African Regional Parliaments – Engines of Integration and Democratisation?
Ulf Terlinden Bonn, September 2004
Although African regional parliaments and parliamentary assemblies are intended to assume the legislative and democratic oversight functions of regional integration organisations in the long run, they so far remain at an infant stage of organisational development and are far from exercising the roles that fully-fledged parliaments play in democratic setups. However, in the course of renewed efforts to complement economic integration with broader political dimension of regional integration, regional assemblies receive increased attention and have gained in significance over recent years. The following paper takes stock of this development and critically reflects the current and potential role that African regional parliaments and parliamentary assemblies have both as “products and participants” (Wanyande 2004) of regional integration, but also as potential promoters of democratisation.
1. Emergence of African Regional The second phase of integration Parliamentarism therefore led to the mushrooming of regional organisations that focussed on Regional integration in Africa has its economic dimensions. A variety of roots in the Pan-African Movement that integration schemes, including accompanied decolonization since the Monetary and Customs Unions as well late 1950s. Yet, despite the visions and as Free Trade Zones, were envisaged. rhetoric expressed during this phase, Yet, these efforts were and remain most African leaders focussed their problematic in many ways. Just to energies on national sovereignty rather name one, the Regional Integration than continental unification. It was only Organisations are not consolidated in after the end of the cold war that terms of their memberships, allowing a regional integration received fresh number of “multiple members” to opt support and interest by national out if need be. governments. The new international A third phase of regional integration set climate helped overcoming political in at the end of the 1990s, when it differences and allowed for deeper became increasingly apparent that collaboration. Furthermore, integration obviously required political globalization demanded renewed understanding (not least as an efforts especially towards economic environment conducive to economic cooperation. development), too. The political dimension of integration experienced The ECOWAS-P held its first new emphasis, involving a strong call session in January 2001. for good governance, accountability · The East African Legislative and transparency as well as the drive Assembly (EALA) was inaugurated to establish regional parliamentary in November 2001. Its creation had assemblies (RAs)1 of different sorts. been stipulated in the new EAC This move was further reinforced by Treaty signed in 1999. EALA is the the donors’ insistence on regional second attempt to set up a regional cooperation and parliamentary assembly in Eastern Africa. The involvement, as expressed more earlier RA had collapsed with the recently in the framework of the first East African Community in Cotonou Agreement (ACP-EU 2000) 1977. and in the course of NEPAD and the · Under discussion since the 1993 G8-Africa Action Plan (see Eid 2003). In particular, Cotonou stipulated the “Windhoek Initiative”, and formally launched in July 1996, the SADC- creation of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and called for Parliamentary Forum is the oldest the strengthening of capacities of regional parliamentary structure covered in this report. However, its national parliaments in matters of regional integration. The G8 Action mandate is fairly restricted due to its status as a parliamentary forum. Plan emphasises effective parliamentary involvement in political There are plans to transform it into decision-making processes. Despite a regional parliament, and the respective protocol has already stressing the importance of good governance, NEPAD itself lacks a been drafted. Yet, the adoption of parliamentary dimension. Yet, the the document and the launching of meeting of the African the SADC-P has been postponed Parliamentarians’ Forum for NEPAD repeatedly, partly in order to move in step with the development of the (APF-NEPAD 2002) can be viewed as a first effort to address this deficit. Pan-African Parliament (PAP). The development and signing of the · Inaugurated on March 18, 2004, the legal basic documents, the adoption by Pan-African Parliament’s geo- regional summits and national graphical scope includes that of all parliaments, and the actual the sub-regional parliaments, but inauguration of the assemblies was, the relationship between the and in some cases still is, a lengthy different multi-lateral parliamentary process. bodies has not been defined to date. · ECOWAS introduced a parliament in its revised treaty of 1993. · Far less established than the other However, while the Protocol for the RAs is the Inter-Parliamentary ECOWAS-Parliament2 (ECOWAS- Union of IGAD Member States P) was signed in 1994, it only (IPU-IGAD). Its founding protocol entered into force in March 2000. was signed by the speakers of the national parliaments in February 2004, but it still needs to be ratified
1 before the IPU-IGAD can begin its “RAs” will hereafter be used to describe the actual work. The mandate of the sum of regional parliamentary assemblies covered in this paper, primarily ECOWAS-P, body is even more restricted than SADC-PF, EALA and IPU-IGAD, but to a that of the SADC-PF. lesser extent also REPAC and PAP. 2 See Annex 1 for member states of RAs. 2 · The same applies to REPAC, the be preferable in terms of democratic Network of Parliamentarians of the participation, legitimacy and its Economic Community of Central “popularizing” effect, contemporary African States (ECCAS). Its RAs in Africa so far cannot, and to founding protocol was adopted in some extent do not want to afford the 2002, but the grouping does not financial implications. seem to be very active and its The ECOWAS-P is the only regional mandate is as restricted as IPU- assembly whose founding document IGAD’s. foresees such direct general elections · The treaty to establish the of its parliamentarians. However, at Parliament of UEMOA (P-UEMOA) present even these MRAs are selected was signed in January 2003, yet it from national parliaments, and the leaves much to be defined in planned transition to universal adult subsequent, additional protocols. suffrage is likely to be delayed All member states of UEMOA are considerably due to the lack of funds. also members of ECOWAS, whose Alternatively, the election of MRAs parliament is already far more could be coupled with the election of established. As to the actual national MPs, as this would be much activities of the P-UEMOA, very cheaper than running separate polls. little information is available, However, this would entail a wherefore it will not receive much continuous fluctuation among the MPs attention in the following paper. of the ECOWAS-P (following domestic election cycles) since candidates could 2. Elections, Legitimacy and no longer be national MPs because the Representation latter would be chosen the very same day. 2.1. Direct or Indirect Elections? Indirect elections using already The election modes for members of legitimized national parliaments as an regional assemblies (MRAs) and the electoral college can sometimes be degree of popular participation in these seen as preferential even from a processes determine the democratic democratic perspective. If one judges legitimacy of the RAs. So far, all MRAs the funding needs of universal adult are elected indirectly by national suffrage in