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How to cite this thesis
Surname, Initial(s). (2012). Title of the thesis or dissertation (Doctoral Thesis / Master’s Dissertation). Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/102000/0002 (Accessed: 22 August 2017). Art and Pornography: A Philosophical Investigation
by
Emmanouel Maninakis
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
Magister Artium (Philosophy)
in the
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG
Johannesburg
January 2019
Supervisor: Prof CF Botha
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof Catherine F. Botha, for her encouragement and for having the patience of a saint while helping me through the process of completing my thesis and providing me with invaluable insight and assistance.
I would also like to extend my thanks to the University of Johannesburg Philosophy Department for the support and camaraderie the staff and my colleagues have given me over the years.
I want to extend my thanks to my family for supporting me over the years. Firstly I would like to thank my father Nikolaos, who passed away recently, but who kept cheering me on to the very the end. Secondly, my mother Eftyhia, for always giving me the tough love I needed to hear and motivating me. Finally my brother Michael, who was always there to listen and provide me with encouragement. Your support has meant more to me than I can ever express.
I also need to thank my friends Bram Van Eerden and Jan-Chris Holtzhausen for all the support and lifting me up whenever I faltered over the course of the years as I would not have completed my degree without you pushing me to keep going.
Contents Introduction ...... 1 Situating the Study: A Literature Review ...... 4 Outline of the Chapters ...... 10 Significance of the Study ...... 13 Chapter 1: Fifty Shades of Nay: Arguments against Pornography as Art ...... 14 Introduction ...... 14 Key Concepts ...... 15 The Arguments Considered ...... 19 a) Artistic Qualities ...... 19 b) Representational Content ...... 24 c) Ethical and Feminist Concerns ...... 35 d) Other Arguments ...... 50 Conclusion ...... 58 Chapter 2: Fifty Shades of Yea: Arguments for Pornography as Art ...... 61 The Arguments Considered ...... 61 a) Artistic Qualities ...... 61 b) Representational Content ...... 67 c) Feminist and Ethical Concerns ...... 70 d) Other Arguments ...... 81 Conclusion ...... 85 Chapter 3 Developing the Artworld ...... 87 Introduction ...... 87 Drawing out the Artworld ...... 89 Conclusion ...... 100 References ...... 104
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
Figure 1: Hylas and the Nymphs by John William Waterhouse, (1896)...... 2 Figure 2: The Spear by Brett Murray (2010) ...... 2 Figure 3: Francisco Goya, Saturn Devouring His Son, 1819–1823, Oil mural transferred to canvas, Museo del Prado, Madrid ...... 26 Figure 4: Piet Mondrian, No. VI / Composition No.II, 1920 ...... 27 Figure 5: A photograph of Exposición N° 1, 2007 by Guillermo Vargas ...... 37 Figure 6: Sun Yuan and Peng Yu, A photograph of the Dogs That Cannot Touch Each Other installation, (2003)...... 37 Figure 7: Derrick Cross by Robert Mapplethorpe, 1983 ...... 55 Figure 8: Lydia Cheng by Robert Mapplethorpe, 1987 ...... 56 Figure 9: Torsos and Sex Parts by Andy Warhol, (1977)...... 57
Introduction
Is there something essential to both art and pornography that makes them incompatible? Can something be both pornographic and artistic? Is there any philosophical reason that some pornography cannot also be art? What is the status of so-called erotic art? These interrelated questions form the basis for my dissertation investigating whether or not pornography can also be art.
These questions are not purely theoretical but rather they have practical implications in contemporary times. In early 2018, a painting by John William Waterhouse titled Hylas and the Nymphs (1896) [Figure 1] was removed from the Manchester Art Gallery (Brown, 2018). This removal was, according to the director of the gallery (Brown, 2018), made with the aim of provoking public debate about the way that we display and interpret pieces of artwork. This specific painting was used to prompt debate because of the fact that it depicted the naked bodies of pubescent girls. The public debate that this removal caused had responses from across the spectrum. On the one hand, there were those who claimed that the removal amounted to unwarranted censorship, and yet on the other hand, there were those that felt that the removal was warranted and should be permanent (Brown, 2018). There was variation in the responses of those who wanted the painting removed permanently: some expressed concern that the painting objectified the female body and highlighted offensive female stereotypes, namely that of the Femme Fatal (Brown, 2018). Others, more strongly, claimed that this erotic painting was too pornographic to be displayed in an art gallery (Brown, 2018).
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Figure 1: Hylas and the Nymphs by John William Waterhouse, (1896).
Another example is the case of the controversial painting The Spear (2010) [Figure 2]. This is a painting by Cape Town-based South African artist, Brett Murray, portraying the former president of South Africa Jacob Zuma with his genitals exposed. This painting immediately generated controversy with many calling the work disrespectful and pornographic with both Al Jazeera and The Guardian covering the controversy it caused (Page, 2012); (Smith, 2012).
Figure 2: The Spear by Brett Murray (2010)
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My aim in the dissertation is first to provide a discussion of some of the main contemporary arguments that have been presented for and against the notion that some pornography can be art. I then weigh these arguments against each other, by extracting the strengths and weaknesses of each position. Once I have provided an extensive discussion of both ends of the continuum, I develop my own position. My argument takes the following form: seeing pornography and art as exclusive categories is an unsupportable position. Rather, the two can be seen as existing on a continuum, with the position of a particular artefact/performance on that continuum being affected by a number of aesthetic, social, cultural, political and economic factors. I use a reading of Arthur Danto’s (1964) notion of the “artworld” to support my contention. Noël Carroll summarises Danto’s initial institutional definition of art as follows:
something x is a work of art if and only if (1) x has a subject (i.e., x is about something) (2) about which x projects some attitude or (this may also be described as a matter of x having a style) (3) by means of rhetorical ellipsis (generally metaphorical ellipsis), (4) which ellipsis, in turn, engages audience participation in filling in what is missing (an operation which can also be called interpretation) (5) where the works in question and the interpretations thereof require an art-historical context (which context is generally specified as a background of historically situated theory) (2012: 120).
Although Danto’s view has been criticised on a number of counts and he himself has distanced himself from it, it is my contention that it provides a useful beginning for developing my own position on how to understand arguments about the differences (or similarities) between art and pornography. I further develop my position by drawing on Mari Mikkola’s (2013) account of Porno-Art and Richard Shusterman’s (1991) pragmatist challenge to the division between so called “High Art” and ‘’Low Art”. I draw upon Mikkola’s work to show how pornography and art can and already do coexist, and use Shusterman’s work to suggest that some pornography could be seen as a kind of popular art that fits the criteria that he uses to challenge the “High Art” “Low Art” divide. These will then be interwoven with my aim to show that Danto’s Artworld as a theory of art can be used in a meaningful way to accommodate the idea of considering some pornography as art.
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Situating the Study: A Literature Review Although there was brief interest in the question of the relation between pornography and art in the 1970’s and 1980’s (cf. Theodore A. Gracyk (1987) in “Pornography as Representation: Aesthetic Considerations” who argued that it was possible to adopt a limited censorship of pornography as long as it did not interfere with non- objectionable explicit art and Robert A. Dyal (1976) in “Is Pornography Good For You?” who argued that all legal and authoritarian censorship of art and pornography should stop), it has only been recently that there has been a resurgence of interest in this debate. The recent work of Hans Maes (2013) who argues against the divide between art and pornography, Jerrold Levinson (2005) who argues that pornographic art cannot exist based in the incompatibility between the aims and representations of art and pornography and Lawrence W. Howe (2010) who argues for that is aesthetic distance which differentiates fine art, erotica and pornography are three of the main contributors to the current debate, with two specific articles also sparking much of the renewed interest. The first article is “Why Pornography Can’t Be Art” by Christy Mag Uidhir (2009), and the second article, a criticism of the arguments contained in the first, is “Why Some Pornography Can Be Art” by Mimi Vasilakis (2010). The current debate, as I read it, centres around four specific overall categories that I claim the arguments can be said to fall into: those that deal with Artistic Qualities, those that deal with Representational Content, those that argue from the standpoint of Feminist and Ethical Concerns and finally there are also a minority of arguments that do not fall into any of the other categories. I structure this dissertation around these categories.
In developing my position in relation to these categories, I draw upon the considerable body of work that exists in the field. Before beginning, it is important to give a brief introduction of the work of the main theorists.
Hans Maes (2012) provides the basic framework, which I use to categories the arguments I will be examining. Further, he also argues against the divide between pornography and art. He also argues against Christy Mag Uidhir’s argument for why pornography cannot be art
Kingsley Amis & Elizabeth Jane Howard (1972) are novelists who argued in The Longford Report on pornography that pornography cannot be art due to the fact that
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it lacks all artistic qualities. Specifically they refer to pornography being unoriginal, formulaic due to only caring about causing sexual arousal.
Vladimir Nabokov (2006) penned an essay to defend his book Lolita from critics who called it pornography. He argues that his book is not pornography because pornography is inherently formulaic because all it cares about is the sexual release of the reader.
Matthew Kieran (2001) argued against the idea that pornography is inherently formulaic. Further, he argues that formulaicness does exclude a work from having being able to cause aesthetic enjoyment.
Luc Bovens (1998) argues that the way pornography represents its subjects is what stops it from being art. For Bovens pornography is too immediate and graphic in nature to allow us to connect with the subject of the work as art does.
Jerrold Levinson (2005) argues that pornography and art are incompatible due the differences in the reception that art and pornography aim for. For Levinson a further concern is the manner in which the reception is achieved.
Ella Peek (2018) provides a basic outline of the ethical criticism of art. This is necessary as the assumptions that allow there to be ethical arguments against pornography being art, are based on the judgement that morals have a part to play in the judgment of art.
Noël Carrol (1996) provides a thorough discussion of the positions of Autonomism and Moralism as well as moderate versions thereof. Carrol provides arguments for both positions while ultimately defending that of Moderate Moralism.
Richard Posner (1997) provides justification for holding a Radical Autonomist position. His justification shows how some proponents of Radical Autonomism value freedom and curiosity in all of its forms above all else when it comes to art.
Josephine Donovan (2011) argues that in contemporary avant-garde art there is an egregious amount of aestheticization of living animals. Donovan argues that this denies the subjecthood of animals and that relegates them to mere objects that exist to be manipulated for aesthetic purposes. I draw upon these arguments to show how Radical Autonomism can lead to certain abuses in the name of creating art.
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Leo Tolstoy (1904) argues that the only purpose of art is to further the development of humankind. It does so by helping knowledge evolve. It is religious perception which furthers the development of humankind and thus good art is moral in nature. This serves as an example of a Radical Moralist position alongside Plato.
Plato (2008) argues that poetry can be harmful if it depicts negative behaviour. This is because these depictions can engender this negative behaviour in the consumers of such poetry. Thus for Plato this kind of poetry must be censored. Plato justifies this by claiming that since mimetic art is so far below the truth it corrupts the soul.
Andrea Dworkin (1981) argues that pornography by its very nature is extremely harmful towards women. She links pornography to the harmful power dynamic between men and women. She justifies this by showing seven powers that men hold over women and which in her contention inform pornography’s attitude towards women.
Christy Mag Uidhir (2009) aims to avoid the pitfalls of most conventional arguments that divide art and pornography by taking a value neutral approach. He claims his argument makes as few assumptions as possible. He argues that it is the ways that art and pornography achieve their purposes that make them incompatible.
David Cycleback (2013) explains Aleatory art as art that incorporates chance into how it is made or into how the final product is received and provides examples of such works.
David Arthur Graver (1995) provides an account of anti-art and shows that it was associated with many artistic movements.
Henry Flynt (1961) argued that his work is apart from art and is effectively irrelevant to the notion of art as a whole.
Paul N Humble (2002) argues that while many works that were anti-art were never intended to be received as art, they have now come to be accepted by the artistic mainstream
Michael Newall (2012) argues that pornography has its own set of transgressive aesthetic qualities. He uses Georges Bataille’s Story of the Eye (1928), the Marquis de Sade’s The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom (2005 and Raymond
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Queneau’s We Always Treat Women Too Well, (1981) as examples of these transgressive aesthetic qualities in action.
David Davies (2012) criticises Levinson’s argument that pornography and art are incompatible due the differences in the reception that art and pornography aim for. He draws upon examples of religious art to show how an artefact whose purpose is not primarily artistic in nature, can meet Levinson’s criteria for the artefact in fact being art
Brandon Cooke (2012) argues against the assumption that pornography presents the situation depicted as a fact or that the author of pornography is making actual assertions about actually existing things. He also argues against the assumption that pornography is by its very nature exploitative, towards those appearing in it and those who consume it
Judith Butler (2006) argues against the notion of “women” and “woman” as a singular subject. Rather she argues that these ideas are composed of many different facets of identity, such as race, ethnicity, class, and sexuality. Thus, these notions are better understood in terms of intersectionality. bell hooks (2003) primarily talks about how the black female body tends to be distorted and represented by contemporary society, with an emphasis on popular culture and the media. She states that black female sexuality needs to be taken back by representing black females as subjects and not as objects.
Puzzy Power - The Manifesto (1997) this manifesto provides guidelines for making female friendly or feminist friendly pornography
Mimi Vasilaki (2010) directly responds to Mag Uidhir’s argument that pornography cannot be art. She argues that while the conclusion is plausible, Mag Uidhir does not provide sufficient evidence for his assumptions.
Arthur Danto (1964) initially argued for an institutional theory of art. What this means is that the power of defining something as art is the purview of the institutions that make up “the artworld”. Meaning that for something to be art, a representative of “the artworld”, such as a curator at a museum or art gallery needs to confer the status of art to it.
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Richard Shusterman (1991) defends popular art as having aesthetic merit. In doing so, he challenges what he feels are the three major criticisms of popular art. These are (i); popular art presents no aesthetic challenge & induces passivity. (ii). Popular art lacks formal complexity. Popular art tends to appeal to the subject matter rather than form. (iii) Popular art lacks aesthetic autonomy
Mari Mikkola (2013) argues for the existence of the extant category of Porno-Art. She provides a useful description for how something may be a porno-art artefact. She challenges the notion that sexual arousal is the central or ultimate goal of pornography and how she explains how some pornographic artefacts are capable of being art.
Howard Saul Becker (1982) takes a sociological approach to the institutional theory of art. He describes the artworld as a complex interconnected network of cooperating people. It is constituted of more than just artists but of all the people that helped the artwork come into being.
Stephen Davies (2001) argues that the biggest problem with the notion of “artworlds” is what he calls the “the Artworld relativity problem”. He states that this problem has yet to find a satisfactory solution.
This dissertation will be weighing up the strength of the arguments found in the current debate. It will fit into the current debate on the side of those that argue that pornography and art are compatible. The overall project’s intent is to show how some pornography and art can be compatible, making use of the work of Danto (1964), Becker (1982), Davies (2001), Mikkola (2013) and Shusterman (1991). As I discuss in what follows, Danto provides the base concept of the artworld that I will work off of. Though his conception of the artworld is not the only one I will discuss, instead I will also focus Becker’s contribution to the institutional theory of art as it presents a much more intertwined and interconnected artworld that avoids some of the problems of Danto’s theory; Mikkola argues for the existence of the extant category of Porno-Art. She provides a useful description for how something may be a porno-art artefact. Her explanations of porno-art artefacts are useful as they do not rely on any specific theory of art and as such, I argue they can fit into any artworld
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context. Moreover, Shusterman’s position is useful for me as challenge the notion that popular art is a lesser kind of art. He does this by challenging the criticisms of popular put forth by proponents of high art.
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Outline of the Chapters I begin in my first chapter by outlining definitions and distinctions that are essential to the study. I then proceed to examine selected arguments against the idea that some pornography can be art. As previously mentioned, I divide these arguments into four distinct categories. The first category is that of Artistic Quality. These arguments try to show why by its very nature pornography lacks the artistic quality that art should possess (Maes, 2012: 20). The second category is that of Representational Content. These arguments focus on the fact that pornography is generally graphic and places human (usually female) anatomy at the forefront for the express purpose of sexual arousal, whereas art is mostly focused on capturing the individuality, personality and subjectivity of the subject captured (ibid., 17). The third category I consider I name Ethical and Feminist Concerns. I group these together as, in my reading; they often overlap in terms of the content of the arguments presented. The primary line of argument that I extract here tends to focus on the idea that pornography causes harm in both its creation and consumption. I consider especially the work of Andrea Dworkin, particularly since she is considered an extremely important voice in the anti-pornography movement and was a member of the organisation and magazine Women Against Pornography. Further Dworkin also testified in front of U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese’s Commission on Pornography (1986). In this section, I also focus on an analysis of the idea that art is required to be morally good in order to be art and briefly consider the moralism vs autonomism debate in this section.
The final category of arguments will be those that do not fit into the prior categories, such as Mag Uidhir’s value neutral approach, whose approach involves the manner specificity of art and the manner inspecificity of pornography. As I explain, what this means in a practical sense is that instead of making claims about the inherent values of art and pornography but instead focuses on the manner in which they may achieve their intended goals whatever those may be (2009).
It is my contention that the arguments presented here are not strong enough to definitively show that pornography is wholly incompatible with art. This is despite my acknowledgement of the complexity introduced when considering the feminist arguments against pornography. However, my contention is that once we consider some counterarguments that I present in my second chapter, the position I take in chapter 1 is further strengthened.
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In the second chapter, I examine selected arguments for the idea that some pornography can be art, as well as counter arguments to some of the arguments presented in the previous chapter. I place the arguments into the same four categories as those I made use of in the previous chapter. In my exposition on the first category (Artistic Quality), I examine the arguments that use examples of works that straddle the line between art and pornography such as Story of the Eye by Georges Bataille to show that there is an overlap in the Aesthetic Qualities that pornography and art possess. It is my contention that some works of art make use of aesthetic elements that are commonly found within what is known as transgressive pornography.
In my discussion of the second category (Representational Content), my arguments focus on showing that there are examples of pornography that do focus on beauty or love for example, rather than simply on graphic representations of sex. I show how this can be seen in the growing trend of female friendly or feminist pornography. In addition, I also argue against the notion that sexual arousal is always the central or ultimate intent for all pornography.
As for the third category - Ethical and Feminist Concerns – drawing on the work of Hans Maes (2012), I argue that not all pornography causes harm in its production and that therefore, harm and objectification are not core to it. I aim to show that pornography is not essentially harmful, that is to say that it is not harmful by its very nature. This does not, however, mean that there are not instances of harmful pornography.
The final category of arguments will be those that do not fit into the prior categories, such as Vasilaki’s refutation of Mag Uidhir’s value neutral approach (2009 & 2010). Vasilaki’s contention is that Mag Uidhir’s argument is plausible but is flawed. Vasilaki contends that Mag Uidhir does not show that any of his claims are necessarily true
I contend that the arguments for pornography and art being compatible are far stronger than those against the possibility of pornography and art being compatible. These arguments address the main concerns that are raised in each of categories of the debate.
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By my third chapter, I will have shown that the arguments for pornography and art being compatible are stronger by the fact that they address many of the concerns that were raised in first chapter. Thus, I will have shown that viewing pornography and art as exclusive categories is not supported by the literature and arguments.
In the chapter itself, I begin by using Danto to provide the base concept of the artworld that I will work off of. I will then provide an overview of Becker’s contribution to the institutional theory of art as it presents a much more intertwined and interconnected artworld that avoids some of the problems of Danto’s theory; Mikkola argues for the existence of the extant category of Porno-Art. She provides a useful description for how something may be a porno-art artefact. Her explanations of porno-art artefacts are useful as they do not rely on any specific theory of art and as such, I argue they can fit into any artworld context. Moreover, Shusterman’s position is useful for me as challenge the notion that popular art is a lesser kind of art. He does this by challenging the criticisms of popular put forth by proponents of high art.
I conclude the dissertation by summarising my arguments and the conclusion that I have reached with the intent to understand and suggest where further research could be directed.
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Significance of the Study The significance of the current study lies in its attempt to gather viewpoints from across all sides of the debate, organising them according to the categories that they best fit in and then weigh those respective arguments. Furthermore, my approach in showing that the work of Mikkola, Shusterman and Danto are compatible can provide at least the beginnings of a theory that can accommodate the idea of considering some pornography as art. The significance also lies in providing an extension of Danto’s initial institutional theory that could be seen as a further development and strengthening thereof.
