Positive Illusions and Well-Being Revisited
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Psychological Bulletin Copyright 1994 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 1994. Vol. 116, No. 1.21-27 0033-2909/94/S3.00 Positive Illusions and Weil-Being Revisited: Separating Fact From Fiction Shelley E. Taylor and Jonathon D. Brown In 1988, we published an article that challenged the notion that accurate perceptions of self and the world are essential for mental health (Taylor & Brown, 1988). We argued instead that people's perceptions in these domains are positively biased and that these positive illusions promote psycho- logical well-being. In the current article, we review our theoretical model, correct certain miscon- ceptions in its empirical application, and address the criticisms made by Colvin and Block. Taylor and Brown's (1988) model of mental health maintains environmental events than is actually the case; and (c) they hold that certain positive illusions are highly prevalent in normal views of the future that are more rosy than base-rate data can thought and predictive of criteria traditionally associated with justify. Establishing the prevalence of positive illusions in non- mental health. The work initially derived from research with pathological populations was one important contribution of our cancer patients (Taylor, 1983) but was integrated in the 1988 article. As just noted, accuracy has been regarded as essential essay with literature on social cognition, suggesting that the for- to psychological well-being. Yet our review showed that most mulation could also make sense of previously anomalous and people do not hold entirely accurate and unbiased perceptions somewhat unrelated errors and biases in human thought. As is of themselves and the world in which they function. It follows, the case with any theoretical model, the goal of the article was then, that accuracy is not essential for mental health; otherwise, to generate research. On this ground, the model appears to have most people would have to be classified as unhealthy. been quite successful. According to Colvin and Block's estima- After documenting the prevalence of positive illusions in nor- tion, approximately 250 studies have made use of the formula- mal populations, we examined whether positive illusions pro- tion. Given its popularity and influence, a critical examination mote psychological well-being. Our strategy had two parts. of the Taylor and Brown argument is appropriate. First, we identified established criteria of mental health from In this article, we (a) review some of the central points of the relevant clinical literature: contentment, positive attitudes our theoretical model; (b) examine Colvin and Block's article toward the self, the ability to care for and about others, openness in view of these issues; (c) present research germane to our the- to new ideas and people, creativity, the ability to perform cre- sis but not discussed by Colvin and Block; and (d) raise some ative and productive work, and the ability to grow, develop, and important issues that have yet to be resolved. As before, our aim self-actualize, especially in response to stressful events (Taylor, is to contribute to an informed dialogue regarding the nature of 1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988). We then reviewed evidence sug- psychological well-being. gesting that positive illusions contribute to each of these behav- iors and perceptions. For example, we discussed research indi- Accuracy as Essential for Weil-Being cating that the ability to engage in productive, creative work, which is considered by many to be a defining feature of mental The point of departure for our 1988 article was the widely health (e.g., Jourard & Landsman, 1980), is facilitated by the accepted belief that accurate perceptions of oneself and the perception that one is capable and efficacious, even if these be- world are essential elements of mental health (Jahoda, 1953; liefs are somewhat illusory. Maslow, 1950). Against this backdrop, we reviewed evidence in- In summary, our 1988 article made two major points: (a) It dicating that most people exhibit positive illusions in three im- challenged a major tenet of psychological thought by document- portant domains: (a) They view themselves in unrealistically ing that most people hold overly positive views of themselves, positive terms; (b) they believe they have greater control over their ability to effect change in the environment, and their fu- ture; and (b) it considered how positive illusions of this type contribute to a broad range of criteria consensually regarded as indicative of psychological well-being. Shelley E. Taylor, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles; Jonathon D. Brown, Department of Psychology, Univer- sity of Washington. Colvin and Block Critique Preparation of this article was supported by National Institute of Mental Health Grants 42152 and 42918 to Shelley E. Taylor. Jonathon With this discussion as background, we turn to Colvin and D. Brown was supported by National Science Foundation Presidential Block's critique. To begin, we note that Colvin and Block focus Young Investigator Award BNS 