the context of the pressing parliaments, as was the case for the challenges of poverty on the continent, European Parliament between 1952 RAs might gain much more legitimacy and 1979. The processes are guided by cutting the costs of their procedures by provisions that demand the (not only elections) and by boosting inclusion of various political parties their efforts instead to tackle issues represented in the national assemblies, that matter to peoples’ everyday lives. and regulations to ascertain a (varying) In other words, input legitimacy involvement of women in these forums. through democratic elections can, at least for some time and in some Besides other advantages (see section stages, be substituted with output 6), these indirect elections are far legitimacy achieved through a cheaper than universal adult suffrage, responsive conduct of politics. which - apart from the immediate logistical challenge - would require the This applies even more when one drawing of electoral maps (for takes into account the fact that the constituency-based elections) and a powers of RAs are by and large costly voter registration. Although confined to advisory functions (see universal adult suffrage would clearly section 3) and that RAs are even more 3 constrained by regional and national EALA’s mode of elections broadens executives than national parliaments. the political space (Eze 2004: 11). In These circumstances do not entail an particular in Uganda the procedure led urgent need for particularly strong to a lively public discussion and a democratic election processes in the degree of serious political competition short or even mid term. among the candidates, which speaks Furthermore, the demand for direct in favour of this mode of election. popular participation in the election of Furthermore, members of EALA work MRAs also depends on the shape of together over the full term of the the regional organisations themselves. parliament, rather than having to be If there is not all that much activity and withdrawn once MRAs loose their seat serious political process to be debated in national parliaments. This allows for on (or even legislated on), the quality greater continuity, but it also implies of democratic legitimization of the that the often rapidly changing MRAs may be of less concern. domestic power relations are not On the other hand, the above- immediately replicated at the regional mentioned responsive conduct of level. For example, the former Kenyan politics can certainly not be taken for ruling party KANU still holds five of granted, and it should not be Kenya’s 9 seats in EALA even 20 overlooked that legitimacy and months after being voted out –not with accountability ultimately depend on the a mandate from the general electoral, people’s power to withdraw their but from an expired parliamentary representatives in periodical elections electoral college. (insecurity of tenure). The choice of “political personnel” for the RAs also determines their 2.2. Candidacy Regulations and autonomy vis-à-vis national politics. Single or Double Mandates E.g. the fact that members of EALA The indirect election procedure adds cannot be national MPs might allow the importance to the selection process of assembly to focus more on its regional candidates, and the actual election of mandate. National MPs by definition MRAs. The ECOWAS-P, the SADC- represent their own country/people, PF, the future IPU-IGAD and the PAP whereas the MRAs are supposed to all have their MRAs nominated and act in the interest of all peoples of a elected by and from the ranks of the respective region. However, some national parliaments, with varying observers argue that the EALA set-up provisions in place for ex-officio leads to a harmful disconnection members (see Annex 3). EALA’s between the regional body and the selection of candidates differs national assemblies at the expense of considerably from that of other RAs: the EALA’s means to push the regional The East African MRAs are nominated agenda at the national level (see also by the parties represented in section 6). parliament, but the MPs themselves 2.3. Election Processes are excluded from candidacy. In Kenya and Tanzania, the lists of candidates All the RAs have provisions in place were drawn up by the party caucuses, demanding equitable representation of while aspirants who wished to be political parties or opinions and a nominated in Uganda had to gain sufficient inclusion of women. In reality, support of at least 50 MPs of the “no- the procedure and quality of the party” parliament. election process varies from region to region as well as within the regions. In
4 all cases, the actual implementation of SADC-PF is sometimes referred to as these provisions is left to the national a “speaker’s forum”. parliaments, which anyhow have to adopt their own national legislation for 2.4. Proportionality versus Repre- this purpose. The challenge here is to sentation of Member States set clear criteria and make them as Proportionality is another issue of obligatory as possible. The definition importance in terms of democratic and homogenous application of representation. Except for the electoral procedures within the ECOWAS-P, all RAs have allocated an member states of a regional parliament equal number of seats to each member is required to guarantee that due state (see Annex 3), even though democratic process will be followed population figures differ widely. In and equitable representation can Southern Africa, populations vary from actually be achieved. one million in Swaziland to more than In the case of EALA, Tanzania and 43 million in South Africa. In the IGAD Kenya used a relatively similar region, they range from 460.000 in approach, selecting MPs along party Djibouti to 66 million people in Ethiopia lines. In the absence of political (World Facts and Figures 2001). parties, Uganda applied this structure However, all national populations of to its geographical areas. Except for IGAD and SADC-PF states are the gender dimension, which was not represented by five parliamentarians sufficiently taken into account in each.4 Kenya, the conditions set by EALA Yet, by comparison, the heterogeneity were applied in a similar and relatively of ECOWAS’ population figures still transparent manner at the national stands out from those of the other level (see Aywa 2004 for details). In regional integration schemes. Nigeria’s contrast to this, the ECOWAS Protocol 126 million people alone represent establishing the parliament remains more than half of the total ECOWAS silent about electoral procedures (Eze population (World Facts and Figures 2004: 12). 2001). Thus the ECOWAS model SADC-PF combines ex-officio principally allows for a better representation and indirect elections. representation of the people of the Of the five members of each member region. country, the speakers and the chairs of Generally speaking, the allocation of the women’s caucuses represent either equal or differentiated numbers functions of the national parliaments of seats per member state represents while the additional three members are two distinct concepts of representation. chosen freely from within the Morara (2001: 2) argues that the parliaments. These circumstances fixation with equal national significantly reduce the legitimizing representation leads to the neglect of scope that the elections of SADC-PF 3 important factors such as population members could generally have. density and size. The latter should Yet, even more significant is the fact ordinarily determine the level of that the speakers of SADC parliaments representation, particularly when one select one of theirs as the chair of the takes into account that all the founding SADC-PF. Due to this special privilege, protocols proclaim that the parliamentary bodies are supposed to 3 It might be interesting to note that the ex- officio members of EALA, who are from the 4 In the case of EALA, proportionality is not executive level and total only five, have no really an issue because the size of the three voting rights in the assembly. Eastern African populations is rather similar. 