Finally, this study has significance beyond the purely theoretical. The two real world examples that I mentioned above (The Spear and Hylas and the Nymphs) are not isolated examples, but rather representatives of an important area of concern within the contemporary philosophy of art.
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Chapter 1: Fifty Shades of Nay: Arguments against Pornography as Art
Introduction
In investigating whether or not some pornography can be considered art, a thorough understanding of all the positions is necessary. The first step is to understand the arguments against pornography as art and whatever problems they may have. There are many arguments as to why pornography and art are not compatible some strong and some weak, but in my view, they can be said to generally fit into one of four distinct categories. Arguments fall into one of these categories based upon what quality of pornography makes it incompatible with art.
The first of these is Artistic Qualities, which argues that there is some sort of aesthetic quality inherent in art that cannot be found in pornography. Some of the. The second category is that of Representational Content, which argue that there is an inherent difference in the subjects that pornography and art represent and the way that they are represented in order to elicit an intended response. The third distinct category is Ethical and Feminist Concerns. I group these two together as there is, in my view, overlap by virtue of the fact that they view pornography as something that is inherently morally flawed and thus argue that it cannot be art. Finally, a fourth category contains arguments that do not fit within the other three categories and so, in my reading, deserves a section of its own.
The aim of this chapter is to provide an explanation of some of the most common arguments that are levelled against my position that pornography can be art. Beyond simply presenting the arguments in each of these categories, I provide an analysis of their relevant strengths and weaknesses. Before I do so, I first provide some working definitions of key concepts that will be utilised in the study.
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Key Concepts
The first key concept I introduce is the concept of pornography. As pornography is central to the work of this paper, I believe that is necessary to provide definitions for it. Defining pornography is a problematic enterprise in and of itself as many of the theorists I discuss will have their own definition but not all of them provide definitions for their own understanding of the concept. As such, I will provide a wide array of working definitions of pornography. I provide scholarly definitions as well as those that are more in line with the common usage of the word.
I will be drawing from Simon Fokt’s work as he provides definitions of pornography that have been widely discussed in recent literature.
The first definition focuses on the sexual subject being objectified as the driving force behind what defines pornography (Fokt, 2012: 288). It can be formulated as such “For all x, x is pornography iff x represents sexual activities the participants of which are objectified.” (Fokt, 2012: 288).
The second definition is one that according to Fokt most authors accept (2012: 288). It combines two of the following criteria; content of representation, function and intention (Fokt, 2012: 288).
It follows “For all x, x is pornography iff x ‘combines two features: it has a certain function or intention, to arouse its audience sexually and also has a certain content, explicit representations of sexual material (organs, postures, activity, etc.)” (Fokt, 2012: 289).
The third definition looks at how the object or performance is treated when deciding if it is pornography or not, claiming that for an item to be called pornography it must be reasonable to believe that its target audience will treat it as such (Fokt, 2012: 289). This account also uses four points to see if something is being treated as pornography (Fokt, 2012: 289). The formulation of this definition is as follows:
“For all x, x is pornography iff it is reasonable to believe that most of x’s target audience will use (or treat) x as pornography, i.e. as a communicative material (picture, performance, etc.) that the user treats primarily as a source of sexual
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arousal and does not use because of any belief that the material was intended to foster intimacy between himself/herself and the subject(s) of x” (Fokt, 2012: 289).
The fourth definition is an exclusivist account developed by Christy Mag Uidhir that will be investigated in depth later in this chapter. Fokt shortens it to “For all x, x is pornography iff x has an intended manner-inspecific purpose of sexually arousing some audience.” (Fokt, 2012: 289).
The fifth and final definition is built upon the argument that Levinson uses to differentiate between art and pornography. While Levinson does not provide a definition of pornography, Fokt formulates a definition from Levinson’s argument:
“For all x, x is pornography iff x was centrally aimed at sexual arousal facilitating sexual release, which necessarily implicates treating representations instrumentally, as wholly transparent (i.e. with no attention to form, medium, etc.), and with no appreciation for their aesthetic or artistic qualities.” (Fokt, 2012: 290).
I also include two very general definitions of pornography that are closer to the common usage of the word. These may differ slightly from the more philosophical definitions that are above.
The first of these is very simple and according to West, it takes the form of “Pornography is sexually explicit material (verbal or pictorial) that is primarily designed to produce sexual arousal in viewers” (2013).
The second definition that West provides is far more normative. Yet it still represents the way the word is used today albeit with a negative bias, taking the form “pornography is sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in consumers that is bad in a certain way” (West, 2013).
The second key concept that I introduce is that of art. There are arguably, as many definitions of art as there are theorists theorising on what makes something art. Thus, I will be providing a series of some of the more prominent contemporary definitions of art. I will provide definitions for the institutional account, an account from historicity and a functionalist account
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First, the institutional account. While there are number of institutional theories of art, Fokt asserts that it is George Dickie’s (1974) account of art that is the most popular (2012: 292). It can be summarised as follows:
“A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld).” (Fokt, 2012: 292).
Simply put the institutionalist definition of art lays the power of defining something as art as being the purview of the institutions that make up “the artworld”. Meaning that for something to be art, a representative of “the artworld”, such as a curator at a museum or art gallery needs to confer the status of art to it.
Next is the historical account of art. Fokt asserts that historicists defend a version of this argument:
For all x, x is an art work at t iff x is an object of which it is true at t that some person or persons, having the appropriate proprietary right over x, non- passingly [or: seriously] intends (or intended) x for regard-as-a-work-of-art, i.e. regard in any way (or ways) in which objects in the extension of ‘art work’ prior to t are or were correctly (or standardly) regarded. (2012: 293).
What this means is that for those who defend a historical account of art that the power of defining something as art falls on whether the work is related to an already established historical context of art and its relation to prior artworks.
The final contemporary definition that I will be explaining is the functionalist account of art: We can formulate it as such:
… an artwork is either an arrangement of conditions intended to be capable of affording an experience with marked aesthetic character or (incidentally) an arrangement belonging to a class or type of arrangements that is typically intended to have this capacity (Fokt, 2012: 295).
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I will now provide a definition for popular art and mass art. According to The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, popular art can be defined as:
Any dance, literature, music, theatre, or other art form intended to be received and appreciated by ordinary people in a literate, technologically advanced society dominated by urban culture. Popular art in the 20th century is usually dependent on such technologies of reproduction or distribution as television, printing, photography, digital compact disc and tape recording, motion pictures, radio, and videocassettes. By the late 20th century, television (q.v.) had unquestionably become the dominant vehicle for popular art and entertainment. Motion pictures are also an important medium of popular art but, in contrast to television, can more often attain the enduring significance and appeal of works belonging to the fine or elite arts. (“Popular art”, 2015)
Richard Shusterman argues that popular art can be distinguished from mass art in that popular art does not require a mass audience but only a large enough one to establish it as being popular (Shusterman 2009: 476). In this way, genres or styles that are clearly oppositional to mainstream culture (e.g., rap or heavy metal music) can be recognized as popular art though they never try to reach the largest possible audience (Shusterman 2009: 476).
Noël Carroll claims that for something to be mass art it needs to meet four criteria (Carroll, 2009: 416). The first of these is that the piece be an artwork (Carroll, 2009: 416). The second criteria is that the artwork must be of the multiple-instance variety (Carroll, 2009: 416). The third criterion is that these artworks are to be produced and/or distributed by a mass production technology (Carroll, 2009: 416). The fourth and final criterion is that this artwork must have intentional design choices that aim for accessibility with minimum effort (Carroll, 2009: 416).
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The Arguments Considered
a) Artistic Qualities According to Maes, there are several complaints about the lack of Artistic Qualities in Pornography (Maes, 2012: 20). It said that art possesses originality, whereas pornography does not (Maes, 2012: 20). The claim is that pornography, no matter the medium, is inherently formulaic and that this is because the sole purpose of pornography is to sexually arouse (Amis and Howard, 1972). This means that pornographers are only concerned with fitting in as many sexually explicit scenes/images/ideas as they can, rather than putting any thought into plot or originality (Amis and Howard, 1972: 153).
Another complaint about the lack of originality in pornography comes from author Vladimir Nabokov from his essay “On a book entitled Lolita” (2006). In this essay, Nabokov is defending his work Lolita (2006). One of the charges he is defending again is that his book is simply pornography.
To defend himself he asserts that the primary difference between art and pornography is originality. He states “in modern times the term “pornography” connotes mediocrity, commercialism, and certain strict rules of narration” (Nabokov, 2006: 208). He justifies the claim of mediocrity by asserting that sexual stimulation completely removes the capacity for every kind aesthetic enjoyment (Nabokov, 2006: 208). The idea of strict rules of narration is explained by the fact that in pornography there are rigid and unchanging rules that facilitate a familiar feeling of satisfaction amongst the consumers of pornography (Nabokov, 2006: 209). Nabokov asserts that this feeling is similar to what fans of detective stories feel in that they are generally formulaic and predictable (2006: 209). This all leads to Nabokov’s claim that, “in pornographic novels, action has to be limited to the copulation of clichés” (2006: 209). What this means is that formal features such as style, structure, imagery are unimportant and only serve to hinder sexual arousal that the consumer demands. The pornographic novel then must simply consist of a series of sexual scenes aimed at arousal (Nabokov, 2006: 209). Beyond this, the sexual scenes in the book must follow a pattern of increasing intensity. For Nabokov this is expressly achieved by the inclusion of a steady increase in the variation of sexual escapades (2006: 209). This
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is achieved with new combinations of sexual interactions and with the number of participants taking part in said acts increasing over the course of the book .This leads Nabokov to conclude that the end of the book must be more pornographic and lewd than initial chapter (2006: 209).
Nabokov above is simply arguing that pornography by its very nature and design lacks originality. This according to Nabokov is because pornography has as its primary purpose sexual arousal. This then causes pornography to follow a very rigid structure that allows it to cram in as much sexually explicit material as it possibly can. This rigid structure then causes it to forgo any and all formal structures that would allow the piece to be enjoyed aesthetically. This is because it would distract from the intended purpose of sexual arousal.
The problem with Nabokov’s overall argument is that he fails to conclusively show that the formulaicness and rigid structure of pornography would not allow for aesthetic enjoyment. The problem with Nabokov relying on formulaicness and rigidity to show the incompatibility of art and pornography is twofold.
While I concede that much of the available pornography is indeed formulaic in nature there is nothing to suggest that all pornography is like that. Further Nabokov does not provide strong evidence that rigidity and formulaicness would necessarily lead to a lack aesthetic enjoyment or appreciation. Matthew Kieran provides an example of how being formulaic does not make something bad art (2001:38). Kieran brings up the example of Westerns. For a movie to qualify as a Western there are certain formulaic elements that have to be met (Kieran, 2001:38). A few of these qualities are:
…a narrative must conform to at least some of a cluster of standard features—set in eighteenth- to nineteenth-century North America, foreground the threat of violence from external lawless groups or individuals, identify a solitary hero, and so on. (2001: 38).
Therefore, as it stands for a movie to be considered a Western then there are several rigid and formulaic constraints that it must meet. These would be commonly thought of as the conventions of the genre. There is similarity here in the way that Nabokov describes pornography above. I contend that in showing how this
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formulaicness in the case of Westerns does not necessarily exclude aesthetic enjoyment we can draw comparisons to the case against pornography.
Kieran uses as an example John Ford’s The Searchers to show these formulaic elements can be enhance its aesthetic enjoyment (Kieran, 2001: 38). The Searcher is a movie by John Ford. A quick synopsis of its plot is due before analysing its formulaic elements can lead to aesthetic enjoyment. The film follows the story of a man who returns home after the civil war. It follows a series of events that include the apparent murder and abduction of some of his family by Comanches and his dangerous journey to track down and rescue them. The plot contains many of the formulaic features that I mentioned above. Kieran contends they are used in such a way as to create a kind of aesthetic enjoyment (Kieran, 2001: 38); this is the same kind of aesthetic enjoyment that Nabokov argued that separated art and pornography.
Kieran argues that through the imaginative use of the above-mentioned conventions to convey and deepen the audience’s sense of central theme of the Western genre (Kieran, 2001: 38). Kieran states that this theme is “importance and fragility of human affection faced with a harsh, violent, blood-soaked world...” (2001: 38).
This theme are shown according to Kieran through
shots of the family, eyes shaded against the sun, waiting on the porch for a glimpse of the rider returning from war—Ford elicits a sense of human sentiment doggedly living on in hope against a hostile world. The compositional beauty of the landscape shots, small figures framed against epic landscapes, the outline of a rider against the horizon, are used to enhance our sense of small men struggling against a harsh, indifferent and threatening country. (2001: 38).
I contend that the above shows that even when something is formulaic there is room for the kind of aesthetic enjoyment that Nabokov was arguing for. It is my contention that the above is an example of how despite the formulaic nature of a piece, there is room for aesthetic enjoyment.
My other problem with Nabokov’s argument is that formulaicness and rigidity are things that are found within art. My contention is that artistic movements can
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sometimes be formulaic to a certain extent. Artworks within artistic movements have certain criteria which they have to meet in order to be considered part of that movement. For example if we look at movements such as De Stijl, Fauvism, Expressionism and others have certain criteria that need to be met in order for a piece of work to be considered a part of the movement. I acknowledge that this is not always the case for example in the early Fauvist works of Matisse. This leads to a double standard; formulaicness is something to that excludes pornography from also being art, yet it there is some formulaicness in art and that is not something that Nabokov addresses.
Maes also touches on one of the above complaints that pornographic films, photographs, and stories are mass-produced commodities—products of what is aptly termed ‘the porn industry’ (2012: 21). This stands in opposition to a work of art, by contrast, is not an industrial product but a unique creation, carefully crafted and skilfully made (2012: 21).
My issue with the above complaints is that there are in fact cases where art has been mass-produced. I contend that there are examples of art being mass-produced almost as if they are commodities. We have to look no further than the art that adorns the walls of most hotels. These pieces are often mass-produced to be sold off in department stores or sold to some hotels to adorn their walls. It would be hard to argue against the idea that these pieces are mass-produces pieces of some sort of porn industry.
Another example of mass produced work can be seen in some of the work of Damien Hirst. In an article titled How Damien Hirst tried to transform the art market by Colin Gleadell (2012) there is some exploration of Hirst process. Hirst’s work has been described as being created in a manner that is reminiscent of production line (Gleadell, 2012). Gleadell also compares Hirst’s process to Andy Warhol’s use of factory workers to create his art (2012).
I contend that these cases show that there are cases of mass-production in the world of art. I contend that the first example is enough to show that there is art that exists as a mass produced-commodity. To the first example, concerns could be raised that it is an example of “low-art” and that it cannot be applied universally. It is my contention that the second example then would satisfy this concern as Damien
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Hirst’s work has been featured in many galleries and as such might be considered “high art”.
In conclusion I contend that the arguments that pornography lacks certain Artistic Qualities and thus cannot be art are too weak. Nabokov poorly justified his intuitions about pornography lacking originality and being formulaic. I drew upon the work of Kieran (2001) to show that formulaic features can be used to create aesthetic enjoyment for the audience. Further, I showed that in some cases, formulaicness is a part of art movements to a certain degree and yet they allow for aesthetic enjoyment. The second complaint was that pornography is mass-produced and treated as a commodity. I found this position to be untenable as there concrete examples of works of art being mass-produced and commoditised. It is for this reason that I do not these arguments to be strong enough to convince me that there are some aesthetic qualities of art that pornography lacks.
Now that we have examined the arguments that state that it is aesthetic qualities that prevent art from being pornography, we move onto those arguments that deal representational content.
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b) Representational Content After examining the arguments that push for the separation of art and pornography and finding that they are not strong enough to support their claims. I will now look at some of the arguments which deal with the way art and pornography represents the subjects. There are two arguments that I will focus on. The first of these focuses on the claim that pornography is generally graphic and places human (usually female) anatomy at the forefront. These depictions, it is also argued, have the express purpose of causing sexual arousal, whereas art is mostly focused on capturing the individuality, personality and subjectivity of the subject captured (Maes, 2012: 22). The second argument aims looks at the response that the representations in art and pornography aim to achieve
The first kind of argument was advanced by Luc Bovens in Moral Luck, Photojournalism, and Pornography (1998: 214) expands on this claim. He claims that pornography is immediate in its graphic nature. What is meant by this is not that it hides something from us but rather that it is ineffective in showing us something about what is being presented. This is caused by the fact that due to its graphic nature, pornography impedes the viewer from making a connection with what is being depicted. Further, it impedes the viewer from making a connection with what is being viewed is actually like (1998: 214).
Already here, my concern is that Bovens provides no reason as to what it is about the immediate and graphic nature of pornography that impedes the viewer from making these connections with the subject being depicted. He simply states this as if it fact without any further discussion.
Bovens does, however, use an analogy to further elucidate his point, and which, I think, makes clear his answer to my raised concern. He claims that the immediate and graphic nature of pornography puts the viewer in a position that is similar to Thomas Nagel’s scientist who has complete knowledge of the workings of sonar perception in bats, but still fails to comprehend what it is like to perceive the world as a bat does (1998, 214). In a similar way to the aforementioned scientist, the viewer of pornography becomes thoroughly acquainted with all kinds of anatomical detail, but what remains unknown to that consumer of pornography is, according to Bovens’ analogy, what it is actually like to be engaged in such a sexual situation.
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Again here, I think that Bovens’ position is problematic. I concede that it is in fact possible for someone to not actually know what it is like to be engaged in such sexual situations. This for example, is because there are in fact instances of pornography that provide a distorted view of the sexual experience as a whole. Yet, Bovens does not provide a justification for why this is an essential facet of pornography. It does not follow, in my view, that this assertion can be transferred to pornography as a whole.
Arguing that some examples of pornography provide a distorted view of sexual situations is not sufficient to show that all pornography provides a distorted view of sexual situations. An example of this can be seen in what is now being called Feminist friendly or Female friendly pornography. Films in this genre tend to focus on exploring far more realistic sexual situations. This style of pornography can be seen specifically in the productions of studio called Puzzy Power1. They have a manifesto which will be discussed in detail later but lays out their ideology in creating these movies that provide a more realistic view of sex, ones that do not exaggerate or distort sex into some sort of spectacle (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998). What this means is that in these movies the sexual acts are still being depicted. The key difference is that these movies provide a narrative and focus on things such intimacy and exploration of sexuality in a safe space. I contend that this is enough to show that distorted sexual situations are not an essential part of pornography as Bovens claims. If we then accept that distorting sexual situations is not an essential part of pornography then we cannot wholesale dismiss the possibility that some instances can be art.
Another issue arises if we accept Bovens’ claim that what makes pornography incompatible with art is that it impedes the viewers’ connection with the subject being depicted. What does the above claim then mean for works of art that present outlandish or abstract content? Consider the work of Francisco Goya, and specifically his painting Saturn Devouring His Son [1819–1823]. This painting depicts
1 It is important to note that the concept of ‘female‐friendly pornography’ is not morally unproblematic. There have been recent attempts to distinguish between the categories of female‐friendly / feminist / alternative / queer /radical egalitarian forms of pornography. These include works by T. Taormino, C. P. ShimiZu, C. Penley & M. Miller‐Young (2013); and H. Maes (2017). I further acknowledge that Zentropa, the mother company of Puzzy Power was caught up in scandals related to the #metoo movement. Despite this, I use the example of Puzzy Power, since the example allows me to develop my argument, most especially in regards to their manifesto, which I examine in depth.
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the moment in the Ancient Greek creation myth where the Titan Cronus (which has been Romanized here as Saturn) devours his son Jupiter, due to the fear that he may overthrow him.
Figure 3: Francisco Goya, Saturn Devouring His Son, 1819–1823, Oil mural transferred to canvas, Museo del Prado, Madrid It would be difficult, I think, to argue that viewers of the painting have an understanding of the subject in the manner that Bovens argues. Another example here is the case of abstract art in which we cannot surmise a clear subject. Many of the paintings in the movement known as De Stijl which advocated for pure abstraction in the works they produced, for example, illustrate the point I make here. Specifically we can see this in Piet Mondrian’s artwork No. VI / Composition No.II, (1920). My view is that it seems difficult to imagine that anyone would argue that
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they feel and immediate and real connection to the “subject” of these works. Bovens’ arguments do not account for such works. I contend that this is a significant weakness in his overall argument. This is because if we accept his argument we would have to contend with the fact that there are significant portions of artworks that are not in fact art. According to the criteria that Bovens himself laid out to exclude pornography from being art.
