Reinforcing the Castle Generating a More Capable, Scalable, and Resourced Force for the MEF by Capt Cameron M
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WEB EDITION (LOGISTICS) Reinforcing the Castle Generating a more capable, scalable, and resourced force for the MEF by Capt Cameron M. Allen & 1stLts Timothy A. Denning & Sean M. Guthrie he will to win is not nearly so important as the will to prepare to >Capt Allen is a 1302 Combat Engineer Officer currently serving as an Instructor, win.” Vince Lombardi Defense Nuclear Weapons School. Previously, he served as the Executive Officer, “Tdid not focus his efforts on winning. Engineer Support Company, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, and deployed as the Rather, he focused on the actions that Engineer Officer in Charge for SP-MAGTF-CR-CENTCOM 16.1 LCE. had to be taken to do so. As a Marine Corps, and as the Nation’s expeditionary >>1stLt Denning is a 1302 Combat Engineer Officer currently serving as the Remain force-in-readiness, we have been given Behind Element Officer in Charge, Company A, 7th Engineer Support Battalion. the task to man, train, and equip our He previously served as the Training Officer, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, and forces in preparation for any conflict deployed as the Engineer Officer for SP-MAGTF-CR-CENTCOM 16.1 CE. across the spectrum of military opera- tions. Given current resourcing limita- >>>1stLt Guthrie is a 1302 Combat Engineer Officer currently serving as the S-4A, tions, the implied task is to do so as Combat Logistics Battalion 11, preparing to depart on the 11th MEU. He previ- efficiently and effectively as possible. ously served as the Remain Behind Element Officer in Charge, Company A, 7th Within the MLG (Marine Logistics Engineer Support Battalion. Group), engineers are currently spread between multifunctional battalions in DS (direct support) of infantry regi- ments, multifunctional battalions in DS of MEUs, and a functional battalion in GS (general support) of the MEF. This hybrid existence can only be maintained with a larger force of engineers. With recent and pending engineer force reduc- tions in engineer force levels, the sustain- ment of engineer capabilities can be best accomplished through the consolida- tion of engineers within the functional ESB (engineer support battalion). This consolidation of engineer and utilities forces under one command will enable the MLG to provide scalable, adaptable, and capable general engineering support, increase the commander’s flexibility to mass engineer forces, and ultimately in- creases the MLG’s ability to provide the full spectrum of logistics support to the MEF during major combat operations. Dispersion of engineer capability among multiple multifunctional battal- ESB Mairnes assembling a medium girder bridge. (Photo by LCpl Tyler Stewart.) Marine Corps Gazette • October 2017 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE9 WEB EDITION (LOGISTICS) ions in the MLG hinders the ability to effectively train to the complete mission essential task list required of these low density capabilities for major combat operations. While multifunctional bat- talions in the MLG gain the ability to rapidly deploy pre-sized forces, they lack experience and effective training in cer- tain fields.1 In an ESB, there are expe- rienced SNCO and officers developing, leading, and evaluating training. They are able to provide subject matter exper- tise, mentorship, direct feedback, and after-action points specifically related to engineering. In recent history, double- digit CLBs (combat logistics battalions) have often had a first-tour second lieu- tenant combat engineer officer who has just finished Engineer Officers Course and is now accountable for an engineer equipment set that consists of bulk fuel, Transportation support battalion Marines attaching an I-beam to a CH-53 during helicopter heavy equipment, power distribution, support team training. (Photo by LCpl Tyler Stewart.) and water purification equipment. Ef- fective employment and maintenance lishing the layout of CLBs, ESBs, or required of engineers. The consolidation of this equipment requires experienced combat logistics regiments, we must re- of combat engineers under one com- personnel, generally chief warrant offi- member that the “willingness to focus at mand, while impeding the development cers, who have operated within the field the decisive place and time necessitates of command relationships, will provide for years. Without having spent time at strict economy and the acceptance of the MEF with a more capable engineer an ESB and working with these subject risk elsewhere and at other times.”2 As force that can be inserted or scaled to matter experts, a junior officer’s knowl- potential adversaries approach competi- meet the requirement of any mission. edge is limited to the brief classroom tive parity, we, as a Marine Corps, must As an MLG, our emphasis should not instruction received at the schoolhouse. be on facilitating the generation of This issue exists on the enlisted side as crisis response and contingency forces well. The single-digit CLBs may have a ESBs can train, screen, but rather on providing forces capable utilities chief gunnery