5 represent the people of the respective important for the practical democratic regions and not an accumulation of value of these bodies. individual national interests. 3.1. Dominant Feature: Advisory Moreover, the quality of representation is also determined by the The scope of the advisory functions of proportionality of the total number of RAs is constrained both in terms of MRAs and the respective regional contents and competencies. All RAs populations. Except for EALA, where have the right to consult on matters nine elected MRAs represent each relating to the respective regional member state, all other RAs have five integration scheme, particularly if they MPs per country. It may be concern the treaties and certain policy conceivable that these small fields that usually form the supposed contingents of delegates represent the areas of cooperation and integration views in and of national parliaments, and are therefore outlined in the yet they are obviously out of proportion founding documents. The latter include for any authentic representation of the issues such as human rights and actual populations (for EALA, see fundamental freedoms of citizens, Morara 2001: 2). The latter would interconnection of energy networks require feasible communication and telecommunications systems, between the individual MP and his or media cooperation, etc. her constituency, which appears The advisory competencies range from unrealistic when e.g. EALA has one debates, consultations, member for about 3.5 million people recommendations, proposals, to each; not to think of the five MPs who inquiries. Set aside the wording, two represent 126 million Nigerians in the questions determine the strength of PAP. these advisory rights: Is it obligatory for In general, the potential scope of regional executives and the inter- models of representation is closely governmental decision-making bodies linked to the limitations of funding of (Councils and Summits) to consult the regional parliamentary activities (see RAs, and will their opinion have to be 4.1). observed? In fact, both EALA and the ECOWAS-P need to be consulted in 3. Powers: From Consultation to certain important areas (which the Legislation latter recently requested to be broadened). In addition, all RAs have Generally speaking, the powers of all the right to make recommendations to RAs are quite limited. In some the executive level on their own instances, their predominant role as initiative. EALA may even request the advisory bodies includes weak Council to submit proposals on matters functions of parliamentary oversight that require action in the view of the and budgetary control. But so far, assembly, an option it has exercised EALA is the only RA under five times so far. However, none of the consideration here which fulfils – albeit executive bodies of the regional very limited – law-making functions, organizations is obliged to pay attention to these different types of the primary role of parliaments in the 5 national sphere. Beyond that, the advice. RPAs pursue a number of activities outside the “classical” responsibilities 5 Eze 2004: 5-7; ECOWAS 1994; IPU-IGAD of parliamentary assemblies which are 2004; EALA Clerks Chambers 2004: 2; SADC- PF 2000: 16; AU 2001: Art.11 (11); ECCAS 2002: Art.6 6 3.2. Investigative Powers 3.3. Budgetary Oversight In the area of parliamentary oversight, Ordinary parliaments exert a lot of their there is not much to counter these influence by providing checks and deficits. The ECOWAS-P (Eze 2004: balances on the executive’s spending 8), IPU-IGAD and REPAC practically and guiding the allocation of funds. But have no oversight roles. Similarly, the REPAC and the IPU-IGAD do not have SADC-PF constitution legally does not any particular rights regarding the permit the assembly to monitor SADC budgets of their regional organisations. and the executive branches of national The ECOWAS-P issued a resolution in governments in the region (SADC-PF September 2002 calling for the 2000: 16). It would first have to be enhancement of its powers to make transformed into a regional parliament consultation on the adoption of the with the necessary empowering legal community budget obligatory provisions. (ECOWAS-P 2002). SADC-PF has the The EALA and the PAP can at least right to scrutinise and make invite any body to address them. The recommendations on the budget of Heads of State of EALA have followed SADC and the Executive Secretary's such an invitation at different times. annual report, including SADC’s The PAP can “request” officials of the audited accounts. However, none of AU to attend its sessions or to produce these recommendation have to be documents (AU 2001: Article 11/15). taken into account (SADC-PF 1995: However, none of these rights have a Art.8 (3. vii, viii)). practical value if invited officials refuse Again, the Eastern African Legislative cooperation. EALA reportedly wished Assembly has the broadest rights in to hold a session on the conflict in that it needs to discuss and approve Northern Uganda in 2003, which the EAC budget, and shall consider President Museveni agreed to and debate on annual and audit participate in. Yet, when the assembly reports (Eze 2004: 6). However, this supported the Ugandan parliament’s does not include entitlements to draw call to declare the North a disaster up or revise budgets, which effectively area and asked for international reduces the assembly to a “rubber engagement, Museveni cancelled his stamping institution” (Morara 2001: 2). attendance of the meeting. The PAP is not required to approve the In the area of parliamentary questions, community budget, but has to discuss the picture is very similar. Only EALA and make recommendations thereon has the right to forward such inquiries before the budget is approved by the to the executives. It has so far asked AU Assembly (of Heads of State and the EAC Council 19 questions which Government of the Union) (AU 2001: were allegedly answered “duly” (EALA Art.11 (2)). It may therefore effectively Clerks Chambers 2004: 2). However, gain greater influence in this respect. in case of conflict, EALA’s powers to 3.4. Law-making: First Inroads by investigate thoroughly and to hold the EALA executive accountable remain very limited. Questions put forward to the As mentioned earlier, EALA is the only Council lapse automatically if not RA with a role in law-making, which – answered within a period of 6 weeks. apart from advisory and oversight functions – forms the third major pillar None of the RAs has the right to set up of RAs’ powers. However, these special investigation committees. legislative rights are seriously constrained, too: EALA can only put