Figure 4: Piet Mondrian, No. VI / Composition No.II, 1920 Finally, Bovens claims that there is a “feeling of emptiness” that emanates from the paradoxical nature of pornography (1998, 214). By paradoxical nature, Bovens is referring to the fact that viewer of such materials feels that due to the graphicness of pornography, what is being depicted has been explored to its limits, and yet, something “essential” remains hidden. Bovens hints that it is in this paradox that the distinction between pornography and erotic art lies. His view is that the more restricted nature of erotic art in terms of overly graphic detail succeeds in drawing the viewer into the actual qualities of what is depicted by retaining a certain suggestive character which pornography does not (Bovens 1998, 214).
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Overall, I do not find Bovens’ argument convincing. While he tries to explain that in representing extreme graphic detail pornography somehow loses something special in its depiction. In my view, there is no strong justification for his conclusion, that erotic art in being less graphic and immediate is somehow more revealing of this special thing. Indeed, Bovens does not explicitly state what this “special thing” actually is. Without knowing what this special essential thing is, we cannot take it at face value that erotic art retains it, whereas pornography does not. Is this special thing intimacy? Is it some sort of special attention payed to the subject of the work? Alternatively, is this something the ability to connect with the work itself? Is it, in short, being able to make a connection with what is being viewed?
Bovens’ never explicitly explains what this may be exactly or what is so special about it. Let us assume that any and/or all of the above are in fact the special thing. How does he arrive at the conclusion that pornography lacks it while erotic art retains it? For this, we would require examples of cases of erotic art that retain any of these above special things. I do concede that in certain cases pornography may obscure or mislead people about the acts being depicted. This is a primary conceit of some pornography - in many cases; pornography is clearly depicting unrealistic or contrived scenarios. Despite this, it does not follow that all cases of pornography obscure or mislead people about the acts being committed, and that no cases of erotic art do. The example of Feminist friendly or female friendly pornography is again a relevant example here, since it focuses more on realistic situations that would not obscure or mislead consumers.
Another argument on the grounds of Representational Content has been put forth by Levinson in a piece titled “Erotic Art and Pornographic Pictures” (2005). In this paper, he concerns himself with discussing the differences between Pornography, Art and Erotic Art and arguing why Pornography is not compatible with the other two.
The crux of Levinson’s2 argument revolves around the reception that erotic art and pornography aim for. A further concern is the manner in which the reception is achieved. For Levinson the reception that erotic art aims for is sexual stimulation but not release. This is contrasted with pornography, which aims for sexual arousal, and
2 It is interesting that Levinson’s more ‘liberal’ view of what counts as art is seemingly incongruous with his more restrictive arguments regarding the incompatibility of art and pornography. Unfortunately due to space restrictions I cannot discuss this in any detail here.
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eventual release that for Levinson is antithetical to art. Simply put his argument can be roughly summarised as follows:
1. Erotic art consists of images centrally aimed at a certain sort of reception R1.
2. Pornography consists of images centrally aimed at a certain sort of reception R2.
3. R1 essentially involves attention to form/vehicle/medium/manner, and so entails treating images as in part opaque.
4. R2 essentially excludes attention to form/vehicle/medium/manner, and so entails treating images as wholly transparent.
5. R1 and R2 are incompatible.
6. Hence, nothing can be both erotic art and pornography; or at the least, nothing can be coherently projected as both erotic art and pornography; or at the very least, nothing can succeed as erotic art and pornography at the same time. (2005: 239).
Simply put Levinson’s argument is that erotic art and pornography aim for different receptions and that influences the way that they represent the content depicted (2005: 239). Therefore, for Levinson pornography aims for sexual arousal with eventual release while erotic art merely aims for sexual stimulation (2005: 229). The sexual stimulation that erotic art aims for still allows for some artistic interest of the work and that is what he means by treating the image as part opaque(Levinson, 2005: 230, 239). Unlike erotic art Levinson, claims that pornography does not reward artistic interest in the work because of its aim to sexual arouse its viewers (2005: 230, 239). Levinson concludes that these two receptions are incompatible and that therefore nothing can be erotic art and pornography (2005: 239). This has the added effect of stopping anything from being both art and pornography.
Levinson holds intuitions about the nature of pornography and erotic art and he bases his argument on these intuitions and uses them to justify it as well (Levinson: 2005: 229). These intuitions are as follows.
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(1) the erotic and the pornographic are both concerned with sexual stimulation or arousal.
(2) while the term “erotic” is neutral or even approving, the term “pornographic” is pejorative or disapproving.
(3) while “erotic art” is a familiar, if somewhat problematic, notion, “pornographic art” seems an almost oxymoronic one.
(4) whereas pornography has a paramount aim, namely, the sexual satisfaction of the viewer, erotic art, even if it also aims at sexual satisfaction on some level, includes other aims of significance.
(5) whereas we appreciate (or relish) erotic art, we consume (or use) pornography. In other words, our interactions with erotic art and pornography are fundamentally different in character, as reflected in the verbs most appropriate to the respective engagements. (2005: 229).
These five intuitions about the nature of Pornography, Art and Erotic Art are crucial to why pornographic art cannot exist in Levinson’s view and as such are worth examining. Levinson’s aim is to accommodate these intuitions about art and pornography as they are at the core of his argument against the possibility of pornographic art.
The first intuition deals with the intended response that the content being represented is meant to elicit. For Levinson sexual stimulation and sexual arousal are distinct from one another (2005: 229). For Levinson sexual stimulation is primarily a mental process in that it induces sexual thoughts, feelings and desires (2005: 229). Sexual arousal on the other hand is a physiological process in that it describes the process that leads to sexual release (Levinson: 2005: 229). He contends that what differentiates the two is which of these aims they are concerned for (Levinson: 2005: 230). He continues that erotic art while creating sexual stimulation it still presents images in a way that also reward artistic interest (Levinson: 2005: 230). On the other hand pornography only aims to present images in a manner intended to sexually arouse the viewer in the interest of causing sexual release (Levinson: 2005: 230).
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The second intuition deals with the normative value placed upon these words. Levinson is touching upon the fact that to label something as pornographic is to confer a negative connotation upon it (2005: 229). This differs from the term erotic, which has connotations and prejudgements that are at best good or at worst neutral.
Levinson’s first two intuitions are widely held and one only has to look at most definitions of pornography that are employed. One of the more every day definitions that I outlined has this intuition as part of it. He does not go through the trouble of justifying or examining them; instead he presents them as if they are wildly held beliefs. Further, he does not consider the idea that sexual stimulation and arousal are more closely linked than he states. As Maes points out that sexual thought, feelings and desires often lead to arousal and eventual release (Maes, 2012: 32). This causes a problem for Levinson’s argument in that the distinction between stimulation and arousal fades in practice (Maes, 2012: 32). This can further weaken his argument as he relies heavily on the distinction between erotic art and pornography being the aims of stimulation and arousal. There is problem when we accept the second intuition without further explanation. He does not examine whether or not these preconceived notions are inherent parts of “erotic” and “pornographic” things. In simply accepting this notion there is a danger we come to the discussion having already decided the nature of things and that can lead to circularity.
The third intuition that Levinson holds is tied to the conclusion of his entire argument. Levinson is asserting that the notion of pornographic art is inherently oxymoronic because pornography and art are concepts that are diametrically opposed. Levinson even states that” the aims of true pornography and the aims of art, erotic art included, are not compatible, but war against one another” (2005: 232). This is because for Levinson pornography’s aim of sexual arousal and release is antithetical to the idea of artistic interest (2005: 232). This is because pornography requires treating the image as transparent, which means that no attention is paid to form (2005: 232). For Levinson erotic art is problematic because it causes a tension (2005: 238). This tension is caused by the fine edge that Levinson claims is walked on when viewing a sexually stimulating artwork (2005: 238). This is because one has to hold sexual stimulation in check when viewing erotic artwork lest one slips into
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arousal and ceases to pay attention to the formal features of the artwork (2005: 238, 239).
The problem that I have with this intuition is that there is nothing that necessarily entails, that one cannot derive sexual arousal from an image while also appreciating its formal features. Levinson himself actually concedes that this may be possible (2005: 236). In response, Levinson states that any image that allowed that would simply be a complex mode of pornography (2005: 236). Further, he states that such a piece of work would also only appeal to atypical consumers of pornography (2005: 236).
Levinson’s fourth intuition deals with the intended aims of pornography and erotic art. He asserts that pornography has the singular aim of sexual arousal (2009, 229). On the other hand, erotic art has sexual arousal as its aim, which still allows for other aims. For Levinson the aim of pornography is sexual arousal with the ultimate intent of sexual release (2005: 230). The aim of erotic art is similar, in that it aims to sexually stimulate the viewer but with the added aim of also rewarding them for taking an artistic interest in it (Levinson, 2005: 230). Artistic interest For Levinson is roughly the attention paid to a piece of art’s form and the relation of that form to its content; the way the content has been embodied in the form, the way the medium has been employed to convey the content (2005: 230).
This is a common intuition and one that will be addressed in more detail later in this paper when I discuss David Davies response to Levinson’s paper. The problem that I have with this intuition is that there is nothing that logically entails that pornography, cannot also aim at rewarding artistic interest. Simply saying that their primary aims are slightly different is not enough to justify such a strong claim.
The final intuition attempts to lay the difference between pornography and erotic art squarely on the verbs that are used to engage with them (Levinson, 2005: 229). It is his contention that because we are said to “consume” pornography and “relish” erotic art that this gives us an insight into their character (Levinson, 2005: 229). The idea is that the word consume it holds the connotation that we are uncritically engaging with some sort of mass produced product. This is contrasted with the idea that we relish erotic art, thereby engaging with it beyond the sexual stimulation that it may provide
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us. For Levinson this only further cements the difference in character, which makes art different from pornography. (2005: 229).
Again, I have a problem with the way that Levinson does not explicitly justify this intuition. I will concede that the verbs he uses here are common ways to refer to engaging with them. Unfortunately, I cannot agree with the idea that this tells us anything substantial about them. He does not specifically spell out the character of each verb, or how this is revealed. Further, the idea of consuming or using is not solely a function of pornography. I contend that we can use art as well. Art can be used as inspiration or to elicit a specific emotion within us. In creation, we can use art to for a specific purpose, meaning that we are using art to accomplish a certain aim. Finally, I do not think that consuming and relishing something are mutually exclusive ideas. Levinson does not justify the idea that consuming something precludes us from also relishing it. For an extremely literal example, we can consume our favourite meal but that does not mean that we are not relishing it as well. In regards to pornography, there is nothing that stops us from using it for its intended purpose of sexual arousal. While also appreciating its form and the relation of that form to its content, the way the content has been embodied in the form, the way the medium has been employed to convey the content.
In conclusion, I contend that the arguments that pornography represents its subject in such a way that it cannot be art weak. The first of these arguments claimed that pornography is too immediate and graphic in nature to allow us to connect with the subject of the work as art does. Bovens followed this up by arguing that pornography provides a distorted view of sex and does not allow the viewer to connect with the subject. Finally, he also argues that pornography creates a sense of emptiness due the graphic nature of it hiding something special. I did not find these arguments convincing as Bovens does not explain what it is about the immediate and graphic nature of pornography that stops viewers from connecting with subject. While I agreed that, some pornography can create a distorted view of sex that is not enough to make the strong claim that all pornography provides this distorted view and in fact, there are examples to the contrary. I also argued that Bovens’ criteria of needing to connect with the subject, is problematic. This is because there are cases in abstract art where we cannot hope to connect with the subject of the artwork. Further, there are cases of artworks depicting horrible scenes and again it would be hard to argue
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that we can connect with the subject. Finally, Bovens was vague in regards to what that something special is that is hidden by pornography’s graphicness. This was followed up Levinson’s argument. In his argument, Levinson argues that erotic art and pornography have different aims. These different aims are what cause their incompatibility. This is because the differences in aim to change the way these works represent the subject. I do not find Levinson’s argument very convincing. I do not believe that he does a thorough enough job of justifying the assumptions that he bases his argument on to make such a strong claim, but a more thorough answer to his argument will be in the next chapter.
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c) Ethical and Feminist Concerns Now that we have dealt with the representational and aesthetic concerns, I consider those that I group together as being ethical and feminist in nature. As previously mentioned, the reason that I have combined ethical and feminist concerns into a single section is due to the similarities and overlap of the main arguments that are presented from these perspectives. These arguments generally focus on the fact that pornography is harmful both in its creation and in its consumption, and that since art has to be morally good to some degree in order for it to be art; pornography cannot be art. In other words, these arguments are generally contingent on the idea that for an artwork to be considered art it has to be morally good.
Before I can even begin discussing the arguments themselves, it is imperative to first discuss the topic of the ethical criticism of art. The ethical criticism of art entails arguments about whether or not the aesthetic value of art should be determined by its ethical value. On the subject of ethical criticism of art, there are two overall opposing positions (Peek, 2018): Autonomism and Moralism. These two categories can further be split into distinct but related categories: Radical Moralism and Moderate Moralism, as well as Moderate Autonomism and Radical Autonomism. As I see it Radical Moralism and Moderate Moralism are related to the position that art has a moral component that is required for its interpretation as art, and so I provide a detailed exposition of these. I begin with a brief explanation of all four positions, and then pay special attention to Moderate Moralism as well as examining arguments in favour of this position. I also draw out the implications of this position for the current study.
Radical Autonomism is the position that holds that applying any ethical considerations to the criticism of art is a mistake (Peek: 2018). Further radical autonomists argue that it is only aesthetic considerations should be relevant to the judgement of a piece of art (Peek: 2018).
A further definition by Noël Carrol describes Radical autonomism as a view that holds that art is a strictly autonomous realm of practice (1996: 224). Radical Autonomists believe that art is in fact different from other social realms that pursue cognitive, political or moral value. This position asserts that it is wholly inappropriate
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or even incoherent to assess artworks in terms of their consequences for cognition, morality and politics (1996: 224).
Richard Posner justifies holding this position in “Against Ethical Criticism” (1997), by arguing,
The aesthetic outlook is a moral outlook, one that stresses the values of openness, detachment, hedonism, curiosity, tolerance, the cultivation of the self, and the preservation of a private sphere - in short, the values of liberal individualism (1997: 2).
We can see that proponents of Radical Autonomism value freedom and curiosity in all of its forms. Ironically, the way that Posner justifies his position conflates an aesthetic outlook with a moral outlook. This would seem to be at odds with the idea that morals and ethics have no place in the criticism of art but is not. While Posner is claiming that, an aesthetic outlook is a moral outlook. It is his specific moral outlook that differentiates his position from Moralism. The highest values of his moral outlook include “openness, detachment, hedonism, curiosity, tolerance, the cultivation of the self, and the preservation of a private sphere” (Posner, 1997: 2), All of these values reinforce an individualistic attitude which closely aligns with how Carrol describes Radical Autonomism’s view of art as a strictly autonomous realm of practice (1996: 224).
While I can see the appeal of this position in that it is incredibly open and permissive allowing for a broad and varied evaluation of works of art. I feel that it is flawed in that its permissiveness may allow for instances of art that are explicitly immoral. An example of this is the work Exposición N° 1, (2007) [Figure 4] by the artist known as Habacuc an exhibition in which an emaciated dog was tied to a wall. This part of the exhibit was controversial in that there were allegations that the dog was allowed to starve (David Yanez, 2010). There were conflicted reports of whether or not the dog was actually starved to death (Yanez, 2010).
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Figure 5: A photograph of Exposición N° 1, 2007 by Guillermo Vargas A further example can be seen in the piece Dogs That Cannot Touch Each Other, (2003) [Figure 6] created by artists Sun Yuan and Peng Yu. The work is a seven- minute video of a piece that was originally performed in Beijing in 2003. The video shows dogs placed on treadmills facing one and other. The dogs are clearly struggling to reach each other, according to some reports to fight each other (Ben Davis, 2017).
Figure 6: Sun Yuan and Peng Yu, A photograph of the Dogs That Cannot Touch Each Other installation, (2003).
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I contend that these pieces can be seen as immoral when viewed from the standpoint of animal ethics. I assert that animals are not simply objects but rather that they are conscious subjects which can feel pain and can suffer. Josephine Donovan shares this inclination in the paper “Aestheticizing Animal Cruelty” (2011). She contends that animals are not objects (2011: 204). What that means is that we should regard animals as individuals with stories/biographies of their own and that very much like humans they dislike pain enjoy pleasure and that they want to live and thrive (Donovan, 2011: 204). Donovan contends that in contemporary avant- garde art movements there is an egregious amount of aestheticization of living animals (Donovan, 2011: 206). This is similar to the pieces that were mentioned above. Donovan asserts that from animal-standpoint perspective, these pieces not only violate the animal’s bodily integrity and thereby its inherent dignity; but it denies the subjecthood of the animal (2011: 206). This then reduces the animal involved to the status of an object to be manipulated for human aesthetic purposes (Donovan, 2011: 204). What is important is that if we hold Radical Autonomism to be true then we would have no recourse in judging this piece from an ethical standpoint
Moderate Moralism, on the other hand, is a more moderate version of Autonomism. Carrol explains that in opposition to Radical Autonomism, Moderate Moralism holds the position that some works of art may be evaluated morally (1996, 236). This is because Radical Autonomism as discussed above contends that works of art can never be evaluated morally. Further those who hold the position contend that sometimes when evaluating a piece of art its moral defects may in fact figure into the evaluation (1996, 236). These moral defects that figure into evaluations are not thought of being an aesthetic value in and of themselves.
Moralism is the position that mostly aligns with the arguments I discuss in what follows, since in both variations of it, the view is that it is not only possible, but necessary, to include ethical considerations in evaluating a piece of art.
According to Peek (2018) Radical Moralism is the view that the aesthetic value of an artwork is determined by its moral value. What this means is that this position reduces all aesthetic value to moral value in other words the moral character of the artwork is what is most valued. This view tends to ignore fundamental aspects of aesthetic value such as the formal aspects of a work of art (Peek, 2018). Radical
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Moralism does not pay attention to such things as colour, lines, shape, tone and composition when evaluating art. Further, this theory ignores things such as beauty. These are what lead to widespread criticism of the theory (Peek, 2018).
According to Carrol, Moderate moralism contends that some works of art may be evaluated morally and that sometimes the moral defects and/or merits of a work may figure in the aesthetic evaluation of the work (1996: 236).
A defence of Moderate Moralism can be seen in Carrol’s 1996 paper titled Moderate Moralism. Carrol provides two distinct reasons as to why this position is appealing. The first, he claims, is that Autonomism of any sort provides an attractive alternative to the views of “apparent” puritanical art critics. These are thinkers like Plato and Leo Tolstoy (Carrol, 1996: 224). To understand why Carrol refers to them as puritanical we need to briefly explain their individual theories.
In his book What is Art? Tolstoy explains his views on art (1904). His idea of what makes something good art is rather strict. This is linked to what he views as the purpose of art. For Tolstoy that purpose is the development of humankind (1904: 156). His explanation:
as the evolution of knowledge proceeds by truer and more necessary knowledge dislodging and replacing what is mistaken and unnecessary, so the evolution of feeling proceeds through art, feelings less kind and less needful for the well-being of mankind are replaced by others kinder and more needful for that end. That is the purpose of art (Tolstoy, 1904: 156).
What this means is that purpose of art is linked to the evolution and well-being of humankind. Therefore, art should help knowledge evolve. It does so by helping new knowledge that is more useful for the development of humankind, dislodge the old less useful knowledge. Therefore, a good piece of art would be one that helps knowledge evolve whereas a bad piece of art would be one that does not. Tolstoy argued that all the art of the time would be better off destroyed, as it did not help further humankind (1904: 185). For Tolstoy the knowledge needed for furthering the well-being of humankind religious perception (1904: 157, 159). Thus for Tolstoy a good piece of art is required to have advance a moral position (1904: 157, 159).
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Despite all of this, Tolstoy despised censorship calling it in his preface “an immoral and irrational institution” (1904: XXXIII).
Plato’s position on art is even more critical of art as he calls for outright censorship In the Republic.; His criticisms from art are laid out primarily in Books 3 and 10 of the Republic.