89-58211. heavily on only a small portion of Taylor and Brown's (1988) Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Shel- essay (three pages). Moreover, the section that is given such at- ley E. Taylor, Department of Psychology, 1283 Franz, University of Cal- tention does not make the claims attributed to it by Colvin and ifornia, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California 90024-1563. Block. Colvin and Block state that "the heart of the evidence 21 22 SHELLEY E. TAYLOR AND JONATHON D. BROWN that Taylor and Brown bring to bear in support of their argu- been adopted by other researchers, is to identify multiple cri- ment that positive illusions underlie mental health is to be found teria that might be said to reflect illusion and look at overall in the section of our paper titled "Positive Illusions and Social patterns of evidence. Although any one operational definition Cognition" (pp. 194-197). This is a misstatement of fact. The of illusion may have problems associated with it, when studies material referred to in these pages documents the prevalence of using different criteria with nonoverlapping problems show the illusions in normal populations (and their relative absence in same effect, our confidence in the phenomenon is increased. We dysphoric populations). It does not examine whether positive maintain that this situation exists in the literature on positive illusions promote psychological well-being. This issue is dis- illusions. cussed in the next section of our article (pp. 197-200), in which we focus on the criteria traditionally associated with mental Self-Aggrandizing Self-Perceptions health and then evaluate the relation of positive illusions to those criteria. The so-called Step C that Colvin and Block attri- Consider our claim that people hold unrealistically positive bute to us and criticize is their own invention, not a faithful views of themselves. This assertion is not based on evidence that representation of our line of argument. people's self-conceptions are more positive than negative, as More generally, the bulk of Colvin and Block's critique is con- Colvin and Block contend (pp. 4-5). It is based largely (although cerned with research that goes under the name of depressive not exclusively) on evidence that people consistently regard realism. As reviewed in our 1988 article, there is suggestive evi- themselves more positively and less negatively than they regard dence that depressed people exhibit accurate perceptions of the others. Insofar as it is logically impossible for most people to be type traditionally thought to characterize the psychologically better than others, we label this tendency an illusion. well-adjusted individual. Colvin and Block correctly note that Colvin and Block argue that this tendency is not illusory. this provocative thesis must still be regarded as preliminary: They contend that students at elite universities are warranted in Some studies find that depressed individuals are balanced and believing they are better than most other people. Although we accurate in their perceptions; others find they are negatively bi- do not find their argument compelling (in what sense are uni- ased in their perceptions (for reviews, see Ackerman & De- versity students warranted in believing they are kinder, warmer, Rubeis, 1991; Alloy & Abramson, 1988; Dobson & Franche, and more sincere than the average person?), we note that the 1989). "better-than-most" effect does not depend on whether people Resolution of this issue is not, however, critical to Taylor and are comparing themselves with a generalized other (Brown, Brown's (1988) thesis. Our concern is with mental health, not 1986, 1993; Brown & Gallagher, 1992) or with those who are depression. The crucial issue is not whether depressed people more similar to themselves, such as fellow students at their own are accurate or negatively biased; it is whether normal, healthy university (Campbell, 1986; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holz- adults are accurate or positively biased. The evidence on this berg, 1989; Schlenker & Miller, 1977). Nor is this form of self- point is clear: Most healthy adults are positively biased in their aggrandizement found only among college students. At least self-perceptions. This fundamental fact is not altered by evi- three studies have shown that individuals facing acute or dence that depressed people often bias information in a negative chronic health threats show the same self-aggrandizing bias direction. Evidence that the perceptions of depressed people are when evaluating themselves relative to other patients with the just as distorted as those of healthy adults can hardly be taken same disease (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, as supporting the traditional view that mental health demands 1990; Helgeson & Taylor, 1993; Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, & As- accuracy. pinwall, 1991). In short, there is no support for the contention In addition to questioning the existence of depressive realism, that these judgments are simply the normatively appropriate Colvin and Block make several other points deserving of atten- perceptions of privileged college students.