7 forward and vote on motions and bills if 3.5. Enforcement and the Absence they have no cost implications to any of Judiciaries fund of the community. This gravely Even in areas where they are equipped impairs the scope and relevance of with competencies, most RAs lack potential laws. powers to enforce their decisions and Furthermore, bills can be initiated by achieve compliance by the member the Council or on EALA’s own initiative, states and the regional executives. The however, they will only be enacted into assemblies cannot impose sanctions community law if the three heads of or other incentives (Wanyande 2004: state assent to them. Bills and motions 15/16). This deficit is particularly not assented to and referred back to relevant and visible in the area of law- EALA lapse if they do not yield assent making, where RAs gain this privilege: a second time. In other words: The For any legislation to be implemented, Summit of Heads of State and it needs a judiciary that can review the Government has an effective veto right actions of the regional bodies in over EALA’s legislation (EAC 1999: accordance with these laws. Only the Art. 59-64). Not surprisingly, the five East African Community (EAC) has set pieces of legislation that EALA has up a court of justice so far. Yet, its enacted so far do not seem terribly jurisdiction is limited to the influential in the overall regional interpretation and application of the integration process. However, the EAC Treaty and does not cover contents of future bills such as the EALA’s legislation. But EALA may still upcoming Customs Management Law benefit from the regional court’s Bill may raise the relevance of EALA’s existence because the treaty also law-making to some extent. details the assembly’s rights and Regional parliamentary law-making will functions. gain importance for RAs. In line with a The AU is in the process of decision by the 1997 SADC Summit, establishing an African Court whose SADC-PF will receive legislative jurisdiction is limited to human and competencies upon transformation into people’s rights and has no practical a parliamentary structure (see also relevance for the PAP, though. The SADC-PF 1995: Art.8 (3b)). However, setting up of a tribunal has been the provision that the conversion shall proposed for SADC. not infringe the sovereignty of SADC national parliaments is likely to 3.6. Practical Parliamentary Activi- constrain this law-making function ties seriously. The ECOWAS-P has Beyond the “classical” roles of commenced reviewing, revising and parliaments, some RAs have the right amending the Revised ECOWAS and do pursue a number of very Treaty so as to enable it to carry out practical activities to promote good legislative functions (Secretariat of governance, democracy and regional IPU-IGAD 2004: 5). The PAP, too, integration. SADC-PF is particularly shall be vested with certain legislative strong in that regard. The forum powers in the future, but these remain provides capacity building to young to be defined and will not be applied parliamentarians, undertakes election during its first term of existence (AU observation and parliamentary 2001: Art.11). diplomacy missions, establishes gender standards and its members actively set the regional agenda in national parliaments (Eze 2004: 9).
8 Similarly, but to a lesser extent, the amounts are not known, however, the speaker of the ECOWAS-P conducted size of the budgets constrains the consultative peace missions in conflict number and length of the sessions to areas. A recent resolution by the what they currently are (see Annex 3). assembly requested that the The annual budget of EALA is said to community parliament be permitted to be around four million USD in 2004, actively involve itself in elections that of the larger ECOWAS-P around observation (ECOWAS-P 2002). The eight million. Administering a budget members of EALA have conducted allocated from the overall budget of the “familiarization tours” to various parts regional organisation implies a high of the member countries and thereby degree of dependence on regional promoted EAC and EALA at the executives and national governments, community level (EALA Clerks who can arbitrarily threaten the Chambers 2004: 2). parliaments’ existence or effective These functions may not really be a ability to work. direct expression of the firm legal and In contrast to these more established institutional establishment of the institutions, SADC-PF and IPU-IGAD assemblies as parliamentary bodies. raise their funds from the contributions However, the RAs may de facto of each of the member parliaments. In possess much greater powers and the case of SADC-PF, this amounts to influence through these practical a total of 600.000 USD core funding activities than through their formal (12 members x 50.000 USD each). procedures in session. In particular, Though this sum seems small by RAs can effectively hold governments comparison, this type of “self-reliance” accountable for democratic standards provides the body with a great deal of and for the goal of regional integration autonomy. And lacking the formal if they use the media to communicate status of a parliament, the institution their views. The great advantage does not have to be too concerned compared to the formal rights in with potential effects of donor advisory, oversight, and legislation is dependence. It can therefore that many of these activities can be complement its own resources more conducted rather independently of the freely by seeking donations for executive level and its immediate individual projects and programmes consent, provided that sufficient funds such as election observation or can be raised. As one member of capacity building. EALA put it (in a reference to the inter- In all cases, however, the model of parliamentary trade committee, see representation is linked to the funding section 6): “If you organise efficiently, of regional parliamentary activities. you can go further than what is actually Wherever member states are stipulated in the legislation”. represented in equal numbers, they contribute to the finances in equal 4. Furnishing shares. Wherever the size of the population is used to determine the 4.1. Budgets number of seats, the more populous The crucial issue here, as in any other states foot a larger part of the bill. In public institution, first of all is the the case of SADC-PF, the economic question of funding. The core budgets giant of the region, South Africa, of EALA, the ECOWAS-P and the PAP merely pays the same amount as are part of the respective budgets of Malawi does. In fact, the Seychelles their regional organizations. The exact revoked their SADC-PF membership
9 (but continue to be a SADC member needs and provisions in their rules of state) because the financial burden procedure. Not much can be said in became too high. In contrast, the summary about these committees populous Nigeria shoulders more than other than that they vary significantly in half of the budget in the case of relevance. Quite a number of ECOWAS-P. committees seem to exist purely for 6 What is ‘the rule’ in other parts of the purposes of proportionality , which also world is likely to be the political logic indicates that there is not much activity for regional integration in Africa. to be observed and assessed. For a Countries with larger economies will detailed account of these committees, only make higher financial consult Annex 3. contributions to regional integration if they receive more influence in return. 