In Book 3 of The Republic Plato discusses that the purpose of poetry is to engender the correct mentality in the people of republic (386a – 386c). Further Plato claims that poetry that does not conform to this ideal should be censored (387c -387e). Plato also discuss representational poetry. For Plato representational poetry can have a harmful effect on the people of the republic. These harmful effects arise when representational poetry depicts negative behaviour and attitudes (395c–395e). For Plato this is because acting out these, parts for too long can make the negative behaviour and attitudes become habitual (395c–395e).
In Book 10 Plato further justifies his calls for censorship of art. Specifically Plato is looking at mimetic art that is common associated with poetry and paintings, and serves to justify the banning of mimetic poetry in Book 3 as discussed above. Plato’s argument is broken down into three parts. The first of these is that representational poetry, mimetic artworks like paintings are imitations of real things, and therefore as products, it does not make sense to assign them reality (596e–602c). The second part of Plato’s argument is that because mimetic art and representational poetry are so removed from reality, they tend to appeal to the emotional parts of the soul (602c – 603e) This for Plato ends up causing damage to the soul and the rational faculties (605b -605e). Thus for Plato poetry and art of this kind should be banished from the republic (607a – 607c).
Autonomists oppose the above thinkers by maintaining that art is intrinsically valuable, meaning that it is valuable in and of itself. This means that, for an autonomist, art should not be subservient to ulterior or external purposes, such as, promoting moral education. Carrol states that this kind of autonomism appeals to the intuition that artworks can be valuable, perhaps in the virtue of the beauty they deliver to disinterested attention, irrespective of their social consequences (Carrol 1996: 224). Carrol admits that this intuition may be a modern one that has already been informed by this kind of autonomism (1996: 224).
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Carrol argues that there is a second reason that this position would be so appealing (1996: 225). That reason is that for theorists who approach art from an essentialist standpoint would find Radical Autonomism to be a satisfying position. (1996: 225). For essentialists art has some sort of unique characteristic to it that it has and that this characteristic is shared amongst all artworks. For essentialists it is only these essential characteristics of art that should be used in evaluating it (1996: 224).
Carrol identifies with autonomism two key problems. The first problem deals directly with the essentialist portion of Radical Autonomism. Carrol points out that most Autonomists cannot point to a specific essential character, which pertains to all, and only art (Carrol 1996: 224). Further, Carrol states that this essentialist position takes a narrow construal of the aesthetic. This does not allow it to account for the aesthetic value of certain art forms of particular artworks. This can be seen in how different local genres of artwork can have different essential characteristics (1996: 227). An example of this can be seen in different genres of music. The formal aspects of Heavy Metal may differ greatly from those of Pop Music. Heavy Metal tends eschew traditional song structure and employ dissonance. Pop music sticks to formulaic song structures and employs harmonies.
The second problem that Carrol identifies deals with the role that moral understanding plays in our appreciation of narrative art. According to Carrol, most, if not all, narrative art is left incomplete by the author (1996: 231). This means that the reader or the audience must be able to fill in the rest of the information on his or her own, in order for the work to be intelligible. According to Carrol, this would include information that is usually supplied by moral understanding (1996: 228). For example, knowing that murder is bad may be a presupposition that the reader must bring to Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment (1996) in order to understand it. Accordingly, Carrol concludes that due to this information supplied by moral understanding (1996: 228). It is highly unlikely that there could be any extensive or important narrative of human affairs that does not rely upon our moral judgement in order to fill in the blanks (1996: 228). Even in the kinds of narrative artwork that do not explicitly require or rely on the moral understanding of those interacting with it to fully understand it (1996: 228). Further, Carrol adds that this is true even in the cases where the works try to purposefully eschew morality (1996: 228). An example of this
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can be seen in some Modernist works of fiction such as Georges Bataille’s Story of the Eye (1928).
In my view, Moderate Autonomism is the most satisfying positon. While Radical Autonomism is extremely permissive, and so allows for freedom of expression, it leaves room for abuse as was shown in the above examples. Moderate Moralism, in my view, allows for the same or similar levels of freedom, but still allows for some sort of ethical evaluation to occur. In my view, it is necessary to have a way to evaluate works of art in terms of their moral defects or strengths. This is the position from which I develop my own position on the status of pornography in Chapter 3 of the current work.
As previously mentioned, in looking at why some theorists argue that pornography is ethically wrong, I focus primarily on the contributions of Andrea Dworkin, and especially on her book Pornography: Men Possessing Women (1981). In this work, Dworkin lays out her position on pornography, and explains why she claims it is so harmful to men and women. She also discusses the underlying relations and power structures that make it so harmful. As such, for her pornography is ethically problematic.
Dworkin’s definition of pornography bears significance to her overall argument. Her definition is based on the fact that the word pornography is derived from the ancient Greek words Porne and Graphos. Since Porne means “whore”, a whore of the absolute lowest class, who had no standing and was below even slaves; and Graphos means writing or drawing (Dworkin, 1981: 200). Even though from the way that she breaks it down it would seem as if pornography simply means writing about sex. For Dworkin this is simply not the case as will be explained further.
Dworkin admits that her own definition of pornography is completely different from our everyday usage of the word (1981: 200). As defined earlier in this paper our everyday usage of pornography according to West is “Pornography is sexually explicit material (verbal or pictorial) that is primarily designed to produce sexual arousal in viewers” (2013). Dworkin denounces the everyday usage of the word and its similar interpretations as simply being euphemisms everyday (1981: 200).
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Contrary to this common conception of pornography, Dworkin explains that for her, it means the graphic depiction of women as “vile whores” (Dworkin, 1981: 200). In Dworkin’s view, contemporary pornography strictly and literally conforms to the word’s original or root meaning (Dworkin, 1981: 200). In other words, it means the graphic depiction of “vile whores” or in contemporary language “sluts”, “cows” (Dworkin, 1981: 200). The only difference between Dworkin’s definition and its etymological origin is these depictions are no longer confined to writings and drawings but have expanded to the realm of photography and film (Dworkin, 1981: 200). Dworkin asserts that pornography has no other meaning than the one she has given (1981: 200).
These “whores” Dworkin continues, exist only to serve men sexually and they are only able to exist within the framework of male sexual domination (1981: 200). According to Dworkin, this is because the word “whore” immediately loses its meaning outside of the system of male sexual domination of women (1981: 200).
Dworkin asserts that by couching pornography in the euphemistic description of pornography as “writing about sex”. “depictions of the erotic”, “depictions of nude bodies” or “sexual representations is very telling of the low value of women held by men (1981: 201). Their widespread use emphasizes the valuation of women as “vile whores” and that the sexuality of women is considered essentially low and whorish (1981: 201). Specifically the view that pornography is “depictions of the erotic” only serves to emphasize that the only real pleasure of sex is the debasing of women (Dworkin, 1981: 201). This in turn reduces the whole of female sexuality to their genitals (Dworkin, 1981: 201). Dworkin continues that the idea of pornography as “dirty” is really a statement that reinforces the notion that the sexuality and bodies of women are dirty. Dworkin claims that pornography does not in fact refute this notion, as some would believe (Dworkin, 1981: 201). In fact, she claims that the pornography industry exploits this idea and uses it by using it to sell and promoting itself (Dworkin, 1981: 201).
Key to her explanation of pornography is the porn industry. Dworkin claims that the pornography industry is the largest entertainment industry in the world (Dworkin, 1981: 201). Not only that but it is still growing and is fuelled by the advancement of technology (Dworkin, 1981: 201). This increase in demand creates a vicious cycle
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(Dworkin, 1981: 201). This is because it necessitates the creation of more “Porneia” (whores) (Dworkin, 1981: 201). A consequence of this is that it creates a passive acceptance to the graphic depictions. This in turn legitimises the use of women in this manner (Dworkin, 1981: 201). For Dworkin this is a vicious cycle. The endpoint of which is that the nature of women is pornography until by their very nature are pornography (Dworkin, 1981: 202). This perpetuates the harm pornography causes in its creation and consumption.
There are two things which I take issue with in Dworkin’s exposition. In my reading, it is precisely Dworkin’s definition of pornography that allows her to show that it can and will cause harm. However, in my view, this definition differs vastly from the way the word is actually used today. Consider again the definitions of pornography that West provides, that I mentioned previously in this chapter. The first of these is very general and takes the form “Pornography is sexually explicit material (verbal or pictorial) that is primarily designed to produce sexual arousal in viewers” (West, 2013). This definition is close to the way that the word pornography is used in our everyday language (West, 2013). The second definition is a more normative one, which also represents another way the word is used today. This definition takes the form “pornography is sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in consumers that is bad in a certain way” (West, 2013).Her definition is also completely at odds with many of the definitions that I covered in the beginning of this paper. It is my contention that the definition that Dworkin utilises is out of date and no longer useful for making such a strong claim about the nature of the harm that pornography causes.
The second issue that I have with Dworkin’s exposition is that she does not show how pornography is harmful, by its very core. While in some cases, it seems perfectly reasonable to argue that pornography harmful in that it can engender a certain attitude towards women and sexual activities, in my view, Dworkin has ignored other contributing factors that may lead to these attitudes.
The second issue can be somewhat addressed by considering what Dworkin calls the seven characteristics or facets of male power. These facets are posited to guide the power dynamic between men and women, and which form the debasement that she views as being inherent in pornography.
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The first of the facets of male power identified is the power of assertion of self (Dworkin 1981: 13). This “I am” according to Dworkin exists a priori; it is a bedrock, without embellishment or apology and can never cease to exist (ibid.). In short, it is an absolute and never-ending metaphysical assertion of self. Further, in Dworkin’s view, this facet of male power is not merely subjective, but codified and protected in all of our modern institutions (Dworkin, 1981: 13).
She connects this power to the first tenet of male supremacist ideology. This ideology holds that it is men have this self that exists a priori and that women by definition must lack it (Dworkin, 1981: 13). Dworkin describes it as a parasite that takes what it wants before putting it in terms similar to Descartes’ by saying “I want and am entitled to have, therefore I am” (1981: 13). She continues with the metaphor of the parasite by saying that the male self takes self from all of those that it deems not worthy of self (Dworkin, 1981).
The second identified is that of physical strength. This physical strength is used over and against others less strong or those without the sanction to use strength as power (1981: 14). It is not simply enough to just to be physically strong what really matters is for it to be used over and above others with less of it (Dworkin, 1981: 14).
This leads into the second tenet of male supremacy. Men are physically stronger than women are and therefore should dominate them. She continues by explaining that in her view, any physical strength that a woman has that is not harnessed to do “women’s work” is seen as an abomination and its use against men is forbidden (Dworkin, 1981: 15). For her, it is not simply the reality of this physical strength that is important but rather the ideologies, which sacralise it. As an example of this Dworkin explains that men always pick weaker female partners and when raising girls, the girls are sabotaged to keep them weak (Dworkin, 1981: 15). As a final point, Dworkin notes that on the occasion that a woman obtains some sort of power, such as economic power, she is kept intentionally weak so that the power she obtains will still lie with men (Dworkin, 1981: 15).
The third power that Dworkin examines is the capacity to terrorise (Dworkin, 1981: 15). This is the power to use the a priori self and strength to terrorise others (Dworkin, 1981: 15). The acts of terror she refers to here are well-known, such as kidnapping, rape, war, and murder, as are the symbols of terror are equally well-
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known - the knife, the gun, the bomb, and the fist (Dworkin, 1981: 15).. Dworkin notes, however, that there is an important hidden symbol of terror, the penis, which is used to terrorise women i.e. rape (Dworkin, 1981: 15). In her reading, the acts and symbols fit together in all combinations, so that terror is the outstanding theme and consequence of male history and culture (Dworkin, 1981: 16). This is euphemised by being called glory or heroism. This terror is spread through legends that treat men as the carrier of values and women as mere “booty” to be accumulated (Dworkin, 1981: 16). In short, the third tenet of male supremacist ideology is that in a secular world without God, men are genetically predisposed to cause, terror and violence and that it is core to their existence (Dworkin, 1981: 16).
The fourth power that Dworkin discusses is that of the power of naming. Dworkin explains that this gives men the power to define experience, to articulate boundaries and values, to designate to each thing its realm and qualities, to determine what can and cannot be expressed (Dworkin, 1981: 17). In other words, it is the power to control perception itself (Dworkin, 1981: 17). For her, male supremacy is fused into language to such a degree that it heralds and affirms it with each sentence (Dworkin, 1981: 15). This, consequently, causes all feminist arguments to be implicit in the male system. This is because no transcendence of the male system can happen as long as males solely hold the power of naming (Dworkin, 1981: 17). This power is enforced via force and it gives males the power to exterminate those that are not allowed to name their own experiences by simply calling them evil (Dworkin, 1981: 18). Dworkin continues by claiming that men force women and everything else to conform to the names that they have been given, through force or coercion (Dworkin, 1981: 18). In sum, for Dworkin, the fourth tenet of male supremacy is that due to the fourth power, men are able to name things authentically and whatever contradicts or subverts this male naming is erased out of existence (Dworkin, 1981:18).
The fifth power that Dworkin identifies is that of ownership. This power is absolute even though sometimes throughout history it had been denied to some men (via slavery for example). Ownership, for Dworkin, is still firmly the domain of men rather than women. She provides examples to substantiate her point. She notes that to this day in some parts of the world, men own women and everything that comes from them, be it children, or labour (Dworkin, 1981: 19). She continues that even though in America in the previous 40 years, the letter of the law has changed to be more
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enlightened, its spirit is not as enlightened. This she continues can be seen in how pervasive marital rape and the beating of spouses is (Dworkin, 1981: 19). In short, the fifth tenet of male supremacy is that men own women and that any actions that they use, violent or otherwise, maintain or effect ownership over women are natural (Dworkin, 1981: 19) The power owning women is given to men by virtue of being an a priori self that takes and never gives (Dworkin, 1981: 19).
Dworkin’s sixth power is that of money. According to Dworkin, it is a supremely male power (Dworkin, 1981: 20). Money speaks, she says, but “in a male voice” (Dworkin, 1981: 20). She elucidates this by saying that in the hands of a woman money is literal, it can be counted out and things can be bought with it (Dworkin, 1981: 20). This is in contrast to how it works for men, where money not only can be used to buy things but it also buys women, prestige, sex, and dignity (Dworkin, 1981: 20). In other words, in the hands of men money does not simply buy, it brings with it qualities, achievements, honour and respect. At every economic level, the meaning of money is significantly different for men and women (Dworkin, 1981: 21). In sum, the sixth tenet of male supremacy is that money properly expresses masculinity. Dworkin explains that men keep money for themselves, before they then dole it out to women and children (Dworkin, 1981: 21). Men even own the market place by virtue of the fact that men earn more money than women do on average, for similar work (Dworkin, 1981: 21). Money has a sexual component; the male touch signifies economic dominance (Dworkin, 1981: 21). Money is primary in the acquisition of sex and sex is primary in the acquisition on money as can be seen in advertising. Dworkin ends by explaining that the sexual meaning of money is not only acted out but that it is also internalised and applied to the functioning of their internal organs (Dworkin, 1981: 21). Specifically Dworkin references how men hoard sperm as they hoard money (Dworkin, 1981: 22). This is seen in religions that prohibit the expenditure of sperm if it is not used for impregnating a woman (Dworkin, 1981: 22). This hoarding is what separates men form boys as boys expend sperm and money of women and men use their sperm and women to make money (Dworkin, 1981: 22).
The final power that Dworkin identifies is sex. Dworkin asserts that even though men often assert that women are the ones that have the all the sexual power, it is in fact men who have all the power (Dworkin, 1981: 22). They justify this stance by claiming that the erection is an involuntary action and that because of this power does not lie
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with them (Dworkin, 1981: 22). This leads them to believe that in this situation, the man is helpless and the woman is powerful (Dworkin, 1981: 22). Dworkin claims that this is contrary to the truth (Dworkin, 1981: 23). Dworkin asserts that sex is defined in action only by what the man does with his penis (Dworkin, 1981: 23). This is seen in the way that “fucking” requires the man to act upon the one with less power (Dworkin, 1981: 23) This is true and implicit to such a degree that the person being acted upon is seen as feminine even when they are not anatomically female (Dworkin, 1981: 24).
This leads to the seventh tenet of male supremacy. Sexual power authentically originates in the penis and that masculinity in action is broadly taking whatever they want (Dworkin, 1981: 24). She continues by explaining that the conceit of sexual power lying with the women is to allow men to avoid the consequences of their masculinity in action (Dworkin, 1981: 24).
After describing the seven male powers and tenets of male supremacist ideology Dworkin moves on to show the relation between power and pornography by calling attention to three pornographic depictions. The first depiction shows how male power being exercised over women in pornography is seen as normal and natural. The men exercising their power are shown as being revered and as perfectly justified in exercising their power (Dworkin, 1981: 25). The first depiction is photograph is captioned BEAVER HUNTERS (Dworkin, 1981: 25). In the photograph, two white men, dressed as hunters, sit in a black Jeep Dworkin, 1981: 25). Tied onto the hood of the black Jeep is a white woman. She is tied with thick rope and is spread-eagled (Dworkin, 1981: 25). In this depiction, the woman’s genitalia front and centre (Dworkin, 1981: 25). This depiction reinforces the notion that women are some sort of sexual conquest.
In the second piece, a woman is shown to be in power. In this case, the woman in power is depicted as being cruel, vindictive and hating men (Dworkin, 1981: 30). She takes the power of men and turns it on them, punishing them for their lack of masculinity in one way or another. In this case, power, when wielded by women is seen as an abomination (Dworkin, 1981: 34). Further, for Dworkin, this piece tries to show that the only thing that a powerful rebellious woman wants or needs is for a
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stronger and more powerful man to take the power from her through sex (Dworkin, 1981: 36).
Dworkin then also considers some homosexual pornographic depictions of pornography. She claims that even in this case when both participants are male there is still a masculine and feminine party along the lines of the one that has power and the one that has the power acted upon them (Dworkin, 1981: 42). Further, in instances when homosexual women are depicted, Dworkin asserts that they are depicted as dirty and depraved as they are away from masculine control (Dworkin, 1981: 42).
Dworkin’s idea of what pornography is and the above seven facets of male power and the seven tenets of male supremacy are important to understanding why pornography is harmful. The facets she discusses are features of the problematic nature of the power dynamic between men and women and this imbalance and abuse of power, for Dworkin is what leads to the harmful nature of pornography as she sees it.
For Dworkin, this power dynamic is amplified to a terrifying degree in pornography, especially when it is made into something desirable. Men dominating and debasing women is seen to be the norm in the kind of pornography that Dworkin describes and it seems to embody the worst aspects of male supremacy as Dworkin lays it out. As a result, her analysis is very successful in showing that the harm that pornography can cause is very real.
However, although her arguments are compelling, my view is that there is something important left out of her analysis. Specifically, she seems to ignore the possibility that something could be called pornography and yet not fall into the toxic power dynamic that was laid out above. I return to this in detail in the next chapter, where I will discuss the phenomenon of what is known as “Female Friendly” or “Feminist Friendly” pornography.
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d) Other Arguments Contrary to the above sets of arguments, in “Why Pornography Can’t Be Art”, Christy Mag Uidhir attempts to provide a value neutral argument for why pornography cannot be art. In other words, he is formulating an argument for why pornography cannot be art that makes no assumptions about essential value differences, such as morals and aesthetics. He explains that he is not attacking or defending the value based arguments but rather merely proposing a value neutral one (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 193).
He states that usually when making claims about whether something can be both art and pornography we are required to use what he refers to as “relatively robust” notions of art and pornography (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 193). This he claims can lead to problems (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 193). The problem is that if we use these notions then any argument made using them would be judged by these notions merits and demerits (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 193). Thus, he aims to argue for a value neutral exclusionary claim.
Mag Uidhir identifies what he sees as necessary conditions of something being art or pornography. He does so in order to achieve his aim of proving that they are mutually exclusive.
In its most basic form, his argument takes this structure:
1. If something is pornography then that something has the purpose of sexual arousal (of someone). 2. If something is pornography, then that something has the purpose of sexual arousal and that purpose is manner inspecific. 3. If something is art, then if that something has a purpose, then that purpose is manner specific. 4. If something is art, then if that something has a purpose of sexual arousal, then that purpose is manner inspecific. 5. A purpose cannot be both manner specific and manner inspecific. 6. Then, if something is pornography, then it is not art. (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 194)
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According to Mag Uidhir, a necessary condition for something to be considered pornography is it having the purpose of sexual arousal (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 195). Further, in his view, it is not simply the sexual arousal that needs to be present but that pornography needs to be designed to be sexually arousing. (ibid.)