sergeant straight of succeeding in major combat opera- out of Utilities Chief Course who now and develop Marines tions. With engineers consolidated un- holds the 1169 Utilities Chief MOS. prior to manning the der the ESB, this will be accomplished The 1169 Utilities Chief MOS pulls primarily through the assumption of from three separate occupational spe- CLBs. the risk inherent in reduced interac- cialties. This means they will have a tion between CLB and special purpose strong background in one of the three MAGTF commanders and their subor- utilities fields and limited understand- accept the friction inherent to force dinates. This may be mitigated through ing of the other two. By consolidating generation of MEUs and other crisis increased interaction at the regimental the MLG’s engineers, ESBs can train, response missions as secondary in prior- level with engineer representation in screen, and develop Marines prior to ity to our ability to mass engineers in order to “focus at the decisive place,” manning the CLBs. Through increas- major combat operations, and not just that is, war with a near-peer threat. ing the competence of the engineers modular crisis response units, with or- During Operation DESERT STORM, assigned to the CLBs, the MLG’s ability ganic engineer capability. Double-digit “[T]he massed power of the engineer to provide engineer support is drasti- and single-digit CLBs, while sharing the support battalions ... [was] key to success cally increased. same unit name, are distinctly different in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.”3 The current method of organization in priority, organization, and mission. This ability to mass was a direct result creates a modular, one-size-fits-all unit Single-digit CLBs have the mission of not of small, multi-functional battalions with fixed and finite engineer capabili- providing direct support to infantry in DS but of well trained, manned, and ties that may be well-suited for rapid regiments, while double-digit CLBs pro- equipped functional battalions, such as deployment but are not ideal in capacity vide the LCE of an MEU. This shared 7th ESB and 1st Transportation Support for either major combat operations or naming convention belies subtle differ- Battalion. The ability to mass was due crisis response missions. When estab- ences in types of missions potentially in large part to established command WE10 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • October 2017 WEB EDITION (LOGISTICS) and support relationships in addition of information. The standard of C2 is tions. For example, a composite en- to well-rehearsed C2 (command and described in MCDP 6 as “reciprocal in- gineer company will be permanently control) procedures. fluence” where “command is the initia- placed in direct support of a combat This concept, when put into prac- tion of action and control is feedback.”5 logistics regiment. The engineer com- tice, poses potential challenges that, The difficulty of achieving this stan- pany commander will work closely with if not mitigated, may neutralize the dard of C2 in the LCE is amplified due the regimental staff to provide engineer advantage gained through consolida- to the diverse nature of logistics. The subject matter expertise in planning, tion of the engineer capability in the LCE commander must be allowed time execution, and post-exercise require- ESB. In combat operations, the CO’s to train his unit under the conditions ments, but retain the training resources ability to command and control his and to the specific mission he will be and knowledge of the engineer battal- force is directly related to the ability assigned. In order to achieve the recip- ion. This concept will allow the LCE of his staff to produce the common rocal influence model of C2, the LCE commander time to train with his en- operational picture of the battlespace commander must have ample time and gineers under the most likely support and the knowledge and interconnect- quality training with all attachments. relationship used in the more kinetic edness of his team.4 The multifaceted In the case of CLBs without organic phases of major combat operations, and complex nature of C2 necessitates engineer support, there is no substitute while allowing the engineer company intimate experience with subordinate for the time needed to achieve recipro- access to training resources required for unit capability as well as knowledge of cal influence in C2, but consolidating a low-density and diverse community the intangible effects of diverse person- engineer capabilities in the ESB need only found in a consolidated engineer alities. This can only built over time op- not deny supported commands that unit. erating as a composite unit; this effect is opportunity. Control measures can be The limited number of engineers magnified in a diverse multifunctional put in place to afford supported com- within the Marine Corps necessitates battalion. Together, this combination of mands and supporting engineer units maximum efficiency and economy of a quality common operational picture the opportunity to work together in the scale in order to man, train, and equip and intimate and implicit relationships planning, execution, and post-exercise them effectively.