5. RAs and the Executives Improving the financial situation of regional parliamentary structures may The executives of regional at times require to do away with equal organisations are somewhat diffuse representation and to allow a more creatures. They are made up of skewed, if not hegemonic, system of secretariats, headquarters, functional influence to win the upper hand. organs and administrative facilities on the one hand, and the regional 4.2. Internal Structures decision-making bodies on the other. The latter are usually composed of Most RAs have established executive representatives of national structures from within their own ranks governments, be it heads of state and which are tasked with organisational government in the Summits or matters such as budgets, auditing and ministers and ambassadors at the level the preparation of agendas. of the Councils. This complicates the ECOWAS-P, REPAC and the PAP distinction of the RA’s relationship with entertain bureaus made up of elected regional decision-making bodies and members of the respective assemblies with national governments and appointed clerks. In addition, respectively. The chapter will therefore ECOWAS-P has established a seek to look at the latter two in “Conference of Chairmen” of its conjunction. committees. The SADC-PF runs an executive committee while IPU-IGAD 5.1. Relationship with the will elect an Executive Council in which Administrations of Regional the speakers of the national Organisations parliaments will play an important role. These structures of the RAs and their The administrations of regional individual members can certainly exert organisations tend to be rather lean, greater influence than “ordinary” weak, and dependent on the Summits delegates. For example, the executive and Councils. Most regional officials committee of SADC-PF holds an are “executives” in the true sense of observer status in SADC Summits. the word, merely implementing the Yet, little is known about the actual specific directives they receive from effect and relevance of these the decision-making bodies. Thereby privileges, and their examination would national governments play a very reach beyond the scope of this paper. dominant role even in the day-to-day At the working level, all RAs have formed standing committees and may 6 E.g. it is a rather peculiar coincidence that the form select committees according to number of ECOWAS-P committees matches the number of its member states. 10 matters of regional organisations. The hinders their effective parliamentary leeway given to regional executives is performance. And wherever RAs do minimal. The fact that most of the possess rights vis-à-vis the regional otherwise few staff members are on decision-making bodies, these do not secondment from national provide for effective accountability, as governments and administrations described in chapter 3. further undermines the organisational The mismatch in the relationship independence of the regional bodies between RAs and their executives is and opens additional channels for particularly visible in the area of these governments to exert influence. legislation. The Councils and the From a functional perspective, the RAs Summits hold legislative functions would be meant to monitor the regional furthering their executive powers. executive activities. However, this Protocols and treaties endorsed by relationship is usually not formalised so Summits and Councils become that RAs have very limited rights to international law. Except for the case hold these executive bodies of the EAC, these legislative functions accountable. Given their mutual are even exclusive. Such concurrent or weakness, it does not really make exclusive legislative powers of the much difference exactly how the two executive undermine the division of are set up and liaise organisationally. powers. Regional parliamentary bodies The regional executive staffs tend to are structurally barred from fully try and function as a guardian of the exercising their supposed democratic decisions of Summits and Councils for roles and control functions. which they practically work. RAs – Furthermore, by practicing their law- ultimately reflecting their relationship making function at the regional level, with the decision-making bodies and the national governments represented national governments – lack most in Councils and Summits undermine means to provide effective checks and the domestic division of powers, too. balances on the regional administrative Depending on the contents of treaties, bodies (see chapter 3 for details). regulations and directives, and the 5.2. Summit, Councils and National specific constitutional realities, this Governments: Dominance and type of supra-national legislation can Narrow National Agendas be directly binding and applicable to the national level (Ssempebwa 2004: In a similar manner, relationships 12). Ratification by national between the RAs and their respective parliaments is not a necessary regional decision-making bodies precondition in all cases8. Therefore, (Summits and Councils) are rarely inter-governmental law-making at the 7 formalised . SADC-PF, the IPU-IGAD regional level is practically realised at and REPAC are not even specifically the expense of parliamentary foreseen in the founding documents of oversight, both at the national and the their respective regional organisations regional level. It can hardly be more and therefore remain somewhat than an interim arrangement that detached. In absence of clearly defined national governments can theoretically working relationships, the RAs’ undermine parliamentary sovereignty dependence on the executive bodies by taking a matter to the regional level.
7 Again, the EALA is the exception to the rule. 8 For example, the protocol to set up the PAP The three national ministers for regional was never brought before the national cooperation sit in the assembly, albeit without parliament of Mauritius. It was only signed by voting rights. the national government of Mauritius. 11 Overall, the limited powers of RAs and depending on the will of their reflect the general approach that membership clientele, RAs seek to national governments take towards emancipate themselves from the political integration. Structures of regional executive branches. SADC- contemporary African regional PF’s outspoken aspirations to organisations remain primarily inter- transform itself into a regional governmental rather than supra- parliament and the resolution national (Ssempebwa 2004: 13). (mentioned in chapter 3) by which the National governments are not or hardly ECOWAS-P called for the willing to give up national sovereignty enhancement of its powers and asked rights to regional levels, be it in the for a terminal date for its transitional executive sphere or in the legislative period are only two examples of this domain. In other words, what is struggle (in September 2002) generally described as regional (ECOWAS-P 2002). Likewise, EALA “integration” would often merely qualify appears quite determined to broaden as an institutionalised form of inter- its mandate and to assert additional governmental co-operation, which is rights. It is too early to judge IPU- hardly compatible with strong and IGAD, REPAC and the PAP in that independent RAs. regard. Furthermore, national parliaments are The struggle over competencies also just about to assert their between the executive and the RAs, democratic roles vis-à-vis the which is a struggle for increased respective executive in the domestic political integration at the same time, is sphere. More often than not, the certainly a lengthy and often tedious winning of political space and the process. Given their relatively weak realization of fundamental political position, RAs can effectively only gain rights are still in their early stages. The ground that the executive is willing to struggle over the establishment and cede to them at some point. These strengthening of regional parliamentary circumstances are perhaps best structures must therefore be regarded captured in the self-reflection by one as an extension or replication of the member of a regional parliament: “If domestic struggles between executives you are a baby and you want to learn and parliaments over political space to walk, be cautious where you go.” and influence. EALA holds a good example of how In combination, these circumstances the efforts of RAs to improve their seriously inhibit political integration and working conditions can promote chances of