He continues by noting that pornography need not be sexually explicit (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 195). This is because as he explains in certain kinds of fetish pornography there is no need for the content to be sexually explicit for it to cause arousal. What matters in the end, is that it causes sexual arousal (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 197).
He does note that he is not claiming that sexual arousal is pornography’s only purpose, or that any other purposes it may have are manner inspecific, but he is claiming that it is its primary purpose (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 197).
In my view, Mag Uidhir’s account of pornography is strong. This is because of the way he couches his argument in value neutral terms and so it is free of some of the difficulties that comes with normative definitions of pornography. The problem with normative definitions of pornography is that they bring with them a set of values that can colour any discussion with prejudgements.
Yet, his claim about pornography’s primary purpose is, in my view, based on an assumption. In some cases, for example in the case of professionally made pornography, sexual arousal would not be the primary purpose of creating pornography. I draw upon the work of Mari Mikkola who argues that sexual arousal may not be the primary purpose of pornography or sexual arousal may have another purpose (2013, 32). Mikkola would argue that in some cases earning money would be the primary purpose for the creation of pornography (2013, 32). What is meant by this is that while most consumers of professionally made pornography use it for sexual arousal. It would be wrong to assume that then this would be the ultimate aim of the pornography industry. It like any other business is run for profit and because of that; I contend that it has dual aims, to create sexually arousing pornographic artefacts and to make money. Secondly Mikkola would also argue that in some cases the sexual arousal may be in service of another purpose, for example in cases of works of protest (Mikkola: 2013, 32). What this means is that in some cases the sexual arousal or sexual explicitness of a work may function to protest a specific
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figure. An example of this is The Spear by Brett Murray (2010) [Figure 2] that was created in protest of the former President of South Africa Jacob Zuma.
As for art, he is not claiming that art has a purpose but rather that if it does have a purpose, that this purpose would be manner specific (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 194).
What he means by a purpose being manner specific is that, the purpose has to be achieved only with a specific action and manner (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 195). In other words if a piece of art does have a purpose, then for that something to be a piece of art that purpose has to be realised in a specific action and manner. So for example, an artist creates a piece of art whose purpose is to create awareness of an issue. For Mag Uidhir this piece would only be successful as art if that purpose were to be realised in a specific manner and action that was port of the artist’s design. Carrying on with the above example that would mean that the artwork would only be successful if it created awareness in a specific manner due to artist’s specific actions.
Two things about Mag Uidhir’s account of art in this context merit highlighting in my view. First, I argue that there are forms of art that would not fit Mag Uidhir’s criteria of manner specificity. If we look at the phenomenon of Aleatory artworks, that is to say artworks that incorporates random chance in the manner of its creation. It can also involve the audience or the performer choice in how it is played (Cycleback, 2013: 113). This leaves the finished result out of the artist’s hands (Cycleback, 2013: 113). An example of this can be seen in the work of novelist William S. Burroughs who heavily incorporated chance in the creation of some his work. Burroughs used what is called the cut-up technique. What this entails is pages of text being cut up and randomly stitched together sometimes including text from other authors (Cycleback, 2013: 114). This was though to give the text a surreal meaning and narrative (Cycleback, 2013: 114). I believe that these pieces of work are examples of artworks that run contrary to Mag Uidhir’s position. This is because in incorporating chance into the creation it is hard to argue that there was a specific manner and action with which its intended purpose was achieved, whatever that purpose was.
Lastly, Mag Uidhir also assumes that both art and pornography have intentional components, that is to say that they are intention–dependant and that therefore any talk of purpose is referring to the intended purpose (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 195). What he
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means is that both art and pornography both have intentional components to them and that any talk of their intent is to talk about their intended purpose. It is not simply that art and pornography have or serve some kind of purpose but that, that purpose is intentional. It my contention that there are examples of pornography and art, that run contrary to that. Let us assume as Mag Uidhir does that pornography has the purpose of sexual arousal, there is nothing about his argument that necessitates that this sexual arousal has to be designed. Some curious examples of this are certain innocuous artefacts that may cause sexual arousal someone who will use it like pornography even if it was not necessarily designed to be so. What I mean by this is that for certain people who have paraphilia for something as innocuous as shoes. This person may derive sexual arousal and release from pictures of shoes. These pictures even though they were not created for the express purpose of being pornography could be used as such. It is my contention that this would then create a scenario where something without the intended purpose of being pornography found itself being used as such.
Another example can be seen in cases of anti-art. Anti-art generally put is a label that can be applied to works, concepts and attitudes that challenge what it means to be art (Graver, 1995: 7 - 8). While it has primarily been associated to the Dadaism, it has also been associated with Surrealism, Fluxus, Conceptual Art and the Russian Avant-Garde (Graver, 1995: 7 - 8). The term is generally considered to have been coined by Marcel Duchamp in regards to his readymade (Humble, 2002: 246). These works were in response to the question of whether there are works that are not art (Humble, 2002: 246). It is contentious as to whether anti-art is art or not. Some deny that their work is art at all; one example is Henry Flynt who states:
perhaps it would be better to restrict `art' to apply to art for the emotions, and recognize my activity as an independent, new activity, irrelevant to art (and knowledge). (1961).
What Flynt means is that he does not consider the work that he produces as artwork, even though he is associated with the movement of Conceptual Art (1961). This alone is not enough to prove a contradiction in Mag Uidhir’s notion that art is intention dependant. What I believe causes this contradiction is the fact that Anti-art and its associated movements have come to be considered art and in cases part of
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the mainstream. For example, Duchamp’s readymades have now become part of contemporary art-school theory (Humble, 2002: 246). This to me shows that we can have works of art that never had the intended purpose of being art at all. Many works of anti-art were created with the intention of not being art and were considered as being irrelevant to art as in the case of Flynt (1961). What this means for Mag Uidhir’s argument is that these examples show that there are examples of art and artists that violate Mag Uidhir’s condition of intended purpose.
It is my contention that the above examples show that Mag Uidhir is mistaken in stipulating that all art and pornography have intentional components and therefore are intention dependant. These above examples show clear cases of pornography and art were the intended-purpose is at odds with them being cases of art or pornography
Mag Uidhir admits that while the term “pornographic art” is meaningful, it does not necessarily entail any overlap between art and pornography. This is because what is being referred to is art with “pornographic” merely being a descriptor in this case. (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 200). He claims that just because a piece of art may have content that could also be considered pornographic does not mean that it is both pornography and art. Rather, he claims that it is simply art that is co-located with pornography, but that it is simply art in the end (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 200).
Here again I feel that Mag Uidhir is mistaken. “Pornographic Art” in his context is a piece of art that displays all the characteristics of pornography, while still displaying characteristics of being art. I would argue that in this case the said piece would be something that fulfil the criteria of art of pornography and should therefore be an example of a piece that is both. In my view, it cannot be said to be “art that is co- located with pornography”.
In sum, while Mag Uidhir’s argument is one that is free from much of the difficulties that come with most value laden arguments. I do not find it strong enough to convince me of his stance. In addition to the arguments, I have provided above, even if we accept the premises that art is manner specific and pornography is manner inspecific. There is no reason why manners and purposes could not overlap. What I mean by this is that if we accept that for something to be art it has fulfil its purpose as being manner specific, if both the conditions of manner and action were met in
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fulfilling that purpose, there is nothing that shows that the conditions of manner and action would overlap with that of pornography.
There are examples of this already, in the case of some of the works of Robert Mapplethorpe and Andy Warhol, both who had work that blurred the lines between pornography and art. In the case of Mapplethorpe we can see it in many of his sexually explicit photographs such as the ones he took of Lydia Cheng (1987) [Figure 8] and Derrick Cross (1983) [Figure 7]. These two sexually explicit photos depict Derrick Cross and Lydia Cheng posing naked. While these images are clearly erotic in nature there is attention paid to form and composition. I believe that these photos evoke comparisons to the classical nudes of the Ancient Greeks and Renaissance. The models in these photographs look statuesque, the lighting and the framing emphasizing the ideal form of each models body.
Figure 7: Derrick Cross by Robert Mapplethorpe, 1983
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Figure 8: Lydia Cheng by Robert Mapplethorpe, 1987
In the case of Andy Warhol we have to look no further than a series of his works which are known as torsos and sex parts (1977) [Figure 9], which was a series of photographs and screen prints of the torsos and sexual organs of anonymous male and female models. According to The Warhol, museum classical nudes and erotic art that was produced throughout history inspired this series of photographs. The works of both these artists are in my view, examples of art works that could be sexual arousing and yet had a purpose that was specific to the manner and action in which they were created. What I mean by this is that it is my contention is that purposes of these works were meant to evoke the classical nude. This was achieved due to the careful attention paid to the form, framing, composition, lighting and poses of the models. These are all intentional components that work towards fulfilling that purpose.
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Figure 9: Torsos and Sex Parts by Andy Warhol, (1977). At the same time, all of these works of are incredibly erotic and the specific manner in which they were created only serve to enhance them. I contend that these are examples of artworks that succeed as art according to Mag Uidhir’s criteria of manner specificity. They can also be considered as they images that were meant to cause sexual arousal and succeed in a manner inspecific way, which satisfies Mag Uidhir’s conditions for something to be pornography. Thus, it is my contention that these examples are enough to contradict Mag Uidhir’s claim that there cannot be instances of art that blur the line with pornography.
In this section, I argued that Mag Uidhir’s arguments are not strong enough to support his claim. I argued that the notion of Aleatory art provides examples of artworks that contradict his intuition that art is manner specific. I also provided examples of pornography that did not have the intended purpose of being pornography. I also showed by way of anti-art that there exist works of art that were never intended to be art that are still considered art. Finally, I argued that there are in fact examples of art that purposefully blur the line between art and pornography.
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Conclusion
In concluding this chapter, we have come one step closer to investigating whether or not some pornography can be considered art. I believe that we examined the arguments against as thoroughly as possible.
In the first category of Artistic Qualities, I examined the arguments that asserted that pornography is inherently missing the artistic qualities of originality, beauty and uniqueness and found that the arguments are not strong enough to support the conclusion. The first of the arguments examined claimed that pornography is too formulaic and lacks originality. Nabokov (2006) expanded upon the aforementioned argument by stating that it is this formulaic nature that causes pornography to be unable to be appreciated aesthetically because it forgoes the formal structures of art in order to satisfy the need to sexually arouse the audience. I argued that Nabokov poorly justified his intuitions about pornography. I drew upon the work of Kieran (2001) to show that formulaic features can be used to create aesthetic enjoyment for the audience using the example of John Ford’s movie The Searchers (1956). Further, I showed that in some cases, formulaicness is a part of art movements to a certain degree and yet they allow for aesthetic enjoyment. The second complaint was that pornography is mass-produced and treated as a commodity. I found this position to be untenable as there are concrete examples of works of art being mass- produced and commoditised. The first being the kind of art produced for the masses that can be found for sale in department stores or hanging on the walls of hotels. A second example of this is some of the work of Damien Hirst. His work has been described as having been created on a production line and as if he employed factory workers. It is for this reason that I do not these arguments to be strong enough to convince me that there are some aesthetic qualities are what divide art from pornography.
In examining the category of Representational Content, I looked at work of Bovens and Levinson. Bovens argued that pornography pornography is too immediate and graphic in nature to allow us to connect with the subject of the work as art does. Bovens followed this up by arguing that pornography provides a distorted view of sex and does not allow the viewer to connect with the subject. Finally, he also argues
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that pornography creates a sense of emptiness due the graphic nature of it hiding something special. I did not find these arguments convincing as Bovens does not explain what it is about the immediate and graphic nature of pornography that stops viewers from connecting with subject. While I agreed that, some pornography can create a distorted view of sex that is not enough to make the strong claim that all pornography provides this distorted view and in fact, there are examples to the contrary. I also argued that Bovens’ criteria of needing to connect with the subject, is problematic. This is because there are cases in abstract art where we cannot hope to connect with the subject of the artwork. Further, there are cases of artworks depicting horrible scenes and again it would be hard to argue that we can connect with the subject. Finally, Bovens was vague in regards to what that something special is that is hidden by pornography’s graphicness. This was followed up Levinson’s argument. In his argument, Levinson argues that erotic art and pornography have different aims. These different aims are what cause their incompatibility. This is because the differences in aim to change the way these works represent the subject. I did not find Levinson’s argument very convincing. I do not believe that he does a thorough enough job of justifying the assumptions that he bases his argument on and goes on to make too strong of a claim, but a more thorough response to his argument will be in the next chapter when I discuss the arguments for pornography as art.
After that, I examined the positions of Autonism and Moralism as Moralism is an assumption that underpins feminist and ethical concerns about pornography being inherently morally wrong and therefore is not capable of being art. I drew upon the work of Dworkin who draws upon the power relations between men and women and the seven powers that men hold over women. She argues that these powers inform what she claims is pornography’s view of women. Dworkin draws on the etymological root of the word pornography to show that it has always had a negative attitude towards women to support her criticism of it. While I found her explanation of the power imbalance between men and women compelling, I feel that she did not do a thorough job of showing how that dynamic is inherent in all pornography
Finally, I was examining the arguments that do not fit within the other three categories. The only argument here was Mag Uidhir’s value neutral approach. I argued that Mag Uidhir’s arguments are not strong enough to support his claim that
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pornography cannot be art. I argued that the notion of Aleatory art provides examples of artworks that contradict his assumption that art is manner specific. I also provided examples of pornography that did not have the intended purpose of being pornography. I also showed by way of anti-art that there exist works of art that were never intended to be art but which are still considered so. Finally, I argued that there are in fact examples of art that purposefully blur the line between art and pornography.
This leads me to the next section in which I examine arguments that are for the possibility of some pornography being able to be art. The same four categories will be used to separate the arguments.
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Chapter 2: Fifty Shades of Yea: Arguments for Pornography as Art
Introduction
In this chapter, I present and discuss some of the arguments that can be given for the possibility of something being both art and pornography. I order my enquiry using the same four categories that were previously discussed in the previous chapter where I weighed up the strength of the arguments against the possibility of a work being both art and pornography. I begin by using Michael Newall’s examination of Georges Bataille’s Story of the Eye (1928); to show that some pornography possesses its own set of aesthetic qualities that can be used for artistic purpose. I then use David Davies response to Levinson’s argument in a previous chapter. I will again tackle Dworkin’s stance on pornography, using the work of bell hooks, Judith Butler and Brandon Cooke. Finally, I will look at Maes’ and Vasilakis response to Mag Uidhir.
The Arguments Considered
a) Artistic Qualities The first set of arguments I discuss are those that refer to the artistic qualities that are claimed to be absent from pornography as a whole. Hans Maes (2012: 25) provides a counterargument to such positions by means of a discussion of the film All About Anna (Nilsson, 2005). As Maes points out, this work are part of the growing trend of what is referred to as female friendly or feminist pornography and is far from being formulaic as it feature original and imaginative scenarios which feature lifelike characters in realistic situations (Maes, 2012: 25).
It is my contention that some pornography possesses its own set of aesthetic qualities that can be used for a broader aesthetic purpose and that can be seen to be found in uncontroversial works of art as well. By uncontroversial I simply mean that the status of these artefacts as art is generally accepted and that there is no ongoing debate about the status of these artworks. This I will achieve with reference
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to the way that they are used in Georges Bataille’s Story of the Eye (1928). Before I do so, there are some important terms to first clarify.
In order to show that pornography has its own set of aesthetic qualities, I consider three aesthetic affects that are often found in both transgressive and normal pornography drawing upon the work of Michael Newall (2012, 206-229). These, it is important to note, are not always intentional when found in “normal” pornography, but are often intentional in the case of transgressive pornography (Newall 2012, 206- 229). The three aesthetic affects are disgust, humour and awe. Before examining how these can be used for broader artistic purpose, it is important to understand how each of these effects are used.
Disgust according to Newall can accidentally occur in more conventional pornography, when the pornographer somehow manages to unintentionally fail to arouse the viewer (2012, 208). In transgressive pornography on the other hand, disgust can be courted intentionally. The work of Marquis de Sade is a prime example, The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom (2005). In the section where the 150 complex passions are described, specifically in passion 72 wherein “A man cuts up a Host with a knife and shoves the crumbs up his ass”. (Sade 2005: ii. 241) could cause disgust for two possible reasons. Disgust may be just be evidence of different taste, or it may be something his readers need to overcome so that they may explore even if it is only in the realm of imagination the full spectrum of transgressive sexual possibilities (2012, 209).
Humour according to Newall is another possible occurrence when sexual arousal is failed to be achieved by a chosen work (2012, 210). It can be brought about in the case of transgressive pornography due to the ornately implausible sex acts that pornographers depict, striking the viewer as ridiculous (2012, 210). It is also very possible that these are achieved as a calculated affect. Raymond Queneau’s We Always Treat Women Too Well (1981) manages to achieve this in the outright ridiculous and incongruous sex acts that it depicts. For example in one scene a character is interrupted mid sex by a bullet decapitating him (Queneau 1981: 122). While this can seem horrifying at first, the incongruity of the scene could plausibly make the reader laugh.
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Newall regards awe and the sublime as being closely related and so sees no pressing phenomenological reason to distinguish between the two (Newall 2012, 211). Unlike the previous affects, which are more apparent and are often immediately recognisable as responses to transgressive pornography, awe is not always immediately recognisable as a response. In fact, Newall asserts that it requires more of an explanation in order to fully understand it (Newall 2012, 211). For him, awe occurs on reflection of a specific piece, since these pieces tend to give space over to such a reflection and in fact encourage it in the viewer/consumer (2012, 212). Newall concludes that this is because in transgressive pornography tends to hold authority figures, moral law, religion in contempt objects of awe for (2012, 212).
How do these affects work in the context of Bataille’s “Story of the Eye” as Newall (2012) explains it? In Newall’s (2012) analysis, each of the qualities, have a certain link to Bataille’s idea of being. Bataille arguably saw transgressive sexuality, disgust and laughter as different manifestations of what he sometimes calls simply ‘being’ (2012, 218-220). According to Newall, being in this case is primal and animal, but becomes focused and intensified in the act of breaking with social, religious or moral norms (2012, 220). What Newall is trying to do in his analysis of Bataille is to show how these transgressive affects can be brought together for the purpose of artistic meaning. He does this in three parts by placing Baitalle’s concept of being in the centre of his examination of the instances of disgust, laughter and awe in The Story of the Eye (1928).
As Newall explains, disgust in The Story of the Eye (1928) provokes and creates a visceral self-awareness (2012, 219). To be disgusted is to feel your body and mind be utterly repulsed by another object and in this moment an intense awareness of being is felt (Newall, 2012, 220). A lot of the disgust in “The Story of the Eye” comes from the incredibly descriptive, transgressive sexual acts that the protagonists of the story take part in. These acts involve bodily fluids such as urine and the insertion of ovular objects into orifices; these objects are a metaphor for eyes and as well violence and death in the course of intercourse.
Newall further explains that laughter in the case of “Story of the Eye” provokes a pleasurable awareness of the self in revolt of the norms that restrict it (Newall, 2012,
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220). The laughter is often seen when the characters are partaking in the abovementioned acts. The characters are depicted as laughing joyously in the presence of disgust and death,
Newall’s (2012) conclusion is that Bataille in “The Story of the Eye” tries uses the effects of disgust and laughter in such an extravagant way to ensure the most comprehensive realisation of his idea of being.
Finally, although awe is not made explicit in Bataille’s work, Newall (2012) argues that its presence can be arguably felt in that Bataille’s transgressive sexuality can inspire a sense of terrible awe in the self-reflective way as was described above. This is despite the fact that it is not made explicit in the work itself or in the thematic writings of Bataille (Newall, 2012, 223).
In light of his examination The Story of the Eye (1928) using the three above mentioned transgressive effects. I contend that Newall was in fact able to show that these three affects deserve to be considered aesthetic qualities. I assert that this is because he is successful in showing that disgust; laughter and awe were used for a greater artistic purpose. This purpose was to expose and highlight Bataille’s concept of being.
