisdiction of the National Police and another three (3) articles in the jurisdiction of the Security Service of Ukraine. A separate notice should be made of the Instruction on Actions of Police Divisions (Units) in Case of Detection of Radioactive, Chemical and Nuclear Materials or on Obtaining of Intelligence on Violation of Rules or Illicit Trafficking Thereof, as approved by Order of MIA of Ukraine of 06/09/2017 No. 754, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 10 October 2017 under No. 1240/31108 (hereinafter the Instruction). The Instruction provides for appointment, at territorial police divisions, of persons 54

responsible for organisation and coordination of police activities in case of violation of rules or illicit trafficking of radioactive material or detection of a suspect object; appointment of personnel from police territorial divisions to be responsible for documentation of event circumstances as part of investigation teams; action procedure for police divisions in case of detection of a suspect object or on intelligence on violation of rules or illicit trafficking of radioactive material.

ANALYSIS OF APPLICATION OF PORTABLE CdZnTe GAMMA SPECTROMETERS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

O. Maslov, V. Mokritsky, R. Yatsenko Odesa National Polytechnic University

Absence of attributes does not mean absence of an object. This means that whatever comprehensive an inspection is any verification process within a country would be subject to uncertainty; this makes us check easily concealed objects such as minor quantities of nuclear material or nuclear weapon components, or unknown sources of ionising radiation. The existing philosophy of instrumentation design may fail to give a positive answer – it is based on a different type of control and protection. Hence the new need for measurements and isotope identification subject to a variety of requirements. Measurements should be conducted in the field conditions within a very short time period, where results are needed within dozens of seconds. Instruments used by personnel in these circumstances should be portable and low-background. Requirements to spectrometers applied for SIR visualisation: — energy resolution: minimisation of impacts of scattered radiation from different isotopes is needed to implement the proposed gamma field algorithms – for this a spectrometer should discriminate lines of the most important isotopes (no less than 20 keV); — field of view: this field should be optimised for prompt monitoring, minimisation of doses and reduce measurement times; — angular resolution: for SIR identification it would be useful to have angular resolution of < 5 degrees, which corresponds to approximately 1 m at 10 m from detector; — detection efficiency: sensitivity should be sufficient for identification of “hot spots” in the area where dose rates vary between the background and 0.5 cGy/g; — portability. Progress in design and production of semiconductor instruments with CdZnTe detectors and development of Internet of Things (IoT) as an element of then fourth industrial revolution create a technological basis for innovative radiation monitoring. A modern CdZnTe detector is a semiconductor detector with energy resolution of up to 10 keV, operating at house temperatures. The high atomic number ensures high efficiency of gamma detection. Ohmic contacts of the said configuration create position-sensitive detectors, manage energy resolution and radiation detection efficiency, and realise electronic collimation technology. IoT is platforms with open hardware for creation of a mobile network of measurement modules. The modules may have functions of a regular smartphone but also may be specialised. Building a mobile spectrometer as part of IoT will ensure a comparatively low cost of the instrument and its availability for mass application and, as the result, practically full operational monitoring and mapping gamma fields for the whole of the country’s territory and to control changes promptly. 55

In this context a digital spectrometer assumes implementation of a digital spectrometric tract for a CdZnTe detector, i. e. the output signal of a single detector- amplifier module is converted into a digital form and is further processed by digital signal processors. This allows the following: — increase scope of information received in the course of measurement; — ensure good scalability of the measurement systems created through application of a unified measurement tract (channel) “detector matrix element – individual preamplifier – ADP – DSP”; — realise the following options: “CdZnTe detector array – preamplifiers of each element” or “CdZnTe detector array – preamplifiers of each ADP element” as a single complete element (module); — and, as mentioned above, ensure a deep modification option – practically, full redesign – of an assembled device by modification of embedded software.