strengthening RAs. regional integration and challenge the Members of RAs tend to be on the look executives’ “national” thinking. out for the position of their home state Members of EALA have proposed to (Ssempebwa 2004: 13) and are fearful turn the EAC Council, which is so far of the (personal) reprisals that a too made up of national ministers with ambitious performance of the obviously dual mandates, into a assemblies might trigger. resident organ9. It is hoped that the Council may thereby develop into a 5.3. Parliamentary Emancipation more adequate counterpart for EALA, and the Integration Agenda hence following an East-African Yet, there are indications that these approach rather than the narrow bodies can and do assert increasingly national interests of the respective stronger roles. To the extent that their 9 dependency on the executive allows, Such a setup reportedly used to be part of the defunct structure of the first EAC. 12 member states (Ssempebwa 2004: character. In other words, they have 15). the potential to develop into power competitors of national parliaments in 6. Relationship and Interaction the mid- to long-term. with National Parliaments This conflict may not have much relevance as long as MRAs are elected 6.1. Natural Allies or Power by and from national parliaments. The Competitors? overlap of “personnel” can be As parliamentary bodies, regional and portrayed as a linkage that guarantees national assemblies exhibit a large representation of national parliaments’ overlap of interests, particularly in interests in RAs. While this point has countering the dominance of the validity with regard to specific political executive level and strengthening issues, it does not apply at the parliamentarism and democracy. structural level, where empowerment National parliaments are believed to be of RAs (especially in legislative somewhat natural lobbyists in favour of matters) would effectively mean that increased political integration because national parliaments hand over part of this is thought to offer them channels their own power to the RAs. This is for political participation and influence, particularly so because these MPs are too. The establishment and not and cannot be bound to the views enhancement of RAs is generally of national parliaments. perceived to widen the national political spaces, exposing domestic political 6.2. Institutional and Working practice to regional fora. This allows for Relations observation and scrutiny, cross-border Altogether, it is clear that both comparisons and the setting of structures ultimately need to cooperate democratic standards in a wide variety to the best possible extent. of ways, all of which can contribute to Institutionally, there is a need for close the empowerment of national interaction between RAs and national assemblies. The most powerful tool in parliaments. National parliaments are that regard is election observation or the only available intermediary to monitoring conducted by RAs. Thus, bridge the gap between regional from an ideal perspective, these parliaments and their actual different parliamentary institutions constituencies. In a similar manner, the should be keen to (inter-)act in a regional parliaments could serve as an mutually reinforcing manner towards intermediary between national the goal of regional integration and parliaments and the PAP (see 7.2 for democratisation. details). However, the applicability of these Against the background of the huge considerations is limited. An implicit but overlap of interests, it seems surprising not negligible conflict of interests is that even the relations existing likely to emerge between national and between the more advanced structures regional parliamentary assemblies, at EALA and the ECOWAS-P on the one least where the latter have asserted hand, and the respective national the status of parliaments. While SADC- parliaments on the other, are not very PF, IGAD-PU and REPAC were formalised and clear. With the primarily created and so far function as exception of EALA, the primary link dialogue fora between national between RAs and national assemblies parliaments, regional parliaments seems to be the personnel overlap. already have a greater supra-national However, while the lack of these links
13 is clearly perceived as a disadvantage have been occasional visits of for EALA, the personnel overlap delegations, such as the study tour cannot compensate for a fully-fledged undertaken by EALA members to institutional relationship in the other SADC-PF in September 2003 (EALA cases either. 2003). However, more could be done Knowledge of on-going regional to distil and disseminate in particular decision-making processes, especially lessons from the more advanced with regard to integration, is often regional parliaments to other RAs. difficult to obtain. The structures of 7.2. Relationship between RAs and most national parliaments appear the Pan-African Parliament insufficient to monitor these distant political processes. Moreover, the The approach guiding the executives tend to handle such matters establishment of the African Union was secretively. Yet, exchange of supposed to treat the existing regional information between national and organisations as points of departure or regional parliaments remains “building blocks”. Yet, this notion has ineffective or unreliable. by and large been ignored with regard to the parliamentary dimension of Weak chains of information (and an continental integration. There are no accompanying lack of initiative) make it formal links between the RAs and the difficult for RAs to force regional PAP, and in particular, the members of debates into the national parliaments. the PAP are exclusively elected from A positive example of cooperation national parliaments. between the different levels is the East African Parliamentary Liaison The Protocol of the PAP does Committee for Trade Negotiations prescribe “close co-operation” with the (Yonasani 2004). It brings together RAs and the national assemblies. MRAs and national MPs in a joint However, all it foresees to realise this forum to debate and to lobby national goal are “annual consultative fora … to governments on the Economic discuss matters of common interest” Partnership Agreements and WTO (AU 2001: Art.18). The structural negotiations. institutional arrangement remains strikingly undefined. This is further 7. Connecting RAs complicated by the fact that the absence of clearly defined relations 7.1. Relationships between RAs coincides with differing perceptions and assumptions at the continental and So far, very few linkages exist between the sub-regional level. the RAs. In fact, the Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung Workshop on “The Role of The PAP itself seems keen to apply Regional Parliaments (ECOWAS, the principle laid out in the Constitutive EALA and SADC-PF) in Regional Act of the African Union, according to Integration Efforts in Africa” (May which the AU is supposed to 2004), from which this paper draws coordinate and harmonize policies heavily, was the first major effort to between the regional organisations establish initial formal relationships. (AU 2000: Art.3 (l)). However, with a view to the age, capacity and Nonetheless, linkages between the experience of the RAs and the PAP RAs could be useful for the exchange respectively, the notion of coordination of experiences and for the ability to from above is likely to meet limited discuss precedents from other regions sympathy at the sub-regional vis-à-vis the executive level. There parliamentary level, particularly