If we take Newall’s analysis as correct, then I argue that pornography can be seen to have its own set of transgressive aesthetic qualities that can be used for a broader artistic purpose. This is because one could argue that pornography could function in the way that Bataille’s The Story of the Eye used a set of transgressive aesthetic qualities to provoke and create awareness of his idea of being. It seems to me that it could be possible to show that some pornography has certain aesthetic qualities that are also used in art, and so that there can be an overlap between the categories of art and pornography in terms of these qualities. To demonstrate my point, I consider certain pieces of uncontroversial art that make use of some of these qualities. Again, by uncontroversial I simply mean that the status of these artefacts as art is generally accepted and that there is no ongoing debate about the status of these artworks. The first example I consider is the depiction of Hell in the right panel of the triptych titled The Garden of Earthly Delights (1510) [Figure 9] by the artist Hieronymus Bosch. In this panel of the triptych, we are treated to a depiction of what awaits those who are believed to go to hell. This panel depicts all manner of torture and violence
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inflicted upon the bodies of those there. It seems reasonable to claim that these depictions would elicit disgust in the viewer. This is arguably intentional and can be seen to serve a broader artistic purpose in that the triptych in its entirety can be seen to be a didactic warning against transgressing the norms of Christianity as it depicts what will befall those who do.
Figure 10: The Garden of Earthly Delights by Hieronymus Bosch, (1510).
The second example I consider is the painting Saturn Devouring His Son (1819– 1823) [Figure 3] by artist Francisco Goya. In this painting we are shown a scene from the Romanised version of the Ancient Greek creation myth in which Saturn, fearing that his children would overthrow him, decides to consume each of them on birth. Here again we have the aesthetic quality of disgust being depicted in a work of art. It is my contention that these two examples show how the transgressive aesthetic affects are being used in art for greater artistic purpose. The disgust and awe that we experience when viewing these works serve to enhance them. It is my contention that this shows that there are aesthetic qualities that are shared between art and certain kinds of pornography. This is problematic for arguments against area and pornography being compatible as it shows that some pornography does not in fact lack aesthetic qualities.
In sum, I drew upon the work of Newall to show that that transgressive pornography possesses its own set of aesthetic affects, namely; disgust, humour and awe. I referenced Georges Bataille’s Story of the Eye (1928), Raymond Queneau’s We
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Always Treat Women Too Well (1981) and Marquis de Sade’s The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom (2005) as examples of transgressive pornography that includes these. I argue that these affects are evidence that pornography has its own set of aesthetic qualities. This is because since these affects are being used in artistic works there is some overlap to be found in the qualities of art and pornography.
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b) Representational Content Now that the arguments about Aesthetic qualities have been dealt with, it is time to move on to those that deal with representational content. In short, the arguments against the possibility of pornography also being art from a representational standpoint tend to focus on idea that what pornography represents in its depictions is fundamentally different to what art depicts.
My aim here is to discuss a response to Levinson’s objections to the possibility of something being both art and pornography that have been described in the previous chapter.
David Davies in his paper titled “Pornography, Art, and the Intended Response of the Receiver” responds to Levinson’s argument that art is incompatible with pornography. The crux of Levinson’s argument revolves around the reception that erotic art and pornography aim for. A further concern is the manner in which the reception is achieved. For Levinson the reception that erotic art aims for is sexual stimulation but not release. This is contrasted with pornography, which aims for sexual arousal, and eventual release, which for Levinson is antithetical to art
In response to Levinson’s argument, Davies draws upon the category of religious art, to argue that pornographic art may function in a similar way. Specifically how an artefact whose purpose is not primarily artistic in nature, can meet Levinson’s criteria that bar pornography and art from being compatible.
Davies simply outlines the key assumptions in Levinson’s argument against the possibility of the existence of pornographic art as:
These assumptions, we may recall, are that (a) what is definitive of pornography is a particular kind of intended response and (b) what is at least necessary for art is an intended L-artistic interest (2012: 66).
What this means is that pornography calls for a certain kind of response to its representation and that this makes it incompatible with art is that art demands what Davies calls an L-artistic interest. Thus, before we continue we must describe what an L-artistic interest is. Davies simply uses the term L-artistic interest as shorthand for the somewhat artistic interest that Levinson argues art is designed to evoke
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(2012: 63). This artistic interest is simply an interest in art for its own sake as art regardless of whatever other functions it may have (Davies, 2012: 80).
Davies argues that there is room for a notion of pornographic art even if we were to accept Levinson’s assumptions as stated above.
Davies overall argument is that pornographic art, is no more problematic than other categories of artworks that are defined in terms of a non-artistic primary intended function (Davies, 2012: 78).
For Davies there is two criteria that must be met for us to have pornographic art, these are:
(1) we have a representation with primary pornographic intent whose focus of pornographic interest is articulated in a ‘Goodmanian’ manner requiring an artistic regard, and
(2) there is a further intention that the representation be appreciable in virtue of this fact—an intention that we take an L-artistic interest in the representation (Davies, 2012: 78).
The first criterion that must be met involves the idea the artefact must have a primary pornographic intent that is conveyed in manner that requires a certain kind of artistic regard. It is also required that this intent in conveyed in a ‘Goodmanian’ manner. What this means is that for something to be articulated in a ‘Goodmanian’ manner is that it has to be articulated in such a way. That it allows us to take an interrogative interest in the way that all of its elements of the work assemble to highlight the artistic or in this case pornographic vehicle (Davies, 2012: 71).
The second criterion that must be met is that there must be intention that we can take and L-artistic interest in the representation. Which simple means that there must be the intention that the representation be regarded for its own sake regardless of the function of the piece (Davies, 2012: 78).
Davies claims that if both of these conditions are met then we would have something that would be an artwork in virtue of the way that it represents its content and its intended artistic interest It would also be pornographic art by referencing its non- artistic intended purpose (Davies, 2012: 78).
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There are two key assumptions that Davies’s argument is based on. The first is that there are artworks (specifically non-representational ones) that call for a particular kind of regard (Davies, 2012: 67). Therefore, we cannot understand and define this piece purely in term of L-artistic interest and thus we need to regard artworks in the abovementioned ‘Goodmanian’ manner (Davies, 2012: 68). The second assumption is that Levinson’s suggestion that the only way something can be pornographic art is if we can appreciate it as pornography and art at the same time is inconsistent with way that we deal with representations that have non-artistic primary intended function (Davies, 2012: 75). He brings the example of the religious images produced by Renaissance artists. For Davies these images are not simple religious due to the subject matter but due to the fact that their primary purpose was to stimulate religious reflection (Davies, 2012: 76). Davies continues by arguing that even in the case of more conventional artwork, we cannot respond aesthetically and emotionally to a work in the way that the artist intended, and take an L-artistic interest in it.
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c) Feminist and Ethical Concerns Now that the arguments that deal with and respond to the Artistic qualities and the Representational content have been dealt with, it is time to deal with those arguments that deal with and respond to the Ethical and Feminist concerns.
As I explained in the previous chapter, the Ethical and Feminist arguments aim to show that pornography is always inherently morally wrong and therefor there cannot be instances of something being both pornography and art. It is important to note that this seems to be based on an underlying assumption – that the only thing worth considering when judging the worth and status of an artwork is the moral content of the work. This attitude can be seen to be held by both Plato (2008) and Tolstoy (1904) who argue that the only good kind of art is, that which promotes moral goodness. Further, both theorists argue that questions of beauty and other aesthetic values are unimportant.
This underlying assumption is problematic as there are a myriad of examples of artworks that depict immoral scenes. Examples of which have already been seen in this paper. Sun Yuan’s and Peng Yu’s installation Dogs That Cannot Touch Each Other (2003) [Figure 10] is a prime example. In this piece several dogs, which were reportedly fighting dogs, have been placed on treadmill facing each other as they struggle and strain to attack each other. I argued that if we examine this from the view of animal ethics this piece is clearly depicting something immoral. Due to the way, it is treating these animals not as subject that can feel but rather as objects for the manipulation of artists.
In addition to the difficulties I have identified with the assumption I think underlies ethical and feminist arguments in general, I now focus on refuting what I feel is the explicit part of the arguments. In other words, I will be attempting to refute the various given reasons as for why pornography is inherently morally wrong, and so at least some instances of it cannot be art. I respond to what I identify as the most significant points in Andrea Dworkin’s (1981) position on pornography that was introduced in the previous chapter. I show that at least two of her claims are problematic by drawing upon the work of Judith Butler and bell hooks. I will also examine Brandon Cooke’s arguments on the nature of pornography as a form of fiction. He uses this to argue against the assumption that pornography presents the
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situation being depicted as a fact or that the author of pornography is making actual assertions about actually existing things. He also argues against the assumption that pornography is by its very nature exploitative, towards those appearing in it and those who consume it. I draw upon this to show that Dworkin’s claims about exploitation being at the core of pornography
As was explained in the previous chapter, according to Dworkin there is a strong link between power and pornography.
The first of these characteristics is the power of assertion of self (Dworkin, 1981: 13). The second power is that of physical strength used over and against others less strong or without the sanction to use strength as power (Dworkin, 1981: 14). The third power that Dworkin examines is the capacity to terrorise, that is to say it is the power to use self and strength to terrorise others (Dworkin, 1981: 15). The fourth power that Dworkin identifies is the power of naming (1981: 17). Dworkin explains that this gives men the power to define experience; to articulate boundaries and values; to designate to each thing its realm and qualities; to determine what can and cannot be expressed. In other words, it is the power to control perception itself (1981: 17). The fifth power is that of ownership (1981: 19). The sixth power is that of money (1981: 20. The final power is that of sex (1981: 22)
After describing the seven characteristics of male power, Dworkin argues that there is a relation between power and pornography. She first calls on two examples of heterosexual pornography. The first shows a woman as being treated as if she was a sexual trophy (Dworkin, 1981: 25). The second example shows how in pornography men view women having power as some sort of abomination and that all a powerful woman needs is a man to show her, her place (Dworkin, 1981: 30 -36). Finally, she calls on an example of homosexual pornography. She does this show that even in homosexual pornography the submissive male is viewed as feminine whereas the dominant one is viewed as masculine (Dworkin, 1981: 42).
In my view, Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (2006).provides a challenge to Dworkin’s position. In the opening chapter, “Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire”, Butler argues against a notion that she claims is often at the core of feminist theory: the idea that there is a singular identity and subject that requires representation in politics and language; “woman” (2006: 1).
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Butler’s view is that the idea of “women” and “woman” as a singular subject and identity is problematic in that these ideas are composed of many different facets of identity, such as race, ethnicity, class, and sexuality. These facets of identity combine and intersect with each other in such a varied way that it would be nigh impossible to find a single form of representation in politics and language that would fit these various multifaceted identities. (2006: 2).
Butler’s assertion of intersectionality is relevant here because her claim that there is no single identity or subject that can be labelled as “woman”, can also be applied to the label “man”. The label “man” is constructed out of the same facets of identity that “woman” is made of – race, ethnicity, class, and sexuality for example. If we accept that if there is no singular “man” identity or subject that can represented in the same way that there is no singular “woman” identity or subject, then Dworkin’s explanation of the imbalance of the power relations that occur between men and women can be called into question as being overly simplistic. My aim here is not to argue against the notion that there is a tension or struggle in terms of the power dynamics of gender (and this is certainly easily demonstrated when one considers the history of the disempowerment of women all over the world), but simply to show that Dworkin’s assertions are not as clear-cut as she would like them to be. If I am right that her understanding of power is presented too strongly, and that because the identity of woman (and man) are better understood in terms of intersectionality, then it is, I think, possible to argue that her stand on the moral deficiency of pornography is also too strong.
As I explained in the previous chapter, Dworkin claims that pornography does not mean merely “writing about sex”. “depictions of the erotic”, “depictions of nude bodies” or “sexual representations. For Dworkin it means the graphic depiction of women as “vile whores” (1981: 199).
Dworkin asserts that pornography has no other meaning than the one she has given.
A position that is contrary to that of Dworkin can be found in the work of bell hooks, especially her chapter titled “Selling Hot Pussy: Representation of Black Female Sexuality in the Cultural Marketplace” (2003). In this chapter, hooks primarily talks about how the black female body tends to be distorted and represented by contemporary society, with an emphasis on popular culture and the media. She
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points out how black female entertainers have had to market themselves by overemphasising their sexuality, often with references to slavery (hooks 2003: 112,122).This she claims is in contrast to white female entertainers who do not have to sexualise themselves at all or even when they do, to the same degree (ibid.).
hooks notes that despite this, there are a number of filmmakers trying to represent black female sexuality in a different light (2003: 126). These filmmakers try to create representations of black female sexuality being reclaimed. This for hooks is not enough; since in her view, it is not enough to try simply reclaiming black female representations of sexuality as they fit within the current system, but rather for them to explore issues of black female sexuality in a way that disrupts conventional representations of it (hooks 2003: 127). She concludes that it is not simply enough for there to representations of black females reclaiming their sexuality in various ways but what is important is for there to be sexual agency and for black females to be represented as a sexual subject and not an object (2003: 128). For hooks:
[w]hen black women relate to our bodies, our sexuality, in ways that place erotic recognition, desire, pleasure, and fulfilment at the center of our efforts to create radical black female subjectivity, we can make new and different representations of ourselves as sexual subjects (2003: 128).
While hooks is primarily talking about the representation of black female sexuality in contemporary society, that the points she raises this can still apply to broader concern that Dworkin seems to raise in her pieces about pornography - the objectification of women as they are depicted in the majority of pornographic material. This would initially seem to Dworkin’s overall argument about pornography. Where it differs is that hooks’ allows for a way forward, a way to fix representation hooks’ work is a call for the taking back of black female sexuality, and she identifies two ideals, which are needed to make that task successful: sexual agency and sexual subjectivity.
What is important about hook’s work in light of my argument is that it does not condemn depictions of sexuality outright, as it seems Dworkin does but rather provides suggestions in which these depictions can be “taken back”. She demands
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that these depictions be better and focus on the sexual agency and sexual subjectivity of women themselves.
As I show in what follows, there are in fact examples of pornography that represent women as having sexual agency and sexual subjectivity. If I am right, then the existence of these examples of pornography weakens Dworkin’s assertion that all pornography is harmful in its creation and consumption.
“Feminist friendly” or “Female Friendly” pornography can be used to show specific examples of women taking back their sexual subjectivity and agency. Specifically the collective known as Puzzy Power has laid out in their manifesto a declaration of intent to continue making movies (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998.). Their aim in making these movies is, in their own words
we intend to produce a series of films that present sensuality (or sexually explicit material, if you like) in a way that appeals to women. To serve this end, a group of women have drawn up a statement (see below) on what women would like to see and what they would not like to see in sensual/pornographic movies. This statement is intended to be the “dogma” for Puzzy Power’s productions. (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998.)
This manifesto’s dedication of sexual agency and sexual subjectivity I contend undermine Dworkin’s definition of pornography. Those two ideals contradict her definition of pornography as being depiction of what she called “Porneia”. The guidelines outlined in the manifesto reinforce the ideals of agency and subjectivity. They have guidelines on plot, eroticism, visual style, setting and humour.
In regards to plot, the manifesto asserts that all of their movies must have coherent plots (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998). What they mean by this is that a coherent plot must be present, where scenes flow from one moment to the next in a logical chain of events. This is so that the characters become relatable like actual people (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998.). This is in opposition to typical pornography that has none. These plots must still be primarily about something erotic, while there can be non-erotic components it must not distract from the eroticism. (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998.).
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In regards to eroticism, the manifesto demands “feelings, passions, sensuality, intimacy, and the lead-up must be emphasised” (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998.). They contend that the senses must be aroused so that there is a focus on woman’s pleasure and desire (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998.). Anticipation and build up are also of paramount import, making use of titillation, distance and closeness to achieve it (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998.).
On visual style, they declare that the beauty of the body both female and male should be at the forefront (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998.). These bodies must be shown caressing the body in erotic detail; this erotic detail need not lie primarily with the genitalia (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998.).
The setting is not of paramount import, the manifesto asserts that time and place are not crucial; the only thing at matters for them is what actually happens in the movie (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998.).
Finally, they allow humour to be a part of the movies as long as the sexual act itself is not poked at (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998.).
These values are manifest in their movies "Constance" and "Pink Prison" for which these guidelines were developed (“Puzzy Power - The Manifesto,” 1998.).
There are other places where assumptions in Dworkin’s work can be challenged. I focus on only two of these. The first is the assumption that pornography presents the situation depicted as fact or that the author of pornography is making actual assertions about actually existing things. The second assumption is that pornography by its very nature is exploitative both towards those who are appearing in such works and to those who are consuming it. My aim here is to show that both of these ethical assumptions/arguments about pornography are false by using the work of Brandon Cooke (2012).
The first assumption can be seen to be caused by forgetting that pornography is also fiction. According to Cooke, the status of pornography as fiction has a bearing on its proper ethical evaluation (2012: 232).
Cooke states that fiction can be standardly characterised as making use of images, language or some other sort of representational medium to invite the audience to
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imagine that certain things are the case (2012: 232). Fiction also tends to always hold the convention that what is being depicted in not in fact being documented. (2012: 232). This can be seen in the concept of “fictive report” which I understand as the convention that to author a work of fiction is not to making actual assertions about actually existing things (2012: 232).
Those who do not acknowledge this distinction imply that pornography requires non- fictional presuppositional beliefs for making sense of the story within pornographic fiction (Cooke, 2012: 234). They then attempt to argue that because this presuppositional knowledge is necessary that pornographic fiction is genuinely trying to make actual assertions about the world in regards to what is being depicted (2012: 234).
Just from the fact that a situation is being depicted by fiction, either that the base level of the story or at the higher thematic level, it does not follow that the work of fiction or its authors are making assertions about the actual world no matter how similar to real world events so to speak (2012: 234). This is the distinction between depiction and documentation. This is further strengthened by the fact that we do not immediately begin to believe that works of fantasy or science fiction are in actuality documentation of these fantastical situations. This holds true even in works of fiction that adopt the style of documentation (Cooke 2012: 234).
A response to this sort of thinking is for some theorists to construe the issue as one of how one can learn from fiction (Cooke, 2012: 235). Cooke contends that they end up setting aside the crucial point that fictional utterances are not offered up as taken up as beliefs to be held as true (2012: 235). These utterances are better understood as material for imaginings that have no basis in truth (Cooke, 2012: 235). This manifests as what is known as “The Fictional Saying Argument”. It aims to examine cases of Fiction that “purports to be fact”; fiction using background assumptions purported to be true in both the fiction and the real world and finally fiction where certain authorial intentions are obscure (Cooke, 2012: 236).
The problem with the Fictional Saying Argument, that the argument makes usage of the word “may”, when arguing that pornographers are liars, background liars, or background blurrers (Cooke, 2012: 239). This makes the argument weak. The usage of the word “may” weakens the argument to the point it cannot support its key claims
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because it is only saying that pornographers “may” only be these things that obscure the truth and not that actually are these things (Cooke, 2012: 239). This leaves the Fictional Saying Argument in a bad position as it renders it too weak to support its strong claims
Further many scholars deliberately blur the distinction that operates for pornography’s audiences, and most people. This distinction is that people are happy to imagine doing things that they would never to actually do in reality (Cooke, 2012: 240). In other words, while people may fantasise about certain behaviours that are morally deficient, they would not actually act on these fantasies in reality (Cooke, 2012:240). This also means that it does not follow that taking pleasure in imagining such things, means that one would want to actually do them.
If we view pornography, or at least some instances of it, as fiction, then like all fiction, pornography is not a vehicle for the conveyance of beliefs about the world, but rather a jumping off point for imaginative activity (Cooke, 2012: 241).
The second set of arguments that Cooke (2012) aims to deal with are those that assume that all pornography is wrongfully exploitative. In order to do this we need to understand what it means to call some exploitative.
Cooke identifies that there exist two senses of the word exploitation; one neutral and one pejorative (Cooke, 2012: 242). The neutral sense of the word simple means to make use of something (Cooke, 2012: 242). Cooke asserts that in this sense all art is ‘exploitative’ as making use of any artistic implement would fit the definition (2012: 242). The pejorative sense on the other hand can be construed as wrongful exploitation that involves unfairness and taking advantage of another’s vulnerability (Cooke, 2012: 242 - 243).
Beyond this exploitation can be further subdivided into three different kinds, where the objects of the exploitation distinguish each kind. The first kind applies to cases where the exploitation occurs in the making of a particular work (Cooke, 2012: 243). The second kind of exploitation occurs in cases where the work exploits the audience. This is primarily due to the way that the work may pander or satisfy certain morally deficient preferences or sensibilities (Cooke, 2012: –243 - 244). The third
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and final kind of exploitation occurs when a work may recommend, endorses, enables or causes the exploitation of some third party (Cooke, 2012: 244).