THREAT OF PROLIFERATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL USABLE IN A DIRTY BOMB

R. Ivanov SSE “ SISC”

Extensive application of radioactive material in science, various economy and medical sectors creates a threat of its use for criminal and terrorist purposes. Accessibility of radioactive material and simple technology draw attention to the so-called “dirty bomb,” posing psychological and social threat. A radioactive source, if abandoned in a public place, will only cause uncontrolled exposure of accidental people and will not have psychological impact, that is, will be ineffective. From a terrorist standpoint, dispersal by an explosion is more effective. An improvised bomb could be built using conventional explosives combined with radioactive material. Damage caused by an explosion is followed by the factor of radioactive exposure, thus the total damage will be defined by radiation intensity and energy, the need for evacuation, and further decontamination of territories. Particular potential threat is posed by RTGs – radioisotope thermoelectric generators using energy of radioactive decay and applied in space satellites, space probes, and independent energy sources for remote automatic beacons and weather stations. Activity of RTGs containing strontium-90 (radioisotope heat source RIT90) could reach 40000 Curies. The design of RTGs is such that the chance of loss of activity, even in extreme conditions (fire, shock, water), including an explosion, is minimum. However, if bioshield is removed, RTGs could become extremely dangerous considering their high radioactivity. Cases are known where RTGs were looted by scrap scavengers – luckily, containers with radioactive isotopes were not used.

IMPROVEMENT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

V. Kokhan KIEP

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In the course of its lifetime Kiev Institute Energoproekt (KIEP) has been a Ukraine’s leader for the development and implementation of projects in nuclear, thermal and renewable power and in the area of civil and residential construction. Currently JSC KIEP is a lead designer of the Holtec International spent nuclear fuel management technology project. All design works for the SNFCS project are performed in strict compliance with applicable legislation – on physical protection among other things. JSC KIEP believe that SNFCS was a good way to learn some lessons from immature regulatory framework on physical protection. Specifically, detailed design of SNFCS physical protection system was performed in absence of a facility-level design basis threat, which, under existing regulations, should be developed only after physical protection system design has been approved (SNRCU Order No. 156 of 28/08/2008 paras. 4.1, 4.2). Because of this some structures approved by the Client at the design stage had to be redesigned based on National Guard requirements subsequently. Implementation of regulatory requirements concerning design basis threat does not look ideal, either. It is a fact that the designers lack SKINRU regulations to specify design basis threats to the nuclear facility with account for new challenges from potential adversaries. Proposals for the amendment of regulatory framework on physical protection: • Amend paragraph 3.5 of SNRCU Order No. 156 of 28/08/2008. - Include “Design and approval of facility-level design basis threat” in paragraph 3.5. • Amend paragraph 4.4.2 of SNRCU Order No. 156 of 28/08/2008. - Remove “Design and approval of facility-level design basis threat.”

IMPROVEMENT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

V. Redkovych Military unit 3045, National Guard of Ukraine

Regulatory framework in the area of physical protection of nuclear facilities, applicable in Ukraine, is generally sufficient as a required base for proper physical protection of nuclear facilities, however there is a number of factors, such as the prolonged military conflict and occupation of a part of Ukrainian territory, terrorist activity in other parts of the world, political and economic instability of the state, streamlined development of new technology, recent developments involving numerous notices on the mining of nuclear facilities, that call for continuous improvement and enhancement of regulatory framework for physical protection of nuclear facilities. Present-day environment requires improvement of the nuclear facilities physical protection regulatory framework, including for their protection from illicit encroachments with the application of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

IMPROVEMENT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

O. Maslakov, V. Bediukh SS” Zaporizhzia NPP”

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Physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionising radiation should be carried out with account for applicable regulatory framework to effectively counter modern terrorist manifestations. As a subject of international relationships, Ukraine has acceded to international conventions in the area of physical protection, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to which Ukraine became a party on 5 May 1993. Additionally, our state is a party to the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism ratified by the Parliament of Ukraine on 15 March 2006. Considering that physical protection was acknowledged by the government as an element of national security of Ukraine the country has established a robust legal framework to regulate physical protection and implement its international treaties. SS NNEGC Energoatom and its nuclear power plants continuously improve and build new physical protection systems in pursuance of requirements of applicable laws and international guidelines on physical protection. Foreign states and international organisation play a palpable role in this area. At Zaporizhzhia NPP, for example, project WBS 1.01.05.18, Zaporizhzhia NPP Physical Protection, was implemented between 2003 and 2009 in the framework of the International Nuclear Security Programme. This project covered gradual implementation of the automated physical protection system Kluch-2M. The project was funded by the US Department of Energy and SE NNEGC Energoatom. Improvement is a process that urges to look for ways to enhance performance indicators on a continuous basis. This is why the legal framework development process involves the whole range of objective and subjective difficulties requiring revision and amendment of documents currently in effect. Specifically, it took the legislators as much as eight years to change the list of physical protection goals in the Law “On Physical Protection…” of 2000, making them more achievable and getting back to the version proposed to IAEA Guidelines.

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