14 because the “building blocks” approach 8. Conclusions has no meaning in the setup and future working mode of the PAP. On balance, the modes of election as well as the representation and However, keeping in mind the infant legitimacy of regional parliamentary stage of the PAP, the undefined assemblies appear less than perfect. institutional arrangement does not yet Yet, given the limited powers, have much practical relevance. The competencies and furnishing of PAP is likely to remain no more than a contemporary RAs, the setup of these plenary on African Affairs for a long bodies seems to be adequate. It is time to come (Ssempebwa 2004: 16). important in this context that none of But it should not be overlooked that the the features observed in chapters 2-4 future emergence of relations will be is assessed in isolation. Quality of characterised by a lack of clear democratic processes is multi- provisions and guidelines. dimensional. Weaknesses in some areas can be compensated in others, and their individual relevance depends heavily on specific circumstances. The past decade has witnessed an impressive proliferation of regional parliaments on the African continent, which are keen to continue on the path of political integration. While it is apparent that RAs are still far from being effective vehicles of popular participation in regional integration, which would require direct elections and overriding powers vis-à-vis the executive (Eze 2004: 13), there is no reason to deplore the limits of what has been achieved so far. What matters more is to see the assemblies in the perspective of progressing regional integration and the continuing democratization processes on the continent. The evolution of the European Parliament (EP) underscores that change cannot be expected to come overnight. First direct elections to the EP were held in 1979, 27 years after its establishment in 1952. It gradually acquired powers, yet still has not achieved the status of a fully-fledged parliament. Budgetary control functions came into play after 1979, but until the present day, spending e.g. on the Common Agricultural Policy, which makes up around 45% of the entire community budget, is excluded from the parliament’s mandate. The EP 15 began to receive legislative powers The Author: after 1992, yet these remain seriously Ulf Terlinden is a researcher at the constrained and the Councils and the Department for “Political and Cultural Commission have kept the upper hand Change“ of the Centre for Development in law-making. Research (ZEF-a) in Bonn. The history of the EP underlines that even under rather favourable Contact: conditions, regional political integration is a lengthy and cumulative process Dr Rudolf Traub-Merz, Phone: +49-228-883590 [email protected] (Morara 2001: 3). The dynamics of Sabine Matambalya, Phone: +49-228-883577 regional parliamentarism ultimately [email protected] depend on the overall progress of regional integration. The latter can only Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung seriously move forward if respective Referat Afrika Godesberger Allee 149 impulses are induced from the national D- 53175 Bonn level. Only over time will national Germany governments develop the political will Fax: +49-228-883623 to grant RAs greater competencies, yet these will not be served on a silver plate. While RAs cannot steer the path of regional integration, they can support it by acting as accelerating catalysts, provided they are willing to pick up the challenge and assert that role. Much depends on how effectively and constructively the assemblies exploit opportunities, and demand more influence, particularly as the competencies of regional organisations are growing steadily. The proposed expansion of economic ties in various regional schemes (e.g. EAC Customs Union) and the planned establishment of regional stand-by peacekeeping forces are just two examples of growing executive activities that demand the reinforcement of parliaments as regional accountability bodies. Areas where RAs could show greater engagement include practical parliamentary activities (see 3.6), liaison with national parliaments, and the development and promotion of trans-national political agendas.
16 Annex 1: Member States of Regional Parliamentary Assemblies East African Legislative Assembly Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda (EALA) ECOWAS-Parliament (ECOWAS-P) Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. (Mauretania quit.) Inter-Parliamentary Union of IGAD Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda. Member States (IPU-IGAD) Network of Parliamentarians of the Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Economic Community of Central Chad, Congo, DRC, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, African States (REPAC) Sao Tomé & Principe. Pan-African Parliament (PAP) Each of the 54 AU member states (Africa except Morocco). Parliament of UEMOA (P -UEMOA) Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo. SADC-Parliamentary Forum Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, (SADC-PF) Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe (SADC except Seychelles and DRC).
Annex 2: List of Abbreviations and Links ACP-EU African, Caribbean and Pacific States - European Union Joint Parliamentary Assembly, JPA http://www.europarl.eu.int/intcoop/acp/10_01/default_en.htm APF-NEPAD African Parliamentarians' Forum for NEPAD AU African Union, http://www.africa-union.org/ CEEAC Communauté Économique des États d’Afrique Centrale (see ECCAS), http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/ EAC East African Community, http://www.eac.int/ EALA East African Legislative Assembly, http://www.eac.int/eala/index.htm ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States (see CEEAC), http://www.ceeac- eccas.org/ ECOWAS Economic Community Of West African States, http://www.ecowas.int/ ECOWAS-P Economic Community Of West African States Parliament, http://www.parl.ecowas.int/ EP European Parliament, http://www.europarl.eu.int/ FES Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, http://www.fes.de/ IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development, http://www.igad.org/ IPU-IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union of IGAD Member States MP Member of Parliament MRA Member of Regional Parliamentary Assembly PAP Pan-African Parliament, http://www.africa-union.org/organs/Pan- African_Parliament.htm P-UEMOA Parlement de l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine REPAC Réseau des Parlementaires de la CEEAC (Network of Parliamentarians of the ECCAS) RA Regional Assembly SADC Southern African Development Community, http://www.sadc.int SADC-P Southern African Development Community Parliament (not yet established) SADC-PF Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum, http://www.sadcpf.org/ UEMOA Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine http://www.uemoa.int/
17 Annex 3: Features of Regional Parliamentary Assemblies in Sub-Saharan Africa RA History, Status & Vision Members Mode and rules of Mandate/ Sessions per Legal Basis Committees Election Powers year / Tenure 11/1999 New EAC Treaty signed, 27 elected MRA: 27 non-MPs Advisory 60 days, in Art.9 EAC Treaty, see 7 Standing Committees: Accounts; Agriculture,
foresees EALA 9 from each Kenya, candidates nominated by sessions of 1-2 Art.48-65 for details Tourism and Natural Resources; General Tanzania, Uganda political parties Very limited weeks (incl. Purpose; House Business; Legal, Rules and 11/2001 Inauguration and first 5 ex -officio (no voting MRAs elected by national legislative committee Privileges; Regional Affairs and Conflict sitting of EALA rights): parliaments. powers meetings) Resolution; and Trade Communication and
EALA One minister from each 3 Ministers, SG and ------Investment.