As Cooke (2012) notes, in talking about the exploitation it is important to note that it is not actually the work, pornographic or otherwise, that can be said to be exploiting people. This is because we cannot actually say that the work itself is an agent, rather we mean that it is the artist, author, pornographer, exhibitor or owner of the work itself (Cooke, 2012: 244).
The second and third kinds of exploitation are far more relevant to the discussion of the ethical distinction between art and pornography. This is because the second and third kind, give us a stronger sense or account of calling something exploitative (Cooke, 2012: 244). This is because in the first kind does not show that exploitation is necessarily core to the content of pornography and most of the arguments tend to focus almost exclusively on this (Cooke, 2012: 244).
The problem with the second and third kind of exploitation as defined above is that rely on causal arguments to show the exploitation they describe occurs (Cooke, 2012: 248).
Further, the second kind of exploitation assumes that there is no instrumental or intrinsic value in employing the imagination in fantasies that would be considered morally deficient (Cooke, 2012: 243 - 244). It also assumes that there is no moral distinction between engaging in imagining versus acting (Cooke, 2012: 240). This was the same kind of problem that was faced by those arguments that ignore the fact that pornography, or at least some of it can be considered fiction. It almost seems absurd to make the claim that imagining an act is just as bad as actually carrying out said act.
This leads to third kind of exploitation that assumes that a strong causal link exists between the consumption of such so-called exploitative works and a deformation of a person’s ethical character (Cooke, 2012: 244, 249). The problem here is that this is a strong causal claim that is not backed up by any sort of empirical study. Proponents of this theory also fail to take into account other factors that influence an individual’s moral growth, such as society, culture and upbringing (Cooke, 2012: 250). This is because they seem to subscribe to some sort of “art imitates life” idea.
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My response to a Dworkin’s position is then as follows. From Butler’s work we can argue that there may be no singular identity or subject of “man” and “woman” in that gender is a more mutable and changeable concept than Dworkin purports it to be. If this is right, then the basis of Dworkin’s claims - the relation between power and pornography – is destabilised. Accepting Butler’s position gives us a more nuanced understanding of the power imbalances that Dworkin catalogues, since it is possible that power appears in much more diffuse ways than Dworkin allows. Beyond that, we can use the work of hooks to provide suggestions for ways in which these pornographic depictions can be “taken back”. This is because hooks demands that these depictions be better and focus on the sexual agency and sexual subjectivity of women themselves. I regards to hook’s suggestions we can already see examples of these pornographic depictions being “taken back” in the fields of feminist and female friendly pornography as outlined in the manifesto by Puzzy Power.
Secondly, we can also offer a response to her assumption that the things depicted in pornography offer actual assertions about the real world. This is also a position held by other theorists. This assumption is built upon the idea that because knowledge of the real world is needed to understand fiction then therefore fiction does say something real about the world. Drawing upon the work of Cooke, I show that this is simply not true. I argue that there is that simply depicting a situation does not necessarily mean that an assertion about the real world is being made. A further assumption that we learn things about the world through fiction and thus because pornography is a form of fiction, it is purported to teach us truths about the world. Thus, pornographers are liars as it provides a distorted view of the world. Cooke argues that fiction does not necessarily convey the truth of the world. Fiction simply functions to spur on the imagination of the consumer.
The final assumption of Dworkin’s to be responded to is the idea that the content of pornography is inherently exploitative. Cooke identifies two kinds of exploitation that can be seen in pornography. The first involves the exploitation of those who create the pornographic work. The second one involves the exploitation of those who consume it, as their ethical character is deformed. There is not enough evidence to show that all instances of pornography are exploitative in the manners explained above though it is certainly not beyond reason that there are instance that are. Cooke argues that calling pornography exploitative is problematic as it in no way can
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be seen to be an agent capable of acting on its own. Finally, Cooke argues that these assumptions rely on strong causal claims that are not backed up by the evidence.
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d) Other Arguments In this section, my aim is to consider and address arguments that argue for the possibility of pornography being art, but that do not fit into any of the previous categories.
I focus mainly on the responses to Christy Mag Uidhir’s paper titled “Why Pornography Can’t Be Art” that was discussed in the previous chapter. As I explained there, Mag Uidhir argues for taking a value neutral approach to the question of whether pornography can be art. In taking this value neutral approach, he argues for the conclusion that no piece of work can be both pornography and art; it has to be one or the other. He justifies this by claiming that usually when making claims about whether something can be both art and pornography we are required to use what he refers to as “relatively robust” notions of art and pornography. This he claims can lead to problems as it would make any exclusionary claims that use them beholden to these notions’ merits and demerits. Thus, he aims to argue for a value neutral exclusionary claim (2009: 193).
To recap, in its most basic form his argument takes this structure:
1. If something is pornography then that something has the purpose of sexual arousal (of someone). 2. If something is pornography, then that something has the purpose of sexual arousal and that purpose is manner inspecific. 3. If something is art, then if that something has a purpose, then that purpose is manner specific. 4. If something is art, then if that something has a purpose of sexual arousal, then that purpose is manner specific. 5. A purpose cannot be both manner specific and manner inspecific. 6. Then if something is pornography, then it is not art. (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 194).
Mimi Vasilaki in a paper titled “Why Some Pornography Can Be Art” directly responds to Mag Uidhir’s “Why Pornography Can’t Be Art.” Vasilaki’s main claim is that despite the fact that the conclusion of Mag Uidhir’s argument may be plausible, there is no strong case has been made for the overall argument. This is because, says Vasilaki, Mag Uidhir does not establish that art is necessarily manner specific and that pornography is manner inspecific (2010: 228).
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Vasilaki claims that Mag Uidhir’s exclusion theory is unable to deal with cases that purposefully try to blur the art and pornography dichotomy or by trying to defy the dichotomy all together by trying to do both art and pornography in the same work (2010: 229). There are examples of this already, as I explained earlier in the paper when it comes to the works of the works of Robert Mapplethorpe and Andy Warhol, In the case of Mapplethorpe we can see it in many of his sexually explicit photographs such as the ones he took of Lydia Cheng (1987) [Figure 8] and Derrick Cross (1983) [Figure 7]. In the case of Andy Warhol we have to look no further than a series of his works which are known as torsos and sex parts (1977) [Figure 9], which was a series of photographs and screen-prints of the torsos and sexual organs of anonymous male and female models.
Further, Vasilaki argues that Mag Uidhir’s exclusive characterisation of pornography does not fit our ordinary usage of language (2010: 230). Vasilaki uses the example of the sexually explicit frescoes of Pompeii to illustrate this point. Vasilaki points out that in the Victorian era these frescoes were thought to be pornographic, but now these frescoes are viewed as art (2010: 230). Thus they are not pornography or merely pornographic art as Mag Uidhir might describe it, but rather, for Vasilaki they are both pornography and art (2010: 228–233). Vasilaki claims that when we classify these frescoes as art, we are not saying that the Victorians were wrong in characterising them pornography, nor have we actually declassified them as pornography when classifying them as art, so in the end they exist as both (2010: 230).
Vasilaki (2010) also argues that the claim that pornography is manner inspecific is not plausible. She does this by attempting to show that the claim that pornography is manner inspecific and that its purpose is therefore sexual arousal is problematic. In her view, this is because such a characterisation does not explain the difference between visual pornography and literary pornography, or in fact between visual pornography and a dildo or Viagra. This is because if pornography’s manner inspecific purpose is sexual arousal, then all of the above are pornography due to them causing sexual arousal (2010: 228–233).Vasilaki’s point is that Mag Uidhir’s argument overlooks the possibility that both art and pornography can be multifunctional.
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A second response to Mag Uidhir’s argument comes from Hans Maes (2012). He compliments Mag Uidhir’s argument by saying that it tends to avoid most of the issues of other arguments against pornography being able to be art (Maes, 2012: 34). These problems arise according to Maes because most other theories tend to use strong theories of art and pornography (2012: 34). These theories can cause difficulties for an argument due to the difficulty of defining art and pornography (Maes, 2012: 34).
Maes’ criticism of Mag Uidhir’s arguments stems from premises (2) and (4) of the argument. These are: (2) “If something is pornography, then that something has the purpose of sexual arousal and that purpose is manner inspecific” and (4) ”If something is art, then if that something has a purpose of sexual arousal, then that purpose is manner specific.” (Mag Uidhir, 2009: 204).
Maes continues by arguing that while these two premises might be useful in order to show the distinction of what is art and what is pornography, they do not show that the one cannot also be the other (Maes, 2012: 35). In other words, nowhere does Mag Uidhir show that these two categories are mutually exclusive. For Maes merely showing that art and pornography have different success conditions is not enough to show that they are mutually exclusive categories (2012: 35). This is because according to Maes there is nothing in Mag Uidhir’s argument that does not allow for a piece of art to be created with the aim of arousing the viewers sexually in a specific way (2012: 35). What Maes means is that if we suppose that there is an artwork that brings about sexual arousal in the prescribed way that Mag Uidhir means it, then it would satisfy Mag Uidhir’s conditions for art and pornography (Maes, 2012: 35). That is to say, that it would have met the manner specific criterion of something being art as well as the manner inspecific criterion of pornography (2012: 36). Maes concedes that a purpose cannot be manner specific and manner inspecific at the same time (2012: 37). Though Mag Uidhir’s does not consider the possibility for a piece of art to be created that satisfies two separate purposes, one manner specific and one manner inspecific (Maes, 2012: 37).
Both Vasilaki and Maes call into question, the main assumptions of Mag Uidhir’s argument. Vasilaki argues that Mag Uidhir does not manage to sufficiently prove his claims that art is manner specific and that pornography is manner inspecific. Further,
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his argument has no way with dealing with already existing pieces of art that blur the line between art and pornography. Finally, Vasilaki argues that Mag Uidhir’s exclusionist account for pornography is different from our common usage and does not account for how what counts as pornography can change. Maes criticises premises 2 and 4 of Mag Uidhir’s argument. Maes argues that simply showing that art and pornography have different success conditions does not mean that they are mutually exclusive.
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Conclusion
In concluding this chapter, I have shown that the arguments that are for the compatibility of art and pornography are stronger than those that are against. I believe that in examining the arguments for the compatibility of art and pornography, I have shown that the arguments for are stronger than those against. I believe that this makes the case that pornography can be art.
In the first category, that of Artistic Qualities, I drew upon the work of Newall to show that that transgressive pornography possesses its own set of aesthetic affects, namely; disgust, humour and awe. I referenced Georges Bataille’s Story of the Eye (1928), Raymond Queneau’s We Always Treat Women Too Well (1981) and Marquis de Sade’s The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom (2005) as examples of transgressive pornography. These affects can be used for a broader aesthetic purpose and this is seen when works of art make use of them as well. I argue that the use of these affects in works of art is evidence that pornography has its own set of aesthetic qualities. This is because since these affects are being used in artistic works there is some overlap to be found in the qualities of art and pornography.
In examining the category of Representational Content, I looked at David Davies’ response to Jerrold Levinson’s argument against the possibility that art and pornography are compatible. In response to Levinson’s argument, Davies draws upon the category of religious art, to argue that pornographic art may function in a similar way. Specifically how an artefact whose purpose is not primarily artistic can still have an artistic purpose. Thus examples of pornographic art, can meet Levinson’s criteria for something being art.
In dealing with Ethical and Feminist concerns, I respond to what I identify as the most significant points in Andrea Dworkin’s position on pornography that was introduced in the previous chapter. I drew upon the work of Judith Butler and bell hooks to show that at least two of her claims are problematic. I also drew upon the work Brandon Cooke. His arguments dealt with the fact that pornography is a form of fiction and thus does not aim to make true statements about the world. I also argued that the claims that pornography is inherently exploitative are not supported by empirical evidence.
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Finally, I showed how both Vasilaki and Maes call into question, the main assumptions of Mag Uidhir’s argument. Vasilaki argues that Mag Uidhir does not manage to sufficiently prove his claims that art is manner specific and that pornography is manner inspecific. Furthermore, his argument is unable to deal with pieces of art that blur the line between art and pornography. Vasilaki’s final argument is that that Mag Uidhir’s exclusionist account for pornography is different from our common usage. I also showed how Maes directly criticises the premises of Mag Uidhir’s argument. Maes argued that by simply showing that art and pornography have different success conditions, it did not mean that they are mutually exclusive.
From this, I move onto the final section. In this section, I develop my own position. I start by explaining Danto’s early institutional theory of art and his notion of the “artworld”. From this base, I examine how the theory has been criticised and improved by other theorists. From here, I will draw upon the work of Mari Mikkola and Richard Shusterman to the notion of the “artworld” to develop a useful way of understanding how porno-art can be conceived.
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Chapter 3 Developing the Artworld
Introduction
In the previous two chapters, I have considered the arguments for and against pornography as art. It is my view that the arguments for considering some pornography as art have emerged as being the stronger and more convincing arguments. Briefly, these arguments were; in first category, that of Artistic Qualities, I drew upon the work of Newall to show that that transgressive pornography possesses its own set of aesthetic affects, namely; disgust, humour and awe and that it shares these with art. In examining the category of Representational Content, I looked at David Davies’ response to Jerrold Levinson’s argument. In response to Levinson’s argument, Davies draws upon the category of religious art, to show how an artefact whose purpose is not primarily artistic can still have an artistic purpose. In dealing with Ethical and Feminist concerns, I drew upon the work of Judith Butler, bell hooks and Brandon Cooke to show that some of Dworkin’s claims are problematic. Finally, I showed how both Vasilaki and Maes call into question, the main assumptions of Mag Uidhir’s argument. Both argue that Mag Uidhir does not do enough to justify his strong claims.
If the arguments evaluated seem to point in the direction of seeing at least some pornography as art, it remains a task to work out how this could be understood. In this chapter, I attempt to do this by drawing upon three approaches in order to propose what I claim is a plausible way for understanding how certain items of pornography can also be considered art.
First, I will be examining Arthur Danto’s concept of the Artworld. In which he discusses his critique of the Imitation Theory of Art before moving on to what is referred to as Reality Theory. From here, he goes on to explain how Modern Art is explained by the Reality theory and how this all fits into what he thinks of as the Artworld. The reason that I will be looking at the work of Danto and specifically his concept of the Artworld is that I believe that the way he describes Reality Theory and the progression and evolution of what is considered art is incredibly permissive. What I mean by this is that in creating an argument as to how incredibly abstract art
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pieces can be considered Art, he creates a rather permissive conception of Art. I will be using Danto’s account of the artworld as a base that I will build upon. I will build upon it by showing how subsequent theorists have criticised his theory and improved upon it. Specifically I will be examining Stephen Davies (2001) criticism that the biggest problem with the notion of “artworlds” is what he calls the “the Artworld relativity problem. I will then examine the work Howard Saul Becker (1982) who took a sociological approach to the institutional theory of art. As a result, he describes the artworld as a complex interconnected network of cooperating people and institutions.
I also draw on the work of Richard Shusterman here. I focus specifically on the way that he defends popular art as having aesthetic merit. In doing so, he challenges what he feels are the three major criticisms of popular art. These are (i); popular art presents no aesthetic challenge & induces passivity. (ii). Popular art lacks formal complexity. Popular art tends to appeal to the subject matter rather than form. (iii) Popular art lacks aesthetic autonomy.
The reason I examine these criticisms of popular art is two-fold. The first is that I argue that pornography is a kind of popular or mass art as defined earlier in the paper and these criticisms generally argue that popular art is not really art. The second reason is that in dismissing these criticisms we can use the category of popular to enhance Becker’s account of the artworld,
I will consider the work of Mari Mikkola (2013) who proposes that art and pornography are not mutually exclusive and that there are in fact examples of pieces that are both. She claims that these pieces belong in a category called Porno-Art that still needs to be created. I believe that her work provides strong arguments on how porno-art artefacts can be conceived the purpose of pornography and on how pornographic artefacts can indeed be art can be useful in creating in showing how something can be both.
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Drawing out the Artworld First, I will examine Danto’s concept of the Artworld. Danto’s concept of the Artworld can be seen to have come about to explain the philosophical insights gained from artworks. This came after he had developed his notion of the “artworld” which was introduced to deal with the idea that what counts as art in the context of one culture may not necessarily be counted as art in another (Ross, 1984: 469). It is my view that Danto’s conception of the “artworld” could be refined and extended to provide a useful way of understanding how some pornography can also be considered art.
Danto begins by explaining that initially we viewed and defined art as simply imitations of reality. Ancient Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle spoke about this mimesis. Danto refers to this an Imitation Theory or IT. He criticises this view by claiming that if this was in fact the case then any time we hold up a mirror to the world we would be creating a mirror image of reality, which would then have to be considered an artwork, which is obviously something that could not be true. Many artists did and still do try to imitate nature in their art but that does not necessarily mean that art as mimesis or imitation is true (1964, 571 -572).
Danto continues by stating that many developments in modern art, especially post- impressionist art challenged the IT. Danto views these developments as analogous to the discovery of a completely new class of facts that needed a way to be explained. This is because these new developments in modern art either challenged the definition or would not be considered art under IT (1964, 572-573). Danto continues by claiming that in order for these artworks to make sense the prevailing and long held theory would need to be revised. This then lead to the formulation of what Danto refers to as the Reality Theory or RT. With RT tended to draw attention to the fact these were non-imitations and specifically intended to not deceive (1964, 574). Under RT, it was more acceptable to look at paintings more based on their formal properties and less based on the quality of their imitation or representation.
Reality theory as described by Danto was formulated to accommodate the changing and evolving of our definition of what we considered art. It allowed for more abstract and conceptual pieces of art. As can be seen in the examples of genuine beds made
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by Robert Rauschenberg and Claes Oldenburg as well as the Brillo Boxes of Andy Warhol. Both of which under the Reality Theory are legitimate artworks.
A consequence of RT is that it allows for a situation where an artwork could be mistaken for a real object. He uses the examples of genuine beds made by Robert Rauschenberg and Claes Oldenburg and claims that the question of how can one mistake them for real beds, instead of artworks, is equivalent to asking what makes them artworks in the first place. Danto argues that there is some theory that makes the ordinary thing into an artwork. To this point Danto introduces the "'is' of artistic identification". This 'is' is used in sentences like "That a is b" where a is some specific physical property or part of an object. It is a necessary condition for something to be an artwork that is can be the subject of such a sentence. (1964: 577).
What all of this means is that in each case in which it is used the a stands for some specific physical property of, or physical part of, an object; and, finally, it is a necessary condition for something be an artwork that some part or property of it be designable by the subject of a sentence that employs this special is (1964, 577). Danto concludes that in addition to the “is” of artistic identification what makes the difference between an artwork and the real object it was mistaken for is that the artwork belongs to a certain theory of art. It is the theory for Danto that lifts the real world object up into the world of art. It is here where we can start to grasp what the Artworld is for Danto. The Artworld is simply put is the cultural context or “an atmosphere of art theory” which allows an artwork to exist and on which the “is” of artistic identification rests.
This is not the only the way in which the abovementioned works have been legitimised. The Artworld plays a part in that too. For those works can only exist within a specific cultural context and atmosphere of art theory. That is to say it is not enough for RT to allow for more abstract works to be created but that there is a context in which the works can arise, either as part of a current artistic movement or theory, or as direct response in opposition to a specific theory.
Danto’s style matrix is a useful tool in order to understand how new artistic movements can arise in response to specific theories. Danto constructs what he calls the style matrix for art (Danto, 1964: 583). Danto’s idea with the style matrix
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involves examining how when any theorist or artistic movements attempt to give a list of what features or styles that art for what should be (1964: 583 - 584). The option is opened up that people will reject them and create works in opposition to those features (Danto, 1964: 584).
Before building upon the institutional theory, it is important to examine some of the failings of the notion of the artworld. I will be examining Stephen Davies notion of the ‘Artwold relativity problem’ (Davies, 2001: 174). The paradox occurs because the artworld relies on there being a continuous tradition, of a historically and culturally unified body of work (Davies, 2001: 174) This body of work is what any new artwork has to relate to in the appropriate fashion (Davies, 2001: 174). For Davies the paradox entails that when an artworld only recognises a single artworld it becomes too narrow and parochial, tending to focus on the Western context for which art would exist in (Davies, 2001: 174). What this means is that these single artworld theories focus on the Western context in which ‘high art’ is made while ignoring ‘low art’. Paradoxically if the theories that subscribe to the notion of multiple artworlds become incomplete due to the fact that they cannot and do not spell out the criteria for distinguishing artworlds from other similar social arrangements (Davies, 2001: 175).This presents a problem for Danto’s account of the artworld. This is because in Danto’s conception, there is a singular artworld and thus it falls into pitfall of possibly being too narrow in scope
I will now briefly provide an overview of Howard Saul Becker (1982) institutional theory of art. Becker approaches the institutional theory from the perspective of a sociologist. He describes the artworld as a complex interconnected network of cooperating people. It is my contention that it is an improvement of Danto’s account. Becker begins by arguing that his sociological approach the arts is informed by the existence of artworlds as well as the way that their existence affects the production and consumption of artworks (1982:1). Becker argues that the artist sits in the middle of cooperative and intertwined community. The cooperation of the other members is key to the final product as it allows someone else to do the things that an artist cannot do (1982:25). This cooperative link creates a division of labour so that everyone involved is responsible for the final product (1982:25). This focus on cooperation naturally restricts the kind of art that can be created due to the abilities of all the linked and cooperating people (1982:26). The interconnected nature of this
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artworld does not mean that there are no conventions that govern the creation of art, as well as regulating the relations between artist and audience (1982:29). These conventions also serve to increase the efficiency of all of the people cooperating (1982:29). Becker also claims that these art worlds have intimate and extensive relations with the other artworlds from which they try to distinguish themselves from (1982:36). This facilitates a sharing of ideas and resources, which can lead to the formation of sub artworlds or the collaboration of several artworlds (1982:36).
Mari Mikkola’s argument can be broken down into three distinct pieces. First she provides an in depth argument as for why sexual arousal is not the central or ultimate goal of pornography as many exclusivist arguments would claim. Secondly, she proposes a way to understand what makes something a pornographic artefact. Finally, she proposes a way that some of the pornographic artefacts can also be art. This is what she calls Porno-Art.
A feature of many of the arguments that I have described in the previous chapters is that they view sexual arousal as the central or ultimate aim of pornography. This is not only present in exclusivist arguments, i.e. those that view pornography and art as wholly exclusive concepts, but also in the arguments that view them as compatible concepts.
For Mikkola (2013, 29) what is meant by this is that the abovementioned arguments view pornographers as allegedly making pornographic artefacts with the express intention of sexually arousing their audiences and that whether these artefacts count as art hinges on whether they have some additional non-pornographic intentions.
This is a rather simplistic view, as it does not take into account why pornographers make pornography. In considering this, we are lead to some complications that do not make such claims as clean cut.
Mikkola (2013, 29) highlights two of these complications, which lead her to endorse a more general view on the intention of pornography:
1. Producing sexually arousing material may be a means to some other end, rather than the end of pornographers per se.
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2. The supposed pornographic intention of soliciting sexual arousal may be more constitutively intertwined with other intentions in a way that makes it impossible to separate the central pornographic intention from additional non- pornographic intentions.
I agree with Mikkola thus far, especially in regards to these two complications that have been mentioned. None of the arguments that view sexual arousal as the central or ultimate aim of pornography, have considered either of these two complications at all further they have offered very little in the way of justification as for why they believe that sexual arousal is the central or ultimate goal of pornography. That is not to say that pornographers do not intend to cause sexual arousal but simply that it may not necessarily be the ultimate goal.
To support this Mikkola uses two examples that show that the ultimate goal of pornography might not be sexual arousal.
The first example Mikkola uses is historical in nature. She argues that if we take pornography to be the explicit depiction of sexual organs and sexual practices with the aim of arousing sexual feelings, then pornography was almost always an adjunct to something else until the middle or end of the eighteenth century (2013, 30). She continues by explaining that if we use pornography in the above sense then it was often used to criticize religions and political authorities (2013, 30).
She points to the fact that during the French Revolution that such graphic imagery was used to attack Marie Antoinette and the French court. This Mikkola states is tells us two things, first that arousing sexual imagery was used as a means of social commentary and secondly that in this case it is impossible to separate the pornographic sexual intention from the socio-political contention (2013, 30). This demonstrates the two complications that were mentioned above.
Another example is the mainstream pornography industry. Mikkola claims that we would be hard pressed to argue that the central or ultimate aim of the pornography industry and it is an industry in every sense of the word, is that of sexual arousal (2013, 32). She asserts that like any industry, the pornography industry’s ultimate goal is to make a profit. That is not to say that they do not intend to cause sexual arousal.
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She makes a parallel to the automotive industry. The automotive industry’s ultimate purpose cannot be said to be that it wants to provide people with a method of conveyance, even though it is a by-product of the way it functions. Its ultimate goal is to turn a profit (Mikkola: 2013, 32).
Both of these examples lend credence to the two complications that Mikkola highlighted. Both of these given examples show that sexual arousal is the means to some other end and that sometimes this other end cannot be separated from the intent to create sexual arousal.
Following this Mikkola (2013, 37) then gives her definition for what a pornographic artefact is. That is to say, she explains what it means for object x (a book, a movie, etc.) to be a pornographic artefact. Her explanation is as follows:
some x (film, book, picture) is of the kind ‘pornographic artefact’ only if it is the product of a largely successful intention to create pornography, where the maker of the artefact intends that the artefact is an instance of pornography only if (a) they have a substantive concept of the nature of pornography and that concept largely matches the substantive concept held by some other prior pornographers, and (b) the maker intends to realize that substantive concept by imposing pornography-relevant features on the object (Mikkola, 2013: 37)
Mikkola then uses an almost identical definition to show how Porno-Art artefacts can occur. It follows along the same lines as the explanation for what makes something a Pornographic artefact.
some x (film, book, picture) is of the kind ‘porno-art artefact’ only if it is the product of a largely successful intention to create porno-art, where the maker of the artefact intends that the artefact is an instance of porno-art only if (a) they have a substantive concept of the nature of porno-art and that concept largely matches the substantive concept held by some other prior porno-art makers (if any), and (b) the maker intends to realize that substantive concept by imposing porno-art-relevant features on the object (Mikkola: 2013, 38).
She then continues that what would constitute as substantive concept of the nature of porno-art and what porno-art relevant features would realise the concept has yet to be seen. This is due to the fact that for Mikkola, the category of Porno-Art is one
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that still needs to be created from the extant categories of Pornography and Art (2013, 38). Though she does believe that there are examples of “prototype porno- art”, namely she references some alt and feminist pornographic work, the works of Inside Flesh a Polish collective of artists that claims their approach is the ‘New Vision of Porn’ and the drawings of Tom of Finland.
It is here where my view diverges from Mikkola’s. She believes that these works are prototypical examples of the new category of Porno-Art that still needs to be invented. The problem with this is that it does not account for the fact that there have been examples of what Mikkola would call Porno-Art. As I mentioned before we have some of the works of Robert Mapplethorpe and Andy Warhol, both who had work that can be called Porno-Art. In the case of Mapplethorpe, we can see it in many of his sexually explicit photographs such as the ones he took of Lydia Cheng and Derrick Cross. In the case of Andy Warhol, we have to look no further than a series of his work that is known as sex parts, which was a series of photographs of the sexual organs of anonymous models. This is a problem because for Porno-Art to occur there needs to be an intention that the artefact is an instance of porno-art and that there be a substantive concept of the nature of porno-art. This unfortunately does not account for works before the creation of this extant category that Mikkola wishes to create. Are these items, somehow Porno-Art despite not meeting those mentioned requirements or are they something else completely despite similarity to something that would meet those requirements. Further, I contend that these examples are not of this separate category but that they already exist as Pornographic Art. That is to say I believe that these above works and many others that I have mentioned such as The Story of the Eye are examples of works that are be both pornography and art. This inability for her theory to deal with these past examples leaves me finding her arguments for the category of Porno-Art are weak. Rather I agree with Maes who claims that these are already obvious examples of Pornographic Art.
I believe that Mikkola’s definition of what would make something porno-art is compatible with the Artworld and with Shusterman’s arguments. The definition:
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some x (film, book, picture) is of the kind ‘porno-art artefact’ only if it is the product of a largely successful intention to create porno-art, where the maker of the artefact intends that the artefact is an instance of porno-art only if (a) they have a substantive concept of the nature of porno-art and that concept largely matches the substantive concept held by some other prior porno-art makers (if any), and (b) the maker intends to realize that substantive concept by imposing porno-art-relevant features on the object (Mikkola: 2013, 38).
If we understand the Artworld as a cultural context or an atmosphere of aesthetic theories then I believe that the above conditions can be fulfilled. Thus, I believe we could arrive at a theory art that allows something to be both pornography and art.
I will now be looking at Shusterman’s challenges to three major criticisms of popular or mass art. These are (i); popular art presents no aesthetic challenge & induces passivity. (ii). Popular art lacks formal complexity. Popular art tends to appeal to the subject matter rather than form. (iii) Popular art lacks aesthetic autonomy. My aim in examining Shusterman’s arguments is that to make use of them alongside Mari Mikkola’s arguments in order to supplement my developing a version of Danto’s Artworld. Further, it is my contention that some pornography can be considered to be popular art. Pornography fits the descriptions of popular art that Shusterman uses when challenging this divide.
The first criticism that Shusterman addresses is that popular art presents no aesthetic challenge and induces passivity. Shusterman claims that this is one of the most common and unquestioned complaints about popular art or mass culture (1991, 205). The crux of this argument as explained by Shusterman is that the appreciation of high art demands a sort of ‘aesthetic work’. Meaning that it stimulates aesthetic activity and results in some sort of aesthetic satisfaction, whereas popular art due to its simple and repetitive structures invites a passivity and absent participation (1991, 205). This passivity is supposedly the reason for its popularity.
Shusterman responds to this criticism in two distinct ways. Shusterman first responds to the supposed passivity of popular art and the exertion required of high art. First he claims that it is misguided and simplistic and misguided to conflate all
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legitimate activity with serious thinking and of any effort with mental effort of the intellect (1991, 205). From this Shusterman recognises that there are humanly worthy and aesthetically rewarding activities other than intellectual exertion. Even if we accept that all art and aesthetic enjoyment do indeed require some active effort and overcoming resistances there it does not necessarily follow that this effort needs to be ”independent thinking” (1991, 205). He argues that we need look no further than rock music. According to Shusterman, the enjoyment of rock music is anything but passive as it often involves moving, dancing, and singing along with the music. All of this requires the overcoming of resistances of embarrassment, awkwardness and self-consciousness. From this, Shusterman concludes that on the somatic level much more effort is required in the enjoyment of rock music than in that of highbrow music. This is because the concerts of the aforementioned highbrow music compel the listeners to sit in silence, which often induces torpid passivity and sleep (1991, 206). Shusterman’s above response leads to another response, which good art does not need to require intellectual exertion. To discount somatic exertion as legitimate would be a form of intellectualist exclusiveness with a Platonic pedigree (1991, 206).
The second criticism that Shusterman responds to is that popular art lacks formal complexity. That is to say, popular art tends to appeal to the subject matter rather than form. This leads critics to link this to its effortlessness and shallowness. The crux of this criticism is the defining of the aesthetic attitude as a capacity to regard things as form rather than function. This detached life distancing attitude is thought to be the key to high art’s formal complexity and reaching the final stage of artistic autonomy (1991, 207). Following this, critics believe that popular art’s greater connection with the content of life implies that form is subordination of form to function.
Shusterman responds by saying that while the critics believe that differential relationality with other works and styles in given artistic tradition is rich source of formal complexity in high art as artistic effects can only be enjoyed in relation to other works of high art (1991, 207). This is not absent from in many works of popular art, which self-consciously allude to and quote from each other (1991, 207). This can be seen in the way many musical artists cover and sample other artists’ songs or compositions as well as in the way they may reference musicians who have come before as is most commonly seen in rap music. Other examples can be seen in
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movies such as those in what is called the Marvel Cinematic Universe, which often allude to and reference other entries in it. This works to produce a variety of aesthetic effects including a complex formal texture of implied art historical relations Further according to Shusterman these allusion are not lost on the popular art audience which (1991, 207).
The third and final criticism that Shusterman addresses is that popular art lacks aesthetic autonomy and resistance. The crux of this argument is for art to be created an appreciated as art and not as something else requires an autonomous field of artistic production capable of imposing its norms on the production and the consumption of its products and of refusing external functions other than those inscribed in its specific tradition (1991, 208). What this means is that form, manner and style rather than the subject are of uttermost import. Further art’s norms are exclusive of any function other than the service of art itself. What this means is that should not serving any sort of role and should eschew even the childish notion of wanting art to be a source of pleasure (1991, 208). This has the function of excluding popular art from aesthetic legitimacy simply by having more than purely artistic functions. Shusterman claims that this ends up entailing that defining art and the aesthetic as essentially opposed to reality or life. For Shusterman the above argument hinges on the premise that art and real life are and should be essentially opposed and strictly separated (1991, 208).
Shusterman makes a bold claim in saying that this argument originated in Plato’s attack on art. Plato attacked art on the grounds that it was doubly removed from reality. He claims that this premise is being sustained by a philosophical tradition which in defending art, endorses its distance from the real to ensure philosophy’s sovereignty in determining reality including the real nature of art. (1991, 209).
Finally Shusterman concludes that if we look at matters free from philosophical prejudice and historical parochiality, art can be seen as part of life, just as life forms the substance of art. Meaning that the relationship between art and life ought to be continuous as art is part of life (1991, 209).
Overall, I find Shusterman’s arguments about the legitimacy of popular art to be rather convincing. First, this response to the criticism that popular art presenting no aesthetic challenge and inducing passivity is very convincing. This because
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Shusterman points out that there hypocrisy because in certain cases there are some qualities that are lauded when it cohabits with so called high art but is then used to take away the legitimacy of low art. Examples of this are passivity when listening to Opera or Classical music is acceptable, but in the case of passivity, popular art is denigrated. This can be linked to pornography as a popular art in that in some cases the consumption is anything but passive
In the case of popular art lacking formal complexity. Popular art tends to appeal to the subject matter rather than form. His response exposes that proponents of high art often deny the features that grant high art legitimacy when it is encountered in popular art. For example, this criticism ignores the fact that there are things such as sampling music, covering songs and remaking movies. To some degree, some pornography occasionally references other elements of popular culture and current events in the form of parody.
Finally in the case of popular art lacking aesthetic autonomy. Shusterman responds to this by claiming that art is part of life and that this fits our intuitions about art since objects and works of art inhabit the world and function within our lives while drawing from it.
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Conclusion
Before explaining what I think the implication of such a theory would be, first I summarise the preceding chapters and the arguments within them, so that we may have a clearer and more concise picture of the overall argument.
In the first chapter of this paper, I addressed the arguments against Pornography being compatible with art. I examined the arguments of four discreet categories. In the first category of Artistic Qualities, I examined the arguments that asserted that pornography is inherently missing the artistic qualities of originality, beauty and uniqueness and found that the arguments are not strong enough to support the conclusion. The first of the arguments examined claimed that pornography is too formulaic and lacks originality. Nabokov (2006) expanded upon the aforementioned argument by stating that it is this formulaic nature that causes pornography to be unable to be appreciated aesthetically because it forgoes the formal structures of art in order to satisfy the need to sexually arouse the audience. I argued that Nabokov poorly justified his intuitions about pornography. I drew upon the work of Kieran (2001) to show that formulaic features can be used to create aesthetic enjoyment for the audience using the example of John Ford’s movie The Searchers (1956). Further, I showed that in some cases, formulaicness is a part of art movements to a certain degree and yet they allow for aesthetic enjoyment. The second complaint was that pornography is mass-produced and treated as a commodity. I found this position to be untenable as there are concrete examples of works of art being mass- produced and commoditised. The first being the kind of art produced for the masses that can be found for sale in department stores or hanging on the walls of hotels. A second example of this is some of the work of Damien Hirst. His work has been described as having been created on a production line and as if he employed factory workers. It is for this reason that I do not these arguments to be strong enough to convince me that there are some aesthetic qualities are what divide art from pornography.
In examining the category of Representational Content, I looked at work of Bovens and Levinson. Bovens argued that pornography pornography is too immediate and graphic in nature to allow us to connect with the subject of the work as art does.
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Bovens followed this up by arguing that pornography provides a distorted view of sex and does not allow the viewer to connect with the subject. Finally, he also argues that pornography creates a sense of emptiness due the graphic nature of it hiding something special. I did not find these arguments convincing as Bovens does not explain what it is about the immediate and graphic nature of pornography that stops viewers from connecting with subject. While I agreed that, some pornography can create a distorted view of sex that is not enough to make the strong claim that all pornography provides this distorted view and in fact, there are examples to the contrary. I also argued that Bovens’ criteria of needing to connect with the subject, is problematic. This is because there are cases in abstract art where we cannot hope to connect with the subject of the artwork. Further, there are cases of artworks depicting horrible scenes and again it would be hard to argue that we can connect with the subject. Finally, Bovens was vague in regards to what that something special is that is hidden by pornography’s graphicness. This was followed up Levinson’s argument. In his argument, Levinson argues that erotic art and pornography have different aims. These different aims are what cause their incompatibility. This is because the differences in aim to change the way these works represent the subject. I did not find Levinson’s argument very convincing. I do not believe that he does a thorough enough job of justifying the assumptions that he bases his argument on and goes on to make too strong of a claim, but a more thorough response to his argument will be in the next chapter when I discuss the arguments for pornography as art.
After that, I examined the positions of Autonism and Moralism as Moralism is an assumption that underpins feminist and ethical concerns about pornography being inherently morally wrong and therefore is not capable of being art. I drew upon the work of Dworkin who draws upon the power relations between men and women and the seven powers that men hold over women. She argues that these powers inform what she claims is pornography’s view of women. Dworkin draws on the etymological root of the word pornography to show that it has always had a negative attitude towards women to support her criticism of it. While I found her explanation of the power imbalance between men and women compelling, I feel that she did not do a thorough job of showing how that dynamic is inherent in all pornography
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In the second chapter, I examined the arguments for pornography to be considered as art. These again were separated into the same four categories that were listed above. When it come artistic quality I looked at the work of Newall who showed that art borrows the aesthetics of transgressive pornography in order to aid it with certain metaphors. When it came to the feminist and ethical concerns, I relied on the work of hook, Butler and Cooke to show that pornography in and of itself is not exploitative in its creation or consumption, further that there are ways that one can express and reclaim female sexuality in a manner that is respectful and focuses on sexual agency. Here though I feel that further research can be focused in that I cannot definitively say that not all pornography is harmful but that there exists instances of pornography that is not inherently harmful. Finally, when it came to other arguments I looked at the response to Mag Uidhir’s paper by both Vasilakis and Maes who provided rather strong arguments against this specific value neutral approach.
In chapter 3, I examined the work of Mikkola and Shusterman in the hopes that elements that I could use to draw out an interpretation of Danto’s Artworld that would allow for pornographic artefacts to also be art. I argued that Mikkola’s arguments against sexual arousal being the ultimate goal of pornography as well as her definition of Porno-Art can comingle with Shusterman’s argument that art can be legitimate even if it does not have purely artistic concerns. This, I argued, when used with an understanding of Danto’s Artworld, as a cultural context or atmosphere of art theory that a work is situated in, can lead us to viewpoint in which some pornographic artefacts can in fact be artistic ones too. In this context, I introduced the paradox of artworlds as a challenge to Danto’s position. I concluded that if we use an enhanced notion of the artworld, Mikkola’s explanation about the creation of porno-art objects combined with elements of Shusterman’s argumentation can provide a fruitful way into the debate on the status of pornography as art and for us to understand the creation of porno art objects.
Now what sort of practical implications can we draw from this? Well while this debate may seem to be conceptual, it has some very practical concerns. As Maes points out, the question of whether something is art or pornography is one of the very few philosophical questions that appear in newspaper headlines (2012: 388). A further practical concern, as Maes (2012: 38) explains it, is that when something is awarded the status of art the social prestige and institutional recognition usually makes that
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work into a legitimate object of interest for the mainstream press and academia. On the other hand, if a work is branded as pornography, it is usually subjected to censorship and banned from appearing in many public places. Sometimes it may be the victim of destruction and it will forgo any sort of critical or academic attention. It is my contention that in finding a theory that allows some pornographic artefacts to also be art, that way we may legitimise and open up a plethora of new forms of artwork for consideration that could then feed into and influence in the progression of our understanding of the aesthetic.
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