(Arusha) country plus SG and Councillor ex -officio (all 5 Councillor of EAC without voting rights) Five year tenure First consultative meeting in 60 MPFs: All members forwarded Advisory 2 x 7 days Art.9 (2) and Art. 10 (6) Standing Committees: October 1993 (“Windhoek 5 each from: Angola, from and by national ------SADC Treaty (not Regional Integration; Democracy, Conflict Initiative”). SADC -PF constitution Botswana, Lesotho, parliaments. Includes two specifically on Resolution/Peace Building and Gender Equity, accepted by member parliaments Malawi, Mauritius, presiding officers Five year tenure, parliament). Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation. in May 1995, formally launched in Mozambique, Namibia, (Speaker and Chair of provided MRAs July 1996. Approved as an South Africa, Swaziland, Women’s Caucus) ex - continue to be Constitution of the autonomous institution by SADC Tanzania, Zambia, officio. Parliaments can MPs in national SADC -PF (SADC-PF Summit in September 1997. Zimbabwe. (SADC replace their delegates at parliaments 1995) Parliament not explicitly foreseen except Seychelles and the plenary assembly. in SADC Treaty. DRC) National parliaments PF (Gaborone)
- In transition to planned SADC decide how they select Parliament. SADC-PF motivation their delegates, but have paper on transformation to to reflect the diversity of discussed at SADC Council in political opinion (parties in SADC March 2004. parliament). Vision: SADC Parliament.
Foreseen in 1993 revised 120 MPs: Currently elected from Adv isory 2 x 14 days Art. 6 and Art.13 13 Standing Committees. 11 listed: Foreign ECOWAS Treaty. 35 Nigeria, 8 Ghana, 7 national parliaments; ECOWAS revised Affairs, Cooperation, Defense and Security; Laws, Côte d’Ivoire, 6 each planned transition to (<2 x <90 days Treaty 1993. Regulations, Legal and Judicial Affairs, Human Protocol signed in 1994. from Burkina Faso, universal adult suffrage acc. to Treaty) Rights and Free Movement of Persons; Rural Protocol 1994 First session held in January Guinea, Mali, Niger, (as foreseen in ECOWAS ------Development; Transport and Communications Senegal Treaty). (ECOWAS 1994). Environment and Natural Resources; Public P (Abuja) 2001. - 5 each from Benin, Cape Five year tenure Health and Social Affairs; Education, Training, Verde, Gambia, Guinea- Employment, Youth and Sports; Economy, Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Finance and Trade; Industry and Mines; Energy, Leone, Togo Technology and Scientific Research; Women’s (Mauretania’s 5 seats to and Children’s Rights; Tourism, Culture and
ECOWAS be redistributed) Handicrafts
18 RA History, Status & Vision Members Mode and rules of Mandate/ Sessions per Legal Basis Committees Election Powers year / Tenure Initiative originating from Djibouti. 35 delegates Elected or designated by Advisory Conference: Once Protocol establishing Proposed in 8th IGAD Summit Max. 5 each from: national parliaments, every year. IPU-IGAD, signed by Declaration of November 2000. Djibouti, Eritrea, including speakers of Executive Council: Speakers of
Promoted by Ethiopia and Sudan. Ethiopia, Kenya, parliaments. Twice every year. Parliaments, to be Protocol adopted by speakers of Somalia, Sudan, Uganda At least two female Extent of sessions ratified by national national parliaments on delegates from each not defined. parliaments and 20.02.2004. Executive Council: 2 member state. ------adopted by IGAD delegates from each Abeba) IGAD (Addis Ratification pending. Selection of Terms of MPs con- Summit. - MPs on-going. member state plus currently with No vision defined. president of conference. terms in national IPU parliaments. Establishing Treaty signed in Unknown number of Theoretically planned: Advisory Two sessions per Traité portant création January 2003. MRAs each from Benin, Universal adult suffrage. year, extent of du Parlement de Burkina Faso, Côte To be determined in sessions to be l'UEMOA (UEMOA -
P d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, additional act by Heads of defined. 2003). Mali, Niger, Senegal, State and Government. ------UEMOA Togo. Five year tenure. Treaty establishing ECCAS does 55 Deputies Elected by and from Advisory 2 x 15 days Protocole Instituant le not foresee parliamentary 5 each from Angola, national parliaments ------Réseau des dimension. Burundi, Cameroon, Parlementaires de la Protocol adopted on 17.06.2002. CAR, Chad, Congo, Five year tenure CEEAC (ECCAS 2002) Vision: Parliament of the DRC, Gabon, Equ.
REPAC Community Guinea, Rwanda, Sao (Malabo) Tomé & Pr. Envisaged in 1991 Abuja Treaty, 270 MPs Elected from national Advisory / 2 x <1 month; to Art.7 and 14 of the
reaffirmed at Sirte Summit 1999, parliaments Consultative be determined by Treaty establishing the Draft protocol considered and 5 MPs from each of the At least one female MP rules of procedure African Economic revised in 2000 54 AU member states. from each country ------Community (AEC PAP Inaugurated March 2004. ”reflecting diversity of Terms of MPs con- 1991) Vision: Full legislative powers and political opinion in national currently with universal adult suffrage. parliaments or other terms in national Protocol to the Treaty deliberative organ” parliaments. establishing the African MPs can be Economic Community
PAP (Midrand) recalled. relating to the PAP (AU 2001)
19 Bibliography ACP-EU, 2000: Cotonou Agreement: Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) and the European Community,
20 Ssempebwa, F.E., 2004: The Role of Regional Parliaments in Regional Integration. Unpublished draft. Workshop on the Role of Regional Parliaments (ECOWAS, EALA and SADC-PF) in Regional Integration Efforts in Africa, Maasai Mara / Kenya, 09.-12.05.2004. Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation. UEMOA, 2003: Traité portant création du Parlement de l'UEMOA: Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine,
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